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Mapping Business-Peace Interactions: Five Assertions for How Businesses Create Peace
Jason Miklian
Abstract: The conjunction of business and peace is a growing global phenomenon, but
conducted and researched over a vast array of fields and contextual settings. This article provides
theoretical order for this disparate material, illustrating cutting-edge research and highlighting the
most urgent knowledge gaps to fill. Extracting findings from the business community,
international organizations, and the academic community, this article maps these findings into
five assertions about how businesses impact upon peace: economic engagement facilitates a peace
dividend; encouraging local development facilitates local capacities for peace; importing
international norms improves democratic accountability; firms can constrain the drivers or root
causes of conflict; and undertaking direct diplomatic efforts with conflict actors builds and/or
makes peace. These assertions provide a framework for categorizing and testing prominent
business-peace arguments. They also support preliminary arguments that businesses cannot
expect to be rewarded as peacebuilders just because they undertake peacebuilding activities, that
economic opening only brings as much peace as a local regime will allow, and that truly
courageous business-peace choices are rarely made in fragile contexts. This framework can
encourage more coherent scholarly findings and more effective business engagements within the
complex and challenging realm of peacebuilding.
Keywords: peacebuilding; Business For Peace (B4P); Business ethics; liberal peace; Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR); multinational corporations (MNCs); corporate diplomacy; international norms
Introduction
The conjunction of business and peace is a growing global phenomenon. The belief that
businesses should help build peace in their operational areas is expanding rapidly,
through ventures like the United Nations Business For Peace (B4P) initiative and within
firms themselves through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) tasks and the
implementation of conflict-sensitive business practices. With donors increasingly
fatigued by traditional mechanisms of aid delivery, both national and international
corporationsi are being encouraged to take more active roles in framing new global
peacebuilding and development agendas. Exemplifying the shift, United Nations
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon is “counting on the private sector” to help fulfill the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UNDP 2015), Norway launched a Business for
Peace Foundation in 2007, and European firms formulated the Ypres Manifesto on
Business for Peace in 2014.
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Supported by the United Nations (UN), World Bank and most international development
organizations, businesses in conflict zones and fragile states are now seen as active agents
of peace, stability and long-term development. Pushes for deeper business engagement in
peacebuilding (business-peace) come from shareholders who want more responsible
firms, from governmental and inter-governmental bodies, from development aid
organizations, and from developing country governments and communities imploring
firms to contribute a greater share to societal improvements. However, as these activities
are conducted over such a vast array of industries and local conflict contexts, and are
discussed across such a wide variety of scholarly fields, it is difficult to decipher the state
of the art and most valuable lessons learned. In addition, much existing material is case-
based, exploring only limited types of business interactions in specific peacebuilding
contexts that are hard to generalize.
This article provides theoretical order and an organizational home for this currently
disparate material, highlighting cutting-edge research from the business, government, and
academic communities. It builds upon previous efforts to survey business-peace
interactions within and across fields (Oetzel et al. 2010; Andersson et al. 2011; Forrer et
al. 2012; Forrer and Katsos 2015; Ford 2015b; Katsos 2016), and categorizes this
material within existing theories of how business facilitate peace to refine where further
study is most needed. This article begins with an overview of the expanding business-
peace relationship, focusing on developments since 2010. It then briefly discusses how
three key groups conceptualize business-peace today: the business community,
international organizations, and the academic community. Five Assertions from this
literature about how businesses impact upon peace are then proposed: economic
engagement facilitates a peace dividend; encouraging local development facilitates local
capacities for peace; importing international norms improves democratic accountability;
firms can constrain the drivers or root causes of conflict; and undertaking direct
diplomatic efforts with conflict actors builds and/or makes peace. Last, the article
discusses how these Assertions inform three preliminary arguments: businesses cannot
expect to be rewarded as peacebuilders just because they undertake peacebuilding
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activities; economic opening only brings as much peace as a local regime will allow; and
truly courageous business-peace choices are rarely made in fragile contexts. Empirical
study of these Assertions and trends is encouraged to support more coherent scholarly
findings and more effective business engagements within the complex and challenging
realm of peacebuilding.
An Overview of Business and Peace Today
The Cold War’s 1990 conclusion presented a generational opportunity for international
businesses to capitalize on a series of transformations described in positive terms as
globalization and deepening of trade relations, or more critically as the erosion of state
sovereignty through submission to market pressures. This was the decade in which the
‘end of history’ was proclaimed, from an optimist belief in the spread of free markets and
democratic institutions. Global corporate expansion thrived, and extractive multinational
corporations (MNCs) in particular entered countries that also saw a spike in civil conflict
as Cold War support was withdrawn. These ventures brought scrutiny, as firms including
Shell in Nigeria (Zalik 2004) and DeBeers in Angola and Liberia were criticized by
governments, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and multilateral
institutions for actions perceived to be conflict-generating. Scholars and practitioners
began to re-consider the relationship between business and conflict, but corporations
were often slow to display a self-awareness as conflict-relevant actors.
Increasingly frustrated with stagnant outcomes of traditional peacebuilding in conflict
zones, many INGOs and international governmental organizations (IGOs) began to
involve businesses as stakeholders in new peace and development initiatives that saw
firms as potential forces for good. With one billion people living in countries or regions
affected by conflict or postconflict violence (World Bank 2013), these “conflict-affected
and high-risk areas” became the core focus of the international community’s
development agenda during the 2000s (UNGC 2010). Businesses were solicited by the
World Bank and other international organizations to contribute to public-private
partnerships that tried to stimulate peaceful development through poverty reduction,
socio-economic growth, and security (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2010; UNGC 2013). As
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enshrined in the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), firms were increasingly
encouraged to commit to “peace” and incorporate conflict sensitivity into their day-to-
day practices.
