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Agent Orange Investigative Report Series, No. 12
Contract: VA-101-12-C-0006
INVESTIGATION INTO
TACTICAL AND
COMMERCIAL HERBICIDES
Compensation Service
Department of Veterans Affairs
810 Vermont Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20420
A. L. Young Consulting, Inc.
Alvin L. Young, PhD
Kristian L. Young, MA
October 2013
A. L. Young Consulting, Inc.
1810 Tranquility Road
Cheyenne, WY 82009-2903
307-638-6279
youngrisk@aol.com
October 31, 2013
Mr. Michael D. Pharr
Contract Officer’s Representative
Compensation Service
Department of Veterans Affairs
810 Vermont Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20420
Dear Mr. Pharr,
Please find attached to this letter the Final Report: Investigation into Tactical and Com-
mercial Herbicides. This report is the twelfth of many reports that will be prepared in ful-
fillment of Contract VA-101-12-C-0006, Development of an Archival Directory of Agent
Orange Documents. The Investigative Reports are supported by the archival research. The
goal of developing the Directory is to search and identify the thousands of documents, re-
ports, and correspondence located within our National Archives and Records Administra-
tion and other document repositories that relate to the use of “Tactical Herbicides”, includ-
ing Agent Orange, outside of Vietnam. Using documents from the repositories, reports are
prepared on topics requested by Compensation Service.
In the case of this report, there continues to be much confusion among Vietnam and Viet-
nam-era veterans, non-governmental organizations, the Department of Defense, the Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs, and others as to the differences between the uses of military
“tactical herbicides” versus the military use of “commercial herbicides” during the Vietnam
War. Thus, this report is part of an effort by the Department of Veterans Affairs to clarify
the intent of the Agent Orange Act of 1991 to focus on those herbicides used in Vietnam in
support of the United States and Allied Military Forces in combat operations occurring
“outside” base installations. The intent is to distinguish the use of tactical herbicides from
the use of the commercial herbicides that were used “inside” base installations.
The selection of commercial herbicides and their recommendations for use on military in-
stallations was the responsibility of the Armed Forces Pest Control Board, while tactical
herbicides were the responsibility of the US Army Chemical Corps. Tactical herbicides dif-
fered from commercial herbicides in the development and testing of formulations, regula-
tory oversight, use guidelines, purchase specifications, toxicological evaluations, shipment
requirements, and military record keeping. Thus, there were technical, administrative, and
legal differences between tactical and commercial herbicides used by the Department of De-
fense.
Sincerely,
Alvin L. Young, PhD
Professor of Environmental Toxicology
Colonel, USAF (Retired)
DISCLAIMER FOR VA REPORTS
The conclusions reached in this report are based upon a comprehensive review of
the historical records maintained in the publicly available files of the National
Archives and Record Administration, and other archival repositories. However, the
conclusions reached do not necessarily represent those of the Department of
Veterans Affairs or any other Department or Agency of the United States
Government.
This report is part of the Agent Orange Investigative Report Series, and should be
considered as an amendable or living document. If additional authenticated
documents or records are found that address the topic of this report, a re-evaluation
of the conclusions may be necessary.
1
INVESTIGATION INTO TACTICAL AND COMMERCIAL
HERBICIDES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
There continues to be much confusion among Vietnam and Vietnam-Era
veterans, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), The Department of
Defense (DoD), the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA), and others as to
the differences between the uses of military “tactical” herbicides versus the
military use of “commercial” herbicides during the Vietnam War.
In the Vietnam War, the US military needed to find methods to control the
dense vegetation while providing protection of American troops against
ambush, and simultaneously exposing enemy camps, food plots and supply
lines of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese military. The successful
experiences of the US Army Chemical Corps’ Biological Laboratories at
Fort Detrick, Frederick Maryland in developing herbicides and aerial spray
equipment for potential tactical military operations for the previous wars
seemed to provide the best option for vegetation control in South Vietnam.
The military use of herbicides in Vietnam included formulations of the
phenoxy herbicides 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, the picolinic acid herbicide picloram
(Tordon), and the arsenical herbicide cacodylic acid or
hydroxydimethylarsine oxide (Phytar 560). Although formulations of
these herbicides were available commercially in the United States and in
other countries, the US Army Chemical Corps designated special
formulations of these herbicides as “tactical herbicides”, and assigned code
names to them, e.g., Agents Orange, White and Blue, respectively.
Concern by the US Congress that veterans who had returned from the war in
Vietnam were reporting health effects that they associated with their
exposure to Agent Orange prompted the Congress to pass and the President
to sign Public Law 102-4, the Agent Orange Act of 1991. In defining the
herbicides for exposure presumption, the Agent Orange Act of 1991 stated
“…the term ‘herbicide agent’ means a chemical in an herbicide used in
support of the United States and allied military operations in the
Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era.” Although the term “tactical
herbicide” was not used in the Act, clearly the intent was to restrict
consideration to only those herbicides used in “military operations” and the
2
associated dioxin contaminant. Thus, in defining its scope of scientific
assessment in support of the Agent Orange Act of 1991, the Institute of
Medicine concluded that four herbicides had been documented in military
records that had been involved in military operations, namely 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T,
picloram, and cacodylic acid. In addition, the IOM included the contaminant
TCDD that occurred in 2,4,5-T herbicide. Thus, it is important that a valid
distinction be established between tactical herbicides and commercial
herbicides used in Vietnam.
Tactical herbicides differed from commercial herbicides in the development
and testing of formulations, regulatory oversight, use guidelines, purchase
specifications, toxicological evaluations, shipment requirements, and
military record keeping. Thus, there were technical, administrative, and legal
differences between tactical and commercial herbicides used by the
Department of Defense.
The tactical herbicides Green, Pink, Purple and Orange contained the highly
volatile n-butyl esters of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T. These tactical herbicides were
formulated as a concentrate without additional solvents, diluents, or
surfactants added. They were formulated at the maximum concentration of
active ingredient. Agents Blue and White were also applied as concentrates
for maximum effectiveness in controlling target vegetation, i.e., also at 3
gallons per acre. Commercial applicators would never have selected the n-
butyl ester formulation of 2,4-D or 2,4,5-T for weed or brush control
because of the problems associated with volatility and drift. Testing of the
candidate tactical herbicides was done by the US Army Chemical Corps,
while the USDA supported the testing of candidate commercial herbicides
for DoD.
For the effective use of tactical herbicides in a combat environment, it was
required that a close interface be developed between the aircraft (RANCH
HAND UC-123 or US Army Chemical Corps helicopters), the aerial spray
equipment, and the requirements for both a biologically effective rate and an
appropriate dispersion of the spray droplets. This was accomplished through
an extensive test program at Eglin AFB Florida. The tactical herbicides and
aerial application systems were subsequently deployed to Vietnam.
The selection of commercial herbicides including their use recommendations
and appropriate application equipment was through a Memorandum of
Understanding with the USDA. These recommendations were approved and
3
coordinated by the Armed Forces Pest Control Board (AFPCB) and
generally published as manuals for use by the individual military agencies.
