Turkey's refugees, Syrians and refugees from Turkey: A country of insecurity

Abstract

The European Union (EU) has faced one of its biggest crises with the rise of population inflows through its Eastern and Southern neighbours as well as movements within the Union. In 2016, the main debate that dominated Europe was on restricting migration within and into the EU along with concerns and objections to the refugee quota systems and the sharing of the burden among member states. Turkey emerged as a 'gate keeper' in this crisis and has since been at the centre of debates because of the large Syrian refugee population in the country and billions of Euros it was promised to prevent refugees travelling to Europe. The Syrian crisis produced over 4.8 million refugees with over 2.8 million were based in Turkey by the end of 2016. Turkey with its generous support for Syrian refugees has been confirmed as a 'country of security'. This shadows the darker side of affairs as the very same country has also produced millions of asylum seekers since the 1980 military coup. Current circumstances and fresh evidence indicate that there will be more EU bound refugees coming through and from Turkey.

Full text

January 2017
Volume: 14, No: 1, pp. 127 – 144
ISSN: 1741-8984
e-ISSN: 1741-8992
www.migrationletters.com
Copyright @ 2017 MIGRATION LETTERS © Transnational Press London
Article history: Received 8 October 2016; accepted 19 December 2016
Turkey’s refugees, Syrians and refugees from
Turkey: a country of insecurity
Ibrahim Sirkeci
Abstract
The European Union (EU) has faced one of its biggest crises with the rise of population inflows
through its Eastern and Southern neighbours as well as movements within the Union. In 2016, the
main debate that dominated Europe was on restricting migration within and into the EU along
with concerns and objections to the refugee quota systems and the sharing of the burden among
member states. Turkey emerged as a ‘gate keeper’ in this crisis and has since been at the centre
of debates because of the large Syrian refugee population in the country and billions of Euros it
was promised to prevent refugees travelling to Europe. The Syrian crisis produced over 4.8 million
refugees with over 2.8 million were based in Turkey by the end of 2016. Turkey with its generous
support for Syrian refugees has been confirmed as a ‘country of security’. This shadows the darker
side of affairs as the very same country has also produced millions of asylum seekers since the
1980 military coup. Current circumstances and fresh evidence indicate that there will be more EU
bound refugees coming through and from Turkey.
Keywords: Syrians; international migration; refugees; Turkey; Turkish refugees; asylum seekers;
Europe.
Introduction
On 18 November 2016, NATO’s Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg said “some
Turkish officers working in NATO command structure… have requested asylum in
the countries where they are working” months after the failed coup attempt in
Turkey and the purges that followed.
1
This is simply adding fuel to the fire in
Europe. The European Union (EU) has faced one of its biggest crises with the rise
of population flows through its Eastern and Southern neighbours as well as
movements within the EU. In 2016, the Brexit referendum and debates
surrounding it in the UK were largely focused on restricting EU immigration to the
UK whereas eastern and central European members were raising concerns about
 Ibrahim Sirkeci is Professor of Transnational Studies, Regent’s Centre for Transnational Studies,
Faculty of Business and Management, Regent’s University London, Inner Circle, Regent’s Park, London,
NW1 4NS, United Kingdom. E-mail: sirkecii@regents.ac.uk.
Acknowledgement: I would like to thank unreservedly for comments from the participants of the
lecture at Ohio State University on 24 October 2016, the reviewers and Jeffrey Cohen, Pıar Yazgan,
Murat Yüceşahin, Onur Unutulmaz, and Welat Zeydanlıoğlu.
1
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/18/turkish-officers-seeking-asylum-after-failed-
coup-nato-chief-jens-stoltenberg. Accessed:18/11/2016.