Today, national, regional, and transnational businesses operating in fragile environments
are asked “to become full partners in broader peacemaking and peacebuilding assessment,
planning and execution” (Ganson 2014:71), amid the belief that business-IGO/INGO tie-
ups are not only mutually adventageous but in fact necessary for the success of peace
operations in conflict zones (Ford 2015a). In 2013, the UNGC launched B4P,
institutionalizing these developments. As perhaps the clearest articulation of the business-
peace philosophy, B4P aims to “mobilize high-level corporate leadership to advance
peaceful development through actions at the global and local levels in order to galvanize
progress and scale up positive impacts, [a] leadership platform which will expand and
deepen private sector action in support of peace” (UNGC 2013). The UNGC’s goal is to
create an “epistemic community” of development organizations and businesses to bring
peace (Dahan et al. 2006; UNGC 2013).
Enthusiasm from private sector stakeholders is anchored in the argument that what they
already do anyway—grow economies and expand markets—can be key ingredients to
peace (Oetzel et al. 2010), and that “a quick influx of capital and know-how is essential
to serve as a counterweight to recidivist violence” (Gerson 2001:106). Recognizing that
economic underdevelopment can be conflict-generating, the UN Security Council
included corporate stakeholders in the drive to attain the Millennium Development Goals,
calling for more investment in fragile conflict areas to stimulate development (UNSC
2009). The UN’s new Sustainable Development Goals further strengthen these ties
(UNDP 2015), which align with business motivations to gain access to new consumer
markets in fragile developing states.
Three main groups of actors engage in significant business-peace discussions: the
business community, international organizations, and academics. Each group forwards
unique narratives about the structure, purpose, and value of business-peace engagements.
However, these groups also find challenges in speaking to each other, and also often lack
consensus within their own community. Even the terms ‘peace’ and ‘peacebuilding’ are
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notoriously difficult to define and can have varied meanings in different contexts. For
purposes of this article, 'peace' is defined as the absence of physical and structural harms
to both a state and its citizens; 'peacebuilding' activities are thus those that aim to either
reduce the likelihood of violence or ameliorate perceived root causes of societal conflict.
While more sophisticated definitions of both terms exist (and should rightly be used in
other settings), broad characterizations are used here in order to draw from the entirety
of the real and potential business-peace activities as defined by firms, governments and
peace organizations, and because there is little empirical evidence guiding us as to which
business activities are truly building peace in practice. A wide conceptual net is thus cast
to lay our groundwork, and key sources and conceptual thrusts are presented to show
where coherency and gaps lie between the main proponents. Claims presented herein are
not formally tested or judged on their veracity, but presented neutrally so as to provide a
more complete mapping.
The ‘business community’ as described herein includes local, national, and international
firms headquartered in western and non-western states, and both large conglomerates and
small and medium enterprises. MNCs carry outsize importance in our discussion, as they
have typically expressed the most interest in those peacebuilding actions that drive
business-peace arguments. This is quantified through annual reports, CSR and
compliance documents, internal strategy memos and presence at business-peace events,
among others. These engagements reflect evolving corporate philosophies that supporting
societal values should be at least equally motivating as profit aims in a world of
‘universal ethics’ (Mele and Sanchez-Runde 2013; Hoskinson and Kurato 2015).
Therefore, peace and peacebuilding are good for business – and vice versa (Killelea
2014). Recognizing that the ‘business community’ represents a diverse set of actors with
competing motivations, institutional philosophies and understandings of what constitutes
positive impact, the business case for business-peace engagement has nevertheless grown
dramatically.
Businesses typically operationalize peacebuilding through CSR frameworks, which
postulate that firms should engage in good corporate citizenship by making a positive
governance contribution in operational areas (Carroll 1998). Beginning largely as public
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relations efforts, CSR projects are now ubiquitous in the developing world (Jamali 2016).
Sometimes they even compete against development aid programs by NGOs and UN
agencies, incentivizing the shift towards businesses as peace agents (Valor 2005). Due to
CSR’s increasing convergence of discourse with aid organizations (Avant and Haufler
2012), it has also become a promotional tool for local development and peacebuilding in
conflict zones (Barbara 2006; JBE 2009; Jamali and Mirshak 2010). While ‘CSR’ can
mean everything from philanthropy and corporate citizenship to long-term business
strategy and risk mitigation, for the purposes of this article those CSR activities claimed
to be peace-positive are of most interest. Early adopters have also worked to encourage
(or drag) their peers into this space. For example, extractive firms have encouraged
consumer goods companies to follow their conflict-sensitive lead, western MNCs are
encouraging their Global South counterparts to participate in peacebuilding and
development activities, and large transnational firms are encouraging local businesses
likewise (USIP 2012).
Deciphering what international organizations believe about business and peace is also
complicated. While a striking degree of conformity has emerged amongst INGOs and
IGOs about the value of engaging businesses as peace partners for everything from global
development projects to the European refugee crisis (UNGC 2016a), there is little
consensus about what exactly businesses should be doing, and where their comparative
advantages lie. Some like the UN Business-Action Hub prefer public relations-style
approaches (UN Business 2016). Others like the World Bank conflate business, peace
and development to argue that business ventures stabilize fragile states by providing
development in areas of poor or non-existent governance (WB 2004; WB 2014). Some
INGOs want businesses working within conflicts to reduce the negative consequences of
their operations (International Alert 2005), while others promote businesses-community
‘partnerships’ to better engage with local communities (Killick et al. 2005; Kolk and
Lenfant 2015). However, these programs can be contentious within INGOs themselves,
as many long-time peacebuilding practitioners remain skeptical of incorporating for-
profit actors into local development projects.
