Economic sanctions: Law and public policy
Abstract
Economic sanctions are increasingly important instruments of regulatory and foreign policy. This book provides a detailed study of the post-9/11 financial sanctions programmes in the US and Europe, examining the key regulatory and legal issues that confront businesses and related liability issues for third parties and individuals.
... Expropriations without adequate compensation, which are illegal under international law, can be interpreted by the targeted state as a countermeasure to sanctions, if the initial sanctions are deemed to be illegal acts. In this case, expropriations could be seen as the target taking something of proportional reciprocal value to the sender's initial restrictions on the target's firms (Alexander 2009;Happold 2016). By acting in a tit-for-tat manner with sender countries, targeted states indirectly levy costs on senders that they could not otherwise impose against more militarily and economically powerful countries. ...
... If we consider that by imposing sanctions, the sender is harming the target nations' overall economy and the business interests of its firms, lessening their value, target states have incentives to take countermeasure against sanctioning states. Targeted states can follow the concept of proportional reciprocation in international law, taking matters into their own hands by confiscating something of value from the sender's firms via nationalization to compensate for the losses caused by sanctions (Alexander 2009;Happold 2016). The relative ease by which host countries can seize firms, especially for immobile assets including natural resources and their rents, and the high costs absorbed by MNCs and their shareholders following expropriation, makes nationalization an attractive strategy for targeted states (Eaton and Gersovitz 1984;Frieden 1994, 567-68;Kobrin 1984). ...
... In 1960 Castro struck a deal with the Soviets to barter Cuban sugar for Soviet petroleum products, prompting the U.S. to retaliate by altering the American sugar quota. While scholars of international law have debated as to whether the U.S. was under any obligation to maintain the present level of economic activity with Cuba (Alexander 2009;Lamrani 2013), the move appears to have been coercive in nature, calling its legitimacy into question as a unilateral use of economic coercion (Dupont 2016, 45). When the U.S. followed these actions with a refusal to refine Soviet crude in their Cuban based refineries, Cuba responded by expropriating these facilities (Green 1983, 66). ...
Studies suggest that home countries impose economic sanctions following host state expropriation of home firms. However, and not addressed in the empirical literature, is the possibility that sanctions lead targeted countries to nationalize firms from sender countries. Using bilateral expropriation data from 1985 to 2010, and controlling for endogeneity issues, we find that sanctions significantly increase expropriation risk, encouraging targeted states to inflict pain in a reciprocal manner on sender countries. Expropriations also enable targeted nations to acquire economic assets from foreign firms, undermining the restricting goals of sanctioning states, and provide opportunities for leaders to show political resolve at home by standing up to senders. Our results are robust using monadic or dyadic data and different statistical methods, indicating another sanction-busting strategy used by targeted countries.
... To investigate the harm caused by economic sanctions on the sender countries, with special reference the to the "sanctions game" in Zimbabwe. Boozer (2000) Economic sanctions refer to the actual or threatened withdrawal of normal trade or financial relations, imposed by the sender against the target, for foreign policy purposes Nyun (2008) Economic sanctions are restrictions upon international trade and financial dealings one country or a group of countries impose on another, usually as punishment for following policies of the sanctioning country/countries disapproves Kern (2009) Economic sanctions can be defined as actions that one or countries take to limit or end their economic relations with a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change its policies or behavior ...
... Table 1 above is a summary of the most common definitions in literature. It is important to note that the definitions given by Rennack & Shuey (1999), Boozer (2000), Nyun (2008) and Kern (2009) imposed on Zimbabwe cannot be described as seeking to "persuade" Zimbabwe to changer her policies or behavior. It is almost unnecessary to highlight the fact that economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe are coercive and they clearly portray foreign policy positions. ...
... It is almost unnecessary to highlight the fact that economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe are coercive and they clearly portray foreign policy positions. Hence the definitions of economic sanctions given by Rennack & Shuey (1999) and Kern (2009) best describe the Zimbabwean scenario. ...
