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Why Brexit? The Toxic Mix of Immigration and Austerity

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Abstract

On June 23, 2016, the UK narrowly voted to exit the European Union. Population issues-especially relating to the effect of population growth on infrastructure and public services and the need to " take back control" over immigration-played a central role in the campaigns (" Leave" and " Remain") leading up to the vote. I argue that the Leave campaign engaged in reckless scaremongering over the demographic effects of membership in the EU, while the Remain campaign was stifled by its commitment to a policy of fiscal austerity. The leader of the Labour Party, while putatively in the Remain camp, was strikingly circumspect in his support.

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... This creates a legitimation device, a fear-generating event based on poorly elaborate arguments (CAP, 2017a, p. 81). Gietel-Basten (2016) observes that such discourse translates into what the author calls 'a toxic mix of immigration and austerity', a general message in which 'immigration was straining infrastructure and public services' (GIETEL-BASTEN, 2016, p. 673-674). As a result, there is a general campaign by the media pointing out that Europe has failed in its economic, political and social projects, as the UK has been indirectly portrayed as successful in hers. ...
... They help us to understand that it is a result of the association of some factors, mostly social perceptions which are amplified by media propaganda in favour of Brexit. Such propaganda seems to have succeeded in creating fear of an unknown scenario (CAP, 2017b) caused by growing immigration (CAP, 2017a) and its consequences to a policy based on the economic balance of welfare (GIETEL-BASTEN, 2016). This sort of legitimation by fear is defined by Cap (2017b) as Proximisation: 'a construal operation meant to evoke closeness of the external threat, to solicit legitimisation of preventive measures' (CAP, 2017b, p. 16). ...
... As a general framework for understanding such evaluation, some social sciences studies (ABRAMS; TRAVAGLINO, 2018;CAP, 2017aCAP, , 2017bGIETEL-BASTEN, 2016;VISKANIC, 2017) were taken as a basis to understand how the issue of immigration is built as a social and political construct in the UK context. The main theory of data analysis was Systemic-Functional Linguistics (HALLIDAY, 1978), with a primary focus on the Appraisal System (MARTIN; WHITE, 2005). ...
Article
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This article aims to discuss how three conservative UK newspapers (The Sun, The Telegraph and The Daily Star) represent the immigration issue during the days that preceded Brexit. The theoretical framework is based on Systemic-Functional Linguistics (appraisal system) and Corpus Linguistics (factor and collocates analysis). Collocates and network representation were calculated using two programmes (COWO and Gephi), and factor analysis and concordancing were based on R programming language. The results reveal a series of evaluation strategies related to immigrants and to the UK government and its policies. It was also possible to calculate how such strategies co-occur in the texts, obtaining a profile of the newspapers in terms of the most present dimensions and also of which strategies co-occur during instantiation
... Much of the work done in linguistics and migration examines urban populations, 18 and communities situated amongst the 'superdiversity' found in cities; 19 however, I was interested in how Polishborn adolescents might be adapting to life in a region with a less diverse demographic, and less accustomed to the arrival of migrants. I therefore recruited participants from two semi-rural towns in South East England, with small Polish communities. ...
... In addition, it has long been known that voters may swing one way or another due to issues not directly related to the referendum issue. 18 A higher threshold for change may have advantages, such as potentially limiting the impact, and perhaps even the articulation, of reductive and emotive arguments, on the final, accepted result of a referendum. Such a higher threshold may at the same time provide added legitimacy to the result. ...
... The second part of this paper therefore examines how the adolescents perceived the Referendum. Much of the work done in linguistics and migration examines urban populations, 18 and communities situated amongst the 'superdiversity' found in cities; 19 ...
Chapter
Experiences of Polish-born adolescents in Britain during the run-up to Brexit. The accession of Poland to the European Union (EU) in 2004 saw Polish migration to the UK increase exponentially. Following the 2016 Referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU, however, the position of EU citizens in the UK has become uncertain. Attention is increasingly being paid to the potential impact of Brexit on the younger generation. My own doctoral study investigating the experiences of Polish-born teenagers living in Britain was conceived and conducted during the 2015-2016 pre-Brexit period. Interviews were held with eleven participants, aged 11-16, whose time in the UK ranges from nine to two years, and who live in semi-rural areas with small Polish communities. This paper aims to demonstrate how a reflection on the adolescents’ lives at that time can be seen to contribute to an understanding of the current situation. This paper also emphasises the importance of listening to younger voices about the challenges they have faced and continue to encounter, and how these should be recognised in the ongoing discussions over the impact of Brexit.
... Plus, as Skeldon (this volume) observes, while the economic and social benefits of migration are well known in certain circles, those voices are drowned out by those who focus on the (perception of) more negative aspects. In some settings, this narrative has become the central feature for discussions of population policy (Gietel-Basten, 2016). Indeed, as Peter MacDonald and Andrew Markus (this volume) argue, migration 'is all about race and immigration'. ...
... The narrative of such a major convulsion in the economy, society and body politic being foisted upon the young by the (English) old still prevails (Schuster, 2016). In that fateful referendum, of course, the narrative of uncontrolled migration placing an unbearable strain on public services (as well as the British 'way of life') was central (Gietel-Basten, 2016). Boris Johnson's mandate to lead the Conservative Party (and hence become Prime Minister in 2019) was decided by a party membership of 160,000, of which 71% were male, 97% were white, 86% were middle class and 44% were over 65 years old (The Economist, 2019). ...
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With around 23% of the global population, democratic countries of the former Indian sub-continent—India, Pakistan and Bangladesh—have an important role in shaping the future of global demography. Population continues to grow in these countries, although at varied pace and demographic diversity is wide. This paper explores the demographic changes in these Asian super-size economies and their political repercussions, with a special focus on the world’s largest democracy—India. To put the political consequences of varied demographic changes in perspective, we discuss the past and future demographic profile in these countries and the factors leading to such changes. In addition, we highlight the regional and religious diversity within these Asian democracies. The chapter elucidates that while India and Bangladesh have similar patterns of changes in age structure and fertility transition, Pakistan is comparatively at earlier stages of such demographic transitions. Consequently, in the coming three decades, while India and Bangladesh will show signs of ageing society, Pakistan will remain a young country. Striking differentials in regional and religious patterns of demographic heterogeneity are observed within India and Pakistan. Such demographic sketches have significant political repercussions at various levels. The chapter opens wider discussions on the political challenges of various demographic changes and illuminates the enormous importance of demographic patterns on the political order among these Asian Giants in population size.
... np. : Coleman 2016;Gietel-Basten, 2016;Harris 2016), brakuje jednak analizy psychologicznej, zwłaszcza tworzonej z punktu widzenia psychologii międzykulturowej, która opisywałaby Brexit w kontekście wiedzy na temat mechanizmów psychologicznych, stojących za tak ekstremalnym przypadkiem swoistej strategii "budowania" stosunków międzykulturowych. ...