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Finally, the academic community is the most fractured of all. Economists, political
scientists, anthropologists, business ethicists, human rights scholars, philosophers, and
others have all tackled the thorny questions inherent in business-peace interactions,
sometimes dating back centuries. One can distinguish between two contemporary
avenues: those who see potential in business-peace interactions (coined here as
‘potentialists’), and those critical of the wisdom of the entire venture. Potentialist
philosophies can be seen as far back as the first issue of the Journal of World Business in
1966, which argued that peacebuilding roles for corporations would make an unmatched
force for peace (Kolk 2016). Drawing on political risk analysis and business strategy,
contemporary potentialist research studies how, when and why firms should engage in
peacebuilding (Ford 2015a; Ford 2015b; Fort 2015; Oh and Oetzel 2016), how conflict
lifecycles affect firm vulnerability and risk (Getz and Oetzel 2010), innovative strategies
and norms firms adopt to address conflict (JBE 2009; Kolk and Lenfant 2015; Miklian
and Hoelscher 2016), and how operating during conflicts can improve risk management
and understanding of local populations (Avant and Haufler 2012; Aaron and Patrick
2013). Potentialists include those who are fundamentally optimistic about sustained
business involvement in peacebuilding – and also those who see only certain limited
circumstances for success. The field of business ethics has made extensive contributions,
for example in exploring how companies can move beyond traditional CSR to Creating
Shared Value platforms that improve conflict-sensitive interactions (Haski-Leventhal
2014), how ethical participative leadership can empower peace (Spreitzer 2007), in
arguments for businesses to support ‘hypergoals’ that incorporate short- and long-term
building blocks for peace (Dunfee and Fort 2003), and exploring the lessons of ‘gentle
commerce’ activities that can lie outside of traditional peacebuilding or conflict zones
altogether (Fort 2014).
Conversely, critical studies give pause to the wisdom of expanding business-peace tie-ups.
MNCs have harmed some vulnerable societies (Pugh 2005), and the international
community has supported the expansion of foreign firms at the expense of their local
business and government counterparts (Richmond and MacGinty 2015). Many scholars
are skeptical of giving business a more central peace role due to repeated field failures
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(Berdal and Mousavizadeh 2010; Idemudia 2010; Hönke 2014). Others question whether
corporations should be involved in the operational side of peace at all. As Milton
Friedman (1970) famously chided: “the social responsibility of business is to increase its
profits” and no more,ii as private sector assistance to peace in any form constitutes a
market distortion. While this idea has fallen out of favor in the business community, it
has found new support from critical scholars, who argue that business-peace engagements
are primarily a tool to defuse criticism of corporate expansion into conflict zones
(Banerjee 2008). Critical scholars also tend to problematize the natures of peace and
conflict in a more comprehensive and nuanced manner than businesses, international
organizations, or potentialists.
Of course, these categories aren’t as neatly drawn in practice as the above assessments
imply. Proponents and detractors of business-peace activities can be found in all three
realms, and there is often coherence across streams. For example, most consider the
Nicosia Chamber of Commerce work in Cyprus’s multi-decade peace process to be a
peacebuilding activity. Further, few argue that participation in economic opening by itself
should be called peacebuilding by business, although the end result may indeed be a more
stable and peaceful society, such as is promised with foreign business engagement in
Myanmar. A lack of coherence about the peace value of a given business activity does
not necessarily signify disagreement, but as these different strands approach these topics
in different ways in this still-emerging arena, conceptual gaps are commonplace. To
move towards testability – and find out which business actions truly engender peace, and
why - we must first provide a more complete taxonomy of the field.
Five Assertions on How Businesses Can Facilitate Peace
This article presents five Assertions that motivate businesses to contribute as
peacebuilders. It collates leading propositions from the academic literature; claims from
policy- and practice-oriented researchers; documented corporate approaches; and new
governmental and institutional pushes, going beyond well-studied literature (e.g.
businesses as conflict actors) to focus on the more aspirational business-peacebuilding
studies. It also builds upon past works, in particular Oetzel et al.’s (2010:355) six
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Business Actions for Promoting Peace. The Assertions are again: economic engagement
facilitates a peace dividend; encouraging local development facilitates local capacities for
peace; importing international norms improves democratic accountability; firms can
constrain the drivers or root causes of conflict; and undertaking direct diplomatic efforts
with conflict actors builds and/or makes peace. The Assertions can be conceived as
transiting from broad/macro impact on peace through traditional or conservative
approaches to specific/micro peacebuilding initiatives with more progressive and
interventionist frameworks.
Each Assertion contains two sections: a description of positive change claims by its
proponents, and a presentation of the challenges given by its detractors. These example-
richiii Assertions go beyond laudable recent analyses that explore similar literature gaps
(e.g. Oetzel et al. 2010; Forrer and Katsos 2015; Ford 2015b; Miklian et al. 2016),
incorporating new literature from more varied practitioner and peace research
backgrounds, and also serves to more deeply define and contextualize major debates to
help clarify how proponents and detractors view business contributions to peacebuilding
in theory and practice.
Assertion 1: Businesses influence peace through economic engagement that
facilitates a ‘peace dividend’.
Description and proponents
The belief that businesses bring peace by growing and linking economies is a core
paradigm of international political economy, rooted in liberal peace theory, economic
integration theory and peace dividend theory. In this strand, business activities in and of
themselves are considered to engender peace. Through trade, economic growth, and
financial injections, businesses help provide the fundamental building blocks of
development to fragile countries that in turn cement peace. The belief that economic
entrepreneurship will lead to peace and development can be traced back to John Locke’s
Second Treatise (1689). The doctrine is also associated with Immanuel Kant, Joseph
Schumpeter, and more recently Francis Fukuyama, scholars who combined elements of
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republican or democratic politics and the ‘spirit of commerce’ in different ways to argue
that economically integrated democracies positively correlate with peaceful foreign
policies (Doyle 1986).
Assertion 1 also incorporates debates over what policy roles governments should support
in the pursuit of sustainable peace, pitting philsophies like those of the free market liberal
economist Fredrich Hayek against the more interventionist-friendly John Maynard
Keynes (Schneider and Gleditsch 2013).iv While the empirical evidence and definitions
remain contested, protagonists hold that “empirical confirmation of the liberal peace is
exceptionally strong” for peaceful interdependence amongst market democracies (Doyle
2005:466; Gartzke 2007). The Washington Consensus of policy prescriptions supported
by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, through its agenda of dismantling
state-led economies to foster peace and development in the Global South through
deregulation, privatization and liberalization forms the most poignant contemporary
enshrining of this agenda (Berdal and Mousavizadeh 2010).
