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Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 1
Psychology of Justice
Mario Gollwitzer1 & Jan-Willem van Prooijen2,3
(1 Philipps University Marburg, 2 VU University Amsterdam, 3 The NSCR)
(Chapter 3 in Sabbagh, C., & Schmitt, M. (eds.), Handbook of social justice theory and
research. New York: Springer)
[10,401 words (excluding references)]
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 2
1. Introduction: A psychology of justice
What do people consider as fair vs. unfair? Why do they care about justice in the first
place? How do they respond to experienced or observed injustice? How do people differ from
each other with regard to justice-related perceptions, attitudes, and dispositions? How does
the social context shape how people think and feel about (in)justice and how they respond to
it? How do justice conflicts arise between groups, and how can these conflicts be solved?
These are typical questions that psychological justice research has been addressing
systematically and empirically for more than 50 years now. Other scientific disciplines, such
as philosophy, sociology, economics, or criminology ask similar questions, and provide a
converging perspective on the dynamics of justice in our society. Moreover, there is certainly
a degree of overlap in the various approaches and theories that are endorsed by these
disciplines. Yet, the angle from which psychology looks at these questions offers a unique
contribution in various respects. Broadly speaking, most philosophical approaches to justice
focus on normative, objectifiable aspects and on the nature of justice-enforcing structures
(what is just vs. unjust; e.g., Rawls, 1971; see also Chapter 1, this volume). A psychology of
justice, on the other hand, is more concerned with subjective aspects (what people perceive as
just vs. unjust). Unlike the sociological perspective, which typically defines justice on the
basis of societal-level structures and forces (e.g., Törnblom & Vermunt, 2007; see also
Chapter 2, this volume), a psychology of justice is more strongly focused on the combination
of individual-level and situational processes leading to justice-related cognitions, affects, and
behaviors. Unlike the economical perspective, which either defines justice as a system of
resource distributions (macro-level perspective; e.g., Fleurbaey, 2012) or as a system of
individual rational choices (micro-level perspective; e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; see also
Chapter 4, this volume), a psychology of justice is less interested in modeling structures, but
rather in understanding and explaining how people think and feel about justice.
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 3
The present chapter describes the current state of affairs regarding the psychology of
justice. We will try to give an overview of the most influential psychological theories of
(in)justice, we will describe a representative set of studies and empirical findings from justice
research in psychology, and we will discuss how these theories and findings can be used (a) to
better understand justice-related perceptions, cognitions, emotions, and behaviors, and (b) to
contribute to peaceful solutions to justice conflicts in our daily lives.
This chapter is hierarchically, “vertically” organized. It describes psychological justice
research on three different levels. The first, lowest level is the individual level: Section 2
focuses on justice “within” the individual. We start by investigating individual needs,
concerns, and motives that may be able to explain whether, why, and under what
circumstances people care about justice. This section also discusses how people differ in how
they perceive, think about, and react to justice. Finally, this section also describes theory and
research demonstrating that people like to see themselves as being moral, benevolent, and
fair―although they sometimes do not really behave that way.
The second level is the interpersonal level (Section 3). Justice and injustice manifests
in how two (and often more) people behave towards each other: how they distribute resources
(“distributive justice”), what procedures people use to make decisions (“procedural justice”),
how respectfully they treat each other informally in direct interpersonal encounters
(“interactional justice”), how they follow vs. transgress social norms and how they respond to
such norm violations (“retributive justice”). In this section, we will discuss how people assess
(in)justice in interpersonal relations, how they enforce justice when other people violate
justice norms, and how they restore justice to maintain social relations.
The third level is the intergroup level (Section 4). Many justice-related conflicts exist
between social groups or social “categories” such as companies, nations, or cultures. Wars
that are led in response to terrorist attacks may serve as an extreme example here. In this
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 4
section, we will discuss what leads people to commit injustices to members of other groups
and how group memberseven those who were originally uninvolved in the events that
originally sparked a conflictrespond to perceived group-based injustices.
2. Individual dynamics: Justice “within” people
Psychological justice research on the individual level has mainly been interested in
three topics: Justice-related motives, personality traits, and the “moral self.” With regard to
justice-related motives, psychological research has investigated whether justice is a motive in
itself, a so-called “primordial” motive, or rather a proxy reflecting other, potentially more
basic motives or needs such as managing uncertainty, securing social acceptance, or
maximizing one’s self-interest. With regard to justice-related personality traits, psychological
research has investigated how (and why) people reliably differ from each other in justice-
related attitudes and behavioral dispositions. With regard to the “moral self”, psychological
research has investigated how people manage to uphold a positive moral self-concept
although their behavior sometimes contradicts the mandates of being fair and moral.
2.1. Justice-related motives
Justice, fairness, and morality are important topics in people’s lives. Perceptions of
being treated unfairly are usually accompanied by strong emotions (anger, resentment, moral
outrage) and by a strong motivation to act against the injustice, to restore justice, to put the
world back into balance. This claim is not only backed up by anecdotic examples, but also by
countless findings from empirical studies. In the domain of distributive justice (which deals
with the fairness of exchanges and the distribution of goods and resources; see Chapter 10,
this volume), for instance, it has repeatedly been shown that people prefer equal payment for
equal contributions. Being paid less than others despite equal contributions not only evokes
strong feelings of anger and resentment, but also compensatory actions that aim at
reestablishing a sense of “equity.” For example, underpaid workers have been found to lower
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 5
their job performance or to steal from their companies (Greenberg, 1982, 1993; Skarlicki &
Folger, 1997)―behaviors that are now referred to as counterproductive work behaviors
(Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). In the domain of procedural justice (which deals with the
fairness of decision processes; see Chapter 11, this volume), it has been shown that people
swiftly withdraw their commitment and their willingness to adhere to social norms if they feel
that their opinions and needs are not acknowledged by the authorities who make decisions
(Tyler, 2006). And finally, in the domain of retributive justice (which deals with the fairness
of sanctions and other responses to norm transgressions; see Chapter 12, this volume), it has
been found that ordinary people often have very clear opinions about what constitutes “just
punishment” in response to norm violations, and whether and why they consider different
forms of punishment (such as the death penalty) as more or less “just” (e.g., Ellsworth &
Gross, 1994).
These and many other findings suggest that people deeply care about fairness and
justice. At this point, one might argue that the finding that people disapprove of being
underpaid or being disrespected rather reflects an egoistic motive instead of a justice motive.
