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Chapter 15
The War at Home: Putin’s Information
Strategy Toward the Russian Population
Nina Hellum
Probably there is no such thing as an objective truth. But we
need the rules to deal with it to function as a society.
—Peter Pomerantsev (in an interview with Urve Eslas, April
2015)
We’re something along the lines of Russia’s Information
Defense Ministry.
—Employees at the news service RT (Russia Today) (Spiegel
Online, May 30, 2014)
Abstract Russian president Vladimir Putin is pursuing a return to great-power status
for Russia. In order to achieve his goal, Putin is using several information strategies to
persuade the population to accept an escalation in military spending and the use of
military force. These strategies have been called hybrid or information warfare,
because they involve manipulating information available to the general public by
controlling television networks and the Russian media. The media presents the
Russian population with an “us against them”narrative where the “genuine and clean”
Russian moral values are contrasted with the “depraved, immoral and decadent West.”
This battle of values is depicted in the national media as an existential struggle that
requires the support and expansion in the use of military force.
Keywords Military Information Strategy Russian Influence
Introduction
President Vladimir Putin has been outspoken about his ambition to return Russia to
a great power status. He needs a powerful military to achieve this. One part of this
strategy is Putin’s promise to protect “genuine”Russians, not only those inside
Russian territory, but all Russians on foreign territory as well. His protection
mandate was the pretext for annexing Crimea in March 2014. Protecting Russians
N. Hellum (&)
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, P.O Box 25, 2027 Kjeller, Norway
e-mail: Nina.Hellum@ffi.no
©Springer International Publishing 2017
I. Goldenberg, J. Soeters and W.H. Dean (eds.), Information Sharing in Military
Operations, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-42819-2_15
235
at home and abroad yields a double benefit for Putin: It increases the level of
patriotism and loyalty among the population, which in turn encourages Russians to
support increased military spending and to join the service.
Various analysts refer to Russia’s strategy as “hybrid warfare”or “information
warfare”because of its strong focus on control through the manipulation of
information:
The weaponization of information, culture and money is a vital part of the Kremlin’s
hybrid, or non-linear, war, which combines the above elements with covert and small-scale
military operations (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014).
Galeotti states that “there is something of a panic in the west at the moment over
fears that it is losing the ‘information war’with Russia”(Galeotti 2015). Much
analysis has concentrated on Russia’s manipulation and deception in connection
with the conflict in Ukraine. But the long-range motive for flexing Russia’s muscles
in Ukraine may not have been to intimidate adversaries, such as the United States
and NATO, but rather to inflame Russian patriotism in support of Russian power.
This chapter explores the strategy used by the Putin regime to control and dis-
seminate information to influence its own population. I argue that the regime’s main
objective is to convince the Russian people to accept expanding military budgets
and the use of military force and to encourage young men to enroll in military
service.
1
To achieve this, Putin and the Russian government strategically use dif-
ferent methods and tools, which will be further described and discussed in this
chapter.
Military Budget
Putin and his administration
2
have to justify the fiscal, human, and equipment assets
needed to enlarge Russia’s military. Increasing the military’s popularity by making
Russians more proud of their national defense again seems to be a priority. In 2008,
an extensive Russian military reform was presented by then-defense minister
Anatoly Serdyukov.
3
The reform followed the August 2008 Russian–Georgian war,
when it became obvious to the Russian military that it needed modernization (Klein
and Pester 2014). There had already been a small change in budgetary structure in
2005, but after 2008 (Kumar 2013) Russia’s total military expenditure increased
1
For original video and English transcript of Putin’s speech March 18. 2014, go to: http://kremlin.
ru/events/president/news/20603 and http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-says-
russia-will-protect-the-rights-of-russians-abroad/2014/03/18/432a1e60-ae99-11e3-a49e-76adc9210
f19_story.html.
2
For more insight on who Putin surrounds himself with, see Dawisha (2014).
3
For more information on the reform, see Sjlykov (2009) and Andresen (2010), http://www.
globalaffairs.ru/number/n_14298,http://en.rian.ru/infographics/20091204/157098191.html.
236 N. Hellum
from 763 million RUB in 2005 to 2.786 billion RUB in 2013,
4
from 3.53 to 4.19 %
of Russia’s GDP (Cooper 2013, p. 20).
