Article

Apples and oranges: Comparing nuclear construction costs across nations, time periods, and technologies

Authors:
To read the full-text of this research, you can request a copy directly from the authors.

Abstract

The literature on energy technology costs, diffusion, and learning has been characterized by data limitations, partial or arbitrary data sets, apples to oranges comparisons, and imprecision in the use of key concepts and terminology. Two responses to our paper, Lovering et al. (2016), by Koomey et al. and Gilbert et al. reflect many of these problems, conflating learning curves with experience curves, trends in actual costs with the relationship between cost estimates and final construction costs, and component costs with total installed costs. The respondents use inconsistent definitions of demonstration, first-of-a-kind, and commercial deployment across different energy technologies. They also propose to compare final installed costs for nuclear power plants, encompassing construction and finance costs, across different national economies and time periods encompassing a wide range of macro-economic circumstances and finance arrangements that overwhelm any signal from trends associated with the actual construction costs of the plants in question. In this response, we address the specific issues raised in these papers and suggest better practices for comparing energy technology costs, trends, and technological learning.

No full-text available

Request Full-text Paper PDF

To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.

... Second, there are rather large uncertainties attributed to these costs [48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56]; Finally, including a wide range of assumptions about cost and technology allows us to investigate the breadth of conditions under which nuclear power can play a role in the future electricity system. ...
... Notably, there are large uncertainties in the future investment cost for nuclear power and this cost varies significantly by country (high in Europe and USA, relatively low in Asia) [48,49,[54][55][56][57][58]. The cost of the two 3 rd generation nuclear power plants (Olkiluoto 3 and Flamanville 3) currently under construction in Europe is estimated as high as 10000 $/kW [59]. ...
Preprint
Full-text available
To achieve the goal of deep decarbonization of the electricity system, more and more variable renewable energy (VRE) is being adopted. However, there is no consensus among researchers on whether the goal can be accomplished without large cost escalation if nuclear power is excluded in the future electricity system. In Sweden, where nuclear power generated 41% of the annual electricity supply in 2014, the official goal is 100% renewable electricity production by 2040. Therefore, we investigate the cost of a future low-carbon electricity system without nuclear power for Sweden. We model the European electricity system with a focus on Sweden and run a techno-economic cost optimization model for capacity investment and dispatch of generation, transmission, storage and demand-response, under a CO2 emission constraint of 10 g/kWh. Our results show that there are no, or only minor, cost benefits to reinvest in nuclear power plants in Sweden once the old ones are decommissioned. This holds for a large range of assumptions on technology costs and possibilities for investment in additional transmission capacity. We contrast our results with the recent study that claims severe cost penalties for not allowing nuclear power in Sweden and discuss the implications of methodology choice.
... There is a lack of consistent treatment of cost data and financial reporting structure (Lovering et al. 2017). Actual data regarding construction and operational costs are also difficult to obtain, making the consistent recording, analysing and comparing of cost performance difficult. ...
Chapter
This chapter starts by explaining the difference between commonly used terminology associated with cost, price, and value. Cost is a key nonfunctional requirement for a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) project and should be considered as part of the decision-making process across all lifecycle phases. Lifecycle cost estimating is commonly used to compare the commercial case of the proposed project with other projects that are competing for the same resources. The Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) is the most commonly applied metric to lifecycle cost assessment for power generation, especially from a policy perspective. This approach to comparing the investment criteria for different power generation technologies is under scrutiny for its applicability in different market conditions. The system LCOE is introduced as a way of incorporating external factors beyond the project level that may influence the investment decision making of key stakeholders. The cost drivers based on the experience of constructing large NPPs are a key consideration that has led to the value proposition of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). Manageable construction cost, schedule certainty and reduction, and the lower upfront cost expected for SMRs are key attributes. There are several commercial challenges, which SMRs will have to overcome before governments, owners, and operators will invest in the technology. They will have to prove to the market that modularization will lead to reductions in First of a Kind (FOAK) costs, such that learning will lower the cost of Nth of a Kind (NOAK) SMRs. In addition, the reduced capacity of SMRs is likely to lead to a shift in cost drivers away from the Capital to Operations and Maintenance costs. The fixed costs for operating an SMR do not scale down with capacity size, and so the margin between operating cost and revenue for an SMR is less than that of a large NPP. SMRs will, therefore, need to prove that the reduction in construction risks associated with NPPs (related to time and cost overruns) will mitigate the loss in operating revenue, thereby making the SMR attractive to investors. Both the estimator and the customer for the estimate must have a common understanding of the expected quality of the estimate in order to make the right commercial decisions for the organization. The challenges associated with producing a good quality estimate are interrelated. The availability of data will influence the estimating method used and the ability to validate estimates. The purpose of the estimate, presentation of cost information, and cost uncertainty analysis are key elements that influence how the estimate is interpreted by the decision maker. Ultimately cost estimates form a key element of a decision-support system. A good quality estimate is required to support investors in NPP projects to make the right decision.
