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Denial Versus Reality of Climate Change
Abstract
Despite the extensive supportive evidence for climate change, there still exists doubt and denial about the topic among the public. One reason for this is that misinformation about climate science is widespread in the society. It should be noted, however, that some individuals are more prone to denying climate change than others. As reviewed in this contribution, different psychological mechanisms could explain this variance in climate change denial. For example, complexity of the topic or efforts to decrease negative emotions may explain some part of the variation. Importantly, however, it has been found that sociopolitical ideology has a particularly important role in explaining climate change denial. This is of importance, because ideologically motivated rejection of science cannot be addressed solely by focusing on communicating science. Rather, the underlying concerns and motivational needs that cause the rejection should be addressed. For instance, environmental messages may threaten some individuals' ideological convictions and social identity. Sociopolitical ideology has been shown to include two components: resistance to/acceptance of change and acceptance of/rejection of inequality. Recent research findings suggest that, although both of these components are likely to explain climate change denial, the latter seems to play a particularly central role. Based on the psychological mechanism explaining climate change denial, possible communication strategies have been proposed.
... Platt, 2019); they continue to increase, as noted by Lees et al. (2020). Denial differs from scepticism (Jylhä, 2018;Washington, 2018). The latter is a genuine component of scientific research and discovery, questioning assumptions, results, interpretations and conclusions, until the weight of evidence supports one conclusion or another. ...
... Denial, on the other hand is plain disbelief in that weight of evidence. The notion of the Sixth Mass Extinction, or at least a major biodiversity crisis, faces both scepticism and denial, as does the notion of anthropogenic climate change (Jylhä, 2018;Washington, 2018), the fact of evolution (Ayala, 2008;Nieminen, Ryökäs & Mustonen, 2015;Hansson, 2017), the negative impacts of invasive species (Tassin, 2014; and see Ricciardi & Ryan, 2018a, 2018b, and many other aspects of science in general (Hansson, 2017;Rutjens, van der Linden & van der Lee, 2021). Scepticism and denial may be fuelled by media headlines over-dramatising dire short-term prognoses combined with exaggeration of perceived professional differences of opinion among scientists, regarding, for instance, analysis and interpretation of data (e.g. ...
There have been five Mass Extinction events in the history of Earth's biodiversity, all caused by dramatic but natural phenomena. It has been claimed that the Sixth Mass Extinction may be underway, this time caused entirely by humans. Although considerable evidence indicates that there is a biodiversity crisis of increasing extinctions and plummeting abundances, some do not accept that this amounts to a Sixth Mass Extinction. Often, they use the IUCN Red List to support their stance, arguing that the rate of species loss does not differ from the background rate. However, the Red List is heavily biased: almost all birds and mammals but only a minute fraction of invertebrates have been evaluated against conservation criteria. Incorporating estimates of the true number of invertebrate extinctions leads to the conclusion that the rate vastly exceeds the background rate and that we may indeed be witnessing the start of the Sixth Mass Extinction. As an example, we focus on molluscs, the second largest phylum in numbers of known species, and, extrapolating boldly, estimate that, since around AD 1500, possibly as many as 7.5-13% (150,000-260,000) of all~2 million known species have already gone extinct, orders of magnitude greater than the 882 (0.04%) on the Red List. We review differences in extinction rates according to realms: marine species face significant threats but, although previous mass extinctions were largely defined by marine invertebrates, there is no evidence that the marine biota has reached the same crisis as the non-marine biota. Island species have suffered far greater rates than continental ones. Plants face similar conservation biases as do invertebrates, although there are hints they may have suffered lower extinction rates. There are also those who do not deny an extinction crisis but accept it as a new trajectory of evolution, because humans are part of the natural world; some even embrace it, with a desire to manipulate it for human benefit. We take issue with these stances. Humans are the only species able to manipulate the Earth on a grand scale, and they have allowed the current crisis to happen. Despite multiple conservation initiatives at various levels, most are not species oriented (certain charismatic vertebrates excepted) and specific actions to protect every living species individually are simply unfeasible because of the tyranny of numbers. As systematic biologists, we encourage the nurturing of the innate human appreciation of biodiversity, but we reaffirm the message that the biodiversity that makes our world so fascinating, beautiful and functional is vanishing unnoticed at an unprecedented rate. In the face of a mounting crisis, scientists must adopt the practices of preventive archaeology , and collect and document as many species as possible before they disappear. All this depends on reviving the venerable study of natural history and taxonomy. Denying the crisis, simply accepting it and doing nothing, or even embracing it for the ostensible benefit of humanity, are not appropriate options and pave the way for the Earth to continue on its sad trajectory towards a Sixth Mass Extinction.
... A growing number and variety of people worldwide recognize the seriousness of the ecological crisis, at least to a certain extent, but their response is mixed and large-scale action still wanting. Some people defiantly practice denial and distancing (Jylhä 2017), which makes climate anxiety worse for those people who recognize the crisis. Others feel more eco-fear than eco-anxiety (Buzzell and Chalquist 2019), in the sense that they clearly perceive the threat. ...
In recent decades, as environmental destruction has become more extreme and prevalent around the planet, the way that humans experience the natural world has also changed, giving rise to more frequent and intense experiences of eco-anxiety. Not simply personal or social, eco-anxiety is distributed across the relationships that humans have with the life, land, air, and water of Earth. This anthology presents international and interdisciplinary perspectives on eco-anxiety, with attention to two of the most prominent sources of eco-anxiety today: the COVID pandemic and the climate crisis. From the microscopic scale of viruses to the macroscopic scale of Earth’s atmosphere, instability in natural systems is causing unprecedented forms of psychological distress, including anxiety and related emotional or affective states like grief, anger, guilt, and depression. To tackle crises of such unprecedented scope and impact, we need to expand beyond mainstream behavioral research approaches to include also rigorous methods from the human sciences. This book both builds upon and moves beyond the latest research in environmental psychology, conservation psychology, and clinical psychology. Dominant research paradigms in these areas rely primarily on experimental and observational methodologies that analyze quantitative data. In contrast, this book focuses on sophisticated traditions of social and cultural psychology in dialogue with other disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. The result is a nuanced understanding of the human experience of confronting eco-anxiety, offering critical insights into the subjective worlds of individuals as they grapple with the intertwined existential threats of the climate crisis and pandemics.
... A growing number and variety of people worldwide recognize the seriousness of the ecological crisis, at least to a certain extent, but their response is mixed and large-scale action still wanting. Some people defiantly practice denial and distancing (Jylhä 2017), which makes climate anxiety worse for those people who recognize the crisis. Others feel more eco-fear than eco-anxiety (Buzzell and Chalquist 2019), in the sense that they clearly perceive the threat. ...