The robust literatures tying economic integration and development to peaceful relations
between states – and that infusions of economic development can mitigate intrastate
conflict - provide straightforward templates for firms to consider corporate expansion as
carrying a peacebuilding ‘value-added’. These activities aim to broadly improve the
conditions of peace without constituting specific peacebuilding activities. Examples
include firms aiding the transition from war to peace economies by helping to normalize
trade and provide essential revenue streams in fragile environments as in post-2011
Myanmar, moving into post-conflict or nearly post-conflict environments to solidify
fragile economies like investment in Kurdistan and Afghanistan, and creating economic
inter-dependence across geographic boundaries and social lines of division, as the
European Economic Community/Union and Nicosia Chamber of Commerce have done.
Others propose that business can build peace by reducing poverty and generating local
economic development through foreign investment or through local economic support,
for example in facilitating post-conflict macroeconomic recovery (ILO 2010). It is
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therefore ‘bad business’ to engage in conflict, and a ‘peace dividend’ of increased
prosperity will result. While policies to boost economies in an effort to create more stable
societies can be traced back centuries – if not millennia - the belief that prosperity equals
peace (and thus more prosperity is peacebuilding) is a more recent variation (Fort and
Schipani 2004). Friedman’s Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention (2005) highlights the
potential of economic interdependence at the national level to reduce conflict risk, and
the public-private partnership strand emphasizes that by providing services that a
government can’t (or won’t), peaceful legitimacy is increased. In short, better services
lead to more legitimate governments, which in turn leads to more satisfied and peaceful
populaces (Tokuda 2014).
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Challenges and challengers
Detractors argue that the empirical evidence in support of liberal peace theories is mixed
(Barbieri and Schneider 1999), typified by the contested legacy of Washington
Consensus-supported activities in fragile states (Szeftel 2000). Within-country empirical
relationships between development, trade and peace are weak, especially for the main
institutional components of the liberal peace in fragile and post-conflict environments:
democratization, promotion of the rule of law and free markets (Richmond 2006). Some
see deeper involvement of businesses into fragile conflict zones as neo-colonial
exploitation (Hönke 2014), claiming “pacification through political and economic
liberalization” (Paris 1997:56). But absent an alternative, liberal peacebuilding continues
to be the frame around which contemporary peace action is organized (Paris 2010;
Miklian 2014; Schouten and Miklian 2017), not least because it still promises peace and
development through the agency of western actors, on the premise that ‘we just need to
get the conditions right’.
Business activity can also exacerbate generalized conflict drivers like inequality. In
resource-poor societies, the introduction of new resources more often intensifies
competition rather than eases it, questioning the argument that better services leads to
more legitimate governance which subsequently leads to peace (Mazurana et al. 2014).
Large investments can corrupt and calcify local elites, reducing space for civil society
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participation and risking new cycles of violence, as seen with oil investments in Nigeria
(Zaum and Cheng 2012). Thus, the connections between economic growth and
peacebuilding can be more complex than a simple input-output model can explain
(Chigas and Woodrow 2009). Finally, the fact that a business conceivably needs to only
conduct its standard operations to reap the benefits of providing a ‘peaceful dividend’
could mean that it warrants exclusion from discussion as a tangible strand of business-
facilitated peacebuilding.
Assertion 2: Businesses influence peace by encouraging local development and
facilitating local capacities for peace
Description and proponents
Under Assertion 2 we find claims that businesses can and should build local development
capacities in their operational areas, which will in turn facilitate local peace. Activities
here are development-centric and generally at least one causal link removed from direct
peacebuilding action. Projects focus on improving the building blocks of society through
community engagement that ‘gives back’ resources to impoverished groups, cutting
across a broad array of actions, sectors, and degrees of local business integration. They
are supported by IGOs and NGOs in the belief that mitigation of harm is a conflict-
sensitive peacebuilding venture, and that addressing local societal needs (past, present or
future) through development leads to broader societal peace (MercyCorps 2011;
International Alert 2015).
Empirical evidence is limited but positive, including studies suggesting that higher-
quality corporate engagement with local communities may lower the incidence of
kidnappings, killings and protracted conflict (Aaron and Patrick 2013). CSR projects
have effectively defused small-scale tensions between local communities, (re)built health
and education infrastructures, and empowered disadvantaged communities, often
prioritized by firms through ‘win-win’ profit and peace relationships. Examples include
corporate support of local and regional peacebuilding organizations like Partners for
Peace in the Niger Delta, strengthening voices of local government and civil society
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through the Tintaya dialogue table in Peru and the Business Partners for Development
experiment, Newmont Gold’s recognition of Ghana’s Peace Councils in its own
grievance resolution processes and Barrick Gold’s support for municipal planning and
service delivery capabilities in the Dominican Republic. Reviews of Chevron’s
community development projects in Nigeria found that empowering peacebuilders
contributed to a dramatic reduction in violence - both against company facilities and
amongst communities formerly fighting one another (Hoben et al. 2012). Recent studies
argue for more direct political engagement that tackles local social issues and governance
gaps in fragile states to generate both societal benefits and corporate profits (Valente and
Crane 2010; Westermann-Beyhalo et al. 2015).v
As a primary cog of local economic development, providing jobs is forwarded as a means
to promote peace, especially in establishing inclusive and diverse workplaces or
supporting collaboration between conflict actors to build social cohesion (Fearon et al.
2009). IGOs like the World Bank (2008) highlight the benefits of employment, and
academics including Forrer et al. (2012) and Ozetel and Getz (2012) highlight the
benefits of inclusive economies. One example is the 2015 Business for Peace award
given to Merrill Fernando, the founder of Dilmah Tea in Sri Lanka. Fernando was
awarded the prize for his emphasis on workplace diversity that “empowered differently
able and under-privileged people in their communities with dignity and in a sustainable
manner” (BfP 2015:1). Firms can also provide a neutral space for suppliers/sellers of
different ethnicities and similar inclusivity characteristics (Khan and Ahmed 2014;
Lugard 2014), believing that engaging in such activities will promote trust, reduce
stereotypes and build inter-personal relationships, reducing participation in or support of
violence. Motivation is essentially subjugated to effectiveness, or as Starbucks Coffee
CEO Howard Schultz framed his firm’s impressive CSR portfolio: “This is not altruistic;
this is business. Values are a big part of both the balance sheet and the income statements
of Starbucks” (Ripley 2016:1).