... There is a lack of consistent treatment of cost data and financial reporting structure (Lovering et al. 2017). Actual data regarding construction and operational costs are also difficult to obtain, making the consistent recording, analysing and comparing of cost performance difficult. ...
... There is a lack of consistent treatment of cost data and financial reporting structure (Lovering et al. 2017). Actual data regarding construction and operational costs are also difficult to obtain, making the consistent recording, analysing and comparing of cost performance difficult. ...
... The outcome is a visible tension between the declared goals and the actual analysis, which is also characterized by a striking underestimation of the complexity of energy policy and its peculiarities. These have been repeatedly stressed, for example, in connection to difference between individual energy sources (Balmaceda, 2018) or in relation to evaluating their actual costs (Lovering et al., 2017). Even if the authors are providing an analysis from a slightly different angle (legal rather than originating in political science), this does not lift the necessity of positioning their argument in some way, rather than simply name-dropping. ...
Article
Michał Krzykowski and Karolina Krzykowska (2017) in an article published in this journal entitled “Will the European Commission's policy hinder gas supplies to Central and Eastern European countries? OPAL case decision” discuss the consequences of European Commission's (EC) exemption from internal energy market rules (especially the third party access) granted to the Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung (OPAL). While this topic is timely and highly interesting, the paper has several important shortcomings, which cannot be left unaddressed. In this response, we identify these and challenge the authors to reconsider their research design as well as methodological and theoretical choices. We would especially like to elaborate on four problems that the paper struggles with: a) limited engagement with existing scholarship; b) theoretical and methodological weaknesses; c) analytical shortcuts, and d) inconsistent terminology. Although we have divided our treatment of these problems – for the purpose of clear argumentation – into four sections, they are interconnected and their mutual combination casts shadow of doubt on the findings presented by Krzykowski and Krzykowska. The main issue, central to our critical argument presented here, is that their analysis does not acknowledge the complexity of energy policy inquiry and the simplifications made in the paper manipulate its results to fit the point they intended to make.
... Lovering's analysis has been critiqued by Koomey et al. [31] and Gilbert et al. [32]. Lovering et al. [33] responded with clarifications and additional information that are relevant for this paper. ...
Article
Full-text available
This paper presents evidence of the disruption of a transition from fossil fuels to nuclear power, and finds the benefits forgone as a consequence are substantial. Learning rates are presented for nuclear power in seven countries, comprising 58% of all power reactors ever built globally. Learning rates and deployment rates changed in the late-1960s and 1970s from rapidly falling costs and accelerating deployment to rapidly rising costs and stalled deployment. Historical nuclear global capacity, electricity generation and overnight construction costs are compared with the counterfactual that pre-disruption learning and deployment rates had continued to 2015. Had the early rates continued, nuclear power could now be around 10% of its current cost. The additional nuclear power could have substituted for 69,000–186,000 TWh of coal and gas generation, thereby avoiding up to 9.5 million deaths and 174 Gt CO2 emissions. In 2015 alone, nuclear power could have replaced up to 100% of coal-generated and 76% of gas-generated electricity, thereby avoiding up to 540,000 deaths and 11 Gt CO2. Rapid progress was achieved in the past and could be again, with appropriate policies. Research is needed to identify impediments to progress, and policy is needed to remove them.
... Lovering's analysis has been critiqued by Koomey et al.[15] and Gilbert et al.[16]. Lovering et al.[17] responded with clarifications and additional information that are relevant for this paper.3 Lovering et al.[14] define Overnight Construction Cost (OCC) as: "The metric OCC includes the costs of the direct engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) services that the vendors and the architect-engineer team are contracted to provide, as well as the indirect owner's costs, which include land, site preparation, project management, training, contingencies, and commissioning costs. ...