This chapter introduces the overall aim and scope of this anthology, providing a survey of recent research into various expressions of eco-anxiety and other ecological emotions, particularly as they pertain to climate change and the coronavirus pandemic. Several possible frameworks are discussed, including “global anxieties” and “macrosocial worries”. The author points out that eco-anxiety can manifest both in adaptive and maladaptive forms. The phases of how societies reacted to the COVID-19 pandemic are compared with the phases of societal reaction to climate change. The impacts of COVID-19 on people who experience climate anxiety are discussed. Various forms of coping and resilience are briefly explored. The chapter also includes summaries of the chapters in this book, which include international and interdisciplinary perspectives on the challenges that the climate crisis and the pandemic pose to mental and environmental health.
... Doubts and denial about climate change emerge from the need of trusting scientists and their conclusions in a complex, long-term and non-observable phenomenon. Therefore, misinformation among the public is widespread, while denial decreases many individuals' engagement in climate action (Jylhä, 2017). ...
... Climate skepticism is a serious obstacle to progress and has been given much attention both in public debate and by researchers in the field (Jylhä 2017;Poortinga et al. 2011). In this article, we instead focus on the fact that many both know and confess to sustainability ideals, but still do not act accordingly (Kollmuss & Agyeman 2002). ...
Most people in countries with the highest climate impact per capita are well aware of the climate crisis and do not deny the science. They worry about climate and have climate engaged attitudes. Still, their greenhouse-gas emissions are often high. How can we understand acting contrary to our knowledge? A simple answer is that we do not want to give up on benefits or compromise our quality of life. However, it is painful to live with discrepancies between knowledge and action. To be able to avoid taking the consequences of our knowledge, we deal with the gap by motivating to ourselves that the action is still acceptable. In this article, we use topical analysis to examine such processes of motivation by looking at the internal deliberation of 399 climate engaged people’s accounts of their reasoning when acting against their own knowledge. We found that these topical processes can be described in at least four different ways which we call rationalization, legitimization, justification and imploration. By focusing on topoi we can make visible how individual forms of reasoning interact with culturally developed values, habits and assumptions in creating enthymemes. We believe that these insights can contribute to understanding the conditions for climate transition communication.
... Especially psychodynamic and psychosocial scholars have pointed out that there is repressed anxiety in relation to the ecological crisis and the climate crisis. This can lead to various forms of denial and disavowal [53,[59][60][61][62][63]. While this anxiety is not usually called eco-anxiety either by scholars or by these persons themselves, this is part of the general phenomenon of "anxiety because of the ecological crisis". ...
Anxiety and distress about the ecological crisis seems to be a rapidly growing phenomenon. This article analyzes the challenges and possibilities posed by such "eco-anxiety" for environmental education. Variations of eco-anxiety are analyzed, and it is argued that educators should be aware of the multiple forms that the phenomenon has. Eco-anxiety is found to be closely connected with many difficult emotions, such as grief, guilt, anger, and despair. However, anxiety also has an adaptive dimension, which can be called "practical anxiety". Anxiety is connected with expectation, motivation, and hopes. Previous research about eco-anxiety and ecological emotions in various disciplines is discussed, and related studies from various fields of education are brought together. Based on this extensive literature review, theoretical analyses are made, using a philosophical method. It is argued that environmental educators need organizational and peer support both in relation to their own difficult emotions and in order to develop emotional skills in their work. Educators should first practice self-reflection about eco-anxiety, after which they have many possibilities to help their audiences to develop emotional resilience. Potential practical activities related to eco-anxiety are discussed, drawing from various fields of education. These include validation of eco-anxiety and ecological emotions, providing safe spaces to discuss them, and, if possible, providing embodied and creative activities to more fully deliberate on them.
This study analyzes how people discursively construct their (non)agency—how they display abilities and capacities to act, or the lack thereof—vis-à-vis climate change. The paper presents the results of a detailed discursive and thematic analysis of 28 interview transcripts: 12 broad agency themes representing different ways of constructing human (non)agency in relation to climate change. The most common agency theme was Collective, followed by Individual, Critical, and Threatened agency. Climate change skepticism was displayed mostly within Critical agency, where the speakers presented themselves as intellectual and critically thinking individuals, drawing from scientific rhetoric while criticizing and misrepresenting climate science. The constructions of Collective agency emerged as a form of agency that displays a sense of meaningfulness related to socially embedded actions. The construction of agency in relation to climate change is very detailed discursive work, as people draw from multiple societal discourses to craft varied discursive positions of experiencing, knowing, and doing in relation to it. The paper suggests ways for climate communications to take into account these multiple themes of agency.
Latest findings of the IPCC highlight the fact that there is an urgent need for climate action on both individual and societal levels, because political regulations and technical advances just would not be enough to counter climate change. Acknowledging young people’s role as present and future decision-makers, their engagement is absolutely imperative in order to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 13, “Climate Action.” Therefore, new methods of teaching and learning are necessary, and they need to encourage transformative learning, which, it is assumed, will lay foundations for transformative engagement. Research in the field of science education credits scientific literacy vision III as fostering transformative learning and engagement. In this study, transdisciplinary education is analyzed as a promising concept that enables exchange of knowledge, experiences, and perspectives between students and scientific partners while they jointly complete research on real-world issues. A quantitative analysis capturing scientific literacy and transformative engagement for climate action of Austrian and German secondary school students (N = 162) is carried out alongside a literature review. This study reveals that the didactical concept of transdisciplinary education notably contributes to the implementation of scientific literacy vision III as well as vision II. According to the results, the three visions of scientific literacy are predictors for transformative engagement for climate action, assuming to be preceded by a transformative learning process. These encouraging findings need to be replicated by further scholars in other contexts.
