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Review of African Political Economy
ISSN: 0305-6244 (Print) 1740-1720 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/crea20
Beyond ethnicity: the violence in Western Uganda
and Rwenzori’s 99 problems
Anna Reuss & Kristof Titeca
To cite this article: Anna Reuss & Kristof Titeca (2016): Beyond ethnicity: the violence in
Western Uganda and Rwenzori’s 99 problems, Review of African Political Economy
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2016.1270928
Published online: 20 Dec 2016.
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BRIEFING
Beyond ethnicity: the violence in Western Uganda and
Rwenzori’s 99 problems
Anna Reuss
a,b
and Kristof Titeca
a
a
Institute for Development Studies and Management, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium;
b
Department
of Conflict and Development Studies, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
SUMMARY
In the Rwenzori region, a range of historical, socio-economic and
political tensions have in past years resulted in a series of deadly
clashes between different ethnic communities. Patronage politics
of recognition of cultural kingdoms and district creation critically
drives the manifestation of these tensions in ethnic violence,
especially in the context of electoral contest.
Introduction
During violence in July 2014, over 100 people were killed in the Rwenzori region on the
border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in western Uganda.
1
The violence
was started by small groups, mainly youth, of the Bakonzo ethnic group, which attacked
police and army posts in three districts. This in turn led to revenge attacks by members of
other ethnic groups, and to brutal counter-security operations against the Bakonzo (HRW
2014). After the February 2016 general elections, clashes in the wider region left more than
50 dead, hundreds of homes razed and thousands displaced (HRW 2016). Government
explanation in both instances focused on the clear ethnic overtones of the clashes, and
in 2016 prominently singled out alleged ethno-nationalist mobilisation among the
Bakonzo, the majority ethnic group in the region, as responsible for the violence. This
briefing aims to show how ethnicity is an outward layer beneath which there is a host
of historical, social-economic and political conflict dynamics –a process we have titled
‘Rwenzori’s 99 problems’. It argues that government failure to effectively address the
root causes of long-standing tensions in the Rwenzori region has led to resurgent violence
often expressed in ethnic terms. The range of conflict drivers is similar to those plaguing
communities across Uganda: they revolve around competition over the use and ownership
of land, access to public office, natural resource exploitation, and a burgeoning youth
population in the face of development challenges, and are fuelled by securitisation, and
patronage politics, especially in the context of electoral contests. In the next sections,
we unpack these various root causes.
© 2016 ROAPE Publications Ltd
CONTACT Kristof Titeca kristof.titeca@uantwerp.be
REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2016.1270928
Historical roots: oppression, marginalisation and resistance
The Rwenzori region comprises three districts –Kasese, Bundibugyo, and Ntoroko –at the
foothills of the Rwenzori mountain range that constitutes Uganda’s natural border with
the DRC. The districts of Kasese and Bundibugyo are at the heart of the Rwenzori
region, and are inhabited mainly by the Bakonzo, the Basongora and the Bamba ethnic
groups.
The Rwenzori region has a long history of armed resistance, revolving around two
interlinked key elements: the struggle of minority ethnic groups against a majority, and
the recognition of cultural institutions or kingdoms.
In the Rwenzori heartland, a minority tribe faces the overwhelming dominance of a
majority ethnic group. In Kasese District, the Bakonzo are the largest ethnic group,
with the Basongora and the Banyabindi ethnic groups being the minority. The cattle-
keeping Basongora were the original inhabitants of the area before the peasant Bakonzo
migrated to the area, and today the former make up only 1% of the population. The Bason-
gora and Banyabindi feel displaced by the Bakonzo and feel that their collective identity
and cultural institutions have been undermined by years of oppression –“we are
victims of cultural genocide”’ (CCFU 2014a, 12). In Bundibugyo District, the role of the
Bakonzo role is reversed: they present a minority against a majority of the Bamba.
The struggle between a minority and a majority group date from the precolonial times,
when the Bakonzo, the Basongora and the Bamba all were subjects of the Tooro kingdom,
situated in Fort Portal. The complexity of colonial rule accentuated the problem of tribe
and tribal identity; the Bakonzo were seen as labourers; the Tooro were given more clerical
work. Much of the ethnic differentiation and a perception of the Batooro as oppressors
dates from this period (CCFU 2014a, 12). During the colonial rule, the Bakonzo launched
a first armed rebellion against the Tooro kingdom.
