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Introduksjon til temanummer om EUs utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk - Integrasjon og samarbeid i Europa: EUs felles utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk som kritisk case
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The Lisbon Treaty gave the European Parliament (EP) considerable new powers in the field of external trade policy. This is puzzling, as there is little to support dominant explanations such as bargaining on the part of the EP or member states making it a priority to enhance the EP’s role in trade. The article shows how the EP (together with the Commission) was able to convince the Convention that extending the EP’s trade powers was reasonable because there were no valid arguments for exempting trade from the general rule of linking qualified majority voting and codecision. The findings challenge established accounts of the EP’s empowerment by demonstrating how the principle of parliamentary representation is not an uncontested source of legitimacy, despite its constitutional status. In situations where institutional foundations are debated, even the principle of parliamentary representation may be put to the test. The article also adds to the debate about the role of norms in political decision-making, by focusing on mutual acceptability rather than truth-seeking as the key co-ordinating mechanism of arguing, clarifying its relevance to the study of political processes.
This contribution addresses two questions. First, what forms and shapes does European Union (EU) differentiation take in the realm of representative democracy in the multilevel constellation that makes up the EU? Second, what are the implications of differentiation for the theory and the practice of democracy? The question is whether citizens are capable of governing themselves in a political entity marked by patterns of authority and/or policy-making that vary in unprecedented ways along territorial and functional lines. Drawing on differentiation rather than the more commonly used term differentiated integration entails a somewhat different research focus and allows considering the democratic challenges of patterns of integration and disintegration actualized by the euro crisis. The contribution establishes a set of democratic standards and assesses the democratic implications of differentiation in the EU. Doing that requires paying explicit attention to the distinctive character of the multilevel EU's structure of democratic representation.
The role of officials from the working groups and the Council Secretariat dealing with European Union (EU) external relations has grown in recent years as a result of the increase in the thematic and geographic scope of EU foreign policy and, in particular, the development of the EU's capabilities in crisis management. The increase in competences of Brussels-based bodies has occurred in parallel to a transformation of the policy-making process that challenges intergovernmentalist assumptions about the extent of the control exercised by the member states over foreign policy-making. This contribution tracks the impact of Brusselization and socialization processes on Council officials and national representatives, which has resulted in these actors playing a role beyond that foreseen in the original delegation mandate. This inevitably raises questions of accountability in EU foreign policy.
This paper examines the contemporary and possible future role of the IMF in European economic governance in light of the cooperation developed between the EU and the Fund in order to tackle financial problems both in non-euro area and euro area Member States. Attention is paid to the influence of the IMF on the revamping of European economic governance through, among others, the establishment of robust crisis management mechanisms. On the basis of this analysis, it is suggested that the Fund will continue to have some role in European economic governance, at least in the mid-term. For this reason the EU, or at least the euro area, has an interest in becoming more influential in the work and decision-making of the IMF through the strengthening of its representation. As discussed in the paper, the Lisbon Treaty has indeed created the potential for a strengthened presence of the euro area (not necessarily the EU) in the IMF (see Article 138 TFEU).
Discussions regarding the functioning of the EU often posit two alternative models: an inter-governmental one, in which the emphasis is laid on how states’ interests are reconciled and national governments retain a central role; and a supra-national one, according to which a leadership role is granted to supra-national institutions such as the Commission or the European Parliament. The Community method provides a kind of tertium genus, since the Commission is supposed to be the policy initiator, but most decisions require a green light from national capitals. As has been discussed in Chapter 1, from the 1990s onward, inter-governmental alternatives to this model have multiplied, most notably in the field of foreign policy, where the reluctance to delegate powers to the EU was very strong.
The European Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is run using special procedures. The Member States have not delegated powers to the supranational institutions. Yet a number of studies challenge the assumption that policy-making lies exclusively with Member States’ governments. The Commission's putative influence within the CFSP, however, remains to be studied systematically from an analytical perspective. Aiming to fill this gap in the literature, this article asks how the Commission de facto influences EU foreign and security policies beyond its delegated powers. Two least likely cases are analysed: the launch of EU naval mission Atalanta and the adoption of an EU Maritime Security Strategy. By adressing this question, the article contributes to a better understanding of the level of EU foreign policy integration. It also adds knowledge on the possible causes of this development, and thus to the EU integration literature more generally.
