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NOVEMBER 2016
NETWORKING ON THE GROUND
EXPLORING THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN REGULATORY
PROVISIONS AND COLLABORATIVE DYNAMICS
IN CHILD WELFARE AND PROTECTION
ACROSS THREE JURISDICTIONS
INGO BODE, Kassel University
JANNE PAULSEN BREIMO, Nord University
OSCAR E. FIRBANK, Université de Montréal
JOHANS-TVEIT SANDVIN, Nord University
HANNU TURBA, Kassel University
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RESEARCH TEAM
Ingo Bode, Ph. D., Professor, Department of Social Policy, Law andSociology, University of Kassel
Janne Paulsen Breimo, Ph. D., Associate professor, Faculty of Social Sciences,Nord University
Oscar E. Firbank, Ph. D., Professor, School of Social Work, Université de Montréal
Johans-Tveit Sandvin, Ph. D., Professor, Faculty of Social Science, Nord University
Hannu Turba, Researcher, Department of Social Policy, Law and Sociology, University of Kassel
EDITING
Geneviève Reed, Centre de recherche et de partage des savoirs InterActions (CRPSI), CIUSSS du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal
DISTRIBUTION
CRPSI, CIUSSS du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal : www.centreinteractions.ca
DUPLICATION
It is permitted to reproduce for purely informative and non-commercial purposes any excerpt of this document provided
that no modication is made to it and that the name of the original author and the source are clearly indicated.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank the ARIMA, SSHRC-funded partnership (Canada), the COST-Action IS 1102 (Europe), and the
Norwegian Regional Research Council for their support.
© CRPSI, CIUSSS du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal
ISBN 978-2-550-77253-8 (Print)
ISBN 978-2-550-77254-5 (PDF)
Legal Deposit – Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec, 2016
Legal Deposit – Library and Archives Canada, 2016
Networking on the ground – Exploring the interplay between regulatory provisions and collaborative
dynamics in Child Welfare and Protection across three jurisdictions
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CIUSSS du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal
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Sommaire
Ce rapport1 présente les résultats d’une étude comparative internationale visant à
identier les facteurs facilitant et contraignant la collaboration interorganisationnelle
dans le domaine des services d’aide et de protection de l’enfance. L’étude comporte
une analyse secondaire des données issues d’études qualitatives distinctes, menées
dans trois juridictions: Québec, Norvège et Allemagne. La réanalyse des données a
porté sur quatre variables composites, à savoir: gouvernance et rapports de pouvoir;
conance et anités culturelles; gestion des ressources; et leadership. Les résultats
de l’étude font ressortir la façon dont les cadres réglementaires propres à chaque
juridiction interagissent avec et aectent les rapports de collaboration entre acteurs,
fournissant ainsi des éclairages pertinents pour l’étude et l’établissement des réseaux,
tant au niveau national qu’international.
MESSAGESCLÉS
• Dans la mesure où la plupart des facteurs qui inuent sur le fonctionnement d’un réseau ont
tendance à interagir entre eux, et sont enchâssés dans un environnement institutionnel donné,
l’importance qu’on leur accorde peut varier considérablement d’une juridiction — voire d’une
initiative de collaboration — à une autre. En conséquence, l’identication d’un noyau de propriétés
génériques agissant comme des préalables au fonctionnement réussi et durable des initiatives
interorganisationnels semble s’avérer illusoire.
• Malgré les eorts de plus en plus courants déployés par les gouvernements en vue de
promouvoir, et parfois de mandater la collaboration, la plupart des réseaux considérés ont
été créés et fonctionnent de façon hybride. Cette approche pourrait être vue comme étant
un compromis pragmatique an d’accroître la nature consensuelle des rapports entre les
organisations impliquées, ou de concilier des dispositions réglementaires contradictoires de la
part du gouvernement.
• Notre analyse rend aussi compte du caractère multidimensionnel des rapports de réciprocité et
de conance entre les milieux impliqués. Considérées comme des dimensions essentielles d’un
réseau, la réciprocité et la conance peuvent toutefois ne pas être incompatibles avec la poursuite
d’intérêts particuliers de la part des organisations concernées. À ce sujet, la complémentarité
perçue – c’est-à-dire le sentiment que les intérêts spéciques de chacun sont pris en compte –
peut parfois servir de levier à l’avancement des activités de collaboration.
1 Exceptionnellement, ce rapport est publié en anglais puisqu’il est destiné à un public international. Un abrégé en français est
également disponible.
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• Une autre observation concerne les dilemmes relatifs à la mobilisation des ressources auxquels les
promoteurs et membres du réseau sont souvent confrontés. Ainsi, lorsque le soutien nancier du
gouvernement est insusant, la participation des organisations peut être onéreuse. Et malgré
que dans certaines conditions une approche créative pour assurer le nancement peut mener à
une certaine stabilité dans le fonctionnement des réseaux; à plus grande échelle, cette pratique
risque de compromettre la qualité et la performance des services.
• Fait à souligner, les initiatives de collaboration nécessitent souvent une ou plusieurs personnes
assumant le rôle de champions pour promouvoir ou pour faciliter leur fonctionnement au
quotidien. Vu sous cet angle, le leadership peut accorder une certaine légitimité, autant interne
qu’externe, au réseau; tout en aectant ses objectifs et nalités, ainsi que le degré d’engagement
des acteurs concernés.
Networking on the ground – Exploring the interplay between regulatory provisions and collaborative
dynamics in Child Welfare and Protection across three jurisdictions
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Abstract
This paper presents results from an international, comparative project aimed at identifying
the enabling and constraining factors that underpin inter-organizational collaboration in
Child Welfare and Protection services (CWP). The study comprised three jurisdictions –Qué-
bec, Norway and Germany– and involved the secondary analysis of data from separate quali-
tative studies available in each place. Re-analysis of data centered on four variable constructs,
namely: Governance and power relations; Trust and cultural anity; Resource management
issues; and Leadership. Study ndings illuminate how regulatory frameworks from each ju-
risdiction interface with and aect cross‐agency collaboration capacity on the ground, thus
provide insights that are relevant for the study and organizing of local networks within and
across jurisdictions.
KEY MESSAGES
• To the extent most factors that bear on network functioning tend to interact with one another
and are embedded in a given institutional environment, their relative importance may vary
greatly from one jurisdiction (or even collaborative initiative) to another. As a result, identifying
a core set of generic properties that would act as prerequisites for cross‐agency schemes to oper-
ate in a successful, sustainable manner seems an elusive endeavour.
• Despite government’s drive to increasingly promote and sometimes mandate collaboration, in
all three jurisdictions most networks reviewed were set up and operate in a hybrid fashion. This
approach may be viewed as a pragmatic compromise geared at building consensus amongst
participating agencies, or sometimes at reconciling conicting government regulatory aims.
• Our analysis also sheds light on the multi‐faceted nature of cross‐agency mutuality and trust.
Seen as crucial network ingredients, mutuality and trust may nevertheless not be incompatible
with self‐interest. Rather, perceived complementarity –i.e. feeling that one’s interests are con-
sidered– can at times provide the basis for collaborative activities to prosper.
• A further observation relates to the resource mobilization dilemmas that often confront network
promoters and members. In situations where government nancial support is inadequate,
agencies’ participation costs prove challenging. Whereas under certain conditions a creative
approach to secure funding can allow initiatives to evolve into a stable pattern; on a larger scale
this practice may undermine service quality and performance.
• Importantly, collaborative schemes often require one or a few individuals acting as champions
to promote them or facilitate their day-to-day operations. In this regard, network leadership may
convey a sense of legitimacy –internal as well as external– to the initiative, variously aecting
network purpose and direction, including stakeholder engagement.
Networking on the ground – Exploring the interplay between regulatory provisions and collaborative
dynamics in Child Welfare and Protection across three jurisdictions
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CIUSSS du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal
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Table of contents
SOMMAIRE .....................................................................................................................................3
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................... 5
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................9
METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACH....................................................................11
NETWORKS BACKGROUND AND OPERATING CONDITIONS ..................................................14
A DIVERSE CATALOG OF NETWORK INITIATIVES ....................................................................16
COLLABORATIVE BARRIERS AND FACILITATORS: MAKING SENSE OF NETWORKING
ACTIVITY ON THE GROUND ...................................................................................................19
Network governance and power relations .................................................................................................19
Trust and cultural anity ..................................................................................................................................21
Resource management issues .......................................................................................................................25
Leadership .............................................................................................................................................................. 27
REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND CROSSAGENCY COLLABORATION DYNAMICS: A
SYNTHESIS ...............................................................................................................................29
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 32
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................ 34
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dynamics in Child Welfare and Protection across three jurisdictions
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2. A rst project component aimed at eliciting the ‘normative rationales’ that underpin and inform LSN in Child Welfare and Protection
systems (Breimo et al., 2016). The third component seeks to understand (through a vignette based survey) how front-line workers
deal with networking issues in a given situation (rather than how this should be done); thus allowing to explore the subjective side
of collaborative action.
Introduction
Over the past decade, the proliferation in most advanced welfare states of local service networks
(LSN) has spawned a very substantial literature on the subject at both the policy and practice
levels (for recent reviews see O’Leary & Vij, 2012; Provan & Lemaire, 2012; O’Toole, 2015). A wide
range of issues and perspectives have been covered; yet, in seeking to understand collaboration
dynamics in social services, a research concern of enduring signicance –and in many respects a
still unanswered question– remains: Given specic policy and institutional environments, what makes
networking activity tick?
