Dangerous Liaison

Full text

Contents
Notes on the Contributors ix
Background and Overview xii
1 Dangerous Liaison: Globalization, Empire and TESOL 1
B. Kumaravadivelu
2 What, then, Must We Do? Or Who Gets Hurt
when We Speak, Write and Teach? 27
Christopher Brumfi t
3 Critical Media Awareness: Teaching Resistance
to Interpellation 49
Sarah Benesch
4 The (Re-)Framing Process as a Collaborative
Locus for Change 65
Branca F. Fabrício and Denise Santos
5 Ideology and Language: Interconnections between
Neo-liberalism and English 84
Marnie Holborow
6 Non-judgemental Discourse: Role and Relevance 104
Julian Edge
7 Teaching Second Languages for National Security
Purposes: A Case of Post-9/11 USA 119
Ryuko Kubota
8 Equity and English in South African Higher
Education: Ambiguity and Colonial
Language Legacy 139
John Katunich
9 Negotiating ELT Assumptions in EIL Classrooms 158
Aya Matsuda
10 Slaves of Sex, Money and Alcohol: (Re-)Locating
the Target Culture of TESOL 171
Abdellatif Sellami
vii

11 Neo-imperialism, Evangelism, and ELT: Modernist
Missions and a Postmodern Profession 195
Bill Johnston and Manka M. Varghese
12 ‘The Hedgehog and the Fox’: Two Approaches
to English for the Military 208
Paul Woods
Index 227
viii Contents

1
1
Dangerous Liaison: Globalization,
Empire and TESOL
B. Kumaravadivelu
Introduction
The central thesis of this chapter is simple and straightforward: the
contemporary world is being inexorably restructured by the forces of
globalization and empire, which together are shaping the global fl ows
of interested knowledge, hegemonic power, and cultural capital. English,
in its role as the global language, creates, refl ects and spreads the import
and the imagery of the global fl ows. The forces of globalization, empire
and English are intricately interconnected. Operating at the intersection
where the three meet, TESOL professionals, knowingly or unknowingly,
play a role in the service of global corporations as well as imperial powers.
What is required to mitigate the intended and unintended consequences
of the dangerous liaison between globalization, empire and TESOL is no
less than transformative restructuring of major aspects of TESOL.
While the central thesis is simple and straightforward, the vital issues
are not. Taking a postcolonial perspective, I explore some of the issues
arising out of the dangerous liaison between the three forces. The
chapter is organized in four parts. In the fi rst, I examine the emerging
process of globalization. In the next, I discuss the entrenched nature of
empire. I then comment on the place of English and the current role
of English teaching in these processes. Finally, I offer suggestions for the
relocation of TESOL in the light of the foregoing analysis.
Globalization and its consequences
Globalization is a slippery term which carries different meanings to
different people at different times. Echoing the current thinking,
sociologist Manfred Steger (2003, p. 13) defi nes it as ‘a multidimensional

2 B. Kumaravadivelu
set of social processes that create, multiply, stretch, and intensify world-
wide social interdependencies and exchanges while at the same time
fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections
between the local and the distant’. While Steger points out that globa-
lization is ‘as old as humanity itself’, historian Robbie Robertson (2003)
argues that globalization as we know it today can be traced to the onset
of the modern colonial period, about 500 years ago. He identifi es three
waves of globalization which can easily be associated with three phases
of modern colonialism/imperialism.
Three waves of globalization
According to Robertson, the fi rst wave of globalization started when two
maritime powers, Spain and Portugal, sought trade routes to Asia to tap
the resources of China and India, which were ‘already the world’s largest
and cheapest producers of a range of highly sought-after commodities’
(Robbie Robertson, 2003: 106). In 1492, Columbus, with Spanish mili-
tary and fi nancial support, landed in the Americas, although he set out
to reach India. Six years later, driven by the fear of Spanish trade advan-
tage, the Portuguese successfully explored their own route to the East
when Vasco da Gama rounded Africa and opened up the sea route to
India. Robertson reckons that this fi rst wave laid the foundation for
European empires, for modern global trade and fi nance, and for the new
global systems of production.
The second wave, after 1800, is marked by the fruits of industrial
revolution. Robertson argues that competition from China and India
‘created the demand for mechanization’ (107), and Britain rose to the
occasion with a mechanization of industry that promoted productivity,
decreased cost, and increased profi t. Countries such as Germany, Japan
and the USA emulated Britain, and benefi ted from the process of glo-
balization that arose out of industrialization. But, ‘for the majority of
the world’s peoples, however, globalization meant only one thing: colo-
nialism’ (131). Imperial powers treated colonialism as a civilizing mission
they were destined to perform:
Schools, churches and mass circulation newspapers and magazines
spread the word far and wide. So too music, theatre, literature, the
visual arts, even postcards. Imperialism became part of the popular
culture. (Robertson, 2003: 141)
Eventually, hegemonic rivalries and economic imperatives led the impe-
rial powers into two World Wars, the end of which also marked the end
of the second wave.

Globalization, Empire and TESOL 3
The third wave of globalization, after 1945, marked a new era of inter-
national cooperation as well as rivalry. The two victors of the Second
World War, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, sought to divide the world into two ideological camps –
capitalist and communist. They both were imbued with a sense of inter-
nationalism deeply infl uenced by their own desire to secure political and
economic advantages. They vied with each other to court several newly
independent Asian and African countries. It was at this stage that colo-
nization took on a decisively different turn – hegemonic control without
territorial possession. As Robertson observes, despite decolonization,
the ‘civilizing’ zeal of former imperialism was far from dead. In
Britain and the United States a new mantra emerged. Western values,
Western institutions, Western capital and Western technology. Only
by Westernizing could former colonies hope to achieve a modern
future. (2003: 182)
Of course, Westernization was presented by the imperial powers and
perceived by developing nations as modernization.
To help modernize developing countries and rebuild war-torn Euro-
pean nations, the United States assumed leadership in establishing three
international economic organizations: the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in charge of administering the international monetary system,
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later
known as the World Bank) in charge of providing loans for industrial
projects, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, which
in 1995 became the World Trade Organization (WTO)) in charge of
formulating and enforcing multilateral trade agreements. These institu-
tions also helped create a money exchange system in which each
nation’s currency was pegged to the value of the US dollar. All these
measures were taken to spread the American-style free-market economy
around the world, which would, in turn, promote the American economy
itself. This effort has only accelerated with the collapse of the Soviet
Union in the 1980s, and with the economic liberalization in communist
China and later in socialist India. Such a triumph of market economy
over political ideology marks one of the distinctive features of the
current phase of globalization.
The current phase of globalization
From a historical perspective, then, the projects of globalization and
empire have always been intricately interconnected. The current phase

4 B. Kumaravadivelu
of globalization, however, is dramatically different from its earlier
phases. According to a United Nations Report on Human Development
(UNDP, 1999), the current phase is changing the world landscape in
three distinct ways:
Shrinking space. People’s lives – their jobs, incomes and health – are
affected by events on the other side of the globe, often by events that
they do not even know about.
Shrinking time. Markets and technologies now change with unprece-
dented speed, with action at a distance in real time, with impacts on
people’s lives far away.
Disappearing borders. National borders are breaking down, not only
for trade, capital and information but also for ideas, norms, cultures
and values. (29)
What this means is that the economic and cultural lives of people all
over the world are more intensely and more instantly linked than ever
before. We are all, whether we are aware of it or not, entangled in a
global web woven by global players bent upon corporate profi t and
imperial power.
The most distinctive feature of the current phase of globalization is
the global electronic communication, the Internet. It has become the
major engine that drives both economic and cultural globalization. In
fact, without global communication, economic growth and cultural
change would not have taken place with ‘breakneck speed and with
amazing reach’ (UNDP, 1999: 30). That is why cultural critic Frederic
Jameson (1998: 55) calls globalization ‘a communicational concept,
which alternately masks and transmits cultural or economic meanings’.
In a development that is unprecedented in human history, the Internet
has become a unique source that instantly connects millions of indivi-
duals with other individuals, with private associations, and with educa-
tional institutions and government agencies, making interaction at a
distance and in real time possible. And in large measure, the language
of global communication is English (Crystal, 1997; Graddol, 1997).
Yet another aspect of the current phase of globalization is the rise of
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) such as IBM, Mitsubishi, Siemens.
The TNCs control much of the world’s investment capital and innova-
tive technology. Some of them are so huge that they are economically
more viable and more powerful than the economies of several countries
put together. It has been estimated that 51 of the world’s 100 largest
economies are corporations, only 49 are countries, and that, by the turn