Zimbabwe's economic hara-kiri has become so stupendous that it can no longer be addressed without dealing with economic sanctions first. If nothing is done now, Zimbabwe will continue to sink deep down into the sanctions-induced economic doldrums. To set Zimbabwe on a genuine economic recovery path, economic sanctions must be removed first. Empirical evidence indicates that economic sanctions are not only predatory but also cancerous for any economy and they must be removed. This study shows that economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe are detrimental to the economy; hence the urgent need for their removal. On the other side of the same coin, this paper also argues that the economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe are also backfiring against the imposers. Therefore, there is absolutely no need for their continued imposition since the sender-countries are also being hurt by the same sanctions! However, the need to "call a spade a spade" in handling the "issues" being raised by the sanctions-imposing countries is not unimportant given the gravity of the "sanctions game" in Zimbabwe. As Zimbabweans continue to lobby for the immediate removal of economic sanctions, this paper offers four-fold policy recommendations in order to boost Zimbabwe's resistance to economic sanctions.
... Scholars of just war theory demand that only legitimate authorities determine the design and implementation of warfare (Lee, 2012). Because, in the just war theory, governments are the most prominent authority in warfare, the sanction literature shares this belief (Alexander, 2009;Winkler, 1999). One reason for this belief is that only governments of states can decide about coercive measures infringing on the property rights of individuals and organizations (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). ...
In response to Russia’s war of aggression and the accompanying human rights violations in Ukraine, several scholars have called for all multinational companies to divest and leave the country; otherwise, they become accomplices to the aggressor. This article reconstructs the arguments in favor of this general call. The first contribution of this article is to extend complicity theory to the context of crimes of aggression and atrocities to promote this demand. Although this extension of complicity theory ensures internal coherence, the call for a general divestment of all companies is tantamount to comprehensive economic sanctions. In contrast, recent developments in sanction theory as part of just war theory suggest that targeted sanctions are the legitimate sanctions that states prefer. Therefore, the second contribution is to evaluate sanctions morally and analyze and discuss the moral implications of three categories of goods and services (sanctioned, essential, and nonessential). This discussion shows no moral justification for a general call for all companies to leave an aggressor state. Companies have moral obligations to comply with legitimate sanctions, moral duties concerning essential goods, and moral permissions concerning nonessential goods.
... Consequently, in cases where an initial evaluation suggests that sanctions are likely to be effective in an economic and political sense, the sending country should still have in place a set of contingency plans to abandon sanctions when they are shown to lack proportionality, or to be ineffective in meeting their objectives (Kern 2009, 65). ...
... Сегодня вопрос о невозможности исполнения обязательств особенно актуален для нас в контексте введения разного рода международных экономических санкций. Если соглашение сторон, попадающее в сферу действия таких санкции, или его исполнение будет нарушать статутное право Великобритании либо противоречить английской «публичной политике», возможно в английском правосудии признание фрустрации этого договора вследствие последующей незаконности 32 . Правда, английские суды до сих пор крайне редко и осторожно применяли доктрину фрустрации договора в делах, связанных с экономическими санкциями 33 . ...