All aspects of the development and deployment of tactical herbicides were
the responsibility of the Army Chemical Corps, Fort Detrick Maryland. This
included the development of purchase specifications and the providing of
those specifications to the Defense Supply Agency. The actual acquisition of
tactical herbicides was the responsibility of the Air Force Air Logistics
Centers at Olmstead AFB Pennsylvania and Kelly AFB Texas. The chemical
companies were selected on the basis of competitive bids and DSA provided
the specifications that were required to be met by the manufacture. The
purchase descriptions for commercial herbicides were recommended to the
AFPCB by USDA’s Agricultural Research Service with their subsequent
acquisition through the Military Supply System operated by the General
Services Administration.
All commercial pesticides used by DoD, including herbicides, were to be
applied only by certified applicators or under the direct supervision of a
certified applicator. Although each military service had its own pesticide
certification program, the coordination of these programs with other
agencies occurred at the level of the AFPCB. The AFPCB depended upon
USDA’s Cooperative State Research Service and its University-based
research and extension system to prepare and publish manuals on pesticide
use, plans for certification of pesticide applicators, and the disposal of old
pesticides and pesticide containers. Frequently, USDA’s Extension Service
conducted pesticide certification workshops to which participants from all of
the military services were invited to attend.
Although no pesticide certification was developed for the spraying of
tactical herbicides in Vietnam, the overall policy and procedures for
herbicide operations in Vietnam were set forth in detailed directives issued
by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). These directives
were based upon specific guidelines provided by the Department of State
and DoD. The most important of these directives was the MACV Directive
525-1 which governed all tactical herbicide used by both US and Free World
Military Assistance Forces troops between 1965 and 1970. This Directive
prescribed policies, responsibilities, and procedures governing the
operational employment of herbicides within South Vietnam, including all
fixed wing, helicopter, and surface-based methods of herbicide application.
Tactical herbicides were not approved for use within the perimeters of US or
4
Allied military installations within Vietnam, or other locations in Southeast
Asia.
Under the Directives 5154.12 and 4150.7, the Department of Defense gave
the Armed Forces Pest Control Board/Armed Forces Pest Management
Board the authority to set pest management policy “applicable for all
Department of Defense pest management activities in any unit, at any time,
in any place, even when conducted by contract operations.” Prior to the
USDA’s recommendation to AFPCB, the Agricultural Research Service
ensured that the commercial herbicides met the label description for use and
safety and that it was registered through the regulatory program of USDA,
and was in full compliance with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Tactical herbicides were not required to be
labeled, nor required to comply with the directions from the Pesticide
Regulation Branch of USDA or with FIFRA. Following publication of
“Military Specifications” (prepared by the Army Chemical Corps), tactical
herbicides were purchased directly by the Department of Defense (via the
Defense Supply Agency) for use in Vietnam. The only labeling requirements
for tactical herbicides were a 3-inch colored band around the center of the
55-gallon drums to identify the specific tactical herbicide and, the lids were
stenciled with a brief description of the herbicide, the Federal Specification
Number, Transportation Control Number, US Port of Embarkation, the
destination, DSA Procurement Number and date, and net weight of contents.
Lastly, the implication that any mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T could be called
“Agent Orange” is incorrect. The butyl formulations were not commercially
available. To be Agent Orange, the formulation had to contain concentrated
n-butyl esters of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, with essentially no solvents, wetting
agents, surfactants, or other inert ingredients. The tactical herbicides were
not to be used in brush and weed control programs on military installations
in Vietnam or elsewhere, because they were not registered or labeled, and
not approved for such use by the Armed Forces Pest Control Board.
INTRODUCTION
There continues to be much confusion among Vietnam and Vietnam-Era
veterans, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), The Department of
Defense (DoD), the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA), and others as to
5
the differences between the uses of military “tactical” herbicides versus the
military use of “commercial” herbicides during the Vietnam War.
THE MILITARY USE OF HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM
South Vietnam was characterized by dense vegetation associated with
grasslands and savannas, impenetrable mangrove swamps, and incredibly
tall triple canopy jungle growth. These “walls” of vegetation forced the US
military to find methods to control that vegetation while providing
protection of American troops against ambush, and simultaneously exposing
enemy camps, food plots and supply lines of the Viet Cong and the North
Vietnamese military [1].
In previous wars (WWII and Korea) the US military had relied upon carpet-
bombing, napalm, or Rome plows to clear vegetation from the theatre of
war. In Vietnam such a large amount of vegetation needed to be cleared;
using fire would have only indicated to the enemy where US troops were
present. Therefore, it was decided that using a method of herbicidal
defoliation would be a better option [2].
The successful experiences of the US Army Chemical Corps’ Biological
Laboratories (later the Plant Sciences Laboratories) at Fort Detrick,
Frederick Maryland in developing herbicides and aerial spray equipment for
potential tactical military operations for the previous wars seemed to provide
the best option for vegetation control in South Vietnam [3]. Because of the
myriad vegetative types present in the various combat environments of
South Vietnam, the desired characteristics of an effective defoliant were the
following:
• Broad spectrum of activity on many kinds of plants;
• Rapid in action so that the results of defoliation or leaf drop could be
observed within a three-day period;
• Suitable for application with air or ground equipment;
• Nontoxic to man and animals, specifically formulations to minimize
hazards of toxicity;
• Stable in storage to insure effectiveness following global
transportation and temporary storage;
• Effective in low dosages from aerial or ground applications;
• Readily available in larger quantities from commercial manufacturers;
and,
6
• Proper formulation to eliminate such hazards as corrosive action on
application equipment, i.e., formulation must be noncorrosive [4].
In July 1963, the US Army Chemical Corps’ Biological Laboratories at Fort
Detrick held the first “Defoliation Conference”. Essentially, the entire
pesticide industry had been invited to Fort Detrick to be briefed on the
technical and contractual aspects of a ‘Military-Industrial Defoliation
Program.’ The intent of this partnership was to “demand of industry its
ability, creative ideas, facilities, and the competence of its scientific and
engineering disciplines to achieve the results needed in the shortest possible
time”, i.e., to develop chemicals that could attack vegetation in order to
destroy the cover and concealment of enemy combatants in South Vietnam
[4]. Fort Detrick sponsored additional Defoliation Conferences in 1964 and
1965. From this partnership more than 6,500 compounds were evaluated
resulting in the final selection of three new “tactical herbicides”: Orange,
Blue, and White [4, 5].
