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Three Islamist generations, one Islamic state: the Darul Islam movement and Indonesian social transformation
Abstract
This article examines the Darul Islam (DI) movement in Indonesia, which has sought to establish an Islamic state since the end of the colonial era. It questions why the movement has been resilient in spite of almost perennial political isolation and marginalization and numerous internal permutations. The article argues that the evolution of the movement has been intricately related to the exigencies of operating in the context of profound social, economic, and political changes associated with state formation and capitalist development in Indonesia since the 1940s. The DI experience helps us to understand the appeal of radical Islamist movements which voice dissent against perceived social injustices within national states where the left is no longer a viable social force.
... The political economy approach provides a more structural alternative explanation by contextualizing broader economic and political developments in understanding political Islam. The development of political Islam is seen as the result of a "struggle for access to material and political resources" involving various social forces (Alamsyah & Hadiz, 2017;Hadiz, 2008Hadiz, , 2011Hadiz, , 2016Hadiz & Robison, 2012;Hadiz & Teik, 2011;Mudhoffir, 2016Mudhoffir, , 2018Mudhoffir, , 2020Robison, 2014;Teik et al., 2014). Specifically, this approach interprets the economic and political environment as a "capitalist system." ...
... Literature reviews, in particular, are utilized to provide an analytical comparison between the political economy approach and the critical agrarian approach in understanding the development of political Islam in Indonesia. Specifically, the article draws on the works of political Islam studies conducted by Vedi R. Hadiz (Hadiz, 2008(Hadiz, , 2011(Hadiz, , 2014(Hadiz, , 2016Alamsyah & Hadiz, 2017) and Henry Bernstein (Bernstein, 2002(Bernstein, , 2004(Bernstein, , 2010. Key informants include seven individuals, comprising ulama who are also landlords, haji who are capitalist farmers, and smallholders and agricultural laborers, most of whom are disciples of the ulama. ...
... These classes emerged from capitalism's development during the New Order, "becoming resonated places with sermons opposing social injustices arising from their harsh encounters with urban realities" (Hadiz, 2016). This process, in general, became the foundation for the development of Islamic populism, which persisted beyond the fall of the New Order, including its more extreme constituents like Darul Islam (DI) (Alamsyah & Hadiz, 2017). ...
This study examines the relationship between capitalism, agrarian transformation, and the development of political Islam in rural Indonesia, focusing on Bulak Village, West Java. It is grounded in debates concerning the relevance of rural areas as the basis for Islamic social movements in the context of global capitalism. The study seeks to answer how agrarian transformation influences class dynamics and the formation of populist Islam-based movements in rural areas. Using a qualitative approach that integrates interviews, observations, and literature reviews, the study reveals that class differentiation driven by agrarian changes—from the Green Revolution era to the dominance of Chinese entrepreneurs in the 1990s—has created significant inequality in access to agrarian means of production. The ulama (Islamic scholars) and haji (pilgrims) classes leveraged these changes to maintain their socio-economic dominance, while sharecroppers and agricultural laborers were the most adversely affected. This situation led to the formation of populist alliances based on religious narratives opposing the capital expansion of "outsiders," particularly Chinese entrepreneurs. However, aspirations within these alliances were fragmented along class lines, with sharecroppers and laborers exhibiting a more critical alternative awareness of capitalist relations compared to the ulama and haji. The study concludes that while Islamic populism is often regarded as an urban phenomenon, experiences in Bulak indicate that rural Islamic movements remain significant. Although these movements do not wholly reject capitalism, they reveal the potential for resistance grounded in diverse class-based awareness, especially from lower classes, against exploitative capitalist relations.
... Consequently, tensions between PKI members and Islamic groups, representing their religious leaders, were inevitable. PKI members often exacerbated this tension by provoking Islamic groups on the issue of land ownership (Bush 2009;Cederroth 2004;van Dijck 1984;Rahman Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017;Sawita 2018;Wertheim 1966). ...
Scholarly inquiry into Islamic populism in Indonesia has distinctly bifurcated into two primary domains. The first is a comprehensive examination of political issues that explores various perspectives, including political identity, agency, and the influence of political figures. The second domain focuses on the impact of digital platforms, particularly how the proliferation of hoaxes and disinformation plays a critical role in shaping political identities during elections. Unlike previous studies, this article employs Gerbaudo’s concept of elective affinity to elucidate the interconnection between populism in political science and the dynamic realm of social media. These forces generate the political sentiments that shape Islamic populism in Indonesia. Specifically, this article conducts a nuanced analysis, utilizing the presidential elections of 2014 and 2019, as well as the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial elections, as comprehensive case studies.
... Consequently, tensions between PKI members and Islamic groups, representing their religious leaders, were inevitable. PKI members often exacerbated this tension by provoking Islamic groups on the issue of land ownership (Bush 2009;Cederroth 2004;van Dijck 1984;Rahman Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017;Sawita 2018;Wertheim 1966). ...
Scholarly inquiry into Islamic populism in Indonesia has distinctly bifurcated into two primary domains. The first is a comprehensive examination of political issues that explores various perspectives, including political identity, agency, and the influence of political figures. The second domain focuses on the impact of digital platforms, particularly how the proliferation of hoaxes and disinformation plays a critical role in shaping political identities during elections. Unlike previous studies, this article employs Gerbaudo’s concept of elective affinity to elucidate the interconnection between populism in political science and the dynamic realm of social media. These forces generate the political sentiments that shape Islamic populism in Indonesia. Specifically, this article conducts a nuanced analysis, utilizing the presidential elections of 2014 and 2019, as well as the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial elections, as comprehensive case studies.
... In contrast, Indonesian Muslim youth exhibit broader perspectives when articulating their religious convictions. Indonesia, home to the world's largest Muslim population, has a historical background marked by pluralism, where multiple interpretations of Islam coexist harmoniously with other religious traditions (Alamsyah & Hadiz, 2017;Hasan, 2012). The heterogeneous environment in which Indonesian Muslim millennials find themselves creates a conducive atmosphere for open and constructive discussions about religion. ...
This study aims to examine how the Department of Youth and Sports in North Sumatra utilises religious communication to enhance the well-being of young individuals. It contributes to scholarly knowledge by shedding light on the strategies employed by the Department to improve youth quality through Islamic communication. The study employs field methodologies and applies Miles and Huberman's data analysis model. The findings are divided into three key dimensions: 1) Planning Islamic Communication: Analysing the Department's Strategies for Effective Communication in an Islamic Context; 2) Organising and Implementing Islamic Communication: Investigating the Department's Efforts in Organising and Executing Islamic Communication Initiatives Targeting North Sumatra's Youth; and 3) Monitoring and Evaluating Islamic Communication: Assessing the Department's Systematic Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Islamic Communication Strategies in Youth Engagement. Additionally, this study encounters challenges related to technology and semantics. Semantic difficulties arise from varying interpretations and analyses of Islamic communication messages among the youth population, while technical obstacles include concerns regarding infrastructure deficiencies and resource constraints.
... Dasar pemikiran yang berbeda tersebut sangat mempengaruhi kewarganegaraan di Indonesia yang dilandasi ideologi Pancasila. Konsep darul islam berdampak pada pengembangan ideologi islam yang tentunya berseberangan dengan ideologi Pancasila (Aspinall, 2007;Rahman Alamsyah & Hadiz, 2017) sekalipun sesungguhnya tidak bertentangan mengingat ideologi Pancasila bersumber dari nilai-nilai ...