Few attempts have been made to develop a systematic normative analysis of where differentiated integration may need justification, and by what standards. This contribution argues that differentiated integration should be evaluated by a standard of how far it improves the management of externalities. That standard allows for disagreement at the European level on what values best justify choices between differential and uniform integration.
Yet it is none the less a standard that member states may need to follow if they are to meet their obligations to their own publics to secure values of democracy, freedom and justice. Whether, in addition to obligations to their own publics, member states owe one another any obligations that constrain choices of differentiated integration, can then be answered by investigating how far they accord one another rights in the course of managing externalities between themselves. The example of banking union illustrates the argument.
The expansion of European Union (EU) foreign policy cooperation since 1970 presents a number of puzzles for theorists of regional integration and International Relations. It is not directed by supranational organizations, does not involve bargaining over policy alternatives, and is not dominated by the largest EU states. Nor do the EU’s common foreign policy decisions reflect ‘lowest common denominator’ preferences. Instead, cooperation has been achieved through decentralized institutional mechanisms, involving processes associated with both intergovernmental and social constructivist theories. This article first explains how changes in institutional context — in terms of intergovernmental, transgovernmental and supranational procedures — affect the propensity for cooperation. It then links processes of institutionalization to an expansion of foreign policy cooperation among EU member states. Finally, it explores three policy areas (the Middle East, South Africa and nuclear non-proliferation) where EU states have adjusted their national foreign policies in line with EU foreign policy norms.
This article offers a neorealist analysis and critique of liberal-idealist notions of the EU as a ‘normative’ or ‘civilian’ power. It argues that structural realist theory can shed considerable light on the emergence, development and nature of EU foreign and security policy co-operation. In contrast to liberal-idealism's reductionist and explicitly normative approach to the EU as an international actor, structural realism emphasizes the systemic determinants of EU foreign and security policy. It stresses the significance of bipolarity for the emergence of the EEC/EPC, and argues that the development of the ESDP is a function of systemic changes in the structural distribution of power. This has created a unipolar world and a multipolar Europe. In this context, the EU is used by its member states as a collective instrument for shaping its external milieu by a combination of hard and soft power.
The status of democracy in European foreign and security policy is increasingly questioned. In order to identify if there is something at the European Union (EU) level that requires legitimation, we need to establish whether there has been a move beyond intergovernmentalism. In this contribution an analytical scheme that makes it possible to identify such a move and its putative democratic implications is developed. Four constituent pillars of intergovernmentalism are identified and discussed. These pertain to actors, decision-making procedures, the scope of delegated powers and the raison d'être of the intergovernmental endeavour. These pillars constitute necessary requirements if intergovernmentalism is to be democratic. Developments within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are assessed with reference to this analytical scheme, with a view to identify whether, when and where a move beyond intergovernmentalism has created a democratic dilemma.
The distinctive profile of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as it has emerged to date is complex and far-ranging. It involves the mobilisation  in the cause of international crisis management, regional stabilisation, nation-building and post-conflict reconstruction  of a vast range of policy instruments: from sophisticated weaponry and robust policing capacity, to gender mainstreaming techniques and cultural assistance; from rapid-reaction battle-groups and strategic transport aircraft, to judges, penitentiary officers and human rights experts; from state capacity-building resources to frontier-control expertise. The role, in this gestation, of the key policy-shaping instrument which has underpinned ESDP  the Political and Security Committee (PSC)  has been noted by several scholars. The principal substantive argument of this study, the first comprehensive analysis of the workings of this committee, is that the normative socialisation processes which inform the work of the PSC have succeeded to an appreciable extent in allowing a trans-European strategic culture to begin to stamp its imprint on one of the EUÂs principal foreign policy projects. A supranational culture is emerging from an intergovernmental process. The PSC has emerged, to a significant degree, as script-writer for ESDP.
Traditional analyses of the European Union's common foreign and security policy (CFSP) tend to characterize it either as an effete and declaratory expression of lowest common denominator politics, or as a limited framework for median-interest foreign policy bargaining. Even at a modest empirical level, however, these representations of CFSP fail to convince in view of its development in recent years. This article will argue that a cognitive approach towards the study of CFSP opens up new and crucial vistas for analysis, and offers some striking conclusions on the reciprocal relationship between CFSP and national foreign policies and the transforming capacity of the CFSP "vis-à-vis" national foreign policies, including their 'Europeanization'. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003.
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