Globalization, Empire and TESOL 5
of the century, 142 of the top 200 TNCs were based in only three
countries: the United States, Japan, and Germany (Steger, 2003: 48).
Considering their stranglehold on global economy, Robbie Robertson
(2003: 11) declares that ‘by the close of the twentieth century, the cor-
porate vision of globalism held center stage’. The impact of economic
globalization is indeed remarkable. Equally remarkable is cultural
globalization.
Cultural globalization
Cultural globalization has become the topic of intense debate among
scholars in social sciences and the humanities. A critical analysis of the
relevant literature reveals the emergence of three overlapping schools
of thought. Members of the fi rst school, represented by political theorist
Benjamin Barber, sociologist George Ritzer and others, believe that some
kind of cultural homogenization is taking place in which the American
culture of consumerism constitutes the dominant center. They see a
simple and direct equation: Globalization = Westernization = America-
nization = McDonaldization. That is, they consider globalization predo-
minantly a process of Westernization which, in their view, is not
substantially different from Americanization which can, in turn, be
easily characterized as McDonaldization. The term ‘McDonaldization’
was coined by Ritzer (1993) to describe the contemporary sociocultural
processes by which the basic principles of the fast-food industry –
creation of homogenized consumer goods and imposition of uniform
standards – shape the cultural landscape in America and elsewhere.
Likewise, Barber’s McWorld represents:
the future in shimmering pastels, a busy portrait of onrushing eco-
nomic, technological, and ecological forces that demand integration
and uniformity and that mesmerizes peoples everywhere with fast
music, fast computers, and fast food – MTV, MacIntosh, and
McDonald’s – pressing nations into one homogenous global theme
park, one McWorld tied together by communications, information,
entertainment, and commerce. (Barber, 1996: 4).
The culture of American consumerism is spreading fast, as evidenced
by young people in various parts of the world wearing Levi jeans and
Nike shoes, sporting Texaco baseball caps and Chicago Bull sweatshirts,
watching music videos on MTV and blockbusters from Hollywood, and
eating at McDonald’s and Pizza Hut. Such a cultural homogenization
is facilitated by global communications industry controlled mostly by

6 B. Kumaravadivelu
American interests. In the year 2000, ‘only ten media conglomerates –
AT&T, Sony, AOL/Time Warner, Bertelsmann, Liberty Media, Vivendi
Universal, Viacom, General Electric, Disney, and News Corporation –
accounted for more than two-thirds of the $250–275 billion in annual
worldwide revenues generated by the communications industry’ (Steger,
2003: 76). Once again, as is apparent from the above, the medium of
the global communications industry is English.
The second school of thought is represented by sociologist Anthony
Giddens, cultural critic John Tomlinson and others. They believe that
some kind of cultural heterogenization is taking place in which local
cultural and religious identities are being strengthened mainly as a res-
ponse to the threat posed by globalization. Invoking the image of ‘a
runaway world’, Giddens (2000) asserts that globalization is becoming
increasingly decentered. He even suggests, rather polemically, that
‘reverse colonisation’ is taking place. For him,
reverse colonisation means that non-Western countries infl uence
developments in the West. Examples abound – such as the latinising
of Los Angeles, the emergence of a globally oriented high-tech sector
in India, or the selling of Brazilian television programmes to Portugal.
(2000: 34–5)
It has been pointed out that the so-called global neighborhood denotes
not enhanced sociability but only enforced proximity (Tomlinson,
1999). That is, globalization has contributed only to the contraction of
space, time and borders but not to the expansion of communal harmony
among the peoples of the world. On the contrary, it has only strengthe-
ned the forces of fundamentalism which Giddens (2000: 67) describes
as ‘a child of globalisation’. Religious fundamentalism, whether it is of
Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Islamic or any other persuasion, is premised
upon a deep desire to protect and preserve certain types of religious
beliefs and practices that are perceived to be threatened by global cultu-
ral fl ows.
The third school of thought is represented by cultural critic Arjun
Appadurai, sociologist Roland Robertson and others. Appadurai’s oft-
quoted statement, ‘the central problem of today’s global interaction is
the tension between cultural homogenization and cultural heterogeni-
zation’ (1996: 5) broadly summarizes the stand taken by this group.
They believe that both homogenization and heterogenization are taking
place at the same time, plunging the world into a creative as well as
chaotic tension that results in what Robertson has called ‘glocalization’,

Globalization, Empire and TESOL 7
where the global is localized and the local is globalized. They see cultural
transmission as a two-way process in which cultures in contact shape
and reshape each other directly or indirectly. They assert that the forces
of globalization and those of localization are so complex that they
cannot be understood from the narrow perspective of a center–
periphery dichotomy. The global is brought in conjunction with the
local, and the local is modifi ed to accommodate the global.
Any tension between the global and the local is seen to be resolved
through a simple accommodation that meets the needs and wants of
the receiving culture. Successful global marketing of consumer goods
involves what is called micromarketing in which products are tailored
to suit religious, cultural and ethnic demands. The American fast-food
chain McDonald’s, for instance, serves Kosher food in Israel, Halal food
in Islamic countries, and vegetarian food in India. One also fi nds certain
traditional Islamic societies embracing the consumer culture of the West
without accepting its sociocultural norms. Similarly, Asian countries like
Singapore claim to strike the right balance between Western develop-
mental processes and Asian values.
In emphasizing the ‘the twofold process of the particularization of
the universal and the universalization of the particular’ (Roland
Robertson, 1992: 177–8), the members of the third group actually draw
attention to the lofty ideal of human universality. They believe that the
particularization of the universal ‘facilitates the rise of movements
concerned with the ‘real meaning’ of the world, movements (and indi-
viduals) searching for the meaning of the world as a whole’, just as the
universalization of the particular facilitates ‘the search for the particular,
for increasingly fi ne-grained modes of identity presentation’ (178). Such
a search for global and local identities, Robertson (2003: 251) hopes,
will ultimately display ‘dynamic signs of life in the great concert of this
globalized planet’. Calling for the creation of effective strategies to
handle the challenge of cultural globalization, he urges educators to
pursue all possible alternative pedagogies which will prepare our lear-
ners to get ready to face the globalized world. There are lessons here for
TESOL practitioners. Before considering them, I shall briefl y discuss the
role of globalization’s twin: empire.
Empire and its contours
According to postcolonial scholar Robert Young (2001: 25–30), the
words ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ have ‘different histories and different
political resonances’. Ever since the Spanish created the fi rst modern