Penelitian ini mengkaji Kyai sebagai sentral gerakan ajaran agama islam dalam kehidupan warga negara. Mayoritas masyarakat Indonesia adalah pemeluk agama islam dengan berbagai ragam pemahaman terhadap islam itu sendiri. Kyai sebagai penerjemah al quran dalam kehidupan, dipahami masyarakat sebagai pencerah setiap persoalan. Pemikiran politik Kyai yang berbeda menimbulkan perbedaan perspektif dalam memaknai sekaligus mengaplikasikan kewarganegaraan di Indonesia. Untuk mengkaji fenomena pemikiran politik kyai tersebut, peneliti menggunakan metode studi kasus. Pemikiran politik tokoh agama diantaranya kyai merupakan sesuatu yang tidak biasa, bahkan terdapat pertentangan diantara beberapa agama mengenai hubungan politik dan agama. Terdapat agama yang memisahkan keduanya namun juga terdapat agama yang menyatukan keduanya, perbedaan tersebut dapat dilihat pada agama islam dan katolik. Kecenderungan islam di Indonesia antara politik dan agama tidak bisa dipisahkan karena ajaran agama islam bersifat menyeluruh. Dari penelitian ini ditemukan beberapa fenomena pemikiran politik Kyai, diantaranya yaitu darul islam dan darus salam. Kyai yang mendasarkan pada konsep darul islam diwujudkan pada pemahaman atas konsep khilafah atau imamah sebagai teokrasi, sedangkan Kyai yang mendasarkan pada konsep darus salam diwujudkan pemahaman atas konsep khilafah sebagai masyarakat madani.
... Almost all Indonesians have a religion expressly recognised through official documents such as Identity Cards (KTP). As many as 87% (some say 82%) of Indonesian people embrace Islam (Alamsyah & Hadiz, 2017;Bayat, 2013;Hasan, 2009;Hefner, 2019). This condition encourages party elites to use religious issues to attract the sympathy of the masses of voters. ...
This research focuses on religious issues used as messages in political communication. A campaign is a form of political communication by one of the candidates for local leader dan vice local leader of Gresik regency Sambari Qosim (SQ) in the 2015 regional election. This study employed a qualitative approach; therefore, the researcher used observation, in-depth interviews, and documentation to collect data. The study found that the SQ candidate pair used religious issues as a message in their political campaign because the local vice leader of Gersik Regency, Mohammad Qosim, was the son of a Kyai. Thus, such a strategy made it easier for him to gain sympathy from the voters, who would ultimately determine his choice of the pair. This strategy was implemented due to the socio-cultural community of Gresik Regency, a religious society that considers religion to be sacred, including the figure of a Kyai. As a religious figure, the Kyai must be obeyed and become an example in attitude and behaviour. This condition prompted the SQ candidate to take advantage of religious issues to gain as many votes as possible to win the 2015 regional elections.
... 203 Kartosuwiryo used the Prophet's historical emigration to justify his confrontation with the colonial Dutch (Formichi 2012). After the demise of Kartosuwiryo's Darul Islam (DI) in the early 1960s, hijrah as both a religious and political practice continued, manifested in different forms of clandestine activism, recruitment, and continued to adapt with the changing political environment (Alamsyah & Hadiz 2017). Through clandestine activism, DI transformed into a Southeast Asian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (see Temby 2010). ...
The Indonesian underground music scene was once known as the bastion of progressive and radical Leftist politics for urban youths during the Reformasi era (1997-2002). After the fall of Suharto on 21 May 1998, leftist activism in the scene declined, and was followed by the emergence of the right-wing Islamic underground movement and the hijrah movement. Their opposition to democracy and enmity towards minority groups has undermined the scene’s reputation as one of the key elements in Indonesia’s emerging democratic culture. The existing studies on the ‘conservative turn’ have failed to explain the ideological shift of underground subcultural participants towards Islamic conservatism and right-wing Islamism. This study was inspired by this background and aimed to answer the following research question: ‘Why did some underground music scene participants shift to conservative Islam and right-wing Islamism in post-authoritarian Indonesia?’ Drawing from extensive (ethnographic) fieldwork in Indonesia between 2015 and 2018, and informed by subcultural theory, I argue that the transformations of the Indonesian underground music scene including the most recent shift towards conservative Islam and right-wing Islamism reflect the transformations of youth resistance in response to different socio-political and economic conditions that have disempowered and marginalised them. These conditions are both external and internal to the scene. The external factors include post-Suharto’s political stagnancy, suppression and co-optation of Left activists by the state and right-wing groups, the domestication of the underground’s subcultural capital and practices, material inequality, and the lack of economic opportunities. The internal factors include polarisation and fragmentation, informal hierarchies, nihilism, the absence of central figures, and stagnancy within the scene. Due to the absence of coherent leftist activism within the scene, the participants sought for alternative channels to express their dissent, including new ideological and organisational platforms to resist hegemonic cultures and authorities and find solutions to the demoralising effects generated by the above conditions.
... Besides these attempts in the formal political channel, there have also been cases of hardliners: Muslims that tried to insert their religious-based interest in a more militant and clandestine way. One notable example is Darul Islam (literally translated as Islamic State) that aimed to include sharia law in the formulation of Pancasila which was later rejected due to Indonesia's pluralist background (Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017). This movement catered to Muslims with radically conservative views who thought that a lack of Islamic values in Indonesia's fundaments would lead the country to mismanagement, immorality, and eventual collapse. ...
In Indonesia's political strategic environment, Islamic narratives have been among the main narratives, but have not always been dominant. The 2014 presidential election displayed the beginning of a rising trend of Islamic narratives within the political context in Indonesia. Since then Islamic narratives influenced the strategy of Indonesia's populist leaders, as particularly seen during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election and 2019 presidential election. This paper analyzes how populism as a strategy was used in recent Indonesian elections. For this purpose, it uses the conception of populism as a political strategy proposed by Weyland. Building on this approach, the paper explains the strategic adjustments made in the use of populism from 2014, 2017, and 2019 in Indonesian political events. It argues that the strategic environment faced by populist actors in Indonesia's 2019 election affected their decision to choose Islamic narratives as an instrument for mass mobilization.
... The fall of Soeharto and authoritarian rule meant that the government needed to find a new way to strongarm the population (Hadiz, 2018). The use of paramilitary organisations such as Pemuda Pancasila (the Pancasila youths) as a tool carry out illegal activity on the government's behalf has been well documented since the 1960s (for instance, Alamsyah & Hadiz, 2017;Heryanto & Hadiz, 2005;Jones, 2005). After the fall of the regime, religion started to become the tool used to control the Indonesians. ...
In this article, I examine politics and protest during the post-authoritarian Indonesian regime by analysing the song ‘Puritan (God Blessed Fascists)’ by Homicide (2002)., drawing from my fieldwork in Bandung and Jakarta to do so. By framing my analysis through Bräuchler’s (2019 Bräuchler, B. (2019). Brokerage, Creativity and Space: Protest Culture in Indonesia. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 40(4), 451–468. https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2019.1628721[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) notion of rappers as ‘protest brokers’, I identify three key sites of protest in Homicide’s song: morality, ideology, and policy. My research shows that Indonesian rappers in the early 2000s, especially those from Bandung, tried to fight the rise of conservatism and fascism by reclaiming their space through the so-called ‘Bandung underground scene’. In Bandung, rappers, their politics and their acts of protest were direct, despite the city and the region being home to the largest concentration of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia. By tapping into their ‘leftist’ ideologies, Homicide established a resistance network in which other rappers could participate and reclaimed their space in an increasingly politicised city.
