Content uploaded by Angelo Tartaglia
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Angelo Tartaglia on Oct 22, 2020
Content may be subject to copyright.
International Journal of Ecosystems and Ecology Sciences (IJEES) Vol. 7 (1): 141-148 (2017)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
141
THE TURIN-LYON HIGH-SPEED RAIL: A TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT
Massimo Zucchetti1*, Marina Clerico1, Luca Giunti2, Luca Mercalli3, Alberto Poggio1,
Marco Ponti4, Angelo Tartaglia1, Sergio Ulgiati5
1*Politecnico di Torino, Italy;
2 HSR Technical Committee of UMVSS, Italy;
3SMI – Italian Metheorological Society, Italy;
4Politecnico di Milano, Italy;
5Parthenope University, Naples, Italy;
Email: d001874@polito.it; zucchetti@polito.it;
Received October, 2016; Accepted November, 2016;
UOI license: http://u-o-i.org/1.01/ijees/96479001
ABSTRACT
One of the best known cases of struggle for the commons in Italy, characterized by bitter controversies over the last
20 years, is the popular opposition to the construction of the High Speed Railway line between Turin and Lyon,
designed to cross the Susa Valley (at the Italian-French border) and the Alps. This HSR project still carries, in spite
of twenty years of continuous updating and reworking, a great deal of unsolved environmental and economic issues.
The Susa Valley, situated between Maurienne, France and Turin, Italy, has been urbanized by the economic
development of the region. The construction of infrastructures like the Frejus highway, the international railway, and
a large number of dams, tunnels and industries, has generated significant environmental and social impacts. The
proposed high-speed railway (HSR) line (Treno Alta Velocità in Italian, or TAV) between Turin and Lyon would
pass cross the Susa Valley, via 2 main tunnels and several shorter ones across the Alps. Main pollution problems
dealing with the railway construction have been put into evidence by several studies and official reports. Moreover,
the insufficient cost-benefit balance, especially in view of the significant passenger and freight traffic decrease along
the Turin-Lyon direction is a fact: the huge amount of public money invested or planned in support of such
development does not appear to be justified by sufficient economic benefits associated to the investment. In other
words, not only a sequestration and degradation of the environment is going to take place, but also there is no
advantage at all in economic terms. The usual appeal to the Precautionary Principle in the case of HSR project is not
even necessary. Economic data, energetic considerations, legal questions, environmental impact, the health impact
potential, the negative experience of other projects suggest that the High-Speed Train Turin-Lyon is not an actual
priority for Italy and Europe, and its construction should be immediately stopped. The most important aspects
dealing with economic costs and claimed benefits, energetic considerations, legal constraints, environmental impact,
health impact potential, and the negative experience of other projects, are discussed.
Key words: High-Speed Train, legal constraints, environmental impact, health impact potential, Italy, France.
Massimo Zucchetti1*, Marina Clerico1, Luca Giunti2, Luca Mercalli3, Alberto Poggio1,
Marco Ponti4, Angelo Tartaglia1, Sergio Ulgiati5
142
INTRODUCTION
The Susa Valley, situated between Maurienne, France and Turin, Italy, has been urbanized by the economic
development of the region. The construction of infrastructures like the Frejus highway, the international railway, and
a large number of dams, tunnels and industries, has generated significant environmental and social impacts.
The proposed high-speed railway (HSR) line (Treno Alta Velocità in Italian, or TAV) between Turin and Lyon
would pass cross the Susa Valley, via 2 main tunnels and several shorter ones across the Alps.
The HSR project has long been surrounded by bitter controversies: it carries, after more than twenty years of
strenuous and continuous redesigning, a large number of still unsolved environmental issues. Main pollution
problems dealing with the railway construction have been put into evidence by several studies and official reports.
Moreover, the insufficient cost-benefit balance, especially in view of the significant passenger and freight traffic
decrease along the Turin-Lyon direction [1] is a fact: the huge amount of public money invested or planned in
support of such development does not appear to be justified by sufficient economic benefits associated to the
investment [2]. In other words, not only a sequestration and degradation of the environment is going to take place,
but also there is no advantage at all in economic terms.
