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Empathy and Its Discontents
Abstract
What role does the experience of feeling what you think others are feeling - often known as 'empathy' - have in moral deliberation and moral action? Empathy has many fans and there is abundant evidence that it can motivate prosocial behavior. However, empathy is narrow in its focus, rendering it innumerate and subject to bias. It can motivate cruelty and aggression and lead to burnout and exhaustion. Compassion is distinct from empathy in its neural instantiation and its behavioral consequences and is a better prod to moral action, particularly in the modern world we live in.
... To begin framing the research question and hypotheses of this study, we start with an attempt to more clearly define and differentiate empathy, sympathy and compassion. Although the precise definitions of these constructs are many-times debated (Cuff et al., 2016;Bloom, 2017;Hall and Schwartz, 2019), there is general agreement among scholars that sympathy can be described as one person understanding what another person is feeling, empathy can be described as one person feeling what another person is feeling, and compassion is the desire to relieve the suffering of another. Bloom (2017) offered the distinction that empathy refers more generally to our ability to take the perspective of and feel the emotions of another person, whereas compassion is when those feelings and thoughts include the motivation to help. ...
... Although the precise definitions of these constructs are many-times debated (Cuff et al., 2016;Bloom, 2017;Hall and Schwartz, 2019), there is general agreement among scholars that sympathy can be described as one person understanding what another person is feeling, empathy can be described as one person feeling what another person is feeling, and compassion is the desire to relieve the suffering of another. Bloom (2017) offered the distinction that empathy refers more generally to our ability to take the perspective of and feel the emotions of another person, whereas compassion is when those feelings and thoughts include the motivation to help. He made the theoretical argument that compassion is distinct from empathy in its neural instantiation and behavioral consequences, stating that compassion is a better prod to moral action. ...
... They specifically argued that their measurements to assess recognition of common humanity in the experience of suffering more closely address two of the elements of Strauss et al. (2016): (1) recognizing suffering and (2) motivation to alleviate suffering, which distinguishes it from pity. This intricate distinction is important to the current study because pity, as defined by Pommier et al. (2020), fosters a sense of distance and disconnection, whereas compassion has connection as its core (Strauss et al., 2016;Bloom, 2017;Pommier et al., 2020). This connection is thought to be a possible mechanism proposed in this study as a mediator between the VR experience and moral reasoning. ...
This study utilizes a controlled experimental design to investigate the influence of a virtual reality experience on empathy, compassion, moral reasoning, and moral foundations. With continued debate and mixed results from previous studies attempting to show relationships between virtual reality and empathy, this study takes advantage of the technology for its ability to provide a consistent, repeatable experience, broadening the scope of analysis beyond empathy. A systematic literature review identified the most widely used and validated moral psychology assessments for the constructs, and these assessments were administered before and after the virtual reality experience. The study is comprised of two pre-post experiments with student participants from a university in the United States. The first experiment investigated change in empathy and moral foundations among 44 participants, and the second investigated change in compassion and moral reasoning among 69 participants. The results showed no significant change in empathy nor compassion, but significant change in moral reasoning from personal interest to post-conventional stages, and significant increase in the Care/harm factor of moral foundations. By testing four of the primary constructs of moral psychology with the most widely used and validated assessments in controlled experiments, this study attempts to advance our understanding of virtual reality and its potential to influence human morality. It also raises questions about our self-reported assessment tools and provides possible new insights for the constructs examined.
... Cozma [43] Overall, the notion of kindness was preferred because it implies actions that help others, regardless of the extent to which one understands what others feel (empathy) or understands their situation (presence or lack of suffering that triggers compassion). Kindness avoids the bias that could result from misinterpretations associated with empathy, argues Bloom [20], because one can behave with compassion regardless of understanding. Further, empathy does not come easy to all people. ...
... Thus little of the literature discussed how faculty embody kindness toward students, peers, or themselves. Twenty-nine papers were selected for more detailed exploration based on having a focus on kindness; this included 19 journal manuscripts [17,18,[20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36], 5 book chapters [15,[37][38][39][40], and 5 conference/guidebook papers [42][43][44][45][46]. Searches within each document were used to identify the frequency that specific terms occurred. All 29 papers included the term kindness 5 or more times (median 29 mentions, with high of 157) or had kindness in the title (26 papers, including 2 with kindness in the title but not mentioned more than twice in the paper overall). ...
... In fact, it almost seems conceited to believe that one can truly understand another person in that way, as it relates to professional contexts (e.g., an engineer working with community members; a professor teaching a student). Bloom [20] calls attention to the potential for bias associated with empathy. As an alternative, Bloom lobbies for compassion. ...
... The main difference in a three-component compared to a twocomponent view of empathy is the distinction in neural and psychological processes implicated in sharing others' emotions (labelled affective) vs. having other-oriented motivations of concern and care toward others' emotions (labelled sympathetic). Whereas it may be reasonable to assume and be hopeful that sharing in others' emotions will co-occur with showing concern, it turns out this assumption may not always be correct (Bloom, 2017;. For instance, feeling others' distress may lead to burnout and result in motivations to alleviate one's own suffering rather than stimulate concern for the other (Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009). ...
... One possibility might be the EmpaToM protocol (Kanske et al., 2015) or modifications to the Lishner et al. (2015) protocol that add cognitive empathy. To improve our understanding of empathy in psychopathy and autism, however, where a two-component model has dominated, future efforts should especially aim to improve how we examine task-based sympathetic vs. affective empathy (Bloom, 2017). ...
Most studies examining empathy in psychopathy and autism agree that different components of empathy are implicated in each condition. Most of these studies, however, have relied on a two-component model of empathy (emotional and cognitive). Our study examines how psychopathic and autistic traits may be associated with the components of a more differentiated model of empathy that includes affective (i.e., feeling what others feel), cognitive (i.e., knowing what others feel), and motivational/sympathetic components (i.e., caring what others feel). The study included 884 college students who completed self-report measures of psychopathic and autistic traits as well as the three components of empathy. Using path modeling, we found that of the three components of empathy, sympathetic empathy was uniquely negatively associated with psychopathic traits and each of its dimensions whereas cognitive empathy was uniquely negatively associated with autistic traits and each of its dimensions. Affective empathy was not uniquely associated with either psychopathic or autistic traits. Our findings suggest that sympathetic aspects of empathy are uniquely implicated in psychopathy and cognitive aspects of empathy are uniquely implicated in autism, but neither condition may have core problems with affective empathy. We suggest that etiological models and treatment approaches might consider the implications of a three-component model of empathy for psychopathy and autism.
... Recent findings, for instance, reveal that higher levels of individualism curb the pro-social tendency of empathetic capacity, resulting in less support for welfare assistance toward those in need (Feldman et al., 2020). Empathy can pose potential burdens for empathic distress and burnout that are likely to hinder empathizers' pro-social motivations (Bloom, 2017). Lebowitz and Dovidio (2015) document that when people regulate empathy by suppressing feelings of compassion, they become less likely to engage in altruistic behavior and are more likely to prefer social distancing. ...
... Although anger and anxiety may have distinct effects on political attitudes, both anxiety (Koc & Anderson, 2018) and anger (Wirtz et al., 2016) felt toward newcomers augment social distance toward immigrants and refugees (Erisen, 2018). Contrarily, compassion is a well-established emotion, boosting pro-social attitudes (Bloom, 2017;Delton et al., 2018). Experimental research reveals that compassion is strongly connected with lower levels of prejudice toward a variety of outgroups, including immigrants (Sinclair et al., 2016). ...
Scholarly research on emotions tackles various domains, among which opposition to immigration ranks as socially and politically critical. While earlier literature captures distinct aspects of this domain, certain emotions are less studied than others, primarily compassion. By focusing on the unique role of compassion in comparison with anger and anxiety, we tackle how and under which conditions compassion changes social distancing and political preferences regarding refugees. Drawing on representative data collected in Turkey—the country with the highest number of Syrian refugees—we test whether feelings of compassion toward refugees can hold back the escalation in opposition to immigration as a result of heightened threat. Our results show that compassion functions as the key to lowering the negative effects of perceived threat in shaping refugees' social and political integration.
... If individuals perceive and internalize vicarious emotions as their own (sympathy), it could lead to aversive emotional reactions such as anxiety or sadness (Eisenberg et al., 2015;Jensen et al., 2014). Consequently, the "empathetic response" could become self-centered, with the aim of alleviating personal distress (Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009;Lamm et al., 2007), potentially leading to aggression (Bloom, 2017;Palumbo & Latzman, 2021). ...
... It is suggested that empathetic concern (precursor of compassion) is associated with feelings of warmth, concern and care for others, which in turn promotes positive emotions and might serve as a motivation to enhance the well-being of others (Gilbert, 2017). Conversely, individuals who exhibit signs of a lack of perspective-taking, such as difficulties in emotional decoding (A. , self-other differentiation, and cognitive appraisal of others' suffering (Lamm et al., 2007;Preckel et al., 2018), may be prone to experiencing distress and intensifying negative affect , leading to aversive and egocentric responses aimed at alleviating their own distress (Bloom, 2017;. We propose that aggression might be utilized by offenders as a coping strategy, akin to a fight-or-flight mechanism, to protect themselves from overwhelming negative emotions. ...
Violence and offending pose significant public health concerns, and understanding the factors associated with these behaviors is crucial for effective intervention and prevention programs. While extensive research has focused on risk factors, the role of protective factors, such as empathy and self-compassion, has received less attention. This study examines the predictive value of cognitive and affective empathy on aggression and explores the mediating role of self-compassion in the relationship between personal distress and aggression within an offender population. A sample of 120 offenders (90 men and 30 women) completed self-report measures of aggression (Aggression Questionnaire), empathy (Interpersonal Reactivity Index) and self-compassion (Self-compassion scale – Short Form). Additionally, a semi-structured interview was conducted to collect sociodemographic information and criminal history. Results showed a negative association between perspective-taking (a cognitive empathy component) and aggression, while personal distress (an affective empathy component) positively predicted aggression. Self-compassion partially mediated the relationship between personal distress and aggression, indicating its potential role in reducing violent tendencies. These findings highlight the importance of considering empathy and self-compassion in understanding and addressing aggression in offenders. Specifically, a deeper understanding of the affective empathy construct and considering self-compassion as a complementary tool could enhance gender-inclusive prevention and intervention programs, potentially reducing recidivism rates.
Keywords: aggression; offenders; empathy; self-compassion.