In fact, many theories that have strongly influenced social justice research are―either
explicitly or implicitly―built on the assumption that humans’ most fundamental behavioral
disposition is to rationally maximize their self-interest. One of the most influential theories in
the distributive justice domain, equity theory, may serve as an example. Equity theory
(Adams, 1965; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978) holds that people make social
comparisons with regard to “inputs” (e.g., the number of hours they work for their company)
and “outputs” (e.g., the salary they receive for their work); equity means an equilibrium state
that suggests that their own input-output relation does not differ from the input-output relation
of other people. In case of inequity, people strive towards restoring equity, either by reframing
the situation or by adjusting their inputsfor instance, by compensating underpayment with
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 6
lower job performance (see above). Equity theorists have argued that the aversiveness of
negative inequity reflects a rational self-interested concern: an interest in justice for oneself,
not an interest in justice as such.
Various scholars have repeatedly challenged the notion of a dominant and singular
self-interest motive (e.g., Miller & Ratner, 1998; Montada, 2002; Ratner & Miller, 2001; see
also Chapter 5, this volume). Accumulating research findings suggest that rational self-
interest is a rather narrow explanatory framework for understanding human motivations in
general, and some justice-related phenomena in particular, such as:
• the finding that people not only respond to negative inequity (e.g., being underpaid
compared to a colleague), but sometimes―albeit to a lesser extent―also to positive
inequity. For example, studies have shown that people start working harder when they
earn more than they are entitled to or when their status has been increased (e.g.,
Greenberg, 1982, 1988);
• the finding that people are willing to reject offers from another party if they think this
offer is unfair even though rejecting implies that they will not receive anything at all
(Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982);
• the finding that people are willing to sacrifice their own resources in order to help
restoring justice in the world (such as donating money for the needy, participating in
public protests or social movements) even if they do not directly profit from these
contributions (Montada & Schneider, 1989; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008);
• the finding that people are willing to sacrifice their own resources in order to punish
norm violators (a phenomenon that has been labeled “altruistic punishment” by
behavioral economists; Fehr & Gächter, 2002) even though they will not directly
profit from such behavior (see also Section 3.2), and
• the finding that people are capable of experiencing a sense of “empathic concern,” that
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 7
is, feeling distress by the suffering of another―which, in turn, motivates non-selfish
helping (Batson, Ahmad, & Lishner, 2009).
Of course, one can always construe additional assumptions that can explain each of
these findings in line with the notion of a dominant self-interest motive. For example, some
researchers have argued that “empathic concern” is not so much a concern for the well-being
of another to whom we feel close, but rather a concern for oneself because the other feels so
close to oneself (e.g., Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). But the wealth of
findings showing that―under certain circumstances―people abandon their immediate self-
interest in order to behave in the interests of others also suggests that one single self-interest
motive may not be sufficient to explain justice-related behaviors. Or, as Batson and Shaw
(1991) have put it, “…at least some of us, to some degree, under some circumstances, are
capable of a qualitatively different form of motivation, motivation with an ultimate goal of
benefitting someone else” (p. 107). This remark also implies that the extent to which social
behavior can be explained by more or less self- vs. other-oriented concerns varies as function
of persons and situations (Van Prooijen, 2013). In the psychological justice literature, it is
now consensus that the assumption of a universal, primordial “justice” motive is useful, both
practically and theoretically (see also Chapter 6, this volume). In Section 3, we will discuss
the question why natural selection might have favored the evolution of a “justice” motive in
humans.
One particularly important conceptualization of the “justice motive” has been
developed by Melvin Lerner. Lerner (1980) understands the justice motive as a need to
believe that the world is a just place in which everybody gets what he or she deserves, and
everybody deserves what he or she gets. Apart from the question whether such a motive can
be considered “ultimately” selfish, other-oriented, or rather a hybrid of both (Montada, 1998),
Lerner suggests that the justice motive fulfills an important adaptive function: It adds sense
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 8
and meaning to what people do (because believing in a just world is a basis for trusting in the
reciprocation of good deeds) and to the things that happen to people (good things happen to
good people; bad things happen to bad people). Such a conceptualization of the justice motive
can explain both socially undesirable phenomena such as the derogation of innocent victims
(Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Hafer & Bègue, 2005) and socially desirable phenomena such as
positive future expectancies in uncertain or unfamiliar situations (Correia & Vala, 2004;
Dalbert, 2001).
2.2. Justice-related personality traits
Batson and Shaw’s claim that “…at least some of us, to some degree, under some
circumstances” (Batson & Shaw, 1991; p. 107) show “truly” other-oriented behavior implies
that the degree to which social behavior can be accounted for by self- vs. other-oriented
concerns varies between situations, but also between persons. For example, people reliably
differ in the extent to which their behavior in social exchange situations is marked by a desire
to maximize their self-interest and/or to maximize the joint outcome of all interaction
partners. The respective personality variable has been labeled social value orientation (SVO;
e.g., Van Lange, 1999). Social value orientation distinguishes between three categories:
prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations, with the latter two often combined
into a “proself” category.
Interestingly, SVO not only predicts people’s behaviors in social dilemmas, it also
predicts how people construe such dilemmas. Prosocials view cooperation as the most rational
thing to do, whereas proselfs view non-cooperation as most rational (Van Lange, Liebrand, &
Kuhlmann, 1990). Moreover, prosocials frame social dilemmas more as a decision between
being moral vs. immoral, whereas proselfs frame the same situations more as a decision
between being weak/naïve vs. strong/self-assured (the “might versus morality effect”;
Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986). These findings suggest fundamental differences in
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 9
how people construe justice, how much value they place on egalitarianism, and how much
concern they have for the well-being of others.
More recently, research on people’s reactions to procedural injustice (which includes,
for instance, denying people the opportunity to “voice” their opinions; see also Section 3.1.)
has shown that prosocials are more sensitive to information on whether other participants
were also given vs. denied “voice”, whereas proselfs were only interested in whether they had
been given vs. denied “voice” (Van Prooijen, Ståhl, Eek, & Van Lange, 2012). These results
suggest that different people can perceive and evaluate justice within the same situation very
differently, and these individual differences can at least partly be accounted for by stable
personality characteristics, such as social value orientation (see also Balliet, Parks, &
Joireman, 2009). To put it more abstractly, one might say that personality and situation
variables jointly (or interactively) shape people’s cognitions, emotions, and behaviors.
Acknowledging and investigating the systematic dynamic interactions between persons and
situations is important for at least two reasons: First, by investigating such interaction patterns
we can learn more about what exactly justice-related personality traits and situational features
psychologically signify. Second, by explicitly modeling person × situation interactions we can
explain justice-related behaviors more precisely and more reliably than either personality or
situation effects alone could do (Schmitt & Sabbagh, 2004; Schmitt, Eid, & Maes, 2003).
The findings showing that prosocials and proselfs differ in how they construe
situations and how they react to contextual information have already illustrated this general
principle. Other examples for systematic person × situation interaction effects can be found in
the literature on justice sensitivity (Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005; Schmitt,
Baumert, Gollwitzer, & Maes, 2010; see also Chapter 8, this volume). Justice sensitivity
reflects how strongly people react to experienced injustice (“victim sensitivity”), to witnessed
injustice (“observer sensitivity”), to injustice from which one profits unilaterally (“beneficiary
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 10
sensitivity”), and to injustice that one has actively produced (“perpetrator sensitivity”).