Addressing this concern is the more so relevant given that stimulating, and sometimes mandating
cross-agency collaboration amongst a wide array of stakeholders frequently represents a
challenging endeavour for policy advocates and practitioners alike (Bryson et al., 2015). On the
frontlines, some suggest that a number of such initiatives are faltering and seem unable to generate
tangible results. Indeed, while operating and power-related challenges abound (Saz-Carranza et al.,
2016), “collaborative inertia” is not an uncommon feature of vertically-dened networks (Huxham
& Vangen, 2005). But potentially successful experiences have also been singled out in the literature
and may show the way forward (Robson, 2012; Packard et al., 2013; Popp et al., 2014). Further, some
have expressed the view that “properly resourced and supported, a mandated network can be an
essential, eective policy catalyst to address compelling public policy issues” (Popp & Casabeer,
2015: 5). Be that as it may, in various jurisdictions on both sides of the Atlantic, questions have been
raised over whether LSN can be steered (i.e. regulated) in a given direction, led to generate a degree
of collaboration among participants, and ultimately perform in a synergistic, eective manner.
Finding the right ‘t’ between regulatory provisions from a given jurisdiction and stakeholder
collaborative dynamics is another subject where knowledge is still fragmented and debated.
This paper presents results from a comparative, secondary analysis of data on the enabling
and constraining factors that underpin inter-organizational collaboration in Child Welfare and
Protection services (CWP). It represents component two from a broader research undertaking on
LSN, comparing three jurisdictions –Germany, Norway and Québec– and aimed at assessing how
CWP regulatory provisions interface and interact with stakeholder interactional dynamics, thus
aecting networks operation on the ground2.
Following this introduction, we dene the paper’s conceptual and methodological criteria and
introduce background information on networks’ operating conditions and CWP collaborative
schemes from each of the three jurisdictions under study. Next, empirical data on barriers and
facilitators to cross‐agency collaboration in CWP from Québec, Norway and Germany are presented.
The following section provides a comparative synthesis of ndings and makes inferences on how
regulatory provisions on cross‐agency networks interact with and aect collaborative endeavour
on the ground. Our conclusions highlights some emerging issues that bear on cross-agency
collaborative endeavour and are relevant for the study and organizing of local networks in a broader
perspective.
Networking on the ground – Exploring the interplay between regulatory provisions and collaborative
dynamics in Child Welfare and Protection across three jurisdictions
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Methodology and conceptual approach
Why these three jurisdictions for comparison in
this area of study? Québec, while sharing with
Norway a state-centred approach to welfare
service delivery, presents the specicity of having
a long history of cross-sector management in
human service provision (Gaumer & Fleury, 2009).
Concomitantly, its welfare system relies on a well-
rooted économie sociale as an institutionalized
non-statutory partner of the state (Graefe, 2004)
–a feature dierentiating the province from
the rest of Canada as well as Norway, where
public involvement is comprehensive, and
municipalities are expected to take a strong
responsibility for social service provision, often
with rather wide mandates. The corporatist
legacy in Germany exhibits a deeply entrenched
division of work among various public, non-
prot and private service providers. Moreover,
in contrast to Norway, ‘welfare pluralism’ has
long been a reality in Germany –although, as
discussed below, cross-agency collaboration
proves challenging in many respects (Bode,
2011). Taking account of dierent worlds of
welfare services (Stoy, 2014), our project thus
covers contrasting jurisdictions, associated
with distinct social service architectures and
traditions.
All network initiatives considered across the
three jurisdictions belong to the same service
intervention domain, i.e. Child Welfare and
Protection. Additionally, in this paper networks
refer to formalized collaborative arrangements
involving autonomous service providers,
public as well as private, and built around
the management and provision of services
of various kinds under public oversight. In
using such generic denition of networks,
our study endorses the view that interagency
joint‐work, embedded in specic national and
local contexts, can manifest itself in dierent
forms –in a continuum from less to more
comprehensive organizational relations–; to
fulll a range of functions, and involving a
varied mix of stakeholders (Popp et al., 2014;
Klijn, 2008). Thus, a diversity of formalized CWP
schemes, dierently named in each jurisdiction
(e.g. teams, networks, collaboratives), were
investigated.
Depending on jurisdiction, various data
sources were taped. As regards Germany,
evidence stems from the research project
SKIPPI (Sozialsystem, Kindeswohlgefährdung
und Prozesse professioneller Interventionen),
concerned with the handling of child
maltreatment within the German welfare
state (Bode & Turba, 2014). The investigation
was conducted in ve municipalities in urban
(n=3) and rural (n=2) areas. Data collection
involved a combination of methods, including
semi-structured interviews, case le analysis,
participant observation (in case discussions
and sta meetings) and documentary analysis
of relevant materials (i.e. Laws, regulations,
contracts). A total of 105 interviews and 12
observation sessions were conducted with
representatives from several professional
groups and organizations from the CWP eld.
Interviews focused on retrospective case analysis
of intervention processes concerning young
children (0-6 years) and where maltreatment
had been suspected or reported. In looking at
intervention processes, collaborative practices
and logics used by professional groups from
various agencies and across intervention sectors
were investigated and compared, including
the operating of formalized networks. Further,
network activity was analyzed from two
standpoints: collaboration in the event of child-
related incidents for which intervention was
legally required; and stakeholder collaborative
endeavour (voluntary as well as mandated)
aimed at improving service delivery.
Concerning Norway, data were derived from
the project Collaboration as innovation in
Public Welfare Services, carried out in 2013-
2014, and aimed at charting service paths
for youth transitioning from CWP to adult
services (Breimo et al., 2015). More specically,
the project investigated what happens in
the Norwegian welfare bureaucracy when
young people turn 18, particularly as regards
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service continuity and the interface between
various support systems. Data collection was
undertaken through in-depth, semi-structured
interviews with young adults and sometimes
their parents, as well as service workers from
municipal CWP and the Norwegian Labor and
Welfare Administration (NAV). The latter is a
relatively new organization set up in 2005 as a
result of the Norwegian Employment Agency
and the National Insurance Scheme having
merged into a single administration; a reform
which, inter alia, included the signing of a formal
collaboration agreement between various
government social services agencies at the local
level. It is interviews with service workers and
senior management from two Norwegian cities,
a big (190,000 inh.) and a small one (20,000
inh.), that constitute the prime data source for
this analysis. The former one, where most of
the eldwork took place, is a reform-friendly
city actively engaged in trying out new forms
of governance, and often a forerunner for what
has gradually become national policy. Municipal
welfare services oered within the city are
split between two agencies: Child and Family,
and Health and Welfare. Additionally, service
delivery is decentralized according to four
districts. A formal agreement has been passed
between the municipality and NAV whereby
all services are organized in compliance with
the same decentralized structure. Agencies also
share a common service counter in each district;
a one-stop shop oering information, guidance
and referrals to various agencies.
As regards Québec, analysis was conducted by
relying on collaborative initiatives investigated
by the Québec observatory of local service
networks (OQRLS) (Archambault & Nadeau,
2012). Out of 62 OQRLS documented networks,
four of them dealing with CWP services were
selected for their relevancy to the study at hand,
and re-examined by centering on facilitating
and hindering collaborative factors.3 OQRLS
data was gathered by means of semi-structured
interviews conducted with a purposive sample
of stakeholders, a general network information
form completed by a key sponsor, and relevant
network documentation concerning each
initiative. A core interview section dealt with
networks’ operating over time, challenges
encountered and optimal conditions for their
success. All four initiatives emerged in the
2005-2009 period, in the context of reforms
mandating local welfare networks as well as
policy geared at enhancing service continuity
between the protection and social support
service streams in this domain. In addition,
the selected networks are located in rural
(n=2), semi-rural (n=1) and urban (n=1) areas
which tend to dier in terms of social service
availability and scope, collaborative dynamics
and local issues at stake. Despite dierences,
all initiatives aim at improving preventive
interventions, whether for young children with
complex psychosocial problems, youth at risk
of suicide, socio-economic disadvantaged
children, or troubled youth likely to be referred
to the Youth Protection services. Furthermore,
all initiatives concern the setting up of new
services whereby agency collaboration is at its
core. As regards network size and composition,
all four initiatives are relatively small, directly
involving a limited number of partners (4 to 8)
from the public and not-prot private sectors.
However, referrals are often made to various
local or regional organizations interfacing with
the network initiative, albeit are not formally
enrolled with it.
Despite dierences in project objectives and
data gathering methods, in all three jurisdictions
secondary analysis of data involved qualitative
thematic coding and was performed in line with
a comparative coding framework agreed upon
by members of the team. Given the study’s
exploratory nature, broad analytical categories
or variable constructs were considered, namely:
(1) Governance and power relations, (2) Trust
and cultural anity, (3) Resource management
issues, and (4) Leadership. These constructs
cover structural, social capital and agency
dimensions prominent in the literature on
network functioning. They loosely draw on the
Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory developed
by Mattessich et al. (2001) to assess factors
3 The local initiatives’ names have been concealed for condentiality reasons.
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inuencing service networks operation; as well
as variables singled out in Thomson and Perry’s
(2006) multidimensional framework. As we shall
see, depending on respondents’ viewpoints
and the network initiative under scrutiny, any of
these variable constructs can be seen as having a
positive (i.e. facilitating), negative (i.e. hindering),
or sometimes neutral (i.e. inconsequential) eect
on network functioning. For instance, in a given
initiative members’ trust and cultural anity can
be recognized as a signicant ‘stepping stone’
toward joint-work; in another one its absence
or low expression might be indicative of poor
collaboration practices; whereas still in others
its perceived impact might be marginal.
Applied to available data from the three
jurisdictions, the coding frame provided a
degree of analytical coherence. However, several
caveats should be borne in mind. Given primary
studies’ characteristics and objectives, the depth
and breadth of available information concerning
networks’ operation varied. As a result, the
equivalency and comparability of ndings were
sometimes dicult to establish. Most important,
there are dangers at being conclusive when
comparing a small sample of joint-work
initiatives from three countries; a feature that
qualies any quick generalization about CWP
network hindering and facilitating factors. Be
that as it may, the evidence underpinning this
study allows for both, a detailed appreciation of
CWP cross-agency collaboration within a specic
regulatory environment, and an accurate
approximation of lessons to be drawn when
comparing dynamics across contexts.
