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An Unholy Mess: Why ‘The Sanctity of Life Principle’ Should Be Jettisoned
Abstract
The aim of this article is to present an account of an important element of medical ethics and law which is widely cited but is often confused. This element is most frequently referred to as ‘the principle of the sanctity of life’, and it is often assumed that this language has a religious provenance. However, the phrase is neither rooted in the traditions it purports to represent nor is it used consistently in contemporary discourse. Understood as the name of an established ‘principle’ the ‘sanctity of life’ is virtually an invention of the late twentieth century. The language came to prominence as the label of a position that was being rejected: it is the name of a caricature. Hence there is no locus classicus for a definition of the terms and different authors freely apply the phrase to divergent and contradictory positions. Appeal to this ‘principle’ thus serves only to perpetuate confusion. This language is best jettisoned in favour of clearer and more traditional ethical concepts.
... Wittgenstein offered a deep pedagogical service in teaching pre-med students how to 8 Anscombe, 1953;Jonston, 1999;Engelhardt, 1996. 9 Eckenwiler & Cohn, 2007;Jones, 2016;Lee, 2011;Arras, 2009. 10 Monk, 2005: 516. ...
... 67 65 Keown and Jones, 2008: 85-126. 66 Glanville Williams (The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 1957) as quoted in Jones, 2016: 190. 67 Milbank, 2006 In the aftermath of Williams' inauguration of "the sanctity of life" as a dated religious vestige, the phrase came to be assumed as more conservative others sought to counter ...
This thesis argues that bioethics emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s not as a novel way to engage new technological or social ethical questions of life (bios), but rather as a late, post-Enlightenment secular phenomenon. In particular, bioethics seeks to adopt a methodology of theorizing on morality that is prominent in modern science, and this is a strategy that I contest by following Wittgenstein’s critique of scientific theorizing. Wittgenstein’s later exercises with language present a critical and clarifying way to identify the immanent and self-referential schema of principlism in bioethics. Additionally, I show how Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy as a skillful and therapeutic activity rather than a cognitive content is informative for bioethics. Hence, I suggest that in pre-modern, traditional eras—or even in many contemporary non-Western global sectors—bioethics largely would be indistinct from religious and theological dogma and practices. I argue that the modern mind prioritizes material causality, leading to a moral techne that divides spirit from matter, vios from bios. Within such a schema, nature—and especially the medicalized human body—is managed, produced, and constructed. Furthermore, I argue that Wittgenstein gestures towards an ancient transcendent way beyond the modern division of vios and bios, and that a full vision of seeing life may be glimpsed through an apophatic epistemology that guides one towards an understanding of ethics itself as a form of apophatic and embodied knowledge.
... In fact, medieval philosopher-theologian Thomas Aquinas specifically said one should not apply these special sanctifications to all unborn beings. 12 Even some prolife theologians today call into question the theological validity of the sanctity of life principle that is so common in prolife discourses (Jones 2016). ...
Vulnerability is a notion discussed in feminist philosophy as a basis for a morality that widens our sense of those whose deaths are grievable. Vulnerability and grievability also factor in reproductive ethics. This essay employs recognition theory to analyze critically how these notions are mobilized in conservative Christian anti-abortion writings and in feminist philosophy. This analysis exposes weaknesses and misrecognition in both sets of discourses. In response, I offer theological arguments for recognizing fetal value without implying a right to life and for acknowledging how human finitude and the precarity of pregnancy render gestational hospitality a discretionary, not obligatory, moral act.
The purpose of the study is to identify a common theoretical basis for the study of human life as capital and unconditional higher value. Theoretical basis is based on the value-laden and revised structural constructivism, provided by the French philosopher and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, critical analysis of the concepts of capital as the embodiment of social expectations, the biological concept of the value of human life, as well as the concepts of its sanctity. Originality. It is proved that one should not consider the value of human life as capital only but instead takes into account its different value interpretations, especially when forming the social identity of a person. Moreover, in each of the value systems, the value of human life can be recognized as unconditional, which does not prevent the coexistence of such different value interpretations within the framework of one social identity, which then inevitably becomes a multiple social identity. Conclusions. Human life cannot be considered as a result of integrating economic expectations into the concept of "advertising" capital: first, expectations may well be inadequate; second, expectations by themselves are not directly related to capital; third, expectations do not necessarily lead to development; fourth, one should clearly distinguish between the spontaneous "expectations" and the values that express people’s strong motivation as members of social communities. The multiplicity of possible cultural conditions that affirm the unconditional value of life indicates that this unconditionality is always relevant rather than absolute. The multiple social identities could be used to add value to the protection of human life, the affirmation of multiple social identities is a means of affirming the unconditional value of human life – it is unconditional in several alternative ways.