Challenges and challengers
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The strongest critiques of local development by business focus upon the aims, scope and
relevance of CSR as peacebuilding. CSR policies only carry limited influence over
operational decision-making for businesses in fragile states (Yang and Rivers 2009), with
a lack of accountability mechanisms and poor track records for those affected in conflict
zones (Idemudia 2010; Prandi and Lozano 2011). Despite support from IGOs and INGOs,
as the operations and CSR divisions of most large firms are different entities, such
activities often merely project the appearance of participation but in practice dilute local
impact and engagement (Guidi 2008). Further, intent does not necessarily translate into
effective action, as declarations by senior management about their CSR programs
correlate poorly to actual CSR impact (Van de ven and Graafland 2006). Attempts to link
ethics, norms and responsibilities together – ‘thick’ CSR approaches – have been made to
break this impasse, but ‘thick’ morality-based approaches are often too complicated to
implement due to the competing needs of different in-house divisions (O’Riordan and
Fairbrass 2014). Despite efforts to guide corporate morality dating back to Adam Smith
(Brown and Forster 2013), CSR is still viewed as a weak strategic platform. CSR
reporting on conflict mitigation and peace impact also remains limited. If such reflections
appear in annual reports, they are almost always generic in nature (Kolk and Lenfant
2010).
Further, while INGO-business partnerships for conflict-sensitive development can
stimulate best practice agendas on conflict resolution (Haufler 2009), firms often view
these partnerships as tools to manage political and reputational costs or to defend against
encroachment by competitors – not as an avenue for constructive peace engagement
(Poret 2014). International firms are wary of funding warring regimes, not least due to the
reputational risks involved should the payouts (constituted as taxes or bribes) become
public knowledge. This wariness is conceived internally as risk mitigation, but often
construed publicly as an unwillingness to help the host community. Many corporate
boards and host governments are skeptical of business interfering in contested issues like
peace and local governance, and some firms curb local participation in CSR processes
lest they lose control of their project’s direction—and of their preferred framing of what
constitutes ‘peace’.
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Last, what many businesses, IGOs and NGOs might call ‘community empowerment’ or
‘inclusive’ activities can be labeled by governments (especially repressive regimes) as
enabling ‘dangerous resistance movements’ or ‘anti-nationalist’ support of political
opposition. This is especially the case where deep ethnic divisions lie. Empowering one
community may be viewed by others as a slight, and evidence for successful local
peacebuilding ‘trickling up’ into power centers for durable change is weak (MacGinty
and Richmond 2013). Further, business empowerment initiatives can trigger new fissures
by creating ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, and firms can become targets of violent resistance.
Well-meaning actions can erode local government capacity as its essential duties are
subcontracted to foreign entities, making a firm so powerful that its presence rivals or
exceeds that of the state (Zandvliet and Anderson 2009). This dynamic of corporate
paternalism harkens back to early 20th century CSR practices (Husted 2015), played out
to the extreme across the colonial world but also in the United States, as Company Towns
asserted absolute control over goods, services and even governance of local populations
(Green 2010).
Assertion 3: Businesses influence peace by importing international norms or other
tools for democratic accountability
Description and proponents
Assertion 3 houses claims that foreign (typically western) firms can contribute to peace
by importing international standards, norms and ethics that improve the structural
conditions for peace and change corrupt local mindsets. These activities constitute
specific actions that are derived from broad regional or global frameworks that explicitly
call for direct engagement by the private sector (Rettberg 2016). Firms can reward good
behavior by states as determined by international guidelines through additional
investment, or punish bad behavior by withdrawing and removing the tax bases that such
operations provide. Indirect initiatives include business compliance and risk mitigation
strategies, under the belief that international firms leading by example through adherence
to global best practice norms will trickle down to local society (Lisk et al. 2013). This
approach encourages peacebuilding buy-ins in ways that businesses find predictable and
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achievable as they promise a competitive playing field and stress engagement with
governments to prevent abuses, as opposed to negotiating through rebel groups or other
less predictable actors.
Accepting the notion that they cannot ethically dismiss the consequences of their
presence, foreign firms increasingly support governance-positive peacebuilding activities
in conflict zones. Such activities include business initiatives that empower civil society
like opening formerly secret data to encourage popular accountability by the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative, working with anti-corruption watchdogs in corrupt
states like Transparency International’s partnership with the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development on anti-bribery regulations, and supporting international
attempts to jointly tackle global trends that are presumed to exacerbate conflict, such as
the 2015 Caring For Climate initiative launched by a large business consortium and the
concerted push for business involvement in the UN SDGs. Recognizing the wide array of
potential guidance, efforts have been made to consolidate such standards to make it easier
for firms to implement these principles (IDPS 2015).
More support is found in discussions on transparency. For example, if a firm complies
with financial transparency initiatives like Publish What You Pay, then it is believed that
citizens will use this information to hold the government accountable, thus constraining
unscrupulous government behavior (Hamann et al. 2011). By refusing to engage in
wrongdoing, say by paying (or receiving) bribes where such practices are pervasive,
healthier societal relations are promoted, fostering a better groundwork for peace (Fort
and Schipani 2007). Peace is thus intertwined with virtues such as justice and honesty,
and to refuse bribes could require considerable courage, personal integrity and
justification to boards or shareholders (Schminke et al. 2015). These actions presuppose
transparency as both outward tool and internal check, and that promoting ethical
problem-solving business behavior will promote peace. In short, more ethical business
practices improve societal accountability, thus making democratic and non-violent means
of redress more realistic and possible.