The usual appeal to the Precautionary Principle [3,4] in the case of HSR project is not even necessary. Economic
data, energetic considerations, legal questions, environmental impact, the health impact potential, the negative
experience of other projects suggest that the High-Speed Train Turin-Lyon is not an actual priority for Italy and
Europe, and its construction should be immediately stopped.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
The Susa Valley and the new Turin-Lyon HSR
The Susa Valley is in Northwest Italy at the border with France, from which it is separated by the Alps. It is the
widest valley in the Western Alps. It is defined as a Site of Community Importance (SCI) according to the European
Commission “Habitats Directive” (92/43/EEC), within the Natura 2000 Network. The Dora Riparia River runs
through the valley, and there are abundant springs and superficial aquifers. Large pastures are located in the high
part of the valley. The Susa Valley is among the most developed alpine valleys from economic and infrastructural
points of view. It is crossed by two main roads through the passes Monginevro and Moncenisio. Moreover, a
motorway and an international railway reach France through the Fréjus tunnel. The Valley hosts three hydroelectric
dams and is crossed by two electric lines. Many tourist and sport resorts make the valley a tourist attraction (it also
was the base of the 2006 Winter Olympics). There are many industries, including mining, and many military roads
built in previous centuries that are currently international tourist attractions for walkers and cyclists.
The valley has about 90,000 inhabitants, and it is divided into 39 Municipalities. There is a well-established tourist
industry: notwithstanding the heavy human presence, the Susa Valley features wide semi-natural and wild areas,
which host many examples of alpine fauna and a very rich diversity of flower species: there are four natural parks,
two natural reserves and many areas of European interest. Livestock rearing, which was very intense until the end of
World War II and subsequently declined, is now in a new phase of growth, albeit slow.
The Turin-Lyon HSR was designed to be part of a more ambitious project linking Kiev (Ukraine) to Lisboa
(Portugal). The project, not included by European Union among its priority high-speed projects, has lost potential
partners on the way (Spain, Portugal, Ukraine, Slovenia) due to the huge financial investments needed, low traffic
forecasts, low economic return expected. As a consequence, it became a France-Italy bilateral project, still under
debate and waiting for final approval and further funding. Its completion requires a new tunnel 57 km long and other
rail works to link to the existing network. Supporters claim the new line to be able to transfer large fractions of
freight traffic from road to rail, with consequent environmental advantages.
International Journal of Ecosystems and Ecology Sciences (IJEES) Vol. 7 (1): 141-148 (2017)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
143
RESULT
Economic assessment
Estimates about the needed investment and expected benefits have been very uncertain for decades, when a
Governmental cost-benefit analysis was finally presented [5] and published. The foreseen investment was so large
that a backdoor plan was put forward: instead of a 270 km line Turin-Lyon, a cheaper solution (only the 57 km base-
tunnel and related links to the existing line) was designed, translating into a 60% cost abatement.
Concerning freight, the central problem is that rail freight transport in Italy occurs at an average speed of 19 km per
hour [1], since trains are often diverted and parked in transit stations, to provide priority to passenger trains. This is
the main bottleneck requiring improvement. It’s a nonsense for commodities to arrive from France at a speed of 150
kilometres per hour and have to stop and spend most of their time in a transit station when they arrive in Italy.
Concerning passengers, it makes sense to talk of High Speed Rail when the journeys are longer than 250-300 km. In
Italy [1,4] 80% of the demand for passenger transport is for short journeys, less than 100 Km. It’s true that Italian
trains are overloaded with passengers on certain routes but only very few people go from one end of the country to
the other, taking real advantage of the high speed (also in consideration of the growing offer for low-cost airfares,
competing with high prices of HSR tickets).
Official costs estimates must refer to the entire line (270 km), not just to the basic tunnel (57 km). Foreseen
investments are around 22 billion euro, but previous experience shows that forecasts result much lower than final
real costs. The Italian Milano-Salerno high speed train line, already implemented, costed three times more than the
forecasts [6]; the benefits for long-distance passengers in terms of time saved cannot be disregarded, but they are
offset by much higher tariffs, and, more than that, by the huge cost of the global investment. An ex-post cost-benefit
assessment published by Beria and Grimaldi [7] in 2011 shows that even the high ticket prices on the Milan-Salerno
HSR line do not pay back the long-term investment and daily operation costs. The implementation of the Turin-
Lyon would probably be even worse, since the expected number of passengers is very low: the line should thus be
essentially used for the transport of commodities, a modality that has been declining in the last 10 years [1] and that
has limited growth perspectives, due to the future competition by the new Gotthard tunnel through the Italy-
Switzerland border, expected to attract the large majority of traffic in the North-South direction. Moreover the
existing line, recently renewed and improved, can carry up to 20 million tons [1], a capacity that is much far from
being saturated in the short-medium time. Concerning construction and operating costs, it was estimated that the
whole Italian High-Speed network (and not just the Turin-Lyon HSR project) would pay back for 60% of its costs.