Notably, the way people respond to certain cues in their social environment depends on their
level of justice sensitivity. For instance, people high in victim sensitivity respond more
strongly to cues indicating that other people might exploit them (“meanness cues”; see
Gollwitzer, Rothmund, & Süssenbach, 2013, for a review). This, in turn, can explain why
especially victim-sensitive individuals tend to behave antisocially in situations that are
marked by uncertainty: When “meanness cues” are present in a situation, victim-sensitive
individuals behave egoistically in order avoid being exploited. This theoretical reasoning can
explain the otherwise puzzling finding that a personality trait that can be considered an
indicator of the justice motive (Schmitt, 1996; Schmitt, Neumann, & Montada, 1995) is
associated with unfair behavior in many social situations (Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes,
& Baer, 2005).
Notably, there is a substantial body of research suggesting that the belief in a just
world (see Section 2.2) also varies consistently between people (Furnham, 2003; Rubin &
Peplau, 1973): Some people seem to believe more strongly in a just world than others.
Whether such individual differences reflect a differential tendency to see the world as more or
less just or rather a differential need to see the world as just is not entirely clear (see Schmitt,
1998). Nonetheless, individual just-world beliefs have been found to correlate with justice
judgments in many different domains, such as perceptions that one is, overall, fairly treated by
one’s peers, teachers, parents, and other authority figures (Dalbert, 2009). Very broadly
speaking, it makes sense to assume that just-world beliefs at least partly reflect individual
differences in the justice motive, as Lerner conceptualized it.
2.3. The “moral self”
The reviewed findings on social value orientation and justice sensitivity have
demonstrated that, under certain circumstances, people behave unfairly, uncooperatively, and
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 11
fully in line with the self-interest model. On the other hand, fairness and benevolence are
strongly inscribed in our cultural guidebook and most people dislike egoists. So one might
wonder how egoists (“proselfs” in the language of social value orientation theory) manage to
save face before others and before themselves. A look into research on victim sensitivity may
be helpful to answer this question: As noted above, victim-sensitive individuals justify their
antisocial behavior by arguing that they would otherwise be exploited (Gollwitzer &
Rothmund, 2009), just as proselfs justify their antisocial behavior by arguing that it is the
most rational thing to do (Utz, Ouwerkerk, & Van Lange, 2004). Justifications or
rationalizations are therefore one way to avoid the cognitive dissonance associated with
behaving uncooperatively (Ariely, 2012; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012).
The question how people manage to justify social undesirable actions before others
and themselves has been addressed by many scholars in social psychology. Daniel Batson, for
example, has demonstrated that people often do not practice what they preach―they demand
others to behave in morally acceptable ways, but fail to live up to these standards themselves,
a phenomenon that he has labeled “moral hypocrisy” (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein,
Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999).
Albert Bandura has coined the term “moral disengagement” to describe strategies that people
use to avoid negative self-evaluations (Bandura, 1999, 2002). These strategies involve coming
up with moral justifications (“it is alright to beat someone who harms you”), using
“sanitizing” or euphemistic language (“Taking someone’s bike without asking them is just
‘borrowing’ it”) and advantageous comparisons (“Stealing a little bit of money is nothing
compared to those who steal a lot of money”), denying or diffusing responsibility for the harm
that is caused (“I am only executing other people’s orders”), disregarding or minimizing the
injurious effects of one’s actions (“Telling lies does not really do any harm”), and attributing
blame to or dehumanizing those who have been harmed (“Some people deserve to be treated
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 12
like animals”).
More recent research has broadened the horizon of moral self-regulation (Ayal &
Gino, 2012; Monin & Merritt, 2011; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). For example, it has
been shown that inducing people to think of past moral actions makes them less compelled to
give for a good cause or to restrain discriminating behaviors in the present (e.g., Jordan,
Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). These findings can be
explained in two ways: First, (thinking of) prior good deeds serve as an opportunity to
establish moral credentials for being moral, prosocial, and unbiased (e.g., Monin & Miller,
2001). Second, good deeds serve as a moral credit that can be spent some other time―which
implies that people construe morality analogous to a bank account, where good deeds and bad
deeds weigh each other out (Effron & Monin, 2010).
The findings on moral hypocrisy, moral disengagement, and moral self-regulation
seem to paint a rather dark picture on people’s everyday morality: They imply that people are
not interested in morality and justice per se, but rather in upholding a favorable view of
themselves while, at the same time, willfully giving in to all kinds of immoral temptations.
Relating these findings back to research on social value orientation and victim sensitivity, one
might wonder whether justifications for immoral behaviors (“I would be stupid if I had not
taken all the money”) are merely hollow post-hoc excuses for reprehensible actions or rather
“true” (and―in principle―socially acceptable) a priori concerns that do not necessarily
reflect an inherent egoistic motive. Clarifying this issue has kept psychological research on
justice and morality busy for decades, and an empirical answer to the question how self-
related and other-oriented concerns are related to each other in our daily lives is not really in
sight. Nevertheless, it should once again be noted that such findings should not be
misunderstood as evidence for a dominant and singular egoism motive. On the contrary: The
fact that people are so strongly concerned with issues of morality and justice in their own
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 13
lives and the lives of others, and that they ever so often struggle with finding the right balance
between what is “right” and “wrong” can even be regarded strong empirical evidence for the
existence of a fundamental, universal concern for justice.
3. Interpersonal dynamics: Justice between people
Assuming universality of the justice motive implies that concerns about justice
originate from innate mental modules, which gradually evolved through natural selection.
Indeed, it has been noted that although justice norms vary across cultures, all known cultures
develop a justice system with norms about morality (Haidt, 2012). Moreover, many authors
emphasized the evolutionary roots of various justice-based motivations such as egalitarianism
and reciprocity (e.g., Boehm, 2012; Brosnan & De Waal, 2003; De Waal, 1996; Trivers,
1971; Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008). Why did the justice motive evolve in humans? To
answer this question, we argue that it is important to appreciate the social nature that
characterizes the evolutionary history of the human species.