... Prosocial behaviors towards in-group members predominantly engages reward network such as the ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex [47][48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56][57] , as well as emotional salience network including the anterior insula and amygdala [58][59][60][61][62] . In contrast, prosocial behaviors towards out-group members is more closely associated with regions involved in cognitive control, such as the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex [56,57] 在腹侧纹状体和内侧前额叶皮层中引发更为显著的激 活 [49] , 这表明内群体成员之间的互惠被赋予了更高的 [91] . 也有研究发现, 在经典道 德困境(电车难题)中, 那些具有更高共情关注的个体, 更容易做出非理性的判断, 从而导致集体利益的受 损 [92] . ...
... In Figure While a moderate level of empathy can be helpful for the client-lawyer relationship, and may also facilitate the management of the legal case (i.e. the attorney is more motivated, dedicates more attention to the case, understands contexts and connections more easily, etc.), excessive empathy can have a negative impact on both the represented party and the attorney. As regards the legal case, a high level of empathy could be linked to a biased assessment of facts and evidence and (unlike compassion) could also be associated with hostile attitude towards to other party in the proceedings (Bloom, 2017), which might be counterproductive with respect to the party represented. ...
... People struggle to relate to large groups of suffering others (Bhatia et al., 2021;Butts et al., 2019;Dunn & Ashton-James, 2008;Nordgren & McDonnell, 2011), just as they become desensitized to horrific events they encounter repeatedly (Effron, 2022). Human emotion is finite (Bloom, 2017). ...
Across 15 studies (N = 2,636), people who considered the prevalence of a problem (e.g., 4.2 million people drive drunk each month) inferred it caused less harm, a phenomenon we dub the big problem paradox. People believed dire problems—ranging from poverty to drunk driving—were less problematic upon learning the number of people they affect (Studies 1–2). Prevalence information caused medical experts to infer medication nonadherence was less dangerous, just as it led women to underestimate their true risk of contracting cancer. The big problem paradox results from an optimistic view of the world. When people believe the world is good, they assume widespread problems have been addressed and, thus, cause less harm (Studies 3–4). The big problem paradox has key implications for motivation and helping behavior (Studies 5–6). Learning the prevalence of medical conditions (i.e., chest pain, suicidal ideation) led people to think a symptomatic individual was less sick and, as a result, to help less—in violation of clinical guidelines. The finding that scale warps judgments and de-motivates action is of particular relevance in the globalized 21st century.
... Although extraordinary altruists are not insensitive to risk and are no less likely than other adults to experience anxiety in general (Rhoads et al. 2023b), they experience less self-focused distress in emergencies or in response to the suffering of others. Several lines of evidence indicate that personal distress is inversely associated with altruism (Bloom 2017). First, altruists self-report less personal distress than other adults on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Rhoads et al. 2023b). ...
... Both are two sides of the same coin. As others have pointed out, adopting a humanitarian gaze (Fassin, 2012) or an empathic stance (Bloom, 2017) does not necessarily lead to altruism. Empathic regard for the humanity of some creates shame and humiliation in the observer that may lead to a disavowal of responsibility and casting of blame on a more susceptible Other. ...
... While some authors emphasized that such emotional response should be identical to the perceived emotions of others for affective empathy to be present (e.g. Bloom, 2017), others argued that it could be either similar or complementary (Murphy et al., 2022). Different neural networks facilitate cognitive and affective empathy (Kogler et al., 2020), supporting the two components' division. ...
Empathy is predominantly assessed with self-report questionnaires. However, their structural validities were not well-supported. This study aimed to re-explore and refine the factor structure of the Chinese version of the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE) and investigate the pathways linked between dimensions of empathy and schizotypy. Data from a valid sample of 1,360 community-dwelling adults (aged 18–35) were subjected to the exploratory graph analysis (EGA) and bootstrap EGA for factor retention. A goodness-of-fit evaluation was conducted using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Lastly, a Gaussian graphical model with sum scores of the resultant empathy dimensions, positive, negative, and disorganized schizotypy, and paranoia as nodes was estimated. Results supported a three-factor structure for the revised 20-item QCAE, demonstrating a good model fit. The new Online simulation subscale was associated with reduced disorganized schizotypy, whereas the new Perspective-taking subscale was associated with decreased disorganized schizotypy and increased positive schizotypy. The composite Affective empathy subscale was associated with decreased negative schizotypy and increased positive and disorganized schizotypy and paranoia. Overall, the revised QCAE demonstrated good structural validity, measuring three separable and internally cohesive factors of empathy. Each factor possessed unique and differential relationships with schizotypy dimensions that merit research and clinical attention.
... We consistently replicated this finding despite using a highly constrained study design with only the time horizon varying between conditions, controlling for plausibly relevant contextual factors such as the quality of medical treatment for the sufferer's pain and cost-effectiveness of the charity. Together, these studies have theoretical implications not only in social psychology (Bloom, 2017;Trope & Liberman, 2010) but also in moral philosophy (Greaves & MacAskill, 2021;Mogensen, 2022;Purves, 2016;Schramme, 2024) and economics (Frederick, 2006;Schelling, 1995). For example, descriptive evidence that people empathize less with future generations compliments normative philosophical arguments and economic delay discounting models about how individuals and institutions should engage in intergenerational cooperation. ...
The present actions of individuals and society at large can cause outsized consequences on future generations’ quality of life. Moral philosophers have explored how people should value the well-being of future generations. Yet, the question of how people actually feel when considering the plight of others in the future compared to the present remains understudied. In four experiments (N = 4,698), we demonstrate evidence of an intertemporal empathy decline such that people feel less empathy toward another person’s suffering in the future compared to the present (Studies 1–4) despite predicting that the same amount of pain would be felt (Studies 1–2). Despite this, imagining another person’s suffering in the future leads to placing greater value on future generations’ welfare (Study 2). We also show that this intertemporal empathy decline reduces the amount people donate to a future-oriented versus present-oriented charity of the same type (Study 3). Finally, we find that prompting people to more vividly imagine another person’s future suffering attenuates the decline in intertemporal empathy (Study 4). Together, this research identifies empathy as a present-biased psychological obstacle impeding future-oriented prosocial behavior.
... It has been argued that affective empathy is an important driver of prosocial behavior, and a large number of studies corroborate this view (e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, 1987;Lockwood, 2016;Masten et al., 2011;Sze et al., 2012;Williams et al., 2014). However, there are also a number of studies that failed to replicate this relationship (e.g., Barlińska et al., 2013;Jordan et al., 2016), while others even report detrimental effects of affective empathy on prosocial behavior (Bloom, 2017;. One reason for these contradictory findings is that affective empathy also entails reactive outcomes, which can manifest as either empathic concern or personal distress, each having distinct motivational consequences on behavior (Davis, 1996). ...
Psychopathy is a personality construct that has witnessed a surge in research interest since its initial conceptualization more than eight decades ago. Throughout this period, a prominent area of focus has been on socio-emotional deficits. Yet, the current body of research exhibits considerable heterogeneity, leaving conflicting results and multiple unanswered questions. In an effort to reconcile contradictory findings, explore socio-emotional deficits more holistically, and advance the conceptualization of psychopathy, this dissertation was conducted along with three studies.
The first study (Chapter 2: Study I) within this doctoral thesis is a comprehensive meta-analysis that synthesized the bulk of evidence concerning the relationship between psychopathy and both empathy and alexithymia. A total of 72 articles comprising more than 15,000 participants from 19 different countries were included in the analyses. The results suggest deficits not only in affective and cognitive empathy, but also in the understanding of one’s own emotions, i.e., alexithymia. Notably, the pooled correlations varied across psychopathy factors in terms of magnitude and direction, underscoring the importance of recognizing psychopathy as a multidimensional construct.
The second study (Chapter 3: Study II) explored whether alexithymia serves as a mediator in the relationship between psychopathy and empathy deficits, as well as between psychopathy and emotion dysregulation. This was tested across two diverse samples, one drawn from the general population and the other from a German forensic hospital. The results of our path analyses suggest that alexithymia contributes to the lack of empathy and emotion dysregulation in psychopathic individuals. However, these findings were again specific to certain psychopathy factors (i.e., meanness and disinhibition), with boldness indicating adaptive features by being linked to lower levels of alexithymia and fewer socio-emotional deficits overall.
In a final study (Chapter 4: Study III), we investigated the potential for overcoming psychopathy-related empathy deficits through explicit instructions to engage in affective perspective taking. To this end, we tested 87 participants from the community, using an experimental paradigm while simultaneously recording their physiological arousal. Although we observed a disconnect between behavioral and physiological measures of empathic concern, our results imply that empathy is not an automatic response in individuals with pronounced levels of meanness, leading to diminished empathic concern. Yet, this can be overcome when individuals are instructed to engage in affective perspective taking. Consequently, psychopathy does not appear to indicate a fundamental inability to empathize, but rather reflects a reduced propensity to do so automatically.
Taken together, the findings presented in this dissertation advance our comprehension of the various socio-emotional impairments in psychopathy. Specifically, four key conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, affective deficits in psychopathy are substantial, including not only impairments in sharing the emotions of others, but also in understanding one’s own feelings. Secondly, these deficits extend to cognitive empathy. Thirdly, empathic concern does not appear to be absent in individuals with psychopathy per se, but instead does not occur automatically, which may be due to a lack of motivation. Lastly, psychopathy is a multidimensional personality construct that must be viewed as a constellation of distinct traits in order to truly capture all its intricacies. As such, this dissertation offers significant implications for future research and clinical practice.
... Power dynamics, as evidenced by Hershcovis et al. (2017), play a crucial role in shaping how individuals respond to interpersonal stressors, with those in positions of power more inclined to intervene in instances of incivility. Furthermore, the propensity to empathize with others, influenced by multiple factors and referred to as the empathy bias (Bloom, 2017), is notably contingent on the nature of the relationship. Individuals often exhibit greater empathy and a heightened inclination to provide support to members of their own group (e.g. de Waal & Preston, 2017;Klimecki, 2019). ...