128 Turkey’s refugees, Syrians and refugees from Turkey: a country of insecurity
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and reluctant to comply with the refugee quota proposals and the burden sharing
they often included
2
.
The Syrian crisis has displaced millions in the country (Yazgan et al., 2015). At least
4,810,710 Syrians (2,823,987 in Turkey alone) were registered as refugees
3
abroad
by 26 September 2016 (UNHCR, 2016). While 494,411 of these refugees lived in
camps the overwhelming majority remained outside camps and relied on their own
means. According to the UNHCR, 1,177,914 Syrians filed asylum applications in
Europe and about two thirds of these were lodged in Germany (449,770), Serbia
and Kosovo (314,852), Sweden (109,664), and Hungary (76,116).
Turkey has been known as a source country (and therefore, I define it as a “country
of insecurity”) for international population movements until very recently.
Currently, Turkey qualifies as a country of immigration (hence called a “country of
security”) with about 4 per cent of its inhabitants being refugees, and another 2
percent being non-refugee foreign borns by 2016. By the end of December 2016,
2,823,987 Syrian refugees registered in the country (DGMM, 2016) represent about
55 percent of the total displaced Syrian population. Turkey also accommodates
about 300,000 refugees from other countries.
4
Despite these incoming movers registering under international temporary
protection, Turkey has not ceased to be a country of insecurity (meaning source
country). There are still strong outflows and increased mobility among Turkish
citizens (as well as among others who arrived as refugees, see Genç & Öner, 2016)
while large diaspora populations exist in countries such as Germany, France, the
Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland (Sirkeci et al., 2015).
In this article, the impact of recently increased insecurity in Turkey on emigration
pressures is discussed in terms of number of asylum applications lodged by Turkish
citizens. These flows are directed to traditional destinations for movers from
Turkey following migration networks as well as legal frameworks and political
perceptions. Current statistics of Syrian arrivals in Turkey as a country of security
are also presented. Hence, the article shows how a country like Turkey swings
between ‘insecurity’ and ‘security’ over time and in relation to conflict. Based on
current asylum flows, Turkey appear as a country of relative (in)security that both
receives and produces significant number of refugees.
2
For an overview of the EU level burden sharing issues from 2010 and 2015 see: Thielemann et al.
(2010) and Carrera et al. (2015).
3
We should note though that Turkey is one of very few countries that impose a geographical
restriction on the 1951 Geneva convention by not accepting refugees from outside Europe. Therefore,
Syrian refugees in Turkey are officially registered under temporary protection regime and often
referred to as “guests”. For details see Öner & Genç (2015), pp.254-255.
4
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 also http://www.goc.gov.tr/
icerik6/uluslararasi-koruma_363_378_4712_icerik. Accessed 4/10/2016.

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Growing refugee flows and Turkey
The total number of international movers according to the widely used definition
of changing place of residence for 12 months or longer from one country to another
is about 3.4 per cent (about 250 million) (Figure 1). Refugees comprised an even
smaller segment of the total of 244 million migrants in 2016. Among over 65.3
million displaced people, only 21 million were refugees by the summer of 2016,
representing an increase from 16 million in 2015 (Sirkeci & Martin, 2016:329;
Martin, 2016:305). Despite the animosity over migration in the debates in the
decade to 2016, international migration is still not a norm but exception (Martin &
Sirkeci, 2017:573). This is more or less also true for Turkey where about 5% of the
population is made up by immigrants, even in the face of a mass inflow of millions
of Syrians in the past five years.
Figure 1. Movers and non-movers in the world, 1960-2015 (in millions)
Source: United Nations, UNHCR, and World Bank.
International migration is driven by three Ds: development (or economic) deficit
(referring to adverse economic conditions marked by inequalities across society
and geography), democratic deficit (referring to presence of representation issues,
particularly for minorities), and demographic deficit (characterised by high fertility
and growth rates), between and within countries at a time when revolutions in
communications, transportation, and rights make it easier to learn about
opportunities abroad, travel, and stay abroad. The recent failed military coup in
Turkey highlighted the three Ds in the country and thus added to migration
challenges in Europe because (a) Turkey may not be considered “safe” anymore
and (b) there is an increasing number of Turkish citizens and others fleeing the
country in response to the emergency rule since the failed coup attempt on 15 July
2016 and increasing number of terror attacks. Growing perception of insecurity
among Turkish citizens and immigrants in Turkey means growing outflows. It may
also result in a change of direction for flows in certain migration corridors such as