Our prehistoric ancestors banded together in small hunter-gatherer societies for
hundreds of thousands of years. Living in such an effectively functioning small group was
essential for survival, as the group provided food, shelter, safety, and potential mating
partners. Indeed, exclusion from one’s tribe effectively boiled down to a death sentence in the
pleistocene. As such, establishing positive interpersonal relations and harmonious within-
group functioning was of crucial importance. Specifically, group members needed to trust that
resources would be shared in ways that were considered acceptable by all; group members
needed to cooperate to reach common goals, and relatedly, group leaders needed the
legitimacy to coordinate and distribute tasks; group members needed methods to resolve
conflicts; and group members needed to feel that their contributions to the group were
appreciated by other members of the tribe in order to stimulate reciprocity and maintain a
sense of community. All of this put substantial selection pressure on group members’ capacity
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 14
to share a concern for justice, stipulating that group members may expect to get what they
deserve in terms of resources and social standing. Modern human beings thus are genetic
descendants of ancestors for whom justice norms were essential to regulate interpersonal
relations and within-group functioning (e.g., Boehm, 2012; De Waal, 1996; Van Vugt et al.,
2008; see also Chapter 21, this volume).
Although people in modern societies no longer live as hunters and gatherers, we can
still see the traces of our ancestral past in the role that justice norms play in how people relate
to each other, and how they organize themselves into social groups. Scientists have widely
noted that justice is of particular importance for the smooth functioning of interpersonal
relations and social groups, as reflected by research that was conducted in the context of
organizations, legal settings, classrooms, sports teams, groups of friends, and intimate
relations (for overviews, see De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Lind,
1992; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). For instance, people generally believe that they should
treat each other fairly, as illuminated by the “do-no-harm” principle (Baron, 1995). Moreover,
people desire to be treated fairly by others, and this desire largely stems from concerns about
one’s interpersonal relations: For instance, it has been noted that people interpret unfair
treatment as a sign that they have low status within a group (Tyler, 1994; Van Prooijen, Van
den Bos, & Wilke, 2002, 2005), are at risk of being excluded (De Cremer, 2002; Tyler, 1987;
Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2004), and have little reason to trust others (Van den
Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998).
In sum, justice serves as a tool to regulate interpersonal or within-group relations. In
the following, we illuminate the specific functioning of the justice motive in such an
interpersonal or within-group context. Specifically, we argue that there are three
complementary aspects of justice that helps people regulate their interpersonal or within-
group relations. First, people need to be able to assess justice: How do people establish
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 15
whether or not they or their fellow group members were fairly or unfairly treated by others?
Second, people need tools to enforce justice: What can people do when they believe others
treat them unfairly, or when they perceive that group harmony is threatened by a group
member who violates justice norms? And third, people need to be able to restore justice: How
can one restore positive interpersonal relations and within-group harmony following minor
infractions, or even following major violations of justice? In the following, we discuss these
three aspects of the interpersonal dynamics of justice in turn.
3.1. Assessing (in)justice
An important first aspect of regulating and maintaining interpersonal relations is the
ability to determine when one is treated fairly or unfairly. People therefore look for various
cues in their social environment that inform them how fairly they are treated by other people.
In this process, people are particularly sensitive to the perception of injustice, as this directly
threatens their well-being and the quality of their interpersonal relations within a community
that they value (Baumeister, Bratlavski, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Van Prooijen, Van den
Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2006). Specifically, we argue that people experience feelings of injustice
when they believe that they are being deprived of a valuable commodity that they feel entitled
to, given what comparable others get, or given specific or generic norms of conduct. These
valuable commodities can be either material (e.g., money, resources, services) or immaterial
(e.g., equality, voice, respect) in nature, but share the propensities that they are considered
desirable, and people can feel entitled to them in an interpersonal setting. Although there may
be subtle differences in the relevant dynamics that are associated with these various ‘sources’
of injustice (e.g., see Chapters 10 and 11, this volume, on distributive and procedural justice),
at a more overarching level, both material and immaterial commodities are distributed and
valued particularly in the context of interpersonal relationships, and share a similar potential
to maintain or disrupt the healthy functioning of those relationships (cf. Cropanzano &
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 16
Ambrose, 2001).
Early studies focused mostly on material outcomes to investigate how people assess
justice (e.g., Stouffer, Suchman, De Vinney, Star, & Williams, 1949). These studies
demonstrated the importance of perceived relative deprivation, defined as the feeling that one
does not get what one deserves compared to other people or groups (for an overview, see
Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012). Central in these feelings of relative
deprivation is social comparison, which is reflected in various distributive justice theories. As
has already been discussed in Section 2.1, the “equity rule” is frequently used to assess
whether material resources are distributed fairly in interpersonal settings.
Besides equity, there are other justice rules that serve a similar purpose, the most
notable ones being equality and need (Deutsch, 1975). Whereas equity, which is based on
direct reciprocity and social exchange, may be considered desirable in, for instance, work-
related settings (where people expect to be rewarded for good performance), equality and
need may be considered more desirable in other interpersonal settings. Equality rules dictate
that resources are distributed equally regardless of one’s relative contributions, which, for
instance, may be preferred in close communal relations (e.g., marital partners sharing a
household). The principle of need dictates that resources should be distributed to those who
need them most, which may be preferred in interactions with people who are unable to
acquire their own resources (e.g., sick people, children, elderly). People thus can employ these
various distributive justice rules depending on the type of social relationship that one has with
each other. At the same time, people often differ in their endorsement of these distributive
justice rules, which is a potential source of conflict (e.g., political debates on equality- versus
equity-based income policies). How these various distributive justice norms are applied may
therefore be part of a shared moral framework that cohesive groups gradually develop.
During the last three decades, scientists increasingly recognized that people do not
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 17
assess justice in interpersonal settings only by considering the distribution of material
resources. Inspired by the classic work of Thibaut and Walker (1975), it is now well-
established that other cues to assess justice are provided by the procedures that group
authorities use when making important decisions that affects various group members. When
evaluating procedural justice, people sometimes also use social comparisons. For instance,
people typically want to be treated the same as others, a procedural justice principle which is
referred to as the consistency-between-persons rule (Leventhal, 1980; see Van Prooijen et al.,
2006; Van Prooijen et al., 2012). But frequently, people assess procedural justice through a
variety of criteria that are based on more general norms of conduct. Leventhal (1980)
specified a range of procedural justice rules that people use to assess justice in their
interpersonal interactions with decision-makers, such as accuracy (i.e., decisions must be
based on all the relevant information that is available), bias suppression (i.e., decision-makers
must have no apparent self-interest at stake in a decision), and ethicality (i.e., procedures need
to be in accordance with common norms and values). The procedural justice principle that
presumably has been most widely studied is the principle of “voice” (see also Section 2.2.):
People consider decision-making procedures fairer if they were allowed an opportunity to
voice their opinion in this interaction than if people were denied such an opportunity (e.g.,
Folger, 1977; Van den Bos, 2003; Van Prooijen, 2009).
