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Die große Koalition in Österreich : Schwierigkeiten bei der Bildung, Stabilität und Alternativenlosigkeit

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... Coalition tools have already resorted to data visualization approaches, albeit only by using trivial graphical representations of seat distributions in form of pie charts or by mapping party positions in spatial models of politics (Koch, 2017;Graichen et al., 2021;Graichen, 2021;Guttmann, 2022). A few studies and tools also incorporated visualization approaches in order to depict more complex analysis results (e.g., Linhart & Shikano, 2007;Graichen, 2019;Linhart & Dumont, 2020). In the following, we investigate in how far yet existing visualization approaches are appropriate with regard to the points mentioned in Section 2. We thereby focus on more advanced tools that go beyond simple approaches like visualization of seat distributions. ...
... Concerning the comparison of parties' and expected coalitions' similarities, Däubler and Debus (2009), for example, project both the parties' and coalitions' sociocultural and socioeconomic policy positions on two-dimensional coordinate systems to show the user what possible coalition merges the most closely aligned party platforms. Other approaches merely focusing on the parties' policy motivations either visualize inter-party preferential relations resulting from the parties' programs (e.g., Linhart & Shikano, 2007;Debus, 2008) or depict inter-party policy distances using edge-weighted graphs, "whose nodes correspond to political parties and whose edges represent the distances between each two parties" (Graichen et al., 2021, p. 280). Although these approaches incorporate the parties' policy interests, they neglect the parties' office motivations and thus do not allow conclusions about possible equilibrium coalitions (cf. Figure 1A and B). ...
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As the formation of government coalitions between two or more political parties is a typical procedure in multiparty systems after elections and the parties’ decision on what coalition to form heavily influences policy outcomes, electorates, academics, and other stakeholders like journalists or party officials increasingly need digital tools that can determine the parties’ most preferred coalitions. This article presents a novel visualization tool for identifying utility-maximizing choices and equilibrium coalitions to provide users with rapid analyzing capabilities revealing parties’ most preferred coalitions in the aftermath of parliamentary elections. We demonstrate our tool’s analytical leverage taking the 2017 German federal elections as in-depth example. Our tool is available online at www.mytuc.org/mcbz.
... His model can be seen as more general, since it includes the purely policy-oriented and purely office-oriented models as special cases. 1 Despite its theoretical innovation, the application of Sened's model to empirical data has been meagre. While there are some applications in the literature (Giannetti and Sened, 2004; Sened, 1996; Linhart and Shikano, 2007), they remain more akin to a 'stylized case study' rather than systematic quantitative empirical evidence. Most importantly for the purpose of this article is that, to date, there are no systematic quantitative estimates of the weights that parties put on these two complementary motivations. ...
... We measure the positions of the national-level parties by using the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data in the following way (cf. Klingemann et al., 2007; Linhart and Shikano, 2007): first, we assume a priori a two-dimensional policy space whose dimensions correspond to the socio-economic and socio-cultural conflict lines. This kind of twodimensional policy space is repeatedly confirmed by multiple empirical studies (see, e.g., Laver and Hunt, 1992). ...
Article
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In this article, we analyze the policy and office motivations of parties in coalition-formation processes at the German federal-state level. We utilize a model developed by Sened that considers both motivations simultaneously and introduces a method by which to estimate its key parameters using data of German state-level coalition-formations.
... Despite its theoretical innovation, the application of Sened's model to empirical data has been quite meagre. While there are some applications in the literature ( Sened 1996;Gianetti and Sened 2004;Linhart 2006;Linhart and Shikano 2007a) they remain more akin to a "stylised case study" rather than systematic quantitative empirical evidence. Most importantly for the purpose of this paper is that, to date, there are no systematic quantitative estimates of the weights which parties put on these two complementary motivations. ...
Conference Paper
This paper aims to analyse policy and office motivations of parties in coalition formation processes at the German federal-state level. We utilise a model developed by Sened which considers both kinds of motivations simultaneously and introduces a method to estimate its key parameters using data of German state-level coalition formations.
Article
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This paper scrutinizes the positions of member state governments and national political parties towards European integration by using original data on Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The data gathered through the use of the wordscore technique offer two interesting insights: First, while both government and party stances have become more integration-friendly over time, the respective positions of governments and parties tend to diverge. Second, the EU stances of governments and parties is not only determined by ideological factors but also by the preferences of the electorate. In this vein, our study does not only provide additional support for empirical claims made by other scholars but also makes a genuine contribution for a more detailed theoretical understanding of the linkage between EU-related government and party positions.
Chapter
Wie schon im Vorfeld der Bundestagswahl 2005 verkündeten auch 2009 die Unionsparteien und die FDP auf der einen Seite sowie die SPD und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen auf der anderen Seite, gemeinsam die künftige Regierung stellen zu wollen (Linhart 2007; Decker 2009; Saalfeld 2010). Das schwarz-gelbe und das rot-grüne Bündnis waren 2005 die beiden einzigen Koalitionen, bei denen Einigkeit innerhalb der jeweils daran beteiligten Parteien darüber bestand, dass sie anzustreben seien.
Chapter
Beschäftigt man sich mit Koalitionstheorien, speziell mit der Frage, welche Parteien weshalb miteinander eine Regierungskoalition bilden, werden den Parteien in der Regel zwei Motivationen unterstellt: Zum einen gehen gängige Koalitionstheorien davon aus, dass Parteien bestrebt sind, an der Regierung beteiligt zu sein und dort möglichst viele Ämter zu besetzen (Ämter-Motivation; etwa Neumann und Morgenstern, 1944; Gamson, 1961; Riker, 1962; Leiserson, 1968; Riker und Ordeshook, 1973), zum anderen wird häufig unterstellt, dass Parteien versuchen, die von ihnen signalisierten politischen Positionen mit möglichst wenigen Abweichungen durchzusetzen (Policy-Motivation; z.B. die Modelle von DeSwaan, 1973 oder Roozendaal, 1992). Problematisch an allen bisher genannten Koalitionstheorien ist die Tatsache, dass sie entweder die Ämter-Motivation der Parteien oder aber deren Policy-Motivation berücksichtigen, nicht aber beide Arten der Motivation. Unterstellt man, dass in der Realität Parteien tatsächlich sowohl ämter- als auch policy-motiviert sind, folgt daraus ebenso banal wie ernüchternd, dass alle oben zitierten Koalitionstheorien zur Erklärung der Realität unterkomplex sind. Aufbauend auf (1988) formuliert (1996) eine Nutzenfunktion für Parteien, die gleichzeitig die Ämter- und die Policy-Motivation während des Koalitionsbildungsprozesses berücksichtigt.
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This article examines the formation of the Grand Coalition in the context of the German party system and draws upon a synthetic analytical framework derived from formal coalition theory. It argues that both the SPD and CDU/CSU would have anticipated that the Grand Coalition would have generated relatively high levels of inter-party conflict as well as significant electoral costs. The article demonstrates that the CDU/CSU's motives for entering a Grand Coalition were quite evident but those of the SPD were more questionable. The SPD's course of action is only explained by a number of specific policy objectives, a desire to minimise co-ordination costs, and through the concept of pure time preference, in which SPD elites demonstrated a preference for an established coalition model over new and untested coalition options. The article concludes that, whilst it is not possible to demonstrate that the Grand Coalition increased the rate of party system fragmentation, it failed to stabilise the declining vote share for the two Volksparteien.
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