... Hence, confrontation was sometimes involved in the incorporation of these irregular forces. Several rebellions, such as the Darul Islam movement led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewiryo to establish the Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII), occurred following the attempt to rationalise military forces (see Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017;Nieuwenhuije 1950). The rest of the militiamen who were not incorporated in the rationalisation program because of a lack of military skills became a source of political gangsters. ...
This chapter explains the engagement of urban poor youths with organised gangs. In particular, it addresses the question of why in Indonesia’s democratic context, privatised violence organisations remain appealing, especially for many urban poor youths. As discussed in previous chapters, the predatory nature of Indonesian requires privatised violence as an instrument in the contest over power and material resources. This is facilitated by the fact that large numbers of urban poor, precarious workers and unemployed youths have not been able to organise themselves as an ‘autonomous social movement’ through vehicles that promote in the interest of the urban underclasses.
... Hence, confrontation was sometimes involved in the incorporation of these irregular forces. Several rebellions, such as the Darul Islam movement led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewiryo to establish the Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII), occurred following the attempt to rationalise military forces (see Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017;Nieuwenhuije 1950). The rest of the militiamen who were not incorporated in the rationalisation program because of a lack of military skills became a source of political gangsters. ...
This chapter addresses the question of why the use of privatised violence tends to decline in the political arena, but increase in the economic field. By using North Sumatra case, it argues that while the practice of money politics might contribute to the declining use of violence and intimidation for vote gathering, it requires business expansion, including through land acquisitions, which often entail the use of violence. The increasing use of privatised violence in the economic field has been made possible by the rising number of agrarian conflicts and the instrumentalisation of disorder in land management. Here, powerful elites regularly use organised gangsters together with the formal repressive apparatus to suppress local communities that attempt to defend or reclaim their agrarian properties.
... Hence, confrontation was sometimes involved in the incorporation of these irregular forces. Several rebellions, such as the Darul Islam movement led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewiryo to establish the Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII), occurred following the attempt to rationalise military forces (see Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017;Nieuwenhuije 1950). The rest of the militiamen who were not incorporated in the rationalisation program because of a lack of military skills became a source of political gangsters. ...
This chapter examines the specific historical trajectories that make possible the persistence of privatised violence in different political settings. It is argued here that the historical development of capitalism, which requires the use of extra-economic means for the accumulation process, ensures that providers of privatised violence play a role in conflicts regarding wealth and power. In particular, the practice of privatised violence tends to be reproduced when predatory social relationships are prevalent in the workings of capitalism. This means that the persistence of privatised violence in Indonesia’s democratic era is not simply a result of the legacies of state formation—particularly in the colonial period, as has been argued in some existing studies; rather, it is also fundamental to how capitalism itself has evolved.
... Muhammadiyah is preparing its cadres with Al-Islam and Kemuhammadiyahan. These roles are strategic, given that these two organizations have considerably more influence than radical Islamic movements [34]. The two organizations have become essential assets in the development of resistance to radicalism in Indonesia. ...
Radical Islamic ideology has penetrated educational institutions in Indonesia. It has the potential to become the seeds of radical movements that threaten the survival of the life of the nation and state. This study aims to explore the madrasah strategies to deal with the threat of extremist radicalism. The authors employed an argumentative exploration that essays a history of the philosophical moderate Islamic attitude, which was supported by relevant recent research findings, government documents, and a review of the theory, and practice of madrasah education in Indonesia. The results of this study indicate that the strategies of madrasah to counter the growth of radicalism is mainstreaming Islamic moderation, which will function as an ideological shield for the younger generation from the threat of extremism, both right-wing, and left-wing. This strategy needs to strengthen the program by developing a blueprint that is supported by stakeholders and regard to the moderate Islamic cultural base that has been built by NU and Muhammadiyah.
... HTI describes itself as a non-violent organisation, yet the group does not repudiate the use of force and strongly opposes the notion of democracy and that of the nation-state (Muhtadi, 2009;Muhtadi, 2019). The last variable of interest in this study is DI/NII, which has sought to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia since the end of the colonial era (Alamsyah & Hadiz, 2016). ...
This chapter addresses many of the unanswered questions in the study of Islamism in Indonesia, such as those regarding the public support for Islamist radical groups and the typical characteristics of their core supporters. Using extensive empirical data drawn from a series of nationwide surveys conducted by our polling institute, the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) from 2006 to 2017, we can assess how large is the support for Islamist radical groups in Indonesia overtime, and why some Muslims become radicalised and engage in such groups and others do not. In our 2017 October survey, we found that 27.2% of Indonesian Muslims profess to support Islamist radical groups, or equals to 44.6 million Muslims. Contrary to prior expectations, our study found that socio-economic factors such as individuals’ income level and education as well as profession have little correlation with the support for Islamist radical groups in Indonesia. Instead, among a large number of variables generally believed to be the determinants of support for Islamism examined in this study, the most consistent and significant factor that influenced the level of support for such groups was socio-psychological explanations (i.e. religious identity and Islamist collective deprivation). We conclude that Islamist radicalism in Indonesia can be best explained in terms of socio-psychological perspectives rather than the socio-economic factors.
... As indicated by Bull, "during 1994Bull, "during -1995 favoritism was perceived toward Muhammadiyah and led some pesantren people to feel some distance from Soeharto regime". In this sense, the pesantren community seemed to be marginalized by the Indonesian government (Lukens- Bull, 2005;Rahman Alamsyah and Hadiz, 2017). ...
... HTI describes itself as a non-violent organisation, yet the group does not repudiate the use of force and strongly opposes the notion of democracy and that of the nation-state (Muhtadi, 2009;Muhtadi, 2019). The last variable of interest in this study is DI/NII, which has sought to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia since the end of the colonial era (Alamsyah & Hadiz, 2016). ...
This chapter addresses many of the unanswered questions in the study of Islamism in Indonesia, such as those regarding the public support for Islamist radical groups and the typical characteristics of their core supporters. Using extensive empirical data drawn from a series of nationwide surveys conducted by our polling institute, the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) from 2006 to 2017, we can assess how large is the support for Islamist radical groups in Indonesia overtime, and why some Muslims become radicalised and engage in such groups and others do not. In our 2017 October survey, we found that 27.2% of Indonesian Muslims profess to support Islamist radical groups, or equals to 44.6 million Muslims. Contrary to prior expectations, our study found that socio-economic factors such as individuals’ income level and education as well as profession have little correlation with the support for Islamist radical groups in Indonesia. Instead, among a large number of variables generally believed to be the determinants of support for Islamism examined in this study, the most consistent and significant factor that influenced the level of support for such groups was socio-psychological explanations (i.e. religious identity and Islamist collective deprivation). We conclude that Islamist radicalism in Indonesia can be best explained in terms of socio-psychological perspectives rather than the socio-economic factors.