Человечество сталкивалось в прошлом и неизбежно будет сталкиваться в будущем с мощными силами природного и антропогенного характера, которые оказывают драматическое и зачастую длительное воздействие на общество, в том числе на экономику, коммерческие и прочие договоры. Фрустрация – один из оригинальных институтов английского права, позволяющий суду освободить стороны от дальнейшего исполнения договора при наступлении таких обстоятельств, когда такое исполнение становится невозможным или чрезмерно экономически невыгодным. Появлению этого правового института в Англии во второй половине XIX в. предшествовал долгий период, в течение которого юридическая практика неотступно следовала принципу pacta sunt servanda. В статье исследуются основные судебные прецеденты, иллюстрирующие развитие доктрины фрустрации договора в английском праве, приводятся воззрения английских правоведов, а также делается попытка сравнительного анализа указанной доктрины и соответствующих норм российского права. Методологическую основу исследования составляют совокупность методов научного познания, среди которых основное место занимают исторический и сравнительно-правовой методы. В течение полуторавековой истории своего развития доктрина тщетности договора в английском праве существенно эволюционировала. За этот период углубилось понятие о природе и видах обстоятельств, которые могут вызвать тщетность договора, о сути такой тщетности, о необходимых ограничениях в применении этой доктрины, а также о правовых последствиях фрустрации. Следует признать, что, являясь своеобразным правовым институтом, фрустрация договора близка по природе к таким традиционно применяемым в странах европейской континентальной семьи гражданско-правовым конструкциям, как непреодолимая сила (форс-мажор) и простой случай, а также невозможность и крайняя затруднительность исполнения обязательств. Автор приходит к выводу о необходимости изучения доктрины фрустрации договора не только в академических целях, но и для совершенствования соответствующих российских правовых норм, практики их применения, обеспечения работы отечественных юристов в сфере применения английского права и права стран, испытавших влияние данной доктрины.
Mankind has faced in the past and will inevitably face in the future with the powerful forces of natural and man-made, which are often dramatic and lasting impact on the society, economy, commercial and other contracts. Frustration — one of the original institutions of English law, which allows the court to release the parties from further performance of the contract upon the occurrence of certain circumstances, when the performance becomes impossible or extremely economically unprofitable. The emergence of this institution in the second half of the 19th century preceded by a long period during which legal practice consistently followed the principle of pacta sunt servanda. The article considers the basic judicial precedents illustrating the development of the doctrine of contract frustration in English law, sets out the views of English jurists in this field, an comparative analysis of this doctrine and relevant norms of Russian law was attempted. The methodological framework of this research based on a set of methods of research cognition, among which the main ones are historical and comparative law methods. For a century and a half of its development the English law doctrine of frustration of contract has evolved significantly. During this period understanding of the nature and types of circumstances that can cause frustration of the contract, of the essence of the frustration, of the necessary restrictions on the use of this doctrine, as well as the legal consequences of frustration, has been improved. The author comes to a conclusion about the need to study the doctrine of frustration of contract not only in academic purposes, but also for the improvement of the relevant Russian legal norms, their application, as well as to ensure the operation of national lawyers in the sphere of application of the English law and law of countries that have experienced the impact of this doctrine.
This paper delves into the intricate relationship between economic sanctions and the tourism industry, highlighting their multifaceted repercussions and proposing strategic solutions. By synthesizing existing research, it offers insights into the challenges posed by economic sanctions in the tourism domain, advocating for adaptive strategies to foster resilience, sustainability, and equitable growth amidst geopolitical uncertainties. As an overview, the article examines how economic sanctions affect visa policies, disrupt travel patterns, and limit access to certain destinations. It provides a comprehensive analysis of these dynamics, focusing on fostering a deeper understanding of how geopolitical measures reshape the tourism landscape globally, while also proposing strategic solutions to address these challenges.
In Public International Law (PIL), the main research studies on sanctions place them as a foreign policy tool, mostly intended to study specific cases. In this research, we needed and got as a result a definition of terms, such as blockade, embargo, international unilateral sanctions, and coercive unilateral measures, in order to avoid confusions. The Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its homologue Ministry on Foreign Trade and Collaboration, and the academic community use different ways to process and interpret these terms when making reports, so we decided to make distinctions. At the same time, we systematized the data we had available from year January 20, 1988–2022, on the sanctions imposed by the USA against Cuba.