For about five decades the phrase “sanctity-of-life“ has been part of the Anglo-American biomedical ethical discussion related to abortion and end-of-life questions. Nevertheless, the concept’s origin and meaning are unclear. Much controversy is based on the mistaken assumption that the concept denotes the absolute value of human life and thus dictates a strict prohibition on euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. In this paper, I offer an analysis of the religious and philosophical history of the idea of “sanctity-of-life.” Drawing on biblical texts and interpretation as well as Kant’s secularization of the concept, I argue that “sanctity” has been misunderstood as an ontological feature of biological human life, and instead locate the idea within the historical virtue-ethical tradition, which understands sanctification as a personal achievement through one’s own actions.
It seems that the revitalisation of Fritz Jahr’s thought has come just at the right time. During the course of its rapid development, bioethics managed to assume different forms, but also to become both reduced in its underlying intention and hyper-specialised in its theoretical and practical aspects. Summed up in his bioethical imperative, Fritz Jahr’s thought prompts us to re-examine both its underlying intention and its field of interest. Accordingly, this paper centres on Jahr’s bioethical imperative, its origins, construction and implications, aiming to scrutinise Jahr’s original thought and his message within the contemporary discourse on bioethics in general and that on integrative bioethics in particular. The latter is examined only in its outlines, leaving room for a possible upgrade. Lastly, the paper looks at the Rijeka Declaration as a document that represents an attempt to both conceptually and methodologically transform contemporary bioethics within the context of Jahr’s thought.
Much of the confusion in the current debate about embryonic stem-cell research is generated by the advocates of stem-cell research who use controversial and misleading terminology about what it involves and who evade or misrepresent the central moral argument against such research, namely, that it involves the destruction of innocent human beings. This essay points out that such failings are not new to bioethical debate and exposes them in one of the earliest and most influential books on the law and ethics of medicine: The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law by Professor Glanville Williams.
Sanctity of life' and `human dignity' are two bioethical concepts that play an important role in bioethical discussions. Despite their separate history and content, they have similar functions in these discussions. In many cases they are used to bring a difficult or controversial debate to an end. They serve as unquestionable cornerstones of morality, as rocks able to weather the storms of moral pluralism. This book provides the reader with analyses of these two concepts from different philosophical, professional and cultural points of view. Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity presents a comparative analysis of both concepts.
This book addresses the controversy over abortion. Covering interesting topics, including the claim that certain items (paintings, people) have 'intrinsic value' and should not be destroyed; the thought that young human beings do not have a good of their own; and the question whether the objection to murder turns on the violation of right to life.
I am a Roman Catholic moral theologian and have often seen the term “sanctity of life”, but in preparing the topic, I am surprised at the fact that it receives very little attention in places where I would have expected some. For instance, in the fifteen volume collection of the New Catholic Encyclopedia, it has no entry. It appears as a modest after-thought in the later supplement. It is not found in new theological dictionaries from the United States, England, or Germany: The New Dictionary of Theology, The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, The Theological Dictionary. It did not appear in the German The Concise Dictionary of Christian Ethics; in Palazzini’s Italian Dictionary of Moral Theology there was only “Life, Respect for: see Murder, Suicide.” Only the Anglican, John MacQuarrie who edited two dictionaries, ran entries in both, A Dictionary of Christian Ethics and The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics. Thus, Roman Catholics, who are believed to be the most apt to use it, rarely explicitly analyze it. The oft-quoted words of Edward Shils ([61], p. 2) seem appropriate: “To persons who are not murderers, concentration camp administrators, or dreamers of sadistic fantasies, the inviolability of human life seems to be so self-evident that it might appear pointless to inquire into it.”
This article examines the claim of Paul Badham that there is theological precedent for ‘a Christian case for assisted dying’. The writings of Rev. William Inge and Joseph Fletcher do indeed advocate forms of assisted dying. However, this precedent is deeply problematic for its ugly attitude towards people with disabilities.