RESPONDING TO THE NEED FOR HERBICIDES
The Department of Defense strictly controlled the use of all pesticides used
by the Department of Defense. This included research, field evaluation,
personnel certification, and procurement. The military use of herbicides in
Vietnam included formulations of the phenoxy herbicides 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T,
the picolinic acid herbicide picloram (Tordon), and the arsenical herbicide
cacodylic acid or hydroxydimethylarsine oxide (Phytar 560). Although
formulations of these herbicides were available commercially in the United
States and in other countries [6], the US Army Chemical Corps designated
special formulations of these herbicides as “tactical herbicides”, and
assigned code names to them, e.g., Agents Orange, White and Blue,
respectively[7]. Dr. Charles Minarik, Director of the US Army Chemical
Corps’ Plant Science Laboratories, frequently used the term to distinguish
commercial formulations from those being developed by the Army Chemical
Corps for operational military use; however, the Department of the Army
routinely used the term as early as 1971 [8]. Indeed, the uses of these
“tactical herbicides” in Vietnam were specifically for military defoliation or
crop destruction operations in the individual Combat Tactical Zones (or
“tactical” environments) [8, 9]. The code names and descriptions of these
tactical herbicides were used to distinguish them from the purchase of
commercial herbicide formulations especially phenoxy herbicides
formulations used by Base Engineering (Facilities Engineering) Units in
7
Vietnam as approved through the Armed Forces Pest Control Board [10].
The belief that commercially available herbicides were simply purchased
from the chemical manufacturers and deployed directly to Vietnam is
incorrect and contrary to historical records [11]. The Department of Veterans
Affairs has not distinguished these crucial differences, and this has resulted
in Vietnam-era veterans demanding that they too should also be presumed as
exposed to Agent Orange and the other tactical herbicides.
.
THE AGENT ORANGE ACT OF 1991
By the very nature of the title of the Agent Orange Act of 1991, it was at a
minimum directed at the two components of Agent Orange, the phenoxy
herbicides, 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, and the dioxin contaminant 2,3,7,8-
tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (dioxin or TCDD) found in 2,4,5-T herbicide
[12]. Specifically, in Section 2 (General) of the Agent Orange Act of 1991
(Public Law 102-4), it notes “…a presumption of service connection for
diseases associated with exposure to certain herbicide agent…” Under
Section 2, subsection (1)(C)(3) “…a veteran…shall be presumed to have
been exposed…to an herbicide agent containing dioxin or 2,4-
dichlorophenoxyacetic acid…or other chemical compound in an herbicide
agent.” Under Section 2, subsection (1)(C)(4) it states: “For purposes of this
section, the term ‘herbicide agent’ means a chemical in an herbicide used in
support of the United Sates and allied military operations in the
Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era” [12].
Within the Agent Orange Act of 1991, the National Academy of Sciences
(specifically the Institute of Medicine) was tasked “to review and evaluate
the available scientific evidence regarding associations between diseases and
exposure to dioxin and other chemical compounds in herbicides” [12]. In
1994, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published its first report on: Veterans
and Agent Orange: Health Effects of Herbicides Used in Vietnam [13].
In defining its scope of scientific assessment, the IOM noted:
Although these is evidence that multiple chemicals were used
for various purposes in Vietnam, the use of four herbicides
has been documented in military records: therefore, toxicologic
assessment was limited to the compounds 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T,
picloram and cacodylic acid….and the contaminant TCDD [13].
8
Thus, as noted the IOM has restricted their comprehensive reviews and
evaluations of the available scientific and medical information just to these
four herbicides and the dioxin contaminant based on the statement within the
Agent Orange Act” “For purposes of this section, the term ‘herbicide agent’
means a chemical in an herbicide used in support of the United Sates and
allied military operations in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam
era” [12, 13]. Although the term “tactical herbicide” was not used in the
Act, clearly the intent was to restrict consideration to only those herbicides
used in “military operations” and the associated dioxin contaminant. Not all
parties accepted this restriction. Recently, it has been argued that: “The
inconsistency in the VA’s policy with respect to military herbicide exposure
is not defensible. No minimal levels of exposure to herbicides have been set
for veterans who served in-country, Vietnam and exposures have NOT been
limited to dioxin” [14].
The above statement could be interpreted that the commercial formulations
of herbicides that were sent to Vietnam to control vegetation within the
perimeters of Allied Bases should be included within the scope of the Agent
Orange Act. If this interpretation is accepted, Vietnam-era veterans that were
stationed at military installations throughout the more than 600 Department
of Defense installations during the Vietnam era could argue that they too
should be eligible for presumptive compensation for exposure to the same
herbicides used in Vietnam.
Thus, it is important that a valid distinction be established between tactical
herbicides and commercial herbicides used in Vietnam. That is the scope of
this report.
TECHNICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL DIFFERENCES
Tactical herbicides differed from commercial herbicides in the development
and testing of formulations, regulatory oversight, use guidelines, purchase
specifications, toxicological evaluations, shipment requirements, and
military record keeping. Thus, there were technical, administrative, and legal
differences between tactical and commercial herbicides used by the
Department of Defense.
9
Technical Differences in Formulations and Their Evaluations
Both tactical and commercial herbicides were routinely used in Vietnam that
contained 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T herbicides. The 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T generally
came from the same companies, e.g., The Dow Chemical Company,
Monsanto Company, Thompson-Hayward Chemical Company, Hercules
Inc. (Transvaal), Diamond Shamrock Corporation and Rhodia, Inc.
However, many smaller companies sold commercial formulations of 2,4-D
and 2,4,5-T, e.g., Amchem Company [6, 11]. The key was whether the
company actually produced the acid formulation or served simply as a
formulator [9]. Thus, many companies world-wide sold various formulations
but did not produce the acid. These formulations included amine salts,
mineral salts, and esters. The commercial formulations were marketed under
a variety of products and trade names such as Dead-Weed, Brush Killer,
Esteron, Veon, Weedar, etc. [6, 11].
The most commonly used forms of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T were the amine salts
and esters [15]. The amine salts exhibited a low degree of volatility. The
esters of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T were typically formed by combining the acid
with one of many different alcohols. The result was an oily liquid that was
oil-soluble but not water soluble. The esters were usually sold as a liquid,
while the amine salts were formulated as a dry powder. The esters formed an
emulsion with water or water-oil carriers when properly formulated and
gave a milky appearance. The esters of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T were more
effective than amines on some weed species, particularly woody plants [15].
The ester was identified by the alcohol used in the reaction. One molecule of
water was eliminated and the alkoxy group of the alcohol replaced the
hydroxyl of the carboxyl group of the phenoxy acid used. The less expensive
and more abundant alcohols included the isopropyl and butyl alcohols.
However, these alcohols formulated as esters exhibited high volatility, and
in weed and brush control programs were undesirable because of their
potential for phytotoxic drift. The long-chain alcohols with an ether linkage
(-O-) had a lower volatility hazard than the short-chain alcohols. The low
volatile esters included for example propylene glycol butyl ether,
butoxyethanol, and isooctyl esters [15].
Active ingredient is defined as the substance contained in a formulated
product that is responsible for the herbicidal effects and is shown as active
ingredient on the registration label. Acid equivalent is the equivalent amount
10
of parent acid from the active ingredient content of a formulation. Inert
ingredients are substances contained in a formulation that are not themselves
phytotoxic, for which the preparation is intended. Materials such as solvents,
emulsifiers, wetting agents, surfactants, etc are included [15].