Empathy plays a crucial role in the workplace, associated with positive outcomes, including helping behavior and task performance. While most studies have treated empathy as a unidimensional and trait-like characteristic, empathy is best understood as a two-dimensional construct, encompassing stable and fluctuating aspects. Considering this conceptualization, our research explores the relationship between the two dimensions – affective and cognitive empathy – with well-being and prosocial behavior, both at the trait and state levels. We hypothesized that affective empathy is positively associated with fatigue, whereas cognitive empathy is positively related to provided support. Furthermore, we predicted that these relationships would be especially pronounced on days when employees witness conflicts in the workplace. Our results, drawn from two diary studies (Ns = 119 and 179), indicated that affective empathy was related to fatigue, and cognitive empathy was related to provided support on the trait level, supporting our hypotheses. However, the distinctions between the two empathy dimensions were less prominent at the state level, and these effects did not depend on observed conflicts. These findings suggest that affective and cognitive empathy have differential effects, emphasizing the need for balanced and beneficial utilization of empathy in both theoretical development and practical workplace contexts.
... From this study, high levels of empathy were linked to a high emotional exhaustion burnout subscale. Consistent with another study, it also reported that empathy plays a role in moral deliberation and moral action, stimulating cruelty and aggression and accounting for burnout and exhaustion 24 . Other earlier studies found that burnout was significantly higher in medical education, and it has been proposed to specifically define burnout as a pathology of care relationships 25,26 . ...
Objective: In medical education, empathy is an essential element of professionalism; however, medical students are sometimes advised to limit empathy. Excessive empathy might be linked to burnout and trigger negative consequences such as low mood and quality of life. Due to limited data regarding the association between empathy and burnout, this study aimed to examine the relationship between levels of empathy and burnout with their respective subscales, among medical students.Material and Methods: This cross-sectional study was conducted at the clinical level of medical students currently undergoing medical training at the Faculty of Medicine, Prince of Songkla University, at the end of the 2020 academic year. Medical students aged more than 20 years who completed the questionnaires were included. The questionnaires comprised 1) demographic data, 2) The Toronto Empathy Questionnaire, 3) The Maslach Burnout Inventory (Thai version), and 4) The Thai Mental Health Indicator-15. Associations between empathy and burnout including emotional exhaustion, depersonalisation, and personal accomplishment subscales were investigated using linear regression analysis. Results: From the three-year clinical level, 91.9% (466 of 507) of medical students completed the questionnaires, with a mean age of 23.1±1.4 years. In the linear regression analyses, empathy scores were positively associated with emotional exhaustion and negatively associated with depersonalisation and low personal accomplishment (Adjusted coefficient 0.18 (0.02, 0.33), -0.09 (-0.18, -0.01), and -0.42 (-0.52, -0.31), respectively). Among the empathy subscales, altruism was significantly correlated with personal accomplishment (r=-0.41, p-value<0.001).Conclusion: The study revealed a negative correlation between empathy and overall burnout. While a high level of empathy was found to prevent depersonalisation and enhance personal accomplishment, it did not significantly hinder the emotional exhaustion associated with burnout. Empathy, particularly altruism, was related to personal accomplishments. Our findings suggest that empathy is a crucial determinant of burnout prevention; therefore, optimal levels of empathy should be taught to medical students during medical training to prevent emotional exhaustion. However, the evaluation of further causal explanations is recommended.
... It suggested that empathy with nature is an uncertain and limited predictor of PEBs (Brown et al., 2019). People tend to be overly sympathetic dispositions to favor personal stories and those types of people who share common characteristics or familiarity and are less likely to relate to collectives and the biosphere (Bloom, 2017). Empathy with nature, therefore, does not always motivate individuals to develop PEBs. ...
Residents’ participation in pro-environment behaviors (PEBs), as an indispensable part of solving urban environmental problems, is important for cities to promote sustainable development. Place attachment (PA) could play a pivotal role in encouraging residents’ PEBs, yet the conclusions are inconsistent. The present study explores the research gaps on how place attachment affects residents’ decision-making of engaging in PEBs. This study employs a combined approach of survey and experimental studies, and integrates empathy with nature and nature relatedness to gain a deeper comprehension of the underlying mechanisms. In Study 1, using large-scale data collected in Beijing (n = 1,128), we found that place attachment was positively correlated with PEBs through the role of empathy with nature and nature relatedness. To further examine the causal link, we manipulated place attachment using a scenario simulation approach in Study 2 (n = 230). Our results demonstrate the robust causal link between place attachment and PEBs. In addition, we further validated the sequential mediating role of both empathy with nature and nature relatedness in this relationship. This study opens new avenues for local government to improve environmental management. The findings are further explored in terms of both theoretical and practical implications.
... The psychologist Paul Bloom has identified four types of empathy that occur in humans: (1) cognitive/intellectual empathy (i.e., having an intellectual understanding of what others are feeling but not necessarily having the same emotions); (2) emotional contagion (i.e., sharing the feelings of others in one's vicinity); (3) affective or emotional empathy (i.e., experiencing the inferred feelings from others); (4) compassion (i.e., caring for others' well-being) (Bloom 2017). However, when it comes to machine, there is a real possibility that algorithmic technologies do not compute with emotion or empathy at all, and that any computer devices or programs have to affect people has more to do with apophenia and pareidolia and magical thinking-by users (not machines)-rather any power intrinsic to their logical or electrical operation. ...
... Although extraordinary altruists are not insensitive to risk and are no less likely than other adults to experience anxiety in general (Rhoads et al. 2023b), they experience less self-focused distress in emergencies or in response to the suffering of others. Several lines of evidence indicate that personal distress is inversely associated with altruism (Bloom 2017). First, altruists self-report less personal distress than other adults on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Rhoads et al. 2023b). ...
... Empathy is the ability to emotionally share in the experiences of another (Dvash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014). Bloom (2017) noted that different forms of empathy can influence moral decision making. Cognitive empathy involves comprehending someone's feelings and thoughts without experiencing those feelings, whereas emotional contagion refers to feeling what someone near you is feeling, and emotional empathy is not distance-dependent, enabling an individual to feel another's emotions, whether they are fictional or real. ...
In this practice brief, we question how, if at all, coming out stars is an activity that functions to cultivate allyship. Building on literature that similarly interrogated educational activities that center privilege to evoke empathy from attendees, we raise concerns about coming out stars as an activity. We then use Love’s (2018) liberatory consciousness framework to offer a reimagined activity that fosters critical thinking without replicating oppression. Our goal is to provide educators with an activity that increases attendee awareness and analysis and inspires action and accountability without enacting dehumanization or using identity as a spectacle for pity.
... Empathy for suffering, de ned as feeling what the sufferers feel (Bloom, 2016(Bloom, , 2017Jordan et al., 2016), emerges as a noteworthy job stressor in child exploitation investigation for two key reasons. First, investigators engage with negative expressions or envision the suffering of children depicted in the material, potentially eliciting empathetic suffering (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006;Singer & Lamm, 2009). ...
Investigating internet child exploitation cases poses unique challenges for law enforcement employees, particularly investigators, who are routinely exposed to traumatic material depicting the suffering of victims. We posit that the primary source of stress in internet child exploitation investigation stems not from the exposure to the material per se, but rather from investigators' empathy for the suffering of the victims depicted in the material. Drawing from the Job Demands-Resources (JD-R) model, our study investigates the relationship between empathy for suffering and the experiences of burnout and posttraumatic stress disorder among investigators in internet child exploitation cases. Additionally, we explore the moderating effect of social support from colleagues on these relationships. In our online study involving 168 investigators of internet child exploitation (90 women), we sought to emphasize the role of empathy for suffering as a key factor in stress reactions. Our findings indicate that, beyond mere exposure, empathy for suffering is positively correlated with posttraumatic stress disorder and burnout (i.e., emotional exhaustion and cynicism). Furthermore, our study provides partial support for the moderating effect of social support from colleagues on investigators' stress responses to both empathy for suffering and exposure. Our findings indicate that empathy for suffering emerges as a central job stressor, while social support serves as a crucial job resource for mitigating this stress in the context of child exploitation investigation. These results carry implications for risk assessment and health promotion within the realm of internet child exploitation investigations, opening up a broad avenue for further research.
... The term 'empathy' can be interpreted in a myriad of ways and is often a synonym for concepts such as kindness, compassion or concern (Bloom, 2017). Although there is no unifying definition of empathy (Cuff et al., 2016). ...
The aim of this study is to explore young people's perspectives on the factors that facilitate or inhibit empathy and prosocial responding among youth. Qualitative focus groups ( n = 29) were undertaken with Irish young people aged 13–17 years relating to their views on the factors that facilitate or inhibit the expression of empathy. Parents, friends, and social media were found to be key influences, whereas barriers identified included societal norms, gender norms, lack of skill, or knowledge and target characteristics. This research provides important insights into adolescents’ perceptions of the social correlates of empathy. Concepts from the sociology of empathy, such as empathy maps and paths, are helpful in drawing out the implications for future research and practice.
... Kendini kişinin yerine koymak olarak da tanımlanan empati, bireyler arasında etkili ve sağlıklı iletişimde önemli bir değişkendir ve genellikle bilişsel ve duygusal empati olarak ikiye ayrılır (Smith, 2001). Bireyin diğer kişinin "duygu ve düşüncelerini" anlaması, örneğin; birinin üzgün olduğu sonucunun "bilişsel empati", birey de diğer kişinin "duygularını" deneyimler, örneğin; birisi üzgün olduğunda, onunla üzgün olma durumu "duygusal empati" olarak tanımlanmaktadır (Bloom, 2017). Spor, dünyada her yaştan ve meslekten katılım ve izleyici bulan sosyal bir olgudur (Öztürk, 1997). ...
... One explanation might be that experts avoided empathic behavior, assuming that showing empathy could possibly jeopardize their objectivity and their role as neutral expert. The psychologist Paul Bloom indeed argued that empathy might bias decisions [43]. ...
... Research with children has found positive relations between empathy induction or scale-based measures of empathy, on the one hand, and various forms of altruistic behavior, including donations and prosocial lying, on the other (Malti et al., 2009;Nagar et al., 2020). However, more recent and nuanced results underline methodological challenges but also point to empathy as a driver of altruistic behavior mainly toward those we know (Bloom, 2017;McCauley et al., 2022;Schaefer et al., 2021). These results highlight that research must look beyond the empathy-altruism hypothesis, and toward cognition in general, to get a fuller picture of how altruistic intentions and behavior are enacted. ...
... In addition, we tested a third model in which some items were combined into factors and other items were entered individually. This model was based on theoretical considerations to distinguish between empathy (e.g., sharing the emotions of another person) and compassion (Bloom, 2017), and to distinguish between the experience of gratitude as a prosocial emotion (Sauter, 2017), and the experience of feeling better as a more hedonically driven motivation. We found that the mixed model achieved the highest model fit, with an AIC of 3808.6, as compared to 3812.7 and 3820.0 for the factor and the individual items model, respectively (see supplemental Table S6, for details). ...
