(PDF) The Arab Transformations Report on Political, Economic and Social Attitudes, 2014: Iraq

The Arab Transformations Report on

Political, Economic and Social Attitudes,

2014: Iraq

IRAQ

The project received funding

from the European Union’s

Seventh Framework Programme

under grant agreement no

#320214 !

ALGERIA

MOROCCO

LIBYA

TUNISIA

EGYPT

IRAQ

JORDAN

Giving Voice

to the Economic, Social and Political Attitudes

and Behaviour of People Living in Iraq!

•Stratiﬁed nation-nationwide probability survey of adults aged 18 or over

•The survey was carried out in May and June of 2014

•Interviews carried out in respondents’ homes by trained researchers

•Respondents interviewed in local Arabic dialect

•Achieved sample: 1613 respondents

•Ethical approval from the University of Aberdeen

!

1

About this Report

In this report we, the respondents to the Arab Trans survey in Iraq, are going to tell you how we

felt about our lives and our country in 2014, around three years after the uprisings and protests

that spread across the Arab world in 2011. On some issues we have different opinions

according to where we live, age, gender, education, religious denomination and/or economic

circumstances. We will tell you about some of the most important differences between us but

we cannot go into detail about all of them. We will also tell you where you might have expected

there to be noticeable differences but there are not.

Who We Are

Three quarters live in urban areas. Just under half of the

respondents are female.

Most of the respondents are under 45 years and only seven per cent are

60 plus years.!

2

Population by Urban/Rural

Location and Gender

52%

48%

Rural 25%

Urban 75%

Age (%)

6.7

17.8

38.4

37.1

18-30 31-45 46-59 60 or over

Iraq’s provinces are usually grouped into three regions of unequal population sizes; the central

region is the largest.

About a third of us have little or no education; at the

other extreme, about 10 per cent have been through

higher education.

Men are more likely to be educated than women and the level of education archived declines

with age; more so for women than men.

3

Region, Percentage of Population Total in Each Region

33%

43.2%

23.8%

North Central South

Elementary

or none

Basic

Secondary

Higher

35.8%

26.4%

27.3%

10.5%

Education

Level of Education for Men, by Age (%)

None/Elementary

Basic

Secondary

Higher

12.9

17.1

20.0

50.0

12.9

32.1

18.6

36.4

12.3

31.2

30.5

26.0

14.7

35.9

27.8

21.6

18-30 31-45 46-59 60+

About half think their household income is at least adequate, though only eight per cent would

describe it as comfortable. For the other half what is coming in does not meet basic needs, and

eight per cent are really struggling.

The Northern region is the most afﬂuent on the whole (with 57% whose income is ‘comfortable’

or ‘adequate’), and the Central is the poorest (46%), but the difference between them is very

small.

4

Level of Education for Women, by Age (%)

None/Elementary

Basic

Secondary

Higher

5.9

8.8

5.9

79.4

4.3

12.9

17.1

65.7

8.4

19.2

24.7

47.7

7.8

31.2

34.6

26.4

18-30 31-45 46-59 60+

Struggling

Inadequate

Adequate

Comfortable

7.8%

41.5%

42.5%

8.2%

Household

Income

Household Income, by Region

South

Central

North

7.3%

9.1%

7.6%

35.6%

45.2%

43.6%

48.7%

36.1%

43.6%

8.4%

9.5%

5.1%

Comfortable Adequate Inadequate Struggling

Men, particularly married men, are much more likely than married women to be a registered

home owner; the majority of non-married (single, widowed, divorced) men and women live with

another relative that is the owner of the house.

Ninety-ﬁve per cent of married women living in accommodation owned by one or both of the

martial partners does not have her name on the registration certiﬁcate; 97 per cent of men living

in the same circumstances do. This makes married women dependent on their husbands and

severely disadvantages them in case of divorce.

5

Housing

Situation

13%

38%

22%

27%

Registered Owner

Spouse Registered Owner

Another Member of the Family is the Registered Owner

Rent

A majority live in owner-occupied accommodation, with just over a

quarter being the registered owner, just under a quarter the spouse

of the registered owner and nearly 40 per cent living with a relative

that is the registered owner. Only just over 10 per cent live in rented

accommodation.

Housing Situation by Gender Controlling for Marital

Status (%)

Registered as

an Owner

Spouse Registered

as Only Owner

Another Member of

Household is the

Registered Owner

Rent

15.3

74.6

10.2

9.8

86

4.3

15.8

17.9

63

3.4

11.8

21.3

2.3

64.6

Married Man Married Woman

Not Married Men Not Married Women

Nationally, Shi’ite Muslims form a narrow majority of the

population.

A majority of those living in the Northern region are Sunni and

a majority of those living in the Southern region are Shi’ite, with

an equal proportion of Shi’a and Sunni living in the Central

Region. A majority of those living in the Northern region are

Kurds, and a majority of those living in the Central and

Southern regions are Arab, but we do not know the exact

proportion of Kurds; the Arab Transitions Survey did not ask

about Kurdish or other ethnicity, but the Third Wave of the

Arab Barometer suggests that about 16 per cent of the

population are Kurdish but does not identify where in the

country they live.

6

Ownership Status of Married Men and Women Living in

Accommodation That They and/or Their Spouse is a

Registered Owner of

Registered as an

Owner of the House

Spouse Registered as

Sole Owner of the House

94.9

5.1

3.4

96.6

Married Man

Married Woman

Religious

Denomination

Shi’a

54.9%

Sunni

45.1%

Sunni Shi’a

Religious Denomination, by Region

South

Central

North

98.2%

49.5%

1.5%

1.8%

50.5%

98.5%

Shi’a Sunni

Half of us think of ourselves as Iraqi, a quarter identify with the wider Muslim community, and

just over a tenth identify themselves as ‘Arabs’.

Region makes a difference. The main dividing line in Iraq has been said to be religious

denomination, but there is evidence that Region makes a difference, at least with respect to

identity – the self-assigned identities of Shi’ites living in the Central and Southern Regions are

similar but not identical. Central Sunni are very different from Northern Sunni (but still clearly

different from Central Shi’ites), while the Shi’ites are similar in the two regions.

7

Iraqi

Arab

Muslim

By region

By local community

Other

0.1%

5.2%

6.4%

24.7%

12.7%

50.9%

Preference for Self Identify

Most Closely Identify Self with

Northern Sunni

Central Sunni

Central Shi'ite

Southern Shi'ite

4.6%

1.8%

1.9%

11.6%

2.9%

1.8%

1.9%

18.5%

23.6%

18.2%

18.8%

42.5%

6.6%

6.8%

25.2%

15.3%

62.3%

71.3%

52.2%

12.1%

Country Arab

Muslim Region

Local Community

Involvement in the

Arab Uprisings

About 16 per cent of us supported the Arab Uprisings. Just

under three per cent supported protests actively by taking

part in demonstrations and the remainder passively.

Having said this, it is important to note that, unlike

for countries like Tunisia and Egypt, political

mobilisation and protest had been taking place on a

greater scale well before 2010-2011 as a

consequence of the US presence after the 2003 invasion and

the country’s highly fractious politics.

The names people give to the Uprising indicated that the protests were viewed positively by

about 60 per cent of respondents (Arab Spring, Democratic Spring, Arab Uprising, Revolution)

but negatively in 31 per cent of cases (Arab Destruction, Conspiracy Against Arabs, Civil War).!

8

Support for the Arab Uprisings (%)

83

14.2

2.7

Support: active Support: passive Did not support

Arab Spring

Arab Uprising

Revolution

Democratic Spring

Civil War

Arab Destruction

Conspiracy against Arabs

Don't know

8.7%

11%

15.4%

4.5%

4%

11.1%

15.7%

28.9%

Name Given to

the Arab Uprising

Those most frequently mentioned as the main actors are young activists (40%), and

spontaneous popular demonstrations (38%), but 29 per cent name Islamist movements and a

ﬁfth speak of NGOs and/or of foreign actors.

Age makes something of a difference to whether we supported the Uprisings.

Region makes a difference to whether we actually participated: the Central Region was

substantially less active in this respect. (This is clearly Region and not Religion, given that the

Central Region is the one that contains both denominations in equal proportions.)

9

Foreign Actors

Young Activists

NGOs

Islamist Movements

Members of Civil Society

Elite/State Institutions

Spontaneous

Popular Demonstrations

Don't Know

10.7%

37.9%

12.1%

14.3%

28.9%

21.9%

40%

20.9%

Main Actors That Participated in the Arab Spring,

Percentage Mentioned (2 Answers Allowed)

18-30 years

31-45 years

46-59 years

60+ years

10.4%

10%

16.6%

18.9%

Support for the Arab Uprisings, by Age

The main reasons for participation in the Uprisings were to protest against corruption (50%) or

to demand improved basic services (43%), with economic problems as third reason (30%).

More political reasons were selected less often by respondents; demanding political freedom

was chosen by 25 per cent and opposition to authoritarian leadership by 23 per cent. If we add

these two groups together, however, we get 45 per cent who selected one or both, second

only to corruption as a reason; the two groups do not overlap much.

Where you live – in which of the three regions – appears to be related to what answers you give

to this question but so does religious denomination – Sunni or Shi’a. However, these two

explanatory variables are confounded: the Northern region is virtually all Sunni and the Southern

Region is virtually all Shi’a, so we cannot tell the two explanations apart if we look just at these

two regions. The third region, however, is split equally between the two denominations, so if we

look at its Sunni and Shi’a populations separately we may be able to draw more useful

conclusions (though the argument is slightly clouded by distinctions between Kurds and Arabs).

Looking at the distributions, corruption and political issues would seem to rank higher with the

Sunni than the Shi’a; while the Sunni response in the Central Region is a good bit lower than in

10

South

Central

North

4.9%

1.9%

3.7%

Participated in the Arab Uprisings, by Region

Economic problems

Protest against Corruption

Demand Improved Basic Services

Demand More Political Freedom

Oppose Authoritarian Leaders

Promote Foreign Interests

Other

2.4%

14.7%

22.9%

25.1%

43.4%

50.4%

29.8%

Main Reasons People Participated in the Arab Uprisings,

Percentage Mentioned (2 Answers Allowed)

Northern Region and more commensurate with the Shi’a response there, it is higher, and the

Sunni Central response is higher than the Sunni Northern response as regards the political

issues. In terms of the demand for improved services, the two Sunni responses are lower than

the two Shi’ite ones, but Southern Region’s response is particularly high and Northern Region’s

is particularly low. The interpretation is not clear-cut, but we are inclined to see Religion as what

makes a difference as regards corruption and the political issues (while noting the strength of

the Northern Region’s ‘corruption’ response) but to see the services issue as more closely

related to Region. (You will remember that the Northern Region is the most afﬂuent, though not

by a great deal.) Economic issues appear on the whole to be nation-wide when analysed in this

way.

A majority think that the uprisings are a genuine revolution of the people against the regime.

However almost a quarter think it was a conspiracy, out of which most think Israel is to blame.

11

Main Reasons Why People Participated in the Arab

Spring, by Region and Religious Denomination,

Percentage Mentioned (2 Answers Allowed)

Protest against

Corruption

Demand Improved

Basic Services

Political issues

(freedom,

authoritarianism)

Economic issues

30.3

35.1

61.8

43.8

32.3

39.6

44.7

46.8

26.4

58.1

37.9

51.2

29.7

53.7

22.7

63.1

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shi'ite Central

Shi'ite South

16.5%

59.7%

23.8%

Conspiracy from outside Revolution against the regime Don't know/RA

What the Arab Uprisings Are

Only 15 per cent of us think that our country has beneﬁtted as a result of the Arab Uprisings,

but half think that Egypt did and a third Libya.