... Darul Islam's tenets and fight for the establishment of an Islamic state started in the late 1940s, not long after Indonesia's independence, and continued underground throughout the New Order regime and even post-1998. Its initial militant worldview was transformed into a more globalized Islamic activism whose goal is to purify Islam, although it often resorts to violent means (Rahman Alamsyah & Hadiz 2017;Temby 2010). The Salman movement started in the Bandung Technological Institute's (ITB) Salman Al-Farisi Mosque in the 1970s, and it was, as Hefner (2000: 123) calls it, 'the new Muslim activism par excellence' . ...
This article reconsiders contemporary digital activism in an increasingly pious Indonesia and responds to Eva F. Nisa’s 2018 paper on young Muslim women as daʾwa (proselytization) activists published in this journal. This paper asks: How have today’s socially mediated publics in Indonesia influenced the figure of the daʾwa activist? How are these daʾwa activists different from those in the past? I argue that the daʾwa activists are the products of a Muslimah intimate public, part of a networked public within which young women discuss, engage with, and express how they ‘feel’ about issues that interest them, and celebrate self-improvement and self-enterprise, combined with religious self-cultivation. Within this public daʾwa activists have two key characteristics. First, market logics and commercial interests are fundamental to their daʾwa. Second, the daʾwa accounts frame controversial and political issues through specific visual ethics that engender a sense of intimacy with their followers.
... 34 Violent extremists appeal to the concrete social circumstances of potential recruitssocial displacements, precarious work, and systemic marginalization and this material attraction appears to be the case for women as well as men. 35 Notably absent from these political economy analysis of the causes of violent extremism in Indonesia, is the role that gender relations, gendered economic and political inequalities and grievances might play in motivations, recruitment and mobilization of women to violent extremist groups. For instance, among Indonesian women who joined Islamic State, a number were overseas migrant workers. ...
The gender dimension of violent extremism is under-studied; and “women terrorists” are stereotyped as either men’s dupes or (internet) warriors. Applying a gender lens, this study uses content analysis to examine Islamist extremist websites in Indonesia. Analysis reveals distinct recruitment language targeted at women and men, and rigid gender segregation of content and spaces. Extremists co-opt the language of women’s rights while also promoting gender-discriminatory harmful practices with the intent of establishing what they consider to be a more devout Islamic state. Gender analysis of online extremism has implications for strategies to counter and prevent radicalization to violence.
... Young adults, including university students, are often targeted by radical groups to be recruited as cadres for radical movements around the world (Aiello et al. 2018;Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017;Doosje et al. 2013;Kortam 2017;Wong et al. 2019). They are recruited in many ways, especially through the utilization of cyberspace. ...
This article examines the radicalization of young adults in relation to internet access and the social media content produced and managed by radical groups in Indonesia. Some of the research problems that become the major concern of this article were how young people respond to the internet and social media that provide radical content, how they find out about and access the content, what their purposes are for accessing radical content, and what they do with the radical content. The data discussed in this article were obtained from surveys and interviews with 700 students from seven state universities in Indonesia who were allegedly exposed to radicalism, according to the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT). The state universities that became research locations were the University of Indonesia (UI), Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), Bogor Agriculture University (IPB), Diponegoro University (Undip), the Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology (ITS), Universitas Airlangga (UNAIR), and the University of Brawijaya (UB). This study revealed that in addition to accessing and consuming various radical content, some students also acted as prosumers. That is, they did not only read, but also produced information related to radicalization, and then recirculated it via social media.
... The publication of this article was supported by the Department of Sociology UGM Yogyakarta. (Azca, 2011;Bruinessen, 2002;Greg Fealy, 2004;ICG, 2003;Karnavian, 2015;Solahudin, 2013 (Abuza, 2003;Barton, 2004;Gunaratna, 2002) Arrobi/The Making of Islamist-inspired Terrorism and It's Counter-terrorism (Sidel, 2006(Sidel, , 2007Hadiz, 2008 Hadiz, 2008;Rahman & Hadiz, 2017;Sidel, 2006Sidel, , 2007 (Sidel, 2007: 11-19). (Maskaliunaite, 2002: 49), and sometimes it is rejected due to the pejorative tendency (Jackson, 2011: 116 (Holland, 2016;Innes & Thiel, 2008;Lindahl, 2016). ...
The study attempts to uncover the making of Islamist-inspired terrorism and its state-led counter-terrorism responses in the modern history of Indonesia. It argues that Islamist-inspired terrorism and its counter-terrorism have been inextricably linked in complex ways within political and historical contexts. Instead of regarding Islamist-inspired terrorism and counter-terrorism as separated and unrelated entities, or perceiving the latter as just response to the former, it suggests that they have been intertwined and shaped each other throughout Indonesia’s modern history. By discussing Islamist-inspired terrorism in the three Indonesian historical periods, namely the resurgence of Darul Islam during 1940-60s, the re-emergence of Darul Islam networks and its series of terrorist attacks in 1980s, and the Jemaah Islamiyah-related terrorist activities in the 2000s as illustrative cases, the study has delineated the ways in which Islamist-inspired terrorism and its state-led counter-terrorism have been bound up within particular political, historical, and sociological context. In addition to that, the study also reveals that both Islamist-inspired terrorism and its state-led counter-terrorism have been shaped by the dynamic interplay of local, national, and global contexts.
... It was the events that unfolded following an attempted coup in October 1965, blamed on the communists, which ended Soekarno's government, destroyed the Communist Party and led to the establishment of Soeharto's New Order. Soeharto played a leading role, not only using the armed forces, but also mobilising various civilian militias, which then paved the way for capitalist development under the New Order (see Roosa 2006;Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017). The New Order maintained heavy anti-communist propaganda to shape the public perception of communism was a national threat and secular-nationalist militias like Pemuda Pancasila held that communism was a threat to national values of Pancasila, the state ideology, and endangered the integrity of the nation-state (see Ryter 1998Ryter , 2009. ...
This article examines the emergence of Islamic militias that are often involved in political gangsterism in post-authoritarian Indonesia. It is argued that these groups are an outcome of the complex structural changes accompanying state formation in the context of capitalist development, instead of the product of a weak state or because of decentralisation of power and authority in the democratic context. Their existence is intricately related to the way the state organises institutions of coercion according to specific exigencies. In addition, these militias are an element of the rise of Islamic identity politics following the fall of Soeharto. The approach advanced here contrasts with two dominant approaches: an institutionalist approach that emphasises a lack of state capacity and the anthropology of the state approach that draws on Migdal’s state-in-society approach, which underlines the fragmentation of authority as the condition for the emergence of militias. It is shown that such groups could exist in a “weak” state and in a “strong” state, and in decentralised and centralised settings.
This study examines the function of da'wah communication in disseminating knowledge, education, and counsel to mitigate divorce rates in Central Aceh Regency. This study incorporated A descriptive qualitative methodology, specifically observation, interviews, and document analysis of pertinent literature, legislation, regulations, and scholarly publications . This methodology provided comprehensive insights into the intricate dynamics of da'wah communication and its influence on marital stability. The study investigated three principal questions: What impact does da'wah communication as an information provider have on divorce rates? How does its educational role affect marital stability? How does its advisory role aid in decreasing divorce rates in the Central Aceh District? The results demonstrate that da'wah communication significantly lowers the divorce rate in Central Aceh District by functioning as a source of knowledge, education, and guidance; effectively resolving family disagreements is essential for fostering patience and encouraging spouses to uphold marital integrity under divine guidance. In contrast, families who do not engage in da'wah communication are more susceptible to issues, misunderstanding, and divorce. These findings underscore the need to incorporate da'wah communication into community initiatives to mitigate divorce rates and promote healthier family relations. Future studies may investigate the enduring impacts of da'wah communication on marital stability and its possible implementation in many cultural settings.