People were confronted with a barrage of negative news during the COVID-19 crisis. This study investigated how anticipated psychological impact predicted decisions to read personalized and factual COVID-19 news. First, participants chose, based on headlines, whether they wanted to read news articles (or not). Then, all headlines were rated on a set of motivational dimensions. In order to test confirmatory hypotheses, the data were divided into an exploration (n = 398) and validation data set (n = 399). Using multilevel modeling, we found robust support for four preregistered hypotheses: Choice for negative COVID-19 news was positively predicted by (a) personal versus factual news; (b) the anticipated amount of knowledge acquisition; (c) the anticipated relevance to one’s own personal situation; and (d) participant’s sense of moral duty. Moreover, exploratory findings suggested a positive relationship between headline choice and anticipated compassion, a negative relationship with anticipated inappropriateness and gratitude, and a quadratic relationship with anticipated strength of feelings. These results support the idea that negative content offers informational value, both in terms of understanding negative events and in terms of preparing for these events. Furthermore, engagement with negative content can be motivated by moral values.
... Significantly, empathy promotes altruistic behaviour by encouraging people to have selfless concerns for the well-being of others and to think beyond personal desires and needs, reorienting their practices towards the benefit of the social group as a whole (Cotton 2021: 73). Empathy is praised by various scholars as playing a positive and moral social role (Slote 2007;Bloom 2017;Cotton 2021). Baron-Cohen (2012) perceives empathy as a cure-all, in that problems can be surmounted or at least be alleviated adopting a more empathetic behaviour towards one another. ...
Bringing together narrative elements, virtual affordances, and participants’ embodied interactions, virtual reality (VR) movies instantiate new narrative techniques by offering an immersive experience. This study examines virtual narrative beyond mere interactional engagement and extends the phenomenon to include worlding, metaleptic embodiment, and instantiated possible selves. It aims at exploring VR narrative as idiosyncratic cognitive processes, with a special focus on the notions of empathy and emotional involvement as significant elements contributing to this peculiar interactional and cognitive experience. A cognitive stylistic approach is adopted to explain the functional ability of VR technology in transporting participants to alternate worlds and in making them experience a kind of self-transformation. The immersively metaleptic discourse of Baba Yaga is examined as engaging participants in a quest of how to act as morally and socially empathetic and responsible citizens—global citizens. Baba Yaga narrative deploys the narrative discourses of flashbacks, facework, doubly deictic ‘you’, performatives, and imperatives along with material processes to situate participants in a virtual space of actions and doings and hence encourage them to configure their desired self(ves) across different immersive interactions. The global citizen is embodied in the interactive narrative of Baba Yaga, through invoking various storyworld possible selves (SPSs): the feeling self, the responsible self, and the moral self, which encompasses climate activist self and interculturally aware self who manages to get rid of its own cultural biases as the narrative proceeds. Embodied in these selves, participants transform the virtual world into possible worlds of their own passion, agency, choices, hopes, and desires.
Across her many works of fiction, Ali Smith at once laments the breakdown of civic conversation and, in what seems a paradoxical move, draws stark ethical demarcations between characters who represent different political orientations. This tension is acute in her Seasonal Quartet, and especially the first of the four novels, 'Autumn.' Hailed on publication as the first serious literary response to Brexit, 'Autumn' gives vivid account of the 'end of dialogue' at a time when 'all across the country, there was misery and rejoicing.' On one hand, in 'Autumn' and elsewhere, Smith laments the consequences of the 'end of dialogue' between citizens and populates her fiction with sympathetic characters who notice, with alarm, that 'people [are] saying stuff to each other and none of it ever actually becom[es] dialogue.' Yet on the other hand, her work is itself partisan, specifically in its tendency to draw caricatures of complacently xenophobic middle-class Britons. This article argues that this tension is in fact crucial to the political outlook suggested in Smith’s work, which hints at a positive, post- or nonliberal vision according to which neither novels, nor politics, draw democratic power from empathetic exchange or dialogue, but rather through world-affirming judgment. The specific sort of judgment Smith endorses, I argue, is rooted in 'Autumn's' 'collage' aesthetic, and its significance crystallizes when read alongside Hannah Arendt's account of political judgment. For both Smith and Arendt, the foremost threat to contemporary political life is not partisanship, but rather, the fragility of the 'common world,' and Smith proposes that the collage aesthetics of work like hers play a specific function in helping restore the 'common world.' This article thus proposes that Smith, read alongside Arendt, articulates an original, political purpose for art in the contemporary era.
This chapter introduces the concepts of peace and kindness from a developmental perspective and outlines a social-emotional developmental framework for the relationship between kindness and inner, relational, and intergroup peace. It first reviews Western and Eastern philosophical and psychological perspectives of peace. Second, it introduces the concept of kindness and provides an overview of core components of kindness (i.e., empathy with the self, empathy with others, and prosocial behavior; Malti, Eur J Dev Psychol, 18(5): 629–657, 2021). Using data from the VIA Inventory of Strengths (i.e., VIA Survey) and supplementary validated scales, we tested the theoretical framework that kindness is an important mechanism promoting peace in youth. Preliminary results revealed unique pathways between self- and other-oriented components of kindness (e.g., empathy with the self, empathy with others, and prosocial behavior) and the inner, relational, and intergroup levels of peace. We discuss findings in reference to peace-building interventions to support social-emotional development and kindness across childhood and adolescence.
This chapter explores the intersection of social neuroscience and pro-environmental behavior to understand how prosocial neuroscientific approaches can inform and enhance climate change mitigation efforts. It emphasizes the critical role of understanding cognitive, affective, and motivational antecedents of behavior to address climate change effectively. By examining the neural underpinnings of prosocial behavior, we highlight how insights from social neuroscience may be used to foster pro-environmental decisions and actions. We first discuss methodologies like functional magnetic resonance imaging and transcranial magnetic stimulation, underscoring their potential to reveal determinants of pro-environmental behavior. Then, we discuss the importance of empathy, social cognition, and the neural mechanisms underlying prosociality, suggesting that these can provide a foundation for investigating and encouraging pro-environmental behavior. In addition, the chapter aims to pave the way for a new subdiscipline, environmental social neuroscience, focusing on the cognitive, affective, and social drivers of environmental decision-making and behavior. Integrating neuroscientific and environmental psychology approaches requires innovative research to understand and mitigate the impacts of climate change, ultimately contributing to a sustainable future.
Abstract
The aim of this study was to identify and prioritize the
organizational components of quality of work life of
nurses in the care department of patients with Covid-19
in Isfahan. The research method was mixed. In the
qualitative part, the content analysis method was used
and in the quantitative part, the descriptive-survey
method was used. The statistical population included
nurses in the care department of patients with Covid-19
in hospitals in Isfahan. In the qualitative part of the
content analysis method, semi-structured interviews
were conducted with 12 nurses in a purposeful manner.
In the quantitative section, 300 nurses were selected by
convenience sampling method and using a researchermade questionnaire, the identified components were
prioritized using the "Friedman" test. Organizational
components affecting the quality of work life of nurses
were identified and prioritized as follows: Feeling of
injustice in the ward and hospital, Atmosphere of
cooperation and professional intimacy in the ward and
hospital, The quality of job relationships with managers
and superiors, Awareness of danger and feeling of
danger in the workplace, Workplace safety,
Proportional division of job duties of ward nurses,
Training and monitoring of safety principles, Effective
and related training for COVID-19 virus.
Keywords: qality of work life, Nurses, COVID-19
چکیده
هدف این پژوهش شناسایی و اولویتبندی مؤلفههای سازمانی
کیفیت زندگی کاری پرستاران بخش مراقبت از بیماران مبتلا به
کووید-19 در اصفهان بود. روش پژوهش از نوع آمیخته بود که در
بخشکیفی، ازروشتحلیل محتواودربخشکمیازروشتوصیفی-
پیمایشی استفادهگردید. جامعهآماری شامل پرستاران بخش مراقبت از
بیماران مبتلا به کووید-19 در بیمارستانهای شهر اصفهان بود. در
بخش کیفی از روش تحلیل محتوا به شیوه هدفمند با 12 نفر از
پرستاران مصاحبه نیمه ساختاریافته انجام شد و در بخشکمی 300 نفر
از پرستاران به شیوه نمونهگیری در دسترس انتخاب شدند و با استفاده
از پرسشنامه محقق ساخته، به اولویتبندی مؤلفههای شناسایی شده با
استفاده از آزمون فریدمن پرداخته شد. دادهها از طریق آمار توصیفی
و استنباطی با استفاده از نرمافزار 24-spss توصیف و تحلیل شدند.
مؤلفههای سازمانی مؤثر بر کیفیت زندگی کاری پرستاران به این
ترتیب شناسایی و اولویتبندی شدند: احساس بیعدالتی در بخش و
بیمارستان، جو همکاری و صمیمت شغلی در بخش و بیمارستان،
کیفیت ارتباطات شغلی با مدیران و همکاران بالادست، آگاهی از
خطر و احساس خطر در محیط کار، ایمنی محیط کار، تقسیم متناسب
وظایف شغلی پرستاران بخش، آموزش و نظارت بر رعایت اصول
ایمنی، آموزش اثربخش و مرتبط با ویروس کووید-19.
واژههای کلیدی: کیفیت زندگی کاری، پرستاران ، کووید-
Classical psychological theories widely assert that empathy plays a pivotal role in facilitating prosocial behavior. In essence, individuals are more likely to engage in actions beneficial to others when they experience a strong sense of empathy toward those individuals. Such actions encompass, but are not limited to, rescuing others from suffering, allocating more resources to them, and resisting unjust treatment they may face. Empathic individuals, in a nutshell, demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice their own interests for the well-being of others. However, previous empirical studies focusing on the relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior have yielded heterogeneous findings, challenging classical theories and prompting a reconsideration. Based on a recent literature review and the ongoing research progress within our team, the authors propose three corrective suggestions for the aforementioned theory.
First, the relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior is constrained by external conditions, and an increase in empathy levels does not always guarantee prosocial actions. These conditions include, but are not limited to, the intensity of empathic experience, personal attributes (such as gender and age), environmental factors (such as the scarcity and uncertainty of resources), and the relationship between the initiator and recipient of empathy (e.g., whether they are relatives, friends, or colleagues). In specific cases, empathy might even trigger antisocial behavior. For instance, the authors recently found that the tendency to engage in corrupt collaboration (which is an antisocial phenomenon) increases as a function of trait empathy level.