To some extent, procedural justice principles such as voice can be used to gauge the
fairness of outcome distributions. For instance, research reveals that variations in procedural
justice particularly influence judgments of distributive justice when people do not know the
outcomes of others, and hence lack the information to make a social comparison-based
judgment (Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). However, procedural justice also
exerts influence on people for reasons beyond the pursuit of material self-interest. The
relational and group-engagement models stipulate that people consider group authorities as
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 18
representative for the entire group, and hence, they interpret the way these authorities treat
them as diagnostic for their standing and inclusion in a group (Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler &
Lind, 1992). Fair interpersonal treatment thus has symbolic value to people as it informs them
that they are taken seriously by others, and are considered a valuable member of one’s
community (Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1987).
Consistent with the view that people assess justice to regulate their interpersonal and
within-group relations, research has consistently found that procedural justice matters to
people particularly when interacting with people with whom they share an identity (e.g., Huo,
Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Tyler, Lind, Ohbuchi, Sugawara, & Huo, 1998). For instance,
people are more strongly influenced by the extent to which an ingroup- as opposed to an
outgroup-leader treats them with respect, as ingroup-leaders are more relevant sources of
information regarding their standing in the group (Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998). In
a similar vein, a manipulation of voice versus no-voice procedures exerts a stronger influence
on people who are included vs. not included in a social group (Van Prooijen et al., 2004).
These effects are not restricted to interactions with group authorities, but extend to the quality
of one’s interactions with fellow group members. As a case in point, respect from fellow
group members is impactful particularly among members who feel marginalized in a group,
as they are most in need of reaffirmation of their belonging to the group (De Cremer, 2002).
The importance of these various justice cues for the quality of one’s interpersonal relations is
further underscored by studies revealing that procedural justice and interpersonal respect
influence the extent to which people identify with their group (Blader & Tyler, 2009; De
Cremer, Brebels, & Sedikides, 2008; Ellemers, Sleebos, Stam, & De Gilder, 2013; Simon &
Stürmer, 2003).
In sum, people continuously assess justice in their interactions with group leaders and
fellow group members. Such justice perceptions may both create and resolve conflicts within
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 19
groups, and generally helps people to determine their standing and inclusion in a group.
Moreover, people assess justice based on various sources of information, including resource
distributions, procedural justice rules, and behaviors that communicate interpersonal respect.
Sometimes, however, people may encounter situations in which other group members violate
these principles and behave unfairly. In such situations, people may need to enforce justice
and restore group norms. This will be discussed in the next section.
3.2. Enforcing justice
It is inevitable that people sometimes are confronted with offenders who selfishly
acquire resources through illegitimate means, bring harm upon others, or otherwise show little
respect for the basic rights of others. In such cases, most people feel that the most appropriate
course of action is to punish the offender. It has been noted that one of the main reasons why
people seek punishment is to restore a sense of justice. Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson
(2002) examined why people punish offenders, and distinguished between the backward-
looking, retributive motivation to restore a sense of justice (“just deserts”) versus the forward-
looking, utilitarian motivation to prevent further harm from occurring (e.g., by deterring
potential future offenders, or by incapacitating dangerous offenders in that they cannot
commit more harm). Results suggest that punishment is mainly motivated by just deserts
considerations, and less so by utilitarian motivations. Moreover, an important predictor of
punishment was people’s moral emotions (“moral outrage”). Similar findings emerged in
various other studies (for an overview, see Carlsmith & Darley, 2008, see also Chapters 12
and 13, this volume).
These findings have led scholars to assume that utilitarian considerations are less
important in people’s motivations to punish offenders than a retributive, justice-driven
motivation. For instance, Darley and Pittman (2003) even concluded that utilitarian motives
are a “happy by-product” of punishment, and that people primarily punish to make sure that
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 20
offenders get their just deserts. Indeed, people can use utilitarian arguments to justify rather
controversial means to enforce justice, such as harsh interrogation techniques in the case of
terrorism suspects (Carlsmith & Sood, 2009). More generally, it has been noted that moral
judgments originate intuitively, and that rational arguments merely serve to justify these
intuitions (Haidt, 2012). But from a more distal, evolutionary point of view one might argue
that both just deserts and utilitarian motives are part of the picture why humans developed
punishment systems to enforce justice. For hunter-gatherer societies to function effectively, it
was necessary to install mechanisms to deter potential offenders, and to protect the group
from disloyal members who threatened the social order. It stands to reason that, over the
course of many generations, these means to enforce justice developed as part of people’s
intuitive psychology, but only because it was functional for the survival of the group. Put
differently, due to its utilitarian implications, groups that managed to enforce justice
effectively were more likely to thrive than groups that did not manage to enforce justice
effectively.
This line of reasoning would suggest that (1) punishment is driven by social
motivations, such as to maintain good interpersonal relations in the group and to protect the
group from dangerous or selfish individuals; and that (2) the presence of a punishment system
has largely beneficial consequences for the functioning of social groups. Empirical research
examined both corollaries. As to the first corollary, various studies support the view that
people are most strongly concerned about offenders in a within-group setting. For instance, a
study by Gollwitzer and Bücklein (2007) reveals that when people are primed with the social
self (“We”)—the part of the self-concept that emphasizes similarity and assimilation with
others—people are more strongly inclined to punish an offender than when they are primed
with the individual self (“I”)—the part of the self-concept that emphasizes individual
uniqueness and differentiation from others. Furthermore, when confronted with a guilty
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 21
offender, perceivers often are more punitive when that offender is part of one’s ingroup than
when the offender belongs to an outgroup (cf. the “Black Sheep Effect”; Gollwitzer & Keller,
2010; Kerr, Hymes, Anderson, & Weathers, 1995; Van Prooijen, 2006). These findings are
consistent with the idea that punishment of offenders matters most in within-group relations.
The social nature of punishment is further underscored by research illuminating the
sacrifices that people are willing to make to enforce justice. In a classic study by Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) participants were confronted with an unknown offender who had
harmed an unknown victim. Participants subsequently had to choose between varying
amounts of money that they had to share with either the offender or the victim. Results
revealed that participants were willing to accept smaller amounts if that enabled them to share
the money with the victim instead of the offender. Subsequent research indeed confirms that
people are willing to pay in order to punish an unknown offender (Turillo, Folger, Lavelle,
Umphress, & Gee, 2002). This suggests that punishment frequently is a prosocial act, as
people endorse punishment even when it harms the immediate financial self-interest.
Such “altruistic punishment” (i.e., costly punishment) has been operationalized in
social dilemma research that tested the second corollary, namely that the presence of a
punishment system is beneficial for the functioning of social groups. Notably, Fehr and
Gächter (2002) investigated the influence of altruistic punishment on cooperation in small
groups of people playing multiple rounds of a public good dilemma. In this public good
dilemma, participants could contribute Money Units (MUs) to a common pool. The
researchers varied whether or not participants could punish their fellow group members by
subtracting three MUs from the free-rider’s assets. Such punishment, however, would cost the
punisher one MU. Results revealed that cooperation was substantially higher when altruistic
punishment was possible than when altruistic punishment was impossible. Moreover, this
finding was mediated by feelings of anger, which is consistent with the view that although
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 22
punishment motivation may originate from intuitive or emotional mental processes, it is
nevertheless functional to make a group more effective. A meta-analysis confirms that in most
social situations, punishment systems have a positive influence on cooperation and reciprocity
(Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011). The existence of a punishment system thus indeed
improves the functioning of social groups.