Article
A transition to nuclear power was disrupted in the late-1960s. Counterfactual analyses suggest the foregone benefits of the disruption are substantial. Learning rates are presented for nuclear power in seven countries comprising 58% of all nuclear power reactors ever built. Learning rates and deployment rates changed in the late-1960s from rapidly falling costs and accelerating deployment to rapidly rising costs and stalled deployment. If the early rates had continued nuclear power could now be around 10% of its current cost. The additional nuclear power could have substituted for 69,000-186,000 TWh of coal and gas generation, thereby avoiding up to 9.5 million deaths and 174 Gt CO2 emissions. In 2015 alone nuclear power could have replaced up to 100% of coal and 76% of gas-generated electricity, thereby avoiding up to 540,000 deaths and 11 Gt CO2. Rapid progress was achieved in the past and could be again, with appropriate policies. Research is needed to identify impediments to progress, and policy is needed to remove them.
Article
Understanding the role of technology characteristics and the context in the diffusion of new energy technologies is important for assessing feasibility of climate mitigation. We examine the historical adoption of nuclear power as a case of a complex large scale energy technology. We conduct an event history analysis of grid connections of first sizable commercial nuclear power reactors in 79 countries between 1950 and 2018. We show that the introduction of nuclear power can largely be explained by contextual variables such as the proximity of a country to a major technology supplier (‘ease of diffusion’), the size of the economy, electricity demand growth, and energy import dependence (‘market attractiveness’). The lack of nuclear newcomers in the early 1990s can be explained by the lack of countries with high growth in electricity demand and sufficient capacities to build their first nuclear power plant, either on their own or with international help. We also find that nuclear accidents, the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the advances made in competing technologies played only a minor role in nuclear technology failing to be established in more countries. Our analysis improves understanding of the feasibility of introducing contested and expensive technologies in a heterogenous world with motivations and capacities that differ across countries and by a patchwork of international relations. While countries with high state capacity or support from a major technology supplier are capable of introducing large-scale technologies quickly, technology diffusion to other regions might undergo significant delays due to lower motivations and capacities.
Article
Full-text available
To achieve the goal of deep decarbonization of the electricity system, more and more variable renewable energy (VRE) is being adopted. However, there is no consensus among researchers on whether the goal can be accomplished without large cost escalation if nuclear power is excluded in the future electricity system. In Sweden, where nuclear power generated 41% of the annual electricity supply in 2014, the official goal is 100% renewable electricity production by 2040. Therefore, we investigate the cost of a future low-carbon electricity system without nuclear power for Sweden. We model the European electricity system with a focus on Sweden and run a techno-economic cost optimization model for capacity investment and dispatch of generation, transmission, storage and demand-response, under a CO2 emission constraint of 10 g/kWh. Our results show that there are no, or only minor, cost benefits to reinvest in nuclear power plants in Sweden once the old ones are decommissioned. This holds for a large range of assumptions on technology costs and possibilities for investment in additional transmission capacity. We contrast our results with the recent study that claims severe cost penalties for not allowing nuclear power in Sweden and discuss the implications of methodology choice.
Article
Increasing global energy demand coupled with the need to reduce carbon and other greenhouse gases make investments in new carbon-free energy technologies more important than ever. One promising new technology is light water small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs). Their relatively small size, modular design, reduced construction times, enhanced safety and other features make them a potentially attractive energy source. A critical element in assessing their potential for future development, however, is their economic viability relative to other energy sources. The most common metric to assess a power system's economic viability is the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE). The LCOE method allows comparisons across energy producing technologies with different capital, operating, fuel, and other costs as well as different levels of power produced and operating horizons. The manufacture, construction and other initial capital costs loom large in LCOE calculations. To date, however, there has been substantial uncertainty regarding these capital costs for SMRs and, as a result, attendant uncertainty about the economic viability of SMRs relative to other energy sources. In order to reduce this uncertainty, this research provides a general framework for estimating the direct and indirect costs of producing SMRs. This study incorporates detailed cost data from a major developer of small modular reactors, NuScale LLC to provide direct and indirect capital cost estimates of the NuScale SMR and cost comparisons with conventional large-scale nuclear power plants. These comparisons illustrate that design simplification, reduced componentry, modularity, and other features of the SMR design result in significant savings in overall base costs. These cost estimates provide strong evidence that SMRs have the potential to be economically competitive with other energy sources while at the same time yielding significant benefits in terms of reducing carbon emissions from power generating facilities.