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Challenges and challengers
Beyond the eyebrow-raising implied by eliciting foreign corporations to be the paragons
of international morality, there remain large gaps between the ethics of ‘do no harm’ and
‘do something!’ for international firms in conflict settings. Fort and Schipani’s
(2004:348) maxim that “it is not any business that fosters peace; it is an ethical business
that fosters peace” still holds. But we lack clear definitions of the meaning of ethical
action, and more importantly how to mitigate unintended consequences. To wit, Talisman
Oil was shamed out of the former Sudan after the Sudanese government was linked to
crimes of genocide; this gap was filled by the Indian firm ONGC Videsh who was
disinclined to consider this link as problematic or join western-led peace initiatives. Thus,
even if business-peace paradigms contain compliance mechanisms, whether this creates
peace dividends in practice is questionable as ethical withdrawal can leave voids for
firms of lower standards to fill (Patey 2007). Further, defining accountability initiatives
as peacebuilding may hold only limited benefit for local populations or local businesses
(Killick et al. 2005).
As with the previous Assertions, empirical links between implementation of standards
and the generation of peace are tenuous (Richmond 2013), and assume that peace action
comes after the successful (and extremely difficult and time-consuming) re-engineering
of society to a more transparent, western model (Roland 2004). Institutional reforms that
attract investment may have little to do with broader societal or economic reform, and
may reinforce neo-patrimonialism (Rodrik 2006). Others see international standards as
simply a new generation of corporate window-dressing to operate in contentious areas
(Chavkin et al. 2015). Even the UNGC (2010:np) has found that “conflict-sensitive
practices have not been widely embraced and have not yielded a cumulative positive
benefit to conflict-affected communities.” And firms complain of the difficulty of
implementing standards in the best of circumstances, let alone in conflict-affected areas
(Hoffmann 2014).
Others critique a host of related assumptions: that local actors care about adhering to
international standards; that clear links exist between norms, standards and the generation
of peace; that corrupt societies are conflict-ridden (and vice-versa); that watchdog
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organizations have legitimate punitive capabilities; that justice and peace are synonymous
in conflict-ridden societies; and that businesses are beacons of best practice on any of the
above (Reimann 2006; Muller 2013). Moreover, there is no clear evidence that adopting
international standards actually fosters peace. In fact, preliminary research has found an
inverse relationship between tax compliance and CSR performance by MNCs in fragile
and conflicted-affected states in certain situations (Hansen 2015). Also, most foreign
firms operate on the basis of contracts with states, whose regulatory power can dictate
aspects of firms’ operations and limit their potential for – or desire for – advocating for
societal change.
Assertion 4: Businesses influence peace by attempting to constrain the drivers or
root causes of conflict
Description and proponents
Proponents here assume that there are specific actions that businesses can take to quell
drivers of conflict. These drivers can be economic, political, or structural in nature, and
the actions may or may not relate to core business operations. Assertion 4 houses specific
initiatives that attempt to tackle root causes of conflict. Much existing business-peace
literature studies the role of business in addressing, influencing and changing the material
conditions of conflict environments. One common proposition is that if local conditions
can be improved, the root causes of conflict are addressed and the incentives for conflict
are reduced (Wenger and Mockli 2003; Ghimire and Upreti 2012). Although this
overlaps with previous Assertions (particularly Assertion 3), debates here focus upon the
multi-faceted causes of conflict gleaned from peace studies literature, including the
motivations, opportunities and incentives for conflict and generalized violence.
For firms, this frequently means attempting to stop financial flows that fund conflict
actors. Examples include the Kimberley Process for diamonds, Conflict Free Minerals
Initiatives in central Africa, banning the sale of oil from ISIS-held areas, and preventing
payment of royalties/taxes to oppressive regimes. Some organizations that normally lean
critical (e.g. Global Witness, International Alert) advocate for business engagement here,
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arguing that tightening trade and finance regimes related to conflict resources will help
stop wars. In support, many firms have elected to institute conflict-sensitive business
practices to attempt to ensure that they do not intentionally or unintentionally provide
material support to conflict actors. Businesses and IGOs/NGOs see these initiatives as
helping to prevent abuses while also reducing incentives to operate unethically
(Ballentine and Haufler 2009). Actions are concrete, and can be clearly presented to
shareholders, activists, and others. Results tend to be direct and accountable, particularly
in linking business actions and contributions to peace and conflict equations.
Beyond Assertion 2’s notion that any job (or any development) can build peace, firms
can employ more targeted approaches to address grievances like hiring former rebels or
other conflict actors, as Juan Valdez coffee in Colombia has done. Businesses have met
basic needs in conflict areas through social contributions assumed to build more peaceful
societies as with school and hospital construction by Heineken in the Congo, and
business organizations have partnered with governments and international bodies to
pressure regimes with discriminatory policies to achieve political change, as in boycotts
of the South African apartheid policy. Businesses have also attempted to address root
causes of insecurity that they risk contributing to, typified by the World Bank’s
Extractives Industry Review (EIR 2003:33) argument that “(m)any grievances from
communities and especially from indigenous peoples…relate to their claims that their
rights to participate in, influence, and share control over development initiatives,
decisions, and resources are ignored.”
Challenges and challengers
Assertion 4’s harshest critiques argue that the fluid nature of complex inter-group
grievances makes them exceptionally complicated to navigate, even for firms with the
managerial capacity and willingness to correctly assess what the true local conflict
drivers are (Ganson 2014). Business activity can also exacerbate conflict drivers like
inequality and exclusion/marginalization as investment partners typically come from
dominant ethnic or social groups. Further, actions like hiring ex-combatants are often not
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of sufficient scale to appreciably alter peacebuilding or peacemaking processes. Country-
level linkages between development, trade and peace are unproven, and the privileging of
business in the peace and development space pushes INGO agendas in fragile states
towards corporate interests, which can in turn exacerbate grievances by further
marginalizing excluded communities (Obenland 2014).
More broadly, there is an inherent difficulty in ‘solving’ root causes of political violence,
and it is questionable whether businesses are the best actors to identify and implement
solutions as their motivations can differ from or even contradict those of peace actors.