Then this estimate decreased down to 40% and finally it was established that the 40% would not include the costs
for the expensive “nodes” near the cities. According to simulations in [4], the final estimate is around 20%.
Concerning the Turin-Lyon HSR, even that 20% will probably not be achieved (no financial analysis is available
yet), and the Italian State is supposed to cover 100% of the costs. As far as employment is concerned, nowadays, the
massive projects have a modest multiplier effect: manual workers are not employed as they were in the 1800’s.
Moreover, the well known tourist value of Italian landscape (with expected increase of visitors from recently
developed countries) should prevent from implementing further landscape degrading infrastructures, calling for
much better ways to invest public and private money, for higher return in terms of revenues and jobs.
Recently, a down-sized project was presented by the Italian Government [8], costing one third of the original one,
and limited to the base tunnel, i.e. without any improvement of the existing line outside it (“Low-Cost Solution”). In
practice, this makes the overall time savings very modest, eliminating any possible relevance for the passenger
traffic.
Greenhouse emissions and Energy Impact Assessment
Assessing the material and energy costs as well as emission flows for construction and operation of the Italian HSR
is not an easy task, due to the lack of data that surrounds the entire process.
It would be very useful to implement a complete Life Cycle Assessment of the entire project (infrastructure
construction and operation phase) by a third party team of experts. Environmental results are very sensitive to
factors such as ridership (load factor), the country’s electric mix, extent of use by passenger and by freight traffic,
allocation of infrastructure costs to passenger and freight transport, site-specific aspects. As a consequence, all
studies and estimates carried out up-to-date are rich with uncertainties and depend on sometimes arbitrary
assumptions. We have identified very arbitrary assumptions in LCA and impact assessment studies performed
Massimo Zucchetti1*, Marina Clerico1, Luca Giunti2, Luca Mercalli3, Alberto Poggio1,
Marco Ponti4, Angelo Tartaglia1, Sergio Ulgiati5
144
within LCA commercial software as well as in official reports published in support of HSR. However, published
peer-reviewed studies [6,7,9-12] allow at least a gross estimates of impacts (Tables 1 and 2).
Table 1. Average load factors and selected LCA impact categories for passenger road and rail transport
modalities [12]
Load factor
(passengers per
trip)
Abiotic material
depletion (kg/p-
km)
Cumulative Energy
Demand (MJ/p-km)
CO2
emissions (g
CO2/p-km)
SO2
emissions (g
SO2/p-km)
Car
1.8
0.53
1.87
89.40
0.24
IC train
400
0.85
0.77
30.30
0.34
HSR
250
1.40
1.44
48.20
0.56
Table 2. Average load factors and selected LCA impact categories for freight road and rail transport
modalities [12]
Load factor
(ton per trip)
Abiotic material
depletion (kg/t-
km)
Cumulative energy
Demand (MJ/t-km)
CO2
emissions
(g CO2/t-km)
SO2
emissions (g
SO2/p-km)
Lorry
(average)
8.8
0.60
1.25
72.10
0.21
Regular
freight train
350
7.65
2.50
150.00
0.85
HSR
350
8.65
3.09
189.00
1.05
Tables reflect average values (based on estimates and published reports) of material and energy flows for the
construction and operation of the Naples-Milan high speed rail [12,13]; results have been compared with
internationally published literature, taking into proper account the variability of ridership and electric mix. Energy
intensity indicators clearly show a much higher energy expenditure of HSR compared to Intercity rail as far as
passenger traffic is concerned. The hypothetical use of HSR for freight transport is also very energy intensive
compared to both regular freight trains and trucks. Only passenger transport by car is more energy expensive than
any other modality. Calculations from [12,13] are based on present load factors from official statistics. A decreasing
traffic would only have the effect of increasing the unit transportation costs and emissions. Claims of HSR proposers
foresee increasing traffic in the next 30-50 years, which is not supported by present trend data and may rather be
ascribed to fairy tales books. Considering the non linear increase of energy consumption of a running vehicle up to
more than 3-4 times when speed increases from 100 to 300 km/yr [14] is an explanation to our data too.