2
Afterwards, the Rwenzururu rebellion
launched in 1962 sought independence from Tooro and the establishment of a Rwenzur-
uru kingdom. As Doornbos (1970, 1069) argued, the Rwenzururu movement was an
attempt to redress ‘inequalities in the distribution of power; in access to the political
centre for the allocation of benefits; in wealth and welfare; and in dignity and social
status’. In 1974, the regime of Idi Amin created Rwenzori District for Bakonzo (roughly
Kasese District today), Semliki District for Bamba (Bundibugyo today) and Kabarole Dis-
trict for the Batooro. However, the Rwenzururu rebellion’s aspiration to an independent
state was not addressed, and Rwenzururu leaders were excluded from the district leader-
ship structure (Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca 2016). In 1982, a political settlement for-
mally ended the low-intensity rebellion. Rwenzururu forces laid down their arms in
return for a degree of local autonomy and the integration of their leaders in the Kasese
administration. However, some secessionist Rwenzururians who rejected this reconcilia-
tion took up arms again, by forming the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
(NALU). In 1989, NALU fighters carried out attacks, killing some local council leaders
in the highlands of Kasese. In 1993, NALU was defeated and its leader killed (Syahuka-
Muhindo and Titeca 2016).
This was not the end of the armed resistance: NALU remnants later joined the anti-gov-
ernment Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) that destabilised the Rwenzori region between
1996 and 2000. By 2001, ADF/NALU no longer posed any serious threat to the Ugandan
government. The remaining parts of the rebel group retreated to DRC (Titeca and
2A. REUSS AND K. TITECA
Vlassenroot 2012, 160; Titeca and Fahey 2016). Nevertheless, the history of rebellion in the
area still is an important frame through which contemporary events are understood. This
is particularly important in the light of continuing tensions between the majority and the
minority ethnic groups, which are discussed further in the next section.
The defining role of ownership and use of land
One way in which the majority–minority tensions have historically been defined is
through competition over the use and ownership of land, particularly between the agricul-
turalist Bakonzo and the Basongora herders. The ‘traditional’tensions between the pastor-
alist Basongora and cultivating Bakonzo are aggravated by unclear land titles and a general
scarcity of habitable land and grazing grounds (New Vision 2007). The gazetted areas of
Rwenzori and the Queen Elizabeth National Parks cover large swathes of the district.
For a long time, the national parks have been sources of contention between the people
neighbouring them, the encroachers and the government authorities (CARE 2009).
Moreover, tensions around perceived preferential treatment of particular groups in
the area contribute to a mutual sense of marginalisation of both minority and majority
ethnic groups. The minority Basongora feel marginalised and dominated by the
Bakonzo majority, while many Bakonzo harbour a sense that the Basongora cattle-
keepers are favoured by the government in land allocation and development projects
(CCFU 2014a, 10). Such situations have led to violent clashes between the Basongora
and the Bakonzo. For example, in 2008 over 80 Basongora houses were set on fire,
and over 500 cattle killed following the eviction of Bakonzo cultivators from a disputed
200-hectare area of land (Musinguzi et al. 2014, 4).
3
Today, Kasese is the fifth most populous district of Uganda, aided by a stream of
migrants and immigrants in the region (RFPJ 2016a, 5).
4
The combination of historical
tensions between cultivators and cattle-keepers, rapid population growth, and the scarcity
of habitable land make fierce competition over land inevitable. Moreover, in recent years,
oil prospects in the Albertine Rift have led to speculative land deals and a sharp rise in
cases of land-grabbing (KRC and RFPJ 2012, 21).
The role of the national government and increased tensions
National political calculations came to play a central role in this situation, and further
fuelled the tensions. Crucially, since the re-establishment of multiparty elections, the
region has been an opposition stronghold. In this situation, the recognition of kingdoms
and the creation of districts has become hard currency in (strategies of) vote winning for
the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government: given that both institutions –
kingdoms and districts –create a whole range of public jobs and guarantee financial
transfers from the national level, they have become central elements in President
Yoweri Museveni’s regime’s patronage politics. It has been widely shown how the creation
of districts has traditionally been used for electoral reasons (Green 2010), and the recog-
nition of kingdoms has been used in a similar manner. As we will show below, instead of
solving existing tensions, the creation of new districts and the recognition of new king-
doms have instead further entrenched and fuelled them: ethnic identities have become
further crystallised, and tensions between majority and minority groups have increased.
REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 3
The recognition of kingdoms
When the Rwenzururu rebels laid down arms, the Rwenzururians did not abandon the
pursuit of a Rwenzururu kingdom. In 1993, the government restored traditional kingdoms
as cultural institutions in the Traditional Rulers Act (Government of Uganda 1993). The
legal recognition of cultural leaders is enshrined in the 1995 Constitution (CCFU 2014b).
But the Rwenzururians’claim to a recognised Rwenzururu kingdom, which they contin-
ued to press for over the following decade, continued to be rejected by government. As a
result of this, the opposition (and more particularly the Forum for Democratic Change
[FDC]) strongly grew in popularity, resulting in a number of harsh electoral battles
(Titeca 2007).
In order to increase its popularity in the region, the government recognised the Obu-
singa bwa Rwenzururu (OBR) kingdom in 2009 (RFPJ 2014) and in the following year
crowned Charles Mumbere, the Mukonzo
5
son of an erstwhile Rwenzururu rebellion
leader, king. But Kasese District again voted for the opposition in the 2011 parliamentary
elections and, rather than pacifying the region, the recognition of the OBR kingdom
further aggravated existent tensions over domination and marginalisation between and
within ethnic groups. Because the Rwenzururu king is a Mukonzo, minority tribes
regard the OBR as a representation of the Bakonzo people, thus institutionalising the min-
ority groups’marginalisation by the majority Bakonzo (CCFU 2014a,9–11). This sense of
cultural domination through the Bakonzo and their language to some extent feels similar
to the cultural oppression the Rwenzori region’s tribes once experienced under the
Batooro (Daily Monitor 2016c). A report on the 2014 clashes (Musinguzi et al. 2014)
describes how minorities consider the attitude of the Bakonzo to be ‘intended assimilation
and imperialism’through for example the adoption of Bakonzo names, the OBR flag in the
communities, and the claim that the Basongora are only a clan group among the Bakonzo
(Musinguzi et al. 2014, 3).
Aggravated grievances over marginalisation of non-Bakonzo gave rise to a growth of
ethno-nationalism in the region (CCFU 2014a, 15, 30): also other ethnic groups (more
particularly the Basongora and the Bamba) advocated for government recognition of
(re-)invented cultural institutions. Further fuelling these tensions is the fact that
control over a kingdom gives access to the government’s patronage network: besides
legally prescribed entitlement to government allowances, their potential for popular
mobilisation at local level commonly grants kingdoms additional financial and material
benefits.
In this context, symbolic issues –such as royal visits or ceremonies –have become
explosive. In 2012, violence erupted between Bamba and Bakonzo when the Rwenzururu
king visited Bwamba County in Bundibugyo, and hissed a Rwenzururu kingdom flag. A
month later, the Basongora in Kasese District crowned their own king, irrespective of
lack of government recognition, triggering clashes between Basongora and Bakonzo
youth who stole the Basongora flag and royal drum (Daily Monitor 2012a; KRC and
RFPJ 2012, 13). Yet another month later, the Banyabindi minority in Kasese District
secretly also installed a cultural leader. In October 2012, tensions flared again between
Bakonzo and Basongora, leaving cattle mutilated and fields razed (Daily Monitor
2012b). In sum, instead of calming down the relations between the various ethnic
groups, the recognition of the Bakonzo kingdom further fuelled these tensions.
4A. REUSS AND K. TITECA
District creation
To avoid the establishment of ever more cultural kingdoms, district creation has been the
primary government response to ethno-nationalist sentiments at local level. As mentioned
above, Idi Amin in 1976 sought to appease Rwenzururu leaders by dividing Kabarole Dis-
trict into three, essentially giving to each of the Bakonzo, the Bamba, and the Batooro their
own district. Since 2002, the number of Uganda’s districts has doubled: Justified by the
country’s decentralisation policy, new district creation has in many cases been primarily
a critical tool of patronage for government to secure votes in elections (Green 2010),
while leaving substantive development challenges unaddressed.