Article
In the late 1990s, a new generation of reactor designs evolved from existing designs was touted as solving the economic problems that led to the collapse of reactor ordering after the Chernobyl disaster. It was claimed these designs would be cheap and easy to build because they would be simpler and use passive safety, modular construction and standardisation. The US and UK governments were convinced by this and launched reactor construction programmes. However, 20 years on, the claims have proved false and the US and UK programmes are in disarray. The last hope for the nuclear industry appears to be that Chinese and Russian reactor vendors, with powerful support from their governments, will take over, providing reactors that are cheap but meet the safety standards required in Europe and North America. However, these vendors and their designs are largely unproven in open markets. There is also little evidence that their reactors will be cheap, there are concerns about quality and safety culture and there are national security concerns that may deter customers. New technologies, such as radical new ones, Generation IV, and Small Modular Reactors are unproven and, at best, a long way from commercial deployment
Article
In this study, we collected Japanese nuclear power plant construction cost data from official documents submitted by the electric utilities and conducted a quantitative analysis of the past trends. We found that the unit construction cost of Japanese nuclear power plants rose during the period from 1975 to 1980, when the “improvement and standardization” programs took place, and did not increase or decline significantly after that. We also observed significant economies of scale, even if we take into account interest during construction, as well as the so-called overnight cost. As far as we know, this study is the first attempt to analyze the total history of Japan's nuclear power generation until the Fukushima accident from the cost perspective. The findings could contribute to a better understanding of the economics of nuclear power, as similar studies in the United States and France tend to exhibit different results. The analyses in this study appear to reinforce the reliability of the cost estimation by the Japanese government, which has been used as the numerical basis for the current energy policies in Japan.
Article
Full-text available
The existing literature on the construction costs of nuclear power reactors has focused almost exclusively on trends in construction costs in only two countries, the United States and France, and during two decades, the 1970s and 1980s. These analyses, Koomey and Hultman (2007); Grubler (2010), and Escobar-Rangel and Lévêque (2015), study only 26% of reactors built globally between 1960 and 2010, providing an incomplete picture of the economic evolution of nuclear power construction. This study curates historical reactor-specific overnight construction cost (OCC) data that broaden the scope of study substantially, covering the full cost history for 349 reactors in the US, France, Canada, West Germany, Japan, India, and South Korea, encompassing 58% of all reactors built globally. We find that trends in costs have varied significantly in magnitude and in structure by era, country, and experience. In contrast to the rapid cost escalation that characterized nuclear construction in the United States, we find evidence of much milder cost escalation in many countries, including absolute cost declines in some countries and specific eras. Our new findings suggest that there is no inherent cost escalation trend associated with nuclear technology.
Article
Full-text available
Residential photovoltaic (PV) systems were twice as expensive in the United States as in Germany (median of $5.29/W vs. $2.59/W) in 2012. This price discrepancy stems primarily from differences in non-hardware or “soft” costs between the two countries, which can only in part be explained by differences in cumulative market size and associated learning. A survey of German PV installers was deployed to collect granular data on PV soft costs in Germany, and the results are compared to those of a similar survey of U.S. PV installers. Non-module hardware costs and all analyzed soft costs are lower in Germany, especially for customer acquisition, installation labor, and profit/overhead costs, but also for expenses related to permitting, interconnection, and inspection procedures. Additional costs occur in the United States due to state and local sales taxes, smaller average system sizes, and longer project-development times. To reduce the identified additional costs of residential PV systems, the United States could introduce policies that enable a robust and lasting market while minimizing market fragmentation. Regularly declining incentives offering a transparent and certain value proposition—combined with simple interconnection, permitting, and inspection requirements—might help accelerate PV cost reductions in the United States.
Article
Full-text available
Energy technologies have a tendency to become locked in. Mature technologies are favoured due to their accumulated experience and low costs, preventing the entry of new competitors into the market. Public policies support technological evolution in the energy sector through research, development, demonstration and market transformation initiatives. These programmes can reduce CO2 emissions. Their scope, however, is limited by costs and therefore efficiency is critical. Based on a study of photovoltaics and nuclear fission, I show that the scale of an energy technology influences its responsiveness to policy interventions. Rapid innovation can be more effectively supported with limited funds for small scale technologies than for those restricted to the size of a large power plant. An energy infrastructure consisting of small scale technologies may more readily adapt to strict emissions regulations.