The project is informed by an institutional
logics perspective, as developed by Thornton
et al. (2012). Accordingly, organizations, and
by extension networks, are conceived of as
entities embedded within broader regulatory
systems, including systems of meaning and
culture; “this embeddedness activates salient
institutional logics” within settings of social
intervention (such as service networks),
enabling or constraining “decisions, practices
and actions”(Glynn & Raaeli, 2013: 175).
This implies a multidimensional perspective
on networks: On the one hand, networking
is subject to regulation; on the other hand,
regulation becomes reality only through a
collective enactment of logics on the ground
(McPherson & Sauder, 2013), with this implying
contingency. Importantly, jurisdiction-based
institutional environments (Bryson et al., 2015),
including local prior relational practices (formal
or informal) are deemed relevant.
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Networks background and operating conditions
All networks under study emerged in a
jurisdiction-specic context (national as well as
local), and are an expression of distinctive and
evolving collaborative eorts, both of which
aect their operating on the ground.
As regards Germany, CWP interagency joint-
work has traditionally represented a taken-
for-granted –yet adhocratic– activity within
a pluralistic welfare state. Up until the 1980s,
non-prot organisations were entrusted by
government with providing services to users
deemed to require social support. Adequate
public funding for this was secured and service
providers’ discretionary power appeared high.
At local level, municipal authorities and non-
prot umbrella organizations handled service
infrastructure issues; with social intervention
being based on ad hoc provider-Youth Welfare
agreements, and professional collaboration
dened on a case-by-case basis.
Although this mode of interaction is still
widespread; several reforms have led to
the establishing of a regulatory framework
characterized by increasing competition,
enforced cross-agency collaboration and
growing bureaucratic control. Additionally,
new provisions compel service providers to
strengthen collaboration all while improving
cost-eectiveness – the latter casting a
shadow over the former. Moreover, while
provider competition generates economic
strains, renewed government eorts aimed
at controlling service provision increases
transaction costs for all involved parties at the
same time it discourages trust-based relations.
Thus, tensions do not only stem from traditional
cleavages between human service professions
or agencies holding distinctive mandates and
cultural values, but also from the increasing
‘disorganization’ of the German welfare state
over the last two decades.
As a result, local governance schemes and
horizontal provider relations, within and across
service sectors, have changed substantially.
Furthermore, the balance of power among
stakeholder has shifted, and in so doing, new
conict zones have emerged. Broader and
more stringent control mechanisms embraced
by government in the social sector create
additional obstacles to collaborative work.
Overall, professionals operating within the CWP
eld have to display a degree of inventiveness
to manage their day-to-day business, including
with regard to binding guidelines to collaborate
with one another.
In the case of Norway, the need for increased
inter-professional collaboration and service
coordination has been a recurring political
theme for several decades. Now as before, the
main explicit goal is to strengthen cooperation
between various actors in the delivery of
services, thereby making interventions more
holistic and tailor-made to suit the needs of
users. However, despite increasing demands
for cross-agencies collaboration, Norwegian
CWP services remain a fairly closed and self-
reliant intervention sector. This is the case even
when CWP appears to be the welfare domain
in which private provider use is most common.
Signicantly, relations between public CWP
agencies and private providers, be it for prot
or non-prot, are normally contractual and
limited in nature. Within the ‘maltreatment’
service component of CWP, a few collaborative
initiatives involving private agencies have
emerged; however, these are highly regulated
by the core principles of condentiality that
characterize standard practice in the sector.
Most inter-agency collaboration encompassing
private parties relates to preventive work and
the following up of young-adults discharged
from child caring institutions. Noteworthy, CWP
services have recently been the subject of much
negative attention in the media; one complaint
being that collaboration with various relevant
welfare agencies is often poor. Government,
for its part, has emphasized that lack of
collaboration is due to the current municipal-
state sharing of responsibilities, which supports
Networking on the ground – Exploring the interplay between regulatory provisions and collaborative
dynamics in Child Welfare and Protection across three jurisdictions
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CIUSSS du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal
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and promotes joint-work amongst CWP public
agencies rather than across sectors, including
with private providers.
Another concerning organizational issue is
the strict separation between child and adult
services, which brings about a complete change
of care regime when children turn 18. However,
in principle at least, children in the custody of
CWP authorities are entitled to care services
until the age of 23; that which oers a scope of
opportunities and some particular conditions
for service cooperation. From the perspective of
CWP agencies, a wide range of potential allies
can be mobilized when it comes to securing the
dicult transition to adulthood, including the
sharing of responsibility and resources. Adult
welfare services, on the other hand, may nd it
advantageous to collaborate with CWP in order
to minimize problems later on.
The situation in Québec is also particular in
many respects and stands in contrast to the
other two jurisdictions. One initial aspect to
consider, having inuenced how and in what
way collaboration initiatives unfolded over
time, is Government’s traditional reliance on
an interventionist, dirigiste perspective to
social services steering and delivery. Despite
an increase in outsourcing to third-sector
providers –on the rise since the mid-1990s–,
managed competition between public and
private agencies or large-scale contracting
out have never gained much traction in the
provincial political arena. Instead, the concepts
of ‘partnering’ and ‘cross-sector action’ have
regularly been mobilized, in discourse and
practice, to characterize public-private relations
and the sharing of responsibilities in service
provision. Since the early 2000s, in particular,
various public facilities were merged into broad,
single Health and Social Services Centers
(CSSS in French). These Centers, entrusted
with a degree of autonomy and decision-
making power, were intended above all as
key orchestrators of public-private relations
at the local level, including the setting up and
steering of service networks.
Inter-agency collaboration in Québec was
originally thought of as a bottom-up process,
based on voluntary interaction rather than
constrained endeavor, even when promoted
and steered by local or regional government
agencies. Up until the late 1980s, minimal formal
coordination structures were established. In
the following decade, however, there’s a shift
toward ‘managed collaboration’, as regional
coordination plans were promoted by the
provincial government. Support for a top-
down, ‘integrated’ system of care was fueled
by positive results from several experimental
initiatives carried-out in the province during
the 2000s. Over time, the combination of
various initiatives and reforms would cause
two collaboration approaches to coexist, one
increasingly hierarchical and constraining –
materialized by the CSSS and their mandate to
establish local service networks in most social
service domains–, and another more consensual
and enabling –typied by a set or voluntary,
locally-driven arrangements.
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A diverse catalog of network initiatives
Concerning collaborative experiences in the
three jurisdictions under study, a diverse
catalogue of initiatives comes to the fore
that could be seen as indicative of relevant
collaborative issues in the general eld of
CWP. As regards Germany, data relates to
network activities at various levels, including
the day-to-day work with families entitled to
‘curative’ social support. More specically,
in the catchment areas where data were
collected, dierent collaborative schemes have
developed, aimed at connecting institutions,
or providers and ‘experts’ from various local
agencies. Oftentimes, network managers
are given a remit to improve coordination,
including activities that go beyond actors’
day-to-day collaboration around a given case.
So-called ‘child protection experts’ play a
signicant role in this respect. For instance, in
one of the settings investigated, more than
600 agents from various organizations in the
CWP eld were trained for such managing role.
A further networking arena takes place when
cross-professional working parties, involving
sta from multiple organizations and public
bodies, are set up to address complex cases or
develop new practices. Many of these working
parties have emerged on an ad hoc, voluntary
basis –as a product of ‘entrepreneurial’
social workers, health care professionals, or
police ocers. Others were prescribed by
public regulations to some extent –even
when the subject of collaboration may be
locally determined. In one of the settings
under study, a working party was initiated
by a regional authority responsible for youth
welfare to tackle substance abuse problems in
families. Following the authority’s instructions,
networking activities began by inviting and
encouraging all concerned local players to
participate –a necessary step for raising public
funds. However, as the working party moved
forward, its scope was expanded by the
regional authority, thus associating a broader
range of local CWP agencies. In this context,
networking can be viewed as a decentralized,
proactive process geared at meeting relevant
parties concerns on the ground; yet, a process
evolving in line with, and largely shaped by,
formal regulation.
Various intermediary network congurations
can also be found, whose format and
objectives vary widely from one region to
another. In some places, for instance, ‘township
conferences’ (Stadtteilkonferenzen) set up by
local youth welfare personnel, will often trigger
a dynamic of open exchange amongst a range
of stakeholders involved in CWP. Furthermore,
non-prot service providers sometimes
assemble ‘local consortia’ (contemplated in the
Social Code) to agree on a joint-work agenda,
including the denition of common policies.
In CWP these consortia are not widespread –
although in one of the settings investigated
a substantial proportion of the local Child
Protection budget was collectively managed
by one of them. Formal collaboration amongst
not-prot agencies is more prevalent at the
regional, Länder level, where federations of
welfare associations are an institutionalized
partner of public bodies when it comes to
social welfare provision. A variety of these
intermediary collaboration structures are local,
pilot projects established in response to new
government directives. Of note, in the settings
under study, pilots generally comprised local
youth welfare oces, specialized non-prot
agencies, and peripheral organizations such
as health care agencies. More specically, it is
in the area of ‘early prevention’ (Frühe Hilfen)
that these initiatives have developed the
most, largely as a result of xed-term funding
provided by a national program.
In the case of Norway, CWP services have
traditionally been more reluctant to involve
non-government agencies, except through
formalized agreements and contracting. Yet, in
recent years, a marked growth in networking
arrangements has taken place, entailing
dierent degrees of collaboration intensity
and formalization. Some are local, bottom-up
initiatives, while others are models traveling
from one municipality to another, including
from abroad.
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One example is the so-called “Family meetings”,
already underway in a number of municipalities.
Depending on the issues at stake, besides the
concerned family, meetings typically involve
a school or kindergarten, CWP agencies, the
Public Health Centre, the School Psychology
Centre, and the Child and Youth Psychiatry
services (BUP). While municipalities host such
meetings, it is usually the BUP that plays the
most central role. Family meetings are based
on a philosophy of simultaneousness; thus, as
a means to avoid any form of time-consuming
referrals and waiting lists.