One of the main environmental justifications of HSR projects is the transfer of goods and passengers from road to
rail modality, resulting in a reduction of the greenhouse gas and other pollutants released by the engines of trucks.
This result, however, depends not only on direct consumption of electricity and fuels, but also on the energy
investment for the infrastructure construction, including the energy incorporated into the materials and their
necessary management and maintenance. In the case of a big infrastructure project, such as HSR, this is a
particularly important requirement for a careful analysis of the life cycle of the project. Rail transport, less versatile
than road transport, may cause less pollution, but only if we use or improve on an existing network. If we build a
new line with about 70 kilometers of tunnel, 10-20 years of construction work, tens of thousands of truck journeys,
excavated material to dispose of, drills, thousands of tons of iron and concrete, heavy interference with underground
and surface water, and the energy necessary to keep it working, then the consumption of raw materials and energy
and the related emissions are so high as to entirely offset the claimed advantage of the hypothetical partial transfer of
freight from road to rail [9,12,13]. The ridership is also of paramount importance: in the presence of a small or
decreasing traffic, the investment per unit of passenger and commodity transported would never be competitive with
other transport modalities.
The environmental impact of any new construction project is high; a project may be justified, however, if its
usefulness compensates the environmental burden from construction and operation. Given the serious doubts about
its usefulness under the perspective of declining freight traffic, the HSR project runs the risk that the shift in traffic
from road to rail would not occur or be very low, and thus the benefits in the reduction of the environmental impact
International Journal of Ecosystems and Ecology Sciences (IJEES) Vol. 7 (1): 141-148 (2017)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
145
would also be very low. Planners forecast fourteen trains per day, while the capacity of the line is for 250 vehicles.
Freight traffic on rail lines is in decline throughout Europe, with very few exceptions: production has shifted away
from raw materials, traditionally carried by rail, such as bricks, wood and coal.
Last but not least, Spiellman et al.[15], Zurich University, in their study about high speed transport in Switzerland,
foresee increased energy demand and emissions due to rebound effect phenomena (and Jevons paradox): increased
time use efficiency and longer distance run within the time fraction allocated to travel are estimated to increase the
number of trips and trains on the same route, thus causing global higher energy consumption and CO2 emissions.
Similar results were confirmed for Italian freight transport by Ruzzenenti et al [16] and by Ruzzenenti and Basosi
[17]. Train transportation modalities are claimed a priori to be carbon free or, at least, less carbon intensive. It is
certainly true that a train does not directly release any CO2 during its operation. However, the construction of the
infrastructure (excavations, tracks, viaducts, concrete for tunnel walls reinforcement, electric lines) and vehicles,
maintenance operations, and the provision of electric power all require huge amounts of energy that are in Italy
mainly based on fossil fuels. Calculations from the Italian Government’s cost-benefit assessment [18] point out – for
the entire, not yet existing, East-West EU Corridor 5 - an annual decrease of CO2 emissions equal to 3 million ton/yr
avoided by the year 2055 with a net release until 2038; in that year the foreseen (although not supported by any
present real traffic data) increase of traffic and related savings on road transport should offset the emissions
associated to the infrastructure and operation of HSR. Surprising it may appear, these calculations do not include the
emissions related to infrastructure construction, which means that about 40% of total life cycle emissions are not
accounted for, thus making the break-even point (if any) estimate wrong.
The Frejus highway in the Susa Valley is presently used by approximately 3300 big transport trucks per day. The
foreseen increase of freight traffic by ten times via railway and by 1.6 times via road by the year 2035 [18] must be
combined to the almost certain decision to implement as a cheaper solution only the construction of the base tunnel
(57 km) and links to the old line: this means that, considering the limited capacity of the latter (20 Mton/yr),
additional 19.9 Mton/yr will have to flow through the Frejus highway instead of being transported via rail, thus
totaling about 52.3 Mton/yr by truck. This translates into 3,300,000 truck trips per year, about 2.75 times the road
traffic in the year 2010, a nightmare scenario for both energy consumption and CO2 and other pollutants emissions.