Second, the primary impact of empathy on prosocial behavior lies not in increasing the frequency of its occurrence but in enhancing its stability. Individuals with higher trait empathy, rather than exhibiting more frequent prosocial tendencies, demonstrate less volatility across different external conditions. Thus, individuals with higher trait empathy may be considered as more reliable and accountable partners in social interactions as their responses to environmental changes are more stable and predictable. The above idea has been supported by our recent experimental studies modulating the scarcity and uncertainty of resources. Here, please note that the “resources” in our experiments were not monetary resources (which have been frequently employed in previous research), but some “relieving resources” (such as flu masks during the pandemic) that could help one or others to get out of trouble. These kinds of resources were used because of their potential implications in evolution psychology.
Lastly, the facilitating role of empathy in prosocial behavior is achieved through alleviating individuals’ anxiety experiences related to the external environment. More specifically, the authors believe that stronger anxiety response to environmental changes during social decision-making processes would make people more focusing on their own risk rather than others’ well-being. As a result, anxious people are more likely to make more self-serving choices. The authors suggest that the influence of empathy and that of anxiety on prosocial volatility counteract with each other.
While some of these points have received empirical support, others remain speculative and warrant further exploration. The authors believe that validating these perspectives will deepen researchers’ understanding of empathy and the essence of prosocial behavior, thereby contributing to the advancement of social psychological theory. It should be noted that previous studies conducted by the authors have focused on resource sharing and helping behavior, in which the status of different participants was imbalanced. Future studies should examine the validity of our “prosocial volatility” hypothesis for other kinds of prosocial behavior such as cooperation. Additionally, exploring empathic responses to artificial intelligence agents remains an important avenue for investigation.
INTRODUCTION As a supplementary mechanism that goes beyond the limits of conventional financial systems, crowdfunding platforms, such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo, have become important funding sources. Crowdfunding enables the generation of funds for business ventures that find traditional profit-based means difficult (Bruton et al., 2015; Davis et al., 2017; Moss et al., 2015). Typical examples are social businesses that address public issues. In crowdfunding, even traditionally hard-to-fund projects such as environmental protection, heritage preservation, welfare for the disabled, and disaster recovery, can be funded by people who agree with their activities. On crowdfunding platforms, money is moved according to a logic that differs from conventional financial systems. Previous studies have revealed the differences between conventional investment and crowdfunding (Allison et 4/, 2015; Belleflamme ez al., 2014; Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Mollick, 2014). A notable feature of crowdfunding platforms is that projects with prosocial orientations are likely to be supported (Allison ez af., 2013; Gorbatai & Nelson, 2015; Pietraszkiewicz et al., 2017). The prosocial orientation of a business refers to its attempt to solve issues related to social welfare through commercial activities (Yunus, 2009). The prosocial orientation of projects in crowdfunding is preferred because the investment motive in crowdfunding is based on altruism, whereas the conventional investment motive is based on self-interest (Allison et al, 2015; Belleflamme ez af., 2014; Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015). In line with this thought, previous studies have pointed out that linguistic expressions of prosocial orientation in campaigns have a significant impact on the success of funding. For example, words indicating virtuous orientation (Moss et al., 2015), altruism (Pictraszkiewicz et al., 2017), and political rhetoric such as accomplishment rhetoric and blame rhetoric (Allison et 4l., 2013), have been reported to foster the success of fundraising.
Dramatic events can evoke feelings of compassion, fear, or threat, and can affect public opinion regarding controversial issues. Such an event was the drowning of 3-year-old Alan Kurdi, a Syrian boy whose body washed up on a Turkish shore, and was photographed, producing an iconic image that was seen worldwide. The image evoked empathy and compassion that neuroscience and psychological research associate with a motivation to help. This article examines the impact of this event on four different aspects of attitudes toward immigration. The timing of the European Social Survey in Portugal allowed us to use this tragic event as a natural experiment. Our results suggest that Kurdi’s drowning had a significant effect on only two sentiments, but no such impact was detected on other attitudes. The results show that the event did not change the respondents’ opinion regarding the possible negative consequences of immigration on the host country’s economy, crime level, or culture, nor did it change their perception of the skills required by immigrants. On the other hand, the empathy induced by the tragic event increased their willingness to have a less restrictive immigration policy and their openness to having close social relationships with immigrants, although these changes were short-lived.
Priority setting is inevitable to control expenditure on expensive medicines, but citizen support is often hampered by the workings of the ‘identified victim effect’, that is, the greater willingness to spend resources helping identified victims than helping statistical victims. In this paper we explore a possible cognitive debiasing strategy that is being employed in discussions on healthcare priority setting, which we call ‘empathy counterbalancing’ (EC). EC is the strategy of directing attention to, and eliciting empathy for, those who might be harmed as a result of one-sided empathy for the very ill who needs expensive treatment. We argue that governments have good reasons to attempt EC because the identified victim effect distorts priority setting in ways that undermine procedural fairness. We briefly outline three areas of application for EC and suggest some possible mechanisms that might explain how EC might work, if at all. We then discuss four potential ethical concerns with EC. First, EC might have the counterproductive effect of reducing overall citizen support for public funding of expensive medical treatments, thereby undermining solidarity. Second, EC may give rise to a ‘competition in suffering’, which may have unintended side effects for patients who feature in attempts at EC. Third, there may be doubts about whether EC is effective. Fourth, it may be objected that EC comes down to emotional manipulation, which governments should avoid. We conclude that insofar these concerns are valid they may be adequately addressed, and that EC seems a promising strategy that merits further investigation.
Activism in educational, social, and community intervention is widespread in literature as an essential professional role in promoting inclusion and social justice for people in situations of vulnerability. Professionals who work with these populations are in a privileged position for informal and situated learning and engagement with professional activism. This contribution reflects upon the many obstacles that may hinder its more prominent expression, but also on its outcomes in terms of learning inclusion, resilience and the process of overcoming the challenges evident in (re)building of professional identities. This involves considering processes that can be decisive in the way people in situations of vulnerability are perceived, heard, supported, empowered, and included.
While wisdom is recognized as a key aspect of human development, it remains unclear how people may be motivated to express and pursue this cherished quality over the course of their development. Here, I investigate the promise of the motivational factors typically covered in self-determination theory (SDT) for offering insights into the expression and development of wisdom. I explore wisdom as conceptualized by the Common Wisdom Model (Grossmann, Weststrate, Ardelt, et al., 2020), which emphasizes moral aspirations and perspectival metacognition. SDT, with its focus on intrinsic tendencies and psychological needs (autonomy, competence, and relatedness), provides a unique lens through which to examine how these wisdom components develop. It offers a view of an agentic person as expressing and developing wisdom in a social context, while navigating life’s difficulties in an unbiased manner. Finally, it offers insight for educational strategies aimed at fostering wisdom, highlighting how an understanding of motivational underpinnings can inform approaches to nurturing wise thinking and behavior.
Much of the excitement about virtual reality and its potential for things like entertainment, art, education, and activism is its ability to generate experiences that are powerfully immersive. However, discussions of VR tend to invoke the notion of immersive experience without subjecting it to closer scrutiny; and discussions often take it for granted that immersive experience is a single unified phenomenon. Against this, we argue that there are four distinct types or aspects of immersive experience that should be distinguished: representational immersion, which corresponds roughly to what is sometimes called “psychological presence”; participatory immersion, which is related to the interactive aspects of VR experience; affective immersion, which has to do with the subject’s emotional relation to the experience; and narrative immersion, which captures the phenomenon of being caught up in the flow of events experienced. We argue that this four-way distinction helps us understand the powerfully immersive character of VR, while also recognizing its continuity with the immersion we experience with media such as novels, films, and music. We also argue that the account of immersion we offer here lets us better understand the connection between VR and empathy, charting a middle course between extreme enthusiasts who view VR as the ultimate “empathy machine” and extreme skeptics who argue that this attitude is misguided.
Compared to the traditional statistical methods, Bayesian linear mixed-effects modeling (BLMM) has a great number of advantages in dealing with the hierarchical structures underlying datasets and providing more intuitive statistical results. These advantages together popularize BLMM in psychological and other field research. However, there is still a lack of tutorials on the practical applications of BLMM in psychology studies in Chinese. Therefore, we first briefly introduced the basic concepts and rationales of BLMM. Then we employed a simulated dataset to demonstrate how to understand fixed effects and random effects, and how to use the popular brms R package to specify models for BLMM based on the experimental design. We additionally covered the procedure of pre-specifying priors with prior predictive checks, and the steps of performing hypothesis testing using the Bayes Factor. BLMM, with its extensions such as Generalized BLMM, has great flexibility and capability, they can and should be applied in various psychology research.
Legal docu-performances (LDPs) are the staging of actual legal cases that have already been decided by the court. As such, they can serve as a laboratory in which the interface between theater and law is explored. The transformation from the courtroom to the stage aims to foster a critical examination of the legal process and its influence on public discourse. In this paper I focus on the place of empathy in this examination. While the role of empathy has been contested in both the legal and the theatrical sphere, empathy has also been advocated as essential to the pursuit of justice. In probing the role of empathy in LDPs, I distinguish different kinds of empathy and different strategies of employing empathy in the service of critique. I illustrate these strategies through three performance case studies that challenge the court decision on which they are based: one based on affective empathy, one on cognitive empathy, and one on a combination of the two. I stress, in particular, the impact of these LDPs on the public understanding of the legal and moral issues addressed by performances.
Many nonhuman animals (hereafter animals) grow old within zoos. Aging animals undergo innumerable bodily and mental changes, some of which lead to suffering and keep them from flourishing while others move them towards other roles, opportunities, and standing. Those who take care of aging animals are confronted with various moral considerations of what it takes to care for these animals. Increased human intervention in the later stages of the lives of animals can make it more difficult to find one’s bearings. Conspecifics in the wild gradually become less of a guide for shaping the lives of geriatric animals in confined spaces. Perhaps to take care is to be responsive to the individual animal, both to understand how they have been shaped by living their lives within a zoo and to explore and make available ways for them to continue to exert agency over the later stages of their lives. Moral deliberation helps to engage with the moral issues of taking care. Compassion comprises a vital part of moral deliberation and appears especially promising to care for animals in the later stages of their lives.