3.3. Restoring justice
Besides methods to enforce justice, interpersonal relationships and social groups also
need methods to restore a sense of justice following transgressions. Such justice restoration
can take on various forms, including repairing the harm that was done to the victim, as well as
forgiving the offender. Such efforts at restoring justice are necessary to facilitate
reconciliation after conflict, in order to prevent the relationship or group from disintegrating.
Research indeed suggests that people attach more importance to compensating victims to the
extent that they feel emotionally close to the victim (Van Prooijen, 2010; Leliveld, Van Dijk,
& Van Beest, 2012). Furthermore, the willingness to forgive offenders has been found to be
an important ingredient in personal well-being and the healthy functioning of interpersonal
relationships (e.g., Karremans & Van Lange, 2004; Karremans, Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, &
Kluwer, 2003; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; Tsang, McCullough, & Fincham,
2006). Moreover, people are more likely to forgive to the extent that they consider their
relationship with the offender more valuable (Burnette, McCullough, Van Tongeren, & Davis,
2012).
At the same time, trying to reconcile following violations of justice often may be
difficult. Indeed, it has been noted that people’s primary urge following a transgression is
punitive or vindictive, and that reconciliatory efforts constitute a transformation of
motivations following this initial punitive tendency (McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003;
Yovetich & Rusbult, 1994). Moreover, it has been noted that people have a strong tendency to
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 23
blame innocent victims for their fate (Lerner, 1980; See also Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Van
Prooijen & Van den Bos, 2009). For restoration of justice to occur, people must hence
override some of their less constructive intuitions and behavioral tendencies.
Both restoring the harm done to the victim as well as reconciliation with the offender
are focal concerns of research on restorative justice. This research proposes interventions to
establish restorative justice as an alternative to the more common court-based punishment in
response to criminal offenders (e.g., Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008, see also
Chapter 13, this volume). A typical restorative justice intervention involves a bilateral
discussion between the offender and a victim that is designed to develop a shared
understanding of the offense that was committed. In this discussion, both sides get a chance to
express their thoughts and feelings regarding the offense. The offender is encouraged to
apologize to the victim; the victim is encouraged to forgive the offender; and, both parties
determine the most suitable way to both punish the offender and compensate the victim.
Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, and Platow (2010) noted that a preference for such restorative
justice interventions originates from different motives than straightforward retribution (i.e.,
punishment): Whereas disempowering the offender is a dominant motivation to seek
retribution, reaffirming the validity of shared values is a dominant motivation to seek
restoration. By reaffirming the validity of shared values, restorative justice may be
particularly well-suited to restore harmony in an interpersonal relation or group. Indeed,
people prefer restorative justice over retributive justice when they share an identity with the
offender (Wenzel et al., 2010).
It stands to reason that compensating victims is commonly conceived of as a way to
restore a sense of justice. After all, such compensation may acknowledge that the
victimization was indeed an injustice, it may repair the harm that was done to the victim (at
least to some extent), and it may reaffirm the victim as a valuable group member (e.g., Darley
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 24
& Pittman, 2003; Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011; Okimoto, 2008). But how
is forgiveness related to justice? After all, a central conceptualization of justice is punishment,
which at first glance seems antithetical to forgiveness. Retribution is, however, one possible
justice motive out of a wider range of justice motives. Justice can also involve values such as
empathy, benevolence, and altruism, suggesting a positive association with forgiveness.
A study by Karremans and Van Lange (2005) tested whether activating a justice
motivation would increase or decrease people’s inclination to forgive an offender. Across
three studies, results revealed that activation of justice increased forgiveness. This finding
suggests that forgiveness indeed is a result of people’s concern to establish a sense of justice.
Furthermore, a study by Strelan and Van Prooijen (2013) reveals that punishment and
forgiveness are less antithetical than is sometimes assumed. In fact, results indicated that the
information that an offender got his or her just deserts through punishment increased the
likelihood that people subsequently were willing to forgive an offender. This effect was
mediated by the belief that justice has been restored. Punishment may thus be an important
element in the process towards reconciliation and justice restoration (see also Gromet &
Darley, 2006). In fact, even interpersonal revenge can be effective in restoring justice to the
extent that the target of the vengeful action understood why revenge has been taken against
him or her (Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009; Gollwitzer, Meder, & Schmitt, 2011). In other
words, punishment and revenge serve a communicative function, and re-establishing justice
may be conducive to promote forgiveness in interpersonal relations.
It can be concluded that, besides assessing and enforcing justice, also restoring justice
is essential for the maintenance and healthy functioning of interpersonal relations or groups.
Such relations benefit from fair treatment of victimized group members by communicating
their value to the group. In fact, even non-victimized group members’ commitment to and
displayed effort for the group is influenced by the extent to which they believe ingroup-
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 25
victims are fairly treated by group authorities (e.g., see work on layoff survivor’s reactions to
the way managers treat layoff victims; Brockner, DeWitt, Grover, & Reed, 1990).
Furthermore, interpersonal relations and groups sometimes benefit from forgiveness of
offenders. Indeed, forgiveness is an element of the “tit-for-tat” strategy in social dilemmas,
which is most effective in establishing cooperation in prolonged interactions (Axelrod &
Hamilton, 1981). However, it must be noted that such forgiveness may only be healthy for
group functioning under certain conditions. To illuminate this, Burnette and colleagues (2012)
found that people endorse forgiveness mainly for offenders who have high relational value,
but who also are low in perceived exploitation risk. This underscores that forgiveness is only
functional to the group if there is trust that the offender is unlikely to offend again.
4. Intergroup dynamics: Justice between groups
Whereas the dynamics outlined above suggest that people have rather sophisticated
mechanisms at their disposal to psychologically establish and maintain a sense of justice in
their interpersonal relations and within their groups, throughout history people have
committed major injustices particularly to members of other groups. Instances of genocide,
hate crime, and discrimination occurred in all eras and illuminate the dark side of human
nature. Moreover, these actions typically have a group-based element as they are usually
targeted against a marginalized minority group in society. Contrary to the popular view that
such injustices are exclusive to a limited number of sociopaths, it has been noted that normal
people, without mental disorder, are capable of the most horrendous atrocities against
members of other groups (e.g., Arendt, 1963; Baumeister, 1997; Zimbardo, 2008). This
suggests that the psychology of justice contains specific and important dynamics at an
intergroup level of analysis. In the following, we seek to illuminate the intergroup dynamics
of justice. Specifically, we examine what leads people to commit injustices to members of
other groups. In addition, we examine people’s responses to perceived group-based injustices.