8 B. Kumaravadivelu
European empire, ‘empire’ has meant taking possession of foreign coun-
tries by means of armies and occupation, administered through a com-
bination of military and political control. ‘Imperialism’ has been used
with two prominent meanings:
It originally constituted a description of a political system of actual
conquest and occupation, but increasingly from the beginning of the
twentieth century it came to be used in its Marxist sense of a general
system of economic domination, with direct political domination
being a possible but not necessary adjunct. (Young, 2001: 26)
Imperialism, then, is characterized by the exercise of power either
through direct conquest or through political and economic infl uence
that effectively amounts to a similar form of domination.
While the Young explanation gives the traditional view of empire and
imperialism, a radically different view, one that is sensitive to the emerg-
ing process of globalization, has recently been introduced. Taking a
neo-Marxist approach, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) argue
that imperialism is a thing of the past, and has been replaced by
‘Empire’. They believe that the contemporary world has moved beyond
the imperialism of a single, powerful nation, and that the present-day
Empire does not have an identifi able location or center. In order to dif-
ferentiate their view of empire from the traditional view, they use the
word Empire, with a capital E.
Briefl y stated, Empire is the direct consequence of the economic, cul-
tural and communicational globalization outlined in the above section.
It constitutes a new form of global system ‘composed of a series of
national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of
rule’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xii). Evidently, these organisms are sustai-
ned by the economic muscle, the technological prowess, the media
power, and the political agenda of certain national and transnational
entities that operate across the globe. Hardt and Negri observe:
The passage of Empire emerges from the twilight of modern sover-
eignty. In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial
center of power and does not rely on fi xed boundaries or barriers.
It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that pro-
gressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expan-
ding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, fl exible hierarchies,
and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command.

Globalization, Empire and TESOL 9
The distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the world
have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow.
(2000: xii–xiii).
While the picture of Empire that Herdt and Negri portray has some
merit, their argument about the absence of identifi able location or
center of Empire has been disputed (Balakrishnan, 2003). It has been
pointed out that they have overlooked the possibility of the US using
its economic, political and military power in order to maintain its global
dominance. This possibility has now become a reality with the Ameri-
can unilateral action in Iraq resulting in a rude awakening to the exis-
tence of the American empire.
The American empire
The ‘shock and awe’ of the American blitzkrieg witnessed in Iraq in 2003
has triggered talks of Pax Americana – a throwback to the Pax Britan-
nica, itself an echo of the Pax Romana, suggesting that the United States
is following a pattern of imperial dominance. Scholars from various
fi elds, including political scientist Aijaz Ahmad (2004), social scientist
Benjamin Barber (2004), linguist Noam Chomsky (2003), historian Niall
Ferguson (2004), sociologist Michael Mann (2003) and others have
offered insightful views on American imperialism. While they differ in
their appraisal, they all agree on one historical fact: America has always
been an empire, ‘an empire in denial’, as Ferguson (2004: 6) puts it.
American leaders have always believed, and have always acted on
their belief, that ‘by virtue of its unique comprehension and manifesta-
tion of history’s purpose, America is entitled, indeed, obligated, to act
as its leaders determine to be best, for the good of all, whether others
understand or not’ (Chomsky, 2003: 43). Recently, the case for American
empire has been forcefully articulated by conservative intellectuals such
as Ferguson. He fi rmly believes that ‘many parts of the world would
benefi t from a period of American rule’ (2004: 2). Comparing ‘the two
Anglophone empires’, that is, Britain in the nineteenth and America in
the twentieth/twenty-fi rst centuries, and correctly making a direct
connection between globalization and empire, Ferguson argues that the
American empire can achieve much more because in ‘Britain’s imperial
heyday’, only a handful of corporations could really be described as
multinational, but today
the world economy is dominated by such fi rms, a substantial number
of which – ranging from Exxon Mobile to General Motors, from

10 B. Kumaravadivelu
McDonald’s to Coca-Cola, from Microsoft to Time Warner – are
American in origin and continue to have their headquarters in the
United States. (Ferguson, 2004: 18)
Ferguson and other conservatives have enthusiastically welcomed the
dramatic, some would say dangerous, turn to the American imperial
perspective: the doctrine of preemption. The US has for a long time
followed the principle of deterrence, that is, the promise of massive
retaliation against nations that act against its security interests. This
principle defi ned US security strategy for nearly half a century. But that
changed. In a commencement address at the military academy at West
Point on 1 June 2002, President George Bush insisted that America
needed a strategy that would ‘take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his
plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge’ (emphasis mine).
The Bush administration later fl eshed out this speech in a formal
National Security Strategy document.
The fi rst test of the doctrine of preemption, the Iraq war, has brought
to light the extent of the American power as well as its limitations.
Images of the awesome might of the American military that subdued
Iraq were beamed through satellite TV into the living rooms of millions
of people around the world. But it turned out that military superiority
can only win the war; it cannot win the peace. Testifying before the US
Senate, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richards
Myers, admitted that America has been checkmated in Iraq. ‘There is
no way to militarily lose in Iraq’, he said. ‘There is also no way to mili-
tarily win in Iraq’ (US Senate Committee on Appropriations, 2004). In
fact, a year earlier, The Economist (2003), which had been steadfastly
supporting the Iraqi invasion, commented:
So there it is. The American empire passes the duck test: it not only
looks like a duck and walks like a duck, it also quacks like a duck. In
short, the empire now proclaimed in America’s name is at best a dull
duck, at worst a dead duck.
The magazine concluded:
People nowadays are not willing to bow down before an emperor,
even a benevolent one, in order to be democratised. They will protest,
and the ensuing pain will be felt by the imperial power as well as by
its subjects.
The imperial pain is not slowing down empire building, however. In
fact, except among the radical liberal wing of the American intellectual

Globalization, Empire and TESOL 11
community (represented, for example, by Noam Chomsky) which is
opposed to any form of American empire, the debate among a number
of American politicians and academicians is not whether the US should
be an imperial power, but whether it should be a ‘hard’ imperial power
or a ‘soft’ imperial power. While conservative thinkers like Niall Fergu-
son and Paul Johnson advocate unilateralism and militarism to main-
tain American hegemony, moderates like Joseph Nye and Zbigniew
Brzezinski call for persuasion and leadership to achieve the same goal.
For Nye (2004a), soft power is the ability to get what the US wants
through persuasion rather than coercion. It is exercised through politi-
cal alliances, economic assistance and cultural exchanges. If soft power
fails, then, hard power may be employed, with the support of like-
minded allies. In a similar vein, Brzezinski (2004) calls for the establis-
hment of ‘a co-optive hegemony’ in which the US provides the leadership
of a global alliance of common interests aimed at maintaining American
hegemony. For all the subtleties, soft power ‘is merely the velvet glove
concealing an iron hand’ (Ferguson, 2004: 24).
Regardless of their preferred path, the proponents of hard as well as
soft options share the same goal: the survival and success of the Ameri-
can empire. There is also something else they share: they all see the
English language as an effective tool in the service of empire. For
instance, Nye (2004b: 19) states that ‘the most effective spokespeople’
for spreading American power abroad ‘are not Americans but indige-
nous surrogates’. He suggests English language education as one of the
ways in which America can promote indigenous surrogates:
Corporations can offer technology to modernize educational systems.
Universities can establish more exchange programs for students and
faculty. Foundations can support institutions of American studies
and programs to enhance the professionalism of journalists. Govern-
ments can support the teaching of English and fi nance student
exchanges. (2004b: 19)
Paul Johnson is even more explicit. Writing in Hoover Digest (Johnson,
2003) about ‘America’s new empire for liberty’, he enumerates several
‘compelling reasons why the United States is uniquely endowed to
exercise this kind of global authority’. And, his very fi rst compelling
reason is:
America has the language of the twenty-fi rst century, English. As fi rst
the Greeks, then the Romans, discovered, possession of a common

