Content uploaded by Susan Haack
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Susan Haack on Dec 09, 2016
Content may be subject to copyright.
Vulgar Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect (1995)
Abstract
Richard Rorty's neo-pragmatist critique of epistemology, Haack argues, is not only false to the classical pragmatist tradition, but badly confused---and when Stephen Stich adds in his version of anti-epistemological neo-pragmatism, matters get still worse. There cold be no honest inquiry in this supposed neo-pragmatist utopia!
... One of the consequences of these theoretical divergences is that sometimes there exists no consensus on deciding whether an author is really in line with the pragmatic credo or not. For example, Susan Haack was very critical about Richard Rorty's understanding of pragmatism, which she called Bvulgar pragmatism^ (Haack 1995). Finally, one may argue that another stumbling block towards defining Bpragmatism^lies in the fact that many pragmatist authors have precisely developed against general Btheories^and intellectualism. ...
This paper discusses the problematic use of the “pragmatic credo” – defined as a minimal set of basic pragmatist propositions – in practice, especially when facing creation. To do so, we analyze how managers deal with “art-based firms” and provide results from an in-depth case study of a small firm operating in garden art and design (Béjean 2015; 2008). The findings are interpreted in light of previous theoretical developments in management theory (Hatchuel European 2005), as well as symbol theory (Goodman 1968; 1978). They suggest that, while appearing wise and reasonable, the pragmatic credo as embodied in practical management doctrines rather inhibits collective action and masks the necessary revision of symbolic “orders of action”, defined as the way action is itself pre-categorized by a special class of symbols. The paper concludes by providing further insights of how an “epistemology of action” could contribute to enriching both pragmatism and management, especially when action is no longer the solution to resort to but rather the enigma to unfold.
... The second variation of the argument against the desirability of Rorty's solution can be termed "the liberal commitment problem" [3,[22][23][24][25][26][27][28]. Rorty urges us, it appears, to wholly devote the private sphere to self-perfection, which is private in the sense that it does not take other people into account. ...
This article provides a new interpretation of Richard Rorty’s notion of the private-public distinction. The first section of the article provides a short theoretical overview of the origins of the public-private distinction in Rorty’s political thought and clarifies the Rortian terminology. The main portion of the article is dedicated to the critique of Rorty’s private-public distinction, divided into two thematic sections: (i) the private-public distinction as undesirable and (ii) the private-public distinction as unattainable. I argue that Rorty’s formulation provides plausible answers to the first kind of criticism, but not to the second. Finally, a reformulation of the private-public distinction will be suggested, which both mitigates the second line of criticism and better coheres with Rorty’s general theory.
This essay critically examines the so-called ‘unnaturalness’ of historical thinking. I identify and analyse three lines of argument frequently invoked by historians to defend the validity of historical inquiry in response to scepticism, which is often couched in postmodern terms. In doing so, I highlight that these lines of argument are predicated upon historians’ thought processes and concepts being domain general. This idea of historical thinking as part of our ordinary thinking could help us develop a history curriculum in which students are required to employ those processes and concepts to solve both everyday and historical questions. With such a curriculum, students could more easily see the relevance of history education to their daily lives.
O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar a perspectiva do filósofo neopragmatista Richard Rorty sobre a filosofia e a atividade profissional de seus praticantes. Nesse contexto, privilegiamos alguns aspectos de sua crítica anti-representacionista ao legado filosófico moderno e também seu prognóstico acerca do que a atividade filosófica pode vir a se tornar na contemporaneidade. No decorrer da argumentação de Rorty, temos uma abrangente crítica à noção epistemológica dominante de uma imagem mental especular e, em contrapartida, a proposição de uma necessária transição para o campo cultural na qual a ênfase filosófica residiria nas possibilidades de uso da linguagem como modo de lidar com o mundo.
This article examines Richard Rorty’s much criticized figure of the ironist, and the role that it plays in liberal society. It argues that, against Rorty’s own presentation, irony might have positive social consequences. It does so by examining Rorty’s description of the ironist, arguing that it contains different ideas which emerge at different points in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. It takes up William Curtis’ claim that irony is a civic virtue, one closely associated with liberal ideas such as tolerance and pluralism. Curtis is insightful in identifying this aspect of irony, but I argue that it might also play a further role. The ironist is concerned with self-creation, something which Rorty takes to be a private activity, but I argue that the selves ironists create might potentially benefit liberal society, with the ironist’s redescriptions calling into question received wisdom and alerting us to unnoticed forms of cruelty.
The aim of this paper is to argue that Richard Rorty’s claim that pragmatism is opposed to all varieties of metaphysics is fundamentally mistaken. After detailing pragmatist reasons for thinking Rorty’s proposal is justified, I argue that there are more compelling pragmatist reasons to think Rorty’s metaphilosophical interpretation of pragmatism is rather problematic: firstly, Rorty has a narrow understanding of ‘metaphysics’ and he does not take into account Peirce’s argument that it is impossible to eliminate metaphysical concepts from ordinary language and our scientific practices; secondly, Rorty’s Sellarsian philosophical anthropology and his proto-Brandomian theory of the constitution of norms are in fact instances of metaphysical positions. I conclude the paper by claiming that given that pragmatism is in fact supportive of a specific variety of metaphysics, the relationship between idealism and pragmatism ought to be seen as involving more convergence rather than great contestation
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.