130 Turkey’s refugees, Syrians and refugees from Turkey: a country of insecurity
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between Germany and Turkey which has been reversed since about 2006 as more
people moved from Germany to Turkey (Sirkeci & Zeyneloğlu, 2014).
Turkish citizens have become increasingly mobile as a result of established
migration networks and existing migration culture as well as the relative prosperity
and stability in the country since the turn of the 21st century. Turkey is currently
officially the largest refugee hosting country in the world, which perhaps is not a
coincidence given its geographical proximity to major conflict zones in the world as
well as its location at the periphery of the EU.
Turkey has long been a country of immigration and emigration; a country with a
diaspora population of over 5 million dispersed across the world and with a refugee
population of over 3 million in the country along with another 1.5 million foreign
born according to official reports (Pusch & Sirkeci, 2016). From 2011 onwards, the
country saw substantial changes in its legislation and infrastructure to deal with
migration. For example, a new migration management directorate was created
alongside a set of new legislations drawing on the 2013 Law of Foreigners and
International Protection (no. 6458) (Sağıroğlu, 2016). As debates and negotiations
continue on readmission agreements, visa free travel in the EU for Turkish citizens
and burden sharing schemes (Sözen, 2016; Genç & Öner, 2016), there are still
ongoing processes that will affect migration policies as well as migration
experiences in Turkey.
Historically, a combination of major conflicts, uneven development, and
demographic pressures in Turkey has driven migration abroad. Turkish citizens,
Turks, Kurds and others alike, have fled the country in large numbers to seek
economic, cultural, and political security elsewhere (Sirkeci, 2003b). Depending on
the admission policies and international “deals” of the time, varying across
destinations, they were reported as guest workers, family migrants, refugees,
asylum seekers, irregular migrants, imported brides, students, labour migrants,
Ankara agreement movers, and adventurers. One may find several periodisations
often based on these administrative categories (Sirkeci, 2005a). Population
movements were in response to labour market dynamics (e.g. Martin, 1991;
Reniers, 1999), or the Kurdish conflict (e.g. Sirkeci, 2006a; Başer, 2015), or marriage
and family connections (e.g. Kulu-Glasgow & Leerkes, 2013; Lievens, 1999).
Nevertheless, the common ground for all these movers were the discomforts,
tensions and conflicts they considered as insecurity and found easier to overcome
by voting with the feet. Many millions have returned, some re-migrated, but all
these moves created a Turkish culture of migration consolidating migration
corridors between several destinations and Turkey and over time diversifying the
composition of flows in both directions.
Turkey has become increasingly prosperous since the 1980s with record levels of
GDP growth in the 1990s and 2000s (World Bank, 2016), while suffering from a
protracted armed conflict with the Kurdish minority predominant in the East and
South of the country. Nevertheless, the conflict over the Kurdish minority (Sirkeci,

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2000 and 2003a), increasing Islamisation (Kaya, 2015), political polarisation (Dalay,
2015) under the AKP (Justice and Development Party) rule, and adverse influences
of the Syrian and Iraqi crises with coinciding ISIS attacks in Turkey (Milan, 2016),
caused the country to swing towards insecurity again in the mid-2010s.
Turkey’s Kurdish question is at least as old as the Republic dating back to the 1920s
(Yeğen, 2007; Sirkeci, 2003b; McDowall, 1996), and it has characterised a
significant portion of migration outflows from Turkey ever since (Sirkeci, 2006a).
However, this became more apparent particularly from the 1980s through the
2000s, when 1,017,358 asylum applications were lodged by (mostly Kurdish origin)
Turkish citizens in the industrialised countries (Sirkeci & Esipova, 2013:3). In the
1960s and the 1970s, many members of minority groups including the Kurds along
with left wing activists moved abroad as guest workers, workers’ families, and
students. In the 1980s, when the insecurity in Turkey was intensified with the 1980
military coup and the armed conflict with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), from
1984 onwards, seeking asylum became the only choice for many who could not
satisfy the ever-tightening visa or work permit requirements of the destination
countries.
Partly mixed with and certainly eclipsed by the Kurdish conflict, another major
issue of insecurity in Turkey is that of the Alevis. Alevis are a heterodox Islamic
population in Turkey with strong secularist characteristics, numbering around 20
million with a concentration in Central and Eastern provinces and some coastal
areas in the south and west (Issa, 2017; Dressler, 2013; Massicard, 2013;
Shankland, 2003; White & Jongerden, 2003). Similar to Kurds, Alevis are
overrepresented in the Turkish diaspora (Sirkeci et al., 2016; Issa, 2017); and they
were heavily targeted by right wing groups in Turkey during the 1970s and onwards
(Kosnick, 2004).
The contemporary Turkish context is characterised by mass purges that followed
the failed coup on 15 July 2016, Turkey’s military incursions into Iraq and Syria, and
intensified armed conflict with Kurdish guerrillas in the southeast Turkey. The lack
of Kurdish and Alevi representation in politics and governance contributes to the
growing frustration of the Kurds and secular people who are increasingly alienated.
Since July 2016, there is an emergency rule, and by 12 presidential decrees, more
than 80,000 people have been expelled, over 2,600 organisations including 15
universities shut down, 39,378 arrested out of 96,000 suspects investigated in
relation to the failed coup attempt by 22 November 2016. These constitute key
elements of the current democratic deficit in Turkey.
Democratic deficit, although, appears to be the key driver for most recent outflows
from Turkey, development deficit and demographic deficit also play a part. For
example, in 2015, Turkey ranked among the bottom four of the OECD in terms of
its Gini coefficient; has nearly 20% of its population below the poverty line (which
is 3 percentage points higher than the 1990s); and the richest 10% having about a
15 times higher income than the poorest 10% (Keeley, 2015). Regional socio-

