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Me and Mine

DOI:10.1007/s11098-016-0853-6
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Peter Martin Jaworski at Georgetown University
Peter Martin Jaworski
David Shoemaker
David Shoemaker
David Shoemaker
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Abstract

In this paper we articulate and diagnose a previously unrecognized problem for theories of entitlement, what we call the Claims Conundrum. It applies to all entitlements that are originally generated by some claim-generating action, such as laboring, promising, or contract-signing. The Conundrum is spurred by the very plausible thought that a later claim to the object to which one is entitled is a function of whether that original claim-generating action is attributable to one. This is further assumed to depend on one’s being identical to the person who performed the claim-generating action. But the right theory of personal identity for grounding these later claims proves quite elusive. In demonstrating both the Claims Conundrum and diagnosing its source, we begin with its (previously unobserved) instantiation in John Locke’s theories of personal identity and initial acquisition, and then we gradually expand its net to include both Lockean and non-Lockean theories of both, moving ultimately to show that this is a problem for most entitlements generally. We then diagnose the source of the trouble, showing that a basic assumption about the link between attributability and identity that most people take to be obvious is in fact false, clearing a path for future investigation into this overlooked but serious problem’s resolution.
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Me and mine
Peter M. Jaworski
1
•David Shoemaker
2
Published online: 18 January 2017
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017
Abstract In this paper we articulate and diagnose a previously unrecognized
problem for theories of entitlement, what we call the Claims Conundrum. It applies
to all entitlements that are originally generated by some claim-generating action,
such as laboring, promising, or contract-signing. The Conundrum is spurred by the
very plausible thought that a later claim to the object to which one is entitled is a
function of whether that original claim-generating action is attributable to one. This
is further assumed to depend on one’s being identical to the person who performed
the claim-generating action. But the right theory of personal identity for grounding
these later claims proves quite elusive. In demonstrating both the Claims Conun-
drum and diagnosing its source, we begin with its (previously unobserved)
instantiation in John Locke’s theories of personal identity and initial acquisition,
and then we gradually expand its net to include both Lockean and non-Lockean
theories of both, moving ultimately to show that this is a problem for most enti-
tlements generally. We then diagnose the source of the trouble, showing that a basic
assumption about the link between attributability and identity that most people take
to be obvious is in fact false, clearing a path for future investigation into this
overlooked but serious problem’s resolution.
Keywords John Locke Personal identity Entitlements Claims Ownership
Attributability Moral responsibility
In the criminal law, one is liable for punishment if one has performed some
criminal action (without sufficient justification or excuse). For most retributivists,
&Peter M. Jaworski
Peter.Jaworski@Georgetown.edu
David Shoemaker
dshoemak@tulane.edu
1
McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA
2
Department of Philosophy & Murphy Institute, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, USA
123
Philos Stud (2018) 175:1–22
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0853-6
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
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