As mentioned above, the OBR was recognised in the lead-up to the 2011 elections in an
attempt to swing Kasese District’s past opposition votes towards government. Yet, Kasese’s
persistent opposition vote and the July 2014 violence underscored the intricacies and
explosive potential of the national government’s approach to mobilisation of votes at
local level.
The government sought to address ethnic tensions expressed in the 2014 and 2016 vio-
lence with the creation of new districts along ethnic lines. But, like kingdom recognition,
district creation feeds into existent sentiments of domination and marginalisation, and
further crystallises ethnic identities, giving rise to new conflicts (Green 2008).
This became particularly clear in Bundibugyo. This district is dominated by the Bamba,
but youth of the Bakonzo minority had been held responsible for instigating violence in
2014. In the lead-up to the 2016 elections, the President promised to carve a highland dis-
trict out of Bughendera County for the Bakonzo in an attempt to secure the Bakonzo vote
in Bundibugyo (Observer 2016a). This buy-off attempt was underscored by the OBR king’s
brother, a long-time opposition politician, switching political allegiance and running for
the county parliamentary seat in the district-to-be (Observer 2016b). But the promise of
a new Bakonzo District heightened tensions in Bundibugyo. The victory of Bughendera
County’s parliamentary seat by the Rwenzururu king’s brother in the 2016 elections
was thus symbolic of the Bakonzo minority’s assertion in Bundibugyo and an expansion
of the OBR kingdom’s influence. After the polls, clashes in Bughendera left at least 30
dead, hundreds of houses razed, and thousands displaced (New Vision 2016b;2016e).
In sum, while district creation might bring political gain for the national government
and ruling party, it creates a range of tensions on the ground.
Kingdoms, youth, and disruption of social order
The creation of the OBR did not only create tensions between the Bakonzo and other
ethnic groups; segments of the Bakonzo also opposed the new kingdom.
6
Tensions
emerged between those who were very actively involved in the rebellion (the freedom
fighters, mainly residing in the mountains) and those who remained on the sidelines –
mainly Bakonzo residing in the lowland, who are known to co-exist more easily with
other ethnic groups (CCFU 2014a, 11). Second, tensions emerged between the ‘traditional’
and ‘new’governance structures. Traditionally, political and social organisation was based
on clans, councils of elders, and on ridge leaders who govern Bakonzo life in the mountain
ridges of the Rwenzori (Mugisha and Infield 2012, 245). Under the ‘reinvented’, centra-
lised kingdom, the OBR has established a ‘new parallel governance structure of traditional
REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 5
but “modern”educated leaders in each sub-county’(CCFU 2014a, 15). This sidelines ridge
leaders and councils of elders, despite the fact that they are in closer contact with the
people. Thus, the establishment of the OBR led to intra-communal tensions surrounding
the legitimacy of the reinvented cultural leadership, and at the same time weakened tra-
ditional institutions such as the ridge leaders, who were considered effective in the resol-
ution of localised conflicts (Sarmiento et al. 2015, 699).
Disruption of the established social order in rural communities is also driven by the
rapidly growing youth population and unaddressed development challenges, most
importantly high youth under- and unemployment (Magelah and Ntambirweki-Karu-
gonjo 2014). This has contributed to rising levels of crime and an erosion of tra-
ditional mechanisms of conflict resolution through elders and ridge leaders (CCFU
2014a, 19; RFPJ 2016b). Youth, some of them organised in vigilante groups, were
identified as the main perpetrators of attacks in recent outbreaks of violence (RFPJ
2016b). On a regular basis, the government accuses members of the Rwenzururu
kingdom government of mobilising a Bakonzo youth militia for attacks (Daily
Monitor 2014b;Daily Monitor 2016b;East African 2016a). More than 500 youths
who were arrested and arraigned before military courts in July 2014 were eventually
released, and granted ‘amnesty’without due legal process or a demobilisation pro-
gramme (RFPJ 2016a). Rather, many of these youth were recruited into the crime pre-
venters, a controversial police-trained, militia-like force that heightened nationwide
fears of election violence in the lead-up to the 2016 polls. In the series of deadly
clashes in the region following the elections, youth again were the main instigators
of violence (New Vision 2016a).