12

All Arab countries

Qatar

European countries

Turkey

Britain

Iran

Saudi Arabia

Israel

75.20%

12.60%

5.40%

1.40%

1.10%

0.40%

1.80%

2.20%

Who Was Responsible for the

Conspiracy (Percentage out of

Those Who Think It Was a

Conspiracy)

Syria

Morocco

Libya

Jordan

Iraq

Egypt

49.3%

14.7%

8.8%

34%

7.4%

13.6%

Countries for Which Arab

Uprisings Have Been Positive

Key Events Since the Start of

the Arab Uprisings in 2010

2010 January

Controversy as candidates with alleged links to Ba'ath Party banned from

standing in the March parliamentary elections. A court lifts the ban.

2010 March

Parliamentary elections. Nine months’ delay before a new government is

formed.

2010 October

Church in Baghdad sized by militants and more than 50 people killed.

2010 November/

December

Parliament reconvenes after long delay, re-appoints Jalal Talabani as

president and Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister. A new government

includes all major factions.

January 2011

Radical Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr returns after four years of self-

imposed exile.

2011 January

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki attempts to broaden his authority by

pressuring the Supreme Court to issue a ruling placing several

independent institutions under his control.

2011 February-

March

A series of demonstrations and riots against the Kurdistan Regional

Government and the two main Kurdish parties, KDP and PUK, starts in

Sulaymaniyah, Northern Iraq, heartland of opposition Change Movement

2011 February

Frustration erupts over corruption six people killed in Mosul and Hawija in

clashes with security services.

2011 March

Anti-government demonstrations held across Iraq, despite tight security

and bans on driving.

2011 August

Violence escalates with more than 40 apparently co-ordinated nationwide

attacks in one day.

2011 September

Hadi al-Mahdi, journalist and activist, is assassinated.

2011 September

Gunmen, presumed to be Sunni extremists, stop a bus carrying Shiʿite

pilgrims near Al-Nukhayb and killed 22 men aboard.

2011 September

Judge Rahim al-Ugaili, head of the integrity commission, is forced to

resign.

2011 December

Sermons spark riots and extremists attack non-Muslim population in

Dohuk in Iraqi Kurdistan.

2011 December

Barack Obama declares Iraq war a success. Last remaining U.S. troops

leave Iraq on December 18.

2011 December

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issued an arrest warrant for Tariq al-Hashimi,

the Sunni vice president. Sunni bloc boycotts parliament and cabinet.

13

2012

Bomb and gun attacks target Shi’a areas throughout the year sparking

fears of a sectarian conﬂict – nearly 200 killed in January, more than 160 in

June, 113 in July, 70 in August and at least 35 in November.

2012 April

The Federal Supreme Court issues a ruling stating that parliament can only

question ministers if there is clear legal evidence of criminal wrong doing.

2012 April/May

Oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan are halted amid a row with Central

government over contracts with foreign ﬁrms. The region says it expects

to start exporting oil via a new pipeline to the Turkish border in 2013.

2012 May

Maliki visits Kirkuk declaring that the city has an Iraqi identity sparking

Kurdish protests.

2012 December

Iraq’s economic situation improves with an increase in revenue from oil

exports.

2013 January

Mass demonstrations against the Shiʿite-led government of Prime Minister

Nouri al-Maliki started in Al-Anbar and then spread to other Sunni

provinces.

2013April

The Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda announces its merger with al-Qaeda in Syria

to form a new group, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The

porosity of the Iraq-Syria border allows ﬁghters to move freely. ISIL

operations concentrated most heavily in the Sunni-dominated provinces

and the Shiʿite areas of Baghdad.

2013 April

Iraqi antiriot forces raid a protest encampment in al-Hawija, a town south

of Kirkuk. More than more than 40 protesters killed further strengthening

anti-government anger among Sunnis.

2013 April-June

Amid severe political and sectarian tension, governorate elections held and

demonstrate a setback for Maliki’s State of Law. ISCI and Sarists entered

coalition with Sunni parties and formed provincial governments in

Baghdad and Basra.

2013 July

ISIL stages a daring attack on the Abu Ghraib prison; several hundred

inmates escape.

2013 September

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), holds elections for its regional

parliament. The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) wins 38 seats, the

opposition Goran 24, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 18.

2013 October

900 people killed in sectarian violence.

2013 December

Following killing of Army General Mohammed al-Karawi Maliki initiated a

military campaign against ISI in Anbar called ‘Revenge of Commander

Mohammed’.

2013 December

At least 35 people killed in twin bombing of Baghdad churches on

Christmas day.

By end of the year UN estimates 7, 157 civilians had been killed in 2013.

14

Time–Line: Key Events Relating to the self-styled “Islamic State”

2014 January

ISIL takes Al-Fallujah, Al-Ramadi, and several cities in the Sunni-

dominated province of Al-Anbar.

2014 March

The Iraqi government under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki blocks the

transfer of revenues to the Kurdish authorities, leaving regional leaders

unable to pay the salaries of ofﬁcials.

2014 April

General elections for the Council of Representatives. Maliki’s party wins

the highest number of seats, but falls short of an outright majority. Maliki

begins negotiations with other parties to form a governing coalition.

2014 June

ISIL occupies Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, and Tikrit, and declares a

caliphate in the territory that it controls with the group’s leader, Abu Bakr

al-Baghdadi, as the caliph. Kurdish Peshmerga forces capture Kirkuk - the

oil-rich city outside the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan that Iraqi Kurds have

long regarded as their capital.

2004

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi establishes al-Qaeda in Iraq

2006 June

Establishment of Islamic State in Iraq with Abu Omar al Baghdadi as its

leader.

2007

ISI driven from Baghdad into Diyala, Salahudeen and Mosul.

2008

ISI membership strongly declines and ﬂow of foreign ﬁghters to Iraq

decreases from about 120 a month to ﬁve or six by year end.

2009

PM Maliki targets Sunni leaders, increasing sectarian tensions. Support

for ISI begins to increase in Sunni tribal areas and ISI claims responsibility

for suicide attacks in Baghdad.

July 2012 -

July 2013

ISI launches ‘Breaking the Walls’ campaign. Carries out 24 bombings

and eight prison breaks.

2013 March

ISI merges with Nusra Front in Syria to form the Islamic State in Iraq and

Syria.

2013 July

Launches the Soldier’s Harvest campaign to weaken Iraqi security

forces.

2013 December

Takes control of Fallujah and parts of Ramadi.

2014 June

10th Takes Mosul and kill at least 600 Shiʿite prisoners from Badoush

prison during the attack.

11th Takes Tikrit.

12th Iraqi forces supported by Iran regain control of most of Tikrit.

18th Iraq asks US to conduct airstrikes against ISIS.

29th Announces establishment of a caliphate and rebrands itself as the

Islamic State.

15

Information about Iraq

Introduction

Iraq is located in North Africa, mid-way between the Atlantic Ocean and the Nile Delta, with

Algeria to the West, Libya to the South East and the Mediterranean Sea to the North and East.

The country is dominated by the Atlas Mountains to the North and the Sahara Desert in the

South. It is in what was ancient Mesopotamia and occupies the Eastern wing of the Fertile

Crescent, the relatively fertile area of land in the otherwise arid region of the Middle East and

North Africa. Over three quarters of the Iraqi population lives in urban areas, mostly in Baghdad,

Basra, Mosul, and Erbil.!Baghdad, a major metropolis, and the capital, is the political,

economic, and communications hub of Iraq. Close to a third of the total population of Iraq live

in Baghdad. Towns, hamlets and villages comprise habitat of the remainder of the population,

with most dependent on agriculture for their survival.

Iraq is made up of three distinct communities that have their own identity: the Kurds in Northern

Iraq, who are Sunni Muslim, Arab Sunni Muslims that live mainly in the Central region and Arab

Shiʿite Muslims who live mainly in the Central and Southern regions. According to the Pew

Research Centre the best estimate is that Shi’a Arab Muslims make up just over 50 per cent of

the population and the ArabBarometer III records 17 per cent of the population as Kurds. This

suggests that about 32 per cent of the population are Sunni Arab Muslims. Under the Ba’ath

Party that ruled from 1968 to 2003 the state was secular and dominated by Sunni Arab

Muslims. After Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979 any sign of protest by Shi’i was heavily

repressed. Furthermore, the period of high economic growth enjoyed since the early 1960s

came to an end; the economy declined during the Iraq-Iran war and then declined further

following the cessation of war due to the UN imposed economic sanctions.

There is a lack of social cohesion and inclusion in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein and a

weakening of a sense of Iraqi identity with the emergence of three distinct communities, Sunni,

Shi’a and Kurds. The Sunni Arabs feel excluded and alienated in a Shi’a-dominated state. In

the past the division between Sunni and Shi’ite was driven by political, theological and doctrinal

issues, but in post-2003 Iraqi it has become driven by competition for power, resources and

status. In Saddam Hussein’s Iraq Sunni Arabs dominated the state but they did not have an

identity as Sunni; rather, they saw themselves as nation-building within a secular state. The

dangers foreseen were foreign invasion, Kurdish nationalism and Shi’a Islamists. Since the

overthrow of Saddam’s Baathist regime in 2003, state building has been Shi’a-centric and

sectarian and an Arab Sunni identity has been strengthened in opposition to this, blurring the

distinction between rejection of the Shi’a political project and outright anti-Shi’ism. The tensions

between Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs and Kurds has expressed itself in demands for community

representation rather than inclusive state building. Shi’a dissent has been kept in check by the

dominance of the Shi’a state. Sunni Arabs who already felt marginalised and victimised have

retreated even further into sectarian identity politics following the 2010 election, when despite

losing the vote, Maliki retained power and continued to promote Shi’a dominance. This has

reinvigorated militant networks and there has been increasing conﬂict added by the spiralling

sectarian-coded violence in Syria. In the summer of 2014 while the survey was being carried

out the self-styled “Islamic State” took control of Mosul, Tikrit, Tal Afar and Al Qalm and

16

declared an Islamic Caliphate - an extreme expression of the dynamic between Shi’a centric

state building and Sunni rejection. The Kurds, meanwhile, have continued to argue for more

autonomy/independence, although in response to the rise of the self-styled “Islamic State” they

have moved to demanding a fairer distribution of oil revenues. Underlying the structural

tensions is a discontent with the failure of the government to deliver basic services.

17

Key Socio-Economic Indicators

Population (2014)

34.81 million

GNI per Capita PPP

US$ 15,030

Gini Coeﬃcient

29.54 (2012)

Poverty Head Count–National Poverty Line (2014)

14.40% (2010)

Unemployment (World Bank 2014)

16.4% (m 14.8%, f 24.1%, youth

(18-24) 34.6%)

Oﬃcial Development Assistance and Oﬃcial Aid (2013)

1.37 billion US$. $39 per capita. 0.6%

of GNI.

Remittance Inﬂows (2013)

0.1% of GDP

Foreign Direct Investment Inﬂows

1.2% of GDP

UNDP Human Development Index 2014

0.654 (equality-adjusted 0.522). Rank

121/188

Life Expectancy at Birth

73.75 years (2012)

Median Age

19.7

Annual Average Population Growth Rate

3.0%

Stock of Immigrants % Population (2013)

0.3% (2010)

Refugees and Asylum-seekers January 2015 UNHCR

288,035 (mid-2015)

Net Migration Rate

3.30 (2015)

Mean Years of School (in population aged 25+)

5.6 (2012)

Overall Level of Statistical Capacity

46.67

Religion

Muslim: roughly, Shi’a 64%, Sunni

35%. Christians 0.8% and there are a

few others.