Actually, these results show that the traffic previsions used to support the HSR construction are unrealistic. It seems
therefore very hard to support the claim that the construction of the HSR Turin-Lyon would be consistent with the
requirements of the Kyoto Protocol and future similar low-carbon agreements.
Further environmental impacts assessment
The Turin-Lyon HSR construction carries a number of additional environmental problems, that have been
highlighted by several studies [1,12,19,20,21,22]. Particularly alarming is that the planned tunnel, which will be
more than 100 kilometers long (a double tunnel, 57 km each one), will pass through zones with a high concentration
of asbestos and uranium.
For example, concerning uranium, it is planned that the resulting material from excavations will also be disposed of
in two open-pit mines in the Susa Valley, Meana and Caprie. Thus, naturally radioactive material with radioactivity
from uranium would be dispersed into the environment, with possible water and soil contamination. Due to weather
conditions, resuspension of polluted dust is quite likely, and such a dispersion of pollutants would expose the local
population to collective doses of several thousands of sieverts per person: this represents a hazard for public health
in the zones surrounding the mines, where hundreds of persons are living [21]. Concerning excavation of tunnels in
uranium-bearing rocks, even with quite low concentration, the main source of radiation exposure is radon (222Rn), a
radioactive gas, and radon decay products. Radon is colorless, odorless, and chemically inert; it is formed by the
radioactive decay of uranium in rock, soil, and water, and has a half-life of about four days. When radon undergoes
radioactive decay, it emits ionizing radiation in the form of alpha particles. It also produces metallic short-lived
decay products, like: 218Po, 214Pb, 214Bi, 214Po, 210Bi, 210Pb. Their chemical reactivity and electric properties make
them stick to dust and other tiny particles in air. These dust particles can easily be inhaled into the lung and fixed to
pulmonary mucosae. The deposited atoms decay and eventually damage cells in the lung. A considerable amount of
evidence has established that prolonged exposure to the α-emitting decay products of radon increases the risk of
lung cancer [22] . Accurate measurements of concentration are mandatory by law in workplaces, and, in some cases,
adequate countermeasures too. Natural radionuclide concentrations in the Susa Valley can reach quite high
concentrations in some selected locations, due to the presence of several uranium-rich geological formations and
even some former sample uranium mines dating from the fifties. For instance, the Regional Agency for the
Massimo Zucchetti1*, Marina Clerico1, Luca Giunti2, Luca Mercalli3, Alberto Poggio1,
Marco Ponti4, Angelo Tartaglia1, Sergio Ulgiati5
146
Environment of Piedmont, Italy (ARPA) measure concentrations up to 100 Bq/g in samples of rock collected in
Venaus (Susa Valley) [23].
Concerning asbestos, HSR proposers claim that about 170,000 m3 of asbestos-bearing rock with “relevant
concentrations” [24] can be found 500 m from the base tunnel. This assumption can be proved to be a huge
underestimate of the real case, by at least a factor 10. First of all, let’s note that “very low levels" are defined in [24]
as "the ones under a 5% concentration of asbestos in rocks encountered during excavation”, while the legal limit is
about 0.1% according to the Italian Law; the latter banned asbestos from any use since 1992 [25], since even a few
fibers can cause serious health damages: if such more appropriate threshold concentration is assumed for asbestos
then the estimated amount of asbestos-bearing rocks in excavation material would be much higher than 170,000 m3.
Moreover, in 1995-1998 the Turin University [26] performed evaluations in the Susa Valley showing the presence
of chrysotile and tremolite, both asbestos minerals. It is important to point out that the study was commissioned by
Alpetunnel, the first company responsible for the design of the Tunnel. The most recent surveys carried out by the
HSR proponents [24] and claiming the absence of asbestos are instead questionable. The sampling activities were
carried out in points where no asbestos presence was expected: the tectonics structure of the Western Alps in the
Susa Valley zone is very complex, having been involved in various geological events; as a consequence, sumpling
results would have been very different in the surrounding areas. Surveys of the University of Siena found asbestos
fibers "with high tendency to defibrillation" [26] in 20 out of 39 rock samples tested in the Susa Valley.