In 2015, the Kremlin’s military spending was expected to slow down. Oil prices
were far lower than expected, and in June 2015, President Putin signed a revised
budget. One prediction said:
With assumptions of a 3 % decrease in the economy’s total output and a 15 % hike in the
real value of the military budget (a modest assumption given some of the outlandish initial
proposals), Russia would spend 5.34 % of its 2015 economic output on its military
(Adomanis 2015).
However, while the numbers are not yet available, the challenge for the Russian
military is that they have already spent too much: “military expenditure already
exceeded 9% of quarterly GDP, more than double the budgeted amount”
5
(Guriev
2015). This fiscal situation makes it even more important for Putin and the Kremlin
to solidify support for military expenditures. Their chosen strategy seems to be to
try and influence the population with different means of information, like manip-
ulated stories, false news, and presenting an enemy who needs to be fought. News
that the Russian defense industry has grown despite sanctions from the West are
frequently communicated from the leaders (Moscow Times 2015).
A debate over Russia’s military expenditure in 2011 ended with the firing of the
finance minister at the time, Alexei Kudrin, who had seemingly been a responsible
and effective financial minister. President Medvedev harshly asked him to resign if
he could not accept his (the president’s) decisions about further increasing the
military budget. Kudrin could not, and resigned the same day (Guriev 2015;
Mauldin and Cullison 2011). Even though the dismissal may have been a move by
Medvedev to prove his authority, it still sent a strong signal about the importance of
a powerful Russian military.
Militarized Patriotism and Masculinity
For many years, the Russian military has had a dubious reputation among the
population, and many young men are terrified of being drafted (women are not
conscripted). According to a 2014 poll, 41% would rather not see their brother,
husband, or close relative serve in the army (Russian Public Opinion Research
Center 2014). Earlier, one concern was the prospect of being sent to Chechnya or
some other warzone, but the worst part has for many young men and their loved
ones been the dedovshchina,
6
or hazing (Daucé2014). Veteran soldiers bully, beat,
and torture recruits, sending dozens of young men to their deaths every year, while
hundreds are injured and thousands affected. This practice has made military
4
Not taking inflation into account.
5
Note the fact that military procurements are charged from the first quarter.
6
A cognate of the Russian word dedushka (grandfather).
15 The War at Home: Putin’s Information Strategy …237
service very unpopular, and many young men who cannot buy their way out, run
away to evade being drafted. One of the latest measures to prevent uklonisty (or
draft dodgers) from escaping the military is a Duma proposal to forbid them from
leaving the country for five years if they evade military service (Lenta.ru 2015).
Diminishing the numbers of evaders is one task for the military, but keeping the
soldiers within the military is also a challenge. Some military personnel, soldiers,
non-commissioned officers, and officers have left their units and been charged with
(and some convicted of) desertion (Koshnik et al. 2015). Some state their reason for
running away as reluctance to fight in the Ukraine. The Secretary General of the
Committee of Soldiers’Mothers of Russia,
7
Valentina Melnikova, reports that in
the Rostov region 250 conscript soldiers refused to sign their contracts when they
realized that they would be sent to fight in Lugansk in the Ukraine (Masyuk 2014;
LIGA 2014).
In order to attract more eligible young men into military service, either as
conscripts or as contract soldiers (kontrakniki), the Russian authorities must
engender a wave of patriotism, supported by good salaries and social and family
welfare benefits. Decline in demography and economy is reducing the military’s
human and monetary resources (Renz 2014, p. 73; Russel 2015, pp. 11–12), thus
making it an unattractive career for many Russians. Klein and Pester refer to a
forecast saying that the number of 18-year-old Russian men will decrease from
1.1 million in 2007 to 630,000 in 2017, with only two thirds of them fit to serve. In
the face of this shrinking number, changing the military’s reputation into a popular
career for young people will be vital for the government.
Cultivating the traditions and the culture of masculinity goes hand in hand with
the idea of a strong nation relying on its military strength. Putin has promoted an
image of himself as a muscular man and a strong leader, posing with fierce animals,
weapons, flexing his muscles shirtless, and generally portraying himself as a
“macho”man.
8
Rebuilding the atmosphere of the great Soviet Union has also been
a passion for Vladimir Putin. Already in 2000, in his presidential inauguration
speech, he said:
We must not forget anything. We must know our history, know it as it really is, draw
lessons from it and always remember those who created the Russian state, championed its
dignity and made it a great, powerful and mighty state (BBC News 2000).
Regaining Russia’s strength seems to have been one of Putin’s highest priorities.