Recognizing that reducing conflict alone is not necessarily peacebuilding (it can simply
be suppression), business attempts to remake societal dynamics can create vacuums of
power that push conflict actors into even more destructive activities. Global initiatives to
eliminate market access for conflict actors are also hard to monitor and implement
(Miller and Bardouille 2014). Politically-engaged firms must pick winners and losers in
ongoing conflicts, and these tend to be pro-government, anti-insurgent in nature due to
corporate desires for security, stability and uninterrupted market access. Finally, business
can be an enabler of conflict in fragile developing countries, either through unintentional
complicity (Ruggie 2003), or through intentional exploitation of conflict for profit (le
Billon 2012).
Assertion 5: Businesses can effectively build and make peace by undertaking direct
diplomatic efforts with conflict actors
Description and proponents
This is the clearest and most specific of the five Assertions, wherein businesses offer a
vested direct stake in not simply peacebuilding but also peacemaking. This can mean
working as peace process participants, as mediators, entering into partnerships with
former conflict elites to encourage their mainstreaming or reintegration into society, or in
leveraging their influence to urge recalcitrant actors to participate in peace talks. Business
leaders who actively pursue peace are considered positive game changers in their
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companies and societies (BfP 2015), and their leadership prompts others to action (Oetzel
and Breslauer 2015). As Petter Furberg, head of the Myanmar branch of Norwegian
telecom firm Telenor, said at the 2016 Oslo Business for Peace event: “We are nation-
building through mobile services. I am personally negotiating with rebel leaders…in
order to operate.” These actions of corporate diplomacy engage in the social and political
realms to extended governance in conflict-prone areas (Westermann-Beyhalo et al. 2015).
Other examples include political negotiations by sponsors of prominent sporting events
including the 2016 Formula 1 in Azerbaijan and the 2022 World Cup in Qatar to
advocate for human rights issues when events are held in countries with poor rights
records.
A firm can facilitate dialogue between warring parties, as Chevron did in Papua New
Guinea by hiring mediators to ameliorate grievances through peaceful dialogue. While
Chevrons’ activities had little to do with the local dispute, they were incentivized to
contribute toward its cessation as fighting made the business environment more fragile.
In this sense, peacebuilding is also proactive risk and impact management. Other
examples include the Bogota and Nicosia Chambers of Commerce in the Colombia and
Cyprus peace processes, and the construction of dispute resolution mechanisms by South
African and international firms during apartheid. At a more basic level, businesses can
also provide logistical peacebuilding support for conflict actors looking to transit to peace,
through meeting spaces, equipment, or the like.
Challenges and challengers
Most critiques of business engagement in formal diplomacy argue that these activities are
both outside the realm of core business actions (Friedman 1970; Berdal and
Mousavizadeh 2010; Hönke 2014), and carry significant reputational and political risk
(Zandvliet and Anderson 2009). While firms can take part in peace talks (usually at the
executive level), if negotiations break down it can leave the business open to blame or
even retaliation by conflict actors (Bouillion 2004), reducing business interest in peace
for years or even decades, as in Colombia (Rettberg 2013). Even celebrated efforts like
the logistical support given by British businessman Tiny Rowland for the Mozambique
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peace process gloss over dirtier details; Rowland supported the liberation movement
Renamo through protection payments, and was implicated in engineering conflict and
commissioning violence for personal gain (Vines 1998).
There also remain gaps in our understandings of relationships between markets and local
conflict economies. Even though sophisticated networks of conflict actors are embedded
in many local social, political and economic fabrics, negotiating with rebels is not
typically an operational activity that firms admit to. Yet expanding to new markets means
that they are inevitably confronted with ethical dilemmas like roadblock economies,
where checkpoint payments can exacerbate local conflict through the very mechanisms
necessary to secure local market access (Bennett 2002). Fragile regions are thus subject
to a political economy of conflict (Ballentine 2005), with security forces and armed
groups controlling access and extracting money from all transitors (le Billon 2008).
Conflict actors also extort businesses, so firms become entrenched within local conflict
economies (Scudder 2013). Evidence from Afghanistan (DuPee 2012), Nigeria (Idemudia
2010) and Colombia (US State 2013) indicates that business operations exacerbate
conflict in such settings, notwithstanding explicit ambitions to instead bring a
‘development dividend’ to local populations. Deciphering how businesses navigate this
landscape by continuing the direct engagements needed to operate while simultaneously
minimizing risk accountability will constitute a core challenge for business-peace action.
Discussion
This model’s primary proposed value lies in contextualizing business-peace activity for
both business and peace scholars in the interest of improving empirical work. It can also
serve to extract common themes from different fields of study, helping us better
understand which Assertions may have the most forward value and why. Here we briefly
explore three potential consequences and limitations of this emergent literature to show
how such categorization can be beneficial in practice, and explore the ability of specific
Assertion studies to better direct peace-positive business ventures.
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23!
First, businesses cannot expect to be rewarded as peacebuilders just because they
undertake activities that are called ‘peacebuilding’ by external actors – and those firms
that do so primarily as a public relations venture risk doing more harm than good to both
local communities and their own brands. For example, Furberg’s comments about
Telenor’s ‘nation-building’ in Myanmar were critically received, and helped to spur a
six-month Norwegian investigation into Telenor’s business practices throughout Asia,
uncovering unethical and possibly illegal activities in several countries. Also, few
individual firms have the capacity, internal expertise or political will engage in the types
of long-term, expansive, institutional ventures that constitute engaged peacebuilding.
Such ventures require engaging within complex grassroots political and societal entities –
and then serving as a broker to power centers or local elites. Efforts by Shell and Chevron
in the Niger delta are instructive, as they successfully built local peace for a period, but as
their projects only assisted the immediate community, they was vulnerable to national
and regional political trends towards conflict and ultimately collapsed.