Tämä artikkeli tarkastelee nuorten kokemia ympäristötunteita ja niin kutsuttua ilmastoahdistuksen ilmiötä Nuorisobarometrin 2021 tuloksia peilaten. Tunteiden joukosta artikkelissa keskitytään erityisesti suruun, riittämättömyyteen ja mielihyvään. Ilmastoahdistuksesta keskustellaan sekä tuoreen kansainvälisen että suomalaisen tutkimuksen valossa. Erityisinä rinnakkaisaineistoina käytetään Sitran vuonna 2019 toteuttamaa ilmastonmuutos ja tunteet -kansalaiskyselyä sekä syksyllä 2021 ilmestynyttä kansainvälistä tutkimusta nuorten ilmastotunteista. Artikkelin luonne on siis kaksiulotteinen: yhtäältä se sisältää uutta tutkimusta, mutta samalla se toimii johdantona aihepiiriin. Barometrin tulokset vahvistavat entisestään käsitystä ilmastotunteiden moniulotteisuudesta sekä siitä, että ympäristöahdistus on merkittävä ilmiö nuorten keskuudessa. Lähes 60 % oli puhunut ilmastoahdistuksesta viimeisen kuuden kuukauden aikana. On hyvin merkittävä tulos, että nuorisobarometrissa 76 % nuorista ilmaisi kokevansa surua luonnon monimuotoisuuden heikentymisestä ja lajien sukupuutosta. Kaikkinensa 35 % nuorista kertoi kokeneensa riittämättömyyttä ilmastotoimiensa suhteen. Analyysi tuo esiin myös toiminnan ja mielihyvän yhteyden: kestävistä valinnoista tuleva hyvä olo oli erittäin yleistä, 75 %, ja vahvasti yhteydessä oman kulutuksen vähentämiseen. Barometri paljastaa kiinnostavalla tavalla monien eri tekijöiden vahvan vaikutuksen nuorten ympäristötunteisiin, kuten sukupuolen, alueen, koulutustason ja syrjityksi tulemisen kokemuksen.
The environmental crisis is producing an increasing number of both physical and psychological impacts. This article studies the challenge of eco-anxiety for pastoral care, drawing from both interdisciplinary research and ecological theology. The aim is to help both practitioners and researchers to encounter eco-anxiety more constructively. The rapidly growing research about eco-anxiety and therapy is discussed in relation to pastoral care. The various forms of eco-anxiety are briefly analyzed. The role of the caregivers is discussed by using sources that study the challenges of therapists in relation to eco-anxiety. The existential depths of eco-anxiety are probed in the light of recent research and older existentialist theory. It is pointed out that the political character of ecological issues, especially climate change issues, causes many kinds of challenges for pastoral care. As the constructive conclusion of the article, various possibilities and resources for encountering eco-anxiety in pastoral care are discussed, along with the connections with wider pastoral theology. It is argued that pastoral care providers should engage in self-reflection about their own attitudes and emotions related to ecological issues, preferably with the support of trusted peers or mentors. Various organizational developments are also needed to support caregivers. Dialectical thinking is one tool that can help to navigate the complex dynamics related to environmental responsibility, eco-emotions, and questions of hope or hopelessness.
Ein Grundproblem der Klimawandelbildung ist die ,,Unsichtbarkeit“ von Klimawandel und seinen Folgen. Priorität im Projekt KlimaAlps ist, Klimawandelfolgen in ausgewählten Landschaftsräumen (,,KlimaTopen“) in der Projektregion Bayern und Österreich für jedermann/jederfrau in der Lebenswelt sichtbar zu machen. Darüber hinaus wird Lernen an ein authentisches Setting im KlimaTop angebunden. Durch Zusammenführung von KlimaTopen und Ausbildungsmodulen (KlimaModule) wird eine innovative Form von Klimawandel(aus)bildung entwickelt.
In this article we argue that drama can provide complementary knowing for climate change education and shed light on the complexity of related psychosocial issues. We bring together an interdisciplinary understanding of eco-anxiety, psychosocial responses to climate change, and drama education. We draw on performance narratives created with young people in Finland and explore the psychosocial dynamics of climate change education. Three key themes are discussed in more detail in relation to education: 1) psychosocial dynamics; 2) alienation; 3) tragedy. The performance workshops provided a safe and creative space for exploring young people’s thoughts and images related to climate anxiety. Many relevant but often silenced issues became visible and were lived through in the process of performance making. This seemed to be fruitful both to the performers, teachers, and researchers, and suggests future, longer-term work would prove beneficial for engaging with these issues.
When the scientific method yields discoveries that imperil people’s lifestyle or worldviews or impinge on corporate vested interests, the public and political response can be anything but favorable. Sometimes the response slides into overt denial of scientific facts, although this denial is often claimed to involve “skepticism”. We outline the distinction between true skepticism and denial with several case studies. We propose some guidelines to enable researchers to differentiate legitimate critical engagement from bad-faith harassment, and to enable members of the public to pursue their skeptical engagement and critique without such engagement being mistaken for harassment.
The consensus that humans are causing recent global warming is shared by 90%–100% of publishing climate scientists according to six independent studies by co-authors of this paper. Those results are consistent with the 97% consensus reported by Cook et al (Environ. Res. Lett.
8 024024) based on 11 944 abstracts of research papers, of which 4014 took a position on the cause of recent global warming. A survey of authors of those papers (N = 2412 papers) also supported a 97% consensus. Tol (2016 Environ. Res. Lett.
11 048001) comes to a different conclusion using results from surveys of non-experts such as economic geologists and a self-selected group of those who reject the consensus. We demonstrate that this outcome is not unexpected because the level of consensus correlates with expertise in climate science. At one point, Tol also reduces the apparent consensus by assuming that abstracts that do not explicitly state the cause of global warming ('no position') represent non-endorsement, an approach that if applied elsewhere would reject consensus on well-established theories such as plate tectonics. We examine the available studies and conclude that the finding of 97% consensus in published climate research is robust and consistent with other surveys of climate scientists and peer-reviewed studies.
Political conservatives and males are more likely to deny human influence on climate change. In this paper we examine the role of social dominance orientation (SDO) in explaining this “conservative male effect” by testing whether SDO mediates the influence of both political conservatism and gender on anthropogenic climate change denial. We use cross-sectional online-based data from Brazil (N = 367) and Sweden (N = 221) to test our mediation hypothesis. Results from path analysis showed that SDO partially or fully mediated the influence of political orientation and gender on anthropogenic climate change denial. The results provide insights about the role of SDO in the “conservative male effect”, and suggest that SDO could be considered more comprehensively in studies focusing on climate change denial and environmental attitudes/behaviours.