A commercial formulation of a low-volatility ester of 2,4,5-T may have
contained the following analysis on the container label [15]:
Active Ingredient: 70%
2,4,5-Propylene glycol butyl ether esters
2,4,5-T (acid) equivalent, 45%, 4 lb/gal
Inert Ingredients 30%
Formulations of the phenoxy tactical herbicides contained only the active
ingredients with no solvents, diluents, or surfactants added. The Army
Chemical Corps specified the formulations of tactical herbicides [8]. The
concentration of active ingredient in the formulation was to be greater than 8
pounds active ingredient per gallon, thus maximizing the amount of active
ingredient that could be aerially applied at 3 gallons per acre by the RANCH
HAND and Chemical Corps aircraft [5, 11]. The n-butyl ester formulation
was ideal for use in a jungle environment. The formulation was not water
soluble, and it was rapidly absorbed into wax layer of the leaf within
minutes and could not be physically dislodged [11]. Its volatility only
enhanced the rapid absorption and facilitated its effectiveness in penetrating
the leaf layers beneath the top canopy [11].
Agent Purple, 1962 – 1965: Purple was first formulated by the Army
Chemical Corps at Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland in the mid-1950s time
period. A similar formulation was first used in the Camp Drum, New York
defoliation tests in 1959 [16]. The formulation was a brown liquid soluble in
diesel fuel and organic solvents but insoluble in water [5, 11]. One gallon of
Purple contained 8.6 pounds active ingredient (acid equivalents) of 2,4-D
and 2,4,5-T. The percentages of the Purple formulation were:
n-butyl 2,4-D 50%
n-butyl 2,4,5-T 30%
iso-butyl 2,4,5-T 20%
11
Agent Green, 1962: Green was a single component formulation consisting
of the n-butyl ester of 2,4,5-T. It was used in limited quantities in 1962. The
formulation was a light brown liquid soluble in diesel fuel but insoluble in
water. One gallon of Green contained 8.16 pounds acid equivalent of 2,4,5-T
[5, 11].
Agent Pink, 1961 – 1964: Pink was a formulation of 2,4,5-T used first in
late December 1961 and subsequently extensively in the early RANCH
HAND operations and in the defoliation test program in Thailand in 1964
[16, 17]. One gallon of Pink contained 8.16 pound acid equivalent 2,4,5-T
as a mixture of the esters [5, 11]. The percentages of the Pink formulation
were:
n-butyl 2,4,5-T 60%
iso-butyl 2,4,5-T 40%
Agent Orange, 1965 – 1970: Orange was a reddish-brown to tan colored
liquid soluble in diesel fuel and organic solvents but insoluble in water. The
first shipment of Agent Orange arrived in Vietnam in March 1965 [18]. One
gallon of Orange contained 8.62 pounds of the acid equivalent 2,4-D (4.41
pounds) and 2,4,5-T (4.21 pounds) [5, 11]. The percentages of the Orange
formulation were:
n-butyl 2,4-D 50%
n-butyl 2,4,5-T 50%
Agent Orange II, 1967-1968: The same as Orange but with the substitution
of the isooctyl ester of 2,4,5-T for the n-butyl ester of 2,4,5-T [5, 11].
Agent Blue (Liquid), 1966 – 1971: In 1961, the first Blue (95 drums) that
was shipped to Vietnam was a powdered formulation (Ansar 138®) that
required water [16]. In February 1966, the first liquid Blue arrived in
Vietnam [18]. Agent Blue was a clear yellowish-tan liquid that was soluble
in water, but insoluble in diesel fuel. One gallon of Blue contained 3.1
pounds of the active ingredient cacodylic acid. Blue contained both the
cacodylic acid as the free acid and the sodium salt of cacodylic acid [5, 11].
The percentages of the formulation were:
12
cacodylic acid 4.7%
sodium cacodylate 26.4%
surfactant 3.4%
sodium chloride 5.5%
water 59.5%
antifoam agent 0.5%
Agent White, 1966 – 1970: White was a dark brown viscous liquid that was
soluble in water but insoluble in diesel fuel or organic solvents. Herbicide
White first arrived in Vietnam in January 1966 [18]. One gallon of White
contained 0.54 pounds of the active ingredient 4-amino-3,5,6-
trichloropicolinic acid (picloram) and 2.00 pounds of the active ingredient of
2,4-D. White was formulated to contain a 1:4 mixture of the triisopropanol-
amine salts of picloram and 2,4-D [5, 11]. The percentages of the
formulation were:
triisopropanolamine salt of picloram 10.2%
triisopropanolamine salt of 2,4-D 39.6%
inert ingredient (primarily water, wetting 50.2%
agent, co-solvent triisopropanolamine)
The Contaminant 2,3,7,8-TCDD: The most controversial issue associated
with Agent Orange has been the concentration of the “unacceptable levels of
impurities” [11]. The procurement specifications provided no information on
potential impurities, including 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (2,3,7,8-
TCDD; TCDD; or dioxin) [19]. It should be noted that TCDD was always a
contaminant of 2,4,5-T and other products made from trichlorophenol [11].
Two sources of data were available to calculate the amount of TCDD that
may have been present in the 2,4,5-T-containing tactical herbicides used in
Vietnam: (1) Historical records indicated that the United States Air Force
Logistics Command collected and analyzed 525 samples from the Agent
Orange inventories at Johnston Island, Central Pacific Ocean, and the Naval
Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport, Mississippi [11, 19]; and, (2)
TCDD data were obtained from 557 archived samples of 2,4,5-T herbicide
(1963-1969) from the Dioxin Registry Reports prepared by the US National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) [20]. NIOSH
examined five of the Chemical Companies that produced >90% of the Agent
Orange purchased by the Defense Supply Agency [20]. A mean of 1.88
mg/kg (1.88 ppm) was obtained for a combined inventory of 40,910 drums
of Agent Orange [11]. The mean TCDD concentration of the 557 samples of
13
2,4,5-T analyzed by NIOSH was also 1.88 mg/kg for production of herbicide
for both commercial and military use [11]. Thus, the historical records and
studies by NIOSH and the USAF Occupational and Environmental Health
Laboratory confirmed that the levels of 2,3,7,8-TCDD contamination found
in the 2,4,5-T used in tactical herbicides and commercial herbicides were the
same, i.e., no data were found that indicated that the 2,4,5-T in tactical
herbicides contained greater levels of TCDD than their commercial
counterpart [11].
Field Testing of the Candidate Herbicides
Beginning in March 1963 and continuing through October 1967, the US
Army Chemical Corps’ Plant Science Laboratories conducted field tests at
numerous locations throughout the Continental United States, Puerto Rico,
Base Gagetown in Canada, on the Island of Kauai in Hawaii, and on the
Pranburi Military Reservation in Thailand [21]. The purposes of these tests
were to evaluate the effectiveness and persistence of the candidate tactical
herbicides on a wide range of vegetation that represented the diversity of
vegetation found in South Vietnam [21]. Details of these tests were
published by the Department of Defense in 2006 in: The History of the US
Department of Defense Programs for the Testing, Evaluation, and
Storage of Tactical Herbicides [21]. These tests and evaluations supported
the selection of the three primary tactical herbicides, Agents Orange, White
and Blue [11, 21]. The selection of commercial herbicides to be used by the
Department of Defense was the responsibility of the Armed Forces Pest
Control Board, AFPCB (later the Armed Forces Pest Management Board),
and the Federal Committee on Pest Control (AFPCB) [22, 23]. The testing
of commercial herbicides for the AFPCB was accomplished through a
Memorandum of Understanding with the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) [22].