Another example, also involving private
partners, is the “Foyer”. A Foyer is a social
enterprise, rst established in Aberdeen
in response to concerns about youth
homelessness and unemployment. In the
Norwegian context, a Foyer is a partnership
which may include CWP, the Youth Outreach
Oce, the Municipal Housing Department,
NAV, the Refugee Oce, private house
owners, a security service company and
various enterprises and employers. The Foyer
provides accommodation with support to
former homeless and at-risk youth, while
helping them link to a range of services (i.e.
health, counselling, employment, etc.).
Other initiatives are the ones encountered in
the cities under study. The most formalized
example is perhaps the OSK-teams (Oentlige
servicekontorer) associating NAV with
municipal Child protection, and Health and
Welfare oces to deal with complex cases
requiring multiple provider interventions.
These networks are mandated, in the sense
that competent local authorities are required
to establish them within their respective
districts. They are regulated through
municipality-NAV agreements, although
some discretion is granted concerning their
organization and mode of operation. Despite
OSK-teams’ collaborative nature, no formal
decision-making structure was envisaged for
binding all agencies together. Hence, when an
intervention plan is established, this is less the
expression of a deliberative, collective process
than the articulation of a set of decisions made
by each agency individually.
A more horizontal collaborative example is
provided by the “Action teams”, aimed at
preventing school dropout. Action teams are
also formalized and exist in all four districts
investigated; however, compared to OSK-
teams, they operate on an ad hoc basis. Their
composition is comparatively larger; besides the
three agencies mentioned earlier, they include
high schools, as well as various follow-up service
providers –public as well as voluntary– with
which links are more loosely dened.
Aside from these initiatives, four
interdisciplinary collaborative networks –one
in each district– were established in one of
the areas under study associating all local
stakeholders concerned with children and
youth –namely, high schools, child protection
services, health visitors, low threshold outreach
services, ambulant teams and youth centers,
the municipal culture administration, churches
and congregations, the police, night watch
services and even representatives from the
local business community. However, to the
extent these networks were established after
eldwork completion; they were not subject to
data collection.
In the small city chosen for the project,
collaboration practices are less formalized;
however, perhaps surprisingly, this seemed
to lead to a higher number of private actors
being involved. Interviewed service workers
interpreted this as the result of non-public
actors possessing expertise and resources that
otherwise would not be available. However, the
collaboration experience was not equally valued
by all stakeholders involved. For instance,
one caseworker describing collaboration in a
positive light stated: “We are people who have
collaborated together for years, we are old in
this game, and we know each other very well.”
But others claimed that often networks were not
diversied enough: “sometimes a bigger team,
a bigger network is needed in order to nd out
what actions to take.”
Other collaborative initiatives, prevalent in
all municipalities in Norway, are built around
persons beneting from an ‘individual care
plan’ (Individuell plan) –which is considered a
legal right for everyone in need of long-term,
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complex assistance. The individual care plan was
an organizing tool envisioned by Government
in response to negative user feedback, which
characterized service provision as fragmented,
random, discontinuous and lacking user
involvement. It is contemplated by various
health and social service laws, including the
Child Care Act. The establishing of such plans
requires a collaboration structure being formed
around users by all concerned professionals
and service agencies, sometimes including
private agencies and informal caregivers. An
appointed case manager oversees client care
processes and works collaboratively with all
parties involved. In many respects, therefore,
these relatively stable initiatives can be viewed
as citizens-centered ‘mandated networks’.
As far as Québec is concerned, a range of
collaborative arrangements have emerged
in CWP that are tied to and partly shaped by
the sector’s particular service architecture. In
this respect, it is important to bear in mind
that Québec’s Child Protection system was
established in line with the Anglo-American
tradition which tends to emphasize a legalistic
and adversarial approach to concerns about
child maltreatment. Accordingly, CWP services
are organized into two discrete streams:
one that is built around the Child and Youth
Protection Centres (CJ), commissioned with
tackling potential abuse situations; and
another that is an integral part of the CSSS
infrastructure –mentioned earlier– to provide
services to low-risk families and troubled youth.4
A wide range of agencies interface with the CJ at
the regional level and partake in the provision
of various services, both public –especially the
CSSS, educational institutions, and the judiciary/
police– and private –such as community
organizations, group and family-type homes,
other.
Collaboration within this constellation of actors
has been promoted through sector-specic
‘child protection’ policies, but also broader
initiatives directed at the CSSS infrastructure
–the ‘troubled youth’ program in particular.
However, depending on service stream, the aims
of collaboration, the schemes envisaged and
their instrumentation are not fully consistent with
one another, thus adversely aecting joint-work
eectiveness on the ground. More specically,
from a CJ and ‘child protection’ perspective,
the focus of collaborative endeavour is the
establishing of a seamless system of care across
the ‘protection’ and ‘support’ service streams
and, in so doing, seeks to facilitate the caring
of all at-risk families and children. From a CSSS
and ‘troubled youth’ services perspective, in
contrast, networking is viewed as a mechanism
for the co-production of services with a range
of community partners, and for entrusting local
actors with “the exercise of a population-based
responsibility.” In addition, CSSS-based service
networks are less centered on clinical tools and
users per se than on the building of eective
inter-organizational links, and the re-casting
of serendipitous collaboratives involving a
complex web of community and cross-sector
providers in accordance with a government-
dened service nomenclature. That said,
collabo ration initiat ives have varied enormously
from one locality to another, sometimes
following (mandated) government dispositions,
other times at the fringes of such blueprints
and as a result of stakeholders’ entrepreneurial
eorts, and still other times –depending on
funding streams– as a combination of both. The
exception is perhaps CSSS-CJ collaboration which
is largely governed by standard service protocols
and guidelines; the goal being to harmonize
practices that vary widely across all Québec
regions. In addition, experimental, university-
sponsored initiatives, aimed at better integrating
services form both service streams are also
underway in a selected number of regions.
As regards schemes’ structure, it is worth noting
that networks such as the ones examined by the
OQRLS have not signicantly altered the shape
or formation of CWP local institutional architec-
tures. In this sense, neither of the networks ques-
tioned the divide between social support and
protection services prevalent in the province; nor
did they radically redene the mandate of each
service stream.
4 Following a new province-wide reform implemented in 2015 (i.e. Bill 10), Integrated Health and Social Service Centers (CISSS in French) have
been created by merging several CSSS and hospitals together into the same institutional structure within a given region, sometimes including
Youth Centers. However, the reforms’ actual eects on the traditional separation between support and protection services streams described
here, including CWP cross-agency collaborative practices are still dicult to ascertain (Collin-Vézina et al., 2015; Goyette et al., 2014).
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Collaborative barriers and facilitators: Making
sense of networking activity on the ground
Drawing upon the data sets from the three
jurisdictions, the following sections provide
a systematic overview of barriers and
facilitations for collaboration according to the
four-construct coding frame described above.
Reanalysis of data is quite illuminating in that
it provides a series of snapshots illustrating the
development and actual operating of several
CWP collaborative arrangements within and
across jurisdictions. However, as noted earlier,
networks reviewed should be understood
in connection to the specic institutional
environments in which they emerged, including
the regulatory provisions governing them.
Network governance and power
relations
• First, as regards Québec, processes leading
to the initiatives’ creation were dissimilar:
three of them were steered by a CSSS,
and a fourth one emerged in a rather
serendipitous manner, through a multi-
agency negotiated approach. Whenever
the network initiative was a reection
of a CSSS clinical project –hence, in line
with the mandated networks reform of
the mid 2000s– schemes were viewed
as a mechanism for the co-production
of services with a range of local actors
entrusted with “the exercise of a population-
based responsibility”. The focus therefore
was on articulating service providers’
mandates and resources in a more eective
manner and around a particular set of
interventions. By contrast, in two of the
initiatives –particularly the serendipitous
one– networks had a more clinical and
professional bent, inspired by a particular
Child Welfare intervention approach used
elsewhere.
That said, all networks developed various
management mechanisms. For instance,
in all four cases a steering committee,
made up of management from a few or
all participating organizations, pilots the
network. A government agency, however,
plays a pivotal role in three of them. Some
initiatives are also aliated with a local
round table comprising a larger number
of stakeholders, which fulls a strategic,
advisory role. Additionally, in three of the
initiatives a cross-agency team was set up
as a means of providing and coordinating
clinical interventions on the ground.
Governance mechanisms tended to evolved
between the time the project was being
developed and promoted, to its actual
operating. For instance, in certain cases a
transitional working group was created at
the outset so as to better conceptualise
the initiative and bring together relevant
stakeholders. A common linkage strategy
used by public agencies consisted of
reaching out to partners and nding a
mechanism to distribute responsibilities
–seen by members as a way of “instilling
a sense of shared leadership” to the still-
emerging collaborative.
In three initiatives formal service agreements
between all concerned network parties
were also established. Agreements
delineated goals, mutual responsibilities
and service paths to be followed; however,
they also served to stimulate members’
meeting of the minds and to standardize
expectations.
Power imbalances were not an explicit
concern, even when some respondents
stated “the need to work towards a more
equal distribution of tasks and roles” as
the basis for enhancing collaboration. All
the same, shared management (i.e. power)
arrangements were worked out in all
initiatives. Signicantly, in at least two cases
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interdisciplinary teams were set up within a
community organization; a decision partly
aimed at defusing potential non-prots
concerns about a loss of organizational
identity or being manipulated for other
objectionable purposes.
• If we now focus on governance mechanisms
in Norway, agreement on, and not least,
compliance with basic parameters and the
‘rules of the game’ seem vital to networks’
smooth operation and outcomes. Important
norms underpinning collaboration seem to
be fairness and a commitment to “genuine
cooperation.” And when participants get
a feeling that initiatives begin to “lose
steam and stall,” the guiding compass of
cooperation may falter.