Article
Lovering et al. (2016) present data on the overnight costs of more than half of nuclear reactors built worldwide since the beginning of the nuclear age. The authors claim that this consolidated data set offers more accurate insights than previous country-level assessments. Unfortunately, the authors make analytical choices that mask nuclear power's real construction costs, cherry pick data, and include misleading data on early experimental and demonstration reactors. For those reasons, serious students of such issues should look elsewhere for guidance about understanding the true costs of nuclear power.
Article
This paper provides an econometric analysis of nuclear reactor construction costs in France and the United States based on overnight costs data. We build a simultaneous system of equations for overnight costs and construction time (lead-time) to control for endogeneity, using change in expected electricity demand as instrument. We argue that the construction of nuclear reactors can benefit from standardization gains through two channels. First, short term coordination benefits can arise when the diversity of nuclear reactors' designs under construction is low. Second, long term benefits can occur due to learning spillovers from past constructions of similar reactors. We find that construction costs benefit directly from learning spillovers but that these spillovers are only significant for nuclear models built by the same Architect–Engineer. In addition, we show that the standardization of nuclear reactors under construction has an indirect and positive effect on construction costs through a reduction in lead-time, the latter being one of the main drivers of construction costs. Conversely, we also explore the possibility of learning by searching and find that, contrary to other energy technologies, innovation leads to construction costs increases.
Article
Dozens of scenarios are published each year outlining paths to a low carbon global energy system. To provide insight into the relative feasibility of these global decarbonization scenarios, we examine 17 scenarios constructed using a diverse range of techniques and introduce a set of empirical benchmarks that can be applied to compare and assess the pace of energy system transformation entailed by each scenario. In particular, we quantify the implied rate of change in energy and carbon intensity and low-carbon technology deployment rates for each scenario and benchmark each against historical experience and industry projections, where available. In addition, we examine how each study addresses the key technical, economic, and societal factors that may constrain the pace of low-carbon energy transformation. We find that all of the scenarios envision historically unprecedented improvements in energy intensity, while normalized low-carbon capacity deployment rates are broadly consistent with historical experience. Three scenarios that constrain the available portfolio of low-carbon options by excluding some technologies (nuclear and carbon capture and storage) a priori are outliers, requiring much faster low-carbon capacity deployment and energy intensity improvements. Finally, all of the studies present comparatively little detail on strategies to decarbonize the industrial and transportation sectors, and most give superficial treatment to relevant constraints on energy system transformations. To be reliable guides for policymaking, scenarios such as these need to be supplemented by more detailed analyses realistically addressing the key constraints on energy system transformation.For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.Conflict of interest: The authors have declared no conflicts of interest for this article.
Article
An analysis of 401 power plant and transmission projects in 57 countries suggests that costs are underestimated in three out of every four projects, with only 39 projects across the entire sample experiencing no cost overrun or underrun. Hydroelectric dams, nuclear power plants, wind farms and solar facilities each have their own unique set of construction risks.
Article
New solar Photovoltaic (PV) installations have grown globally at a rapid pace in recent years. We provide a comprehensive assessment of the cost competitiveness of this electric power source. Based on data available for the second half of 2011, we conclude that utility-scale PV installations are not yet cost competitive with fossil fuel power plants. In contrast, commercial-scale installations have already attained cost parity in the sense that the generating cost of power from solar PV is comparable to the retail electricity prices that commercial users pay, at least in certain parts of the U.S. This conclusion is shown to depend crucially on both the current federal tax subsidies for solar power and an ideal geographic location for the solar installation. Projecting recent industry trends into the future, we estimate that utility-scale solar PV facilities are on track to become cost competitive by the end of this decade. Furthermore, commercial-scale installations could reach “grid parity” in about ten years, if the current federal tax incentives for solar power were to expire at that point.