Although there have been many studies investigating Islamist movements andtheir views concerning the relationship between Islam and politics, very rarestudies examining the ways particular ethnicity-based Islamist group invent andrevitalize their cultural capital in dealing with Islamism. Based on the case of therole of FPI (the Islamic Defenders Front) group in Jakarta rejecting the resultof Pemilu 2019 (Indonesian General Election), this study aims to investigatethe way a young Batavian community that is engaged in the FPI (a semi radicalIslamist organization) interpret their Batavian values and tradition in dealing with Islamism. This research uses a case study approach that investigates culturalcapital and its influence to a young Batavian community joining the FPI. Thisstudy relies more on in-depth interviews with the members as well as observation.Based on the fieldwork this article shows that tension in national political levelin Pemilu 2019 which polarized society had encouraged these young Batavians tobe engaged in an organization connecting them to wider Islamic groups. Insteadof Muhammadiyah or Nahdatul Ulama (NU), their cultural capital is moresupportive encouraging them to be engaged with the Islamic Defenders Front(FPI). Through this engagement in FPI and participation in political distrustrejecting the result of Pemilu 2019 they were not only involved with nationalissues, but also local issues dealing with their domination as an indigenous groupliving in an urban area.
Although there have been many studies investigating Islamist movements and their views concerning the relationship between Islam and politics, very rare studies examining the ways particular ethnicity-based Islamist group invent and revitalize their cultural capital in dealing with Islamism. Based on the case of the role of FPI (the Islamic Defenders Front) group in Jakarta rejecting the result of Pemilu 2019 (Indonesian General Election), this study aims to investigate the way a young Batavian community that is engaged in the FPI (a semi radical Islamist organization) interpret their Batavian values and tradition in dealing
The objective of this study is to examine the portrayal of the Dunning-Kruger Effect in the context of interpersonal communication. This study employs descriptive research methodologies utilising a quantitative approach. The objective of this study is to observe a manifestation of the Dunning-Kruger Effect in the context of interpersonal communication. The data collection in this study was conducted by the utilisation of a purposive sample strategy, wherein questionnaires were distributed. Next, descriptive statistical approaches, specifically data portrait analysis, are employed to process and analyse the quantitative data. This is done using JASP (Jeffrey's Amazing Statistics Programme). Out of the 56 samples analysed in this research, it was found that 4 of them exhibited the Dunning-Kruger Effect. For Islamic Youth organisation members who display the Dunning-Kruger Effect, their interpersonal communication skills are categorised as poor.
Many Islamic movements have emerged with a different style from the mainstream. One of them is the Salafi movement. Although many parties reject Salafi preaching, not a few can also accept it, one of them is a group of artists who are growing their religious passion. They are known as hijra celebrities. This article discusses the process of acceptance of Salafi da'wah among hijra celebrities. This research is field research with a descriptive qualitative approach. The primary data of this study were obtained from in-depth interviews with preachers and celebrities who attended Salafi recitations. The research subjects were determined purposively after observing several Hijra artists. This research also utilizes various literature related to the Salafism theme and the phenomenon of Hijra celebrity. The results show that social media plays an important role in encouraging the development of the Hijra movement. Social media has connected Hijra celebrities with Salafi preachers. Some of the celebrities interviewed admitted that their interest in attending Salafi studies grew after listening to recitations through social media. Thus, Hijra celebrities are actively seeking and receiving Salafi preaching.
The article aims to explore and discuss specific patterns of dysfunctional and destructive conflict resolution. The problem is focused on seven conflicts, which consist of four kinship and three socio-political cases throughout 2016-–2019. The study was carried out qualitatively, using the Dahrendorf structural–functionalism paradigm. Field data consists of narrative text on a series of events based on personal experience. The data is are in the form of verbatim transcripts, to reduce bias through comparisons between the subjects, and analyzed based on the Ricouer hermeneutic circle approach. The study found alignment, determinants, and basic patterns of reconciliation, fundamental points, and resolution prerequisites. Alignment, the conclusion of the study is a mechanism for self-discovery in conflict through differentiated recovery. Through alignment, the differentiation of authority is restored and the structure is more functional.
This is thesis about transnational movement of muslims activity. Specialized on activity in area about jihad ideas with connections within muslims in Middle East.
This paper aims to analyse the rise of radicalism in Indonesia which is at an alarming stage. It needs to be watched out by various parties, especially the government as a policymaker. It is necessary to strengthen communication systems to develop state institutions to overcome radicalism. This paper results from research using descriptive-analytical methods with qualitative approaches and case studies. As a result, in tackling radicalism in Indonesia, State Institutions have synergised but not yet optimally. This is because there are still differences in perceptions between institutions assessing radicalism. Therefore, there needs to be particular terminology, such as the National Strategic Plan, which is made to equalise the perception so that all state institutions can work optimally in tackling radicalism. With the development of the Strategic Plan, state institutions will automatically synergise with all levels of society so that the handling of radicalism can be quickly prevented.
Schools in an area of conflict often experience traumatic memories regarding radicalism and terrorism. Besides having to develop student's talents and interests, schools are also required to take an important role in conflict resolution. Poso regency is an Indonesian territory that has a long history of conflict. After the social conflict that was accompanied by armed violence, Poso was designated as a red area of terrorism in Indonesia. This study aims to find schools strategies in countering radicalism through multicultural-based peace activities in implementing Islamic religious education in schools. This study used qualitative research methods with a multi-site study design. This study found that schools apply Islamic religious education in schools in a multicultural frame based on religious values, nationalism, and local wisdom. In practice, students play active roles in interfaith social action and humanitarian charity activities. Among them, there are peace ambassadors to elementary schools in building inter-religious peace in Poso schools and communities. Apart from that, they also keep each other safe and regulate traffic during the celebration of religious holidays. This effort was made to prevent the entry of radicalism into schools after the Poso conflict.
p> Abstract: This article is aimed to explore the contested authorities in the enforcement of sharia law in Aceh. The existence of these contesting authorities could be observed in the qanun shari’a (the shari’a bylaws) formulation and implementation processes. In Aceh Province, this contestation is also further complicated by a wider contestation among formal and non-formal actors, representing pluralities of Aceh jurisprudence perspectives. Hence, the dynamic of sharia law products and its implementation in Aceh actually [re]presents a unique situation of how pluralities of actors could influence the Sharia Law formulation and its enforcement, and this is also mediated by the historical, political and cultural contexts. This research utilizes a qualitative approach, through a library research data collection which is also combined by few interviews. Generally, it seems that the authorities or agencies of both formal and non-formal institutions sometimes intersect, overlap and contest, which also complicate the production or of the incorporation of moderate Islamic thought.