12 B. Kumaravadivelu
language is the fi rst vital and energizing step toward embracing
common norms of law, behavior, and culture. A more secure world
will be legislated for, policed, and adjudicated in English.
There is, of course, nothing novel about these observations. English has
been used for policing and adjudicating a ‘secure world’ for a long
time.
English and its connections
Historically speaking, language has always been a good traveling com-
panion of empire. The problem is that, even when the colonial masters
are forced to leave the occupied land, their tongue lingers on. While
this is true of all colonial languages, this is particularly true of English
because of the length and breadth of British colonialism. According to
some, English just happened to be in the right place at the right time
(Crystal, 1997), but according to others it rode on the back of colonia-
lism (Pennycook, 1998). The Economist magazine summed it all up when
it asserted that English is just ‘a world empire by other means’ (2001).
The insidious nature of English linguistic imperialism (Phillipson, 1992),
the imperial character that still adheres to it (Pennycook, 1998), the
indelible impact it has had on the identities of the colonized people
(Krishnaswamy and Burde, 1998) and the indefatigable attempts to
resist its imposition (Canagarajah, 1999) have all been well documented.
There is, of course, nothing inherent in any language that makes it
colonial. A language takes on colonial coloration when it is used as a
tool to serve the cause of empire. The history of English language and
English language teaching (ELT) shows that its colonial coloration has
four interrelated dimensions – scholastic, linguistic, cultural, and eco-
nomic (see Kumaravadivelu, 2003b for details). Briefl y, the scholastic
dimension of English relates to the ways in which Western scholars have
furthered their own vested interests by disseminating Western knowledge
and by denigrating local knowledge. The linguistic dimension pertains
to the ways in which the knowledge and use of local language(s) were
made irrelevant for learning and teaching English as an additional lan-
guage. The cultural dimension integrates the teaching of English lan-
guage with the teaching of Western culture with the view to developing
in the L2 learners cultural empathy towards the target language com-
munity. These three dimensions are linked to a vitally important
economic dimension that adds jobs and wealth to the economy of
English-speaking countries through a worldwide ELT industry. Collecti-

Globalization, Empire and TESOL 13
vely, then, these four colonial dimensions have served, and continue to
serve, the interests of English-speaking countries as well as native spea-
kers and native-speaking professionals.
If the coloniality of the English language is undeniable, so is its glo-
bality. ‘A language achieves a genuinely global status’, observes David
Crystal (1997: 2), ‘when it develops a special role that is recognized in
every country.’ Clearly, English has achieved such a role. It has become
the world’s lingua franca. Because of its association with global economy,
it is deemed to be ‘the natural choice for progress’ (Crystal, 1997: 75).
It is seen as opening doors for social mobility. As Robert Phillipson
(2003: 16) observes:
English has acquired a narcotic power in many parts of the world,
an addiction that has long-term consequences that are far from clear.
As with the drugs trade, in its legal and illegal branches, there are
major commercial interests involved in the global English language
industry.
English as a language of global communication also doubles as an effec-
tive tool of global propaganda in times of war and peace (see Collins
and Glover, 2003; Silberstein, 2002 for details).
To sum up, the current phase of globalization, aided by transnational
entities and powerful regimes, is affecting the economic and cultural
lives of people all over the world. It is safe to suggest that while naked
colonialism in the form of territorial occupation will not go unchallen-
ged, empire in the form of neocolonial hegemonic control will go on
unchanged. English, as a global language, will continue to serve the
communicational needs as well as the propaganda purposes of both
globalization and empire. The mutually advantageous liaison between
the project of globalization, the power of empire, and the politics of
English is complex but clear. And, all three are here to stay for a foreseea-
ble future. It is at the busy and dangerous intersection where the three
meet that TESOL professionals have found their calling.
TESOL and its conduits
By virtue of operating at the intersection, TESOL professionals may be
perceived, rightly or wrongly, ‘as a second wave of imperial troopers’,
who move in to perform the unspoken role of ‘facilitating the consent
that hegemony requires so that the fi st can be returned to the glove’
(Edge, 2003: 703). That this is more than a mere perception is borne
out by recent reports from Iraq and other parts of the Middle East. An

14 B. Kumaravadivelu
article on the role of language in Arab educational reforms that appeared
in Al Jazeera.net (Chughtai, 2004) warns:
The concept of English as a modern Trojan horse carrying a different
set of beliefs and views into hostile territory has reared its head in
Iraq, where ELT intertwined with missionary work has enjoyed a
post-war surge.
In response, there has emerged a group of ELT professionals in the
Middle East who have formed an organization called TESOL Islamia.
The chief mission of this Abu Dhabi-based professional organization is
to promote ELT in ways that best serve the sociopolitical, sociocultural
and socioeconomic interests of the Islamic world. According to their
website (www.tesolislamia.org), one of their goals is ‘promoting and
safeguarding Islamic values in the teaching of English as a second or
foreign language in the Muslim World’. To achieve their goals, they wish
to take
a critical stance towards ‘mainstream’ TESOL activity particularly in
the area of language policy, curriculum design, materials develop-
ment, language testing, teaching methodology, program evaluation,
and second language research.
Even a cursory reading of fi les in their ‘Discussion Forum’ reveals that
they are all seized upon the impact of the politics of globalization,
empire and TESOL. The periphery has declared its intentions to distance
itself from the center. Whether it will be able to convert its admirable
intentions into actionable plans remains to be seen.
There are signs that a segment of the center itself has started taking
a self-critical stance towards mainstream TESOL activity (see Ricento,
2000; Block and Cameron, 2002; and Tollefson, 2002). Several contri-
butors to the Block and Cameron volume on Globalization and Language
Teaching make useful suggestions to deal with the theoretical and peda-
gogic implications of globalization. One of its editors, Deborah Cameron,
herself warns against using globalization as a pretext to make language
no more than
a vehicle for the affi rmation of similar values and beliefs, and for the
enactment by speakers of similar social identities and roles. Language
becomes a global product available in different local fl avours.
(Cameron, 2002: 69–70)

Globalization, Empire and TESOL 15
Sadly, presenting a global product in different local fl avors is precisely
what seems to be happening. A striking example comes from John Gray
who gives us a glimpse of the ways that the lucrative ELT textbook
industry can present its centrally controlled, global product with various
local emphases. He discusses two possible approaches to producing
global coursebooks for local markets. One approach, meant for large
international markets, is for the textbook industry
to produce materials which are tailor-made and take into consider-
ation the number of hours students are expected to devote to English,
the methodologies to be used, and the themes which have to be
addressed. (Gray, 2002: 165)
The second, meant for smaller international markets, involves the pro-
duction of a core text but with ‘the variety of add-ons’ to meet the
demand for a local fi t. He advises the global textbook industry to follow
‘editionizing’, a process by which national newspapers customize for
local readership. Interestingly, this is very similar to the process of
‘micromarketing’ used by transnational corporations to sell global pro-
ducts in local markets. With editionizing, Gray reckons ‘globalization
has the potential to increase rather than threaten diversity’ (165). That
may be true in terms of diversity of topics and themes. But, what is
being overlooked here is that it also has the potential to increase the
center’s fi rm grip over textbook authorship and production, and to
threaten any possible devolution of power and authority to the peri-
phery ELT community. Diversity without devolution can be dubious.
One should also be aware (beware?) of the use of postmodern and
postcolonial vocabulary that masks the attempts to preserve the status
quo. Nothing brings out this concern more than a recent proposal by
Sue Wright (2004) who concludes that the only solution to the language
problem faced by the globalized world is for the people all over the
world to become bilingual. She recommends that people should learn
‘the group language’ which is, in most cases, their native language, and
‘the language of wider diffusion’, which is, of course, English. She
asserts:
The group language provides for socialisation, rootedness, continuity
and identity and the language of wider diffusion allows access to
higher education, international networks, to information in the
international arena, to social and geographical mobility.
(Wright, 2004: 250)