The OSK-teams investigated, which
encompass two municipal agencies
and the state-run NAV, have succeeded
dierently in achieving eective
cooperation. There are several reasons for
this, not least that stakeholders’ degree of
trust (see following section) varied across
initiatives. But to some extent, trustworthy
relations are reective of dierences in
how participants’ cooperation behavior
was shaped by regulation. In this respect,
participants’ assigned mandates may play
a signicant role. Regarding NAV, central
management tends to decide on the cases
to be prioritized, which in some oces get
precedence over a common local agenda.
But power-related variables (i.e. economic
resources, prestige, and expertise) also
prove to be central to networking. NAV, for
instance, command many resources, which,
together with prestige from its public
status, entrusts the agency with signicant
decision-making authority. In large
measure, however, power is a relational
feature tied to the control someone exerts
over something others may have an interest
in. A network, for instance, is comparatively
more important to municipalities (who
have a wider remit) than to agencies such
as NAV. This unequal balance of power is
noticeable in all OSK-teams.
Stakeholders’ resistance to mandated forms
of collaboration is sometimes present as
well. In formalized networks, like the OSK-
teams, this expresses itself through a dutiful
yet disinterested participation, if not verbal
opposition –depending, it seems, on the
extent to which collaboration is promoted
by higher authorities.
• Evidence from Germany, in turn, indicates
that governance and power relations are
of particular importance as well. An initial
observation is that, depending on the
initiative, member participation motives
seem quite diverse, above and beyond
service improvement considerations. Thus,
in one of the local settings under study,
stakeholder organizations sometimes
expressed an interest in forming service
alliances primarily for political reasons, i.e.
to build a common front and speak with
one voice within a given policy arena. The
corporatist legacy of the German welfare
state creates institutional incentives for
providers to organize in advocacy-oriented
groups. However, some interviewees
reported an interest in keeping newcomers
out of such collectives as a means to
protect a mandate for delivering services.
In other cases, politically-motivated
behavior tied to funding proved relevant
in network dynamics as well. For instance,
participants to a working party involving
the local Youth Welfare oce mentioned
that criticizing the latter was often avoided
due to nancial concerns.
Stakeholder resistance to mandated forms
of collaboration is also present at times.
Thus, as reported by a network manager,
the creation elsewhere of positions similar
to hers had triggered fears of parallel roles
being established, including within public
administration settings. Moreover, “being
accountable to yet another public body”
or feelings of “being bossed around” by
various sets of directives were considered
problematic. Colleagues within her
organization were unsettled by fears of
additional external interference and role
confusion. Besides that, some interviewees
also observed an “authoritarian culture
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of conversation” in network meetings.
Apparently, collaboration resonates with
top-down control in this context.
Occasionally, steps were also taken to
try and reorient a mandated arrangement
toward a more consensual one in which
collaboration goals and activities are jointly
decided by members. For instance, a leader
in such network explained that while strict
“conformity with ocial guidelines [was
initially necessary] to raise the money”
earmarked for the project –concerned
with drug addiction–; as time went by
she thought about actually doing “things
that would be helpful”, hence, engaged
in activities closer in line with what she
and other stakeholders considered most
relevant and useful for the targeted
population. This draws attention to the
opportunities for pragmatic adjustments
that might be present and are sometimes
pursued by members within top-down
arrangements. More specically, to the
extent network policies ‘from above’ may
create a set of participation dilemmas
among relevant stakeholders; playing
along with the rules or getting around
them are not uncommon strategies.
In some instances, creative coping strategies
were devised by stakeholders to deal with
hierarchical network policies concerning
them. One such strategy consisted in
selectively abiding or neglecting to engage
in government-sponsored activities (e.g.
regularly missing meetings; not complying
with decisions; showing passivity in
discussions; other). An alternative one
entailed deecting from the network’s
original purpose, thus incorporating
objectives other than the ones set by
national or regional regulation. In such
situations, initial goals were gradually
transformed, sometimes substantially,
through open stakeholder discussions and
the initiative of a network manager.
Participant observation in group meetings
allowed for the identication of particular
network management mechanisms
and practices used in CWP. Some such
meetings resembled a transmission belt
for hierarchically dened government
guidelines. For instance, a training session
was organized whereby local welfare
department representatives introduced
‘best practice’ models and tried to impart
distinctive professional attitudes to
participants –some of which felt as though
they were in a ‘classroom’. Lectures given
by visiting experts served a similar purpose.
In other meetings, communication was
more interactive –e.g. when discussing
a case for which child protection
interventions were needed. A third variety
of networking activity consisted of open-
ended, brainstorming sessions in which
participants would address in tandem an
assortment of issues –in some respects
akin to situations of ‘organized anarchy’
described by Cohen et al. (1972). Altogether,
these network gatherings suggest various
managing mechanisms were employed to
steer collaboration on the ground; their
application being contingent on participant
power relations –e.g. having the capacity to
structure meetings’ content and format vs.
possessing enough clout for manipulating
or sidestepping a given agenda.
Trust and cultural afnity
• For most Québec network members,
the establishing of service links was not
new or contrived even when initiatives
responded to a public mandate. There’s
little to indicate that members felt
pressured (e.g. not-prots) or participated
for opportunistic reasons (e.g. large public
agencies) other than addressing a service
need. Practitioners were usually quite
familiar with one another owing to service
referrals or their association with specic
local activities. And this familiarity seems
to have played a crucial trust-building role.
As reported by one respondent: “Before
arriving with a project like this, cooperative
relations should be already underway. You
do not establish a trusting relationship
in the context of a new project; you
establish a new project in a relationship
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that already exists.” Likewise, a manager
stated: “Our complicity, our previous
collaboration, our credibility were already
established and mutually recognized. Our
shared ndings and experience… All of
this no doubt contributed to the project’s
implementation.”
The importance of building trustworthy
relations as a prerequisite for the establishing
of eective collaboration is somewhat at
odds with the hierarchical nature of recent
policy directives on networks. For public
providers entrusted with a mandate to set
up networks, translating these directives
into workable action entails performing a
delicate balancing act; one that requires
“making pragmatic adjustments to some
extent.” As put by one CSSS manager: “The
term collaboration is a much vaunted part of
our mission as a service provider. But working
well with partners requires we don’t push our
views on others. It means making the best
out of it for everyone. Sometimes a network
sponsor [such as a CSSS] must be ready and
willing to make dicult compromises.”
Dierent venues were used to foster closer
relations and reinforce trust. For instance,
transitional working groups set up to
dene the initiative’s main parameters,
stakeholders consultations or aliation
with a local round table, provided a unique
opportunity for partners to exchange
information and bring each other’s
expectations into line. In any event, infusing
a sense of mutuality was regularly viewed
as an indispensable network ingredient.
Furthermore, one of the challenges
regarding mutuality was members’
willingness to forego their own interests
at the expense of goals established in the
collaborative: “Transparent interaction
between members is paramount.
[Participants should] avoid ‘pulling the
cover’ in their direction… Collective
goals should be placed before their
organizational or personal ones.”
Closely linked to the establishing of
trustworthy and collaborative relationships,
bridging organizational cultural dierences,
particularly between public agencies
and non-prots, was vital for getting
the collaborative under way. In several
initiatives, drawing practitioners out of their
“comfort zones” concerning intervention
approaches, routines and attitudes appeared
challenging. As stated by a CSSS practitioner:
“In the beginning it was a culture shock. Not
only were we no longer working within our
respective organizations and traditional
mandates, but we were sitting across from
each other, holding our own ideas, yet
faced with situations as complex as they
were before” Non-prots in particular
feared an organizational identity loss:
“Identity dierences and confrontation of
intervention perspectives were particularly
challenging for stakeholders during the
rst year of implementation (Community
organization director).”
However, to the extent networks took
time to become operational, deeply-rotted
dierences in intervention perspectives,
norms and expectations could generally
get ironed out. In this respect, network
intervention protocols, regular clinical
supervision and steering committee
meetings played a key role in helping
to forge shared views. Interestingly, in
some initiatives endorsing beforehand a
particular intervention philosophy seems
to have served as a rallying point, providing
members with a stronger base from which
to build a collaborative.
• As far as Norway is concerned, interviewees
tell about personal relations being developed
through participation in networks. An
important factor seems to be the knowledge
obtained about other parties, which may
serve to supersede biased perceptions and
prejudice. One interviewee talks about
how such mutual understanding and the
personal relations established through
formal networks also contribute to enhance
the informal cooperation between the
parties
Nevertheless, interviews also contain
stories about suspicion and distrust. It
even seems as though trust and distrust
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sometimes coexist in a given network; both
mutual understanding and suspicion may
be present, and shift depending on the
situation or the constellation of actors
involved. It would also appear that some
partners are considered either more
trustworthy than others or, on the contrary,
always viewed with some suspicion.
Municipal actors are generally more
suspicious of state agencies than other
municipal counterparts, and NAV (state) is
generally regarded with a degree suspicion
by municipal partners.
Struggles over resources seem more pre-
valent amongst municipal partners than
between municipalities and the state. But
NAV is a powerful agency whose own agenda
is dened in a hierarchical manner. Even
when local NAV-oces participate in local
networks, they are primarily accountable
to their own ‘primas’. There is a general
feeling among municipal interviewees that
NAV primarily seeks to protect their own
interests. At the same time, responsibilities
often overlap, and NAV command many
resources that municipal agencies can
only access through cooperation. These
dynamics illustrate the potential for local
collaboration; however, they also point at
power imbalances, which sometimes turn
mutuality unto an ambivalent endeavor.
This leads to another aspect of mutuality
that emerges from the analysis of
networking initiatives in Norway,
namely, the fact that partners are bound
together not always (or only) through a
sense of shared values and preferences
but, interestingly enough, also through
complementary dierences. As put by one
interviewee working for an OSK-team: What
happens, she says, is that “we learn about
the possibilities that exist within other
sectors that we didn’t know about. It means
that the space of opportunities becomes
extremely enlarged.” And such “possibility
room” means everyone could benet
from a larger set of working instruments.