132 Turkey’s refugees, Syrians and refugees from Turkey: a country of insecurity
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economic development disparities remain strong (Gül & Çevik, 2015) and they are
known to increase migration propensities (Sirkeci et al., 2012). Demographic deficit
in Turkey is characterised by disparities in fertility rate and in net migration across
regions and between western and eastern provinces (Ediev & Yücesahin,
2016:382). Total fertility rate in Turkey stands at 2.17 whilst it is 1.57 in the EU
countries (Scherbov et al., 2016). These three Ds combined with an existing Turkish
culture of migration (Sirkeci & Cohen, 2016; Sirkeci et al., 2012; Sirkeci, 2006a;
2006b) is likely to direct Turks towards key European destinations such as
Germany, France, Austria, UK, Sweden where strong diaspora communities exist.
Movers and refugees in Turkey
Turkey as a country of immigration and a “country of security” has attracted
movers including refugees from around the world since its foundation in the 1920s.
Officially, it is claimed that Turkey has received over 3 million applications for
protection including Syrians and 2,442,159 regular movers with residence permits
between 2002 and 2015.
5
Among regular movers, the returnees from countries like
Germany or second and third generation Turks from these countries constituted
the majority. German nationals constituted 32.5% of all foreigners in Turkey
according to the 2000 census followed by Bulgarians with 13.4% for a total of
1,260,530 foreign born in the country, over 84% of whom were Turkish citizens
born abroad (Sirkeci, Cohen, Can, 2012 and Sirkeci & Zeyneloğlu, 2014).
Table 1. Top 10 nationalities among resident permit holders in Turkey, 2015.
Nationality
N
Nationality
N
Nationality
N
Iraq
33,202
Russia
22,377
Libya
14,421
Syria
32,578
Georgia
19,242
Iran
14,276
Azerbaijan
32,476
Ukraine
16,951
Others
199,554
Turkmenistan
22,891
Uzbekistan
14,927
TOTAL
422,895
Source: DGMM (2016)
More recently reports indicate over 1.4 million foreign born but these numbers are
often contested. An analysis of border statistics indicates that, for example, a
surplus population of 7,011,745 between 1995 and 2015 (Sirkeci & Martin, 2014;
GDMM, 2016). Nevertheless, it has to be noted that asylum and migration statistics
in Turkey are overall unreliable and inaccurate. Yet, it is clear that a sizeable foreign
born population is present, particularly concentrated in large cities and coastal
areas. Despite sizeable groups from Germany, Russia, and Britain are present
among Turkey’s immigrants, dominant nationalities in all immigration categories
are Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans. In 2015, the top ten nationalities among the
5
http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/goc-tarihi_363_380 Accessed 4/12/2016. Iraqis are unsurprisingly the
largest group as a result of long term insecurity in Iraq (see Sirkeci, 2004; 2005b; 2006b)

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Copyright @ 2017 MIGRATION LETTERS © Transnational Press London
resident permit holders were all from Middle Eastern and former Soviet Union
countries (Table 1).
Compared to large Turkish diaspora populations in Europe and elsewhere, these
numbers are significantly small. However, in the decade to 2015, in main corridors
such as Germany and Turkey, net migration flows were reversed as the numbers
arriving in Turkey had surpassed those leaving. Number of resident permit holders
in Turkey was 422,895 in 2015 which was about 11% higher than 2014 and 35%
higher than the 2013 figures
6
. 202,403 of them were for short term residence,
73,705 belonged to families, 67,529 to students and 62,756 were work permits.
This paper focuses on refugees who are dominantly from Syria (2.8 million), Iraq
(125,879), Afghanistan (113,756), Iran (28,534), and other countries (12,195).
7
In
the last ten years, the number of asylum applications lodged in Turkey totals
216,351 in a gradually growing fashion until 2015, when the numbers suddenly
doubled to 64,232 (Table 2).
8
Table 2. Applications for international protection in Turkey, 2005-2015.
Year
N
Year
N
Year
N
Year
N
2005
2,935
2008
12,002
2011
17,925
2014
34,112
2006
3,550
2009
6,792
2012
29,678
2015
64,232
2007
5,882
2010
8,932
2013
30,311
TOTAL
216,351
Source: DGMM (2016)
In 2015, Turkish authorities had apprehended 146,485 irregular migrants (including
73,422 Syrians). In 2016 (by 22 November), 67,358 more Syrians were
apprehended along with 29,782 Afghans, 29,117 Iraqis, and 15,699 Pakistanis
amounting to a total of 163,278. Hence the total number of apprehensions since
1998 reached 1,270,781.
9
In 2015 and 2016, number of human smugglers arrested
has also sharply increased in Turkey from 1,506 in 2014 to 4,471 in 2015 (it was
3,052 in the 11 months, by 28 November 2016). Responding to the 2013 EU-Turkey
readmission agreement, 468 individuals were readmitted from Greece to Turkey.
Syrians have become the largest immigrant group in Turkey and it is very likely that
they will be the centre of attention in migration debates for the foreseeable future.
Syrians have a young population with 38.7% younger than 15. This is significantly
different than Turkey’s age composition (in which the demographic group make up
the 24% of the population). Among those younger than 55, the majority are males
(53.3%) while among those 55 and over it is females (51.2%) (Figure 1 and Table A1
in Appendix). Syrian migration to Turkey needs to be considered in relation to
6
http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/ikamet-izinleri_363_378_4709 Accessed 4/10/2016.
7
UNHCR (2016) Turkey Fact Sheet. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=11928.
8
http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/uluslararasi-koruma_363_378_4712_icerik Accessed 4/12/2016.
Relatively small number of applications is partly due to the geographical limitation on the Geneva
Convention imposed by Turkey (see Sirkeci & Pusch, 2016; Kirişçi, 1996).
9
http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/duzensiz-goc_363_378_4710 Accessed 4/10/2016.