Government response to the violence and the role of security forces
The government’s response to the Rwenzori violence in early 2016 was twofold. First, a
flurry of mediation efforts ensued (New Vision 2016h). President Museveni engaged
with delegations of local political, cultural and religious leaders (New Vision 2016g). On
a tour of the region, Museveni brokered a symbolic peace deal between the king of the
Bamba and the king of Rwenzururu, who both denied their kingdoms’involvement in
the clashes (New Vision 2016i).
Second, the government engaged through a strong militaristic response, which has been
a dual driver of stability and fragility. The fact that police and army personnel and installa-
tions were the first targets in the outbreaks of violence in 2014 and 2016 points to existing
popular grievances over the role of state security forces in the region (New Vision 2016b).
President and police have blamed grassroots intelligence officers for not only failing to
detect the violence, but also of contributing to local tensions through arbitrary arrests
and abuse of office (Daily Monitor 2014a;New Vision 2016d; Tabaire 2014). Heavily
armed police were deployed to contain clashes, but some units soon had to be withdrawn,
as local political leaders particularly blamed the notorious Flying Squad for fuelling further
unrest (Daily Monitor 2016e;New Vision 2016c). In early March 2016, an officer of the
police’s militarised Field Force Unit was filmed shooting an unarmed civilian, sparking
national outrage (Daily Monitor 2016a).
7
One month later, a Flying Squad officer shot
and killed a Rwenzururu traditional guard (Daily Monitor 2016d). As often in Museveni’s
Uganda, the military came in to salvage the situation. The deployment of the army into
6A. REUSS AND K. TITECA
Kasese and the mountains of the Rwenzori in April 2016 put a temporary end to the vio-
lence and restored a sense of calm. However, it is unnecessary to state that a ‘military sol-
ution treats symptoms, not causes’(MRG 2016).
Third, and in line with the above point on district creation, six months after the elec-
tions the government endorsed the creation of four new districts out of Kasese District. A
plan to carve out new districts to counter a sense of Bakonzo domination had repeatedly
been tabled since 2010 (Daily Monitor 2013), but failure to agree on how the new districts
would be carved out –and how many of them there would be
8
–had stalled their creation
(KRC and RFPJ 2012, 23). Following the 2016 elections, which were overwhelmingly won
by the opposition in Kasese District, and particularly following the consequent post-elec-
toral violence, the split of the district was retabled for discussion in order to counter this
violence and the opposition’s success. The local ruling party caucus and Crispus Kiyonga,
the ousted long-time NRM Member of Parliament and cabinet minister (and vocal
opponent of the kingdom), endorsed the creation of new districts in a bid to alleviate ten-
sions between different groups. In October, President Museveni approved the division of
Kasese into four new districts: Bwera, Hima, Kasese, and Katwe (Daily Monitor 2016f).
The OBR and the newly elected opposition parliamentarians from Kasese District
opposed the split, regarding it as an attempt by government to weaken their power. At
the Rwenzururu kingdom’s50
th
anniversary celebrations the following week, the OBR cri-
ticised the new district creation as an attempt by illegitimate ‘self-seekers’to undermine
the kingdom and the elected district council, since the 2016 elections were dominated
by the opposition FDC (New Vision 2016j).
9
Peace and justice remain unaddressed in the region. No substantive reconciliation
efforts have been pursued or policy changes effected to address long-standing grievances
over a perceived government neglect of the region (East African 2016b). Up till the present,
no investigations have been conducted into mass graves discovered in 2014 (East African
2016c). Hundreds of youths brought before military tribunals over the violence have
neither been given due legal process nor a demobilisation programme after release
(RFPJ 2016a).
Conclusion
The government’s reaction to the recent tensions in the Rwenzori region has consistently
been to blame local political and cultural leaders for instigating ethnic conflict. In response
to the 2014 attacks, the police spokesperson for example argued how ‘There is a tribal con-
flict,’while the government, in response to the 2016 killings, alleged that (segments of) the
Bakonzo-led Rwenzururu kingdom in Kasese sought to create an independent ‘Yiira
Republic’(New Vision 2016f) together with their tribesmen in Congo popularly known
as the Nande.