Sözleşme nazariyesi ve tatbikatında, bir sözleşmenin ifa ile sona ermesi ve tasfiyesi beklenir. Bununla birlikte bazı hâllerde, tarafların sözleşme ile bağlı kalmaları mümkün olmaz veya kendilerinden beklenemez. Haklı sebepler olarak tavsif edilen bu hâller, bittabî navlun sözleşmeleri bakımından da cârîdir. Türk Ticaret Kanunu’nun 1218 ilâ 1227’nci maddelerinde, navlun sözleşmesinin feshine sebep olabilecek haklı sebepler düzenlenmiştir. Bu sebeplerin başında bir kamu tasarrufuna bağlı olarak gemiye el konulması ve ticaretin yasaklanması gelir; bundan başka savaş hâline bağlı olarak geminin zapt ve müsadere edilmesi de Kanun’da zikredilmiştir. Hakeza tabiî bir olay veya umulmayan hâllerden kaynaklanan gecikmelerin ise, sözleşmenin belli amacının kaybolmasına sebep olması hâlinde bir fesih sebebi sayılacağı ifade edilmiştir. Bu makale, iş bu haklı sebepler ve yine aynı bapta fesih sebebi olmayacağı öngörülmüş hâller ile bu baptaki hükümlerin tatbikine dair usul, esas ve neticelerin incelenmesine hasredilmiştir. Mamafih inceleme konusu olan bu baptaki hükümlerin, TTK m. 1243 ilâ 1245 hükümleri kapsamında emredici mahiyette olmadığı dikkate alındığında, tatbikatta kahir ekseriyette standart sözleşmelerin kullanıldığı görülmektedir. Hâkezâ bu standart sözleşmelere, haklı sebeplere dair standart klozlar da dercedilerek bunların hukukî neticeleri kararlaştırılabilmektedir. Bu makalede de yeri geldiğince, bu klozlardan da örnekler verilerek sözleşme serbestîsine dikkat çekilmiştir.
US extraterritorial sanctions, also called secondary sanctions, are inherently controversial due to the use of the exorbitant privilege of encroaching not only on the target state but also on third states’ jurisdictions and national interests. After surveying the state of the art in the debate on extraterritorial sanctions with a particular focus on the financial industry, this article refers to the major balancing powers’ policies for dealing with the US use of an exorbitant privilege and concludes that, even though the effectiveness of unilateral secondary sanctions has been apparent as demonstrated in the case of the Iran sanctions, the US practices stand out as being increasingly incongruent in the international system, especially in the slow process of distancing from the US-led unipolarity and its manifestations. Thus, the future of secondary sanctions depends on one hand on the US preserving its diminishing credibility and coordination and on the other hand on third countries’ collective actions for voicing to protect their national interests.
Current article focuses on the legal assessment and the possibility to use sanctions by the
UN Security Council as well as states and regional organisations unilaterally in response to the
malicious activity in cyberarea. The article identifies the main situations when sanctions were
introduced with reference to malicious cyberactivity such as: attacks over critical infrastructure;
attacks which can be qualified as an armed attack; dissemination of hostile propaganda or malicious
information; cybercrimes; undermining state security through cybermeans, and presents legal
qualification on the use of sanctions from the international law point view.
International sanctions are one of the most commonly used instruments of influence against countries, organisations, legal or natural persons whose activities violate the principles and norms of international law, including international human rights law, and pose a threat to global or regional peace and security.
Yaptırımlar modern diplomasinin ayrılmaz bir parçası olarak görülmekle beraber Uluslararası Hukuk’ta yeterince ele alınmış bir konu değildir. Yaptırımlar hukuki dayanak ve sınırları itibarı ile oldukça heterojen karakterlidir. Uluslararası politikanın ayrılmaz bir parçası olan yaptırımlar uluslararası politikanın yürütülmesinde öngörülen amaca erişmeyi temin eden bir araç olarak değerlendirilse de etkinliği bakımından tartışılmaktadır. Bugün çok sayıda devletin ve uluslararası örgütün değişik nedenlerle yaptırım uyguladığı görülmektedir. Uluslararası Hukukta yaptırım olarak alınan önlemler çeşitlilik göstermektedir. Bu çerçevede anlaşma hükümlerine istinat eden yaptırımlar ve uluslararası teamül hukukuna istinat eden yaptırımlar arasında ayrım yapılmaktadır. Yaptırımların Uluslararası Hukuk ihlâllerine reaksiyon olarak ilân edilmesi nedeni ile bu bağlamda uluslararası sorumluluk kuralları esas alınmaktadır. Uluslararası ilişkilerde ancak Uluslararası Hukuk ihlâllerinden etkilenmeyen devletler ve uluslararası örgütler de sık şekilde yaptırım ilân etmektedir. Yaptırımların etkinliği yaptırım uygulanan devletin tutumunda değişikliğe yol açıp açmadığına göre değerlendirilmektedir. Yaptırımların etkisi somut ekonomik, siyasi, konjonktürel koşullara bağlıdır. Bu çerçevede yaptırımların, yaptırım muhatabı olmayan bireyler üzerinde doğurduğu etkinin ve bumerang etkinin de gözardı edilmemesi gerekmektedir. Makalede uluslararası ilişkilerde yaptırım kavramı, yaptırımın Uluslararası Hukuk’taki dayanağı, sınırları, Uluslararası Hukuk süjelerine ve kişilere yönelik yaptırımlar arasındaki farklar, (targeted sanctions) yaptırım mağdurları ve yaptırımların etkisi ele alınmaktadır.