An assessment of hydrological risks connected with the HSR construction may be summarized as follows. In 2006,
about 30 superficial water springs have been identified by the HSR proponents [27] along the old version of track of
the national segment rail line, in many villages in the Susa Valley. Same situation appears in the Municipalities
impacted by the international segment, where the number of water sources and creeks is quite high, with the
complication that several of them are used as drinkable water supply. Therefore, two kinds of problems emerge: the
excavation activities can drain or divert the springs leaving population without water, and the sources can be
polluted, becoming undrinkable and unusable. In the presence of very deep tunnel design, sampling surveys are not
so easy because of the depth of some sites and because of the difficulty to reach the surface sampling sites located in
mountain. Just to mention an example related to the Susa Valley, during the activities for the construction of the
“Pont Ventoux” hydroelectric power plant, a large number of high pressure water jets have been found, together
with an underground lake of hundreds of thousand cubic meters. Moreover, the artificial lake of the Mont Cenis, a
333 million cubic meters water reservoir at 2000 meters of altitude, supplying power plants in France and in Italy, is
located in the area. Interception of very high-pressure jets cannot be excluded a priori during excavations.
CONCLUSION
From the beginning, the NOTAV movement was aware that the politics of the particular and localized, while
powerful in mobilizing citizens, has the potential for political defeat in that it speaks only to a small fraction of the
population, involving interests that are insufficient to generate a critical mass to win. In order to refute the NIMBY
characterization and overcome national political apathy on the issue, the NOTAV movement pushed the lines of the
“inner boundary” of the Susa Valley through economic and scientific analysis, which demonstrated dangers and
inefficiencies that could affect the entire country.
The NOTAV movement is part of a broader struggle of the commons movement linking together with movements
engaged in other segments (water, culture, labor, education) to build a social movement encouraging democratic and
popular participation in resource management at both local and global levels. The Susa Valley is a common for the
nation, and actions of the NOTAV movement are anything but merely local. The environment and its degradation
are commons. Public funds and how you decide to spend them are commons. Land and water and how you use them
are also commons. Public health is a common. This is the simple message of the NOTAV movement, which has
been affirmed with a potent injection of scientifically based arguments also on international peer reviewed scientific
journals [1,7,12,13,16,17,20,22,28,29,30].
Can the opposition against HSR be defined as “against Progress”? Results suggest the opposite to be true. Progress
and wellbeing must not be confused with infinite growth. The territory of Italy is small and over-populated. Natural
resources (water, agricultural land, forests, minerals) are limited. Pollution and waste are increasing. Fossil energy
supplies are coming to an end. Progress means understanding that physical limits exist to our mania to construct and
International Journal of Ecosystems and Ecology Sciences (IJEES) Vol. 7 (1): 141-148 (2017)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
147
transform the face of the planet. Progress means optimizing, increasing the efficiency and durability of already
existing infrastructures and built environment, cutting out what is superfluous and investing in intellectual and
cultural growth more than material one, using minds more than muscles. The HSR represents the exact opposite of
this idea: wasting resources for no benefit.
Appendix: a brief history of the NOTAV movement [29].
The first HSR proposal in the late 1980s sparked a strong opposition movement in the Susa Valley. Particularly active in the
early days was a pacifist nonviolent and environmental movement based in the small village of Condove; this movement was
known for its opposition to military service, weapons factories, and cruelty to animals. The first opponents to the HSR were local
people belonging to pacifist and ecologist movements. The movement then began to generate support across party lines; some
individuals belonged to a left-wing and communist contingent, while others were part of a local association called Cattolici per
la Valle (Catholic People for the Valley). In the 1970s and 1980s, a local monthly magazine, Dialogo in Valle (Dialogue in the
Valley) was active in the movement, and in the early 1990s, the environmental association Comitato HABITAT formed and later
evolved into the NOTAV movement. During the 1990s, activism strengthened, though it was still only at the local level.
The state’s severe repression of the movement was highlighted in 1999 when three young squatters in Turin, Silvano Pelissero,
Edoardo Massari, and María Soledad Rosas, were arrested and accused of terrorist acts against HSR construction sites.
Although the final trial proved their innocence, Massari and Rosas never heard the sentence, as they had both committed suicide.
At the end of the trial, Pelissero was charged only with robbery and arson, and was acquitted of all other charges.
In 2005 and 2006, the movement again gained the attention of the national media, due to massive demonstrations and clashes
with the police when NOTAV activists succeeded in occupying a site where the first surveys for the HSR were to take place.