Article
The paper reviews the history and the economics of the French PWR program, which is arguably the most successful nuclear-scale up experience in an industrialized country. Key to this success was a unique institutional framework that allowed for centralized decision making, a high degree of standardization, and regulatory stability, epitomized by comparatively short reactor construction times.Drawing on largely unknown public records, the paper reveals for the first time both absolute as well as yearly and specific reactor costs and their evolution over time. Its most significant finding is that even this most successful nuclear scale-up was characterized by a substantial escalation of real-term construction costs. Conversely, operating costs have remained remarkably flat, despite lowered load factors resulting from the need for load modulation in a system where base-load nuclear power plants supply three quarters of electricity.The French nuclear case illustrates the perils of the assumption of robust learning effects resulting in lowered costs over time in the scale-up of large-scale, complex new energy supply technologies. The uncertainties in anticipated learning effects of new technologies might be much larger that often assumed, including also cases of “negative learning” in which specific costs increase rather than decrease with accumulated experience.
Article
Technology foresight studies have become an important tool in identifying realistic ways of reducing the impact of modern energy systems on the climate and the environment. Studies on the future cost development of advanced energy technologies are of special interest. One approach widely adopted for the analysis of future cost is the experience curve approach. The question is, however, how robust this approach is, and which experience curves should be used in energy foresight analysis. This paper presents an analytical framework for the analysis of future cost development of new energy technologies for electricity generation; the analytical framework is based on an assessment of available experience curves, complemented with bottom-up analysis of sources of cost reductions and, for some technologies, judgmental expert assessments of long-term development paths. The results of these three methods agree in most cases, i.e. the cost (price) reductions described by the experience curves match the incremental cost reduction described in the bottom-up analysis and the judgmental expert assessments. For some technologies, the bottom-up analysis confirms large uncertainties in future cost development not captured by the experience curves. Experience curves with a learning rate ranging from 0% to 20% are suggested for the analysis of future cost development.
Article
We present a reactor-by-reactor analysis of historical busbar costs for 99 nuclear reactors in the United States, and compare those costs with recent projections for next-generation US reactors. We argue that cost projections far different from median historical costs require more justification than estimates that lie close to those medians. Our analysis suggests that some recent projections of capital costs, construction duration, and total operations and maintenance costs are quite low—far enough from the historical medians that additional scrutiny may be required to justify using such estimates in current policy discussions and planning.
Article
In response to energy security and environmental concerns, the U.S. is collaborating with nine other countries to develop fourth-generation reactor technology that the industry intended to be safer than current reactors, available at lower total cost, and incurring financial risks no greater than those for other energy technologies. From a three-decade historical database of delivered costs from each of 99 individual U.S. nuclear reactors, we discuss the financial risks for new nuclear power to achieve its cost objectives. We argue that past technology development patterns indicate the importance of including high-cost surprises in the planning process.
Power Plant Cost Escalation: nuclear and Coal Capital Costs, Regulation, and Economics
  • C Komanoff
Komanoff, C., 1981. Power Plant Cost Escalation: nuclear and Coal Capital Costs, Regulation, and Economics. Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, Inc, New York.
PRIS Database 〈https://www.iaea.org
IAEA, 2016. PRIS Database 〈https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/ CountryDetails.aspx?Current=KR〉.
Reactor Capital Costs Breakdown
  • F Ganda
  • J Hansenb
  • T K Kima
  • T A Taiwoa
  • R Wigeland
Ganda, F., Hansenb, J., Kima, T.K., Taiwoa, T.A., Wigeland, R., 2016. Reactor Capital Costs Breakdown. in ICAPP 2016.
Variation in Organizational Learning Rates
  • L Argote
  • D Epple
Argote, L., Epple, D., 1990. Variation in Organizational Learning Rates. Science 80, 247.
Utility-Scale Solar 2014: an Empirical Analysis of Project Cost, Performance, and Pricing Trends in the United States
  • Mark Bolinger
  • Joachim Seel
Bolinger, Mark, Seel, Joachim, 2015. Utility-Scale Solar 2014: an Empirical Analysis of Project Cost, Performance, and Pricing Trends in the United States. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, (LBNL-1000917. September).
Nuclear reactors' construction costs: the role of lead-time, standardization and technological progress
  • L Argote
  • D Epple
Argote, L., Epple, D., 1990. Variation in Organizational Learning Rates. Science 80, 247. Berthélemy, M., Rangel, 2015. Nuclear reactors' construction costs: the role of lead-time, standardization and technological progress. Energy Policy 82, 118-130.