16 B. Kumaravadivelu
What she does not pursue is the distinct possibility that, for all practical
purposes, her brand of bilingualism for the world would mean only one
thing: native speakers of English will have the luxury of remaining
monolingual while all others will have to learn their language.
The issue is not whether non-English speakers should learn English
or not. The globality of the language, the connectedness of world
economy, and the power of the Anglophone empire will all ensure that
English will continue to reign supreme. The issue, in my view, is one of
diffi culty and discrimination encountered by non-native speakers of
English as well as the power and privilege enjoyed by native speakers
of English. The dominance of the English-speaking monolingual also
enshrines the issue raised by Robert Phillipson (2003), who observes in
the context of language policy in the European Union, that what is
at stake here is whether it is reasonable to expect that someone speak-
ing a foreign language should use the language in exactly the same
way as a native speaker. Anyone who functions regularly in a foreign
language knows how extremely challenging it is to express oneself
in the same degree of complexity, persuasiveness, and correctness as
in one’s mother tongue. (140)
Wondering whether monolinguals in Britain and the United States even
see the problem where others are obliged to function in English, he
states:
Those of us who have gone through the demanding process of learn-
ing a second language well, and use one regularly, are likely to be in
a better position to understand the predicament of users of English
or French as a foreign language. (Phillipson, 2003: 141)
In spite of the indisputable inequities, Wright goes on to predict an
egalitarian outcome:
There may be all the advantages that accrue to those who possess the
language of power and there may be a hierarchy that puts non-native
speakers in a weaker position, but, as the language is taken up in
more and more sites, the advantages are spread more widely.
(2004: 250)
Coming as it does in the penultimate page of the book, this unexplained
and unsubstantiated claim leaves it to the reader to fi gure out how and

Globalization, Empire and TESOL 17
when the advantages will spread. Or, whose advantage will spread.
What is also left to the reader to wonder is the debilitating nature of
the native and non-native bifurcation among English-language educa-
tors (see Braine, 1999), and the long and lingering history of the scho-
lastic, linguistic, cultural and economic dimensions of the coloniality
of the English language mentioned earlier (see Kumaravadivelu, 2003b).
As Walter Mignolo (1998) succinctly puts it:
The question is not so much the number of speakers as it is the
hegemonic power of colonial languages in the domain of knowledge,
intellectual production, and cultures of scholarship. (41)
Relocating TESOL
The confl icts and consequences wrought by the dangerous liaison
between globalization, empire and English demand that we go beyond
the superfi cial and the surreptitious. What is needed is transformative
restructuring of the TESOL professional activity. Focusing on broader
aims and strategies rather than specifi c objectives and tactics, I contend
that any transformative restructuring would require signifi cant shifts in
our philosophical, pedagogical and attitudinal investment.
Philosophical investment
Any serious attempt by the TESOL profession to meet the challenges of
globalization and empire has to begin with the philosophical under-
pinnings of its mission and goals. One of its chief goals is to help its
members ‘foster effective communication in diverse settings while
respecting individuals’ language rights’ (cited in the front pages of
TESOL Quarterly). Fostering effective communication in diverse settings
is more than a matter of respecting individuals’ language rights. As
Hardt and Negri (2000) point out in the context of Empire:
If communication has increasingly become the fabric of production,
and if linguistic cooperation has increasingly become the structure
of productive corporeality, then the control over linguistic sense and
meaning and the networks of communication becomes an ever more
central issue for political struggle. (404)
We need to recognize that in a globalized and globalizing world, lan-
guage rights cannot be separated from social, political and cultural
rights.

18 B. Kumaravadivelu
Connecting the linguistic with the social, political and cultural is
what seems to be the intention of one of the TESOL caucuses, TESOLers
for Social Responsibility. Its goal, according to its website (www2.tesol.
org/mbr/caucuses/tsr/htm), is to integrate language teaching with social
responsibility, world citizenship, and an awareness of global issues, such
as peace, human rights, and the environment. It is, however, interesting
to note that the word ‘political’ does not appear even once in the cau-
cus’s brief statement of purpose or in its lengthy statement about teach-
ing, research, networking, advocacy and professional development. I
wonder how the caucus can even begin to address its stated goals
without considering the politics of globalization, empire and English.
If we consider the politics of globalization, empire and English seri-
ously, then we understand its close connection to the politics of iden-
tity. Recognizing the importance of individual identity in the era of
globalization, the United Nations has chosen ‘cultural liberty in today’s
diverse world’ as the thematic focus for its latest Human Development
Report (UNDP, 2004). According to the report:
Cultural liberty is a vital part of human development because being
able to choose one’s identity – who one is – without losing the respect
of others or being excluded from other choices is important in leading
a full life. (1)
Linking cultural liberty to language rights and human development, the
report argues that there is
no more powerful means of ‘encouraging’ individuals to assimilate
to a dominant culture than having the economic, social and political
returns stacked against their mother tongue. Such assimilation is not
freely chosen if the choice is between one’s mother tongue and one’s
future. (33)
There are those who believe, not without justifi cation, that the eco-
nomic, social and political returns are stacked in favor of English and
against their mother tongue, both at international (Phillipson, 2003)
and, in certain cases, at intranational (Ramanathan, 2004) levels. Some
others also see English as a Trojan Horse, a hidden threat to one’s cul-
tural liberty. In such an atmosphere, the TESOL profession ought to
show its sensitivity and sincerity by making a good faith attempt to
create, as the UN report suggests, ‘an environment in which multiple
identities fl ourish’ (42).

Globalization, Empire and TESOL 19
One of the avenues open for the TESOL profession to create an envi-
ronment in which multiple identities fl ourish is to move away from the
prevailing notion of English as a cultural carrier to English as a com-
municational tool. Varieties of English such as Indian English, Nigerian
English and Singaporean English represent the extent to which a foreign
language can be profi tably reconstructed into a vehicle for expressing
norms and networks that are typically local. Creative writers such as
Salmon Rushdie, Chinua Achebe and others have shown how the
Western language can be used for communicating sociocultural nuances
that are completely alien to Western culture. Cultural critics such as
Frederic Jameson (1998: 59) are never tired of pointing out that ‘for
most people in the world English itself is not exactly a culture language:
it is the lingua franca of money and power, which you have to learn to
use for practical but scarcely for aesthetic purposes’. Common people
who speak English as an additional language use it to meet their indi-
vidual and institutional needs, and, for most part, keep it separate from
their cultural beliefs and practices (Krishnaswamy and Burde, 1998). For
them, English is a language of communicational necessity, not of cul-
tural identity.
While the world at large seems to be treating English as a vehicle for
global communication, a sizable segment of the TESOL profession con-
tinues to be informed by an anachronistic anthropological belief in
the inextricability of the language–culture connection. TESOL textbooks
continue to use the English language as a cultural carrier. There are
instances where academic papers presented at professional conferences
propagate an ethnocentric view of culture learning and culture teaching
(Kumaravadivelu, 2002). Even textbooks on intercultural communica-
tion, with very few exceptions, still treat Western cultural practices as
the communicational norm for intercultural communication across the
globe. As Cameron (2002) correctly points out, we
know of no case in which the communicative norms of a non-
Western, or indeed non-Anglophone society have been exported by
expert consultants. Finns do not run workshops for British businesses
on the virtues of talking less; Japanese are not invited to instruct
Americans in speaking indirectly. (70)
Clearly, the TESOL profession cannot remain oblivious to the fact that
globalization has resulted in greater contacts between people of differ-
ent cultures, leading to a better awareness of each other’s values and
visions, and to a fi rmer resolve to preserve and protect one’s cultural