Demonstrations were held in Turin as well, with many people coming from outside the valley. After these protests, participation
and attention at the national level grew more rapidly. In 2011, when a new site for the HSR surveys was chosen, the NOTAV
movement occupied the zone and founded the so-called Repubblica della Maddalena, a free zone where the NOTAV movement
was promoting seminars, discussions, concerts, etc. The police eventually removed it forcibly on June 27, 2011.
Since then, many nonviolent actions and demonstrations have taken place, successfully delaying the construction of the HSR. The
Comunità Montana della Val Susa e Val Sangone (CMVSS; Association of Villages of the Susa Valley) has set up a team of
volunteer scientists and experts to perform technical analyses and to produce reports and papers used as evidence by the CMVSS
to support the legal opposition to HSR construction. Additionally, by holding meetings available to the public, the CMVSS
combats misinformation, particularly NIMBY accusations. The NOTAV movement, at all levels, heavily draws on this analysis
and invites experts to public actions and demonstrations to clearly show that there are good scientific and economic reasons for
its opposition. Cooperation among activists and experts is one of the most important and distinctive aspects of the NOTAV
movement.
REFERENCES
[1] L. Giunti, L. Mercalli, A. Poggio, M. Ponti, A. Tartaglia, S. Ulgiati, M. Zucchetti, “Economic, Environmental
And Energy Assessment Of The Turin-Lyon High-Speed Rail”, International Journal of Ecosystems and Ecology
Sciences (IJEES) 2 (4): 361-368 (2012). ISSN:2224-4980;
[2] Donald Gray, Laura Colucci-Gray and Elena Camino: Science, society and sustainability, Routledge (USA-UK),
2009 (see particularly cap. 3 Active Citizenship, a Case Study. The Controversy of High-Speed Rail in the Susa
Valley);
[3] EU, 2000. Commission of the European Communities. Communication from the Commission on the
Precautionary principle. Bruxelles, 2/2/2000. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf.;
[4] UNESCO, 2005. The Precautionary Principle. March 2005. World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific
Knowledge and Technology. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001395/139578e.pdf.;
[5] Ministero Infrastrutture e Trasporti, 2012. CONFERENZA STAMPA DI PRESENTAZIONE DEL PROGETTO
E DELL’ANALISI COSTI BENEFICI. Roma, 26 aprile 2012;
[6] Marco Ponti, Competition and Regulation in the Public Choice Perspective, in 16th International Symposium on
Theory and Practice in Transport Economics, 247, 259 (2005);
[7] Paolo Beria, Raffaele Grimaldi, 2011. An Early Evaluation of Italian High Speed Projects. Tema, 4(3): 15-28.
http://www.tema.unina.it. ISSN 1970-9870;
[8] F. Pasquali (ed.), “Osservatorio Collegamento Ferroviario Torino-Lione. Quaderno n.8. Analisi costi-benefici.
Analisi Globale e ricadute sul territorio”, May 2012, available at:
http://www.regione.piemonte.it/speciali/nuova_TorinoLione/dwd/quaderni/quaderno8.zip;
[9] Chester, M.V., A. Horvath, and Samer Madanat, 2009. Parking infrastructure: energy, emissions, and
automobile life-cycle environmental accounting. Environ. Res. Lett. 5(3): 1-8;
Massimo Zucchetti1*, Marina Clerico1, Luca Giunti2, Luca Mercalli3, Alberto Poggio1,
Marco Ponti4, Angelo Tartaglia1, Sergio Ulgiati5
148
[10] Grossrieder, C., 2011. Life-Cycle assessment of Future Highspeed Rail in Norway. Norwegian University of
Science and Technology, Department of Energy and Process Engineering,
http://daim.idi.ntnu.no/masteroppgaver/006/6265/tittelside.pdf ;
[11] Åkerman, J., 2011. The role of high-speed rail in mitigating climate change – The Swedish case Europabanan
from a life cycle perspective. Transportation Research Part D 16: 208–217;
[12] M. Federici, S. Ulgiati, R. Basosi, A thermodynamic, environmental and material flow analysis of the Italian