134 Turkey’s refugees, Syrians and refugees from Turkey: a country of insecurity
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Turkey’s ethnic minorities. Kurdish and Arabic speaking minorities in Turkey’s
southern provinces have friendship and family ties to Syrians across the border.
This is one of the reasons why Syrian refugees are concentrated in this region
although large metropoles, such as Istanbul, Izmir and Bursa are among the top
receiving provinces. (Map 1).
Figure 2. Population Pyramid of Syrians in Turkey
Source: GDMM, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713. Accessed
1/12/2016.
Concentration in the border provinces of Kilis, Hatay, Sanliurfa, and Gaziantep is at
alarmingly high levels where the ratio of Syrians to the usual resident population
rises up to 93% (Appendix Table A2). This has enormous implications on public
service provision and resources especially regarding schooling, health and housing
provisions at the local level. For example, although only about 15% of Syrian
children at school age were enrolled by July 2016
10
, to provide schooling for all of
them at the same standards with Turkey’s usual residents, it was estimated that
government would need over 40,000 new classrooms and about 80,000 additional
teachers. This strengthens the environment of insecurity and hence increases the
out-migration pressures within the refugee population too. The impact of refugee
arrivals on economy overall is yet inconclusive as there are both positive and
negative influences observed in these provinces (see Lordoğlu & Aslan, 2015).
10
According to the Education Ministry in Turkey, only 170,000 of 625,000 school-aged Syrian children
living in Turkey were receiving formal education http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/less-than-one-
third-of-syrian-children-in-turkey-in-formal-education.aspx?pageID=238&nID=101498&NewsCatID
=341. Accessed 1/10/2016.

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Source: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713
Map 1. Syrians distribution across provinces of Turkey, 2016.

136 Turkey’s refugees, Syrians and refugees from Turkey: a country of insecurity
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Table 3. Syrian refugees in camps in Turkey, 29 December 2016.
Location
Population
Location
Population
Location
Population
Sanliurfa
114,218
Kahramanmaras
17,968
Osmaniye
7,250
Gaziantep
39,082
Malatya
10,301
Mardin
4,113
Kilis
36,338
Adiyaman
9,589
Adana
341
Hatay
19,397
Total
258,597
Source: DGMM (2016)
About 9% (258,597) of Syrians were living in refugee camps set up in provinces
within 200 kilometres to the Syrian border by December 2016 (Table 3).
Turkey’s deal with the EU and the 2013 readmission agreement are probably one
of the reasons of a sudden surge in unauthorised border crossings from Turkey to
Greece and Bulgaria in the second half of 2015 and early 2016, since the agreement
has a clause stating that the deal would come in force in three years. Thus to avoid
being sent back, over one million of refugees risked their lives to leave Turkey
before the agreement was implemented. So far only 2,655 Syrians have been
resettled in the EU against the unauthorised migrants Turkey readmitted since April
2016 within rules of the EU-Turkey agreement. Half of these readmitted movers
were from Pakistan and Afghanistan (DGMM, 2016). While understanding
foreigners in need of humanitarian protection in Turkey trying to leave the country,
we should also look into the number of Turkish citizens applying for international
protection elsewhere and Turkey as a country of insecurity.
Refugees from Turkey, a country of (in)security
Citizens of wealthier countries, which we may call “countries of security”, also seek
refuge elsewhere, but the numbers are negligible. For example, the number of
German citizens applied for asylum in other countries were about 40-50 per annum
over the period from 1999 to 2016. One of these countries of security, Turkey is
also a country of insecurity with a steady outflow of refugees (Table A4 in
Appendix). The total number of asylum seekers with Turkish citizenship in
industrialised countries exceeded one million between the 1980 military coup and
2011 (Sirkeci & Esipova, 2013) and the total number from January 1999 till October
2016 was 233,091 (Figure 3). Since the second half of 2015, there has been a sharp
increase in the number of asylum applications by Turkish citizens abroad. For
example, the volume of Turkish (first time) asylum applications in the EU countries
had increased by 48% in the first quarter of 2016 and 100% in the second quarter
(Eurostat, 2016); applications in the third quarter increased from 985 in 2015 to
3,779 in 2016. These trends show a possibly larger increase will follow in 2017 and
onwards.
The striking feature that emerges in the trends shown in Figure 3 is the sudden but
expected jump in asylum applications since July 2016, when the failed coup
attempt was made. As seen in Table A3 in Appendix, between January and October
2016, the total number of asylum applications lodged by Turkish citizens was about