The masculinity culture and the military are closely linked. Belkin explains the
importance of images in connection with American politicians placing themselves
in various military contexts in order to appear masculine (Belkin 2012, p. 2). In
numerous societies, including Russia, the ideal of the masculine and the idea of the
military are closely intertwined.
7
Sojuz Komitetov Soldatskikh Materej Rossii (Союз Комитетов Солдатских Матерей России).
8
Numerous pictures and videos are available, see for example: https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=4igWP1CPREw,orhttp://www.mnn.com/lifestyle/arts-culture/blogs/vladimir-putin-the-undisputed-
master-of-eccentric-macho-photo-ops.
238 N. Hellum
Sasson-Levy argues that “hegemonic institutions are embodied and reproduced
through the construction of extreme masculinities”(Sasson-Levy 2008, p. 296) and
goes on to emphasize that
In militaristic societies, the most significant contribution to the state is participating in the
armed forces. This connection between military service and the state is based upon the
glorification of militarized masculinity, with the soldier’s body providing its material
infrastructure (p. 301).
The 2015 military parade on Den’Pobedy (Victory Day), celebrated in Moscow
on May 9th, was a prestige-building project for President Putin.
9
On account of the
Russian annexation of Crimea and Russia’s involvement in East Ukraine, most
Western leaders declined his invitation, which would seem like a defeat for the
Russian president (Parfitt 2015a,b; Walker 2015a). But it was still a large-scale
demonstration of Russian military power. Russians of all ages were seen wearing
military paraphernalia. It was even reported that there was an official spraying of
dry ice and chemicals (hydrocarbon) to keep the clouds away during the parade at
the cost of 430 million RUB (RSN 2015; Dobroserdova 2015).
Some of the negative aspects of Russia’s recent military ventures have also been
hidden or masked. Reports from the Committee of Soldiers’Mothers of Russia
describe graveyards with unmarked graves, portable crematoriums, disappearing
grave plaques, and journalists being beaten by strangers for photographing occur-
rences like these in connection with the conflict in Ukraine (Masyuk 2014;
Ivanenko 2014; Dvali 2015). Valentina Melnikova describes how families of
deceased soldiers suddenly “clam up”and refuse to talk any further about their
sons’cases. She believes that the families’silence comes from fear of not receiving
their pensions or losing the money promised to their sons (Ivanenko 2014).
The effort of the Russian regime to enhance the popularity of the military
through imagery and spectacle is evident in the recent opening of a military theme
park just outside Moscow (Chance 2015). The so-called Patriot Park consists of a
vast amount of military equipment, such as tanks and grenade launchers. Children
get to play with them while eating military rations and watching re-enactments of
key Russian and Soviet battles (Dean 2015). The park has been called a “military
Disneyland”(Chance 2015; Dean 2015; Walker 2015b) and was opened by
President Putin himself in June 2015. Putin declared that this was a part of his
“military-patriotic work with young people”(Walker 2015a).
A poll conducted by the Levada Center in April 2015 shows that the level of
Russian patriotism is very high. In October 2013, 69 % answered that they con-
sidered themselves to be patriots, and after the annexation of Crimea and during the
conflict in East Ukraine, the number rose to 78 % (Levada-tsentr, 2015b
10
). The
Russian regime had succeeded in creating a wave of patriotism among its citizens.
9
See the whole parade on: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GE023IHaCyE.
10
The Levada Center operates with a Russian and an English website. They do not contain the
same polls and results. Therefore, in this chapter, the different sites will be referenced using the
Russian and the English names.
15 The War at Home: Putin’s Information Strategy …239
In June 2015, the Levada Center presented their polls on the situation in Russia,
saying that 89 % of the Russian population approved of Putin’s actions as president
(Levada Center 2015e). In November 2013, the number was as low as 61 %. So
Putin’s actions in Ukraine made him popular at home, much like the Russian
intervention in Syria in 2015–2016. Of course, the Kremlin has other means of
promoting a positive image of the regime—especially of the president—in the
public’s mind. The most important weapon in the domestic information war is
television.
Television as a Weapon
One of Russia’s most influential news channels is RT (formerly called Russia
Today), a large network with viewers all over the world, broadcasting in several
languages. Its goal is to “give Russia’s point of view on world events”and their
slogan is “Question more.”The managing editor once told Pomerantsev that “there
is no such thing as objective reporting”(Pomerantsev 2014, pp. 4, 47). According
to Lucas, RT “acts as a corrosive, anti-systemic force”(2014, n.p.). The aim is to
attack the whole idea of truth, and spread uncertainty about all the news coming
from the Western world.