Hence, mutuality rests on the potential for
collective goal achievement and the fact
that individual partner’s success benets
everyone.
It therefore appears that, at least within
the Norwegian public service context, self-
interest is not incompatible with mutuality.
Rather, what we observe is a development
whereby self-interest is often tacitly
accepted, that which turns collaboration
into a generic activity, as opposed to one
requiring a degree of organization. One
interviewee, for instance, characterizes
the OSK-team as a “great opportunity for
case-managers working alone with dicult
cases to be able to address them with
professional managers from dierent elds,
with dierent competences and loads of
experience.” The problem, however, is
that “it is very dicult to get people to use
it.” Although mutuality and self-interest
are not necessarily inimical principles;
lack of mutuality and trust may prevent
collaboration processes from getting
established.
That said, overcoming myths and
prejudices that agencies might hold
about one another is a precondition for
developing a collaborative relationship.
Dierences with regard to legislation and
governance structure can also be dicult
to handle within a network setting. Some
interviewees even point at dierences
in professional opinion as an occasional
obstacle. Still, dierences in experience
and competence, and even in cultural
patterns of thought, are most often regarded
as assets for collaboration by Norwegian
interviewees. This is probably because the
networks under study dier from those in
the Québec sample both regarding setup
and objectives, as they meet occasionally,
though regularly, to deal with common,
cross-sector and complex problems.
• Turning now to Germany, we can infer
from our material that trust-based
relations are just as crucial when it
comes to the setting up and running
of network schemes. As previously
indicated, major stakeholders engage in
collaborative initiatives for a number of
reasons; primarily, though, as a means to
improve CWP service organization and
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delivery. However, interacting with actors
from other professions or organizations
outside their own sector is sometimes
fraught with challenges, one of them
resulting from what a respondent calls
language differences (i.e. professional and
organizational cultural barriers). To bridge
this gap members have to become adept
at translating ‘foreign’ concepts into their
own organizational and professional world
–some even speak of the need to develop
an intervention Esperanto of sorts.
That said, regular network interaction can
provide valuable opportunities for getting
acquainted with others and embarking on
a fruitful exchange of ideas; a prerequisite
to build up trusting relationships with
relevant stakeholders. Indeed, diculties
in collaboration are often interpreted
as problems with ‘particular individuals’
within the network. Conversely, successful
partnerships are sometimes associated
to members’ personal characteristics,
including their level of commitment vis-
à-vis working with others. As put by one
interviewee: when dealing with the police
or a Youth Welfare oce “[working well] is
a matter of who you come across.” A Youth
Welfare manager, for his part, argued that
getting a personal impression on relevant
actors is often necessary before deciding
on whether and how to collaborate in
a given context. In addition, informal
contacts amongst partners are seen as an
advantage. For instance, doctors facing
a potential case of child maltreatment
may at times sidestep protocols and
condentiality norms by contacting
relevant professionals directly. On the
whole, it seems as though the existence of
regular, one-on-one contacts is a stepping
stone for consolidating a network and
making it work smoothly.
Moreover, in situations where such
communication channels do not operate
well, a high dose of inter-professional
diplomacy is required. For instance, a
child psychiatrist explained that Youth
Welfare workers, quite protective of their
decision-making autonomy, often behave
defensively when intervention suggestions
are made concerning a cared-for child. In
such situations, overcoming resistance and
working collaboratively is only possible
through intensive personal interaction and
compromising beyond formal protocols.
Network managers, in particular, fulll a
key role in this respect given their center
stage positioning and remit to facilitate
members’ expected level of interaction.
In a similar vein, Youth Welfare ocers
would take a favourable view toward
network interaction, particularly as
regards private stakeholders –who are
often suspicious of oversight and funding
roles–, and in doing so seek to improve
their reputation. This is obviously related to
power relations and resource management
issues. We also found instances in which
various stakeholders would compete
on leading a collaboration initiative. A
representative of a public health oce
reported that it proved important to ‘y
one’s ag’ within the complex network
infrastructure in a given local setting, with
the result of various stakeholders talking at
cross-purposes in many instances.
To be sure, most interviewees held
that networks were a helpful vehicle
for improving professional standards,
therefore highlighted the importance of
getting to know other stakeholders within
the CWP ‘jungle’. That said, we found
instances in which mandated networking
was perceived as a threat to existing
patterns of inter-agency collaboration.
For instance, a local Welfare Department
initiative geared at creating community-
based support facilities by integrating
new partners and modifying collaboration
objectives was antagonized by a group
of service providers who, having worked
together for a lengthy period of time,
had already built close collaboration ties.
The inherited routine had contributed in
forging common strategies vis-à-vis the
local Welfare Department all while avoiding
detrimental stakeholder competition.
Hence, faced with the mandated
initiative, ‘Old networkers’ perceived the
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‘formalization’ of collaborative action as
conducive to retrenchment dynamics and
top-down governance. This indicates that
building ‘trust’ and establishing ‘mutuality’
is considered essential by non- statutory
stakeholders but also potentially fraught
with conicts, to be closely scrutinized.
Resource management issues
• Concerning resources, a constraint on
network development often highlighted
in Québec is the fact that, despite a policy
drive geared at stimulating and sometimes
mandating local collaborations, new
moneys needed to implement and sustain
such government-inspired initiatives were
never provided. Not surprisingly, in all
networks under review various nancial
streams had to be tapped to support their
establishing and long-term operation.
Sometimes partial nancial support was
secured through an accessory Ministry
assistance program (not necessarily geared
at networks); in others, ad-hoc nancing
was obtained from a regional government
body; whereas still in others a fund-raising
program was used. Financing from multiple
sources was nevertheless the norm.
Also, despite a new service being created,
interdisciplinary teams were normally
formed by reassigning professionals
already working in a member organization.
Last, professional training sessions, oces
and equipment needed were provided
free of cost by the participating member
organizations. “We began with a zero
budget, but secured donations from the
Municipal Housing Bureau, furniture was
provided by the Youth Protection Oce,
and two practitioners and a doctor were
re-assigned [to the network]. We agreed to
call on a special funding pool; everyone has
contributed.”
In any event, creative problem solving
was generally needed to pull together
all necessary monetary and personnel
resources. Financial shortcomings often led
to delays in the networks’ start or inability
to adequately respond to service demand.
However, whereas some saw funding
shortages as “the projects Achilles heel”
and a source of concern; others seemed
no longer concerned. As stated by a Child-
protection manager: “Usually collaborations
with community organizations do not last
very long. But in the case of this project the
partnership has already lasted since 2002.
Common budgets have gone up steadily,
and partner interactions have improved
over time. We’ve already received several
partnership awards.” Still others are of the
opinion that “management commitment
is paramount and comes before nancial
security.”
• As in Québec, in Norway networking
endeavor has seldom been endorsed by
extra moneys; something that several
interviewees found quite unfortunate.
Although increased collaboration required
no more than participants’ time, nancing
may represent an issue, especially so
concerning young care leavers being
transferred from Child Protection to
community-based social services. One
OSK-team member stated that “young
adults are sent over to us when they
are 18 years and ten minutes old. This
further leads to some tough processes of
bargaining. If we only had joined budgets,
this could all have been avoided”. Further,
some interviewees questioned whether the
time invested was worthwhile: “Sometimes
I look at the meeting agenda and decide
there is not much for me to contribute in
here; and there is no point in just sitting
and listening, and there’s no point either
in making these meetings bigger than they
have to be.” As mentioned above, NAV is
a large organization controlling a sizeable
proportion of public welfare expenditure.
Its introduction was a valued government
initiative giving the agency a high degree
of decision latitude, even concerning its
own objectives –something other agencies
are not capable of. Municipal interviewees
stressed that NAV often focused on self-
evaluated goals. In this respect, one OSK-
member said that “NAV is only occupied
with processing applications for grants
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and services; they do not use any resources
on guidance and counseling.” She further
regretted that these tasks, considered
less ‘countable’ and outside the ocial
statistics, were often left to the other team
members.
‘Action teams’ members, on the other hand,
reported few resources or management
collaboration obstacles. A reason for this
is probably their more ad-hoc and ‘low
threshold’ way of networking. Fewer
economic resources are at stake and the
decisions made are of a more practical
nature. As highlighted by a member: “we
don’t count numbers on these meetings;
there is not much number counting.” When
asked about the prevailing positive attitude
towards these teams, a respondent pointed
out that “members are very engaged and
really interested in making it work.” Another
reason is a prevailing “good chemistry”
between members. Also, the Action-teams
have a common target population; seen as
an important factor holding collaborations
together.
• As far as Germany is concerned, analysis
shows that networking initiatives often
present relevant actors with a predicament,
particularly so regarding access to nancial
resources. As illustrated by a regional
community-based network (known as
Sozialraumorientierung) which required
added funding from the local administration
and the establishing of new service facilities
(e.g. community cafés for young mothers);
the initiative was initially well received by
many stakeholders, in that it was viewed
as a step forward toward creating synergy
throughout the Child protection system.
However, to the extent public authorities
were concurrently planning budgetary
cuts for ordinary services to families
in need, the same network was also
equated with a government-led strategy
for economizing on child protection
services. Interestingly, some service
providers embarking on the program
appeared little concerned by this context
in that they anticipated opportunities to
consolidate or even enhance their own
position in the ‘social market’ through their
participation in community-based projects.
Others felt compelled to go along with
the collaborative given their perception
that on the whole it would represent an
innovation with little negative eect on
service quality. Oftentimes, subsidies were
accepted by independent providers while
adopting a ‘wait and see’ attitude. That
said, many service providers were quite
skeptical, seeing in networking a ‘Trojan
horse’ of sorts, essentially aimed at service
retrenchment. For them, the credibility of
the network policy in question was low.