Across two preregistered studies with children (3–12-year-olds; N = 356) and adults (N = 262) from the United States, we find robust expectations for intergroup empathic biases. Participants predicted that people would feel better about ingroup fortunes than outgroup fortunes and worse about ingroup misfortunes than outgroup misfortunes. Expectations of empathic bias were stronger when there was animosity and weaker when there was fondness between groups. The largest developmental differences emerged in participants’ expectations about how others feel about outgroup misfortunes, particularly when there was intergroup animosity. Whereas young children (3–5-year-olds) generally expected people to feel empathy for the outgroup (regardless of the relationship between the groups), older children (9–12-year-olds) and adults expected Schadenfreude (feeling good when an outgroup experiences a misfortune) when the groups disliked one another. Overall, expectations of empathic biases emerge early but may be weaker when there are positive intergroup relationships.
Researchers have long been interested in the relationship between feeling what you believe others feel?often described as empathy?and caring about the welfare of others?often described as compassion or concern. Many propose that empathy is a prerequisite for concern and is therefore the ultimate motivator of prosocial actions. To assess this hypothesis, the authors developed the Empathy Index, which consists of 2 novel scales, and explored their relationship to a measure of concern as well as to measures of cooperative and altruistic behavior. A series of factor analyses reveal that empathy and concern consistently load on different factors. Furthermore, they show that empathy and concern motivate different behaviors: concern for others is a uniquely positive predictor of prosocial action whereas empathy is either not predictive or negatively predictive of prosocial actions. Together these studies suggest that empathy and concern are psychologically distinct and empathy plays a more limited role in our moral lives than many believe.
Most people are caring and will exert great effort to rescue individual victims whose needy plight comes to their attention. These same good people, however, often become numbly indifferent to the plight of individuals who are "one of many" in a much greater problem. Why does this occur? The answer to this question will help us answer a related question that is the topic of this paper: Why, over the past century, have good people repeatedly ignored mass murder and genocide? Every episode of mass murder is unique and raises unique obstacles to intervention. But the repetitiveness of such atrocities, ignored by powerful people and nations, and by the general public, calls for explanations that may reflect some fundamental deficiency in our humanity - a deficiency that, once identified, might possibly be overcome. One fundamental mechanism that may play a role in many, if not all, episodes of mass-murder neglect involves the capacity to experience affect, the positive and negative feelings that combine with reasoned analysis to guide our judgments, decisions, and actions. I shall draw from psychological research to show how the statistics of mass murder or genocide, no matter how large the numbers, fail to convey the true meaning of such atrocities. The reported numbers of deaths represent dry statistics, "human beings with the tears dried off," that fail to spark emotion or feeling and thus fail to motivate action. Recognizing that we cannot rely only upon our moral feelings to motivate proper action against genocide, we must look to moral argument and international law. The 1948 Genocide Convention was supposed to meet this need, but it has not been effective. It is time to examine this failure in light of the psychological deficiencies described here and design legal and institutional mechanisms that will enforce proper response to genocide and other forms of mass murder.
In this chapter I ask whether empathy is necessary for morality. This question can be disambiguated in several ways. Is empathy necessary for making moral judgments? Is empathy necessary for developing a moral sense? Is empathy necessary for moral motivation? Is empathy normatively necessary--i.e., should we necessarily try to cultivate an empathy-based moral psychology? I argue that the answer to each of these questions is no. Empathy is less integral to morality, than some have thought, and potentially an impediment to moral motivation. Other moral emotions are more important.
Few psychological concepts evoke simultaneously as much fascination and misunderstanding as psychopathic personality, or psychopathy. Typically, individuals with psychopathy are misconceived as fundamentally different from the rest of humanity and as inalterably dangerous. Popular portrayals of "psychopaths" are diverse and conflicting, ranging from uncommonly impulsive and violent criminal offenders to corporate figures who callously and skillfully manuever their way to the highest rungs of the social ladder. Despite this diversity of perspectives, a single well-validated measure of psychopathy, the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991; 2003), has come to dominate clinical and legal practice over recent years. The items of the PCL-R cover two basic content domains-an interpersonal-affective domain that encompasses core traits such as callousness and manipulativeness and an antisocial domain that entails disinhibition and chronic antisocial behavior. In most Western countries, the PCL-R and its derivatives are routinely applied to inform legal decisions about criminal offenders that hinge upon issues of dangerousness and treatability. In fact, clinicians in many cases choose the PCL-R over other, purpose-built risk-assessment tools to inform their opinions about what sentence offenders should receive, whether they should be indefinitely incarcerated as a "dangerous offender" or "sexually violent predator," or whether they should be transferred from juvenile to adult court. The PCL-R has played an extraordinarily generative role in research and practice over the past three decades-so much so, that concerns have been raised that the measure has become equated in many minds with the psychopathy construct itself (Skeem & Cooke 2010a). Equating a measure with a construct may impede scientific progress because it disregards the basic principle that measures always imperfectly operationalize constructs and that our understanding of a construct is ever-evolving (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). In virtually any domain, the construct-validation process is an incremental one that entails shifts in conceptualization and measurement at successive points in the process of clarifying the nature and boundaries of a hypothetical entity. Despite the predominance of the PCL-R measurement model in recent years, vigorous scientific debates have continued regarding what psychopathy is and what it is not. Should adaptive, positive-adjustment features (on one hand) and criminal and antisocial behaviors (on the other) be considered essential features of the construct? Are anxious and emotionally reactive people that are identified as psychopaths by the PCL-R and other measures truly psychopathic? More fundamentally, is psychopathy a unitary entity (i.e., a global syndrome with a discrete underlying cause), or is it rather a configuration of several distinguishable, but intersecting trait dimensions? Although these and other controversies remain unresolved, theory and research on the PCL-R and alternative measures have begun to clarify the scope and boundaries of the psychopathy construct. In the current comprehensive review, we provide an integrative descriptive framework-the triarchic model-to help the reader make sense of differing conceptualizations. The essence of this model is that alternative perspectives on psychopathy emphasize, to varying degrees, three distinct observable (phenotypic) characteristics: boldness (or fearless dominance), meanness, and disinhibition. The triarchic framework is helpful for clarifying and reconciling seemingly disparate historical conceptions, modern operationalizations, and contemporary research programs on psychopathy. Our review addresses what psychopathy is, whether variants or subtypes exist (i.e., primary and secondary, unsuccessful and successful), the sorts of causal influences that contribute to psychopathy, how early in development psychopathy can validly be identified, and how psychopathy relates to future criminal behavior and treatment outcomes. Despite controversies and nuances inherent in each of these topics, the current state of scientific knowledge bears clear implications for public policy. Policy domains range from whether psychopathic individuals should be held responsible for their criminal actions to whether employers should screen job candidates for tendencies toward psychopathy. In many cases, the findings we review converge to challenge common assumptions that underpin modern applications of psychopathy measures and to call for cautions in their use. For example, contemporary measures of psychopathy, including the PCL-R, appear to evidence no special powers in predicting violence or other crime. Instead, they are about as predictive as purpose-built violence-risk-assessment tools, perhaps because they assess many of the same risk factors as those broader-band tools. Specifically, the PCL-R and other psychopathy measures derive most of their predictive utility from their "Factor 2" assessment of antisocial and disinhibitory tendencies; the "Factor 1" component of such measures, reflecting interpersonal and affective features more specific to psychopathy, play at best a small predictive role. Similarly, current measures of psychopathy do not appear to moderate the effects of treatment on violent and other criminal behavior. That is, an increasing number of studies suggest that psychopathic individuals are not uniquely "hopeless" cases who should be disqualified from treatment, but instead are general "high-risk" cases who need to be targeted for intensive treatment to maximize public safety. Misunderstandings about the criminal propensities and treatability of individuals achieving high scores on measures like the PCL-R have been perpetuated by professionals who interpret such high scores in a stereotypic manner, without considering nuances or issues of heterogeneity. A key message of our review is that classical psychopathy, whether measured by the PCL-R or other measures, is not monolithic; instead, it represents a constellation of multiple traits that may include, in varying degrees, the phenotypic domains of boldness, meanness, and disinhibition. Measures such as the PCL-R that do not directly assess features of low anxiety, fearlessness, or boldness more broadly tend to identify heterogeneous subgroups of individuals as psychopathic. As a consequence, efforts to apply one-size-fits-all public policies to psychopathic individuals may be doomed to failure. In aggregrate, these conclusions may help to shed light on what psychopathy is, and what it is not, and to guide policy interventions directed toward improved public health and public safety.
Emerging evidence suggests that meditation engenders prosocial behaviors meant to benefit others. However, the robustness, underlying mechanisms, and potential scalability of such effects remain open to question. The current experiment employed an ecologically valid situation that exposed participants to a person in visible pain. Following three-week, mobile-app based training courses in mindfulness meditation or cognitive skills (i.e., an active control condition), participants arrived at a lab individually to complete purported measures of cognitive ability. Upon entering a public waiting area outside the lab that contained three chairs, participants seated themselves in the last remaining unoccupied chair; confederates occupied the other two. As the participant sat and waited, a third confederate using crutches and a large walking boot entered the waiting area while displaying discomfort. Compassionate responding was assessed by whether participants gave up their seat to allow the uncomfortable confederate to sit, thereby relieving her pain. Participants' levels of empathic accuracy was also assessed. As predicted, participants assigned to the mindfulness meditation condition gave up their seats more frequently than did those assigned to the active control group. In addition, empathic accuracy was not increased by mindfulness practice, suggesting that mindfulness-enhanced compassionate behavior does not stem from associated increases in the ability to decode the emotional experiences of others.
A growing body of research has focused on so-called ‘utilitarian’ judgments in moral dilemmas in which participants have to choose whether to sacrifice one person in order to save the lives of a greater number. However, the relation between such ‘utilitarian’ judgments and genuine utilitarian impartial concern for the greater good remains unclear. Across four studies, we investigated the relationship between ‘utilitarian’ judgment in such sacrificial dilemmas and a range of traits, attitudes, judgments and behaviors that either reflect or reject an impartial concern for the greater good of all. In Study 1, we found that rates of ‘utilitarian’ judgment were associated with a broadly immoral outlook concerning clear ethical transgressions in a business context, as well as with sub-clinical psychopathy. In Study 2, we found that ‘utilitarian’ judgment was associated with greater endorsement of rational egoism, less donation of money to a charity, and less identification with the whole of humanity, a core feature of classical utilitarianism. In Studies 3 and 4, we found no association between ‘utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial dilemmas and characteristic utilitarian judgments relating to assistance to distant people in need, self-sacrifice and impartiality, even when the utilitarian justification for these judgments was made explicit and unequivocal. This lack of association remained even when we controlled for the antisocial element in ‘utilitarian’ judgment. Taken together, these results suggest that there is very little relation between sacrificial judgments in the hypothetical dilemmas that dominate current research, and a genuine utilitarian approach to ethics.