... Stąd pojawiające się na dużą skalę problemy w systemie szkolnictwa, problemy mieszkaniowe i związane z niezwykle ważnym dla Brytyjczyków NHS (Narodowy System Zdrowia) -wszystkie one dość głośno obecne w mediach (patrz: Coleman, 2016). Gietel-Basten (2016) wskazuje, że decydenci znają plusy i minusy imigracji, jednak populiści mają tendencję do podkreślania wad. "Kiedy narracja krytyczna wobec imigracji zostanie utworzona i osadzona w szerszej narracji, dotyczącej kruchości infrastruktury i usług publicznych, potrzeby zaciskania pasa i zagrożeń tożsamości narodowej (...) bardzo trudno jest ją jakkolwiek przekształcić" (Gietel-Basten 2016, s. 674). ...
... The Brexit process dates back to 23 June 2016, when the referendum on whether the UK should remain in the EU was held. The electorate's choice to leave, which was fuelled by the idea that the UK should "take back control" of immigration (Gietel-Basten, 2016), created an unprecedented situation of political discontinuity that led to widespread uncertainty about the status of immigrants in the UK. It has been shown that changes in migration policy affect the decisions of researchers to migrate internationally (Arrieta et al., 2017;Scellato et al., 2015), which, in turn, have an impact on the scientific and technological development of the countries involved (Mahroum, 2005;Moser et al., 2014). ...
Preprint
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This study assesses the initial effects of the 2016 Brexit referendum on the mobility of academic scholars to and from the United Kingdom (UK). We leverage bibliometric data from millions of Scopus publications to infer changes in the countries of residence of published researchers by the changes in their institutional affiliations over time. We focus on a selected sample of active researchers whose movements are traceable for every year between 2013 and 2019, and measure the changes in their international migration patterns. While we do not observe a brain drain following Brexit, we find evidence that the mobility patterns of scholars began to change following the referendum. Among the active researchers in our sample, we find that their probability of leaving the UK increased by approximately 86% if their academic origin (country of first publication) was an EU country. For scholars with a UK academic origin, we observe that after Brexit, their probability of leaving the UK decreased by approximately 14%, and their probability of moving (back) to the UK increased by around 65%. Our analysis points to a compositional change in the academic origins of the researchers entering and leaving the UK as one of the first impacts of Brexit on the UK and EU academic workforce.
... Similarly, anti-immigration sentiments have played a major role in the recent success of several right-wing populist parties across Europe, such as the Freedom Party of Austria and the Alternative for Germany (Einbinder 2018;Weisskircher 2018). The outcome of the 2016 British referendum, in which 52 percent of votes were cast in favor of leaving the EU and which dealt a blow of unprecedented proportions to the project of European unity, is largely attributed to public anxiety over immigration in the United Kingdom (UK) (Gietel-Basten 2016;Hobolt 2016). ...
Article
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Drawing on intergroup threat theory, this article argues that immigrant integration policies can improve public attitudes toward immigrants and, particularly, toward refugees and asylum-seekers. Examining evidence from an original survey experiment conducted in the United Kingdom, I find that support for admitting asylum-seekers increases when respondents are made aware that prospective asylum-seekers will be required to partake in language and civic-education courses. This effect is particularly strong among respondents who were more likely to perceive asylum-seekers as a symbolic threat (i.e., conservatives). Similarly, support for admitting asylum-seekers increases when respondents are told that future asylum-seekers will only have limited access to welfare. This effect is stronger among respondents who were more likely to view asylum-seekers as a material threat (i.e., conservatives and individuals with low socioeconomic status). These findings have important implications for the literatures on immigrant integration policies, intergroup threat theory, and public immigration attitudes generally. Importantly, the results reported in this article illustrate the significance of structural determinants for the study of immigration attitudes and demonstrate the importance of disaggregating immigrant integration policies when evaluating their effects.
... public institutions, established media, social media, anti-migrant campaigners) (Moore and Ramsey, 2017;Robinson, 2009;Townsend, 2017). From the 2004 EU enlargement onwards the role of CEE migrants for Britain's socio-economic systems was heavily debated, with voices identifying the beneficial aspects of migrants who filled gaps especially in secondary economic sectors and contributed to economic prosperity, whilst others juxtaposed migrants with a rise in criminal activities, abuses of social benefits and taking jobs from the indigenous population (Blinder and Jeannett, 2018;Gietel-Basten, 2016;Salt and Millar, 2006). The latter voices overlapped with the growth of hostile anti-CEE migrant societal reactions, which included hate speech incidents and moral panic campaigns (Carby-Hall, 2007;Fox et al., 2012;Mawby and Gisby, 2009;Medic, 2004). ...
Article
The UK 2016 EU Referendum has introduced a period of uncertainty for both the indigenous population and for non-British citizens. This uncertainty is considered within a framework of the recent revisions in the sociology of moral panics through an analysis of interviews with Polish migrant workers. This analysis reveals two main discursive framing logics. The first logic refers to a self-reported anti-Polish migrant moral panic discourse that – according to respondents – was exploited by British anti-migrant campaigners. The second type of articulation illustrates the good moral panic logic, namely, a panicking discourse appearing among respondents about the vulnerability of their community in post-Referendum Britain. This article, however, problematises the good moral panic logic by eliciting competing narratives found in the interview data. The latter did not aim merely at stimulating caring attitudes but referred also to moral regulation techniques to manage Brexit-oriented risks and avoid the trap of becoming a vulnerable migrant.
... In a similar vein, this work does not review the extent to which the UK's vote to leave the European Union was a response to austerity, as some scholars have suggested (Dorling 2016;Gietel-Basten 2016;Fetzer 2019). This is an important but complex question which would constitute an entire paper in its own right. ...
Article
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This article argues that the serious, negative consequences of austerity have discouraged political participation in many of its forms, because affected citizens believe that political participation will not achieve anything. Based on interviews with members of the public across England, many people feel that participating is not worthwhile because the government will not listen. This belief stems at least partially from the coalition and Conservative governments’ narrative choices since 2010, in which they argued that austerity is the only viable option for economic recovery following the financial crisis. As a result, individuals feel they lack influence, which further undermines their motivation to participate. It is fundamental to understand why citizens facing rising poverty, health problems and food bank usage are reluctant or unable to engage in politics. A lack of political voice may exacerbate the issues faced by vulnerable people living under austerity, meaning this research makes an important contribution to understanding the consequences of austerity, both in the UK and beyond.