Bioethics is a field that has defined itself in moral controversies. For example, bioethics has emerged as a discipline in the attempts to resolve moral controversies surrounding medical practices and health care policies in areas such as experimentation and research, abortion, reproduction, and the allocation of resources in health care. One source of constant moral controversy has been the issues surrounding death and dying. There have been controversies about the definition of death, the extent of the obligation to treat the dying, the use of resources for the care of the dying, euthanasia, and assisted suicide. From the celebrated cases in the United States of Karen Ann Quinlan and Nancy Beth Cruzan to the ruling on assisted suicide in the state of Washington (see, Compassion in Dying) the controversies of death and dying have been part of bioethics and public policy.
Albert Schweitzer maintained that the idea of "Reverence for Life" came upon him on the Ogowe River as an "unexpected discovery, like a revelation in the midst of intense thought." While Schweitzer made numerous significant contributions to an incredible diversity of fields -medicine, music, biblical studies, philosophy and theology - he regarded Reverence for Life as his greatest contribution and the one by which he most wanted to be remembered. Yet this concept has been the subject of a range of distortions and misunderstandings, both academic and popular. This book provides a new interpretation of Schweitzer's reverence and shows how it emerged from his studies of German philosophy, Indian religions, and his biblical scholarship on Jesus and Paul. By throwing light on the origin and development of Schweitzer's thought, we are led to a closer appreciation of the contribution that reverence makes to current ethical concerns. Life-centered ethics - in the broadest sense - has continued to flourish, though Schweitzer's pioneering contribution is often overlooked. Not only did he help put the issue on the moral agenda, but, most significantly, he also provided much sought after philosophical and theological foundations. Schweitzer emerges from this critical study of his life and thought as a remarkable individual who should rightfully be regarded as a moral giant of the 20th-century.
In a previous paper in this journal I responded to Professor John Keown’s criticisms of the British Medical Association guidance on withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging treatment, arguing that the sanctity of life principle he endorses is indefensible as a juridical and moral guide. Professor Keown replied recently, also in this journal, alleging that I wrongly caricatured the sanctity of life position he supports, which continues to illuminate the proper decision-making path in relation to the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment. In this present paper it is submitted that Keown’s riposte is misconceived and disguises the true nature of the sanctity of life stance, which both rests upon unconvincing premisses and tends towards unacceptable repercussions, thus leading to its inevitable and rightful rejection.
In an earlier paper in this journal I criticised the British Medical Association Guidance on withholding and withdrawing treatment on the ground that it undermines the principle of the sanctity/inviolability of life. Professor David Price responded with a paper criticising the principle. This reply to my learned colleague respectfully contends that his criticisms are based on a caricatured misunderstanding of the principle.
Recently in this journal John Keown attacked the BMA Guidance published on ‘Withholding and Withdrawing Life-prolonging Medical Treatment’, arguing that it was, fundamentally at odds with the sanctity of life doctrine as properly understood, condemning the intentional termination of individuals’ lives. In riposte it is asserted that even this modified version of the doctrine cannot support a defensible moral or legal standard for decision-making here, being founded upon an excessive emphasis on the mental state of the clinician and an inappropriately narrow focus on the effects of the proposed treatment on the ‘health’ of the patient, as opposed to being primarily driven by the (best) interests of the patient. The attempt to divorce treatment decisions from broader evaluations of the net benefit or other otherwise able to be attained by the patient from such treatment, including the taking into account of the individual's handicapped state, accordingly fails. Acceptance of such reality is, at the least, the first step toward a common language for further dialogue even between those with polar opposite opinions in this sphere.
Our growing technical capacity to keep human beings alive has brought the sanctity of life ethic to the point of collapse. The shift to a concept of brain death was already an implicit abandonment of the traditional ethic, though this has only recently become apparent. The 1993 decision of the British House of Lords in the case of Anthony Bland is an even more decisive shift towards an ethic that does not ask or seek to preserve human life as such, but only a life that is worth living. Once this shift has been completed and assimilated, we will no longer need the concept of brain death. Instead we can face directly the real ethical issue: when may doctors intentionally end the life of a patient?
In recent months there has been considerable discussion on the ethics of using organs from anencephalic babies for transplantation purposes. The heart of an anencephalic in Ireland was so used, but the recipient died very soon after the operation. Since this case came to light the Royal College of Physicians has imposed a ban on the use of these babies as donors while a working party investigates the issues involved.* This article attempts to examine the problem and reaches the conclusion that in practice it is not ethical to use the organs of anencephalics for transplants.
It is possible and necessary to compare stretches of human life with other goods, such as the good of conserving resources for others. A minute of human life is not of infinite value; all else being equal, a minute of life is less valuable than 10 years of the same life. Nevertheless, this ability to evaluate human life does not necessarily lead to total commodification of human life.
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