Conclusion: The tactical herbicides Green, Pink, Purple and Orange
contained the highly volatile n-butyl esters of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T. These
tactical herbicides were formulated as a concentrate without additional
solvents, diluents, or surfactants added. They were formulated at the
maximum concentration of active ingredient (> 8 pounds per gallon). The
dioxin (TCDD) concentrations in the 2,4,5-T herbicide used in tactical
herbicides were no different than the level of TCDD in the 2,4,5-T herbicide
used in commercial herbicides. Agents Blue and White were also applied as
concentrates for maximum effectiveness in controlling target vegetation.
14
Commercial applicators would never have selected the n-butyl ester
formulation of 2,4-D or 2,4,5-T for weed or brush control because of the
problems associated with volatility and drift. Commercial formulations
would have contained low volatile esters or water soluble amine salts and
would have contained emulsifiers, diluents, and/or surfactants. For spray
operations of commercial herbicides, applicators would have diluted the
formulations with water or diesel fuel prior to application. Similarly
commercial formulations of picloram and cacodylic would have been diluted
in water. Testing of the candidate tactical herbicides was done by the US
Army Chemical Corps, while the USDA supported the testing of candidate
commercial herbicides for DoD.
Technical Differences in Dissemination Characteristics
Tactical Herbicides: Simultaneously with the development of the tactical
herbicide formulations, the US Army Chemical Corps’ Plant Sciences
Laboratories at Fort Detrick worked closely with the United States Air
Force’s Air Development Test Center (ADTC) and the Air Force Armament
Laboratory (AFATL) at Eglin AFB Florida to develop and test the aerial
spray equipment that were subsequently deployed for use in Vietnam [11,
21]. The development of the aerial spray equipment was a challenge that
required interfacing the necessary dissemination characteristics with the
biologically effective rate of application, i.e., “the minimum biologically
effective ground deposition level of herbicide” [8, 24]. The field tests by
Army Chemical Corps indicated that an aerial application rate of 3 gallons
of concentrated herbicide per acre provided an effective control over most
species of vegetation [5].
The extensive research into the design and testing of aerial herbicide
application equipment by the ADTC and AFATL resulted in highly precise
application systems for Vietnam. The development of the AA 45Y-1 Internal
Defoliant Dispenser in 1964 allowed the RANCH HAND UC-123 aircraft
(‘U’ designated that the aircraft had been modified to spray herbicides) to
make only one spray pass on the mission target in Vietnam [24, 25]. Tests at
Eglin AFB showed that 87% of Agent Orange would have impacted the
vegetation within one minute and within or near the swath (a swath of 80
meters/~260 feet and drop size >400 microns) [24]. The remaining 13% of
the herbicide took longer due to vortices at the wind tips, drift or
evaporation; even these <100 micron size droplets would have impacted the
vegetation with 3 minutes after spraying [24, 25]. Similar tests were
15
conducted at Eglin AFB on the helicopter systems used by the Army
Chemicals in Vietnam [11, 25].
Commercial Herbicides: On 17 November 1956, Department of Defense
Directive 5154.12 established the AFPCB [subsequently The Armed Forces
Pest Management Board (AFPMB). The Directive placed the AFPCB within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense [22]. Today, the AFPMB resides
within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations
and Environment). The Board is composed of members from the Army,
Navy, Air Force and selected Defense Agencies (a total of 20 members).
The Board was also to have 24 liaison members and 25 non-DoD Agency
representatives. The Board established 8 Standing Committees:
Environmental Impact, Equipment, Quarantine, Medical Entomology,
Pesticides, Real Property Protection, Stored Products, and Training,
Certification, and Manpower [22].
During the Vietnam Era, the Armed Forces Pest Control Board provided the
oversight for the selection of commercial herbicides used on military
installations [10, 22]. ]. The Board DID NOT work with the chemical
companies manufacturing pesticides, rather, these materials were evaluated
through a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA). The USDA recommended the
formulations based on research conducted by the Agricultural Research
Service (ARS) and validated by the Cooperative Agricultural Research
Service (CSRS) and the Extension Service. These studies focused on
individual weed or brush species, by location, and by either ground or aerial
application systems [22]. These guidelines for the use and application rate of
specific herbicides and the selection of appropriate application equipment
were approved by the AFPCB and adopted by the various branches of the
military. For example, in 1970 the Herbicide Manual for Noncropland
Weeds was published as an Army, Navy and Air Force Manual [26].
Conclusions: For the effective use of tactical herbicides in a combat
environment, it was required that a close interface be developed between the
aircraft (RANCH HAND UC-123 or US Army Chemical Corps helicopters),
the aerial spray equipment, and the requirements for both a biologically
effective rate and an appropriate dispersion of the spray droplets. This was
accomplished through an extensive test program at Eglin AFB Florida. The
tactical herbicides and aerial application systems were subsequently
deployed to Vietnam.
16
The selection of commercial herbicides including their use recommendations
and appropriate application equipment was through a Memorandum of
Understanding with the USDA. These recommendations were approved and
coordinated by the AFPCB and generally published as manuals for use by
the individual military agencies.
Administrative Differences
Purchase Descriptions: All herbicides, both tactical and commercial, used
by the Department of Defense required purchase specifications. There were
four distinct “types of specifications”. These were: (1) Purchase
descriptions; (2) Army, Navy, and Air Force Specifications; (3) Military
Specifications; and, (4) Federal Specifications [27]. Purchase descriptions
were merely descriptions of the material desired and were used for filling
small needs or for materials that were needed on an emergency basis. They
were issued by all government agencies and were of a temporary nature.
Army, Navy, and Air Force specifications covered items specific to one of
these military services (e.g., a biocide for ship hulls). Military Specifications
were complete documents and were used when the need for the materials
were confined to a specific military operation (e.g., all of the tactical
herbicides used in tactical operations in Vietnam) [27].
Tactical Herbicides: The actual military specifications for the tactical
herbicides were prepared by the Army Chemical Corps and those
specifications were provided to the Defense Supply Agency for procurement
actions [11]. The acquisition of tactical herbicides was initially the
responsibility of the Army Chemical Corps but in 1962 this responsibility
was transferred to the Middletown Air Materiel Area (MAAMA), Olmsted
AFB Harrisburg Pennsylvania and in August 1966 this responsibility was
assigned to the Air Force Aerospace Fuels at the San Antonio Air Materiel
Area (SAAMA), Kelly AFB Texas [28].
As noted, the procurement of all tactical herbicides was done by the Defense
Supply Agency (DSA). DSA provided the 55-gallon drums and arranged for
all transportation (primarily by rail) of the drums from the chemical
companies manufacturing the herbicides to the port of embarkation for
transport to South Vietnam. The chemical companies were selected on the
basis of competitive bids and DSA provided the specifications that were
required to be met by the manufacture [28].