Keywords: religious authority, institution, agency, Islam in Aceh, shariah law</p
We argue that the ‘youth movements’ of the Arab uprisings are better understood through a political generations framework that shifts the analytical lens away from a transitional stage towards a collective identity forged as the result of a major event. We identify a pre-revolutionary generation of feminists, a political generation of the revolution – those who, as a result of the revolution identified themselves as feminist for the first time and, consequently, founded or joined a feminist organization – and an incipient generation of feminists, that emerged from the recent protests marking the 10th anniversary of the revolution. We demonstrate how the revolution created a new political generation of secular feminists that can be distinguished from pre-revolutionary feminism along four important lines: state feminism; decolonization; intersectionality; and their perspective on and use of the term gender. We conclude with a discussion of the fragmentation of the secular feminist movement.
This dissertation examines the ideological evolution of the Darul Islam (DI) movement in Indonesia. It argues the movement was defined by two core ideas: hākimiyya and jihad. While these ideas are not unique to Indonesian militant Islamists, this dissertation aims to examine how each concept was understood, interpreted and transformed by key DI leaders from the Indonesian independence struggle to the final years of the Suharto regime. Beginning with Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo’s bid to establish an Islamic state in opposition to Dutch rule, this dissertation assesses how DI defined and promoted an understanding of hākimiyya and jihad through the works of classical ideologues to form a cohesive doctrine. Following Kartosuwiryo’s death in 1962, this thesis outlines how these ideas were reinterpreted by subsequent leaders, ultimately resulting in a split within the movement and the formation of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in 1993. This dissertation argues the accelerated globalisation of the 1970s gave Indonesian Islamists unprecedented exposure and access to the teachings and works of hard-line Salafist groups and Wahhabi preachers and organisations in the Middle East. The selective adoption of their interpretations of hākimiyya and jihad, and the introduction of related concepts such as takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’, reinvigorated DI after Kartosuwiryo’s execution. While the material for this ideological revival largely appeared from foreign sources, the movement’s new intellectual leader, Abdullah Sungkar, with help from his close friend, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, largely applied these ideas in response to growing state repression and the perceived secularisation of Indonesian society. Finally, this dissertation argues the ideology of DI was shaped through participation in conflict. Periods of struggle against the Dutch in the 1940s, the Republican government in the 1950s and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan between 1985 and 1991 led to significant transformations in the beliefs of DI members. Notably, the Afghan conflict cemented the increasingly takfīri outlook of Sungkar’s faction, narrowing their conceptualisation of jihad. These ideological transformations proved to be sufficiently severe leading to a rupture within DI and the formation of JI.
Exploring the links between armed conflict and transnational crime, Florian Weigand builds on in-depth empirical research into some of Southeast Asia’s murkiest borders. The disparate voices of drug traffickers, rebel fighters, government officials and victims of armed conflict are heard in Conflict and Transnational Crime, exploring perspectives that have been previously disregarded in understanding the field. Weigand’s nuanced comparative analysis of four border regions in Southeast Asia counters the stereotypical view that conflict zones are lawless areas in which all kinds of criminal activities flourish. Chapters illustrate the logic that determines the relationship between armed conflict and transnational crime. Further, the book analyses how smuggling economies function in conflict zones, explaining why some rebel groups are involved in the smuggling economy more than others, and why state actors actually play a much more crucial role. This crucial study will be a compelling read for international relations, political sociology and development studies scholars. The in-depth analysis of real-life situations will also greatly benefit policy-makers and aid organisations looking to better support areas at the heart of conflict and transnational crime.
The demise of Leftist political traditions in Indonesia has come to facilitate newer Islamic expressions of socio-political discontent accompanying socio-economic modernisation in localities that used to be dominated by communist and radical nationalist organisations. Because social grievances related to endemic issues like social injustice are increasingly being framed through Islamic cultural references, there will be implications for the workings of Indonesian democracy, premised on secular state institutions. But this does not lead to the sort of post-Islamism associated by Bayat with Iran, where the imperatives of running a modern state and economy once purportedly enabled pluralist social inclinations, albeit within an Islamised polity. Nor does it lead to the generalised ‘Islamisation of radicalism’ envisaged by Roy. Rather, what is witnessed is the substantial, though by no means uncontested, mainstreaming of social grievances through the lexicon of Islamic politics within Indonesian democracy even if there has been no take-over of the state by Islamic forces. The adoption of such framings even in the former bastions of the Indonesian Communist Party, once the third largest in the world, provides important insights into how hegemonic contests have taken place in the Muslim world after the end of the Cold War.
The focus of this article is historiography of rebellion of Unity of the Oppressed (Kesatuan Rakjat jang Tertindas/KRjT) which is led by Ibnu Hadjar on South Kalimantan (1950-1963). In 1950, Ibnu Hadjar’s troops choose desertion from Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) and entered to the forest on the range of Meratus hills, for doing the rebellion to the Government of Indonesia, whereas, 1963 is the time when The KRjT surrendered and Ibnu Hadjar be arrested. The result showed that the emergence of KRjT caused by crystallizing of dissatisfaction and hurt over Jakarta’s policy in treating local ex-guerrillas in the early 1950s. Ibnu Hadjar and his followers felt leisureliness that appear between what they expect in terms of status and material acquisition with what they have or their capacity for got it (relative deprivation).
Right-wing politics in Indonesia is frequently associated with Islamic populist ideas. In part this is because Islamic organisations played a major role in the army-led destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party in the 1960s. Since then Islamic populism has evolved greatly and in post-authoritarian Indonesia it includes manifestations that see no fundamental contradiction between Islam and neo-liberal market economies as well as those that do. Significantly, like their counterparts in other countries, Indonesian Islamic populists maintain vigilance against the purveyors of class-based politics who may exert a divisive influence on the ummah. Thus, Indonesian Islamic populism shares with many of its counterparts a disdain for Leftist challenges to private property and capital accumulation besides political liberalism’s affinity to the secular national state. Yet strands of Islamic populism have relegated the project of establishing a state based on sharia to the background and embraced the democratic process. But this has not translated necessarily into social pluralist positions on a range of issues because the reinforcement of cultural idioms associated with Islam is required for the mobilisation of public support in contests over power and resources based on an ummah-based political identity.
This article examines the changing nature of organized violence in post–New Order Indonesia. The New Order regime, which ended with the overthrow of Suharto in 1998, employed violence as a central strategy for maintaining political control, both through the state apparatus and via state proxies: criminal and paramilitary groups acting in the state's behalf. In effect, violence and criminality were normalized as state practice. The collapse of the New Order and the resulting fragmentation of its patronage networks have prompted a decline in state-sponsored violence, but at the same time the number of non-state groups employing violence and intimidation as a political, social, and economic strategy has increased. This article looks at this phenomenon of the “democratization” and privatization of organized violence in post–New Order Indonesia via detailed case studies of a number of paramilitary and vigilante groups. While operating in a manner similar to organized crime gangs, each group articulates an ideology that legitimizes the use of force via appeals to ethnicity, class, and religious affiliation. Violence is also justified as an act of necessary rectification rather than direct opposition, in a situation where the state is considered to have failed in providing fundamentals such as security, justice, and employment.
Fred Halliday was one of the most important scholars of his generation. This article examines Halliday’s intellectual influences, assesses his contribution to International Relations (IR) and probes the broader challenges which his work raises. Halliday had a direct impact on IR through his interventions in historical sociology, revolutions and gender studies, and through his capacity to intertwine analytical, normative and political registers. More indirectly, Halliday promoted a form of critical, engaged scholarship which stands as a model for the idea of academic life as a vocation. As such, his example has much to offer current students and scholars of IR.