This study extends the Mini-IPIP, a short measure of the Big-Five personality dimensions, to a Big-Six model of personality structure based on the HEXACO. Exploratory and Confirmatory analyses of a representative New Zealand sample (N = 5,562) validated the original Mini-IPIP five-factor structure, and supported an extended six-factor model also indexing Honesty-Humility. The Mini-IPIP6 reliably predicted variation in hours spent performing activities relating to aspects of personality (e.g., socializing, voluntary/charitable work, housework, and computer games). The Mini-IPIP6 also differentially predicted criterion outcomes such as religious affiliation and identification, political orientation, beliefs about climate change, and willingness to make personal sacrifices for the environment. The 24-item Mini-IPIP6 (four items indexing each personality dimension) fills a niche where brief markers of the Big-Six dimensions of personality are desired. A regression equation demonstrating how to integrate parameters derived using representative New Zealand data with a given individual's Mini-IPIP6 scores to estimate his or her predicted value for each criterion outcome is provided (e.g., predicted housework in a given week), along with a copy of the scale itself, coding instructions and norms. This study represents the most detailed validation of a reliable and comprehensive broad-bandwidth public domain personality inventory for use in New Zealand to date. © This material is
Learning about global problems, such as climate change, is not only a cognitive endeavor, but also involves emotions evoked by the seriousness and complexity of these problems. Few studies, however, have explored how young people cope with emotions related to cli-mate change. Since coping strategies could be as important as the emotions themselves in influencing whether young people will acquire knowledge concerning climate change, as well as ethical sensibility and action competence, it is argued that it is important for teach-ers to gain insight into how young people cope with this threat. Thus, the aim of this study was to explore how Swedish young people - in late childhood/early adolescence (n=90), mid to late adolescence (n=146), and early adulthood (n=112) - cope with worry and pro-mote hope in relation to climate change. A questionnaire containing both open-ended and Likert-type questions was used. Using thematic analysis, several coping strategies were identified, for instance, de-emphasizing the seriousness of climate change, distancing, hyperactivation, positive reappraisal, trust in different societal actors, problem-focused cop-ing, and existential hope. Furthermore, the results show that the children used less problem-focused coping and more distancing to cope with worry than the two older groups. Con-cerning sources of hope, the children used less positive reappraisal and instead placed trust in researchers and technological development to a higher degree than the two older groups. Practical implications for education for sustainable development are discussed.
Significance
Ideological polarization around environmental issues—especially climate change—have increased in the last 20 years. This polarization has led to public uncertainty, and in some cases, policy stalemate. Much attention has been given to understanding individual attitudes, but much less to the larger organizational and financial roots of polarization. This gap is due to prior difficulties in gathering and analyzing quantitative data about these complex and furtive processes. This paper uses comprehensive text and network data to show how corporate funding influences the production and actual thematic content of polarization efforts. It highlights the important influence of private funding in public knowledge and politics, and provides researchers a methodological model for future studies that blend large-scale textual discourse with social networks.
Ending poverty and stabilizing climate change will be two unprecedented global achievements and two major steps toward sustainable development. But the two objectives cannot be considered in isolation: they need to be jointly tackled through an integrated strategy. This report brings together those two objectives and explores how they can more easily be achieved if considered together. It examines the potential impact of climate change and climate policies on poverty reduction. It also provides guidance on how to create a “win-win” situation so that climate change policies contribute to poverty reduction and poverty-reduction policies contribute to climate change mitigation and resilience building. The key finding of the report is that climate change represents a significant obstacle to the sustained eradication of poverty, but future impacts on poverty are determined by policy choices: rapid, inclusive, and climate-informed development can prevent most short-term impacts whereas immediate pro-poor, emissions-reduction policies can drastically limit long-term ones.
Personal and political action on climate change is traditionally
thought to be motivated by people accepting its reality and importance.
However, convincing the public that climate change is
real faces powerful ideological obstacles1–4, and climate change
is slipping in public importance in many countries5,6. Here we
investigate a di�erent approach, identifying whether potential
co-benefits of addressing climate change7 could motivate
pro-environmental behaviour around the world for both those
convinced and unconvinced that climate change is real. We
describe an integrated framework for assessing beliefs about
co-benefits8, distinguishing social conditions (for example,
economic development, reduced pollution or disease) and
community character (for example, benevolence, competence).
Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; 6,196
participants) showed that two co-benefit types, Development
(economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a
more moral and caring community), motivated public, private
and financial actions to address climate change to a similar
degree as believing climate change is important. Critically,
relationships were similar for both convinced and unconvinced
participants, showing that co-benefits can motivate action
across ideological divides. These relationships were also
independent of perceived climate change importance, and
could not be explained by political ideology, age, or gender.
Communicating co-benefits could motivate action on climate
change where traditional approaches have stalled.
Is hope concerning climate change related to environmental engagement, or is it rather associated with unrealistic optimism and inactivity? This study on Swedish high school students identified two kinds of hope: constructive hope and hope based on denial. Constructive hope was positively associated with engagement and a perception that teachers respect students negative emotions concerning societal issues and have a future-oriented, positive, and solution-oriented communication style. Students who felt hope based on denial instead were less inclined to behave pro-environmentally and perceived their teachers as not taking their emotions seriously and as communicating in a pessimistic way. Boys perceived their teachers as less accepting of negative emotions, which explained why they felt more hope based on denial than girls. Practical implications of these findings are discussed.
Extending previous research, we examined whether the relation between social dominance orientation (SDO) and climate change denial reflects group-based dominance (SDO and nature dominance) or general system justification. Moreover, we examined whether the relation between personality (domineering and empathy) and denial is mediated by group-based dominance variables. The results showed that the group-based dominance variables reduce the effect of system justification on denial to nonsignificant. Also, social dominance and nature dominance explain unique parts of the variance in denial. Moreover, path analyses showed that the relations between empathy and system justification with denial are mediated by both of the group-based dominance variables, while the relation between domineering and denial is mediated only by SDO. Together, these results suggest that denial is driven partly by dominant personality and lowempathy, and partly by motivation to justify and promote existing social and human-nature hierarchies. We conclude by suggesting that climate change mitigation efforts could be more successful if framed as being clearly beneficial for everybody and nonthreatening to existing social order.
Diverse methods have been applied to understand why science continues to be debated within the climate policy domain. A number of studies have presented the notion of the ' echo chamber' to model and explain information flows across an array of social settings, finding disproportionate connections among ideologically similar political communicators. This paper builds on these findings to provide a more formal operationalization of the components of echo chambers. We then empirically test their utility using survey data collected from the community of political elites engaged in the contentious issue of climate politics in the United States. Our survey period coincides with the most active and contentious period in the history of US climate policy, when legislation regulating carbon dioxide emissions had passed through the House of Representatives and was being considered in the Senate. We use exponential random graph (ERG) modelling to demonstrate that both the homogeneity of information (the echo) and multi-path information transmission (the chamber) play significant roles in policy communication. We demonstrate that the intersection of these components creates echo chambers in the climate policy network. These results lead to some important conclusions about climate politics, as well as the relationship between science communication and policymaking at the elite level more generally.