UNDP Gender Inequality Index

0.539 123rd / 155

World Economic Forum Gender Gap Index

136 out of 155 economies, 0.599

Freedom of the Press (Freedom House)

Rating: 72. Status – not free.

Transparency International Corruption Perception

Index

16 Rank 161st/167

Civil Liberties (Economist Democracy Index 2015)

4,41

Law Based on Shari’a

To a large extent. Civil Code identiﬁes

Shari’a law as a main source of

legislation, but interpretation appears

to be possible – for example, they have

made bigamy very difﬁcult.

Internet Users, % of Population

11.3%

Mobile Phone subscriptions per 100 Population

95

18

The Country’s Economy

Iraq is an upper middle-income country with a GDP of US$224 billion in 2014 (down from US

$232 billion in 2013). It is a rentier economy, dependent on oil revenues to fund the government

budget. There is virtually no taxation of citizens, making it largely independent of them. The

central government runs a corrupt and repressive state which has failed to deliver on the

authoritarian bargain or social contract with citizens of providing security, basic services and a

way for citizens to earn a living. Oil accounts for about 41 per cent of GDP in 2014, 99 per cent

of exports and 93 per cent of federal reserves. Oil reserves are located in the Northern and

Southern regions. Iraq is the 45th largest export country in the world but falls to 162 on the

Complexity Index, with a score of -2.3 which shows a very high concentration of exports.

Nearly 40 per cent of workers are employed in the public sector, with virtually all other workers

split between the informal private sector and self- and unpaid employment. It has one of the

smallest formal private sectors in the world. Public services are of poor quality, and while

progress has been made towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals few of the

country targets are likely to be met.

The economy grew between 2006 and 2013 but fell back in 2014. Since 2008 the GNI per

capita has exceed the average for MENA developing economies, although it has remained

below the average for upper middle income ones.

19

GNI Per Capita (Current US$), 2006-2014

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

3.1

3.7

4.4

4.8

5.5

6.1

6.9

7.5

7.9

2.4

2.8

3.3

3.7

4

4.1

4.5

4.7

2

2.5

3.5

4

4.4

4.8

6.1

6.9

6.5

Iraq

Middle East & North Africa (Developing)

Upper middle income

The economy grew at an annual average rate of 4.6 per cent between 2008 and 2013,

although the year-on-year increase ﬂuctuated from a low of 0.6 in 2009 to a high of 10.6 in

2012. It declined from the high of 2012 to 2.4 in 2013, and the economy fell into recession in

2014 with a negative growth rate of -5.

Following a budget surplus in 2011 and 2012 when the government increased oil production,

Iraq ran a budget deﬁcit in 2013 and 2014.

The country has a relatively high debt stock, despite being given debt relief including a

reduction of debt of 80 per cent by the Paris Club. The external debt stock fell from a high in

2005 to its lowest point in 2013 but rose again in 2014. The country has the 56th largest debt

stock in the world.

20

GDP per Capita Growth (Annual), 2006-2014 (%)

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

7.4

-1.1

5.5

0.6

3.3

4.4

10.6

3.4

-5

Government Budget Deﬁcit, 2006-2014 (%)

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

-2.69

-5.47

4.5

5.46

-3.69

-12.55

-0.98

7.35

10.72

The ratio of Government debt to GDP remains relatively high at 37 per cent in 2014 but down

from 152 per cent in 2006.

Apart from volatile oil prices the major pressure on government revenues is the ongoing

instability in the country, requiring high military spending‑ - the 16th highest out of 142 1

countries for which data are available - and the cost of looking after an estimated 3.3 million

internally displace people.

SIPRI data on military expenditure

1

21

External Debt Stock, Current US$ Billions

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

62.2

120

93.95

125

92.33

81.48

100.9

67.74

73

52.58

50.79

50.26

59.49

Government Debt, Percentage of GDP, 2006-2014

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

37.02

32.1

33.46

39.12

51.03

83.97

72.61

116.1

152

Military Spending by Government as Percentage of GDP

2004-2013

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

1.68

2.24

1.9

2.18

2.66

2.59

3.18

2.8

3.44

4.3

Development assistance has declined sharply since 2006, although it has remained steady for

the last three years. Remittances are low and stable. FDI is relatively low but has shown a small

increase since 2010

Development assistance from the EU and EU/DAC countries shows the same pattern as DA

more generally.

22

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

0.59

1.09

1.41

1.43

1.01

1.12

1.56

2.21

2.14

13.46

10.19

7.13

2.43

1.55

1.03

0.59

0.66

0.61

Development assistance

Remittances

Foreign Direct Investment

Finance for Development,

Percentage of GDP (or GNI for

ODA)

Development Assistance from EU/DAC Countries

and EU Institutions, 2006-2014 , US$ Current

Millions

0

2500

5000

7500

10000

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

EU Institutions

EU DAC

Total

The top bilateral donor in 2013/14 was Japan, followed by the US and EU institutions. The

World Bank, a multilateral donor, was the fourth largest donor. Other EU countries in the top 10

were Germany, Sweden and the UK.

Nearly half of all DA is humanitarian, the rest goes mainly to the productive sector and other

social infrastructure.

The loss of potential tax revenue through illicit ﬁnancial ﬂows is a major issue for many

developing economies. Iraq was ranked as the developing country with the 16th highest

average loss due to illicit ﬁnancial ﬂows between 2004 and 2013 by Global Financial Integrity.

Data is only available for Iraq from 2007 and since then the amount lost each year has varied

from a high of US$21.1 billion in 2010 and a low of 3.6 billion in 2007. In 2013 it stood at US

$15.9 billion or 43 per cent of GDP much the same as received in remittances and only

marginally less than is received in ODA.

23

Norway

Canada

Turkey

UK

Sweden

Germany

Int. Devp. Association

EU Institutions

USA

Japan

544.00

423.00

82.50

68.00

62.50

37.80

37.50

33.40

26.20

23.40

Top 10 Donors 2013-14,

US$ Millions

Allocation of Development Assistance by Sector 2013-14

48%

3%

21%

22%

4%

Education Health Other Social Infrastructure

Economic Infrastructure Production Multi-sector/cross-cutting

Humanitarian Other

The economy is dependent on oil, with an estimated 90 per cent of government revenue and

80 per cent of export revenue coming from the petroleum sector. However, the sector employs

only a small proportion of the labour force and the government does not have the capacity for

effective allocation of the oil revenues it receives. There is widespread corruption in the

petroleum sector and in government departments. Furthermore, oil revenues have been

declining. There is a lack of export diversiﬁcation, with the highest Concentration (Herﬁndahl-

Hirschmann) Index in the MENA region and a chronic employment problem. Nearly 40 per cent

of employment is in the government sector and there is virtually no formal private sector, with

non-government employment being equally distributed between informal private and self-

employment.

There is demographic pressure, although the population growth rate has declined from a high

of 3.1 per cent in 1995 to an estimated 2.2 per cent in 2015. The population is young and there

is a ‘youth bulge’, with about 20 per cent of the population estimated to be aged 14-24 and 37

per cent 0-14 years. This means that there are a large number of young men and women

coming onto the labour market desperate for careers, jobs, marriage and a family. The ofﬁcial

unemployment rate is high, 16.4 per cent, and especially so for young people and those

24

Iraq

Morocco

Egypt

Tunisia

Algeria

Jordan

Libya

1.2

1.5

1.7

4

4.1

10.5

Estimate Loss through Illicit Financial

Flows to Selected MENA Countries by

Global Financial Integrity, Average

Annual Loss 2004-2013 in US$

Billions

Total Unemployment Rate, Youth Unemployment Rate, Female

Unemployment Rate and % of Women in the Labour Force

0

10

20

30

40

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

14

15

26.9

25.9

23.4

23.3

23.2

23.1

22.5

24.1

36.6

35.5

32.3

32.4

32.1

34.6

17.5

16.9

15.3

15.2

15.1

16.4

Total Unemployment % of Labour Force

Youth Unemployment % Total Labour force 15-24 Years

Female Unemployment % Female Labour Force

% Women in the Labour force

women that are economically active; only 15 per cent of women are in the labour force and

men make up 82 per cent of workers. Ofﬁcial unemployment rates are an underestimate of the

total levels of unemployment as disaffected workers either withdraw from the labour market or

engage in poorly paid casual informal sector work. Gallup Poll in 2014 recorded a 22 per cent

unemployment rate, but even this is likely to be an underestimate. Disaffected youth make

ready recruits for militias and disaffected Sunni youth for the so called Islamic State.

Iraq needs to invest in inclusive social development that ensures that all sections of society

beneﬁt from economic growth. Foreign Direct Investment can be an important means by which

developing countries achieve economic growth, but while the oil and gas sector in Iraq provides

opportunities for investors, instability and conﬂict poses risks for them. The oil and gas industry

has suffered from severe underinvestment in the past because of multiple wars, and the

infrastructure was severely damaged during the Gulf War. Since 2010 there has been an

increase in FDI, but the amount remains modest, the increase was from US$ 1.4 billion net to

US$ 4.9 billion net in 2014. Iraq is ranked near the bottom of the World Bank Ease of Doing

Business Index, in 156th place, and it ranks 161 out of 167 countries on Transparency

International Corruption Perception Index. On the Distance to Frontier score, which shows the

absolute distance to the best performing country on each indicator of Ease of Doing Business,

performance can be seen to be very uneven: resolving insolvency, getting credit and trading

across borders all score extreme poorly while the distance to frontier is much lower for paying

taxes, getting electricity and dealing with construction permits. Qualitative research in 2013‑ 2

found that most FDI was in the Kurdistan region (and such investment is in the oil industry), that

expatriate Iraqis were heavily represented and that the main challenges are lack of security,

political instability, corruption and inadequate government policies to support FDI.

Hanna, G. F., Hammoud, A. S. and Russo-Converso-Russo, J. A. ((2014) Foreign Direct Investment in

2

Post-Conﬂict Countries: The Case of Iraq’s Oil and Electricity Sectors, International Journal of Energy

Economics and Policy 4: 137-148.

25

World Bank Ease of Doing Business - Distance to

Frontier 2014

Governance and

the Rule of Law

The World Bank ranks Iraq as one of the least effective

governments in the world and as having made little progress

since 2010. It is also ranked as one of the least politically

stable and most violent regimes in the world. While there has

been marginal progress in voice and accountability and

regulatory control, performance has actually deteriorated on

ﬁghting corruption, the rule of law and government

effectiveness.

In 2013 and 2014, according to the US Department of State, Iraq had the highest number of

terrorist attacks in the world by quite a wide margin, accounting for a quarter of all terrorist

attacks recorded. There was a signiﬁcant increase in terrorism between 2013 and 2014, from

2501 attacks to 3370, which was mostly due to the increase in attacks by the self-styled

“Islamic State”.

26

Voice and

Accountability

Rule of law

Regulatory quality

Political stability and

absence of violence

Government

effectiveness

Control of corruption

4.29

9.09

2.36

15.79

1.90

17.54

5.80

13.88

2.40

9.10

5.80

13.80

2014 2010

Worldwide Governance Indicators 2010-2013, Percentile

Rank

Little progress has been made on the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and by 2015 (2016

Index) very modest gains achieved although in 2013 (2014 Index) both economic and political

transformation had been reversed compared to 2009 (2010 Index). !