Is a retrospective review of the U.S. regulatory policy and sanctions imposed on Cuba, citizens and legal entities of this country, as well as against third countries and persons related to this state. The aim is to comprehensively understand the scope of such restrictive measures. The research provides a brief analysis of the impact of such measures on civil and business relations along with examples of secondary sanctions and the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which have a negative and long-term impact on the business partners in terms of excessive compliance with restrictions (overcompliance). The authors offer assessment of concepts of economic coercion, extraterritorial jurisdiction, as well as limits of responsibility of private and public actors for breach of legal obligations due to compliance with sanctions restrictions. Continuing the study of issues related to consequences of unlawful unilateral application of restrictive economic measures against a number of states by the U.S., the EU and imposition by countries of their jurisdiction on the parties of a dispute, including those complicated by a foreign element, in the process of dispute resolution , raised by authors' colleagues on scientific research in their published scientific articles (Tsepova E.A. Unprecedented law: Protecting the Russian financial system against the impact of sanctions. RUDN Journal of Law . 2022. Vol. 26. No. 3, 655-677; Ermakova E.P. When the “pro-arbitration” policy of the United States becomes aggressive . Eurasian Law Journal . 2023. No. 5 (180), 77-80; Rusakova E.P., Frolova E.E. Digital disputes in the new legal reality. RUDN Journal of Law. 2022. Vol. 26, No. 3, 695-704), the authors come to the conclusion that it is necessary to develop obligations directly as the duty of businesses to comply with universally recognized norms regarding property, non-discrimination, legal certainty even under the pressure of secondary sanctions and unlawfully expanding extraterritorial jurisdiction of certain countries imposing sanctions, as well as understanding the complex negative impact on the structure of all levels of the economy and sustainable social relations, as well as de jure existence of already designated legal positions on the need to gain consolidated support from all the actors of international communication to overcome the existing rupture: condemnation and recording of illegality in the public law field and forced compliance with such non-legal requirements of certain jurisdictions in the domain of private law relations.
The instruments of economic statecraft have been utilized increasingly in the face of geopolitical challenges. The EU's response to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 was to impose sanctions. This paper analyzes the EU as a normative sanctioning power in the context of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, until the start of the Russia-Ukraine War on February 24, 2022. In its Global Strategy, the EU mentioned sanctions as a credible tool in the Union's foreign policy mix. Following David A. Baldwin's economic statecraft conceptualization, this article argues that in various contingencies, economic statecraft might constitute a credible option, especially if the potential perils of military statecraft in a nuclear world are considered. The EU sanctions after the annexation of Crimea functioned at least for two purposes: first, the EU successfully conveyed its messages to Russia and the wider international community that what Russia committed was not approved. Although this message could be conveyed verbally/diplomatically, as done by many international actors, the EU's message was supported with relatively credible instruments compared to ineffective verbal declarations. Secondly, the EU committed itself on the Ukrainian cause through the sanctions. Thus, this paper argues that although economic statecraft cannot be considered a cure for all the vagaries of geopolitical challenges, it has proved to be an essential part of the policy mix of a containment strategy upon the annexation of Crimea.