... The Brexit vote and its results have become a key theme in European media, and countless experts and journalists have shared their opinions on the reasons behind Brexit and its possible effects. Scholars soon followed with analyses that led to one conclusion: Brexit resulted from a "toxic mix of immigration and austerity" (Gietel-Basten, 2016). Yet the debates on Brexit, interested almost exclusively in the motives of British Leave-voters, largely neglect the voices of migrants, that is, unless they pose the question: will migrants return 'home'? ...
Chapter
Full-text available
The Brexit vote and its results have become a key theme in European media, and countless experts and journalists have shared their opinions on the reasons behind Brexit and its possible effects. Scholars soon followed with analyses that led to one conclusion: Brexit resulted from a “toxic mix of immigration and austerity” (Gietel-Basten, 2016). Yet the debates on Brexit, interested almost exclusively in the motives of British Leave-voters, largely neglect the voices of migrants, that is, unless they pose the question: will migrants return ‘home’? (Guma and Jones, 2018; Lulle et al., 2018). As scholarship linked the Brexit vote to austerity politics, it failed to ask whether migrants’ choices and austerity are also connected. In this chapter, I scrutinize the conjuncture of British austerity politics, the Brexit vote and migrants’ perceptions of both. I draw my insights from a longitudinal study among Polish migrants in London and Birmingham. Out of the 3.8 million EU citizens living in the UK (6% of the country’s population), almost 30% were born in Poland (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva, 2018). Some 200.000 Poles reside in London, and 17.000 in Birmingham. While analysing migrants’ perceptions of austerity politics and the Brexit vote, I look also at their past experiences. This shows how the Brexit vote exacerbated a longer (and also austerity-fuelled) process of transnational neoliberal disciplining of workers and migrants. Further, it reveals how migrants’ perception of their own and others’ position in contemporary Britain engage the national welfare-state logic which legitimises inequalities and discourses of deserving.
... A kilépéspártiak fő érve a Brexit mellett a bevándorlás feletti felügyelet visszaszerzése volt "Brüsszeltől". Ezt azzal támasztották alá, hogy Nagy-Britanniában az éves nettó migráció 2000-től 2016-ig 300 000 és 400 000 fő között ingadozott (Gietel-Basten [2016]), amelynek következtében a népesség egyre nőtt, és ez a szociális ellátás minőségének rovására ment. Emellett teret nyert az a nézet is, hogy a bevándorlás korlátozására az Egyesült Királyság túlnépesedése miatt van szükség. ...
Article
Az Egyesült Királyság kiválásával az Európai Unióból (tehát a Brexittel [British exit – brit távozás]) olyan kereskedelmi és gazdasági kérdések merülnek fel, amelyek az összes tagállamot érintik. Az Egyesült Királyság ugyan nem tartozik Magyarország jelentős kereskedelmi partnerei közé, Németországnak viszont igen, amely fontos szerepet tölt be hazánk külgazdasági kapcsolataiban. Jelen tanulmány célja az, hogy egy vektor-hibakorrekciós modellel, makrogazdasági és külkereskedelmi mutatók alapján azonosítsa a Brexit lehetséges közvetlen és közvetett (a német gazdaságon keresztül begyűrűző) hatásait a magyar külkereskedelemre. A szerzők eredményei szerint a kiválás várhatóan közvetett módon gyakorol majd nagyobb hatást: a német gazdaság (és az ezen belül meghatározó szerepet betöltő gépjárműipar) teljesítményének Brexit okozta változása jelentős mértékben befolyásolhatja a magyar exporttevékenységet. Az Európai Unió és az Egyesült Királyság jövőbeli kereskedelmi kapcsolata azonban még egyelőre tisztázatlan, így a hatások mértékét nem lehet pontosan megbecsülni. = The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (i.e. Brexit) raises numerous trade and economic questions that affect all the member states. The United Kingdom is not a significant trade partner of Hungary; however, the Hungarian foreign trade is strongly bounded to Germany whose main trade partner is the United Kingdom. This study estimates the direct and indirect effects of Brexit (the shock’s spillover from the German economy) on Hungarian foreign trade, using a VECM (vector error correction model) with several macroeconomic and foreign trade variables. The results suggest that the indirect effect will be greater: the Brexit-induced changes in the performance of the German economy (in particular the dominant automotive industry) may have a major impact on the Hungarian export activity. Still, the future trade relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union is uncertain, so the scale of the effects is unpredictable.
... The Brexit vote and its results have become a key theme in European media, and countless experts and journalists have shared their opinions on the reasons behind Brexit and its possible effects. Scholars soon followed with analyses that led to one conclusion: Brexit resulted from a "toxic mix of immigration and austerity" (Gietel-Basten, 2016). Yet the debates on Brexit, interested almost exclusively in the motives of British Leave-voters, largely neglect the voices of migrants, that is, unless they pose the question: will migrants return 'home'? ...
Chapter
Full-text available
In this chapter, the conjuncture of British austerity politics, the Brexit vote and migrants’ perceptions of both are scrutinized. The author draws her insights from a longitudinal study among Polish migrants in London and Birmingham.While analysing migrants’ perceptions of austerity politics and the Brexit vote, this chapter also looks at their past experiences. This shows how the Brexit vote exacerbated a longer (and also austerity- fuelled) process of transnational neoliberal disciplining of workers and migrants. Further, it reveals how migrants’ perception of their own and others’ position in contemporary Britain engage the national welfare- state logic which legitimizes inequalities and discourses of deserving.
... Some researchers have suggested that the UK's vote to leave the European Union (EU) may have been in part prompted by the hardship created under austerity (Dorling, 2016;Fetzer, 2018;Gietel-Basten, 2016). Such a connection is plausible, given that some argue that it is typically poorer, working class and disadvantaged individuals who voted to leave the EU, a group which has considerable overlap those who have been most negatively affected by austerity (Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 2017). ...
Article
Since 2010 the UK government has undertaken extensive spending cuts which have manifested in significant reductions in welfare, local authority and justice system spending. The cuts have been linked with rising poverty, food bank use and serious health issues. Such extreme cuts are likely to affect how citizens view and interact with government. This paper argues that the theories of civic voluntarism, grievance and policy feedback in combination explain why austerity has provoked relatively little political participation in the UK.
... The issue of access to social security benefits has informed debates across Europe on 'welfare tourism' particularly in the years immediately before and after EU enlargement to include the A2 and A8 states (Shutes, 2017). More recently, the impact of immigration on public services featured prominently in the leave campaign during the Brexit referendum (Gietel-Basten, 2016), with a correlation between negative attitudes towards immigration and EU enlargement and voting for Brexit (Arnorssona and Zoegabc, 2018), and higher support for leaving the EU in areas that had experienced higher immigration in the period leading up to the vote (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017). ...