Ambiguity between intrinsic motivation to
embark on networking on the one hand,
and the impression of this strategy being
promoted for economic, instrumental
reasons on the other, seemed to be a
general pattern throughout the settings
we investigated. Interviewees explaining
their perspective on inter-agency
collaboration often placed an emphasis on
the added value for their own organization.
Participating in networks, it was stated,
helped to promote one’s own image in a
competitive environment. As put by an
independent service provider: “There are
networks where you simply have to be
onboard in order to show your face as a
provider.”
In addition, as a matter of principle some
service providers in need of referrals
were keen to interact with the local
Youth Welfare oce as well as with other
providers. In this respect, a representative
of a non-prot service provider indicated
that her organization was obliged to
regularly interface with the Youth Welfare
oce simply because this was the place
where local policies were operationalized
”otherwise, we could close, I mean, if we
do not support the conversation with the
oce.” Likewise, a midwife explained that
being part of a network made sense to her
for many reasons, but that this was also an
occasion for advertising services; for her,
it was important that “families know; well,
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this is an oer I may want to use one day.”
In the same way, an agent from a for-prot
service provider stated that it was essential
to keep contact with Youth Welfare workers
by “saying hello whenever possible”.
Various CWP actors felt that mandated
collaboration was driven by New Public
Management (NPM) policies that strongly
impacted on resource allocation. In this
regard, a respondent from a non-prot
provider involved in child protection
schemes argued that networking was
imposed by external bodies without any
thoughts on the participation costs. In his
eyes, to engage in extended and multiple
partnerships without increasing available
resources was rather “absurd”. He expressed
a general concern that networking was
more than just “knowing each other” and
should include conceptual work across
elds and organizations. For collaboration
to ‘become alive’, he posited, an enormous
investment is generally needed; failing
which cross-agency synergy would be
unrealistic. Major CWP stakeholders
considered that current network policies
promoted by public bodies often
generated excessive demands negatively
aecting their day-to-day activities. For
some, these demands had the potential to
‘paralyze’ providers already facing growing
service demand. Under these conditions,
participation in networks was perceived as
a cumbersome duty to which one complied
for symbolic reasons or because of pressure
from purchasing bodies.
Importantly, oftentimes networks
were perceived as opportunities or
even indispensable arenas to ensure a
profession’s or an organization’s particular
interests. It seems that in a ‘disorganized
welfare mix’ networks provide incentives to
‘tap’ information without disclosing relevant
knowledge. While extended collaboration
or participation in network meetings were
often considered demanding, cross-agency
interaction appeared as a solution to the
CWP ‘business’ dilemma, i.e. being ‘on one’s
own’ but also dependent on others. By
seeking ‘close interaction’ with a selected
range of partners or just being visible,
CWP stakeholders pursued idiosyncratic
rather than ‘public good’ goals. In this
context, German CWP networks can be
seen as a hybrid form of collective action,
with mutuality overlapping an egocentric
perspective centered on economic and
resource management issues (i.e. funding,
accountability, reputation in the contract
business, etc.).
Leadership
• As regards Québec, multiple actors were
normally tasked with developing and
managing network initiatives. Noteworthy,
several projects were led by clinician-
managers –i.e. practitioners holding
managerial responsibilities– able to draw
on their expertise for setting the network
up. This leadership conferred grater
legitimacy to the initiative than if it had
been brought about by managers less
cognizant of realities on the ground. The
centrality of clinician-managers was even
more apparent for initiatives focusing
on a particular intervention philosophy,
whereby their credibility ensured
stakeholders’ buy-in at every stage of the
process.
That said, however, several respondents
emphasized the importance of a shared
leadership approach. As stated by a CSSS
community organizer: “Dierent leadership
styles can combine and intertwine... On the
one hand, there is leadership in connection
with the model, which has its own
objectives, its philosophy and approach.
Compliance with it is a requirement [and
NN’s] leadership in this regard has been
important. On the other hand, each of us
has our own idea of what this model means
and entails. Through several meetings
partners ironed out a common vision. On
the whole, this shared leadership provided
by members of the Board of Directors […],
contributed to a collective, locally relevant
response.” Along similar lines, a Child-
protection manager stated; “We mapped
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out a common vision [for the network].
Thus, the initiative is a good example of
shared leadership between all partners; from
the strategic to the intervention levels, all
decisions are taken by mutual agreement.”
• Issues related to leadership seem to
be less important in Norway, at least as
regard the OSK-teams. Again, this could
be attributed to properties of the networks
under study. By and large, the legitimacy
and mandate of the OSK-team is rooted in
political decisions, as they are composed
by managers from dierent public agencies
meeting on an equal footing. Formal
leadership is problematic, as no one would
have formal authority over the other.
Nonetheless, there are dierences between
the teams, which presumably relate to the
establishment of informal leadership roles.
Action-teams also lack formal leaders, but
here we can clearly see the importance of
someone ‘taking the lead’ and showing
the enthusiasm to maintain and further
develop the network.
• Concerning Germany, leadership
arrangements can have a mitigating impact
in the face of collaboration dilemmas
and stakeholder dynamics, although our
evidence does not provide very precise
insights in this respect. More specically, in
many of the network meetings mentioned
earlier, formal authority did not translate
into eective leadership, as Youth help
oce actions were often perceived as top-
down dominance. Further, concerning
joint-work within mandated networks,
coordinators seemed to encounter limited
partner compliance; that which hints at
their formal leadership being questioned
by members. However, in the case of
voluntary, cross-professional working
parties (depicted above), informal leaders
were usually essential for collaboration
to evolve beyond what formal authorities
seemed to mandate.
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Regulatory provisions and cross-agency
collaboration dynamics: A synthesis
The distinct ‘network stories’ which emerge
from our three jurisdiction analysis provide
various insights on how regulatory frameworks
interface with and aect cross-agency
collaboration capacity on the ground. The
‘stories’ have important implications for CWP
network policy and practice that should be
considered before drawing a more general,
comparative conclusion of emerging trends
and issues.
In looking at governance arrangements rst,
it is noteworthy that despite dierences all
networks under study were set up and operate
in a hybrid governance fashion. In Québec for
instance, such governance model appears to
have been the means by which local actors,
eager to engage in a collaborative, were
able to reconcile a hierarchical mandate,
particularly vis-à-vis public providers such as
the CSSS, with the expectations, interests and
reservations of various stakeholders favoring
a more relational, and horizontal approach.
Network management mechanisms show that
usually local government agencies still sit in a
pivotal position; however, steering committees
set up to run the initiatives tend to associate
most, if not all network organizations, thus
encouraging a greater distribution of roles and
decision-making capacity. In addition, formal
service agreements were often established to
delineate service responsibilities, and in doing
so, served to frame members’ expectations
–including the risk of manipulations. Power
asymmetries and related tensions may remain,
but were rarely mentioned or identied as
a concern. The same could be stated about
oversight provisions, which do not seem overly
constraining; nor were they singled out as
inuencing member dynamics.
Importantly, schemes’ organizational shape
as well as the gradualism used to implement
them, have to be considered when exploring
the governance of networks. Québec is again
a case in point. None of the networks analyzed
modied in any signicant manner existing
service architectures. In many ways, nding
a niche between the support and protection
service streams –yet not questioning the divide–
could be seen as a pragmatic organizational
strategy likely to have contributed in gathering
support from relevant stakeholders, particularly
government agencies. Likewise, a step-by-step
implementation approach, based on previous
smaller-scale projects from other regions
provided a rmer foundation for the networks
to emerge.
Regarding Norway, the mandates established
for the OSK- and Action-teams were very
precise with respect to composition and setup,
whereas aims were more vaguely stated or even
implicit in some respects, thus allowing for a
degree of governance hybridity. Further, unlike
in Québec or Germany, collaborative schemes
were largely conceptualized and processed
in a prescriptive manner by others than those
actually participating in them. Despite this, both
OSK and Action-teams were given considerable
leeway in how to accomplish their respective
set of objectives; including scheme’s design
and operating mode.
Germany’s ‘story’ on the other hand sheds
light on a conguration whereby inter-
organizational collaboration has developed
concurrently with a growing control culture
and greater competitive relations. Given
that demands for enhanced collaboration
intersect with other policy agendas such
as budget cuts or enhanced government
control processes, stakeholder grievances
about imposed network agendas and joint-
work overload are not uncommon. As a result,
major stakeholders often face contradictory
imperatives or appear trapped in a paradox
between collaboration and rivalry –including
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the fact that some stakeholders may exploit
collaborative initiatives for their own ends.
Moreover, experiences from Germany suggest
that unbalanced power relations persist
despite network interaction. Stakeholders who
concede keeping a low prole when meeting
public administration ocials bear witness
to this. Against this backdrop, stakeholders
may be reluctant to ‘buy-in’ to the argument
that networking may represent a panacea for
improving CWP service delivery.
Whether in Québec or Norway, reconciling
apparently contradictory tendencies –
such as in Germany between collaboration
and competition– was not an issue for the
initiatives studied. In the former in particular,
CWP service privatization or provider rivalry for
public funds or contracts have never been on
the public agenda. That said, as in Germany, in
Québec multiple collaboration mandates and
requests may sometimes create a sense of “task
overload” amongst relevant stakeholders.
Concerning cross-agency trust and cultural
anity, bridging dierences was a clear
challenge to most initiatives reviewed in either
jurisdiction. In Québec, this challenge concerned
how to prompt members to think critically and
outside of their ‘organizational boxes’, all while
nding a common service denominator for them
to collaborate eectively and in meaningful
ways. Bridging this gap took time and eort;
more so given fears of an organizational
identity loss voiced by some. However, various
network development activities appear to
have provided the opportunity for members
to forge common views. Interestingly, where
the collaboration was centered on a particular,
proven intervention approach, sense making
and cultural diculties appear to have been
less of an issue. In addition, mutuality and
trust, a dimension much cited in the literature
on networks, were also frequently singled out
by respondents as a necessary condition –and
a prerequisite– for the initiatives’ emergence
and sound operation. As outlined earlier,
although all of the initiatives developed in
the context of policy-mandated networks,
in Québec members were generally quite
familiar with one another; many of whom had
already established trustworthy relations.