The emergence of violent Muslim vigilante groups employing
a jihadist discourse and mobilizing followers for jihad in
regions where there have been inter-religious conflicts, such
as the Moluccas or the Poso district in Central Sulawesi, is
one of the most conspicuous new phenomena in
contemporary Indonesian Islam. During the twenty-month
presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, such groups often gained
control of the streets, and the army and police appeared
unable, or unwilling, to contain them. Against the president’s
express orders, groups of jihad fighters could leave the island
of Java for the Moluccas without being checked by police or
army; upon arrival in the Moluccas they were even given
modern weapons by certain military officers sympathetic to
their cause.
Long before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, awakened the United States and the Western world to the heightened level of the terrorist threat, Southeast Asia had been dealing with this threat. The bombing in Bali that killed 202 people, many of them Australian tourists, was by no means the region's first experience with Islamic extremism, which can be traced back to the 1940s, and the Darul Islam struggle. The most recent group to emerge is Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah (AJAI), the most potent Islamic terrorist organization to date in the region and the group behind the Bali bombing. Understanding the process of Talibanization in Southeast Asia, which was once an oasis of moderate Islam in the modern world, is a key to unraveling the mystery of the increased radicalization in the region.
Essentially, this involved the establishment of a political system that was more Islamic in character, either nationally or within a specific territory of a national state. This book analyzes the increasing Talibanization of Southeast Asia, a relatively new phenomenon that involves the adoption of Islamist doctrines, ideologies, and values that are largely militant in character, and that for some groups includes the adoption of violence to achieve their goals.
This has succeeded in posing one of the most serious security challenges to the region since the end of the Cold War. Jihadists are operating in small and localized cells even though the broad goals remain the same, namely, to spread sharia, establish an Islamic state, and bring down secular regimes. As most governments do not have the credibility or the expertise to diminish the threat posed by Islamist extremism, Wahhabism, and Salafism, Southeast Asia is in danger of being Talibanized in the near future.
Inside Al Qaeda examines the leadership, ideology, structure, strategies, and tactics of the most violent politico-religious organization the world has ever seen. The definitive work on Al Qaeda, this book is based on five years of research, including extensive interviews with its members; field research in Al Qaeda-supported conflict zones in Central, South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East; and monitoring Al Qaeda infiltration of diaspora and migrant communities in North America and Europe.
Although founded in 1988, Al Qaeda merged with and still works with several other extremist groups. Hence Al Qaeda rank and file draw on nearly three decades of terrorist expertise. Moreover, it inherited a full-fledged training and operational infrastructure funded by the United States, European, Saudi Arabian and other governments for use in the anti-Soviet Jihad.
This book sheds light on Al Qaeda's financial infrastructure and how they train combat soldiers and vanguard fighters for multiple guerrilla, terrorist and semi-conventional campaigns in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caucuses, and the Balkans. In addition, the author covers the clandestine Al Qaeda operational network in the West.
Gunaratna reveals:
how Osama bin Laden had his mentor and Al Qaeda founder, "Azzam", assassinated in order to take over the organization and that other Al Qaeda officers who stood in his way were murdered,
Al Qaeda's long-range, deep-penetration agent handling system in Western Europe and North America for setting up safe houses, procuring weapons, and conducting operations,
how the O55 Brigade, Al Qaeda's guerrilla organization, integrated into the Taliban,
how the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui forced Al Qaeda to move forward on September 11,
how a plan to destroy British Parliament on 9/11 and to use nerve gas on the European Union Parliament were thwarted,
how the Iran--Hezbollah--Al Qaeda link provided the knowledge to conduct coordinated, simultaneous attacks on multiple targets, including failed plans to destroy Los Angeles International Airport, the USS Sullivan, the Radisson Hotel in Jordan, and eleven US commercial airliners over the Pacific ocean,
that one-fifth of international Islamic charities and NGOs are infiltrated by Al Qaeda,
how the US response is effective militarily in the short term, but insufficient to counter Al Qaeda's ideology in the long-term.
Finally, to destroy Al Qaeda, Gunaratna shows there needs to be a multipronged, multiagency, and multidimensional response by the international community.
With deep interest I have followed the Indonesian people's fight for freedom and independence from 1945 onwards. This interest has come to be centred in particular on the question of how religions, especially Islam, were involved in this struggle, and what role they would fulfil in the new Indonesia. After having lived and worked in Indonesia from 1946 to the end of 1959, I was twice more enabled to yisit I ndonesia thanks to grants from the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO). It was during these sojourns in particular, from May to October 1966 and from February to July 1969, that the material for this study was collected, supplemented and checked. For the help I received during these visits I am greatly indebted to so many Indonesian informants that it is impossible to mention them all. Moreover, some of them would not appreciate being singled out by name. But while offering them these general thanks I am thinking of them all individually. In spite of all the help given and patience shown me, this publication is bound to be full of shortcomings. An older Muslim friend, however, once encouraged me by reminding me that perfection belongs only to God (al-kamal li'llah). Nevertheless, I should like to offer my apologies for errors and mistakes; I would appreciate it if readers drew my attention to them.
Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia presents a penetrating new investigation of religious radicalism in the largest Muslim country in the world. Indonesia is a country long known for its diversity and tolerant brand of Islam. However, since the fall of Suharto, a more intolerant form of Islam has been growing, one whose adherents have carried out terrorist attacks, waged sectarian war, and voiced strident anti-Western rhetoric. Zachary Abuza's unique analysis of radical Islam draws upon primary documents such as Jemaah Islamiyah's operations manual, interviews, and recorded testimonies of politicians, religious figures, and known militants, as well as personal interviews with numerous security and intelligence experts in Indonesia and elsewhere, to paint a picture at once guardedly optimistic about the future of Indonesian democracy and concerned about the increasing role of conservative and radical Islam in Indonesian society. This book will be of great interest to students of Indonesian politics, Asian studies, political violence and security studies in general.
In October 2002 a bomb blast in a Balinese nightclub killed more than two hundred people, many of them young Australian tourists. This event and subsequent attacks on foreign targets in Bali and Jakarta in 2003, 2004, and 2005 brought Indonesia into the global media spotlight as a site of Islamist terrorist violence. Yet the complexities of political and religious struggles in Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country in the world, remain little known and poorly understood in the West. In Riots, Pogroms, Jihad, John T. Sidel situates these terrorist bombings and other “jihadist” activities in Indonesia against the backdrop of earlier episodes of religious violence in the country, including religious riots in provincial towns and cities in 1995-1997, the May 1998 riots in Jakarta, and interreligious pogroms in 1999-2001. Sidel's close account of these episodes of religious violence in Indonesia draws on a wide range of documentary, ethnographic, and journalistic materials. Sidel chronicles these episodes of violence and explains the overall pattern of change in religious violence over a ten-year period in terms of the broader discursive, political, and sociological contexts in which they unfolded. Successive shifts in the incidence of violence-its forms, locations, targets, perpetrators, mobilizational processes, and outcomes-correspond, Sidel suggests, to related shifts in the very structures of religious authority and identity in Indonesia during this period. He interprets the most recent “jihadist” violence as a reflection of the post-1998 decline of Islam as a banner for unifying and mobilizing Muslims in Indonesian politics and society. Sidel concludes this book by reflecting on the broader implications of the pattern observed in Indonesia both for understanding Islamic terrorism in particular and for analyzing religious violence in all its varieties.