27

Iraq

Afghanistan

Nigeria

1298

719

2658

2246

4699

15137

7512

4505

9929

662

1591

3370

Attacks Fatalities

Injuries Hostages

Countries with the Most

Terrorist Attacks or Fatalities,

2014

Status Index

Economic

Transformation

Political

Transformation

Government

Management

4.2

3.5

3.6

3.5

4.1

4

4.1

4

4.2

3.7

4

2010 2014 2016

Bertelsmann Transformation Index (0=Worst, 10=Best)

Human Development

and Gender

Iraq is classiﬁed as having a medium level of development and

had the same score in 2014 as the average for Arab states and

marginally above the average for all medium development

countries. However, its score is signiﬁcantly below Jordan’s,

although its GNI per capita is higher, $14, 000 ppp at 2011

prices compared to $11,400 ppp.

Iraq scores signiﬁcantly lower on each component of the index compared to Jordan except on

GNI per capita.!

28

UNDP Human Development Index 2014: Iraq, Jordan,

Arab States, Medium and High HDI

Iraq

Jordan

Arab States

Medium HDI

High HDI

0.744

0.468

0.512

0.748

0.512

Life Expectancy

at Birth

Expected Years

of Schooling

Mean Years

of Schooling

Gini Per Capita

(2011 PPP$)

14

6.4

10.1

69.4

11.4

9.9

13.5

74

Jordan Iraq

Iraq's and Jordan's HDI 2014

In 2011, according to UNDP, only four per cent of Iraqis lived below the poverty income line,

with a further 7.4 per cent living in near poverty The most recent Multidimensional Poverty Index

for Iraq is for 2011 and showed that 13.3 per cent of the population lived in multidimensional

poverty, with an additional 7.4 per cent living just above multidimensional poverty. Forty per

cent of the multinational poor lived in severe deprivation, 5.2 per cent of the population,

compared to 2.5 per cent in extreme monetary poverty. This suggests that those above the

monetary poverty line may nonetheless still suffer deprivation in education, health and other

living requirements.

29

Near

Poverty

Extreme

Poverty

3.9

2.5

3.5

13.3

5.2

7.5

Multidimensional Monetary

Living

Standards

Education

Health

38.6

50.1

11.3

Percentage in Monetary

and Multidimensional

Poverty, 2011

Contributions to Overall

Multidimensional Poverty

(%)

The Millennium Development Goals provide a ‘dashboard’ with indicators of the minimum

standards of decent living to which the world signed up in 2000, with targets to be achieved by

2015. The update report for 2013 showed further progress towards achieving the 2015 MDGs,

but more effort was needed to be made in promoting gender equality, empowering women and

reducing child mortality. More work was also needed to bring the promised proportion of Iraq’s

population out of poverty.

Legend:

Already Achieved

Strong Potential to Achieve

Off Track

2013

2015

Target

Status

Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger

Percentage of population living on less than $2.5

11.5

0.0

Percentage of underweight children under ﬁve years.

8.5

4.5

Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education

Target 2: Ensure that by 2015 children everywhere, boys and

girls alike will be able to complete a full course of primary

schooling.

Net enrolment ratio in primary school.

95

100

Proportion of pupils starting grade one who reach last grade of

primary school

95

100

Net enrolment ratio in secondary school.

45

100

Literacy rates of women and men aged 15-24 years.

85.5

100

Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women

Target 3: Ensure that gender disparity in primary and

secondary education is eliminated

Ratio of girls to boys in primary school

85

1:1

Share of women in waged employment in the non-agricultural

Sector.

14.7

50.0

Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament.

27

50

Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality

Target 4: Reduce by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015 the

under-ﬁve mortality rate.

Under-ﬁve mortality rate.

37.2

21.0

Infant mortality rate.

31.9

7.0

Proportion of one-year-old children immunised against

measles.

75.0

100.0

30

The situation of women in Iraq is very much affected by the implementation of Islamic law and

on the priorities of male religious authorities. Iraq ratiﬁed the Convention on the Elimination of All

Forms of Discrimination on the 28th June 1986, but women and young females have different

and unequal access to basic rights and different and unequal opportunities for protection,

promotion and maintenance of their rights. Iraq has yet to ratify the Optional Protocol on

Violence against Women and maintains reservations about Article 2 (f ) and (g) (which call on

states to modify or abolish existing laws and penal codes that discriminate against women),

Article 9 (which requires equal rights regarding changes and transfers of nationality) and Article

16 (which concerns the elimination of discrimination in marriage and family relations). The 2005

Constitution states that all Iraqis are equal before the law and prohibits discrimination based on

sex (Article 14). However, Islam is mandated as the basic source of legislation and Article 41

allows each religious group in Iraq to govern its own personal status matters – though this

Article has not yet been implemented, as revisions to the constitution are ongoing.

Goal 5: Improve Maternal Health

Target 5A: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and

2015, the maternal mortality ratio.

Proportion of births attended by skilled health

professionals."

90

100

Proportion births in health centre

77.7

100

Received antenatal care – at least one check-up

89.1

100

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases

Target 6A. Have halved by 2015 and begun to reverse the

spread of HIV/AIDS.

Percentage of women that have heard or know about HIV.

91.9

100

Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability

Target 7C: Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without

sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation.

Proportion of population using an improved drinking water

source.

70.6

90

Proportion of population using an improved sanitation facility.

93.8

96.3

Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development

Satellite TV - percentage of households.

96

100

Cellular per 100 population.

94.3

80

Computer per 100 population (household).

17.2

10

31

According to UN Women the situation has become worse for women since 2003 and violence

has increased against them with the deteriorating security situation, although this has been

difﬁcult to document. They report that nearly half of girls aged 10-14 years and of currently

married women have experienced domestic violence. Violence against women in public space,

so called honour killings and trafﬁcking are also common, as is female genital mutilation in

Kurdistan. Just over half of the women think that a man has a right to hit or beat his wife if she

disobeys, with the same proportion thinking that women should be protected by deterrent law,

protecting institutions or by providing protection. However, there is a widespread view among

men that it is justiﬁable to beat women if they behave in ways that are seen to be unacceptable.

Article 41 of the 1969 Penal code gives a man the legal right to punish his wife, although Article

29 of the 2005 Constitution prohibits all forms of violence and abuse in the family.

Inadequate progress toward the MDGs for gender equality and health as well as women’s

limited access to the labour market demonstrate the ways in which women are marginalised

socially and economically. The main reason that women give for not competing their education

in 2011 is because their family refused to let them (40.8%) with a further 13.1 per cent saying

because they were already married.

32

Force Daughter to Marry Against her Will

Force Daughter to Marry Before Legal age

Prevent Wife from getting Education

Prevent Wife from getting Employment

Prevent Wife Going to PHU Without Permission

Beat Wife if She Goes Out Without Permission

Beat Wife if She Disobeys

Control Daughters' Way of Dressing

74.6

56.4

49.8

49.5

40.6

40.4

33.2

15.6

Percentage of Men (18+) Who Think That the Following

Control Measures Are Justiﬁed

The OECD Gender Index suggests that while Iraq is highly discriminatory against women in

terms of their rights in marriage and the family, their rights to property and their rights to

exercise civil and political rights, it is substantially less discriminatory than Egypt in terms of

physical integrity and somewhat less discriminatory than both Egypt and Jordan in terms of civil

liberties in general.

33

OECD Development Centre Social Institutions and Gender

Index 2014 (0 Is Best)

Restricted

Civil Liberties

Restricted

Resources

and Assets

Discriminatory

Family Code

Restricted

Physical

Integrity

Son Bias

0.38

0.33

0.7

0.59

0.46

0.37

0.74

0.67

0.59

0.81

0.68

0.36

0.43

0.59

0.61

Jordan Egypt Iraq

Wellbeing and

Quality of Life

Life is about more than economic factors and it is

increasingly recognised that broader measures are needed

to understand how people are experiencing their daily lives.

Our life satisfaction is relative low in Iraq; the mean on a

scale going from 0 (completely dissatisﬁed) to 10

(completely satisﬁed), averaged for 2012-14, is 4.6;

Switzerland was the highest ranked country with an

average score of 7.6 and Togo the lowest with a score

below 3.

The Gallup World Poll carried out in 2014, the same year as the Arab Transitions survey,

provides information on how Iraqis feel about their lives - their subjective wellbeing; responses

are generally low across all the domains of life. Only in the community domain does the

proportion who are thriving climb higher than 21 per cent, and between 25 and 40 per cent of

us are struggling each domain.!

34

Mean on Scale of Life Satisfaction from 0-10 Averaged

2012-2014, Every 5th Country on Gallup World Poll,

Including Selected MENA Countries

Togo, 2.8

Egypt, 4.2

Tunisia, 4.7

Jordan, 5.2

Morocco, 5

Algeria, 5.6

Libya, 5.8

Switzerland, 7.6

Iraq, 4.6

35

Financial - managing economic

life to reduce stress and

increase security

Community - likes where lives,

feels safe, pride in community

Physical - good health and

energy to get things done

Social - has supportive relationships

Purpose - like what does and

motivated to achieve goals

40%

24%

25%

31%

47%

41%

61%

39%

48%

13%

19%

15%

36%

21%

Thriving Sruggling Suﬀering

Gallup Global Wellbeing Index 2014

!

Daily Lives

Main challenges

The three major challenges we see our country as facing are the

question of internal stability and security (nominated by 60%), the

economic situation and the corruption of politicians and government

servants (both 49%). Authoritarianism and external interference are

also issues raised by substantial minorities.

Income makes a difference to two of these: the economic situation is seen as more of a

challenge by those who are poorer and external inﬂuence as more of a challenge by those who

are more afﬂuent.#

!

37

Economic situation

Government corruption

Authoritarianism

Stability/Security

External Interference

Palestinian Situation

1.6%

20.7%

59.9%

12.9%

48.7%

49.2%

The Main Challenges the Country Is Facing, (Two

Answers Allowed)

The Main Challenges the Country Is Facing, by Income

Economic situation

External Interference

13.3%

64.8%

16.4%

52.6%

24.6%

45.1%

26.2%

38.5%

Comfortable Adequate

Inadequate Struggling

Religious denomination and region appear to make a difference to some of the challenges we

identify, and again it is difﬁcult to disentangle these two, but we can do so by taking advantage

of the mix of population in the Central Region. The high scores for the economic situation lie

with the Sunni (mainly Kurdish) North and with the Shi’a in the Central Region; this is probably

best seen as a challenge for everyone, but less so for the Sunni in the Central Region. ‘Stability

and security’ is identiﬁed most often as a challenge by people in the Central region, irrespective

of their denomination. Concern about external interference, again, is low in the Central region

irrespective. These are regional rather than religious effects for the most part.

When it comes to authoritarianism, however, it is clearly religion rather than region that makes

the difference: the Sunni are signiﬁcantly more likely to see authoritarianism as a challenge than

the Shi’a, whatever their region.!

38

Main Challenges the Country Is Facing, - Economic

Situation, Stability/Security and External Interference - by

Religious Denomination within Region

Economic situation

Stability/security

External interference

21%

57.8%

50.7%

15.4%

72.2%

51.1%

14.9%

78%

38.2%

16.5%

54.7%

55.1%

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shi’a Central

Shi’a South

Percentage Who See Authoritarianism as One of Two

Main Challenges Facing Country, by Religion within

Region

North Sunni

Central Sunni

Central Shi'ite

South Shi'ite

6.5%

7.5%

19.6%

21.7%

Safety And

Security

A third of us are very concerned about breaches of

security through war, terrorism or sectarian violence,

and over 70 per cent show some concern. Terrorism is

the greatest worry.