The United States wields disproportionate global influence in terms of carbon dioxide emissions and international climate policy. This makes it an especially important context in which to examine the interplay among social, psychological, and political factors in shaping attitudes and behaviors related to climate change. In this article, we review the emerging literature addressing the liberal-conservative divide in the U.S. with respect to thought, communication, and action concerning climate change. Because of its theoretical and practical significance, we focus on the motivational basis for skepticism and inaction on the part of some, including "top-down" institutional forces, such as corporate strategy, and "bottom-up" psychological factors, such as ego, group, and system justification. Although more research is needed to elucidate fully the social, cognitive, and motivational bases of environmental attitudes and behavior, a great deal has been learned in just a few years by focusing on specific ideological factors in addition to general psychological principles.
Examining the relation between ideological variables and climate change denial, we found social dominance orientation (SDO) to outperform right-wing authoritarianism and left–right political orientation in predicting denial (Study 1 and 2). In Study 2, where we experimentally altered the level of denial by a newscast communicating supporting evidence for climate change, we demonstrated that the relation between the ideology variables and denial remains stable across conditions (newscast vs. control). Thus, the results showed that denial can be altered by communicating climate change evidence regardless of peoples’ position on ideology variables, in particular social dominance. We discuss the outcome in terms of core elements of SDO – dominance and system-justification motives – and encourage researchers on climate change denial to focus on these elements.
Negativity bias may underlie the development of political ideologies, but liberals and conservatives are likely to respond to threats similarly. We review evidence from research on intolerance, motivated reasoning, and basic psychological threats that suggest liberals and conservatives are more similar than different when confronting threatening groups, situations, and information.
Historical analyses and contemporary social psychological research demonstrate that prevailing systems, institutions, and practices espouse an ideology of conflict between humans and the natural world. The established paradigm of society espouses domination of and separation from the natural environment, and manifests in environmentally detrimental attitudes and practices. Ecological exploitation appears to stem from the same root socioeconomic processes as social injustice—the hierarchical arrangement of power which places some groups and the environment in a position devoid of power or rights. Accordingly, endorsement of social and environmental injustice is exacerbated by tendencies toward domination and hierarchy, such as social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism. Moreover, injustice is perpetuated by motivation to uphold and justify social structures and the dominant paradigm, which stifles societal change toward intergroup fairness and equality and motivates denial and neglect in the face of environmental problems. Ideological tendencies in service of the system, including political conservatism, belief in a just world, and free market ideology, contribute toward perpetuating injustice as well as anti-environmental sentiment and behavior. Considering the shared psychological and ideological underpinnings of social and environmental injustice point to important interventions, such as cultivating interdependence through contact, fostering inclusive representations, and harnessing ideological motives toward overcoming resistance to change, and carry implications for expanding the scope of justice theory, research, and practice.
Despite the well-documented implications of right-wing ideological dispositions for human intergroup relations, surprisingly little is understood about the implications for human–animal relations. We investigate why right-wing ideologies – social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) – positively predict attitudes toward animal exploitation and meat consumption. Two survey studies conducted in heterogeneous community samples (Study 1, N = 260; Study 2, N = 489) demonstrated that right-wing ideologies predict greater acceptance of animal exploitation and more meat consumption through two explaining mechanisms: (a) perceived threat from non-exploitive ideologies to the dominant carnist ideology (for both SDO and RWA) and (b) belief in human superiority over animals (for SDO). These findings hold after controlling for hedonistic pleasure from eating meat. Right-wing adherents do not simply consume more animals because they enjoy the taste of meat, but because doing so supports dominance ideologies and resistance to cultural change. Psychological parallels between human intergroup relations and human–animal relations are considered.
Recent theorizing suggests that biases toward human outgroups may be related to biases toward (non-human) animals, and that individual differences in desire for group dominance and inequality may underlie associations between these biases. The present investigation directly tests these assumptions. As expected, the results of the current study (N = 191) demonstrate that endorsing speciesist attitudes is significantly and positively associated with negative attitudes toward ethnic outgroups. Importantly, individual differences in social dominance orientation accounted for the association between speciesist and ethnic outgroup attitudes; that is, these variables are associated due to their common association with social dominance orientation that underpins these biases. We conclude that social dominance orientation represents a critical individual difference variable underlying ideological belief systems and attitudes pertaining to both human–human intergroup and human–animal relations.
The deficit-model of science communication assumes increased communication about science issues will move public opinion toward the scientific consensus. However, in the case of climate change, public polarization about the issue has increased in recent years, not diminished. In this study, we draw from theories of motivated reasoning, social identity, and persuasion to examine how science-based messages may increase public polarization on controversial science issues such as climate change. Exposing 240 adults to simulated news stories about possible climate change health impacts on different groups, we found the influence of identification with potential victims was contingent on participants’ political partisanship. This partisanship increased the degree of political polarization on support for climate mitigation policies and resulted in a boomerang effect among Republican participants. Implications for understanding the role of motivated reasoning within the context of science communication are discussed.
This chapter considers psychological aspects of global warming and climate change. It begins with a brief consideration of the public and political recognition of global warming and climate change as significant environmental issues. The chapter then turns to a review of the scientific evidence of the causes and consequences of climate change, and some of the issues in psychology that attend its investigation. The main section of the chapter reviews of characteristics of global warming and climate change that function as psychological barriers for the awareness of their existence and for willingness to act. Using Construal Level Theory, a new integrative approach is then outlined that links climate change barriers with psychological distance, and implications of the high-level construals of climate change are discussed. Thereafter some research agendas for further psychological research addressing global warming and climate change is proposed and delineated. This is followed by a section highlighting that the rate and consequences of global warming and climate change can be downgraded by global and local reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. The chapter finishes with some concluding remarks.
Open access here http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09644010802055576
Environmental scepticism denies the seriousness of environmental problems, and self-professed ‘sceptics’ claim to be unbiased analysts combating ‘junk science’. This study quantitatively analyses 141 English-language environmentally sceptical books published between 1972 and 2005. We find that over 92 per cent of these books, most published in the US since 1992, are linked to conservative think tanks (CTTs). Further, we analyse CTTs involved with environmental issues and find that 90 per cent of them espouse environmental scepticism. We conclude that scepticism is a tactic of an elite-driven counter-movement designed to combat environmentalism, and that the successful use of this tactic has contributed to the weakening of US commitment to environmental protection.
We studied environmental action and its predictors in a multi-scalar context of climate change politics. We asked how belief in climate change, post-materialist values, trust and knowledge predict people's engagement in environmental action by testing two alternative structural equation models (SEM). In one of these models all these factors directly predicted climate-friendly action, and in the other the effect of political trust, post-materialist values and climate change knowledge on climate-friendly action was mediated by belief in climate change. The models were tested with Eurobarometer 69.2 survey data of adult people living in Finland (N = 1,004). The SEM revealed that belief in climate change mediates the effect of post-material values, trust and knowledge on climate-friendly action. It is therefore important to recognize the role of belief in the public understanding of large-scale environmental problems. These results help political authorities to develop policies to encourage people's engagement in climate-friendly action.