A testament to the relevance of historical research in understanding contemporary politics, Islam and the Making of the Nation guides the reader through the contingencies of the past that have led to the transformation of a nationalist leader into a 'separatist rebel' and a 'martyr', while at the same time shaping the public perception of political Islam and strengthening the position of the Pancasila in contemporary Indonesia.
Are political parties the weak link in Indonesia’s young democracy? More pointedly, do they form a giant cartel to suck patronage resources from the state? Indonesian commentators almost invariably brand the country’s parties as corrupt, self-absorbed, and elitist, while most scholars argue that they are poorly institutionalized. This book tests such assertions by providing unprecedented and fine-grained analysis of the inner workings of Indonesian parties, and by comparing them to their equivalents in other new democracies around the world. Contrary to much of the existing scholarship, the book finds that Indonesian parties are reasonably well institutionalized if compared to their counterparts in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and other parts of Asia. There is also little evidence that Indonesian parties are cartelized. But there is a significant flaw in the design of Indonesia’s party system: While most new democracies provide state funding to parties, Indonesia has opted to deny central party boards any meaningful subsidies. As a result, Indonesian parties face severe difficulties in financing their operations, leading them to launch predatory attacks on state resources and making them vulnerable to manipulation by oligarchic interests.
For centuries, oligarchs were viewed as empowered by wealth, an idea muddled by elite theory early in the twentieth century. The common thread for oligarchs across history is that wealth defines them, empowers them and inherently exposes them to threats. The existential motive of all oligarchs is wealth defense. How they respond varies with the threats they confront, including how directly involved they are in supplying the coercion underlying all property claims and whether they act separately or collectively. These variations yield four types of oligarchy: Warring, ruling, sultanistic and civil. Moreover, the rule of law problem in many societies is a matter of taming oligarchs. Cases studied in this book include the United States, ancient Athens and Rome, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, medieval Venice and Siena, mafia commissions in the United States and Italy, feuding Appalachian families and early chiefs cum oligarchs dating from 2300 BCE.
This book contains a collection of papers on various aspects of Indonesia's economic and its industrial development. It discusses the early independence period in the 1950s; the Soeharto era (1966-1998); and the ensuing two economic crises, namely the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/98 and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. © 2012 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. All rights reserved.
This article addresses the inability of Indonesia’s Islamic parties to launch a serious challenge for control over state power through insights obtained via comparisons with the Turkish case. By juxtaposing Indonesia’s PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Justice and Prosperity Party) and Turkey’s AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party), in particular, it offers a political economy-oriented understanding of the limited achievements of Islamic party politics in Indonesia. The analysis places Islamic party politics in Indonesia and Turkey in the context of social-structural changes associated with capitalist development. It argues that, unlike the AKP, the PKS remains predominantly identified with an urban middle-class constituency rather than a cross-class alliance waging struggles under the Islamic banner.
It is argued in this study that the trajectory of Islamic politics in Indonesia has been shaped within larger processes of state formation and socio-economic and political changes associated with the advance of the market economy and the pressures of globalisation. It incorporates the Indonesian case into a vast and well-developed debate that has hitherto focused on North Africa and the Middle East. As such it offers a distinct interpretation that goes beyond the prevailing understanding of Islamic politics in Indonesia as the product of conflicts over ideas, doctrine or culture or the institutional requisites of authoritarianism or democracy. Specifically, it is proposed that Islamic politics has been underpinned variously by the conservatism of small propertied interests, the populism of marginalised urban and small town middle classes and the ambitions of the upper middle classes and business. While these dynamics are found across much of the Muslim world, the political outcomes have been diverse. We show that the Indonesian trajectory has been greatly influenced by the failure of Islamic politics to establish effective cross-class alliances behind the banners of Islam and the ability of the secular state to effectively establish its own apparatus of populist politics.
The article traces the trajectories of Islamic politics in Indonesia and Malaysia in relation to the changing political economy of these two countries. The approach adopted is to understand Islamic politics less on the basis of Islamic doctrine, or conflicts over its interpretation, than in connection with the changing social bases of politics, the context established by capitalist economic transformations, the evolution of the post-colonial state from the Cold War and its aftermath, and of crises of political economy in the 1980s and 1990s. The exercise reveals important convergences and divergences in trajectories that help to explain the complex historical processes which have shaped Islamic politics in these two cases and possibly beyond. It also reveals the entanglement of Islamic politics in very profane conflicts over power and tangible economic resources over time. In both countries a new form of Islamic populism has emerged as a major articulator of grievances against the secular state and perceived social injustices. However, the same historical processes have enabled the social agents of Islamic politics in Malaysia to contest state power more effectively than their counterparts in Indonesia.
Over recent decades, Islamismhas become a powerful force throughout much of the Muslim world. Through a discussion of the Egyptian case, this essay shows how the rise of Islamism can be illuminated by findings of the literatures on revolution and civil society, and vice versa. As many leading theories on revolutions would predict, the necessary precondition for Islamism's rise has been the declining efficacy and legitimacy of the state. Yet what has occurred in Egypt (and other parts of the Arab world) is not a successful revolution but a peculiar stalemate in which the existing regime retains political power while ceding substantial control over the societal and cultural spheres to the revolutionary challenger—an outcome that the literature does not envision. This stalemate, in turn, is largely a consequence of Islamists' ability to expand their presence in civil society. This expansion in Egypt and other Arab countries over recent decades is thus best understood as a sign not of benign liberalization, but rather of profound political failure, and as an incubator for illiberal radicalism.
This book is about how the design of institutional change results in unintended consequences. Many post-authoritarian societies have adopted decentralizationâeffectively localizing powerâas part and parcel of democratization, but also in their efforts to entrench "good governance." Vedi Hadiz shifts the attention to the accompanying tensions and contradictions that define the terms under which the localization of power actually takes place. In the process, he develops a compelling analysis that ties social and institutional change to the outcomes of social conflict in local arenas of power. Using the case of Indonesia, and comparing it with Thailand and the Philippines, Hadiz seeks to understand the seeming puzzle of how local predatory systems of power remain resilient in the face of international and domestic pressures. Forcefully persuasive and characteristically passionate, Hadiz challenges readers while arguing convincingly that local power and politics still matter greatly in our globalized world.
Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, Pengakuan Mantan Ketua JI
- Nasir Abas
Perpecahan dan Integrasi: Perkembangan Darul Islam di Indonesia dan Jaringannya di Asia Tenggara
- Al Chaidar
Introduction.” In The Princeton Encylopedia of Islamic Thought
- Gerard Bowering
Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia: An Anthropological Analysis of Darul Islam, Jamaah Islamiyah, and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid
- Al Chaidar
Darul Islam dan KartosuwirjoAngan-angan yang Gagal”. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan
- Dengel
- H Holk
The End of Innocence? Indonesian Islam and the Temptations of Radicalism
- Andrée Feillard
- Rémy Madinier
Ali Imron Sang Pengembom Bali 12 Oktober Kesadaran dan Ungkapan Penyesalan
- Ali Imron
Pengantar Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia
- Al Chaidar
Poso’s Jihadist Network
- Sidney Jones