There are no signiﬁcant differences in this by gender, but household income makes a difference:

while at least half of the most afﬂuent do show concern, the ﬁgures is over 70 per cent for

those with the least income.!

39

Sectarian Violence

Civil War

Terrorist Attack

War

30.4%

48.5%

38.8%

37.0%

33.8%

30.6%

32.8%

34.2%

20.5%

14.3%

17.9%

19.0%

15.4%

6.6%

10.6%

9.8%

Not At All Not Much Much Very Much

Worry about War, Terrorism and Violence

Respondents Who Were Worried/Very Worried about War

and Terrorism, by Income (%)

War

Terrorist attack

Civil war

Sectarian violence

72.7

73.4

84.4

70.3

74.6

74.1

79.4

64.7

64.5

65.8

74.5

58.3

64.8

63.1

67.2

58.2

Comfortable Adequate Inadequate Struggling

These worries also show up differently in the different regions, and the effect is clearly a regional

one, not a religious one. The North Region expresses only half the concern of all the others,

including the Sunni of the Central Region, on all four issues. The South expresses a good deal

more concern on the whole than the North, but less so than the Central Region, including the

Shi’a of Central Region. Mostly the concern expressed in the Central Region is irrespective of

religious denomination, but the Shi’a in the region are particularly concerned with terrorist

attacks.

Just over 40 per cent say that their family’s security is good or very good at present; the

percentage for neighbourhood is slightly higher, but the security of the region is rated a little

lower (35%) and the security of the country as a whole a lot lower (17.5%). Things are seen as

being a little better now than in the past, except at the country level, where security has

40

North Sunni

Central Sunni

Central Shi'ite

70.7%

89.3%

81.7%

33.9%

71.2%

87.1%

39%

85.4%

94.6%

84.9%

37.3%

67.3%

82.7%

74.3%

30.2%

War Involving Country

Terrorist Attach

Civil War

Ethnic /Sectarian Violence

Respondents Worried/Very Worried About War, Terrorist

Attack and Violence by Denomination, Controlling for

Region

declined over the past ﬁve years. There is hope for the future, with better marks for ﬁve years’

time, but also great uncertainty, with at least a quarter having no idea what the future will bring.

41

FAMILY

Five years ago

Present time

Five years from now

NEIGHBOURHOOD

Five years ago

Present time

Five years from now

REGION

Five years ago

Present time

Five years from now

COUNTRY

Five years ago

Present time

Five years from now

28.7%

0.5%

0.9%

25.0%

0.7%

1.9%

25.1%

0.7%

1.6%

27.2%

0.4%

1.1%

18.7%

6.0%

10.6%

38.4%

34.9%

23.8%

44.3%

43.5%

40.1%

40.8%

41.2%

34.3%

14.5%

17.7%

28.8%

14.8%

25.0%

37.4%

14.7%

25.4%

34.0%

15.0%

24.6%

39.6%

38.10%

75.86%

59.74%

21.80%

39.46%

36.96%

15.82%

30.33%

24.30%

17.00%

33.80%

24.97%

Marks 1 and 2 Mark 3 Marks 4 and 5 DK/RA

Security at Various Levels Now, in the past and in the

Future (Awarding Marks out of 5 - 5=Good - or DK)

Income makes a difference: at all levels the more afﬂuent feel more secure than the more

impoverished.

Region also makes a difference: the Central Region feels much less secure at all levels than the

other two, and the South feels more secure at most levels than the North but less secure at the

level of the country as a whole. This is not surprising given the difference across the regions in

the levels of violence they are experiencing. (Again, the fact that it is the Central region which

stands out from the others means that it is region, not denomination, which is the driver.)

42

Percentage of People Giving the Highest Two Marks on

Security, by Income

Security of family

Security of

neighbourhood

Security of district

Security of country

6.3

24.2

28.9

27.3

4.7

31.1

38.2

36.4

6.8

42.2

52.9

49.4

9

36.1

50

50.8

Comfortable

Adequate

Inadequate

Struggling

Percentage of People Giving Highest Two Marks on

Security, by Region

Security of family

Security of

neighbourhood

Security of district

Security of country

5.1

59.9

73.6

69.9

3

6.3

12.7

11.9

12.5

51.9

57.9

54.8

North Central South

Over 60 per cent are not worried about being robbed or sexually assaulted on the streets or

having their houses burgled, and 55 per cent are not worried about harassment. At the other

extreme, around 10 per cent are very worried about theft or robbery, 14 per cent about

harassment and 18 per cent about sexual assault. The small ‘don’t know’ proportion includes

people who seldom or never go out alone.

Women are more likely to fear sexual assault, but the difference by gender is not as great as

might have been expected.

43

Saying They Are Worried/Very Worried about Sexual

Assault, by Gender

26%

37.8%

Female Male

Sexually Assaulted

Robbed on the Streets

Harassed on the Streets

Things Stolen

from Our Houses

10.1%

14.6%

11.5%

19.1%

23.4%

28.9%

22.5%

14.7%

32.5%

33.0%

33.5%

16.1%

34.1%

23.5%

32.5%

50.2%

Not At All Not Much Much Very Much

Worry about Safety in the Home and on the Street

All in all, 60 per cent of us mostly or always feel safe in our community at night and over 70 per

cent during the day. (This is not a very high ﬁgure, however; 28 per cent of us feel unsafe in the

community even during the day.) Over 80 per cent of us believe neighbours would help if help

were needed.

44

Feeling safe during night

Feeling safe during day

Neighbours would help if needed

81.7%

72.1%

60.5%

Feeling Safe Overall in the Community

Migration

Almost a quarter of us (22.6%) have

considered living abroad, either permanently

or for a period of time. Men are twice as likely as

women to have considered moving abroad (30.9%,

compared with 15.3%). The higher our education

and the younger we are, the more likely we are to

be interested in to moving to another country.

Considering which of us have considered migration, there is no particular pattern, surprisingly,

by income or education. Those who are considering migration are younger on the whole, male

mostly and while there is no interpretable pattern by either region or religious denomination, the

Sunni of Central Region appear more likely to migrate.!

45

No

Yes, unsure for how long

Yes, for a period of time

Yes, permanently

12.5%

6.9%

3.2%

74.4%

Considering Moving Abroad

"

Security is by far the most popular reason we have for wanting to move to another country,

either temporarily or permanently. Half of us would move for security and more than a quarter

for economic reasons. This pattern is quite unlike what is found in the other countries in this

survey, where the two leading reasons are economics and education. The only exception is

Libya, but even here only around 30 per cent of those that have considered migrating give

security concerns as the main reason; about the same proportion give education as the reason.

"!

46

Male

Female

18-30

31-45

46-59

60+

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shi’a Central

Shi’a South

20.4%

21.6%

33.9%

18.9%

13.6%

18.8%

22.8%

27.7%

32.0%

68.0%

Would Consider

Migrating, Permanently

or Temporarily, by

Gender, Income, Age,

Education and Religious

Denomination/Region

Family

Religious

Security

Educational

Political

Economic

Other reasons

1.9%

27.9%

7.7%

4.4%

51.1%

3.3%

3.6%

Reasons for Moving Abroad, on a Temporary Basis or

Permanently

Iraq’s Economic

Situation

30 per cent rate their own household economic situation as

good or very good, and another 30 per cent rate it as bad

or very bad. It is seen as a bit worse than it was in 2009.

Furthermore, half think that their living conditions are similar to those of other people in the

country, and less than a quarter believe they are worse or much worse.

47

Five Years Ago

2014

Five Years' Time

25.1%

33.9%

30.2%

23.0%

24%

39%

45%

17%

31%

32%

Very Bad/Bad Average Good/Very Good DK/R

Rate Family's Economic Situation in 2009, 2014 and

2019

1.9

21.7

48.7

22.4

5.3

Much worse Worse Similar Better Much better

Comparing Household Living Conditions with Those of

Other People in the Country (%)

Household economy is affected by region: the North does best, followed by the South, and in

last place comes the Central Region, irrespective of religion. The same is true of our estimates

of how the national economy is doing, except that the positions of North and South regions are

reversed, and the South see the national economy as much better than the North do.

The vast majority of us can afford basic food all of the time, most of us can have water indoors

and a majority can afford clothes, electricity, fuel and medicine most of the time. Heating,

visiting the doctor and telephone airtime are more problematic, and a third of us cannot afford

house repairs when they are needed.

48

HOUSEHOLD

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shi’a Central

Shi’a South

NATION

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shi’a Central

Shi’a South

42.2%

12.2%

9.6%

19.0%

35.9%

18.8%

17.8%

44.8%

29.8%

31.6%

18.1%

26.1%

38.8%

40.4%

39.0%

36.0%

28.0%

56.2%

72.3%

54.9%

25.3%

40.7%

43.1%

19.2%

Very bad/bad Neither Good/very good

Household and National Economic Situation, by Region/

Religious Denomination

Basic Food

Heating

Clothes/Shoes

Electricity

Water Indoors

Fuel for Car

Visiting a doctor

Medicine

House Repairs

Credit for Mobile Phone

Entertainment

23.7%

3.4%

11.9%

3.2%

3.4%

2.6%

3.4%

6.6%

3.6%

2.9%

0.4%

37.7%

45.2%

52.1%

34.9%

40.4%

32.5%

19.8%

27.8%

31.6%

41.4%

6.6%

38.6%

51.3%

36.1%

61.9%

56.2%

65.0%

76.7%

65.6%

64.8%

55.7%

93.0%

Never Go Without Sometimes Go Without

Constantly Go Without

Ability to Afford Basic Daily Needs

Combining the responses to all these items in a Deprivation Index. We ﬁnd that Iraqis are quite

comfortably off in terms of household income. The mean on the ten-point scale is 7.9, not far

from the top; 9 per cent can afford all of the items, including entertainment, whenever they

want them, and only a tenth of one per cent (2 people) are struggling to afford all of them.

The economic situation of the country is generally seen as poorer than that of people’s own

households. Overall it is seen as worse in 2014 than it was in 2009 but there has also been a

modest increase in the proportion who thought that it has improved. In terms of the future a

quarter do not know what the economic situation will be, but among the rest there is some

optimism that it will improve. !

49

Most Deprived

Least Deprived

Deprivation Index Score (/10), (%)

.0

3.5

7.0

10.5

14.0

Five Years Ago

2014

Five Years' Time

24.8%

29.7%

22.8%

18.3%

17.8%

26.5%

42.8%

27.8%

50.7%

38.9%

Very Bad/Bad Average Good/Very Good DK/R

The Country's Economic Situation Now, in 2009 and in

2014 and in 2019

How we think our

Government is

performing

We tend to rate the government’s performance rather

poorly. Fewer than half of us rate the government’s ability to

provide basic utilities as good, and only one in six is

satisﬁed with how it provides security .

3

Missing values and people who do not think it is the government’s responsibility have not been

included!

The questionnaire asked about government; it is possible that some respondents in the

3

Northern Region understood this to mean their regional government rather than the national

government.

50

Creating jobs

Reducing inequality

Controlling prices

Providing utilities

Providing security

16.9%

43.3%

25%

11.5%

11.2%

-80.2%

-54.3%

-72.3%

-79.4%

-86.4%

Negative Positive

Rating Government Performance as Positive or Negative

Our household income makes a difference in how highly we rate the government’s

performance; the more we earn, the more we believe our government is doing a good job.