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140% higher than the total in 2015. Applications between July and October in 2016
(5,161) quadrupled in comparison with the same period in 2015. The increase was
even sharper in the case of Germany as the number of applications in 2016 was
three and a half times higher than 2015 whilst the increase in the July-October
period was 7 times (2,501) higher than that of the same period in 2015 (361).
This was expected within the conflict model of migration (Sirkeci, 2009) as the
failed military coup in Turkey was followed by a mass purge by the government and
hundreds of thousands of public workers including judges, police officers, and
academics lost their jobs and many were arrested. This can be seen as the
beginning of a period of increased asylum seeker flows from Turkey. Turkey has
been one of the top source countries for asylum migration in the 1990s and early
2000s (Sirkeci, 2006; Sirkeci & Esipova, 2013). Germany as the host country for the
largest segment of Turkish populations abroad has been historically the main
destination for asylum seekers, too. This is simply because, asylum seeking
migration is only slightly different from any other migration in terms of
administration but when it comes to the support of migrant networks, there is
virtually no difference. Earlier research shows, for example that in Germany, that
there was fluidity between categories such as guest workers and asylum seekers
over time (Sirkeci, 2006). Disproportionate numbers targeting Germany is likely to
be partly due to the presence of a large Turkish diaspora in the country.
Figure 3. Asylum applications by Turkish citizens lodged in 38 European and 6 non-
European countries (i.e. Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea,
United States), 1999 -2016
Source: UNHCR. * Jan-Oct only

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If we project the numbers for the rest of the year, as the situation in Turkey has
been deteriorating, given that the total number of asylum applications continued
at similar levels until the end of 2016, the numbers in Germany is likely to exceed
5,000 which is close to the levels in the early 2000s. Corresponding projected figure
for all 38 European countries and 6 non-European destinations would take the tally
for 2016 to about 11,500 at the end of the year. This negates Turkey’s profile as a
‘country of security’.
This is alarming news since Turkey is increasingly unstable and highly polarised
after the failed military coup, yet hosts over 3 million refugees. Given the selective
nature of the purges (i.e. targeting professionals such as judges, academics,
government officers) following the failed coup and emergency rule in place, these
asylum seeker outflows from Turkey are likely to have involved high number of high
skilled movers. These movers are capable and equipped with social and human
capitals, hence are likely to overcome imposed barriers (e.g. costs, exit and entry
restrictions). With the purges, government targeted high rank and high skilled
groups such as 3,800 judges and prosecutors, and over 6,300 academics were
among 115,000 people who lost their jobs and 82,000 who were detained. These
are clear indicators of a brain drain risk for Turkey, but also an indication of a steady
outflow of population in years to come. As suggested by the conflict model, the
impact or repercussions (including emigration in response to it) of an environment
of insecurity continues even after the original triggers of conflict disappears. It is
also to be noted that this environment of insecurity affects not only Turkish citizens
but immigrants including Syrian and other refugees in Turkey. Therefore, their
flight will also continue despite all agreements between Turkey and the EU.
Conclusion
Turkey, once again, has become a country of origin for sizeable number of Turkish
citizens filing asylum applications in industrialised countries and elsewhere. An
environment of human insecurity has become more apparent in Turkey in 2016
after a relatively smooth period in the last decade. Yet, a country of (human)
security, millions of Syrians and other refugees arrived and remained in Turkey,
perhaps many hoping eventually to be resettled somewhere more stable and
democratic. The Truce may stem further outflows from Syria but it would be naïve
to expect significant numbers returning from Turkey or elsewhere back to Syria any
time soon. Emerging Turkish-Syrian culture of migration would be just another
driver to maintain flows from Syria to Turkey in the near future.
Coinciding with frequent terrorist attacks and occasional tensions with
neighbouring countries, Turkey also faces an economic downturn marked by high
inflation, high unemployment levels and slow (or negative) growth. Absence of
competitive job markets and large regional disparities in development as well as
high inequality levels highlight Turkey’s Development Deficit. Situation in Syria was
even worse and has deteriorated further during the civil war since 2011.