Chapter
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The ‘Air Jamaica generation’ of undocumented migrant families who came to the UK over the past 30 years, have received less political and scholarly attention than the so-called Windrush generation, yet are some of the most socially excluded in the UK. These families, particularly those with dependent children, are often invisible in social policy discussions because they lack the legal right to paid employment, and are subject to the no recourse to public funds (NRPF) rule, which excludes them from accessing the majority of welfare state services, including most social security benefits, local authority housing and homelessness assistance. One of the few statutory welfare services which undocumented migrant children and families do have the entitlement to are services provided by local authority children’s services. This paper analyses the levels of support provided to undocumented children by local authorities under section 17 of the Children Act 1989, arguing that in the absence of access to mainstream social security benefits, the level of support provided is not an adequate safety net to prevent poverty and to protect a child’s health and wellbeing. The article concludes that the lack of support to prevent undocumented migrant children falling into poverty and destitution is rooted in discriminatory legislation and policy, and results in situations which are structural in cause, but which would be viewed as neglectful if as a result of action by an individual parent or carer.
... This type of politics of insecurity about migrants is ever present in Europe today, which is why the framework formulated in this article could prove helpful for the analysis of populism as it manifests itself in political episodes such as the 2016 Brexit campaign in the United Kingdom (Gietel- Basten, 2016) and the 2018 re-election campaign of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in Hungary (Walker, 2018). In both cases, populism and anxieties over immigration meshed in ways similar to the ones studied in the above US case study. ...
Article
Despite the recent multiplication of publications on populism, an area that remains underexplored is the relationship between populism and the politics of insecurity, which refers to how perceived collective threats are framed and acted upon. The main objective of this article is to formulate an ideational framework for the analysis of populism as it intersects with the politics of insecurity. More specifically, the article focuses on right-wing populism, turning to the framing of migrants in the United States during the Trump presidency to illustrate specific claims about the relationship between populism and the politics of insecurity. As argued, the political framing of collective threats is a central aspect of populism. The role of framing points to the ideational side of populism, which is not a coherent ideology but a type of discourse through which perceived threats are strategically framed to both exacerbate collective insecurity and gather popular support by promising to shield citizens against these threats.
... They showed that the negative relationship between ethnic fragmentation and economic growth is also present in the context of developed economies. Increasing diversity from mass migration can also have a negative impact on aspects of social capital like shared norms and trust (Levy 2017;Putnam 2007) and have influenced critical political outcomes such as the Brexit (Coleman 2016;Gietel-Basten 2016), the rise of populism movements such as the one leading to the election of Donald Trump in the United States, or the recent entrance of deputies from an extreme right party (Alternative für Deutschland) in the Germans' Bundestag for the first time since World War II. Projecting the changes in population composition in terms of diversity has therefore an interest per se. ...
Article
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Background: Pressures to keep immigration rates at relatively high levels are likely to persist in most developed countries. At the same time, immigrant cohorts are becoming more and more diverse, leading host societies to become increasingly heterogeneous across multiple dimensions. For scholars who study demographic or socio-economic behaviours, the need to account for ethno-cultural “super-diversity” brings new challenges. Objective: The main objective of this paper is to present a framework for the prospective analysis of super-diversity in several high immigration countries. Methods: We developed microsimulation models that simultaneously project several population dimensions for Canada, the United States and countries of the European Union, with the aim of studying the consequences of alternate future population and migration trends. Results: The paper presents the projected progression of three indicators of diversity: percentage of foreign-born population, percentage of the population using a non-official language at home and percentage of non-Christians. It also examines the projected changes in the labour force by education levels and language. Using alternative scenarios, we also show that the proportion of highly educated in the US and EU28 labour force could increase by 11 and 15 percentage points respectively if future immigrants were selected as in Canada. Finally, the paper proposes a new longitudinal indicator that counts the number of years lived as active and inactive over the life course for foreign- and native-born cohorts. Contribution: The microsimulation models provide much more informative results than more traditional cohort-component models to study the future effects of ethno-cultural super-diversity on high immigration countries.
... On these varied tensions, British politicians across the political spectrum -Tories, Labour and UKIP -built a chain of equivalence between immigration, austerity and British community traditions (Gietel-Basten, 2016). The National Health Service (NHS) -an institution infused with almost sacred popular emotionality -epitomized the emerging political discourse of 'overstretching' by foreigners, championed by UKIP and the Tory Party -and sometimes shared explicitly by the Labour Party (Toynbee, 2017). ...
Article
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In this paper we argue that mature political democracies require an agonistic form of populism in order to function. Agonistic populism counters technocratic apathy and instrumental reductionism and provides democracies with discursive legitimacy for the expression of antagonisms. We draw on the exemplary case of Brexit to show how the long-term suppression of English populism by an all-conquering British imperial discourse, and the hegemony of technocratic solutions in Europe, transformed populism’s potentially virtuous agonistic effects into an often anachronistic, toxic and ill-directed ressentiment against the European Union. We call upon management scholars to focus on how popular ressentiment can be used as a force for good in two ways: (1) by contributing agonistically to an alternative, emotionally founded discourse about England, the European Union and a new popular civilizational project that could bind them; and (2) by inducing the creation of collective moral categories embraced across the elite/non-elite divide in the image of the post-World War II National Health Service.
... For those trading in xenophobia, the NHS is an astute choice. As one commentator put it: "the NHS is almost a religion in the UK; its "overstretching"-especially by foreignerspresented as a blasphemy" [28]. ...
Article
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During the “age of austerity” the UK government has progressively limited free health services for “overseas visitors” on the grounds of fairness and frugality. This is despite the fact that the cost of the additional bureaucracy required by the new system and the public health consequences are expected to exceed the sums saved. In this article I explore the interaction between the discourses of austerity and xenophobia as they relate to migrants’ access to healthcare. By examining the available data and adjudicating various moral arguments, I cast doubt on the claim that the current charging regulations are cost-effective and fair. I instead contend that if the UK is concerned with running a health service that is economically-sustainable and morally-defensible, it is critical that migrants are welcomed, both as staff and as patients. I conclude by arguing that xenophobia has precipitated changes to the health service which do not qualify as “austerity” in the way that is claimed, but rather deliberately produce a “hostile environment” for migrants, despite this very likely generating economic losses.
... Hydrological changes lead to climate disasters such as droughts and floods, and recent extreme droughts and floods have appeared in many parts of the world [3]. In 2016, the cause of Brexit, namely Britain's withdrawal from the European Union, was socio-economic and political, but it originated from a prolonged, severe drought in Syria [4,5]. This drought, which has been extensive and prolonged owing to climate change, has had a direct impact on agriculture and has resulted in the emergence of refugees and international issues. ...