highway and railway transport systems, 33,5 Energy 760, 775 (2008);
[13] Federici, M., S. Ulgiati, R. Basosi, 2009. Air versus terrestrial transport modalities: An energy and
environmental comparison. Energy, 34(10): 1493-1503;
[14] Network Rail, 2009. New Lines Programme. Comparing the Environmental Impact of Conventional and High
Speed Rail. http://www.networkrail.co.uk/newlinesprogramme/;
[15] Spielmann, M., de Haan, P., and Scholz, R.W., 2008. Environmental rebound effects of high-speed transport
technologies: a case study of climate change rebound effects of a future underground maglev train system. Journal
of Cleaner Production 16 (2008) 1388-1398;
[16] Ruzzenenti, F., Federici, M., Basosi, R., 2006. Energy Efficiency and structural change in production: an
analysis of long-term impacts in the road freight transport sector. Book of Proceedings of the Biennial Inernational
Workshop “Advances in Enrgy Studies. Perspectives on Energy Future”, Porto Venere, Italy, 12-16 September
2006. S. Ulgiati, S. Bargigli, M.T. Brown, M. Giampietro, R.A. Herendeen and K. Mayumi Editors;
[17] Ruzzenenti, F. and Basosi, R., 2008. The role of the power/efficiency misconception in the rebound effect’s
size debate: Does efficiency actually lead to a power enhancement? Energy Policy, 36(9):3626-3632;
[18] Italian Government: collection of documents on the HSR question, 2012. See:
http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma/Dossier/TAV/TAV_risposte_osservazioni_comunita_montana.pdf;
[19] Claudio Cancelli, Giuseppe Sergi, Massimo Zucchetti, Travolti Dall’Alta Voracità; Odradek, Roma, 2006 (in
italian);
[20] Federica Appiotti, Fausto Marincioni, The Lyon-Turin High-Speed Rail: The Public Debate and Perception of
Environmental Risk in Susa Valley, Italy, 43 Environmental Management 863, 875 (2009);
[21] Massimo Zucchetti, 2012. Railway Related Soil Pollution: The Turin-Lyon High-Speed Rail Case, Paper
S12.01-P -34, p.127. Conference EuroSoil 2012, Bari (Italy), see:
http://www.eurosoil2012.eu/download/300/Final%20Programme;
[22] Lucia Bonavigo, Massimo Zucchetti, Dose Calculation Due To Underground Exposure: The Tav Tunnel In
Valle Di Susa, 17,9B Fresenius Environmental Bulletin 1476, 1480 (2008);
[23] ARPA Piemonte, 1997. Letter, October 9th 1997, prot. n. 3065, see
http://www.ambientevalsusa.it/Images/uranio-amianto/arpa.jpg;
[24] Italian Law, 1992: Legge n. 257/92, available in Suppl. Ord. n. 64 alla Gazz. Uff. n. 87, Serie Generale, Parte
Prima del 13.4.92;
[25] R. Sacchi, 2004. Studi geologici in Val Susa finalizzati ad un nuovo collegamento ferroviario Torino-Lione,
Report of the Museo Scienze Naturali, Torino (Italy), n.41. ISBN-10: 8886041594;
[26] Mario Cavargna, 2006. Il problema dell’amianto accompagna la storia recente della Valle Susa. Riccardo Pavia,
2006. Amianto e uranio in Valle Susa: quali pericoli si corrono?. Marco Tomalino, 2006. TAV e amianto, quale
rischio per la Valle Susa?. Three papers in: Medicina Democratica, 165-167 (2006) 67-90. (in italian);
[27] A. Allasio, 2006. The High Speed and High Capacity railway Turin-Lyon, Report for The Association of
villages of the Susa Valley (Comunità Montana della Val Susa e Val Sangone: CMVSS, www.cmvss.it ) (in Italian);
[28] Gianfranco Chiocchia, Marina Clerico, Pietro Salizzoni et al., Impact assessment of a railway noise in an alpine
valley, 10th Congress Francais de Acoustique, Lyon (2010), available at:
http://areeweb.polito.it/eventi/TAVSalute/Articoli/000256.pdf (in italian);
[29] M. Zucchetti, The Turin-Lyon High-Speed Rail Opposition: The Commons as an Uncommon Experience for
Italy, SAQ South Atlantic Quarterly, 112:2 (2013) 388-395. ISSN: 0038-2876;
[30] M. Zucchetti, M. Clerico, L. Giunti, L. Mercalli, A. Tartaglia, Railway Related Impacts: the Turin-Lyon High-
Speed Rail Case, Fresenius Env. Bull. (in print, 2014);