Russians receive much of their news through television. For example, the
Levada Center published numbers showing that 94 % of the Russian population
used television as their main source of news information concerning Ukraine and
Crimea (Levada Center 2014). Being able to control this media means being able to
exert considerable influence over the population. Pomerantsev describes the
importance of television in the regime’s effort to gain information control: “TV is
the only force that can unify and rule and bind this country. It’s the central
mechanism of a new type of authoritarianism, one far subtler than twentieth-century
strains”(Pomerantsev 2014, p. 5).
Russia appears democratic in some ways, with democratic elections and a
political opposition. But this is also a maskirovka,
11
Pomerantsev claims, which
takes the form of a theater play on TV that makes the Kremlin leaders look good:
“When the beetroot-faced communists and the spitting nationalists row on TV
political debating shows, the viewer is left with the feeling that, compared to this
lot, the President is the only sane person”(2014, p. 42).
A German journalist who worked for the Russian television network NTV
reveals how he and his colleagues were drawn more and more out of journalism and
into propaganda:
Sometimes the instructions come from the Presidential Administration, and they’re written
on these special notecards. Everybody knows about them, even though they’re not signed
or anything, and you can’t ever prove it. These contain so-called “strong
11
A Russian term used to describe military deception, or earlier, camouflage.
240 N. Hellum
recommendations,”which are, for example, regularly sent to evening news shows, and they
deal with inconvenient, controversial topics. What to emphasize, what scandal to highlight,
which points to bring up, and so on (Loshak 2015).
RT reported in the summer of 2015 that 86% of the Russian population did not
doubt the capabilities of the Russian military (RTa 2015). The poll was conducted
by the state agency VTSIOM and was also cited in Ria Novosti, saying that 86% of
the population are convinced that the Russian army will protect them against
possible threats. This is a huge leap from only 25% answering the same in 2013
(Ria Novosti 2015).
Trolls: Russia’s Information Soldiers
Television has been central to Putin’s information strategy, but his regime has not
overlooked the power of social media. An element in the strategy for influencing
social media is a group of professional online “trolls”—that is, young men and
women who are paid to write comments and plant stories on various web-based
media outlets. One of these “troll farms”is widely known as “the Agency”:
The Agency had become known for employing hundreds of Russians to post pro-Kremlin
propaganda online under fake identities, including on Twitter, in order to create the illusion
of a massive army of supporters; it has often been called a “troll farm”(Chen 2015).
The company, called Internet Research, was sued by a former employee, the
undercover journalist Lyudmila Savchuk, in a bid to expose them as propagandists
working for the Kremlin. The practice seems to continue, in spite of several jour-
nalists’reports about the firm’s activities (Bidder 2015; Dolgov 2015; Chen 2015).
Another tactic used to influence the population is distraction. In this context, the
“bread and circuses”approach seems relevant. The dazzle of the Victory Day
parades and military theme parks is being paired with moving the audience’s
attention away from political issues by getting them looking in the same direction as
Putin. When Putin got personally involved in arranging the Sochi Olympic Games,
large parts of the media followed him, bringing the public along with them.
Distraction also seems to be one of the goals of the trolls who use social media.
Spreading disinformation and discrediting the regime’s opponents distracts from the
regime’s activities.
Recently, RT presented a story about a new flag depicting a “proper”family. It
was made by activists from Russia’s majority political party, United Russia
(Edinaya Rossia), and supposedly intended to oppose “gay fever”and defend tra-
ditional values against “aggressive LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender)
propaganda”(RTb 2015). The slogan on the flag reads “A real family”(Fig. 15.1):
Several comments followed the article, many of which could have been written
by various trolls (Chen 2015). One commentator calls him- or herself “Foreign
Agent”and writes demeaning of Russians, mentioning alcoholism and domestic
violence: “Vodka intoxicated guy beating his wife, that is more the Russian reality.
15 The War at Home: Putin’s Information Strategy …241
Make such a flag.”Another commentator calls him- or herself “Lyn Shermont”and
answers back, “A white cop beating a black guy flag is needed as well,”trying to
make a point about racist American police officers. As Chen suggests, both these
commentators could be fake, working for companies like the Agency (aka, Internet
Research) (Chen 2015). The aim is to stir things up and construct degrading
comments from both sides. It could even be the same person, or troll, behind both
these comments, with the intent to create more conflict.