20 B. Kumaravadivelu
liberty. Besides, the profession can only gain by recognizing, and by
seriously acting on the recognition, that
what the current stage of globalization is enacting is (unconsciously)
the uncoupling of the ‘natural’ link between languages and nations.
Thus, it is creating the condition for and enacting the relocation of
languages and the fracture of cultures. (Mignolo, 1998: 42)
What such relocation entails is that language teachers cannot afford to
ignore the global reality that infl uences identity formation in the class-
room, nor can they afford to separate the linguistic needs of learners
from their sociocultural needs. Consequently, ‘language teachers cannot
hope to fully satisfy their pedagogic obligations without at the same
time satisfying their social obligations’ (Kumaravadivelu, 2001: 544).
Pedagogic investment
Satisfying pedagogic obligations itself warrants a different kind of peda-
gogic investment in which the center–periphery relationship is reviewed
and reconceptualized. Such an attempt would necessarily involve three
major areas of TESOL activity: instructional materials, teaching methods
and teacher education. As mentioned earlier, textbook preparation and
production remain a centrally controlled, globally targeted activity
with very little role for local ELT professionals. To be relevant, textbooks
should refl ect the experiences teachers and students bring to the class-
room, experiences that are shaped by the social, economic and political
environment in which they operate. Instead of using the process of
globalization merely to re-center the textbook industry, as is happening
now, what needs to be done is to de-center it so that the periphery ELT
community which is knowledgeable about local needs, wants and situ-
ations can legitimately enjoy a meaningful sense of authorial ownership
and professional contribution.
Similarly, any serious commitment to relocate TESOL methods would
demand a move beyond the centralized concept of method and towards
the localized concept of postmethod. The construction of method is
basically a top-down exercise that adheres to idealized concepts geared
towards idealized contexts. Since the audiolingualism of the 1940s,
TESOL has seen one method after another roll out of Western universi-
ties and through Western publishing houses to spread out all over the
world. On each occasion, teachers in other countries and other cultures
have been assured that this one is the correct one, and that their role
is to adapt it to their learners, or their learners to it.

Globalization, Empire and TESOL 21
The concept of postmethod seeks to help the periphery ELT commu-
nity to activate its latent agency. It is governed by the parameters of
particularity, practicality and possibility (see Kumaravadivelu, 2003a).
The parameter of particularity seeks to facilitate the advancement of a
context-sensitive, location-specifi c pedagogy that is based on a true
understanding of local linguistic, sociocultural and political particulari-
ties. The parameter of practicality seeks to rupture the reifi ed role
relationship between theorizers and practitioners by enabling and
encouraging teachers to theorize from their practice and practice what
they theorize. The parameter of possibility seeks to tap the sociopolitical
consciousness that students bring with them to the classroom so that
it can function as a catalyst for a continual quest for identity formation
and social transformation.
Postmethod pedagogy provides one possible way to be responsive to
the lived experiences of learners and teachers, and to the local exigen-
cies of learning and teaching. It also
opens up new opportunities for the expertise of language teachers in
periphery contexts to be recognized and valued (and) makes it more
feasible for teachers to acknowledge and work with the diversity of
the learners in their classrooms, guided by local assessments of stu-
dents’ strategies for learning rather than by global directives from
remote authorities. (Block and Cameron, 2002: 10)
A context-sensitive postmethod pedagogy that encompasses location-
specifi c teaching strategies and instructional materials cannot evolve
in a pedagogic vacuum. It requires the development of teachers who
are autonomous decision makers. TESOL teacher education programs,
therefore, have to move away from the prevailing transmission model
which is designed to pass on a body of received wisdom from the teacher
educator to the prospective teacher, and move towards a transforma-
tional model which helps them develop the knowledge, skill, attitude
and autonomy necessary to construct their own theory of practice.
The objective is to produce self-directing and self-determining teachers
capable of refl ecting upon, and shaping, their own pedagogic experi-
ences, and eventually transforming such experiences.
Attitudinal investment
The philosophical and pedagogical investments deemed to be necessary
to restructure TESOL activity cannot be expected to yield rich dividends
unless they are buttressed by attitudinal changes. There is no gainsaying

22 B. Kumaravadivelu
the fact that, at the broadest level, the TESOL profession is divided on
the accent line – those who speak English natively and those who do
not. One of the ways in which this division manifests itself is through
the profession’s attitude towards marginality. Historically, there has
been a tendency to valorize the native Self and marginalize the non-
native Other. While there indeed are noteworthy exceptions on both
sides of the accent line, the general attitude that prevails today can be
characterized by the process of marginalization and the practice of self-
marginalization (see Kumaravadivelu, 2003b, for details).
The process of marginalization pertains to the ways in which the
coloniality of the English language with its scholastic, linguistic, eco-
nomic and cultural dimensions is exploited to maintain the authority
of the center over the periphery. It seeks to preserve the dominance of
interested Western knowledge over subjugated local knowledge by
steadfastly adhering to some of the fl awed practices, such as proclaiming
the superiority of native-speaking professionals over non-native ones,
discouraging the use of mother tongue in TESOL education, treating
monolingual speakers and societies as norms for forming hypotheses
about bilingual development, and delinking the investigative processes
of learning and teaching from sociolinguistic contexts and historical
realities of language use.
The practice of self-marginalization refers to the ways in which the
periphery surrenders its voice and vision to the center. That is, members
of the dominated group, knowingly or unknowingly, legitimize the
characteristics of inferiority attributed to them by the dominating
group. The TESOL profession is replete with instances where, in certain
periphery communities, program administrators ‘require’ or at least
‘prefer’ native speakers to carry out teaching and consultancy, and
teachers and teacher educators look up to native speakers for inspiration
thinking that they have ready-made answers to all the recurrent prob-
lems of classroom teaching (Nayar, 2002). By their uncritical acceptance
of the native speaker dominance, non-native professionals legitimize
their own marginalization. Both the process of marginalization and the
practice of self-marginalization bring to the fore the coloniality, rather
than the globality, of the English language. They cast a long, hegemonic
shadow over the activity of TESOL.
In closing
In this chapter, I have attempted to highlight the dangerous liaison that
exists between the forces of globalization, empire and TESOL. I have

Globalization, Empire and TESOL 23
argued that, whether they know it or not and whether they like it or
not, most TESOL professionals end up serving the profi t motives of
global corporations and the political motives of imperial powers. I have
also argued that only fundamental restructuring, not superfi cial appro-
priation, can help us begin to combat the consequences of the liaison.
Finally, I have called for philosophical, pedagogical and attitudinal
investments that are absolutely essential for any meaningful relocation
of the TESOL activity. TESOL cannot remain insulated and isolated from
the growing awareness across the world of the impact of globalization
and empire.
I recognize that transformative restructuring is a challenge that
involves multiple tasks by multiple players. The most intractable chal-
lenge of all is to seek abdication of authority on the part of center
professionals, and acceleration of agency on the part of periphery com-
munities. Neither of them is easy to accomplish because each of them
demands a new mindset that is yet to crystallize. While I have no illu-
sions about the enormity of the task and the power of the historical,
political and economic forces arraigned against it, I also believe that we
should not allow the challenges to paralyze us from initiating appropri-
ate action, if only because the status quo is neither desirable nor
defensible.
In this context, a word of wisdom from postcolonial critic Gayatri
Spivak is worth considering. Pointing out that the discipline of Com-
parative Literature has been, not unlike TESOL, subject to colonial and
neocolonial projects, and stressing the need to free it from the imperial
shackles, she observes:
We cannot not try to open up, from the inside, the colonialism
of European national language-based Comparative Literature and
the Cold War format of Area Studies, and infect history and anthro-
pology with the ‘other’ as producer of knowledge. From the inside,
acknowledging complicity. No accusations. No excuses. Rather,
learning the protocol of those disciplines, turning them around,
laboriously, not only by building institutional bridges but also
by persistent curricular interventions. The most diffi cult thing here
is to resist mere appropriation by the dominant.
(Spivak, 2003: 10–11)
I believe Spivak’s prescription for the practitioners of Comparative
Literature is a good prescription for the practitioners of TESOL as well.