Article
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Hydrological changes attributable to global warming increase the severity and frequency of droughts, which in turn affect agriculture. Hence, we proposed the Standardized Agricultural Drought Index (SADI), which is a new drought index specialized for agriculture and crops, and evaluated current and expected droughts in the Korean Peninsula. The SADI applies crop phenology to the hydrological cycle, which is a basic element that assesses drought. The SADI of rice and maize was calculated using representative hydrological variables (precipitation, evapotranspiration, and runoff) of the crop growing season. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of SADI, the three-month Standardized Precipitation Index, which is a representative drought index, and rainfed crop yield were estimated together. The performance evaluation of SADI showed that the correlation between rainfed crop yield and SADI was very high compared with that of existing drought index. The results of the assessment of drought over the past three decades provided a good indication of a major drought period and differentiated the results for crops and regions. The results of two future scenarios showed common drought risks in the western plains of North Korea. Successfully validated SADIs could be effectively applied to agricultural drought assessments in light of future climate change, and would be a good example of the water-food nexus approach.
... They showed that the negative relationship between ethnic fragmentation and economic growth is also present in the context of developed economies. Increasing diversity from mass migration can also have a negative impact on aspects of social capital like shared norms and trust (Levy 2017;Putnam 2007) and have influenced critical political outcomes such as the Brexit (Coleman 2016;Gietel-Basten 2016), the rise of populism movements such as the one leading to the election of Donald Trump in the USA, or the recent entrance of deputies from an extreme right party (Alternative für Deutschland) in the German's Bundestag for the first time since World War II. Projecting the changes in population composition in terms of diversity has therefore an interest per se. ...
Technical Report
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Background Pressures to keep immigration rates at relatively high levels are likely to persist in most developed countries. At the same time, immigrant cohorts are becoming more and more diverse, leading host societies to become increasingly heterogeneous across multiple dimensions. For scholars who study demographic or socio-economic behaviours, the need to account for ethnocultural “super-diversity” brings new challenges and complications. Objective The main objective of this paper is to present a framework for the prospective analysis of super-diversity in several high immigration countries. Methods We developed microsimulation models that simultaneously project several population-dimensions for Canada, the United States and countries of the European Union, with the aim of studying the consequences of alternate future population and migration trends. Results The paper presents the projected progression of three indicators of diversity for Canada, the USA and the EU28: percentage of foreign-born population, percentage of the population using a non-official language at home and percentage of non-Christians under the reference scenario. Results from alternative scenarios show the potential impact of modifying the composition of migrant cohorts. The paper also examines the projected changes in the labour force for each region by education level and language. Finally, the paper proposes a new longitudinal indicator that counts the number of years lived as active and inactive over the life course for foreign- and native-born cohorts. Contribution The microsimulation models provide much more informative results than more traditional cohort-component or multi-state models to study the future effects of ethnocultural super-diversity on high immigration countries.
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La incertidumbre generada con la separación del Reino Unido de la Unión Europea constituye un evento histórico y sin precedentes, conllevando a un ambiente de discordia dentro y fuera del bloque económico, en especial para los migrantes, debido a las consecuencias que ha desatado el Brexit. La revisión de literatura se basó en un mapeo científico sobre la influencia de los migrantes europeos, abordados desde el Brexit y las consecuencias, tendencias y políticas migratorias. Se utilizó la base de datos Scopus en el periodo 2015-2021, mediante herramientas bibliométricas y RStudio se revisó el tema basado en la metáfora del árbol; se concluye con 3 temáticas de estudio: perspectiva social y cultural de los migrantes; impacto económico y laboral asociado al Brexit y; política, debates y votación sobre consecuencias del Brexit, que permiten determinar una tendencia sobre la evolución y consecuencias de la separación del Reino Unido de la Unión Europea.
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Combining the theoretical background of Critical Discourse Studies (van Dijk 2015a, 2015b; van Leeuwen 2008; Wodak 2015a) with a corpus-assisted methodology (van Diik 2015a; 2015b), this paper contrastively investigates the discursive representation of migration and migrant people by leading British (Nigel Farage, Jeremy Corbyn) and Italian politicians (Matteo Salvini, Matteo Renzi) in the years 2016-2018, starting from the examination of the collocational profile of such migration-related terms as immigration, immigrant, migrant, refugee and asylum seeker. The period is salient for the global upsurge of populism (Mudde 2004), the Brexit referendum, and the so-called 'refugee crisis,' which turned immigration into a hot topic in the political agenda of parties of different orientations. Our empirical analysis sheds light on two opposing views: the negative portrayal of migrants as a threat by right-wing populist politicians across countries (Lorenzetti 2020), while left-wing politicians display a more humanitarian attitude. Regardless of political stance or specific migrant terms, however, the representation of migrant groups as social actors is crucially founded on the strategies of aggregation, collectivisation and functionalisation (van Leeuwen 2008), which ultimately result in the perpetuation of stereotyped and partial depictions that overlook their features as individuals.
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Scenario planning has been gaining popularity during the last decade as a tool for exploring how international migration flows might be affected by changing future circumstances. Using this technique, scholars have developed narratives that describe how flows might change depending on different developments in two of their most impactful and uncertain drivers. Current applications of scenario planning to migration however suffer from limitations that reduce the insights that can be derived from them. In this article, we first highlight these limitations by reviewing existing applications of scenario planning to migration. Then, we propose a new approach that consists in specifying different pathways of change in a set of six predefined drivers, to then ask migration scholars how each of these pathways might impact both migration flows and the other five drivers. We apply our approach to the case of migration pressure and demand from less developed countries to Europe until the year 2050. Results from our survey underscore the importance of a wide array of drivers for the future of migration that have so far not been considered in previous applications of scenario planning. They further suggest that drivers do not change independently from each other, but that specific changes in some drivers are likely to go hand in hand with changes in other drivers. Lastly, we find that changes in similar drivers could have different effects in sending and receiving countries. We finish by discussing how enhanced, quantified scenarios of migration between less developed countries and Europe can be formulated based on our results.
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From 2010 the UK entered an ‘age of austerity’, with major cuts to welfare payments. We study the link between these cuts and increases in hate crimes. Using a panel of 313 Community Safety Partnerships areas in England and Wales, we show that for each £100 loss per working age adult, racially or religiously motivated crimes rose by approximately 5-6% in 2013/14 and 2014/15. These effects are large given a mean loss of £450 per working age adult and survive multiple robustness checks. Using individual data, we find no evidence that these crimes are driven by increased anger of the benefit recipients per se but find evidence for a decline in community cohesion.