The practice of “trolling”the comments section of websites is now so common that
several newspapers worldwide have simply removed the option. Troll farms and the
manipulation of social media will most certainly continue, but the exposure of such
activity, like Chen writes about in “The Agency,”may create greater awareness.
Why do people believe this kind of disinformation? Russia’s recent past entails
uncertainty, which largely emerged from the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In
the aftermath of this situation, the Russian people had a desire to believe in
something, and the narrative of Putin as Russia’s savior was eagerly welcomed by
large parts of the population. Putin has since used information strategy as a means
to stay in power. Schepp writes in his review of a biography on Putin:
It is not the truth about Putin himself which Belkovsky’s book reveals, but rather the Putin
system: Information and disinformation merge seamlessly into each other. The assurances
of those in power have not held sway over a suspicious populace for a long time now. That
is why conspiracy theories flourish, and that is why Russians consider almost anything
possible no matter how insane it seems (Schepp 2013, n.p.).
Henrik Ibsen declared in his play “The Wild Duck”from 1884: “Deprive the
average human being of his life-lie, and you simultaneously remove his happiness”
(Ibsen 1991).
12
In tumultuous times, people long for explanations that make them
feel safe. In other words, the majority of the Russian population accepts the story
they are given, as a choice of safety and comfort. Making a distinction between
one’s group and “others”is an effective way of building an image of an entity or
group or society as interdependent. As a poll from the Levada Center in 2015
Fig. 15.1 The “real family”
flag (RTb 2015)
12
Original title: “Tar De livsløgnen fra et gjennemsnittsmenneske såtar De lykken fra ham med det
samme”.
242 N. Hellum
shows, the Russian’s impression of the United States posing a threat to Russia is
“definitely”and “probably”believed by 59% of the population, which is an increase
from 47% in 2007 (2015c). So, why is it important to have an enemy?
Us and Them
Authoritarian states take advantage of people’s need to feel safe. Creating an
outside enemy is an especially effective way of leveraging this need, since it also
plays into our desire to differentiate ourselves from other groups (Berreby 2008;
Neumann 2003). In a war, conflict, or dispute, this need becomes even more salient.
People distinguish themselves through categorizing others, and the starkest dis-
tinction between us and them is human and inhuman.
Dehumanizing one’s opponent is a potent way of drawing the home audience
into supporting military force and accepting the legitimacy of violence. As
Grossmann (2009) explains, the ability to kill gets stronger the more cultural, moral,
social, and physical distance one places between oneself and one’s victim. Creating
distance between oneself and another person simplifies the dehumanization of that
person. Eventually, one no longer sees the other person as a human being: “When
we dehumanise others, we do not simply regard them as non-human. We regard
them as less than human”(Smith 2014, n.p.).
Characterizing groups of people in subhuman terms has been used by the Putin
regime to dehumanize its enemies. Zhanna Nemtsova, daughter of murdered
Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, claims that Russian propaganda kills
because the dehumanizing rhetoric of state TV incites violence (Vedomosti 2015).
As prime minister in 2000, Putin vowed to “destroy Chechen vermin”(Parsons
2000). Language that dehumanizes the enemy has also been used in speeches
rationalizing military campaigns, including the war on terrorism:
The “breeding grounds”metaphor is part of a family of metaphors that represent terrorists
as “vermin,”“parasites,”“plague”and “viruses.”President Bush, for example, repeatedly
called terrorists “parasites”while Putin gained prominence and stature as a strong leader in
part because of his use of crude language to describe Chechen terrorists as “vermin”and
“viruses.”Besides dehumanising and decontextualising terrorism, such metaphors consti-
tute and justify exterminist military campaigns to “wipe out”and “eliminate”the disparate
social movements, armed resistance networks and political organisations determined by
hegemonic power structures to be “terrorists”(O’Loughlin et al. 2004, pp. 7–9).
Shekhovtsov points out that Putin’s regime has been “constantly alarming the
Russian information system with reference to various perceived threats”
(Shekhovtsov 2015). The division of us and them is stressed in several different
ways by the Russian regime. One important example is the Russian authorities’use
of the gay community as a distinction between Russia and the West. The gov-
ernment calls the gay lifestyle “gay propaganda”and explains the purpose of the
new strict legislation as “a protection of Russian children”(Federal Law of the
Russian Federation 2013). Dividing the West and Russia into an “us and them”
15 The War at Home: Putin’s Information Strategy …243
dichotomy by depicting the LGBT community as an immoral Western invention
seems to have helped in forming anti-Western public opinion. This is an important
argument for Putin because he can further emphasize the need for military resources
to fight “depraved”Western societies.