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Copyright @ 2017 MIGRATION LETTERS © Transnational Press London
Development Deficit often goes along with Democratic and Demographic Deficits.
Democratic Deficit is about political representation, or the lack of it. Countries such
as Syria denied basic citizenship rights to segments of their residents. For example,
the Kurds were denied passports by the Assad regime until 2011 when some were
granted citizenship (CNN, 2011; HRW, 1996). Similar democratic
disenfranchisement was evident in Iraq under Saddam and an armed conflict with
Kurds is still ongoing in Turkey. However, this does not have to be as drastic as in
Syria. Long term frustration in politics where one group is disadvantaged and have
no prospect of being involved in governance can create a perception of (political)
insecurity leading people to consider moving elsewhere. Current circumstances in
Turkey and tensions arising from an increasingly oppressive and authoritarian
conservative government with strong religious tones imposing a kind of polity over
a secular minority. Secularists and many other opposition groups in Turkey have
already been frustrated with almost zero prospect of becoming an influential part
of the governance. The purges and wider adverse effects of mass sackings,
detentions and polarisation make the country an insecure place.
Demographic Deficit is about high fertility and high population growth rates in
contrast to limited job and opportunity creation for a growing population. Most
source countries in the developing world have high fertility rates and growing
populations, whereas most destination countries have stagnant or declining
populations characterised by ageing populations with low fertility levels. This
contributes to emigration pressures at countries of high fertility. Turkey’s fertility
levels are relatively higher than its European neighbours and lower than Middle
Eastern neighbours Syria and Iraq. This means that migration pressures and hence,
inflows from Middle East and outflows to Europe are likely to continue in the
foreseeable future.
These three deficits are the root causes of most human mobility we observe around
the world today. Therefore, any policy attempt to tackle migration must address
these three deficits, root causes of environment of human insecurity and thus
drivers of migration, internal and international alike. Otherwise, it will be simply
indulging into costly adventures such as building walls, fences, Frontex and deals
with Turkey and other countries.
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Appendix
Table A1. Syrian refugees registered in Turkey by age and gender, 2016
Age groups
Male
Female
Total
0-4
210,027
195,557
405,584
5-9
203,325
191,888
395,213
10-14
154,737
141,057
295,794
15-19
135,394
113,558
248,952
20-24
225,234
177,832
403,066
25-29
150,877
116,890
267,767
30-34
122,530
97,781
220,311
35-39
87,591
74,652
162,243
40-44
60,278
56,830
117,108
45-49
48,656
44,780
93,436
50-54
37,889
36,620
74,509
55-59
25,549
25,640
51,189
60-64
17,780
18,209
35,989
65-69
11,417
11,807
23,224
70-74
6,185
7,175
13,360
75-79
3,797
4,542
8,339
80-84
1,989
2,548
4,537
85-89
1,082
1,255
2,337
90+
442
587
1,029
Total
1,504,779
1,319,208
2,823,987
Source: GDMM, 3/1/2017. http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713