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This article examines the relationship between nationalistic mobilisations, hidden funds and undisclosed campaign contributions, commonly known as dark money. Contextualising Brexit alongside the Icelandic economic crash of 2008 shows how nationalist mobilisation and racism can secure economic and political interests for a small minority and thus create space for what Zygmunt Bauman has called ‘evasion’ or ‘slippage’ as a primary technique of power in the present. Both the build-up to Brexit and the Icelandic economic crash were characterised by a strong national-centred rhetoric of ‘us-the-nation’ versus ‘others’ that diverted attention from massive minority interests, which had access to hidden funds. The Panama Papers showed that many of the same people celebrated in Iceland as the embodied representation of the country were simultaneously moving money into tax havens. Exposés have also revealed the way that dark money secretly funded campaigns using anti-migrant racism to facilitate the Brexiteers’ longer-term interests.
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Whereas social scientists have devised various ways to measure representation gaps between the political elite and the masses across nations and time, few datasets can be used to measure this gap for particular social groups. Minding the gap between what parties social groups vote for and what parties actually attain seats in parliament can reveal the position of social groups in the political power structure. We help to fill this gap with a new publicly available dataset, Party Representation of Social Groups (PaReSoGo), consisting of 25 countries and 150 country-years, and a method for its construction. We used the European Social Survey 2002–2016 and ParlGov data for this time span to create a Dissimilarity Index. To demonstrate the utility and flexibility in the combination of cross-national surveys and administrative data, we chose social groups of gender, age, and education, as well as intersectional groups based on gender and age, and attitudinal groups. We conclude this research note with empirical illustrations of PaReSoGo’s use.
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This paper promotes the idea of a culturally‐sensitive Tiebout‐Hirschman‐Rothschild mechanism underpinning the UK’s 2016 Brexit result. Our Culture‐Based Development (CBD) model asserts a trade‐off between two rival types of voting: voting with one’s feet or voting in a radical way due to being unable to vote with one’s feet, akin to a protest vote. We explore the effects on the Brexit vote of shares of public spending on culture and a particular type of migration dynamic that triggers social closure. Our findings reveal that strong support for the Leave campaign was encountered in areas with lower local government expenditure on culture and in areas with higher outflows of UK residents. Previous literature had found that left‐behind places and places with concentrations of highly educated commuters are the pro‐Brexit nests. Our CBD mechanism of perceived relative deprivation offers a reconciling explanation of these seemingly controversial findings.
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In July 2020 The Lancet published global scenarios of fertility, mortality, migration and population trends from 2017 to 2100 produced by the research team from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) (Vollset et al. 2020). These projections, based on a vast amount of data, complex estimates and models, have gained high visibility, also in subsequent media coverage and interviews. Yet, IHME highly publicised population data and scenarios suffer from numerous issues with the underlying data, models and scenarios as well as over-simplistic interpretations of their results. This study aims to substantiate our concerns, spelled out earlier in a letter to the Lancet (Basten, Sobotka et al. 2020), and review major issues and weaknesses with IHME projections and their interpretation. First, we critically examine the data issues, models and their underlying assumptions, including implausible uncertainty intervals and contrasts in predicted trends among countries from broader regions, which often share similar economic and cultural characteristics. Second, we discuss the interpretations of the main findings presented in the discussion part of the paper by Vollset et al. and reflect on the media representation of the projection results. In conclusion, we highlight internal inconsistencies in the IHME modelling approach, which lead to questionable projections for many countries and scenarios.
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The theory of capitalist peace claims that contractual social relations, free trade and cross-border investments are conducive to peace. In discussing this theory, I first sketch some key paradoxes and contradictions of capitalist market economy. These paradoxes and contradictions have critical implications for the theory of liberal-capitalist peace. Free-market policies and re-regulations have released and strengthened various problematical mechanisms that are typical to capitalist market economy. Second, I explain Piketty's inequality r > g and its wider meaning to democracy and global integration under market globalism. Third, I describe briefly two mechanisms that can explain the move from uncertainty and inequalities to existential insecurity and securitization. Fourth, I summarize how these mechanisms can shape macro-history and why the anticipation of a global military catastrophe by futurologists such as Attali and Wagar is not only relevant but unfortunately also plausible. Finally, I discuss briefly how the contradictions of global political economy could be overcome by collective actions and by building better common institutions.
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Research and evidence suggest that the expression of targeted intolerance increasingly manifests in subtle ways. Innovative work on colour-blind racism and unconscious bias underlines the unacknowledged ways that prejudicial attitudes are perpetuated/emerge without being overtly expressed. Building upon this work, we identify an additional dimension of intolerance defined by the intentional masking of anti-immigrant sentiment directed at immigrant groups defined by nation, race and religion. Using two survey experiments – conducted before and after the Brexit vote in the UK – we reveal that individuals mask intolerance strategically and that these strategies shift depending on the normative context. In particular, Muslim immigrants, who experienced little protection from overtly expressed intolerance before the Brexit referendum, confront a post-Brexit landscape in which intolerance is significantly overstated. The root of this emergent masking of intolerance is attributable to the Brexit campaign that simultaneously normalized AND stigmatized anti-immigrant sentiment. We conclude that our understanding of emergence and perpetuation of intolerance needs to account for the strategic and intentional disclosure of intolerance.
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Chapter 3 explores the change in Conservative Party’s immigration stance during David Cameron’s leadership (2005–2015) and explains why the party made a U-turn on immigration policy, abandoning its ‘detoxification strategy’. In addition to testing existent theories of party policy change, the chapter identifies one new crucial factor that led to the change in Conservatives’ immigration policy—the Home Office’s ideological dogmatism, which manifested itself in the Home Office’s control over agenda setting, evidence twisting and lack of communication with other governmental departments that were involved in immigration policymaking. The chapter pinpoints to the mechanisms that accounted for the immigration policy change and provides an explanation why some interest groups were more successful in lobbying the UK Conservative Party and the Home Office more than others.
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In this chapter, I ask whether fiscal austerity since the global financial crisis can help explain the growth in anti-immigrant sentiment that undergirds right-wing populism, focusing in particular on the United States and the United Kingdom. This empirical question also speaks to a theoretical issue central to populism scholarship: What explains the success of right-wing populism in particular? Drawing on Thomas Edsall’s (2012) idea of the politics of scarcity, I will suggest that fiscal austerity since the global financial crisis contributed to citizens’ sense of scarcity of public goods and services, including in the areas of social housing, healthcare, and education. Nationalist political entrepreneurs found in this sense of scarcity an opportunity to scapegoat groups they define as falling outside the national community, simultaneously redirecting blame away from the project of austerity itself.
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This chapter explores how the debate on multiculturalism has securitized the issue of integration, problematizing the ‘Muslimness’ of Muslims in questions of political violence and extremism. This dynamic combines a set of cultural, political, theological and sociological debates around identity and belonging. It also connects with issues of immigration, integration, intelligence, counterterrorism, policymaking and securitization, and in the process, further ‘othering’ an already beleaguered body of people. Given the current reductions to public spending in most Global North economies, the ongoing impact of the war on terror, and limited community, cultural and intellectual development, the challenges facing Muslim minorities are likely to endure for the near future. While the Middle East is currently facing its own internal trials and tribulations, and the wider Muslim world often lags behind the West when it comes to technological advances, divisions are likely to increase and tensions grow as the global continues to intersect with the local in shaping and playing out identity politics.