It is noted that prejudice is primarily studied as a group or socially shared phenomenon. However, prejudice can also be viewed as an individual phenomenon in the sense that individuals often seem to differ in their propensity to adopt prejudiced and ethnocentric attitudes. This chapter focuses on the explanation of negative intergroup attitudes, prejudice, discrimination, and oppression by two basic cognitive-motivational dynamics. These dynamics can also have relevance for explaining those social and intergroup attitudes and behaviors associated with resistance to oppression, discrimination, and injustice. The chapter proposes a theoretical model that essentially suggests that prejudiced intergroup attitudes result from two motivational goals in individuals—namely, the competitively driven dominance-power-superiority motivation and threat-driven social control and group defense motivation. These motivational goals are aroused by two main kinds of situational characteristics of intergroup relationships: social and intergroup threat and inequalities in or competition over power and dominance. The model is fundamentally considered motivational as it involves prejudiced social and intergroup attitudes emerging from powerful and basic human motivational goals.
A belief in human dominance over nature lies at the heart of current environmental problems. In this article, we extend the theoretical scope of social dominance theory by arguing that social dominance orientation (SDO) is an important variable in understanding person-environment relations. We argue that individuals high in SDO are more willing to exploit the environment in unsustainable ways because SDO promotes human hierarchical dominance over nature. Four studies provide support for this perspective. High SDO was associated with lower levels of environmental concern in a nationally representative New Zealand sample (Study 1) and in country-level data across 27 nations (Study 2). SDO was also positively related to utilization attitudes toward nature (Study 3) and mediated the gender difference in beliefs about anthropogenic climate change (Study 4), and both occurred independently of right-wing authoritarianism. Implications for the human-dominated view of nature subscribed to by those high in SDO are discussed.
Investigated the functional relations among cognitive appraisal and coping processes and their short-term outcomes within stressful encounters. The authors used an intraindividual analysis of the interrelations among primary appraisal (what was at stake in the encounter), secondary appraisal (coping options), 8 forms of problem- and emotion-focused coping, and encounter outcomes in a sample of 85 married couples (females aged 35–45 yrs and males aged 26–54 yrs). Findings show that coping was strongly related to cognitive appraisal; the forms of coping that were used varied depending on what was at stake and the options for coping. Coping was also differentially related to satisfactory and unsatisfactory encounter outcomes. Findings clarify the functional relations among appraisal and coping variables and the outcomes of stressful encounters. (47 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The article reviews two decades of scholars' claims that exposures to pollution and other environmental risks are unequally distributed by race and class, examines case studies of environmental justice social movements and the history and politics of environmental justice policy making in the United States, and describes the emerging issue of global climate justice. The authors engage the contentious literature on how to quantitatively measure and document environmental injustice, especially the complex problems of having data of very different types and areas (such as zip codes, census tracts, or concentric circles) around polluting facilities or exposed populations. Also considered is the value of perspectives from critical race theory and ethnic studies for making sense of these social phenomena. The article concludes with a discussion of the globalization of the environmental justice movement, discourse, and issues, as well as with some policy implications of finding and understanding environmental justice. One unique feature of this review is its breadth and diversity, given the different approaches taken by the three coauthors.
Pseudoscientific claims concerning medical and psychological treatments of all varieties are commonplace. As behavior analysts, a sound skeptical approach to our science and practice is essential. The present paper offers an overview of science and skepticism and discusses the relationship of skepticism to behavior analysis, with an emphasis on the types of issues concerning behavior analysts in practice.
Although preliminary estimates from published literature and expert surveys suggest striking agreement among climate scientists on the tenets of anthropogenic climate change (ACC), the American public expresses substantial doubt about both the anthropogenic cause and the level of scientific agreement underpinning ACC. A broad analysis of the climate scientist community itself, the distribution of credibility of dissenting researchers relative to agreeing researchers, and the level of agreement among top climate experts has not been conducted and would inform future ACC discussions. Here, we use an extensive dataset of 1,372 climate researchers and their publication and citation data to show that (i) 97-98% of the climate researchers most actively publishing in the field surveyed here support the tenets of ACC outlined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and (ii) the relative climate expertise and scientific prominence of the researchers unconvinced of ACC are substantially below that of the convinced researchers.
This latest Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will again form the standard reference for all those concerned with climate change and its consequences, including students, researchers and policy makers in environmental science, meteorology, climatology, biology, ecology, atmospheric chemistry and environmental policy.
To read and download my thesis online, follow this link: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-297879
Abstract: Climate change denial has been found to correlate with sociopolitical ideology. The general aim of the present thesis was to investigate this relation, and more specifically to 1) test the unique effects of intercorrelated ideological variables on denial, and 2) investigate the psychological underpinnings of the ideology-denial relation. This approach helps estimating what component of right-wing ideology better explains climate change denial; resistance to change (indexed by left-right/liberal-conservative political orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and system justification), or acceptance of inequality (indexed by social dominance orientation [SDO]). In Paper I, SDO outperformed the effects of right-wing authoritarianism and political left-right orientation on denial (Study 1 and 2). Further, the SDO-denial relation was stable when denial scores were experimentally lowered by a newscast that communicated supportive evidence for climate change (Study 2). Thus, the following studies focused specifically on the SDO-denial relation by testing path models that also included other ideological variables (political conservatism, system justification, and endorsement of nature dominance), as well as personality variables (dominance, empathy, openness to experience, and anxiety avoidance) and/or gender. In Paper II, SDO and endorsement of nature dominance explained unique parts of climate change denial, and both of these variables mediated the effects of system justification and (low) empathy on denial. SDO mediated also the effect of dominance. In Paper III, focusing specifically on denial of human-induced climate change, SDO either partially or fully mediated the effects of political conservatism and gender across two cultural contexts (Brazil and Sweden). Additional analyses extended these results, by building on the model presented in Paper II. These analyses showed that SDO (and in some cases also political conservatism and endorsement of nature dominance) fully mediated the effects of gender and personality variables on denial, with one exception: Predisposition to avoid experiencing anxiety predicted denial directly, as well as through a link via general conservative ideology (system justification or political conservatism). In sum, the results indicate that denial is more strongly and consistently predicted by SDO than by the other included variables. Thus, endorsement of group-based inequality/hierarchies offers an important explanation for climate change denial.