17
Commercial Herbicides: The AFPCB adopted the policy for the
Department of Defense to recommend that any pesticide formulation that
has uses in civilian agencies be issued as a “Federal Specification”. These
types of pesticide were to be issued by the Military Supply System within
the General Services Administration [11]. By 1966, the AFPCB strictly
controlled the kinds and forms of pesticides available under “Federal
Specifications” and on the military supply list [22, 26]. New pesticides,
before being considered by the Board, had to be recommended by the US
Department of Agriculture, the Fish and Wildlife Service, or the Public
Health Service, and the proposed use must have been approved by all three
of these organizations. In February 1967, the Federal Committee on Pest
Control (FCPC) was established [23]. All Federal pest control activities were
placed within the purview of the Committee. The Committee was composed
of two members from each of the Departments of Agriculture; Defense;
Health; Education, and Welfare; and Interior. Before a pesticide was
approved for use in the United States, or by a Federal Agency, it had to be
reviewed by the FCPC. Tactical herbicides were exempt from this approval
and oversight process. However, all other herbicides used by the Department
of Defense were required to meet this approval process. The significance of
this action was that herbicides used in 1967 to 1970 on the more than 600
military installations managed by the Department of Defense required
approval by both the AFPCB and the FCPC (after 1970, the registration and
oversight of commercially available pesticides was the responsibility of
EPA) [11]. This requirement applied to herbicides used in Vietnam that
were NOT TACTICAL HERBICIDES.
Thus, herbicides used on Allied Bases in Vietnam around buildings, in
equipment storage sites, and along interior roads within the base perimeters
came under the oversight of the AFPCB. The responsibility for the purchase
and application of commercial pesticides on these installations was the Base
Civil Engineer (Facilities Engineer), NOT the Army Chemical Corps [11].
None of the tactical herbicides were approved for these uses. The
insecticides used in Operation FLYSWATTER (the aerial application of
insecticides to control mosquitoes in Vietnam) were under the Military’s
Disease Prevention Program and were recommended and approved by the
AFPCB [29].
Conclusions: All aspects of the development and deployment of tactical
herbicides were the responsibility of the Army Chemical Corps, Fort Detrick
18
Maryland. This included the development of purchase specifications and the
providing of those specifications to the Defense Supply Agency. The actual
acquisition of tactical herbicides was the responsibility of the Air Force Air
Logistics Centers at Olmstead AFB Pennsylvania and Kelly AFB Texas. The
chemical companies were selected on the basis of competitive bids and DSA
provided the specifications that were required to be met by the manufacture.
The purchase descriptions for commercial herbicides were recommended to
the AFPCB by USDA’s Agricultural Research Service with their subsequent
acquisition through the Military Supply System operated by the General
Services Administration.
Pesticide Certification and Oversight Programs
Commercial Herbicides: All commercial pesticides used by DoD,
including herbicides, were to be applied only by certified applicators or
under the direct supervision of a certified applicator. Although each military
service had its own pesticide certification program, the coordination of these
programs with other agencies occurred at the level of the AFPCB. Indeed,
in August 1974, Department of Defense Directive 4150.7 established
minimum levels of pest control for DoD Installations compatible with
national objectives for the protection of the environment [30]. Within this
Directive, ‘Certification’ was defined as the “attainment of competency for
pest control operators and supervisors” equal to standards recommended by
the AFPCB. The AFPCB, operating under the Office of the Secretary of
Defense had the major responsibility to coordinate the applicator
certification plan among the operating agencies [30].
The application of a commercial herbicide could only be done within the
base perimeter and by a Board “certified” (trained) applicator with
equipment that had been approved by the USDA, and/or under the
supervision of the Base Civil Engineer. The AFPCB even depended upon
USDA’s Cooperative State Research Service (CSRS) and its University-
based research and extension system to prepare and publish manuals on
pesticide use, plans for certification of pesticide applicators, and the disposal
of old pesticides and pesticide containers. Frequently, USDA’s Extension
Service conducted pesticide certification workshops to which participants
from all of the military services were invited to attend [11, 22].
19
Tactical Herbicides: The oversight for the use of tactical herbicides did not
reside within the responsibilities of the AFPCB. As previously noted, the
Army Chemical Corps’ Plant Sciences Laboratories at Fort Detrick
Maryland was responsible for developing vegetation control concepts,
vegetation control agents (including Orange, White and Blue) and with the
help of both the United States Air Force and the United States Navy, the
development and employment of the aerial and ground dissemination
systems [5]. Although no pesticide certification was developed for the
spraying of tactical herbicides in Vietnam, the overall policy and procedures
for herbicide operations in Vietnam were set forth in detailed directives
issued by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) [31]. These
directives were based upon specific guidelines provided by the Department
of State and DoD [31]. The most important of these directives was MACV
Directive 525-1 which governed all tactical herbicide used by both US and
Free World Military Assistance Forces troops between 1965 and 1970. This
Directive prescribed policies, responsibilities, and procedures governing the
operational employment of herbicides within South Vietnam, including all
fixed wing, helicopter, and surface-based methods of herbicide application
[31].
The challenges to obtain successful vegetation control in tactical operations
in South Vietnam required a cadre of professionally trained men dedicated to
the successful completion of a military mission [11]. The Army Chemical
Corps had the responsibilities for the ground and helicopter operations, and
the oversight of the overall ground vegetation control program OUTSIDE
THE BASE PERIMETERS. The Department of the Army assigned a
Chemical Officer (J3-09) to the MACV to coordinate “operational aspects
and plans” involving the use of the tactical herbicides by US and Allied
military units [31]. In 1966, the US Army deployed the first (of 22) Army
Chemical Corps units to South Vietnam. These units were responsible for
the storage, handling, mixing, and application of riot control agents (tear
gas), burning agents, and tactical herbicides by the US Army. Men serving
in these units performed duties associated with storage, preparation, and the
ground and helicopter applications of vegetation control chemicals, as well
as equipment cleaning and maintenance. From 1952 – 1973, the training of
the Army Chemical Corps personnel was the responsibility of the US Army
Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama. In 1979, the US Army
Chemical Center and School was re-established at Fort Leonard Wood,
Missouri [11, 31].
20
The fixed-wing aerial spray operations of Agent Orange and other tactical
herbicides were conducted with highly trained RANCH HAND aircrews
using the UC-123 (B and K models) and aerial spray equipment that had
been specifically developed, thoroughly tested and critically evaluated for
their performance and dissemination characteristics [11, 18, 24, 31]. The
USAF was responsible for the training of the aircrews and development of
aerial tactics for herbicide missions [11]. MACV Directive 525-1 also
applied to RANCH HAND Operations [31].