Can empathy for others motivate aggression on their behalf? This research examined potential predictors of empathy-linked aggression including the emotional state of empathy, an empathy target's distress state, and the function of the social anxiety-modulating neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin. In Study 1 (N = 69), self-reported empathy combined with threat to a close other and individual differences in genes for the vasopressin receptor (AVPR1a rs3) and oxytocin receptor (OXTR rs53576) to predict self-reported aggression against a person who threatened a close other. In Study 2 (N = 162), induced empathy for a person combined with OXTR variation or with that person's distress and AVPR1a variation led to increased amount of hot sauce assigned to that person's competitor. Empathy uniquely predicts aggression and may do so by way of aspects of the human caregiving system in the form of oxytocin and vasopressin.
In the past decade, a flurry of empirical and theoretical research on morality and empathy has taken place, and interest and usage in the media and the public arena have increased. At times, in both popular culture and academia, morality and empathy are used interchangeably, and quite often the latter is considered to play a foundational role for the former. In this article, we argue that although there is a relationship between morality and empathy, it is not as straightforward as apparent at first glance. Moreover, it is critical to distinguish among the different facets of empathy (emotional sharing, empathic concern, and perspective taking), as each uniquely influences moral cognition and predicts differential outcomes in moral behavior. Empirical evidence and theories from evolutionary biology as well as developmental, behavioral, and affective and social neuroscience are comprehensively integrated in support of this argument. The wealth of findings illustrates a complex and equivocal relationship between morality and empathy. The key to understanding such relations is to be more precise on the concepts being used and, perhaps, abandoning the muddy concept of empathy.
As humans we are a highly social species: in order to coordinate our joint actions and assure successful communication, we use language skills to explicitly convey information to each other, and social abilities such as empathy or perspective taking to infer another person’s emotions and mental state. The human cognitive capacity to draw inferences about other peoples’ beliefs, intentions and thoughts has been termed mentalizing, theory of mind or cognitive perspective taking. This capacity makes it possible, for instance, to understand that people may have views that differ from our own. Conversely, the capacity to share the feelings of others is called empathy. Empathy makes it possible to resonate with others’ positive and negative feelings alike — we can thus feel happy when we vicariously share the joy of others and we can share the experience of suffering when we empathize with someone in pain. Importantly, in empathy one feels with someone, but one does not confuse oneself with the other; that is, one still knows that the emotion one resonates with is the emotion of another. If this self–other distinction is not present, we speak of emotion contagion, a precursor of empathy that is already present in babies.
Morality and empathy are fundamental components of human nature across cultures. However, the wealth of empirical findings from developmental, behavioral, and social neuroscience demonstrates a complex relation between morality and empathy. At times, empathy guides moral judgment, yet other times empathy can interfere with it. To better understand such relations, we propose abandoning the catchall term of empathy in favor of more precise concepts, such as emotional sharing, empathic concern, and affective perspective-taking.
Assumptions regarding the importance of empathy are pervasive. Given the impact these assumptions have on research, assessment, and treatment, it is imperative to know whether they are valid. Of particular interest is a basic question: Are deficits in empathy associated with aggressive behavior? Previous attempts to review the relation between empathy and aggression yielded inconsistent results and generally included a small number of studies. To clarify these divergent findings, we comprehensively reviewed the relation of empathy to aggression in adults, including community, student, and criminal samples. A mixed effects meta-analysis of published and unpublished studies involving 106 effect sizes revealed that the relation between empathy and aggression was surprisingly weak (r = -.11). This finding was fairly consistent across specific types of aggression, including verbal aggression (r = -.20), physical aggression (r = -.12), and sexual aggression (r = -.09). Several potentially important moderators were examined, although they had little impact on the total effect size. The results of this study are particularly surprising given that empathy is a core component of many treatments for aggressive offenders and that most psychological disorders of aggression include diagnostic criteria specific to deficient empathic responding. We discuss broad conclusions, consider implications for theory, and address current limitations in the field, such as reliance on a small number of self-report measures of empathy. We highlight the need for diversity in measurement and suggest a new operationalization of empathy that may allow it to synchronize with contemporary thinking regarding its role in aggressive behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).
Is it permissible to harm one to save many? Classic moral dilemmas are often defined by the conflict between a putatively rational response to maximize aggregate welfare (i.e., the utilitarian judgment) and an emotional aversion to harm (i.e., the non-utilitarian judgment). Here, we address two questions. First, what specific aspect of emotional responding is relevant for these judgments? Second, is this aspect of emotional responding selectively reduced in utilitarians or enhanced in non-utilitarians? The results reveal a key relationship between moral judgment and empathic concern in particular (i.e., feelings of warmth and compassion in response to someone in distress). Utilitarian participants showed significantly reduced empathic concern on an independent empathy measure. These findings therefore reveal diminished empathic concern in utilitarian moral judges.
Although empathy is crucial for successful social interactions, excessive sharing of others’ negative emotions may be maladaptive
and constitute a source of burnout. To investigate functional neural plasticity underlying the augmentation of empathy and
to test the counteracting potential of compassion, one group of participants was first trained in empathic resonance and subsequently
in compassion. In response to videos depicting human suffering, empathy training, but not memory training (control group),
increased negative affect and brain activations in anterior insula and anterior midcingulate cortex—brain regions previously
associated with empathy for pain. In contrast, subsequent compassion training could reverse the increase in negative effect
and, in contrast, augment self-reports of positive affect. In addition, compassion training increased activations in a non-overlapping
brain network spanning ventral striatum, pregenual anterior cingulate cortex and medial orbitofrontal cortex. We conclude
that training compassion may reflect a new coping strategy to overcome empathic distress and strengthen resilience.
Background:
Psychopathic traits are associated with increases in antisocial behaviors such as aggression and are characterized by reduced empathy for others' distress. This suggests that psychopathic traits may also impair empathic pain sensitivity. However, whether psychopathic traits affect responses to the pain of others versus the self has not been previously assessed.
Method:
We used whole-brain functional magnetic resonance imaging to measure neural activation in 14 adolescents with oppositional defiant disorder or conduct disorder and psychopathic traits, as well as 21 healthy controls matched on age, gender, and intelligence. Activation in structures associated with empathic pain perception was assessed as adolescents viewed photographs of pain-inducing injuries. Adolescents imagined either that the body in each photograph was their own or that it belonged to another person. Behavioral and neuroimaging data were analyzed using random-effects analysis of variance.
Results:
Youths with psychopathic traits showed reduced activity within regions associated with empathic pain as the depicted pain increased. These regions included rostral anterior cingulate cortex, ventral striatum (putamen), and amygdala. Reductions in amygdala activity particularly occurred when the injury was perceived as occurring to another. Empathic pain responses within both amygdala and rostral anterior cingulate cortex were negatively correlated with the severity of psychopathic traits as indexed by PCL:YV scores.
Conclusions:
Youths with psychopathic traits show less responsiveness in regions implicated in the affective response to another's pain as the perceived intensity of this pain increases. Moreover, this reduced responsiveness appears to predict symptom severity.
Results of 2 experiments supported the proposal that empathy-induced altruism can lead one to act in a way that violates the moral principle of justice. In each experiment, participants were asked to make an allocation decision that affected the welfare of other individuals. Participants who were not induced to feel empathy tended to act in accord with a principle of justice; participants who were induced to feel empathy were significantly more likely to violate this principle, allocating resources preferentially to the person for whom empathy was felt. High-empathy participants who showed partiality agreed with other participants in perceiving partiality to be less fair and less moral (Experiment 1). Overall, results suggested that empathy-induced altruism and the desire to uphold a moral principle of justice are independent prosocial motives that sometimes cooperate but sometimes conflict. Implications of this independence are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Insensitivity to quantity in valuation appears in 3 ways: embedding (when willingness to pay for a good is smaller if assessed after a superordinate good), insensitivity to numerical quantity, and adding up (when willingness to pay for 2 goods is less than inferred from willingness to pay for each good alone). Results of 11 experiments on these effects are generally inconsistent with 3 accounts: People think of the task as a contribution, they get a warm glow from participation, and they have budget constraints on expenditures for certain goods. The results support an explanation in terms of prominence of the type of good as opposed to its quantity. In addition, 1 study supports availability of only the good evaluated rather than other goods of the same type. These findings support the critics of contingent valuation, but they suggest that some of the methods of decision analysis can improve the elicitation of economic values. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This investigation combined behavioral and functional neuroimaging measures to explore whether perception of pain is modulated by the target's stigmatized status and whether the target bore responsibility for that stigma. During fMRI scanning, participants were exposed to a series of short video clips featuring age-matched individuals experiencing pain who were (a) similar to the participant (healthy), (b) stigmatized but not responsible for their stigmatized condition (infected with AIDS as a result of an infected blood transfusion), or (c) stigmatized and responsible for their stigmatized condition (infected with AIDS as a result of intravenous drug use). Explicit pain and empathy ratings for the targets were obtained outside of the MRI environment, along with a variety of implicit and explicit measures of AIDS bias. Results showed that participants were significantly more sensitive to the pain of AIDS transfusion targets as compared with healthy and AIDS drug targets, as evidenced by significantly higher pain and empathy ratings during video evaluation and significantly greater hemodynamic activity in areas associated with pain processing (i.e., right anterior insula, anterior midcingulate cortex, periaqueductal gray). In contrast, significantly less activity was observed in the anterior midcingulate cortex for AIDS drug targets as compared with healthy controls. Further, behavioral differences between healthy and AIDS drug targets were moderated by the extent to which participants blamed AIDS drug individuals for their condition. Controlling for both explicit and implicit AIDS bias, the more participants blamed these targets, the less pain they attributed to them as compared with healthy controls. The present study reveals that empathic resonance is moderated early in information processing by a priori attitudes toward the target group.