Sirkeci 143
Copyright @ 2017 MIGRATION LETTERS © Transnational Press London
Table A2. Turkey’s registered Syrians by provinces and ratio of Syrians to resident
population
Province
Syrians
Total
Ratio
Province
Syrians
Total
Ratio
Total
2,823,987
78,741,053
3.59
Adana
149,760
2,183,167
6.86
K.Maras
86,878
1,096,610
7.92
Adiyaman
24,752
602,774
4.11
Karabuk
373
236,978
0.16
Afyon
4,173
709,015
0.59
Karaman
508
242,196
0.21
Agri
856
547,210
0.16
Kars
158
292,660
0.05
Aksaray
1,171
386,514
0.30
Kastamonu
738
372,633
0.20
Amasya
217
322,167
0.07
Kayseri
55,399
1,341,056
4.13
Ankara
66,998
5,270,575
1.27
Kirikkale
687
270,271
0.25
Antalya
366
2,288,456
0.02
Kirklareli
2,083
346,973
0.60
Ardahan
76
99,265
0.08
Kirsehir
690
225,562
0.31
Artvin
40
168,370
0.02
Kilis
122,236
130,655
93.56
Aydin
7,392
1,053,506
0.70
Kocaeli
27,422
1,780,055
1.54
Balikesir
1,876
1,186,688
0.16
Konya
70,185
2,130,544
3.29
Bartin
40
190,708
0.02
Kutahya
347
571,463
0.06
Batman
19,377
566,633
3.42
Malatya
20,751
772,904
2.68
Bayburt
39
78,550
0.05
Manisa
5,884
1,380,366
0.43
Bilecik
511
212,361
0.24
Mardin
93,527
796,591
11.74
Bingol
718
267,184
0.27
Mersin
139,811
1,745,221
8.01
Bitlis
653
340,449
0.19
Mugla
8,517
908,877
0.94
Bolu
1,035
291,095
0.36
Mus
845
408,728
0.21
Burdur
7,813
258,339
3.02
Nevsehir
5,658
286,767
1.97
Bursa
102,915
2,842,547
3.62
Nigde
3,217
346,114
0.93
Canakkale
3,438
513,341
0.67
Ordu
616
728,949
0.08
Cankiri
339
180,945
0.19
Osmaniye
41,622
512,873
8.12
Corum
1,510
525,180
0.29
Rize
628
328,979
0.19
Denizli
7,326
993,442
0.74
Sakarya
6,922
953,181
0.73
Diyarbakir
29,169
1,654,196
1.76
Samsun
4,012
1,279,884
0.31
Duzce
574
360,388
0.16
Siirt
3,173
320,351
0.99
Edirne
6,492
402,537
1.61
Sinop
71
204,133
0.03
Elazig
5,108
574,304
0.89
Sivas
2,181
618,617
0.35
Erzincan
173
222,918
0.08
Sanliurfa
405,150
1,892,320
21.41
Erzurum
511
762,321
0.07
Sirnak
14,335
490,184
2.92
Eskisehir
2,083
826,716
0.25
Tekirdag
5,917
937,910
0.63
Gaziantep
318,243
1,931,836
16.47
Tokat
810
593,990
0.14
Giresun
146
426,686
0.03
Trabzon
2,053
768,417
0.27
Gumushane
67
151,449
0.04
Tunceli
89
86,076
0.10
Hakkari
874
278,775
0.31
Usak
1,202
353,048
0.34
Hatay
379,093
1,533,507
24.72
Van
1,645
1,096,397
0.15
Igdir
81
192,435
0.04
Yalova
2,702
233,009
1.16
Isparta
6,212
421,766
1.47
Yozgat
3,019
419,440
0.72
Istanbul
429,972
14,657,434
2.93
Zonguldak
303
595,907
0.05
Izmir
99,443
4,168,415
2.39
Source: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713. Accessed: 3/1/2017.

144 Turkey’s refugees, Syrians and refugees from Turkey: a country of insecurity
www.migrationletters.com
Table A3. Asylum applications by Turkish citizens lodged in 38 European and 6 non-
European countries (i.e. Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea,
United States), 1999 -2016
Global
Only in Germany
Total
July-Oct
Total
July-Oct
1999
19,789
6,984
9,094
3,089
2000
24,711
8,530
8,970
3,133
2001
30,320
10,627
10,887
4,137
2002
29,810
10,137
9,569
3,235
2003
24,739
8,498
6,235
2,032
2004
15,795
4,684
4,136
1,205
2005
11,907
3,983
2,767
938
2006
8,621
2,720
1,891
580
2007
6,760
2,100
1,368
450
2008
7,360
2,367
1,320
397
2009
7,078
2,476
1,429
503
2010
6,509
2,323
1,340
448
2011
6,887
2,144
1,578
521
2012
6,941
2,256
1,457
454
2013
6,422
1,900
1,521
492
2014
5,797
1,803
1,565
442
2015
4,018
1,322
1,140
361
2016*
9,627
5,161
3,994
2,501
Total
233,091
80,015
70,261
24,918
Source: UNHCR. * Jan-Oct. only.
Table A4. Turkish migration and asylum applications in Germany, 1961 to 2000
Year
Turkish in
Germany (in
thousands)
Year
Total number
of Turkish
asylum seekers
Number of Turkish
asylum seekers in
Germany
1961
9.2
1980-85
105,480
45,640
1966
161.0
1985-90
192,939
90,500
1970
469.2
1991-93
100,909
68,891
1975
1,077.1
1994
25,909
19,118
1980
1,462.4
1995
41,370
33,750
1985
1,400.4
1996
38,260
31,730
1990
1,694.6
1997
32,830
25,940
1997
2,107.4
1998
21,027
11,754
1998
2,110.2
1999
19,789
9,094
1999
2,053,6
2000
24,700
8,970
Source: Sirkeci (2003b): 60; Martin, (1990):21-24.