Conclusions: All commercial pesticides used by DoD, including herbicides,
were to be applied only by certified applicators or under the direct
supervision of a certified applicator. Although each military service had its
own pesticide certification program, the coordination of these programs with
other agencies occurred at the level of the AFPCB. The AFPCB depended
upon USDA’s Cooperative State Research Service (CSRS) and its
University-based research and extension system to prepare and publish
manuals on pesticide use, plans for certification of pesticide applicators, and
the disposal of old pesticides and pesticide containers. Frequently, USDA’s
Extension Service conducted pesticide certification workshops to which
participants from all of the military services were invited to attend.
Although no pesticide certification was developed for the spraying of
tactical herbicides in Vietnam, the overall policy and procedures for
herbicide operations in Vietnam were set forth in detailed directives issued
by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). These directives
were based upon specific guidelines provided by the Department of State
and DoD. The most important of these directives was MACV Directive 525-
1 which governed all tactical herbicide used by both US and Free World
Military Assistance Forces troops between 1965 and 1970. This Directive
prescribed policies, responsibilities, and procedures governing the
operational employment of herbicides within South Vietnam, including all
fixed wing, helicopter, and surface-based methods of herbicide application.
Tactical herbicides were not approved for use within the perimeters of US or
Allied military installations within Vietnam, or other locations in Southeast
Asia.
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS INCLUDING RECORD KEEPING
Commercial Herbicides: Under the Directives 5154.12 and 4150.7, the
Department of Defense gave the Armed Forces Pest Control Board/Armed
21
Forces Pest Management Board the authority to set pest management policy
“applicable for all Department of Defense pest management activities in any
unit, at any time, in any place, even when conducted by contract
operations.” As previously noted, in August 1961, the Department of
Defense established a support program through a Memorandum of
Understanding with the USDA that among other responsibilities provided
the research, recommendations, and specifications of commercial pesticides
that were suitable and met the need for Department of Defense use. Prior to
the USDA’s recommendation to AFPCB, the Agricultural Research Service
ensured that the commercial herbicides met the label description for use and
safety and that it was registered through the regulatory program of USDA
[22]. The significance of these Directives and the Memorandum was that
any commercial herbicides used after 1961 on the Department’s more than
600 installations must have been approved by the Board, and must have met
USDA’s regulatory requirements (now the Environmental Protection
Agency), and be in full compliance with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) [22, 23].
Once the herbicide met the regulatory requirements, it was assigned a
Federal Standard Stock number (FSN) and would be listed in the Federal
Stock Catalog as available from the Military Supply System operated by the
General Service Administration [32]. For example:
_________________________________________________________
Stock List FSC Catalog No. FSN No. Description & Price
Herbicide, Amitrole 048720-500 6840-833-1217 Amitrole 90% powder, 24 lb pail
Herbicide, 2,4,5-T 049280-200 6840-582-5440 Low volatile ester as emulsifiable
concentrate, 4 lb acid equivalent
per gallon, $32.60/5-gal pail
When received by the military agency, the container had a label to include the product
name, the company name, regulatory registration number, use recommendations, and
safe handling instructions.
________________________________________________________________________
With the establishment and functioning of the AFPCB, anytime a DoD
Military Base, e.g., Eglin AFB, Florida, Andersen AFB, Guam, or Osan AB,
Korea, requested the use of an herbicide to control plant pests, the selection
of the herbicide must have been one that was recommended by USDA and
22
approved by the Board. Locally purchased pesticides were to be approved by
the Command Entomologist [22, 32]. To ensure that military installations
were identifying and controlling pests detrimental to military personnel,
property, projects, and programs, the AFPCB had a cadre of military and
civilian personnel via supporting Agencies and Laboratories (e.g., the
Epidemiology Division of the School of Aerospace, Brooks AFB, Texas;
USAF Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory, Kelly AFB,
Texas; and the Public Health Service) that routinely conducted Pest Surveys,
Staff Visits, Training Programs, and Conferences on identifying and
controlling pests. Reports of these visits, programs, and conferences were
published by the AFPCB and widely circulated to other military installations
[10, 11, 22, 26, 30]. Normally Base or Facilities Engineering Organizations
maintained use and procurement records for only five years [30, 32].
Tactical Herbicides: The exception to the above Directives was the
development of the “tactical herbicides” sprayed in combat military
operations in Vietnam, or by Department of State approval as used in Korea
adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone in 1968 [33]. The USDA had no
regulatory authority over the selection or use of herbicide formulations
developed by the Department of the Army for tactical military operations.
Thus, tactical herbicides were not required to be labeled, nor required to
comply with the directions from the Pesticide Regulation Branch of USDA
or with FIFRA. Following publication of “Military Specifications” (prepared
by the Army Chemical Corps), tactical herbicides were purchased directly
by the Department of Defense (via the Defense Supply Agency) for use in
Vietnam. The only labeling requirements for tactical herbicides were a 3-
inch colored band around the center of the 55-gallon drums to identify the
specific tactical herbicide, e.g., Orange, Blue, or White and, the lids were
stenciled with a brief description of the herbicide formulation (e.g.,
“HERBICIDE BUTYL ESTERS, 50% 2,4-D and 50% 2,4,5-T), the Federal
Specification Number (FSN), Transportation Control Number, US Port of
Embarkation (e.g., Transportation Officer, Gulf Outport, Mobile, Alabama),
destination (e.g., ARVN 511th Ordinance Storage Depot, Da Nang,
Vietnam), DSA Procurement Number and date, and net weight of contents
[11].
The Air Force Armament Laboratory at Eglin AFB, Florida, the Air Force
Environmental Health Laboratory, at McClelland AFB, California, the Air
Force Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory, Kelly AFB,
Texas, the Plant Sciences Laboratory at Fort Detrick, and the United States
23
Army Environmental Hygiene Agency, Aberdeen, Maryland, were
responsible for determining physical properties, efficacy, toxicology, safe
handling procedures, and actions to be taken for spills, environmental
contamination, and disposal for all of the tactical herbicides [5, 11, 21, 28].
The Army Chemical Corps had responsibility for maintaining the records on
the use of tactical herbicides in Vietnam (and elsewhere). The use of tactical
herbicides by RANCH HAND (7th Air Force) and the US Army Chemical
Corps were recorded on the HERBS tape and have been made available to
the public [11, 18]. The request for procurement of tactical herbicides was
the responsibility of the Chemical Corps’ Chemical Operation Division, J-3,
MACV [18, 28]. Thus, RANCH HAND operations that used the tactical
herbicides had to coordinate all procurement actions with the Army
Chemical Corps. The Chemical Corps then authorized the Air Force
Logistics Command to purchase and transport the herbicide [28].
The transport of tactical herbicides required concurrence by the US Army
Chemical Corps and/or the San Antonio Air Material Area with full approval
of the Military Sea Transportation Service. Shipments were authorized by a
DD Form 173 “Joint Message Form.” This was critical so that schedules
were established and stevedores and barges or derricks were dispatched to
the dock and ship to facilitate in the loading and unloading of the drums, and
arrangements made to ensure the safety, transport, and storage of the
defoliants [28].
Numerous evaluations of the effectiveness of tactical herbicides in South
Vietnam were published by the Army Chemical Corps, MACV, the 7th Air
Force, and the Rand Corporation [11]. Because tactical herbicides were not
registered, and because of litigations actions beginning in the 1970s, most
records of their use, transport, disposal, and environmental fate are now
maintained in the National Archives.