Chapter
A historical process of framing Muslims negatively within popular discourses in society during imperialism and colonialism reveals how the emergence of Orientalism and the birth and eventual dominance of neoliberal capitalism had coincided. In the current period, both mainstream and social media continue to disseminate negative views on Islam and Muslims - transmitted through the 24-hour new cycle – which is heightened by an emphasis on extremism, radicalization and terrorism. These concerns reflect the unease felt about matters related to security and counterterrorism, and reinforce the notion that Muslims en masse are somehow antithetical to the norms and values of all of society. A populist politics of division has forced through the ideas of ethnic nationalism, which have come to define this anti-Muslim moment. The confluence of far right normalization in media, and Islamophobia propagated through the news cycles, has real-world implications – from attacks on people and property. In exploring the Danish Cartoons Affair of 2006, which had a global impact on Muslim-non-Muslim relations and perceptions, and the localized nature of anti-Pakistani sentiment in a popular BBC television sitcom, Citizen Khan, there is a discussion of the local and global being bound in framing Muslims.
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Islamism is a much used concept, yet it involves a variety of perspectives on political Islam, some of which are positively orientated towards citizenship. However, for the most part, Islamism implies regressive practices. This chapter identifies a range of theoretically and conceptually derived notions of Islamism that exist in the Muslim world but also among Muslim minorities in diasporic settings. It explores how it is conceivable to move from one form to another depending on context and opportunity, analyzing the risks for the emergence of different types of Islamism’s, in particular how the global affects the local in the conceptualization and realization of various forms, from anti-Islamism to cultural Islamism to radical Islamism to violent Islamism. Directly linked to these realities is the economic and political context, developing societies in particular, and the issues of poverty and disadvantage that affect Muslim minorities.
Book
Since the 1970s, there have been three challenges to traditional, homogeneous ‘national’ identities across the Western world: political and socioeconomic inequality; neoliberal globalization; and more diverse, multicultural societies. As in the US and elsewhere in Western Europe, the decline of an old, masculinized national identity has now begun to open a new, dark era for Britain. Ever since the ‘war on terror’ was added to the mix, ‘others’ in Britain have been brutally demonized. Muslims, routinely presented as the source of society’s ills, are subjected to both symbolic and actual violence. Deep-seated and structurally racialized norms amplify the isolation and alienation impeding Muslim integration. Both these ‘left-behind’ Muslims and white-British groups who perceive themselves as the true nation are under pressure from ongoing geopolitical concerns in the Muslim world, as well as widening divisions at home. Tahir Abbas argues that, in this context, the symbiotic intersections between Islamophobia and radicalization intensify and expand. His book is a warning of the world that results: a rise in hate crime, the institutionalization of Islamophobia, and the normalization of war and conflict.
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This article explores the UK vote in 2016 to exit the European Union, colloquially known as ‘Brexit’. Brexit has been portrayed as a British backlash against globalisation and a desire for a reassertion of sovereignty by the UK as a nation-state. In this context, a vote to leave the European Union has been regarded by its protagonists as a vote to ‘take back control’ to ‘make our own laws’ and ‘let in [only] who we want’. We take a particular interest in the stance of key ‘Brexiteers’ in the UK towards regulation, with the example of the labour market. The article commences by assessing the notion of Brexit as a means to secure further market liberalisation. This analysis is then followed by an account of migration as a key issue, the withdrawal process and likely future trajectory of Brexit. We argue that in contrast to the expectations of those who voted Leave in 2016, the UK as a mid-sized open economy will be a rule-taker and will either remain in the European regulatory orbit, or otherwise drift into the American one. JEL Codes: F2, F53, F55, F66, K33
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This paper aims to make a timely and original contribution to the long-standing debates regarding the interrelationships(s) between democracy, anarchism and the state in two key ways. The first is by exploring more fully the work of Errico Malatesta, particularly focused on critical discussions around 'the nation', 'federation' and 'democracy'. Cognisant of these Malatestian insights, the second part of the paper reflects a resurgent interest in anarchist geographies more generally, and foregrounds a contextual focus of the divisive politics associated with Britain's attempts to leave the European Union ('Brexit'). Here the paper argues for the need to recognise that the crisis of representative democracy is always social and spatial in nature. This is illustrated primarily by highlighting the importance the state places by repeatedly appealing to popular "nationalist" sentiments. In doing so, the state draws on a spatial mechanism of control, one which relies heavily on imagined and real geographical senses of sovereignty, territory and boundaries. Thinking though the implications that a more explicitly spatial reading of democracy, anarchism and the state presents, the paper concludes by considering how post-statist democratic futures might be better envisaged and enacted more fully.
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On 23 rd June 2016, a referendum on Britain staying in the European Union was held. The electoral turnout was very high (72%) and 52% of the preferences were for Leave. Therefore, the referendum result confirmed the image of a country divided between Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans. The aim of this article is to highlight whether the vote was not only an expression of the opinion about the European Union, but also the clear manifestation of a malaise linked to the influence of other factors, such as the economic crisis and immigration.
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Zusammenfassung Die Wähler Donald Trumps, des Brexits und populistischer Parteien leitet weniger materielle Sorgen, grundsätzliche Vorbehalte gegen internationalen Freihandel oder eine ausgeprägte Fremdenfeindlichkeit. Vielmehr empfinden diese Wähler stärker als andere Wählergruppen eine politische Ohnmacht, Unbehagen angesichts des gesellschaftlichem (Werte-)Wandel und Verunsicherung über eine bislang unbekannte Migrationsdynamik. Welche Antworten können etablierte Parteien diesen Wählern geben, ohne die Position wirtschaftspopulistischer Parteien einfach zu kopieren? Wie kann der zunehmenden Spaltung der Gesellschaft Einhalt geboten werden? Dieser Beitrag zeigt, dass es dazu keiner neuen politischer Konzepte und auch keiner Umverteilungsprogramme oder protektionistischen Aktionismus bedarf. Vielmehr bietet das bewährte ordoliberale Konzept überzeugende Antworten auch für eliten- und migrationsskeptische Wähler und kann so geistige Risse in der Gesellschaft kitten.