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 26
4.1. Committing injustice to outgroup members
Even when people have high standards of justice in the way that they treat members of
their own group, this does not automatically mean that people always apply these standards to
how they treat members of others groups. This idea is highlighted in theorizing on moral
exclusion (Opotow, 1990), which states that people categorize other living entities (i.e.,
animals and fellow human beings) in terms of the “scope of justice”—that is, a mental
classification of the extent to which justice norms apply to another social entity (see also the
“circle of moral regard”; Reed & Aquino, 2003). Individuals (or outgroups) who fall inside a
perceiver’s scope of justice are considered worthy of fair and respectful treatment; but when
individuals fall outside of a perceiver’s scope of justice, justice norms are not considered
relevant when interacting with that individual. As a consequence, the perceiver may believe
that harming the individual who falls outside the scope of justice is not immoral and
sometimes even appropriate or desirable.
This scope of justice should be regarded as a continuous mental scale instead of as a
strict dichotomy, as living entities may differ in the level of moral treatment that the perceiver
accords to them (to illuminate this, dogs usually do not have the same rights as humans; but
many people find the killing of a dog immoral, yet are perfectly comfortable killing an insect).
Moreover, the scope of justice is not static: Subtle contextual cues influence the number of
entities that people are willing to include in their scope of justice (Laham, 2009). For instance,
a highly self-important moral identity was found to increase the number of outgroups that
perceivers place in their circle of moral regard, as reflected in the amount of harm that one
considers acceptable towards outgroups (Reed & Aquino, 2003).
For most outgroups that people normally encounter in their daily lives, these processes
do not manifest themselves to an extreme extent (e.g., people rarely feel that it is morally
appropriate to injure or kill members of a rival organization, university, or soccer team). Still,
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 27
with the right measurement tools, the process of moral exclusion can be observed even in
normal, everyday life encounters with members from other groups. For instance, research on
infrahumanization often compares people’s perceptions of the extent to which ingroup versus
outgroup members are capable of experiencing a range of emotions (e.g., Haslam, in press;
Leyens et al., 2000). In this research domain, a distinction is made between primary emotions
(i.e., emotions that are not uniquely human but are likely also experienced by other animals,
such as anger and fear) and secondary emotions (i.e., emotions that are assumed to be
uniquely human, such as pity and regret). Infrahumanization research typically finds that
people accord primary emotions to both ingroup and outgroup members, but accord secondary
emotions more to ingroup than to outgroup members. Thus, ingroup members are perceived
as more capable of experiencing typically human emotions, making them more prototypically
human. This, in turn, influences discrimination in the prosocial treatment of ingroup versus
outgroup members (Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003).
People thus do not treat outgroup members with the same moral standards as they treat
ingroup members. This has substantial implications for what people consider to be fair in
intergroup situations. Whereas people are guided by norms about equity, equality, and need
when distributing resources within groups, people seem to be mainly concerned with favoring
their ingroup when distributing resources between groups. The classic work by Tajfel (1970)
on ingroup favoritism reveals that, even in a minimal intergroup setting, people allocate more
valuable points to other ingroup members than to outgroup members. More generally, it has
been noted that groups behave more competitively in mixed-motive situations than
individuals do, a finding referred to as the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect
(Wildschut, Pinto, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003). It is likely that there is a moral
dimension to this tendency to favor one’s own group at the expense of other groups. Instead
of principles such as equality, reciprocity, and fairness, at the group level justice may be
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 28
defined by norms to favor the ingroup. For instance, a study by Pinter et al. (2007) reveals
that group leaders scoring high on guilt proneness—an emotion that signifies moral
motivation—are more strongly inclined to display ingroup favoritism than group leaders
scoring low on guilt proneness, provided that they are accountable towards the ingroup. This
suggests that people’s inclinations to favor their ingroup at the expense of outgroups are, quite
paradoxically, driven by justice-based motivations.
The finding that people are predisposed to favor their ingroup can be observed in
various other, related lines of research. For instance, research on parochial altruism reveals
that people are willing to invest their own resources in costly punishment in order to both
support the well-being of members of their own ingroup and protect against threats embodied
by a rival outgroup (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006). Furthermore, research on
punishment of ingroup versus outgroup offenders finds that people punish an ingroup
offender more severely when guilt is certain, but they punish an outgroup offender more
severely when guilt is uncertain (Kerr et al., 1995; Van Prooijen, 2006). An alternative way of
formulating this conclusion is that certainty of guilt matters more for punishment in the case
of ingroup compared to outgroup offenders, suggesting that people are relatively more
indifferent about the extent that justice is done towards outgroup members. Likewise, it has
been found that people offer more procedural protections to ingroup than to outgroup crime
suspects (Boeckmann & Tyler, 1997).
Moreover, punishment is sometimes driven by negative stereotypes that one has about
a rival outgroup. It has been noted that when an offender belongs to a societal outgroup that is
stereotypically associated with crime, people use these stereotypes heuristically, leading them
to punish this outgroup offender more severely than they would punish an ingroup or non-
stereotyped outgroup offender (e.g., Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Sweeney & Haney, 1992).
Such defensive responses to criminal stereotypes are in line with a more general notion that
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 29
the processes of moral exclusion and ingroup favoritism might be particularly noticeable
when people are confronted with an outgroup that is considered threatening. Intergroup threat
generally has been defined in terms of situations where “one group’s actions, beliefs, or
characteristics challenge the goal attainment or well-being of another group” (Riek, Mania, &
Gaertner, 2006; p. 336). These perceptions of threat can take on many forms, such as
competition over existing recourses (cf. realistic group conflict theory; Sherif & Sherif, 1969),
conflicting cultural values (Sears, 1988), and intergroup anxiety (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).
According to Riek and colleagues (2006), intergroup threat is a strong predictor of for
instance intergroup prejudice, hostility, and anxiety, which may lay the foundations for
violence and injustice.
An illustration of how such intergroup threat may fuel intergroup hostility is provided
by research on “sacred values” in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (e.g., Atran,
Axelrod, & Davis, 2007). These sacred values represent values that are considered to be
absolute, inviolable, and that require complete devotion (examples of such sacred values are
the well-being of one’s family, or religious devotion). Intergroup conflict is particularly likely
to escalate when the other group poses a direct threat to one’s sacred values, or when both
groups have sacred values that are mutually incompatible (e.g., the sacred status of Jerusalem
in both Judaism and Islam). Such intergroup conflict resulting from sacred values may be
particularly difficult to resolve. For instance, a study by Ginges, Atran, Medin, and Shikaki
(2007) indicates that offering material incentives to compromise over sacred values only
backfires, and leads to an exacerbation of the conflict. This finding is explained by the
assertion that people find the offer of a material exchange offensive in the context of values
that are considered too sacred to comprise on (see also the work on “taboo trade-offs”;
Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). The only intervention that, in the study by
Ginges and colleagues (2007), did reduce intergroup hostility was the perception that the
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 30
other group is also willing to make a symbolic compromise over one of their own sacred
values.