SUMMARY
In 1961, Air Materiel Command became the Air Force Logistics Command
(AFLC). During the Vietnam War, AFLC was responsible through the Air
Logistics Command Centers for the procurement, supply, and maintenance
of all weapons systems deployed to Vietnam, including tactical herbicides.
In 1962, the responsibility for the management of tactical herbicides was
assigned to the Middletown Air Materiel Area, (MAAMA) Olmsted AFB
24
Pennsylvania. In August 1966, the management for tactical herbicides was
transferred to the San Antonio Air Materiel Area (SAAMA), Kelly Air
Force Base Texas, This responsibility included the procurement and
shipment of all the tactical herbicides sent to Vietnam. Although The United
States Army Chemical Corps, and specifically the Plant Science
Laboratories at Fort Detrick, was responsible for the selection, evaluation,
and purchase description of the herbicides, the Product Engineering Branch,
Directorate of Aerospace Fuels, San Antonio Air Logistics Command at
Kelly AFB was the organization that contracted for the tactical herbicides
through the Directorate of Procurement and Production, Defense General
Supply Center, Defense Supply Agency, Richmond, Virginia. The Air Force
Armament Laboratory at Eglin AFB, Florida, was assigned the research,
development, and testing of the aerial spray equipment for use in Vietnam.
In the case of the phenoxy herbicides, when formulated as tactical
herbicides, the high volatile esters were used because they were less
expensive and the particle size was sufficiently large to place the
concentrated materials on the upper canopy with minimal drift when aerially
applied by RANCH HAND aircraft under approved atmospheric conditions.
The concentrated tactical herbicides were aerially sprayed at the rate of 3
gallons per acre in Vietnam. These were formulations and concentrations
that generally greatly exceeded how the commercial components of these
tactical herbicides (2,4-D; 2,4,5-T) were formulated and used in the United
States in brush and weed control, forestry management, ranges and rice
cultivation. The implication that any mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T could be
called “Agent Orange” is incorrect. The butyl formulations were not
commercially available. To be Agent Orange, the formulation had to contain
concentrated butyl esters of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, with no solvents, wetting
agents, surfactants, or other inert ingredients. The tactical herbicides were
not to be used in brush and weed control programs on military installations
in Vietnam or elsewhere, because they were not registered or labeled, and
not approved for such use by the Armed Forces Pest Control Board.
The commercial formulations used by Base Civil Engineering Units in
Vietnam were formulations that minimized drift to Vietnamese crops
growing near the bases. These formulations contained surfactants, and other
inert materials to enhance effectiveness, and were mixed either in water or as
a water-oil emulsion and were either hand sprayed or sprayed with mobile
ground equipment.
25
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25. Young AL, Giesy JP, Jones PD, Newton M (2004): Environmental Fate and
Bioavailability of Agent Orange and Its Associated Dioxin During the Vietnam
War. Environ Sci Pollut Res 11 (6): 359-370 (Available from the Armed Forces
Pest Management Board Literature Retrieval System, Accession No. 180537)
26. Department of Defense Tri-Service (1970): Herbicide Manual for Noncropland
Weeds. Army TM 5-629, Navy NAVFAC MO-314, Air Force AFM 91-19
(Available from the Armed Forces Pest Management Board Literature Retrieval
System, Accession No. 167371)
27. Fleck EE (1967): The Development of Pesticide Specifications for Government
Use. Agric Chem 16 (9): 28-30. (Available from the Armed Forces Pest
Management Board Literature Retrieval System, Accession No. 10193)
28. Craig DA (1975): Use of Herbicides in Southeast Asia. Directorate of Energy
Management, San Antonio Air Materiel Center, Kelly AFB TX (Available from
the Armed Forces Pest Management Board Literature Retrieval System,
Accession No. 188338)
29. Cecil PF, Sr. Young AL (2008): Operation FLYSWATTER: A War Within A
War. Environ Sci Pollut Res 15 (1): 3-7 (Available from the Armed Forces Pest
Management Board Literature Retrieval System, Accession No. 193091)
30. AFPCB (1977): Department of Defense Plan for Certification of Pesticide
Applicators. Armed Forces Pest Control Board, Forest Glen Station, Walter Reed
Army Medical Center, Washington DC (Available from the Armed Forces Pest
Management Board Literature Retrieval System, Accession No. 96815)
31. Young AL, Cecil PF Sr., Guilmartin JF, Jr. (2004): Assessing Possible Exposures
of Ground Troops to Agent Orange during the Vietnam War: The Use of
28
Contemporary Military Records. Environ Sci Pollut Res 11 (6): 349-358
(Available from the Armed Forces Pest Management Board Literature Retrieval
System, Accession No. 180802)
32. Naval Medical Field Research Laboratory (1968): Pesticides and Pest Control
Equipment, Information Concerning. NMFRL-032, Camp Lejeune NC (Available
from the Armed Forces Pest Management Board Literature Retrieval System,
Accession No. 42937)
33. Young AL, Young KL (2011): Historical Review of the 1968 Project to Spray
Tactical Herbicides on the Korean DMZ (Available from the Armed Forces Pest
Management Board Literature Retrieval System, Accession No. 192313)
34. USAEHA (1987): Toxicological and Efficacy Review of USAREUR Pesticides.
United States Army Environmental Hygiene Agency, Aberdeen Proving Ground
MD, USA. (Available from the Armed Forces Pest Management Board Literature
Retrieval System, Accession No. 135136)
BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF THE AUTHORS
For more than 40 years, Dr. Alvin L. Young has been involved in issues surrounding the
use of Herbicide Orange and other tactical herbicides in Vietnam. He completed his PhD
in Herbicide Physiology and Environmental Toxicology at Kansas State University in
1968. In his 21 years with the USAF (obtaining the rank of Colonel), he was involved
with the testing and evaluation of the equipment used in Operation RANCH HAND,
Vietnam, and with the environmental and human health studies with the USAF School of
Aerospace Medicine and the Department of Veterans Affairs. He served as a Science
Advisor on environmental issues including Agent Orange with the President’s Office of
Science and Technology Policy. He was the Director of the Department of Energy’s
Center for Risk Excellence. He was a Visiting Professor at the University of Oklahoma,
2001-2007, and has served as the Senior Consultant on Herbicide Orange for the Office
of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment). He has more
than 300 publications in the scientific literature, including five books on issues related to
Herbicide Orange and/or dioxins and furans. From 2000 to 2012, He was the Editor of
the international journal Environmental Science and Pollution Research.
For the past ten years, Kristian L. Young has been the Principal Researcher for A.L.
Young Consulting. He received his Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from DePaul
University, Chicago (Magna Cum Laude, Phi Kappa Phi, and Pi Sigma Alpha). He
received the Master of Arts in International Relations in 2010 through Webster
University’s Global Program having studied in Europe and China. He has provided
support to the company in areas of public policy, technical issues, archival research, and
the coordination of national and international projects.