Економічні санкції є потужною зброєю України у боротьбі з
агресором і вагомим чинником майбутньої перемоги у війні за свободу і
незалежність. Наша держава послідовно реалізує власну санкційну
політику, визначену Законом України «Про санкції» [1], який встановлює
підстави та принципи їх застосування, запроваджує перелік з двадцяти
п’яти видів обмежувальних заходів та процедуру прийняття у цій сфері.
The author discusses the modern international legal framework governing the application of sanctions. The author focuses on the following issues: international and regional sanctions in the context of the UN Charter, restrictions on sanctions regimes, sanctions in humanitarian law, the legitimacy of unilateral economic sanctions. The methodological base of this work is a systematic approach, which allows to consider sanctions as part of the modern international legal system. As a result of the study, it was revealed that within the framework of the existing international legal system, only the UN Security Council is authorized to impose sanctions in order to ensure global peace and security. The resolutions of the UN Security Council on the issue of the application of restrictive measures are dominant in comparison with the decisions of other international bodies and the obligations of member countries under international treaties. The legitimacy of applying regional sanctions is limited by the statutes of regional organizations. The novelty of the study lies in a comprehensive consideration of the reasons why unilateral sanctions are a violation of international law. Unilateral economic restrictions violate the free trade regime of the WTO and the principle of non-discrimination that underpins the GATT. They represent a violation of the fundamental principles of sovereign equality, as well as the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. As a result of the application of economic sanctions by certain states, extraterritorial jurisdiction is manifested, which creates a dangerous precedent for international law.
Η παρούσα μελέτη πραγματεύεται τη σχέση μεταξύ των κυρώσεων που
επιβάλλονται από ένα κράτος ή οργανισμό σε άλλους δρώντες και της ισχύος
αυτού.
Σκοπός της είναι η εξαγωγή συμπερασμάτων σχετικά με το βαθμό στον
οποίο οι κυρώσεις συντελούν στη διαμόρφωση της ισχύος ενός κράτους ή
οργανισμού, καθώς και ο εντοπισμός των παραγόντων που επηρεάζουν την
αποτελεσματικότητά τους.
Στο 1ο Κεφάλαιο αποσαφηνίζονται οι βασικές έννοιες και η μεταξύ τους σχέση, στο 2ο Κεφάλαιο και 3ο Κεφάλαιο αναλύονται το πλαίσιο και η αποτελεσματικότητα των κυρώσεων
επιλεγμένων διεθνών οργανισμών και κρατών αντίστοιχα, ενώ στο τελευταίο
Κεφάλαιο παρατίθενται τα συμπεράσματα της παρούσας μελέτης, τα οποία απαντούν στα τεθέντα ερευνητικά ερωτήματα.
Current article focuses on the legal assessment and the possibility to use sanctions by the UN Security Council as well as states and regional organisations unilaterally in response to the malicious activity in cyberarea. The article identifies the main situations when sanctions were introduced with reference to malicious cyberactivity such as: attacks over critical infrastructure; attacks which can be qualified as an armed attack; dissemination of hostile propaganda or malicious information; cybercrimes; undermining state security through cybermeans, and presents legal qualification on the use of sanctions from the international law point view.
Настоящая статья посвящена правовой оценке возможности применения санкций Советом Безопасности ООН и в одностороннем порядке государствами и региональными международными организациями в ответ на злонамеренные действия в информационном пространстве. Проанализированы основные случаи введения санкций в ответ на такую деятельность (атаки в отношении критической инфраструктуры; атаки, достигающие уровня вооруженного нападения; распространение враждебной либо злонамеренной информации; подрыв безопасности государства с использованием информационных технологий; совершение киберпреступлений) и дана их правовая оценка с точки зрения международного права.