In sum, various basic psychological processes facilitate injustices in an intergroup
context. This, however, should not be taken as evidence that humanity is facing an impossible
challenge in reducing intergroup hostility, terrorism, genocide, and war. As noted previously,
the scope of justice is not static (e.g., Laham, 2009), and group members frequently may
realize at some point that their past actions against another group constituted an injustice.
Such realization may cause feelings of collective guilt, even decades after a historic injustice,
among a generation that was not involved in the event (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, &
Manstead, 1998). Moreover—and contrary to popular belief—data reveals that intergroup
violence has gradually declined throughout the ages, and that the last 50 years constituted the
most peaceful era in the history of humanity (Pinker, 2011). As such, recognizing intergroup
injustice and promoting social change constitutes a forceful part of human psychology that
counteracts the dynamics leading to intergroup injustice. In the next section, we examine how
people respond to perceived injustices towards their group, and briefly note some of the
actions that may drive social change.
4.2. Responding to intergroup injustice
Although recognizing severe intergroup injustice can be evident for the victimized
group, in many cases intergroup injustice may manifest itself in more subtle ways. For
instance, members of specific societal groups may be discriminated against through implicit
mental processes, and specific discriminatory outcomes—for instance, not getting a job
because of one’s race or gender—frequently can be attributed to other causes (e.g., the job
qualification of competing candidates). As a case in point, it has been noted that many
underpaid women see that women as a group are being underpaid, but they typically do not
see that they themselves are being underpaid (Crosby, 1982). There is thus a discrepancy
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 31
between personally experienced injustice (cf. relative deprivation) versus group-based
experienced injustice (i.e., fraternal deprivation). Whereas relative deprivation involves a
fairness judgment that is based on a comparison of one’s own outcomes versus the outcomes
of a referent other individual, fraternal deprivation involves a fairness judgment that is based
on a comparison of one’s group’s outcomes versus the outcomes of a referent other group.
Fraternal deprivation thus entails a sense of collective disadvantage (Runciman, 1966). People
are particularly likely to detect fraternal deprivation when they define the self and their
experiences in group-based terms (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997).
Once people detect that their ingroup is the victim of fraternal deprivation, a common
response for them is to strive for social change. A typical response to change the status quo is
to mobilize the ingroup and protest against the illegitimate social inequality that they believe
their group is facing. Indeed, it has been noted that collective action is driven by three
complementary processes (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). First, people indeed need to believe
that a particular societal group is victim of an injustice, resulting in feelings of anger. Second,
people need to share an identity with the deprived societal group, and hence be motivated to
actively pursue change. And third, there needs to be a sense of efficacy: People need to
believe that their collective action tendencies can potentially be successful in restoring
equality. The combination of these three factors mobilizes a group to come into action against
the perceived fraternal deprivations. Sometimes such collective action can indeed be highly
effective, as the 2011 uprisings in the Arab world illustrate.
In addition, social change can be stimulated through policy interventions. A well-
known example of such an intervention constitutes affirmative action programs, where
members of marginalized groups in society (e.g., ethnic minorities; women) are given
preferential treatment in application procedures. Such programs are designed to increase the
diversity in organizations that are traditionally dominated by a majority group (e.g., White
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 32
males). Affirmative action programs are a topic of substantial debate from a justice-based
perspective. Proponents point to the existence of racial and sexual discrimination even in
today’s society, and construe affirmative action as a necessary tool to create opportunities that
are truly equal (Crosby, Iyer, & Sincharoen, 2006). Opponents, however, typically point out
that affirmative action violates principles of meritocracy, dictating that the most capable
individuals should be promoted or hired. Although sometimes dismissed as rationalization of
one’s prejudiced attitudes, research suggests that opposition against affirmative action can be
genuinely based on the belief that principles of justice are violated (Bobocel, Son Hing,
Davey, Stanley, & Zanna, 1998). Moreover, research suggests that affirmative action
programs can have negative side-effects, as people tend to perceive employees who were
hired based on such programs as relatively more incompetent (Heilman, Block, & Lucas,
1992). This debate notwithstanding, initiatives such as affirmative action programs illustrate
that many people are concerned about injustice against minority groups, and actively look for
ways to ensure justice between social groups.
Although human psychology offers a strong potential for intergroup conflict, as well
as for rationalization processes to justify harming others, human psychology also has an
undeniable drive to extend principles of justice, benevolence, and altruism to members of
other groups. Collective action and policy interventions sometimes may be necessary steps
towards social change. True social change, however, happens in the minds of perceivers as
they expand the scope of justice to incorporate an increasing number of outgroups.
5. Conclusion
This chapter was designed to give a contemporary overview of the psychology of
justice. We have described how justice can be conceptualized as a unique, primordial motive
that is distinguishable from other human motives (e.g., self-interest), and that evolved through
the evolutionary process of natural selection. Moreover, we have summarized the psychology
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 33
of justice at three complementary levels of analysis: The intra-individual level, stipulating
how justice can differ between persons, and how people are motivated to perceive themselves
as a fair and moral person; the interpersonal level, stipulating how people use justice to
regulate the functioning of important interpersonal relations or groups; and the intergroup
level, stipulating why people commit injustice to other groups, as well as how people respond
to (and restore) such between-group injustice. What is striking about the research summarized
here is how justice seems to matter at all these levels of analysis, not only in terms of how
people perceive, respond, and behave towards others, but also in terms of how people prefer
to perceive and present themselves. A concern for justice thus seems deeply engraved in
human psychology.
The various levels of analysis that we described in this chapter also illuminate the
unique contribution that psychology has to offer to understand justice judgments. Whereas
other disciplines either focus on “objective” justice (philosophy; e.g., Rawls, 1971), or on
more macro-level conceptualizations of justice (e.g., sociology, economy), psychology
focuses on how individual persons—due to their own unique personality, the specific features
of the situation that they find themselves in, and all the perceptual or self-serving biases that
may color their judgment—subjectively construe justice, and use these justice judgments as a
moral compass guiding their behavior in the social world. The insights derived from the
psychology of justice are strongly connected to the insights obtained by other disciplines, of
course, as subjective justice judgments provide impetus to broader societal developments, as
well as to policy aimed at establishing a more just society. Scientific understanding of justice-
based processes may hence be furthered by increased interdisciplinary collaborations that
integrate the various contributions that are made within the social sciences on this important
topic. We conclude that the psychology of justice is part and parcel of the fabric of social life,
and an undeniable force driving human behavior all over the world.
Running Head: PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE 34
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