The Russian population’s skepticism toward the gay community seems to have
increased, making an even more distinct gap between us and them. In June 2003,
47% reported positive feelings toward homosexuals and lesbians, while 48%
reacted negatively. In March 2015, the positive percentage had shrunk to 29%,
while the negative percentage had risen to 65% (Levada Center 2015d). To present
one of many examples, in May 2015, an activist, Elena Kakhtaryova, held a placard
with the following message at an anti-gay rally in Moscow: “No to euro gay values.
No to a euro gay way of development. Only Russia and only victory”(Zemaryalai
and Bush 2015).
This is in line with the Russian regime’s making a distinction between “the real
victorious Russia”and “the decadent and depraved West.”Putin has also been a
keen advocate of stronger ties between the government and the Russian Orthodox
Church. In April 2015, he praised the church for “working tirelessly to bring unity,
to strengthen family ties and to educate the younger generation in the spirit of
patriotism”(Parfitt 2015a). Patriarch Kirill demonstrated the Orthodox Church’s
resistance to same-sex marriage when saying it was a “very dangerous symptom”
that would lead down a “path of self-destruction”if applied in Russia (Parfitt
2015a). Teaming up with the powerful Patriarch Kirill and underlining “the vic-
torious and morally superior Russia”reinforces the us–them division and provides
Putin with another reason for justifying his protection of Russia and its values.
Closing Remarks
When analyzing how information campaigns work, it is important to understand
which mechanisms come into play when specific groups of human beings are
targeted. Russians have a different language, rhetoric and culture than the
Americans, the English, or the Norwegians. Russia has a complicated past, and the
history of tsars, communism, and the break-up of the Soviet Union has made many
Russians think and live in a very distinct way. There is an expression in Norway,
“It’s not about how your life is, but how you take it.”This point becomes essential
when trying to understand what Russians believe in, and how they live their lives.
To control a country’s self-image is to control the country: “For it is surely the case
that control of a society’s memory largely conditions the hierarchy of power”
(Connerton 1989, p. 1).
Bateson (1972) uses the term skismogeneses (creation of division) to depict
progressive differentiation between social groups or individuals. It can be sym-
metrical: a spiraling self-reinforcing interaction, leading to destruction if not stop-
ped. Or it can be complementary, in that the actors involved supplement each other’s
244 N. Hellum
behavior in a way that leads to extreme outcomes of their particular characteristic
role-patterns. When analyzing the relationship between the Russian leadership and
the Russian population, there seems to be a skismogeneses of the last kind. Their
relationship can give the impression of destructive dependency, where the leadership
is dominant and deceptive and the population is submissive and receptive.
In light of these cultural differences, we should not expect the same reaction and
behavior from various people confronted with the same information. As
Pomerantsev writes in his book Nothing is True and Everything is Possible,
Russians have been “following the system”without ever believing in it:
Seen from this perspective, the great drama of Russia is not the “transition”between
communism and capitalism, between one fervently held set of beliefs and another, but that
during the final decades of the USSR no one believed in communism and yet carried on
living as they did, and now they can only create a society of simulations….All cultures
have differences between “public”and “private”selves, but in Russia the contradiction can
be quite extreme (2014, p. 199).
There is a big difference between Russian private and public behavior. Few
emotions are shown in public. Goffman (1992) describes the difference between
facades and the various roles people play in their ev eryday lives. Publicly, most people
have just one, or at least only a few facades, but privately, they play out a much more
varied set of roles. Pomerantsev (2014) depicts such patterns of behavior in Russia, the
seemingly cynical mentality, and how people can be sweet and cruel at the same time.
In order to comprehend the Russian information strategies, understanding Russian
history, culture, mentality, and rationale is of vital importance:
The Kremlin has finally mastered the art of fusing reality TV and authoritarianism to keep
the great 140-million-strong population entertained, distracted, constantly exposed to
geopolitical nightmares, which if repeated enough times can become infectious
(Pomerantsev 2014, p. 231).
At the end of April 2015, 61 % of the population answered that order was currently
more important for Russia than democracy. The term order here being described as
preferable “even if achieving this means that some democratic principles are violated
and personal freedoms are limited”(Levada Center 2015a). Russians are born into a
world of maskirovka. For them, upholding the image of the box itself seems more
significant than scrutinizing its contents. This is why Putin’s information strategy can
influence the Russian people into believing distortions, making him popular and
increasing patriotism and support for military funds and operations.
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