Technical Report
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This report examines how the 2008 financial crisis and the agenda of austerity and Brexit have affected young mothers, migrant domestic workers and other precarious workers in the United Kingdom, and how political actors have mobilised for economic justice in this context. In addition to identifying explicit legal restrictions that have excluded workers from employment protection, we examine the gaps between labour law in the books and in practice, highlighting structural factors that have impeded the effective exercise of statutory rights. Our methods include legal analysis based on primary and secondary sources, a review of policy reports and academic publications on labour market trends, and semi-structured interviews with 11 workers, activists, trade unionists and think tank advisors. The first part of the report, which focuses on law in the books, offers an overview of the creation and enforcement of labour rights through consultative bodies, Employment Tribunals and administrative agencies falling within the remit of a newly appointed Director of Labour Market Enforcement. It also describes the content of key UK labour rights in the light of minimal standards set out in EU directives, tracing their evolution since the 1990s. The second part problematises these provisions by looking at their implementation and impact from the perspective of workers themselves. We explore five structural sources of rights violations: 1) the subordination of subsistence to paid work created by welfare conditionality; 2) the subordination of legal residency to paid work; 3) the difficulty of claiming employment rights in court due to the casualisation of employment relations and rising judicial costs; 4) the underenforcement of worker-protective standards by administrative agencies; and 5) the decline of union membership. Subsequently, we address the formulation of justice claims around economic relations, international migration and childcare. Starting from interviewees’ recollections and interpretations of concrete injustices, we outline their underlying ideals of justice, mobilisation strategies, mutual perceptions and expectations for a post-Brexit future. Results suggest that the evolution of economic conditions during the last decade has exacerbated and exposed deep tensions between economic justice and the ideal of the worker citizen, the person who proves their citizenship through labour. While all interviewees adhered to a version of this ideal, notably by expressing reservations toward universal basic income, they also criticised its contribution to current material and symbolic exclusions. For an increasing proportion of workers on non-standard contracts, the worker citizen’s promise of decent pay and positive identity has been replaced by low wages, short termism and unpredictability of hours. This has made it difficult for them to plan their personal and family life, enforce their rights in court and participate in political struggles. Official exhortations to take up paid employment under threat of benefit sanctions have reminded young mothers that family-provided childcare was not considered worthy of legal protection and financial compensation, but also that most jobs did not pay enough to turn its commodification into a plausible alternative. Migrant domestic workers lost their right to renew their visas and therefore the capacity to effectively enforce all employment-related rights. Trades unions have adapted their structure and tactics to deal with these challenges, but economic struggles have also been waged in other sites such as informal grassroots organisations, political parties and think tanks. The remedies advanced to tackle economic injustice have included minimum wage enforcement, stronger legal underpinnings for trade unions activities, state-funded vocational training, public awareness campaigns, guaranteed means of subsistence for carers and long-term residence rights. For most respondents, Brexit raised the prospect of further deregulation and tighter migration control.
Article
Cassirer's notion of myth and Langer's process philosophy are used to provide a novel perspective upon how feelings were both expressed and organised in the Brexit referendum, showing how multiple, overlapping organisations of feelings created a set of emergent rationalities. Political parties and campaigns, the media, and lived experience serve as analytic foci, and various feelings are identified. It is concluded that the result was largely rational on its own terms and that understanding this is central to the social psychology of Brexit.
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The article analyzes the push factors that compelled many people to flee from the region.
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This chapter explores the immigration-related topics in the news media during the EU referendum campaign in the UK (April–June 2016) and after (July–September 2016). The chapter argues that attitudes anti-EU immigration are a wave of “new(s)” racism (van Dijk 2000) in the UK and EU immigration is frequently used as an umbrella term for Eastern European immigration being often mixed with non-EU immigration and the refugee crisis. The data shows that the prevalence of negative news stories has led to a distinctive immigration-narrative, confirming the claim of Hoffner and Cohen (2013) that members of minority groups are almost always associated with violent and threatening media content.
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Much has been written about the 'Death of the West', a demise threatened by the low level of reproduction in Western countries. That fate is contrasted unfavourably with the rapid growth of the populations and economies of less developed countries, and the prospect of the numerical and political marginalization of the formerly dominant developed world. We believe that trends in European fertility have been misunderstood and that, with effort and some pain, their consequences for age structure are manageable. Many European societies also enjoy the advantages of demographic and social maturity, the resilience of established consensual democratic institutions, the rule of law, and civil society. The sizes of China and India raise problems of resource sustainability and vulnerability to climate change. China risks falling into a low-fertility trap, reinforced by urban working conditions unfriendly to family formation. Traditional patriarchal and familist cultures may depress fertility rates to unhelpfully low levels in other less developed countries.
Article
We investigate the fiscal impact of immigration on the UK economy, with a focus on the period since 1995. Our findings indicate that, when considering the resident immigrant population in each year from 1995 to 2011, immigrants from the European Economic Area (EEA) have made a positive fiscal contribution, even during periods when the UK was running budget deficits, while Non-EEA immigrants, not dissimilar to natives, have made a negative contribution. For immigrants that arrived since 2000, contributions have been positive throughout, and particularly so for immigrants from EEA countries. Notable is the strong positive contribution made by immigrants from countries that joined the EU in 2004.
Rosemary 2010 The UK's population problem https
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Net immigration will be capped at tens of thousands The Daily Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/6961675/David-Cameron-net-immigration-will-be-capped-at-tens-of-thousands
  • Rosa Prince
How likely is a UK population of 80m-and would it really be a problem?
  • Jane Falkingham
Revealed: England faces shortfall of 10,000 primary school places The Observer
  • Toby Helm
Britain must stop half of EU migrants claiming benefits, says Fallon
  • Rowena Mason
Johnson says low immigration could lead to economic stagnation The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/politicsboris-johnson-says-low-immigration-could-lead-to-economic-stagnation
  • Rowena Mason
  • Boris
Britain's green fields will have to be built over to provide new homes for migrants, warns Chris Grayling The Daily Telegraph
  • Tim Ross
Nigel Farage immigration poster made me ‘shudder,’ says Michael Gove Huffington Post UK
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Brown stands by British jobs for British workers remark The Guardian
  • Deborah Summers
Britain risks migration timebomb as population set to swell by 500
  • Craig Woodhouse
There is no ‘upper limit’ to EU migration The Daily Telegraph http
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  • Jeremy Corbyn
Nigel Farage immigration poster made me ‘shudder,’ says Michael Gove
  • Ned Simons
Jeremy Corbyn: There is no ‘upper limit’ to EU migration The Daily Telegraph
  • Steven Swinford
David Cameron: Net immigration will be capped at tens of thousands The Daily Telegraph
  • Rosa Prince
Boris Johnson says low immigration could lead to economic stagnation
  • Rowena Mason
Britain must stop half of EU migrants claiming benefits, says Fallon The Guardian
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Boris Johnson says low immigration could lead to economic stagnation The Guardian
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David Cameron criticised over migrant ‘swarm
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Corbyn: I'm ‘seven out of 10
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