Another difference in how we rate government performance involve the confounded variables of

region and religious denomination. Shi’ite citizens appear more satisﬁed with the government’s

performance on controlling prices and reducing inequalities (though less than 25% of any of the

groups says they are doing well or very well on the latter) but are doubtful about the

government’s ability to provide security. On the provision of utilities the Sunni in the Central

Region score low (25%), but at least 40% of all the others think they are doing well. On security

the Central Region and the South are not impressed; indeed, the Sunni in the Central Region

have only four per cent of respondents saying they are doing well, but 42 per cent of the Sunnis

in the Northern Region are prepared to say this.

51

Rating the Government's Performance Good/Very Good,

by Income (%)

Providing

security

Providing

basic utilities

Controlling

prices

Narrowing the

gap between

rich and poor

Creating

employment

3.1

8.6

16.7

35.9

16.4

7.7

10.6

23

41.1

12.5

15.1

13.1

27.2

47

21.8

22.3

23

44.1

59.2

24.2

Comfortable

Adequate

Inadequate

Struggling

52

PROVIDING EMPLOYMENT

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shi’a Central

Shi’a South

REDUCING INEQUALITIES

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shi’a Central

Shi’a South

CONTROLLING PRICES

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shi’a Central

Shi’a South

PROVIDING UTILITIES

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shi’a Central

Shi’a South

ENSURING SECURITY

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shi’a Central

Shi’a South

14.6%

8.9%

4.2%

42%

55.6%

49.6%

24.8%

41.6%

40.4%

29.6%

15.3%

11.5%

15.2%

17.4%

8.8%

8.7%

8.5%

16.2%

9.3%

14%

Satisfaction with Government Provision, by Region/

Religious Denomination

Most of us are unsatisﬁed with the services provided by the government. We are most satisﬁed

with the education system (but still fewer than half of us consider it satisfactory), while our

lowest-rated services are Central government itself and the social security system.

Missing values have not been included

The higher our income, the better we rate government services, with a few exceptions such as

the educational system, where those of who are most comfortable ﬁnancially are little less

satisﬁed than those of us from the next income bracket.

53

Developing the economy

Government performing its duties

Local authorities

Education system

Healthcare system

Social security system

24.3%

38.2%

43.7%

34.7%

21.5%

31.8%

75.7%

61.8%

56.3%

65.3%

78.5%

68.2%

Dissatisﬁed Satisﬁed

Satisﬁed or Dissatisﬁed with Government Services

Satisﬁed with Government Services, by Income (%)

Developing

the economy

Government

performing

its duties

Local

authorities

Education

system

Healthcare

system

Social

security system

18.8

24.2

28.1

27.3

16.4

18.8

20

36.8

42.3

28.3

15.2

25.1

26.5

41.2

47.4

38

24.6

38.8

26.2

40.2

41.8

49.2

35.2

41.8

Comfortable Adequate Inadequate Struggling

Satisfaction with the education, health and social security services is mostly low and shows a

clear division by religious denomination: the South and the Shi’a of the Central Region are

reasonably approving (respectively 40-60% and 30-45%), while the North and the Sunni of the

Central Region show less approval (15-22% and 10-30%). Mediocre levels of satisfaction

overall with central and local government are due to a low ﬁgure in the Central Region

speciﬁcally for the Sunni. The development of the economy satisﬁes three quarters of the

population or more except in Southern Region, where the ﬁgure is less than 45 per cent.

54

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shi’a Central

Shi’a South

36.2%

27.3%

10.7%

18.6%

58.4%

44.9%

26.3%

15.5%

68.7%

43.6%

30.2%

22.2%

46.8%

34%

11.6%

41%

30.1%

25.7%

8.4%

18.7%

43.9%

76.3%

86.1%

65.5%

Developing Economy Central Govt Local Govt

Education Health Social Security

Satisﬁed with Government Services, by Region/Religious

Denomination

The Political System

Less than eight per cent consider the political system in Iraq

as good or very good, and it is generally seen as worse than it

used to be. Although there is some hope for the future, 28 per

cent say they ‘do not know’ what to expect of the future at all,

suggesting a strong degree of volatility. Those of us in the

highest income bracket rate the political system of our country

more positively.

!

55

Five Years Ago

2014

Five Years Time

28%

17.4%

7.5%

8.6%

18.8%

20.0%

35.5%

35.8%

72.5%

55.9%

Very Bad/Bad Average Good/Very Good

DK/R

Rating of the Country's Political System, Now, in the Past

and in the Future (%)

23.4%

20.3%

32.4%

42.1%

Comfortable

Adequate

Inadequate

Struggling

Rating Current Political System as Good or Very Good,

by Income

By Region, the Shi’a scores are very similar in the Southern and Central regions, except that

there are signiﬁcantly more in the Central Region who consider the system as poor or bad. The

North approves of the system more often, although still only 14% report it as good. Sunnis in

Central Region are almost as strong than the Shi’a in their disapproval.

We do not think our current government system is very democratic: less than 20 per cent of us

would score it at 7 or above out of 10 in that respect, and 38 per cent would give it a score of 3

or less.

56

Shi’a South

Shi’a Central

Sunni Central

Sunni North

63.6%

87.9%

89.9%

70.6%

22.3%

10.7%

23.7%

22.2%

14.1%

1.4%

7.6%

7.2%

Good or very good (scores 4-5) Neutral (score 3)

Poor/bad (scores 1-2)

Rating Current Political System as Good or Very Good,

by Region/Religious Denomination

How suitable is democracy for Iraq?

How democratic is Iraq?

37.7

15.5

43.2

44.7

19.1

39.8

7-10 4-6 Scores: 0-3

How Suitable Is Democracy for Iraq, and How

Democratic Is It? (% in Score-Band, out of 10)

Nevertheless, democracy would appear to be what we want: 87 per cent of us say that with all

its faults democracy is the best form of government, 40 per cent scored it at 7+ in terms of

suitability for Iraq, only 15.5 per cent scored it at 3 or below, and 75 per cent of us disagreed

with the statement that it was a Western form of government not compatible with Islam.

However, what we mean by ‘democracy’ may not be quite what its proponents in the North

and West have in mind. Slightly more than half of us consider free elections as one of the two

main characteristics of democracy, but the other half do not mention this. Twenty per cent think

democracy is about political equality between citizens and 30 per cent think it gives citizens the

freedom to criticise government. A third think democracy should get rid of corruption. Only one

in twelve of us think that providing employment is one of the main two characteristics of

democracy, but a quarter think providing basic necessities is characteristic, and 20 per cent

think that democracies do not have a great deal of income inequality. The deﬁnitions therefore

range across the electoral, the political, and the socioeconomic. This suggests that the

conception of democracy desired by respondents is considerably more ‘holistic’ than that

currently favoured in scholarship or policy – which focuses primarily on procedural and formal

aspects – including not just civil and political rights but also social justice and economic rights.

57

Democracy is compatible with Islam

With all its faults, democracy is the best

87.2

75.1

12.8

24.9

Disagree/strongly Agree/strongly

Democracy Is the Best Form of Government despite Its

Faults, and It Is Compatible with Islam (Scores Reversed

from Original Way in Which Question Was Put) (%)

The vast majority think that the political system most suited for Iraq is a parliamentary system

based on political pluralism. Respondents could pick more than one answer, but only one in ten

of us thinks any other system would be suitable, whether this be a system based on Islamic

Law with no political parties, or a parliamentary democracy limited to Islamic parties, or a

strong authority that takes decisions with no regard for elections.

There are no particularly interpretable patterns in the choices made, by region or religion,

except that Islamic Parliamentary government attracts a small but non-trivial minority in the

North (17%) and both the Parliamentary and the non-Parliamentary version of it score higher in

the South (20% and 14%).

58

No Corruption

Equality between Citizens

Small Gap in Income Between

the Poor and the Rich

Free elections

54%

29.5%

24%

26.1%

21.2%

8.3%

32.6%

Nominated as Essential Characteristics of Democracy

(up to 2 Choices)

Parliamentary System with Nationalist,

Left/Wing, Right Wing and

Islamist Political Parties

Only Islamic Parties competing

in Parliamentary Elections

Strong Authority Makes Decisions

Regardless of Election Results

Islamic Law with No Political Parties

or Elections

9.4

11.1

10.1

78.1

Types of Political

Regime Nominated

as Suitable or Very

Suitable for Iraq (%)

#

Whether we would call ourselves religious makes a difference: every one of those who said they

were not religious at all thought open parliamentary democracy was suitable for Iraq, and the

minority of 15 per cent for the two Islamic forms of government among the most religious falls

to zero or six per cent among those who are not religious.

!

59

Parliamentary System

with Nationalist,

Left/Wing, Right Wing

and Islamist Political

Parties

Only Islamic Parties

competing in

Parliamentary Elections

Strong Authority

Makes Decisions

Regardless of

Election Results

Islamic Law with

No Political Parties

or Elections

14.3

15.5

10.9

81.9

2.4

7

9.2

82.2

5.8

17.4

6

64.9

19.8

7.4

17.1

84

Sunni North Sunni Central

Shi’a Central Shi’a South

Types of Political Regime Nominated

as Suitable or Very Suitable for Iraq,

by Region (%)

Types of Political Regimes That Are Seen as Suitable or

Very Suitable for Iraq , by Strength of Religious Belief

Parliamentary System

with Nationalist,

Left Wing, Right Wing

and Islamist

Political Parties

Only Islamic Parties

competing in

Parliamentary Elections

Strong authority

disregarding

Parliament

Islamic Law, with

No Political

Parties or Elections

5.7%

12.1%

0%

100%

7.4%

15.7%

8.2%

81.6%

15.1%

8%

15.3%

84.5%

Religious Somewhat Not at all

Political Participation

A two thirds majority disagree that Government decisions

should be supported even if we disagree with them, but nearly

40 per cent of us think that this is what is required.

The overwhelming majority would rather that political reform were introduced gradually.

Almost half of us are interested or very interested in politics.

60

Government Decisions Should Be Supported Even If We

Disagree with Them (%)

6.7

30.8

42.4

20.1

Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree

Political Reforms Should Be Introduced Gradually, Step by

Step (%)

9

17.2

56.3

17.5

Disagree Agree Strongly agree Strongly disagree

People Interested in Politics (%)

10

38.5

37

14.4

Not interested at all Somewhat interested

Interested Very interested

Sixty per cent follow news about politics and government often or fairly often.

Nearly three quarters of us voted in the last elections. However, less than one in twenty people

in our country are members of a political party. Almost a quarter say they would go on a

demonstration now, if appropriate.

Men are more likely to be interested or very interested in politics than women. Men also follow

political news more often than women, and are more likely to be part of a political party and are

more prepared to go on demonstrations.

61

Percentage of People Who Follow Political News (%)

19.1

40.5

32.8

7.6

Never Sometimes/rarely

Often Very often

Interest in politics

(interested + very interested)

Follow political news

(often + very often)

Vote in the last

national election

Member of a

political party

Go to a political

demonstration now

23.7

4

73.6

58.9

47.7

Interested in Politics and Participating in Politics (%)

Older people are more likely to show an interest and follow the news, but the peak age group

for voting is 31-45.