For forward conceptual clarity, it will likely be valuable to remove those business actions
that are peripheral to, but ultimately separate from, peacebuilding. Ganson (forthcoming)
lists four categories of such, including ‘doing good but not building peace’ (generic
health, education, or employment initiatives), ‘small wins that don’t add up to peace’
(micro-community ventures that have no impact on broader societal peace), ‘program
failures’ (well-intended ventures that fail due to local fragility), and ‘perverse impacts’
(well-intended ventures that create more harm than good by skewing local resource
dynamics). It may also be a question of scale. A business-peace project that works on
community reconciliation in 3 villages is unlikely to make a true peace contribution,
while one that works in 3,000 villages, as was done by the Federacion Nacional de
Cafeteros in Colombia through their ‘Footprints of Peace’ project, may indeed have
significant long-term positive peace impacts (Miklian and Bickel 2017). Linking business
and management scholars more strongly with their peacebuilding counterparts will likely
offer a wealth of cross-disciplinary guidance as concerns what is more (or less) likely to
work in such realms.
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24!
Second, economic opening often only brings as much peace as a local regime will allow.
Firms that enter fragile new markets should not overstate their positive peace and
development contributions unless they are willing to also shoulder blame for political
conflict events that may be outside their control or sphere of influence later. The lessons
of Assertion 1 are instructive here, as participation in economic opening alone is often
claimed by firms to provide a core peace-positive development benefit for local societies
(and usually presented when starting new expansions to shareholders and the public), but
it is rarely coupled with an engaged effort to improve local societies. Peacebuilders have
problematized this space extensively, asking questions like ‘development for whom?’ and
‘economic growth for whom?’ when considering new engagements (Miklian et al. 2011).
Also, there are significant business benefits to partnering with the ‘best, most connected’
partner to ensure project success, but such decisions may merely exacerbate local conflict
dynamics by giving legitimacy and funding to a local conflict actor in the name of
stability and growth (Miklian 2012).
Further, ‘win-win’ business logics can have deeper consequences than the benign
buzzword suggests, especially if encouraging an econometric understanding of peace
reduces peacebuilding to whatever numbers can express. This risks silencing voices
whose perspectives might not be articulated within technocratic discourses,
disfranchising those who should be the principal business-peace benificiaries. Without a
clear, locally-sourced definition of peace, it will be difficult to measure empirically if
business-peace ventures truly succeed. The 5 Assertions intend to provide clarity and
assist in forward guidance for this growing field, but if businesses are to become ethical
peace actors, operationalizing peacebuilding must be contextualized through grounded
fieldwork for each specific setting, making explicit the concrete outcomes associated with
peace by different stakeholders. While this complicates business-peace tasks, it is much
more likely that long-term results will be more robust for firms and of deeper value to the
local communities who should always be regarded as the ultimate beneficiaries (Miklian
and Hoelscher 2017).
Third, truly courageous business-peace choices are rarely made in fragile contexts. There
exist only a handful of cases where a firm made a conscious decision to forego profit in
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25!
the interest of ameliorating conflict drivers (as did Talisman), and even then such choices
are usually due to external public pressure from human rights or advocacy groups. To
give a counter example, since Myanmar’s 2011 economic opening hundreds of MNCs
have entered the country, and most require a government-affiliated joint venture partner
by law. However, the government has since begun and expanded an ongoing ethnic
cleansing program against one million ethnic-minority Rohingya people (BBC 2016). As
of publication, no foreign firms have so much as issued a statement of concern about their
partner’s actions, let alone left the country because of it.
Why are firms in Myanmar silent on the ethnic cleansing, and where is the leadership
from the dozens of firms operating there who are signatories to the UNGC, Business and
Human Rights framework, and other similar business-peace ventures even as the UN
confirms the atrocities? It speaks to the significant limitations of action that we can
expect from corporations under the 5 Assertions, as well as the recognition that large
elements of this agenda remain deeply aspirational. It is unrealistic to hope that firms will
unilaterally pull out of Myanmar precisely due to the “unprecedented opportunities for
hypergrowth” (and corporate career-making) that exists for firms in just these sorts of
settings around the world (Musacchio and Werker 2016:23; Miklian 2017), coupled by
the fact that few firms have interest in engaging in the types of political interventions that
are needed for peace action. However, the international community is arguing for just
such an expansion, typified by John Ruggie’s keynote argument at the UN Business and
Human Rights council that “for business to maximize its contribution…it must put efforts
to advance respect for human rights at the heart of the people part of sustainable
development.” (UNBHR 2016).
Directions for Further Research
To bridge this widening gulf, more exact calculations of how profit, risk, and sustainable
peace and development promotion must be made (and metrics established for such) for
firms that wish to justify lofty claims of working towards peace. Concurrently, claims by
the international community of what businesses can and should do in the peacebuilding
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26!
space should be tempered to the realm of the realistic and possible, drawing upon the
strengths of business knowledge in conflict (like rule of law, systems thinking, risk
mitigation and infrastructure development) instead of their weaknesses (like deep
understanding of complex socio-political dynamics). Linking to business self-interest and
offering firms a specific complementary (as opposed to primary) role in peace is also
likely to be beneficial, and a key way in which business, management, and peace scholars
can find common ground. Empirical research of and within the above Assertions can help
to better define and frame research questions for such. Meanwhile, promoting peripheral
good through CSR or philanthropy while ignoring active corporate harm through
operations that support repressive regimes risks the business-peace community being
used to simply ‘peacewash’ corporate activities in conflict zones, endangering the
business-peace agenda while at this critical nascent stage.
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27!
Compliance with Ethical Standards:
Funding: This study was funded by the Norwegian Research Council
(AIDEFFECT)
Ethical approval: This article does not contain any studies with human participants
performed by any of the authors.
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28!
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i Our discussion is most relevant for western multinationals, but many dynamics also hold for Global South
firms and local businesses.
ii The morality of profitmaking has long been contentious. Friedman himself was supportive of CSR if it
could be directly linked to profitable outcomes.
iii Selected examples only scratch the surface of business-peace interactions, and were chosen upon two
criteria: 1) best-fit, and 2) new examples are used where possible to further enrich our cumulative example
base.
iv While Hayek is often presented as an anti-intervention minimalist abhorring the concept of social justice,
his repeated support of a social safety net could be considered as amenable to certain business-peace
activities from an ethical standpoint.
v One could consider ‘political’ to be a misnomer, as all CSR projects are inherently political in their efforts
to change local societal dynamics.!