Some scientifically well-established results—such as the fact that emission of greenhouse gases produces global warming—are rejected by sizable proportions of the population in the United States and other countries. Rejection of scientific findings is mostly driven by motivated cognition: People tend to reject findings that threaten their core beliefs or worldview. At present, rejection of scientific findings by the U.S. public is more prevalent on the political right than the left. Yet the cognitive mechanisms driving rejection of science, such as the superficial processing of evidence toward the desired interpretation, are found regardless of political orientation. General education and scientific literacy do not mitigate rejection of science but, rather, increase the polarization of opinions along partisan lines. In contrast, specific knowledge about the mechanisms underlying a scientific result—such as human-made climate change—can increase the acceptance of that result.
Widespread political polarization on issues related to environmental conservation may be partially explained by the chronic framing of persuasive messages in ideological and moral terms that hold greater appeal for liberals and egalitarians. A series of three experiments examined the extent to which variations in the moral framing of pro-environmental messaging affect liberals' vs. conservatives' conservation intentions, climate change attitudes, and donations to an environmental organization. While liberals did not generally differ across conditions, conservatives shifted substantially in the pro-environmental direction after exposure to a binding moral frame, in which protecting the natural environment was portrayed as a matter of obeying authority, defending the purity of nature, and demonstrating one's patriotism to the United States. This shift was pronounced when conservatives perceived the congruent appeal to be a stronger argument. Evidence of mediated moderation is also presented, in which the attitudinal and behavioral shifts for conservatives were a function of the degree to which the values present in the pro-environmental appeal were perceived as coming from the ingroup. Discussion focuses on future directions for more precisely specifying moral framing effects, and on considering the pros and cons of targeted messaging for the sustainability of environmental attitude change.
Recent growth in the number of studies examining belief in climate change is a positive development, but presents an ironic challenge in that it can be difficult for academics, practitioners and policy makers to keep pace. As a response to this challenge, we report on a meta-analysis of the correlates of belief in climate change. Twenty-seven variables were examined by synthesizing 25 polls and 171 academic studies across 56 nations. Two broad conclusions emerged. First, many intuitively appealing variables (such as education, sex, subjective knowledge, and experience of extreme weather events) were overshadowed in predictive power by values, ideologies, worldviews and political orientation. Second, climate change beliefs have only a small to moderate effect on the extent to which people are willing to act in climate-friendly ways. Implications for converting sceptics to the climate change cause-and for converting believers' intentions into action-are discussed.
Humans have always used denial. When we are afraid, guilty, confused, or when something interferes with our self-image, we tend to deny it. Yet denial is a delusion. When it impacts on the health of oneself, or society, or the world it becomes a pathology. Climate change denial is such a case. Paradoxically, as the climate science has become more certain, denial about the issue has increased. The paradox lies in the denial. There is a denial industry funded by the fossil fuel companies that literally denies the science, and seeks to confuse the public. There is denial within governments, where spin-doctors use ‘weasel words’ to pretend they are taking action. However there is also denial within most of us, the citizenry. We let denial prosper and we resist the science. It also explains the social science behind denial. It contains a detailed examination of the principal climate change denial arguments, from attacks on the integrity of scientists, to impossible expectations of proof and certainty to the cherry picking of data. Climate change can be solved - but only when we cease to deny that it exists. This book shows how we can break through denial, accept reality, and thus solve the climate crisis. It will engage scientists, university students, climate change activists as well as the general public seeking to roll back denial and act.
Political polarization has been observed on climate change issues, with right-wing adherents more likely to deny climate change and oppose policies aimed at mitigation. Most theory and political discourse frames this divide as being driven by support for economy-driven environmental exploitation on the right. However, consistent with rhetoric characterizing environmentalists as "Communist watermelons" (i.e. green on the outside, red on the inside), we test an intergroup explanation for political polarization on climate change attitudes, with the perception that environmentalists are a threat to society also underlying right-wing climate change denial. In an American community sample (N = 384), environmentalist threat consistently, strongly, and uniquely accounted for the link between right-wing ideology and opposition to environmentalist policies and climate change denial, over and above views that the environment exists for economic exploitation and other relevant beliefs about the environment. Implications for encouraging climate change mitigation among right-wing adherents are discussed.
Although the term “ideology” is ubiquitous in modern political discourse, it is used in diverse and usually ambiguous ways which limit its value as an analytical concept. The main ambiguity arises from the fact that, as most writers use it, the concept of ideology does not provide criteria for distinguishing ideological thought from nonideological thought. Lacking this power to make concrete discriminations, the concept fails to achieve empirical relevance. This paper attempts to remedy that deficiency and save the concept of ideology for the explanation of politics.
The problem of conceptualization is approached by viewing ideology primarily as a cultural phenomenon. As such, it is argued, ideology has characteristics that distinguish it from other symbol systems. Of special importance in this regard is the identification of basic differentia between ideology on the one hand, and myth and Utopia (with which ideology is often confused) on the other. The features of ideology identified in this comparative analysis are then discussed in fuller detail with a view to understanding (1) the significance of ideology in politics, and (2) the way in which the concept of ideology can help us to understand politics, insofar as politics involves ideology.
Environmental justice is a major movement and organizing discourse in the environmental politics arena, and both the movement and the idea have had a large influence on the way that climate justice has been conceptualized. While most discussions of climate justice in the academic literature focus on ideal conceptions and normative arguments of justice theory, or on the pragmatic policy of the more elite environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), a distinct discourse has developed out of the grassroots. In these movement articulations of climate justice, the concerns and principles of environmental justice are clear and consistent. Here, climate justice focuses on local impacts and experience, inequitable vulnerabilities, the importance of community voice, and demands for community sovereignty and functioning. This review traces the discourse of environmental justice from its development, through the range of principles and demands of grassroots climate justice movements, to more recent articulations of ideas for just adaptation to climate change. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website. Conflict of interest: The authors have declared no conflicts of interest for this article.
This study tests a model of reinforcing spirals in the context of global warming, using a 2-wave, within-subjects panel survey with a representative sample of Americans. Results show that, within waves, conservative media use is negatively related to global warming belief certainty and support for mitigation policies, while nonconservative media use is positively associated with belief certainty and policy support. In addition, the results show that consuming conservative or nonconservative media at Wave 1 makes people more likely to consume those same media at Wave 2, partly as an indirect result of the media's effects on global warming belief certainty and policy preferences. Wave 2 media use, in turn, further strengthens audiences' global warming belief certainty and policy preferences.