62

Interest in politics

(interested + very interested)

Follow political news

(often + very often)

Vote in the last

national election

Member of a

political party

Go to a political

demonstration now

13.8

2

69.2

45.7

34

32.9

5.9

77.6

71.3

60.6

Male Female

Interested in Politics and Participating in Politics, by

Gender (%)

Interested in Politics and Participating in Politics,

by Age (%)

Interest in politics

(interested + very interested)

Follow political news

(often + very often)

Vote in the last

national election

67

62

72.5

63.2

53.6

79.3

61.9

50.2

70.8

53.3

41.3

18-30 31-45 46-59 60+

There is some tendency for the Shi’a to evince more interest in politics, but more importantly

the Central Region has a higher response in terms of following the news but a lower one in

terms of being prepared to go on demonstrations and (particularly the Sunni) voting. The North

stands out with 12.5 per cent rate of party membership.

Education has an effect on political participation: at all levels, the higher the education the more

the involvement. Voting does not increase with education to the same extent as other forms of

participation, however.

63

Interested in Politics and Participating in Politics, by

Region/Religious Denomination (%)

Interest in politics

(interested +

very interested)

Follow political

news (often +

very often)

Vote in the

last national

election

Member of a

political party

Go to a political

demonstration

now

42.2

1.5

86.1

60.7

58.9

22.8

2.6

76.6

70.4

54

27.1

1.1

67.1

64.4

46.7

41.5

12.5

80.8

44.5

47.1

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shi’a Central

Shi’a South

Interested in Politics and Participating in Political

Activities, by Education (%)

Interest in politics

(interested + very

interested)

Follow political news

(often + very often)

Vote in the last

national election

Go to a political

demonstration now

40.8

81.4

65.7

58.9

37.7

82.8

65.2

54

30.9

76.6

61.3

46.7

30.5

75.7

52.8

42.8

No education Basic education

Secondary education Post-secondary education

When those who would attend a political demonstration right now were asked to nominate the

two main reasons for which they would attend, almost all listed political issues as one of two

reasons, followed by two thirds listing economic reasons.

The most popular forms of political action that we have taken are signing a petition, attending a

demonstration and/or joining a boycott. Notable also are the relatively large numbers that say

they would never do these things, have refused to respond or declare they do not know.

64

Security Reasons

Educational Reasons

Political Reasons

Economic Reasons

64.7%

95.6%

3.2%

36.5%

Main Reasons for Attending a Political Demonstration

Now, (up to Two Reasons Were Allowed)

Signing Petitions

Joining Boycotts

Attending

Demonstrations

Joining

Unofﬁcial Strikes

Occupying

Buildings or Factories

12.8%

12.1%

11.1%

9.5%

10.8%

82.9%

76.8%

53.7%

62.6%

46.9%

4.0%

9.9%

28.8%

23.3%

28.8%

0.3%

1.2%

6.4%

4.6%

13.5%

Have Done Might Do Would Never Do DK RA

Participating in Political Action (%)

Men are more likely to have participated, particularly when it comes to demonstrations.

Those living in the Central region are noticeably less politically active than those living in either

of the other regions.

About half of us never or hardly ever use the internet: 49 per cent never use it, and about

another two per cent use it less than once a week. Age, Education and Region make a lot of

difference: people aged 18-30 and people with no education or very little are at least half as

much again as anyone else likely to use the net at least once a week, and usage in the Central

Region (irrespective of religion) is nearly twice as high as in the other two regions. There are

also differences by gender and household income.

65

Signing petitions

Attending demonstrations

1.9%

9.9%

10.8%

17%

Male Female

That Have Participated in Political Action, by Gender

Signing petitions

Attending

demonstrations

10.3%

13.5%

1.9%

8.9%

9.5%

22%

North

Central

South

Percentage of People That Have Participated in Political

Action, by Region

66

Total

AGE

18-30

21-45

46-59

60+

EDUCATION

None/elementary

Basic

Secondary

Higher

REGION

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shi’a Central

Shi’a South

GENDER

Male

Female

INCOME

Comfortable

Adequate

Inadequate

Struggling

42.4%

43.8%

54.1%

58.2%

42.2%

53.8%

37.2%

62.6%

59.7%

42%

62.7%

59.3%

53.5%

33%

23.1%

35%

46.5%

61.2%

51.3%

Internet Use, in Total and by Variables Inﬂuencing Its Use

Of those who use social media on the web, nearly 80 per cent use them to gather political

news, but at the other extreme only one in eight uses them to organise political activities.

Generally, very few of us participate in civil society organisations, societies, and charities. Only

roughly one in eight of us are likely to be members of a charitable organisation, and even less

so for other types of civil society organisations.

67

Getting Information on

Politics and Political Events

Commenting on Political Issues

Taking Part in

Political Demonstrations

Organising Political Activities

12.8%

29.9%

66.1%

78.8%

Using Social Media for Political Activity

Charitable societies

Professional associations

or Trade unions

Youth, cultural, or

sports organisations

Other organisations

2%

5.6%

7.8%

12%

Members of Civil Society Organisations, Societies, and

Charities (%)

Men are twice as likely as women to participate in most categories.

People living in the Central Region, perhaps not surprisingly given the security situation, are less

likely to be members than those in the other two regions.

68

Charitable societies

Professional associations

or trade unions

Youth, cultural, or

sports organisations

0.8%

5.1%

9.3%

10.2%

10.4%

14.6%

Male

Female

Members of Civil Society Organisations, Societies, and

Charities, by Gender (%)

Charitable societies

Professional associations

or trade unions

Youth, cultural, or

sports organisations

4.7%

8.4%

15.4%

4.9%

5%

4.9%

8.3%

12.2%

20.5%

North

Central

South

Members of Civil Society Organisations, Societies, and

Charities, by Region

Governance

Sixty per cent believe that there is a great deal of corruption

within government, and not much less than 90 per cent

believe that government corruption is a sizeable problem.

A third believe that the Government is doing nothing to crack down on corruption and another

third that they are doing very little.

The poor have a stronger belief than the better off that there is government corruption, and they

are also less likely to think that the Government is tackling it. !

69

Believing There Is Corruption within Government

60.4%

26.4%

9.5%

0.4

Not at all To a small extent

To a medium extent To a large extent

Believing the Government Is Working to Deal with Corruption

10%

22.5%

31.1%

31.3%

Not at all To a small extent

To a medium extent To a large extent

Believing There Is Corruption and That the Government Is

Dealing with Corruption, to a Medium or to a Large Extent,

by Income

Corruption within state

agencies and institutions

Government is dealing with corruption

30.5

91.4

30.2

92.8

35.5

82

40.2

74.6

Comfortable Adequate

Inadequate Struggling

Those living in the Central Region are more likely to think that there is state corruption than

those living in the other two regions but those living in the Northern Region are the least likely to

think that the Government is doing anything about it.

‘Wasta’ – cronyism, nepotism, social inﬂuence allowing one to obtain an advantage because of

who you know rather than what you can do – is thought to be prevalent.

Income makes a difference, or rather the lack of it, and there are also some differences by

region.

70

Believing There Is Corruption and That the Government Is

Dealing with Corruption, to a Medium or to a Large

Extent, by Region

Corruption within state

agencies and institutions

Government is dealing

with corruption

36.7%

78.3%

37%

94.4%

18.7%

84.7%

North

Central

South

3.1

0.9

9

31.9

55.1

Extremely widespread Frequent

Happens sometimes Jobs can be had without it

I don't know any examples

Getting a Job by Wasta Is...

Believing Wasta Happens Quite Often or Is Extremely

Widespread in Getting a Job, by Income and Region

Comfortable

Adequate

Inadequate

Struggling

North

Central

South

81.2%

94.1%

82.3%

88.3%

93.2%

84.6%

70.5%

We do not have much faith in other Iraqis: only a quarter of us would say most people are

trustworthy. Household income makes a difference – the more afﬂuent are more trusting – and

there are regional/denominational differences – the Sunnis are less trusting than the Shi’a, but

the differences are not as extreme within the Central Region.

We tend to trust local government (60%) much more than central government (26%) and

political parties (39%) more than parliament (11%) – but we do not much trust either of these

last two and only a quarter of us trust central government.

71

All

INCOME

Comfortable

Adequate

Inadequate

Struggling

REGION

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shia Central

Shia South

35.1%

31%

23.4%

17%

16%

22.4%

30.2%

30.3%

27.3%

Believing Most People Are Trustworthy, by Income and

Region

The Government

The Parliament

Political parties

Local Government

59.8%

38.7%

11.3%

25.6%

Trusting Government Institutions Quite a Lot or a Great

Deal

These average ﬁgures conceal large discrepancies by income, region and/or religious

denomination. To the extent that central government are trusted, it is by the afﬂuent and the

Shi’as, and the same is even more strongly true for local government. Parliament is not trusted

much by anyone, but to the extent that it is trusted at all it is by the afﬂuent, perhaps, and

certainly by the people of the South. Political parties are trusted by the most afﬂuent and

perhaps by the Shi’as (certainly the people of South Region).

72

The government

The parliament

Political parties

Local government

36.9%

5.7%

10.5%

32.4%

8.6%

21.4%

44.4%

13.7%

30.4%

59.9%

52.1%

18.6%

38.6%

Comfortable

Adequate

Inadequate

Struggling

Trusting Government Institutions Quite a Lot or a Great

Deal, by Income

When it comes to the security and legal systems, 65 per cent of us trust the armed forces, 40

per cent trust the courts and the legal system, but only eleven per cent trust the police.

The more afﬂuent are more likely to trust the courts and to some extent the police (what little

trust there is in them).

73

The government

The parliament

Political parties

Local government

78.4

47.3

37

69.7

41.8

12.1

31.8

33.6

32.7

1.4

7.5

34.7

39

14.4

18.1

Sunni North

Sunni Central

Shi’a Central

Shi’a South

Trusting Government Institutions Quite a Lot or a Great

Deal, by Region/Denomination (%)

Legal system

Army

Police

11.1%

65.2%

40.7%

Trusting Law and Order Institutions Quite a Lot or a

Great Deal

Shi’as, both in South Region and in Central Region, trust the courts and the armed forces more

than the Sunnis do. The police are trusted most in the North Region (16%) although this is still

extremely low, and least by the Sunni in Central Region (2%).

74

The legal

system

The army

The police

7.5

65.2

24.8

10

65.8

36.5

12.5

66.1

46.2

14.4

60

49.6

Comfortable

Adequate

Inadequate

Struggling

Trusting Law and Order Institutions Quite a Lot or a Great

Deal, by Income (%)

The police

The army

The legal

system

27

23

16

16.6

37.7

2.2

46.2

76.6

13.2

40.7

97.4

11.1

Shi’a South

Shi’a Central

Sunni Central

Sunni North

Trusting Law and Order Institutions Quite a Lot or a Great

Deal, by Region/Denomination (%)

Forty per cent of us trust the media in broad terms, and 30 per cent trust civil society

organisations. Rather more than half of us trust religious leaders – which is more than trust the

courts, the police or any branch of central government.

The more afﬂuent tend to trust the media a little more and deﬁnitely have more faith in civil

society organisations. When it comes to religious leaders, it appears to be the adequately

provided rather than the afﬂuent that have the most trust in them.

The Southern Region has more faith in the media and in CSOs, and for the media this could be

a religious rather than a regional distinction – the Shi’a in Central Region also have more trust

than the Sunnis.

For CSOs, however, it is the Shi’a rather than the Sunni in the Central Region that had the

lower score, by a very substantial margin. The Sunni in Central Region stand out as trusting

religious leaders very little at all. This could be a denominational rather than regional matter,

given that the Northern region has a lower score than the Shi’a of Central Regions, but the

margin is nowhere near as large.