The historical development of the practice of applying restrictive measures (sanctions) has led to a transition from the idea of their application against States to the concept of their application against individual private law entities. The article examines the historical practice of applying sanctions against Russia and the prerequisites for their application against private law entities. The author gives a general description of the restrictive measures of the European Union used against third States and individuals. In addition, the article examines the specifics of the restrictive measures of the European Union that have been in force against Russia since 2014, taking into account their significant expansion that occurred after February 24, 2022. The legal regulation of the European Union, which establishes restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, was significantly expanded and revised after the announcement by the President of Russia about the beginning of a special military operation in Ukraine. As a result of the analysis of this regulation, the author comes to the conclusion that at the moment there is a hybrid sanctions regime in the European Union, when targeted sanctions against individuals are combined with comprehensive restrictive measures against a number of sectors of the Russian economy. The article also assesses the compliance of restrictive measures of the European Union with modern concepts of "smart" and "targeted" sanctions, which, according to the supporters, should reduce the negative humanitarian consequences of the use of restrictive measures. Despite the official statements of the European Union, the article presents arguments that allow us to conclude that in practice such "smart" and "targeted" sanctions are accompanied by indiscriminate comprehensive restrictions that apply not only to sanctioned persons, but also, in principle, to any Russian persons.
Стаття присвячена розгляду питання екстериторіальності в застосуванні односторонніх економічних санкцій.
У статті розглядається співвідношення теоретичних принципів здійснення юрисдикції держави з правовими актами та практикою держав, що запроваджують економічні санкції. Юрисдикція держави, яка накладає санкції, може бути територіальною, тобто поширюватися на її територію та на осіб, які на ній перебувають, чи екстериторіальною, тобто поширюватися за межі її території. У сфері економічних санкцій екстериторіальна юрисдикція може здійснюватися за принципами активної національності, захисту та універсальності. Принцип активної національності, тобто регулювання державою поведінки своїх громадян і зареєстрованих у ній юридичних осіб, є загальновизнаним і не викликає заперечень. Принцип захисту, який базується на необхідності захисту національних інтересів, активно використовують США, що викликає критику. Останнім часом великого значення набуває принцип універсальності – накладення санкцій на осіб, які здійснюють порушення прав людини.
Для правомірного здійснення екстериторіальної юрисдикції необхідний зв’язок між державою та об’єктом здійснення нею юрисдикції. У ЄС діє концепція «існування зв’язку з ЄС», а в США – концепція «американського елемента». США надзвичайно розширюють межі своєї юрисдикції щодо економічних санкцій, наполягаючи на наявності такого «американського елемента» у випадках перебування іноземних юридичних осіб у володінні чи під контролем осіб США, використання американської фінансової системи, володіння товарами, технологіями чи послугами, які походять зі США. ЄС у питанні санкцій ґрунтується лише на принципах територіальності та активної національності та послідовно заперечує позицію США щодо екстериторіального розширення сфери застосування американських санкцій.
Зроблено висновок, що, незважаючи на опір, фактично США у сфері економічних санкцій національним законодавством і національною практикою його застосування розширюють межі здійснення екстериторіальної юрисдикції.
Broadening the view to measures of economic warfare which are not limited to the sectors treated in the previous chapters—trade, investment and currency—, this chapter contains the final case studies on sector non-specific economic warfare. First, extraterritorial national legislation is discussed in a case study on antitrust law and blocking statutes. Second, the (threat of) termination of international agreements is presented as a form of sector non-specific economic warfare in a case study looking at recent treaty practice of the United States. This includes the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Paris Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Limitations of international law set by the rules on extraterritorial legislation, on countermeasures and retorsions, the law of treaties and the law of neutrality are introduced and discussed in the following.
This chapter begins by defining the object of study: economic warfare. It also clarifies the related terms boycott, embargo, sanction, blockade, retorsion and countermeasure. As usage in news coverage and academia shows, economic warfare is an elusive term and certainly not a term of art in international law. This work defines it as follows: Irrespective of whether being referred to as such, economic warfare consists of measures of an exclusively economic character taken by subjects of international law to express disapproval of the acts of the target, to induce that target to a particular conduct, or to further an economic goal of the imposing subject of international law. By falling under this wide definition, a particular measure only qualifies as economic warfare within the scope of this work—it is not deemed legal or illegal.