And such familiarity no doubts facilitated the
development of reciprocal relationships based
on trust. It also contributed in forging a degree
of collegiality within the network, including a
sense of common purpose beyond individual
agendas.
Interestingly, as Norway’s experiences suggests,
although trust remains a needed collaborative
ingredient, its distribution might be unequally
spread through the network, in the sense that
trust can coexist with a degree of suspicion
and relational ambiguity. Accordingly, trust
and distrust are often simultaneously present;
with some actors being regarded as more
trustworthy than others depending on issues
tackled and situations. The reason for this may
be that, at least in the case of Norway, networks
are established not only on the basis of shared
values, but also perceived complementary
dierences. In this respect we see that
members’ singular, and potentially conicting
interests can nevertheless aggregate into a
higher, collective purpose; a major stepping
stone for cross-agency collaborative work. One
additional lesson arising from the OSK-team
example in Norway concerns the diculty
low-ranking, participating professionals often
encounter when making network decisions on
behalf of their own organizations –a diculty
that inter alia led to their replacement by
agency directors.
Moreover, as shown by our evidence,
collaborative schemes’ setting up and running
often require one or a few individuals to perform
leadership roles within and across organizations.
Whether formal or informal, leadership
therefore variously aects network purpose and
direction, including stakeholder engagement.
This comes clearly to the fore when looking
at Québec initiatives; several of which were
championed or led by clinician-managers who
could build on their eld experience, but also
and most important, convey a greater sense
of legitimacy –internal as well as external– to
the network being promoted. In addition,
exibility in the way government regulation
envisioned collaboration in Québec also
allowed for adaptation and compromise on
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how schemes, once set up, would be managed
and operate. Accordingly, respondents from
three initiatives underscored the importance
of a shared management approach as a means
to strengthen members’ connection and better
align cross-organization eorts. By contrast,
in Norway all networks under study consisted
of collegiate units formally associating a set of
‘equal’ partners. To the extent leadership played
a role, it should be understood in relation to
the informal positions adopted by members
showing a degree of enthusiasm or greater
abilities in facilitating dialogue. Moreover, the
experience in Germany suggests that besides
leadership roles, developing informal ties
between professionals or individual agents
from dierent agencies may be a pre-condition
for collaboration to become sustainable on the
ground.
Concerning nancial and material resources,
their availability, or lack thereof, can be a
serious stumbling block, more so given that
government’s promotion of networks is
seldom supported by a formal commitment
to adequate funding. In Québec, securing
funding was especially challenging at the
projects’ inception phase; in the four cases
under study sponsors had to go the extra mile
and proactively invest in fund-raising from
various sources, mostly public, but sometimes
also private. Furthermore, long-term funding
and availability of personnel remain one of
the main sources of concern for the networks’
continuity. Data from Norway corroborates
that resource shortages and stakeholder
unequal access to them may cause dicult
conditions for collaborative endeavor to
emerge and fructify –albeit less so than is
the case in Québec. Importantly, in Norway,
struggles amongst municipal partners over
resources, or underpinning norms of fairness
and equal distribution of burdens were at times
a source of tensions and operative diculties.
More generally, the evidence from Germany
is indicative of the fact that, tied to power
imbalances and resources, the institutional
context –i.e. legal frameworks and approach to
public management– may have an enormous
impact on the incentive structures underlying
collaborative eorts.
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Conclusion
Having synthesized ndings on how regulatory provisions appear to interface and impinge on
collaborative capacity in the three jurisdictions considered, we conclude by highlighting some
emerging issues that bear on cross-agency collaborative endeavour more generally. Insofar as each
of our country-based ‘stories’ ts into and expresses particular institutional environments (Bryson et
al., 2015) –hence, extrapolating from them would be speculative at best– conclusions drawn center
on key themes relevant for the study and organizing of local networks.
A rst observation concerns whether a bundle of common properties would act as prerequisites for
cross-agency schemes to operate in a successful, sustainable manner. Indeed, implicit in much of the
literature on the subject is the search for such generic, enabling qualities –work that we partially drew
on for the purpose set out in this study (Thomson and Perry, 2006; O’Toole, 2015). As shown in our
analysis, however, most facilitating or constraining features that bear on collaboratives’ functioning
not only tend to interact with one another, but their relative importance may vary greatly. Further,
schemes scope and scale of objectives appear to be key mediating factors in understanding how
features impact on collaborative endeavour. The point to emphasize in here is that although a set
core of properties –such as the ones identied in our empirical data on CWP networks in Quebec,
Norway and Germany– is a necessary step toward enhancing our understanding of collaborative
dynamics and functioning; properties in and by themselves may be insucient means for
improving cross-organization collaboratives. ‘Common denominators’ for eective collaboration
are dependent on the adequate interplay between relevant factors in a given context.
A second, related consideration refers to the governance mechanisms and processes whereby
collaborative schemes are predicated across contexts. In this regard, all the while acknowledging
that in many jurisdictions collaboration in CWP has increasingly been promoted through top-down,
hierarchical processes; such governance mechanisms appear highly encultured and mixed in many
respects. Hence, ‘mandated collaboration’ may have dierent meanings depending on jurisdiction;
including the scope for adjustment, adaptation and negotiation that is provided for to relevant actors.
Accordingly, our three-jurisdiction ‘stories’ hint to a variety of hybrid collaboration arrangements
rather than a uniform pattern concerning the way government enforces the ‘network agenda’ and
various stakeholders interact with one another. Furthermore, sometimes governance mechanisms
can signicantly inhibit or embroil the capacity of major stakeholders to embark on inter-agency
collaboration. For instance, under conditions of competition or institutional rivalry as found in
Germany, ‘taking the role of the other’ (in the sense of Mead, 1934) would be often conned to
the spotting of opportunity structures relevant to one’s own mandate and economic survival.
Further, forging relations to various institutional partners may be used mainly as a means to ‘tap’
information without disclosing much in return. Having said that, even under adverse regulatory
circumstances stakeholders on the ground can nd ways to overcome inter-organizational rivalry or
distrust, and to discover complementarities, including a broader collective purpose –as suggested
by the Norwegian evidence and one German initiative. Moreover, the development of joint-work
activities at arm’s length from government or through the ‘translating’ (Callon, 1986) of open-
ended and vaguely dened mandates –as seen in Québec– may provide good opportunities for
non-instrumental collaboration. At the same time, evidence from Norway shows that enforcing
government mandates can be a major, eective driving force for local cross-agency schemes to
emerge.
Thirdly, our analysis sheds light on the multi-faceted nature of cross-agency mutuality and trust;
seen in the literature as crucial for service collaboration to emerge. Overall, networks can be prime
Networking on the ground – Exploring the interplay between regulatory provisions and collaborative
dynamics in Child Welfare and Protection across three jurisdictions
InterActions, centre de recherche et de partage des savoirs
CIUSSS du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal
33
vehicles for building reciprocal service linkages, opening up to other ‘languages’ and perspectives,
and ultimately overcoming barriers for cross-agency collaboration. Yet, as stated above, self-interest
is not always incompatible with mutuality, nor is it an obstacle for collaboration to prosper; rather,
perceived complementarity –i.e. the feeling of one’s interests being promoted by collaboration– can
provide the basis for collaborative activities. In any event, for this to occur informal collaboration at
street level, the building of personal relationships, or diplomacy may be needed given that various
stakeholders and professionals (holding dierent responsibilities and mandates) tend to exhibit
idiosyncratic attitudes and behaviours –an observation found in the literature for a long time now
(Head, 2014; Carey & Crammond, 2015).
Whereas experience with a given organizational or professional culture can be ambivalent, other
factors may be helpful when it comes to creating and maintaining a sense of mutuality. In this regard,
although bridging cultural dierences is often a signicant challenge overall, our evidence shows that
trust-based mutuality can be fostered through various means, namely transitional working groups
set up to dene the initiative’s main parameters; the conducting of stakeholder consultations; the
power-brokering of network entrepreneurs; the framing of a common collaborative vision, other.
Moreover, the growth in shared leadership appears to enhance sustainable trust-building relations;
whereas the leading role of clinician-managers contributes in ensuring a collaborative’s required
internal or external legitimacy.
A further observation relates to the resource mobilization dilemmas that often confront network
promoters and members in a given regulatory environment. To the extent that the establishment
and long-term operation of networks requires considerable investment, both in nancial and
personnel time; in many situations ’participation costs’ often prove a challenging, dicult to resolve
issue. In addition, relevant stakeholders normally have to invest in collaboration while not knowing
its actual pay o in advance. Whereas a creative, piecemeal approach to secure funding and other
needed resources can make network initiatives evolve into a stable pattern under certain conditions;
the fact remains that on a larger scale such piecemeal approach would likely produce shortcomings
in service delivery and the quality of collaborative social intervention as a whole.
What is more, in many quarters policies geared toward ‘enforcing collaboration’ can be perceived
as a Trojan horse for achieving other objectives than strictly improving joint-work. Where mandated
networking overlaps with NPM-driven policies (see the situation in Germany), stakeholders’ primary
concern in participating in a collaborative may be to ensure their economic survival at the expense
of service improvement considerations –networking policies main rationale. Accordingly, what
stakeholders experience under these conditions is in stark contrast with the ‘textbook’ message
concerning cross-agency collaboration; that is, creating opportunities for overcoming idiosyncrasies
and rivalry in the face of social service fragmentation. Overall, the adequate alignment of regulatory
provisions, network conguration (i.e. objectives and architectures), and stakeholder dynamics on
the ground appear crucial for cross-agency collaboration to thrive.
InterActions, centre de recherche et de partage des savoirs
CIUSSS du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal
Working Paper
34
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