75

Media

Civil Society

Religious

Leaders

55.2%

30.1%

41.2%

Trusting Media, Civil Society and Religious Leaders Quite

a Lot or a Great Deal

Trusting Media, Civil Society and Religious Leaders Quite

a Lot or a Great Deal, by Income (%)

The media

Civil society

Religious leaders

47.6

30.1

41.2

52.1

24.6

34.5

59.4

34.1

49.4

47.6

46.5

43.5

Comfortable Adequate

Inadequate Struggling

76

The media

Civil society

Religious

leaders

55.2

40.8

58.2

59.8

30.4

39

15.5

8.9

28.4

41.3

32

31.3

Sunni North Sunni Central Shi’a Central Shi’a South

Trusting Media, Civil Society and Religious Leaders Quite

a Lot or a Great Deal, by Region/Denomination (%)

Religion

The overwhelming majority of us describe

ourselves as religious at least to some

extent.

Age makes a difference: those of us aged 60 or older are almost twice as likely to declare

ourselves religious as those aged 30 or less.

Our religion has some impact on how we lead our daily lives, with 81 per cent of us thinking

that banks should not charge interest, for example, and nearly 60 per cent that women should

wear the hijab. However, only around a quarter of us think that other elements of Shari’a should

be enforced.!

77

Identifying as 'Religious'

6.3%

43.1%

48.2%

2.4%

Not religious Religious to some extent

Religious Don't know/refused

18 to 30

31 to 45

46 to 59

60+

67.3%

52.5%

48.9%

36.5%

31.7%

46.0%

49.4%

59.4%

1.0%

1.5%

1.8%

4.1%

Not religious Religious to some extent Religious

Identifying Themselves as Religious, by Age

Missing values have not been included

While few of us support the idea that eligibility for parliament should be restricted to Islamic

parties, as we have seen, over 40 per cent of us are likely to prefer a religious political party to a

non-religious one. (However, 18% did not give an answer to this question.)

The relationship between religion, law and politics is a complex one. It should go without saying

that religious law will mean very different things to different people, and is obviously different

between Sunni and Shi’a. That being said, nearly 60 per cent of us appear to believe that the

Government should implement only Shari’a, but three quarters say that laws should be made

78

Democracy is a Western form of

government not compatible with Islam

Islam requires that the political rights of

non-Muslims are less than those of Muslims

Banks must be forbidden from

charging interest

It is not acceptable for male

and female students to attend

classes together

If a Muslim converts to another

religion he/she must be punished

by execution

Islam requires that women wear a hijab

54.4

23.4

21.6

73

13.2

23.1

-39

-62

-73

-16.7

-81.1

-60.7

Disagree and strongly disagree Agree and strongly agree

How Much Islam Should Impact on Our Lives (%)

Prefer a Religious Political Party to a Non-Religious One

10.3%

32.3%

28.4%

10.7%

18.3%

Don't know/refused Strongly disagree

Disagree Agree

Strongly agree

which reﬂect the wishes of the people, and nearly 80 per cent of us think Shari’a law should be

applied in some areas and laws made according to the wishes of the people in others. With

regard to what areas religious law should be applied in, seventy per cent say that criminal law

should be grounded in the Shari’a, we are nearly unanimous that Shari’a should dominate

family/personal status laws, but as indicated below we also believe religious law should be

separate from socio-economic life. Certainly this is an area in which more ethnographic

research is needed to better understand what people mean when they think of religious law

and its boundaries in relation to secular law, society and politics.

Missing values have not been included.

More than three quarters of us believe that religious practice should be kept separate from the

socio-political sphere. Speciﬁcally, over 80 per cent agree or agree strongly that religious clerics

should not inﬂuence how people vote and more than a third of us believe they should not have

inﬂuence on the government’s decisions.

79

The government should make laws

according to the wishes of the people

The government should implement

only the laws derived from Shari'a

The government should implement

laws according to the wishes of the

people in some spheres and

according to Shari'a in others

Criminal Law should be according

to Shari'a

Family and Status Law should be

according to Shari'a

90.3

69.5

78.9

51.9

75.2

-5.6

-27.3

-13.2

-39.3

-19.7

Disagree and strongly disagree Agree and strongly agree

Think Sharia Law Should Be Applied (%)

Missing values have not been included.

80

Religious Clerics Should Not Inﬂuence

How People Vote in Elections

Religious Clerics Should Not Have Inﬂuence

Over Decisions in the Government

Religious Practice Should be

Separated from Socioeconomic Life

66.8

36.7

77.9

-29.6

-56.1

-15.7

Disagree and strongly disagree Agree and strongly agree

How Much Religious Clerics Should Inﬂuence Socio-

Economic Life (%)

Gender

Our position on the status and role of women varies by

our own gender, with women generally being more in

favour of gender equality, and by area of life. A married

woman working outside the home is seen as acceptable

by nearly 85 per cent of us, while just over 50 per cent

of us think that men and women should have equal

inheritance rights.

In the area of marriage and divorce there is a surprising amount of agreement with equality of

rights, but the underlying patriarchal stance can still be seen. Around half of the men agree that

women should have equal rights in divorce on the one hand and should be consulted and their

consent obtained before a man takes a second wife on the other, and 70 per cent agree that a

woman should not be forced into an arranged marriage against her will. The ﬁgures are higher

from women, but there are still between 15 and 30 per cent of the female population who

would not agree with these statements. !

81

May work outside the home

Can be President

Can be judge

Men make better leaders

University more important for boys

Equal inheritance rights

May travel abroad alone

36.9%

50.8%

23.5%

77.1%

62.7%

55.7%

84.5%

47.9%

60.9%

18.5%

69.9%

76%

68.9%

90.8%

27%

41.3%

28.1%

83.9%

50.1%

43.4%

78.7%

Men Agree

Women agree

All agree

Percentage of People Expressing a Variety of Attitudes

and Beliefs about the Position and Capabilities of Women

82

Attitudes to Social/Cultural Equality for Women (%)

A Woman Should

be Able to refuse

to Marry Someone

Chosen by

Her Parents

Husbands and Wives

Should Have Equal

Rights in Divorce

The First Wife Must

Consent before a Man

Can Take a

Second Wife

Polygamy Should

be Illegal

18.8%

51.1%

54.7%

70.5%

48%

73.7%

74.1%

84.8%

32.9%

62%

64.1%

77.4%

All Women Men

Media

Only 18 per cent of us think our press is

completely free, but if we add in those who said it

was ‘somewhat free’ the ﬁgure rises to 60 per

cent. Only six per cent thought it was not free at

all. Almost a quarter of us think that the national

media are less trustworthy than in 2010, although

almost half think they have not changed.

Household income makes a difference: more of the afﬂuent think there is freedom of the press.!

83

17.8

42.3

25.2

8.3

6.4

Don't Know/refused

Not free at all

Not very free

Somewhat free

Completely free

Views on

Freedom of the

Press in Iraq

(%)

23.8

42.8

16.9

16.5

Don't Know/refused

More than in 2010

The same as in 2010

Less than in 2010

Trust in National

Media (%)

Thinking the Media Is Somewhat or Completely Free, by

Income

Comfortable

Adequate

Inadequate

Struggling

55.5%

55.2%

68%

What the majority use and trust as a main source of political information is television. Fewer of

us trust international TV stations than private national TV, and while 55% of us use the national

television as a main source, only a third of us actually trust it. Very few of us use or trust

newspapers, and even fewer use and trust email, text messages, or social media. A well-used

and trusted source of political information is our friends and colleagues.

84

International TV

Private National TV

Government TV

Government Newspapers

Private National Newspapers

International Newspapers

Government Radio

Private National Radio

International Radio

Internet

Social Media

E-Mail

Text Messages

Friends and Colleagues

Word of Mouth

Public Places

11.9

8.8

25

1.1

0.9

5.1

13.2

7.4

8.3

10.9

6.3

3.9

8.6

31.5

34

27.4

20.3

25.3

39.2

3.4

1.4

10.3

17.8

12.7

18

23.7

11.9

11.7

17.7

51.7

55.1

51.1

Used as a main source

Trusted

What Is Used and Trusted as a Main Source of Political

Information (%)

The younger we are, the more likely it is we are using the internet or social media for political

information. Older people are more likely to gain information from public places. This seems to

be true of the TV as well, with the exception of government TV, use of which seems to increase

with age. However, even those of us aged 18-30 do not trust social media very much, although

the internet in general is trusted by a sixth of us.

85

International

Newspapers

Government TV

International TV

The Internet

Social Media

Public places

Word of mouth

30.2

33

1.9

2.8

57.5

54.7

17.9

32.1

24.6

6.1

9.3

53.2

57.1

11.4

22.8

18.9

9.4

15.2

47.2

56.3

14.1

22.3

17.2

14.8

27.1

53

44.1

8.7

18-30

31-45

46-59

60+

Main Sources of Political Information, by Age (%)

Household income makes a difference: the most afﬂuent are the least likely to be using the

government TV and the most likely to get their news from international newspapers and/or the

net.

86

Private National Newspapers

International Newspapers

Government TV

International TV

Government Radio

Private national Radio

International Radio

The Internet

Social Media

Word of mouth

17.2

3.1

7

21.1

31.3

60.2

51.6

18.8

12.5

28.4

8.9

14.1

14.9

17.9

23.3

50.2

53.8

12

10.5

23.5

11.5

21.4

9.4

15.4

22.8

50.3

54.9

11.5

11.1

22.1

19.7

35.2

11.5

27

18.9

53.3

31.1

9.8

23

Confortable

Adequate

Inadequate

Struggling

Main Source of Political Information, by Income (%)

Younger people and the more afﬂuent have more faith in the internet as a reliable source of

political news.

Almost half of us think that the internet allows people to have more political power and that

public ofﬁcials will learn more about what people think through it. 35 per cent, however, think it

can and will be used by politicians as another way of inﬂuencing people. It is the younger

people among us who most often come up with these responses.

Missing values and people who neither agree nor disagree with the statement are excluded.!

87

All

INCOME

Comfortable

Adequate

Inadequate

Struggling

AGE

18-30

31-45

46-59

60+

0.9

6.8

10.4

20.9%

5.5%

10%

16%

27.9%

13.2%

Trust in the Internet as a Main Source of Information, by

Income and Age

Politicians are trying to inﬂuence people

Public ofﬁcials will know more

about what people have to say

People can know more about

what government does

People will have more say about

what the government does

People can have more political power

-7.5%

-11.6%

-8.4%

-11.1%

46.3%

39%

49%

43.1%

35.2%

Percentage of People Agreeing or Disagreeing That the

Internet Can Change Politics

International

Relations

Tunisia has consistently received a fairly small

amount of development aid from Europe, from

bilateral donor relationships with individual countries

(who increased their contribution a great deal,

temporarily, in 2007 and 2008) and from a cooperation

programme with the EU as a whole. Only one in ten of us

had heard of EU Development Cooperation, but of those

that have heard of it a large majority believe it has a positive

impact.

Almost a third of us believe that the most positive thing the EU could do for us is to offer

support by promoting economic development, and almost a quarter thought that the EU

should be promoting democracy in the country. However, a ﬁfth of us think that the EU should

not get involved in Iraq’s affairs and only three per cent believe it should help promote women’s

rights.!

88

Percentage of People That Have Heard of the EU

Development Cooperation Programmes

87.2%

12.8%

Yes No/DK

Rating of the EU Development Cooperation Programmes

(% of Those Who Have Heard of Them)

10.4%

79.2%

6.6%

3.8%

Negative/Very Negative No Impact

Positive Very positive

The Arab Transformations Report on Political, Economic and Social Attitudes, 2014: Iraq

Figures