10
This briefing aimed to show how ethnic tensions are only the outward layer of the
conflict, and how instead various other layers are crucial driving factors: historically, the
differentiation and opposition between majority and minority groups can be traced back
to the colonial intervention and continues to play an important role. This became
further pronounced through increasing (im)migration tendencies, tensions around
land, and increasing youth unemployment. The national government’s interventions
played a crucial role in further fuelling these tensions: districts and kingdoms are
REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 7
popular pawns in the political game of vote winning. Similarly, local elites manipulate
communal identities to ensure their control over voters and resources. Rather than
bringing people together, the recognition of the cultural institutions and the politics
of new district creation has further emphasised division, which make many claim
that they have led to a deterioration of conflicts, by further crystallising ethnic identities
and the consequent tensions surrounding them, both between different ethnic groups
and within them. While the government’s securitisation approach helps to temporarily
stop the violence, it also further contributes to it.
What happens in this process is an ‘ethnicisation of politics and politicisation of eth-
nicity for political leverage and expediency’(RFPJ 2016b, original emphasis). However,
the unclear process of establishing a kingdom, contested district creation, and the poor
management of the consequences, in turn magnify existing tensions and conflict (CCFU
2014a, 30). What has happened in this process is that the various actors –minority/
majority ethnic groups, the kingdoms, local political leadership, and the state –have
continuously focused on short-term gain of winning votes or gaining control over
public resources associated with kingdoms and districts, yet they have equally added
fuel to the slow-burning fire of inter- and intra-communal tensions, which overall
has led to an explosive situation in which potentially marginal events achieve highly
symbolic significance.
The violence in the Rwenzori region offers important lessons for the rest of Uganda.
Rwenzori’s‘99 problems’are not unique to the communities in the region. All of the
root causes of the deadly violence in western Uganda are key elements of the overall pol-
itical culture in Uganda: land conflicts, youth unemployment, ethnic tensions, perceptions
of marginalisation, traditional institutions, the involvement of security agencies, political
manipulation and the other factors mentioned above are found in districts and commu-
nities all over Uganda. The Rwenzori case particularly highlights the high risks of ethnic
violence in Uganda implied in the current practice of addressing inter- and intra-commu-
nal grievances primarily through patronage politics of district and kingdom creation in
pursuit of short-term gains.
Notes
1. The final version of this paper was submitted on 1 November 2016, before the clashes of late
November 2016 in the Rwenzori region. For this reason, the briefing does not deal with these
events. For a brief analysis incorporating these events, see Reuss and Titeca (2016).
2. The Abayora revolt was a protest against the imposition of colonial rule on the Bakonzo, and
on the cultural oppression of Tooro, in addition to forced labour and taxation (Syahuka-
Muhindo and Titeca 2016).
3. See http://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/basongora-bakonzo-clash-over-land-evictions.
4. This (im)migration is related to a variety of issues, such as labour migrants who seek oppor-
tunities in Kasese’s mining industry and the oil sector, but also Ankole cattle-herders and
refugees from DRC.
5. Mukonzo is the singular of Bakonzo.
6. Long-time defence minister Crispus Kiyonga, a Mukonzo from Kasese, was one of its most
vocal critics.
7. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YVBATs-uIZw.
8. And thus who would control more and better habitable land, and whether the Basongora
minority would gain a majority in any of the new districts.
8A. REUSS AND K. TITECA
9. Heightened tensions between the kingdom and government became visible at the ceremonial
grounds: royal guards denied access to police, including personal guards of politicians (New
Vision 2016j).
10. See Pennacini (2008) for history, relations and identity politics of the Nande and Bakonzo.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Anna Reuss is a joint PhD candidate at the University of Antwerp Institute for Development
Studies and Management, and in the Department of Conflict and Development Studies at Ghent
University. Her doctoral research focuses on regime stability and the security sector in Uganda.
Based in Kampala, Uganda, she works as an independent analyst of political, security and integrity
risks in Eastern Africa. Email: anna.e.reuss@gmail.com.
Kristof Titeca is an assistant professor at the University of Antwerp Institute for Development
Studies and Management. He has published extensively on conflict and governance in Central
and Eastern Africa. Email: kristof.titeca@uantwerp.be.
ORCID
Kristof Titeca http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2003-2053
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