Recent imaging results suggest that individuals automatically share the emotions of others when exposed to their emotions. We question the assumption of the automaticity and propose a contextual approach, suggesting several modulatory factors that might influence empathic brain responses. Contextual appraisal could occur early in emotional cue evaluation, which then might or might not lead to an empathic brain response, or not until after an empathic brain response is automatically elicited. We propose two major roles for empathy; its epistemological role is to provide information about the future actions of other people, and important environmental properties. Its social role is to serve as the origin of the motivation for cooperative and prosocial behavior, as well as help for effective social communication.
Most people are caring and will exert great effort to rescue individual victims whose needy plight comes to their attention. These same good people, however, often become numbly indifferent to the plight of individuals who are ``one of many'' in a much greater problem. Why does this occur? The answer to this question will help us answer a related question that is the topic of this paper: Why, over the past century, have good people repeatedly ignored mass murder and genocide? Every episode of mass murder is unique and raises unique obstacles to intervention. But the repetitiveness of such atrocities, ignored by powerful people and nations, and by the general public, calls for explanations that may reflect some fundamental deficiency in our humanity --- a deficiency that, once identified, might possibly be overcome. One fundamental mechanism that may play a role in many, if not all, episodes of mass-murder neglect involves the capacity to experience \textit{affect}, the positive and negative feelings that combine with reasoned analysis to guide our judgments, decisions, and actions. I shall draw from psychological research to show how the statistics of mass murder or genocide, no matter how large the numbers, fail to convey the true meaning of such atrocities. The reported numbers of deaths represent dry statistics, ``human beings with the tears dried off,'' that fail to spark emotion or feeling and thus fail to motivate action. Recognizing that we cannot rely only upon our moral feelings to motivate proper action against genocide, we must look to moral argument and international law. The 1948 Genocide Convention was supposed to meet this need, but it has not been effective. It is time to examine this failure in light of the psychological deficiencies described here and design legal and institutional mechanisms that will enforce proper response to genocide and other forms of mass murder.
Eminent moral philosopher Michael Slote argues that care ethics presents an important challenge to other ethical traditions and that a philosophically developed care ethics should, and can, offer its own comprehensive view of the whole of morality. Taking inspiration from British moral sentimentalism and drawing on recent psychological literature on empathy, he shows that the use of that notion allows care ethics to develop its own sentimentalist account of respect, autonomy, social justice, and deontology. Furthermore, he argues that care ethics gives a more persuasive account of these topics than theories offered by contemporary Kantian liberalism. The most philosophically rich and challenging exploration of the theory and practice of care to date, The Ethics of Care and Empathy also shows the manifold connections that can be drawn between philosophical issues and leading ideas in the fields of psychology, education, and women's studies.
Empathy is critical for social functioning, but it often wanes when it is needed most. Resulting empathic failures precipitate and worsen social conflict. Accordingly, conflict-reduction interventions prioritize developing empathy in order to achieve harmony. Recent research has indicated that such interventions can benefit from a more nuanced understanding of empathy. First, empathy is a multidimensional construct, including understanding, sharing, and feeling concern for others’ emotions. The expression of these empathic processes is further influenced by psychological factors that “tune” people toward or away from empathy. Interventions must therefore diagnose the specific nature and precursors of empathic failures and tailor interventions appropriately. Second, empathy alone may be insufficient to produce prosocial behavior, especially when parties differ in status or power. In these cases, interventions should promote equitable goals and norms in addition to empathy. By understanding its component processes and boundary conditions, practitioners can work to promote empathy in maximally effective ways.
This book takes a hard-science look at the possibility that we humans have the capacity to care for others for their sakes (altruism) rather than simply for our own (egoism). The look is based not on armchair speculation, dramatic cases, or after-the-fact interviews, but on an extensive series of theory-testing laboratory experiments conducted over the past 35 years. Part I details the theory of altruistic motivation that has been the focus of this experimental research. The theory centers on the empathy-altruism hypothesis, which claims that other-oriented feelings of sympathy and compassion for a person in need (empathic concern) produce motivation with the ultimate goal of having that need removed. Antecedents and consequences of empathy-induced altruistic motivation are specified, making the theory empirically testable. Part II offers a comprehensive summary of the research designed to test the empathy-altruism hypothesis, giving particular attention to recent challenges. Overall, the research provides remarkably strong and consistent support for this hypothesis, forcing a tentative conclusion that empathy-induced altruism is within the human repertoire. Part III considers the theoretical and practical implications of this conclusion, suggesting that empathy-induced altruism is a far more pervasive and powerful force in human affairs than has been recognized. Failure to appreciate its importance has handicapped attempts to understand why we humans act as we do and wherein our happiness lies. This failure has also handicapped efforts to promote better interpersonal relations and create a more caring, humane society.
Importance A marked lack of empathy is a hallmark characteristic of individuals with psychopathy. However, neural processes associated with empathic processing have not yet been directly examined in psychopathy, especially in response to the perception of other people in pain and distress.
Objective To identify potential differences in patterns of neural activity in incarcerated individuals with psychopathy and incarcerated persons serving as controls during the perception of empathy-eliciting stimuli depicting other people experiencing pain.
Design In a case-control study, brain activation patterns elicited by dynamic stimuli depicting individuals being harmed and facial expressions of pain were compared between incarcerated individuals with psychopathy and incarcerated controls.
Setting Participants were scanned on the grounds of a correctional facility using the Mind Research Network's mobile 1.5-T magnetic resonance imaging system.
Participants Eighty incarcerated men were classified according to scores on the Hare Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL-R) as high (27 men; PCL-R, ≥30), intermediate (28 men; PCL-R, 21-29), or low (25 men; PCL-R, ≤20) levels of psychopathy.
Main Outcome Measure Neurohemodynamic response to empathy-eliciting dynamic scenarios revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging.
Results Participants in the psychopathy group exhibited significantly less activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, lateral orbitofrontal cortex, and periaqueductal gray relative to controls but showed greater activation in the insula, which was positively correlated with scores on both PCL-R factors 1 and 2.
Conclusions and Relevance In response to pain and distress cues expressed by others, individuals with psychopathy exhibit deficits in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and orbitofrontal cortex regardless of stimulus type and display selective impairment in processing facial cues of distress in regions associated with cognitive mentalizing. A better understanding of the neural responses to empathy-eliciting stimuli in psychopathy is necessary to inform intervention programs.
Students of empathy can seem a cantankerous lot. Although they typically agree that empathy is important, they often disagree about why it is important, about what effects it has, about where it comes from, and even about what it is. The term empathy is currently applied to more than a half-dozen phenomena. These phenomena are related to one another, but they are not elements, aspects, facets, or components of a single thing that is empathy, as one might say that an attitude has cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. Rather, each is a conceptually distinct, stand-alone psychological state. Further, each of these states has been called by names other than empathy. Opportunities for disagreement abound. In an attempt to sort out this disagreement, I wish first to identify two distinct questions that empathy is thought to answer. Then I wish to identify eight distinct phenomena that have been called empathy. Finally, I wish to relate these eight phenomena to the two questions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
People's greater willingness to help identified victims, relative to non-identified ones, was examined by varying the singularity of the victim (single vs. a group of eight individuals), and the availability of individually identifying information (the main difference being the inclusion of a picture in the “identified” versions). Results support the proposal that the “identified victim” effect is largely restricted to situations with a single victim: the identified single victim elicited considerably more contributions than the non-identified single victim, while the identification of the individual group members had essentially no effect on willingness to contribute. Participants also report experiencing distress when the victim is single and identified more than in any other condition. Hence, the emotional reaction to the victims appears to be a major source of the effect. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The last decade has witnessed enormous growth in the neuroscience of empathy. Here, we survey research in this domain with an eye toward evaluating its strengths and weaknesses. First, we take stock of the notable progress made by early research in characterizing the neural systems supporting two empathic sub-processes: sharing others' internal states and explicitly considering those states. Second, we describe methodological and conceptual pitfalls into which this work has sometimes fallen, which can limit its validity. These include the use of relatively artificial stimuli that differ qualitatively from the social cues people typically encounter and a lack of focus on the relationship between brain activity and social behavior. Finally, we describe current research trends that are overcoming these pitfalls through simple but important adjustments in focus, and the future promise of empathy research if these trends continue and expand.
People’s greater willingness to help identified victims, relative to non-identified ones, was examined by eliciting real contributions to targets varying in singularity (a single individual vs. a group of several individuals), and the availability of individually identifying information (the main difference being the inclusion of a picture in the “identified” versions). Results of the first and second experiments support the proposal that for identified victims, contributions for a single victim exceed contributions for a group when these are judged separately, but preference reverses when one has to choose between contributing to the single individual and contributing to the group. In a third experiment, ratings of emotional response were elicited in addition to willingness to contribute judgments. Results suggest that the greater contribution to a single victim relative to the group stems from intensified emotions evoked by a single identified victim rather than from emotions evoked by identified victims in general.
Little is known about the neurobiological mechanisms underlying prosocial decisions and how they are modulated by social factors such as perceived group membership. The present study investigates the neural processes preceding the willingness to engage in costly helping toward ingroup and outgroup members. Soccer fans witnessed a fan of their favorite team (ingroup member) or of a rival team (outgroup member) experience pain. They were subsequently able to choose to help the other by enduring physical pain themselves to reduce the other's pain. Helping the ingroup member was best predicted by anterior insula activation when seeing him suffer and by associated self-reports of empathic concern. In contrast, not helping the outgroup member was best predicted by nucleus accumbens activation and the degree of negative evaluation of the other. We conclude that empathy-related insula activation can motivate costly helping, whereas an antagonistic signal in nucleus accumbens reduces the propensity to help.
Participants in contingent valuation surveys and jurors setting punitive damages in civil trials provide answers denominated in dollars. These answers are better understood as expressions of attitudes than as indications of economic preferences. Well-established characteristics of attitudes and of the core process of affective valuation explain several robust features of dollar responses: high correlations with other measures of attractiveness or aversiveness, insensitivity to scope, preference reversals, and the high variability of dollar responses relative to other measures of the same attitude.
Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Empathy is a moral force
- J Zaki
- K Gray
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(Gray, K. and Graham, J., eds), Guilford Press (in press).
The Science of Evil: On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty.
- Baron-Cohen S.
Baron-Cohen, S. (2012) The Science Of Evil: On Empathy and the
Origins of Cruelty, Basic Books
The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World in Crisis.
- Rifkin J.
Rifkin, J. (2009) The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global
Consciousness in a World in Crisis, Penguin