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) predicts support for unsustainable environmental exploitation, but the mechanism driving this effect remains unclear. Here we propose and test a novel Hierarchy Enforcement Hypothesis of Environmental Exploitation. Two experiments analysed using Bayesian moderated regression showed that SDO predicted support for a new mining operation expected to generate further profits to high-status groups in society, but not when profits were expected to equally benefit all members of the community. SDO predicts environmental exploitation to the extent that doing so helps sustain and widen the gap between dominant and disadvantaged groups through the disproportionate allocation of resources. This research identifies a dominance motive that may explain why some people support environmental exploitation more than others.
Three studies showed that social dominance orientation could contribute to environmental inequality through its association with environmental and economic ideologies, pursuit of ingroup interest, and relative indifference toward groups with low economic standing. Study 1 showed that social dominance orientation is correlated with a lack of concern for the natural environment and with the endorsement of free-market ideology. In Study 2, people higher in social dominance orientation endorsed a polluting industry that hurt a foreign population when the industry benefited their ingroup. Study 3 demonstrated that, given a choice of locations to site an environmentally problematic industry, people higher in social dominance orientation chose to direct the dangerous environmental footprint toward economically vulnerable foreign populations, and this was because of their relative lack of concern for human justice.
This study presents a detailed investigation of public scepticism about climate change in Britain using the trend, attribution, and impact scepticism framework of Rahmstorf (2004). The study found that climate scepticism is currently not widespread in Britain. Although uncertainty and scepticism about the potential impacts of climate change were fairly common, both trend and attribution scepticism were far less prevalent. It further showed that the different types of scepticism are strongly interrelated. Although this may suggest that the general public does not clearly distinguish between the different aspects of the climate debate, there is a clear gradation in prevalence along the Rahmstorf typology. Climate scepticism appeared particularly common among older individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds who are politically conservative and hold traditional values; while it is less common among younger individuals from higher socio-economic backgrounds who hold self-transcendence and environmental values. The finding that climate scepticism is rooted in people's core values and worldviews may imply a coherent and encompassing sceptical outlook on climate change. However, attitudinal certainty appeared mainly concentrated in non-sceptical groups, suggesting that climate sceptical views are not held very firmly. Implications of the findings for climate change communication and engagement are discussed.
We examine whether conservative white males are more likely than are other adults in the U.S. general public to endorse climate change denial. We draw theoretical and analytical guidance from the identity-protective cognition thesis explaining the white male effect and from recent political psychology scholarship documenting the heightened system-justification tendencies of political conservatives. We utilize public opinion data from ten Gallup surveys from 2001 to 2010, focusing specifically on five indicators of climate change denial. We find that conservative white males are significantly more likely than are other Americans to endorse denialist views on all five items, and that these differences are even greater for those conservative white males who self-report understanding global warming very well. Furthermore, the results of our multivariate logistic regression models reveal that the conservative white male effect remains significant when controlling for the direct effects of political ideology, race, and gender as well as the effects of nine control variables. We thus conclude that the unique views of conservative white males contribute significantly to the high level of climate change denial in the United States.
We trace the rise, fall, and resurgence of political ideology as a topic of research in social, personality, and political psychology. For over 200 years, political belief systems have been classified usefully according to a single left-right (or liberal-conservative) dimension that, we believe, possesses two core aspects: (a) advocating versus resisting social change and (b) rejecting versus accepting inequality. There have been many skeptics of the notion that most people are ideologically inclined, but recent psychological evidence suggests that left-right differences are pronounced in many life domains. Implicit as well as explicit preferences for tradition, conformity, order, stability, traditional values, and hierarchy-versus those for progress, rebelliousness, chaos, flexibility, feminism, and equality-are associated with conservatism and liberalism, respectively. Conservatives score consistently higher than liberals on measures of system justification. Furthermore, there are personality and lifestyle differences between liberals and conservatives as well as situational variables that induce either liberal or conservative shifts in political opinions. Our thesis is that ideological belief systems may be structured according to a left-right dimension for largely psychological reasons linked to variability in the needs to reduce uncertainty and threat.
© 2008 Association for Psychological Science.
Although many young people think climate change is an important societal issue, studies indicate that pessimism is quite common. Finding ways to instill hope could therefore be seen as vital. However, is hope positively related to engagement or is it only a sign of illusory optimism? The aim of the study was to explore if hope concerning climate change has a significant relation to pro-environmental behavior as well as an impact on behavior when controlling for already well-known predictors such as values, social influence, knowledge, and gender. Two questionnaire studies were performed, one with a group of Swedish teenagers (n = 723) and one with a group of Swedish young adults (n = 381). ‘Constructive’ hope had a unique positive influence on pro-environmental behavior. Hope based on denial, however, was negatively correlated with pro-environmental behavior in the two samples and was a significant negative predictor in the teenage group. The conclusion is that hope is not only a pleasant feeling but could also work as a motivational force, if one controls for denial. Implications for education concerning sustainable development are discussed.
Although the concept of justification has played a significant role in many social psychological theories, its presence in recent examinations of stereotyping has been minimal. We describe and evaluate previous notions of stereotyping as ego-justification and group-justification and propose an additional account, that of system-justification, which refers to psychological processes contributing to the preservation of existing social arrangements even at the expense of personal and group interest. It is argued that the notion of system-justification is necessary to account for previously unexplained phenomena, most notably the participation by disadvantaged individuals and groups in negative stereotypes of themselves, and the consensual nature of stereotypic beliefs despite differences in social relations within and between social groups. We offer a selective review of existing research that demonstrates the role of stereotypes in the production of false consciousness and develop the implications of a system-justification approach.
[T]he rationalizing and justifying function of a stereotype exceeds its function as a reflector of group attributes—G. W. Allport (1958, p. 192).
Avoiding dangerous climate change is one of the most urgent social risk issues we face today and understanding related public perceptions is critical to engaging the public with the major societal transformations required to combat climate change. Analyses of public perceptions have indicated that climate change is perceived as distant on a number of different dimensions. However, to date there has been no in-depth exploration of the psychological distance of climate change. This study uses a nationally representative British sample in order to systematically explore and characterize each of the four theorized dimensions of psychological distance--temporal, social, and geographical distance, and uncertainty--in relation to climate change. We examine how each of these different aspects of psychological distance relate to each other as well as to concerns about climate change and sustainable behavior intentions. Results indicate that climate change is both psychologically distant and proximal in relation to different dimensions. Lower psychological distance was generally associated with higher levels of concern, although perceived impacts on developing countries, as an indicator of social distance, was also significantly related to preparedness to act on climate change. Our findings clearly point to the utility of risk communication techniques designed to reduce psychological distance. However, highlighting the potentially very serious distant impacts of climate change may also be useful in promoting sustainable behavior, even among those already concerned.