24 B. Kumaravadivelu
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227
Index
academic discourse 50, 150
action research 106
additive multilingualism 142
affect 115, 172, 175, 191
Afghanistan, xii 30, 122, 208,
210–11, 214–15, 224
air-traffi c (and mariners) 158,
214
alienation 90
American foreign policy 104,
195, 197, 206
Americanization 5
anarchism 43
anti-capitalism 85, 99
anti-war 49–50, 52–4, 56–8, 63,
85, 99
apartheid xvii, 139–43, 155–6
arrogance 46, 88
articulation 78, 105–7, 141
assessment 21, 43, 62, 110, 136,
164–8, 176, 222
asylum seekers 35, 96–7
authoritarianism 216
belief systems 199
bilingual education 120, 124–6,
128, 131, 135
branding 87, 90–1
British Council 1, 36, 90–1,
209–10, 212, 215, 219, 222,
225
Buzzfl ash.com 57
capitalism 3, 30, 36, 84–5, 99,
126, 130–3, 146, 172
Celtic 92
certainty v. doubt 195, 198–200,
206
children’s animated fi lms 58–62
Christianity 181, 195–204
colleagues xvi, 104, 108, 167,
182
colonialism 2–3, 12–13, 23, 38,
66, 85, 98, 139–40
commercial globalization xiii,
xvi, 13, 33, 38, 96, 98, 133,
147, 185
communicative competence 165
community of practice 145
conservation 162
conservativeness 9–11, 71, 74,
76, 188, 196–8, 204
continuing development 104–5
conversion (to
Christianity) 198–9, 202–3,
223
cooperation 3, 17, 30, 33, 219,
225
corporate identity 4–5, 90, 92,
94–5, 99
critical discourse analysis 51
critical media awareness xvi,
49–51, 53, 58, 63
critical media literacy 49–50, 54,
56–7
cross-regional content 40
curriculum xiv, 14, 41, 46, 71,
100, 147, 158–9, 162, 165–8,
200, 222
customers xvii, 96–7, 220
decadence 178–8
democracy 34–5, 63, 75, 100,
179, 208, 213, 219
dialogic critical teaching 53, 59,
146
dialogue 63, 68, 70, 189, 201–2,
206, 219
discourse xvii, 43, 50–1, 58, 65,
68, 73, 75, 85–6, 88–93, 150,
185–6, 189–91
Disney 6, 61–2
diversity 15–16, 34–5, 66, 72,
90, 127, 130–1, 134, 155,
162–3, 165–6, 171, 190,
199–200, 224
dominance xiv, 9, 16, 22, 27,
30, 38, 40, 51, 84, 98

228 Index
egality 16, 188
elite xvii, 27–8, 30–1, 68, 120,
128, 132
empathy 12, 35, 46, 116–17,
174
empire xiii, xv, xix, 1–3, 7–14,
16–18, 22–3, 79, 84, 104,
116–17, 189–90, 195, 199,
212
Empire 8–9, 17, 66–7, 74
English-mainly 139, 141–4
English-only xvii, 37, 119, 121,
124–9, 139, 141–4, 155
entrepreneurial activity 28, 30,
92
environment 113, 127
ethics xv, xviii, 120, 131,
178–9, 208–9, 211, 213–14,
225
ethnicity 52, 58, 61–2, 134–5
ethnocentrism 70, 172, 177
European Social Forum 100
evangelicalism vxiii, 195–206
expanding circle xviii, 159–60,
162, 164–7
exploitation xvii, 33, 38, 46,
128
Fairness and Accuracy in
Reporting (FAIR), 57
foreign language education 65,
68, 72, 121–2, 124, 128, 135,
190
foreign policy 104, 195–6, 206
fragmentation 31, 125
framing process 74, 76, 78–9
free market 3, 88, 197
fundamentalism 6, 100, 223
gender xix, 58, 60–2, 134, 177
genre 53
globalization xiii, xv, xvi, 1–23,
41, 66–7, 69, 72, 84–5, 87,
89–91, 100, 155, 171–2, 210
glocalization 6
hedonism 178
hegemony xiv, xv, xviii, 11, 13,
30–1, 37, 52–3, 62, 89, 119,
125, 127, 130, 149, 168, 172,
211–12
heritage xvii, 31, 35, 119–20,
122–3, 126–33
heterosexuality 185
homosexuality 185
humanitarian 208, 210
hybrid xvi, 8, 67–9, 72, 204
idealism/realism, xv 46
identity xvii, 8, 15, 18–21,
29–31, 33–5, 39–40, 43, 45,
52, 99, 130, 135, 140, 143–6,
152, 155, 154–6, 163, 171,
173, 224
ideology x, 4, 44, 54, 61, 84–7,
89–91, 93, 96–7, 99–101,
124–5, 129, 131, 224
immorality xviii, 179
imperialism xiii, 1–4, 7–13, 23,
35–6, 38, 42–3, 47, 66–7,
84–5, 91, 98, 108, 116, 119,
129, 140, 146, 159, 166, 172,
195–6, 204, 208–9, 211–12,
223–4
inclusiveness 220–1
independence 31, 187, 223
India 2–3, 6–7, 19, 29, 72, 85,
88, 139
individual xii, xiii, xvi, xvii,
xviii, 5, 7, 17–19, 28, 32–3,
36, 38–9, 43, 45–6, 54, 57,
71, 74–6, 78–9, 87–9, 93,
97, 104–5, 109, 111–12,
115–16, 123, 125, 127–31,
155, 161, 173–4, 175–8,
181–2, 187–8, 199–202, 208,
213, 217, 223
inner circle 85, 159–60, 162,
165–6, 172
innovation 65, 68, 142
insight 9, 110, 113, 132, 146,
154
intelligibility 41, 66
intercultural competence 171–2,
175, 190–1
international language 45–6,
158–60, 166, 168, 172, 190,
213, 224

Index 229
Internet 4, 30, 40–2, 44, 68, 99,
158, 163–4
interoperability xix, 213–16,
219–20
interpellation xvi, 52–4, 58, 60
intersubjectivity 65
intranationality 18, 159
Iraq xii, xiii, xiv, 9–10, 13–14,
22, 30, 33, 45, 49, 53, 55, 58,
63–4, 84, 88, 108, 110,
112–13, 122, 208, 210–12,
214–15, 223–4
Ireland 87–8, 92–4, 98, 101, 211
Irish education 93
labour mobility 33
laissez-faire 88
language and ideology 86
language ecology 135
language identity 145, 154
language planning 31–4
language policy xvii, 14, 16,
31–2, 34, 37, 46, 121, 132,
141–5, 147
legitimacy 54, 134, 160
liberal points of view 3, 10, 130,
142, 178, 204, 213
liberation xiv, xvii, 41, 120
linguicism 85
linguistic human rights 130,
135
linguistic nationalism 31
linguistics xiv, xv, 12, 17–18,
20–2, 24, 27, 30–1, 34–7, 39,
40–5, 53–4, 58, 69, 71–2, 82,
85–6, 88, 107, 116, 199,
122–3, 125–8, 130–2, 134–5,
140, 144, 146, 149–50, 152,
154, 156, 159–60, 132–3,
166–8, 173–5, 177, 189, 198,
209, 213–14
literature xiii, xvii, 2, 5, 23,
34, 41, 44, 105, 143, 156,
166, 172, 174–5, 177, 180,
198
localness xiii, xvii, 2, 6, 7, 12,
14–15, 19–22, 33–8, 40–1,
45–6, 66, 70, 75–7, 79, 87–8,
90, 93, 133, 140–2, 155,
160–1, 164–5, 167–8, 178,
186, 191, 208, 210, 215,
217–22, 245
marginality xvii, 22, 29, 36–8,
145–7, 154, 179, 211
market 3–4, 7, 15, 43–4, 46, 66,
69, 72, 84, 87–8, 91, 94–6,
100, 123, 197, 212, 223
materialism 158, 178–9, 186,
188
materials xvi, xix, 14–15, 20–1,
72, 75, 111, 114, 122, 161–3,
168, 172, 174, 190, 197, 208,
217–18, 221, 223, 225
McDonald’s 5, 7, 10, 69
McWorld 5
media xvi, 6, 8, 39, 49–58,
61–3, 66–7, 69, 75, 122,
140–1, 146, 163, 174–5, 178,
181, 183, 186–8, 190
metaphor xiv, xvi, 38, 42, 96–8,
100, 107, 123, 153, 215
method xvi, xviii, xix, 14–15,
20, 50, 53–4, 58, 71, 73, 86,
113, 139, 141–2, 145, 147–8,
150, 154–5, 166, 175, 200,
204, 213, 215, 218, 220–1,
226
migration 31, 50, 66, 92, 96,
115, 181
military xiii, xiv, xvi, xviii, 2,
8–10, 23, 35, 55, 84, 88,
100–1, 104, 119, 122, 127,
188, 195, 197, 208, 210–19,
221–3, 225
minority xviii, 40, 126, 128–9,
132–3, 135, 147–8
‘mission civilisatrice’, 189
models 30, 35, 41–2
modernity 2, 3, 7, 11, 14, 31,
36, 44, 67, 73, 80, 91, 99,
109, 167, 171–2, 175, 178,
189, 196, 200, 203, 205
modesty 46
monoculturalism 70
morality xviii, 121, 178–9, 181,
186, 195, 197, 201, 209, 225
motivation 37, 106, 129, 171

230 Index
multiculturality xvi, 29, 72, 86,
120, 224
multidialectism 40
multilingualism 27, 29, 40, 99,
120, 125, 135, 142–3, 150
multinationality 9, 28, 44, 84,
88, 95, 98, 99, 110–11, 214,
219
mutuality 215–16, 219–21
nation-states 31, 72
national security xvii, 10,
119–22, 125, 128–9, 131–5
nationalism 31, 33
native language 15, 31, 126–7,
150, 181
native speakers xvi, 13, 16, 22,
35, 38–41, 44–6, 150, 165–6,
189
nativization 160
neo-conservatism 196–8
neo-imperialism 119, 195–6,
223
neo-liberalism 84, 86–91, 93,
95–100, 144
new world order 40, 66, 84–6,
100
non-defensive attitude 107, 116
non-judgemental attitude xvi,
105, 107, 114, 116–17, 135
non-native speakers 38, 41, 62,
154, 166
non-standard 142, 152
norms 4, 7, 12, 19, 22, 66, 144,
154–5, 160, 164–5, 167
objectivity 174
outer circle 159–60, 163
particularization 7
Pax Americana 9, 189
peacekeeping 208, 212–17, 221,
225
pedagogy xv, xvi, xviii, xix, 14,
17, 20–1, 23, 50–1, 71, 75,
95, 111, 113, 140, 154, 165,
168, 191, 200, 224
peripherality 145, 154
planting seeds 202
policy xvii, 14, 16, 31–5, 37, 46,
50, 92–3, 95–6, 99, 104, 121,
127, 132–3, 140–5, 147,
154–6, 195–7, 206, 209
political, the xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, 3,
5, 7–9, 11, 14, 17–18, 20–1,
23, 27, 30, 32–4, 36, 39–40,
43–4, 46, 50–1, 66–8, 70, 72,
75–6, 79, 85–6, 90, 98, 101,
109–12, 116, 119–20, 124–7,
130–1, 133–4, 142, 159,
176–7, 180, 182, 195–8,
208–9, 211–12, 214, 216
postcolonialism 1, 7, 15, 23
postmethod 20–1, 140, 155
postmodern 15, 135, 195, 199,
200, 205
power xii, xiii, xv, xvi, 1, 4,
8–11, 13, 15–19, 23, 30–3,
35–8, 40, 42–7, 51–2, 54, 58,
60, 62, 66–7, 70–2, 77, 84–9,
97, 99, 101, 119–20, 124–7,
129, 131–4, 142, 167, 172,
187, 196–7, 199, 208,
210–11, 215, 224
primary allegiance 39
primary socialization 39
progressivity 179, 188, 198
Project for a New American
Century 84
propaganda 13, 191
race 52, 61–2, 85, 99, 120,
134–5, 151–2, 154, 173
register 53, 150
relativism 174, 189, 195
religion 175, 178–80, 211
relocation xv 1, 20, 23, 65, 116
repertoire 29, 42, 45, 68, 215
research 14, 18, 32, 34–5, 73,
75, 80, 91–2, 94–6, 121, 128,
132, 139, 143–6, 154, 171–2,
175–6, 188, 199, 201, 212
resistance xvi, 31, 33, 40, 49,
52–4, 57–8, 95, 100, 141, 205
respect xv, xvii, xix, 17–18, 34,
116–17, 132, 134, 159, 162,
172–3, 181–2, 187–8, 213,
216, 219, 224

Index 231
rhetoric 53, 79, 99, 121, 132,
151
rights 17–18, 36–7, 120, 127,
130, 135, 139, 143, 159,
185, 187, 208, 213, 216, 219,
225
scaffolding 189
secularity 179, 196, 198
security xvii, 10, 119–22, 125,
128–9, 131–3, 135, 208,
210–15, 217, 219, 221, 223
self-development 105, 114
self-marginalization 22
servant leadership 214
servitude 178
sexuality 134, 184–5
sincerity 18, 116–17
social 2, 5, 9, 13–15, 17–18,
20–1, 32–3, 39–40, 50–2,
60–1, 63, 65–74, 78–9, 85–7,
89–91, 93, 97–100, 113,
119–20, 123, 125–8, 131–5,
139, 144–5, 152, 154, 172–3,
177–8, 181–2, 184, 186–8,
202, 205
sociolinguistic xvii, 22, 37, 58,
61, 85, 158, 166–7, 175
soft power 11, 85, 101
speech community 32, 38–9, 43
standard 5, 34, 41, 62–3, 99,
142, 146, 152, 154, 160, 164,
180–1, 221
stereotyping xviii, 28–9, 35, 46,
62, 70, 171–2, 191, 201
strong discourse 86, 88–9
subjectivity 178, 185, 195
supra-regionality 41
sustainability 213, 219, 222–3
synergy 98, 225
teacher development 73, 116,
221
technology 3–4, 5, 8, 11, 28, 29,
30, 40, 43, 180, 184, 186,
188, 208, 215, 218
terrorism 210, 223
terrorist 211
TESOL Islamia 14, 180, 224
textbook 15, 19–20, 72, 75, 110,
162–3, 175, 188–9
theorization 72, 105–6
traditionality xv, 7–8, 30, 38,
41, 50, 73, 92, 128, 160,
162–3, 166, 181–2, 185, 196,
204
transcription 76, 80, 107
transformational model 21, 133
transmission 7, 21, 71
transnationality 4, 8, 13, 15, 66,
92, 95, 212
universalization 7
values xii, xv, xviii, xix, 3–4, 7,
14, 19, 37, 47, 61–2, 66–7,
71–2, 93, 129, 162, 172,
175–82, 185–7, 189–91, 195,
199–200, 216, 219, 223
victimization 46
vision 91, 120, 131–3, 135, 189,
213, 222, 224
war xiii, 3, 10, 13–14, 23,
49–50, 52–8, 63, 84–6, 89,
99, 110, 112–13, 122,
209–10, 213–14, 223
Washington Consensus 87–8, 99
West, the 3, 5–7, 12, 19–20, 22,
155, 178–84, 187–90, 195,
204, 215
witnessing 197, 202
World Englishes 101, 163–4,
166
World Social Forum 85, 99–100
Zapatista 99, 210