Increasing calls to amend Section 25 of the South African Constitution which promotes that land may be expropriated without compensation has drawn global attention. The driving factor behind the increasing rhetoric of land expropriation without compensation is the assumption that the majority of black South Africans are living below the poverty line, mainly because they do not have access to land. This chapter seeks to understand if the expropriation of land without compensation will lead to poverty alleviation within the black community or rather it will have an adverse effect by worsening of poverty and economic conditions of black South Africans. The findings of the study reveal that although implementing the strategy may give the poor access to land, in the long run‚ it will have a detrimental effect on economic growth‚ addtionally‚ commercial farmers are heavily indebted to commercial banks, owing them billions‚ hence expropriating land with compensation will significantly effect the balance sheet of commercial banks and the economy at large. The failure of Venezuela and Zimbabwe to alleviate poverty through land expropriation raises questions regarding the success rate for such a policy and its suitability to South Africa‚ especially considering the country’s current economic direction.
US extraterritorial sanctions are implemented with comprehensive global reach, despite allies and adversaries opposing and rejecting them as violations of international law. I argue that this staggering reach rests on more than just the central position of the US in the global financial system, as existing accounts indicate; it builds fundamentally on the financial system’s operational autonomy. Enabled by technologies such as the ‘risk-based approach’ and automated screening procedures, this globalized network of private actors observes its regulatory environment through its own logic. It translates sanctions into risks susceptible to mitigation beyond the political system’s territorial borders, as the cases of Switzerland and the European Union show. These jurisdictions took futile measures to defend against foreign encroachment of their authority. Unless the financial system’s increased autonomy from the state system is recognized conceptually, analyses of international sanctions will remain deficient and attempts to counter their extraterritorial reach ineffective.
The development of the US foreign policy tools in the 20th century resulted in sanctions becoming one of the most convenient means for achieving administration’s goals on the international arena, as well as a useful tool in domestic politics. Institutionally established within the scope of the executive branch, buttressed by the US dominance in the world economy and viewed as a “humane” way of influencing foreign elites, it does not demand significant political capital and, as a result, can be implemented without deep strategic thinking. Current US policy towards Russia is constrained by the framework of the sanctions regime, created by Barak Obama Administration in 2014. This regime is inherently inert and is likely to determine the scope and methods of the US policy towards Russia for the foreseeable future regardless of the priorities of the country’s leadership. This article seeks to study the creation of the regime and explain the logic of decision-making process regarding this issue. Utilizing the approach of Francesco Giumelli, who developed a system of factors to explain the logic of a sanctions policy, the author shows that the US sanction policy towards Russia was framed by the desire to demonstrate the ability to mobilize international community and reaffirm its commitments to the security of the Eastern Europe. Low profile of the Ukraine issue on the US foreign policy agenda as well as low political cost of the escalation towards Russia resulted in sanctions becoming a substitute for a foreign policy strategy and were not accompanied by the analysis of the situation, determination of goals and the parameters for evaluating the success of the policy. The deficiency of such an approach is accentuated by the comparison with the European Union who paid a higher price for its sanctions and, despite a popular in Russia notion of a unified “West”, not only resisted the will of the US, but acted as a deterrent for its actions.
This report analyzes the effects of US and European unilateral measures (sanctions) imposed upon the Syrian economy since 2011 - more specifically, the impact on its agricultural, small and medium private enterprises (SMEs), and private banking sectors. The report does not address the unilateral measures imposed on individuals, but those related to state institutions and networks of the Syrian private economic sectors. The report assumes that the impact of unilateral measures on the Syrian economy and livelihood was unintended.
Through the analyses of each sector’s evolution since the early 2000s, the report attempts to distinguish between the various influencing factors, in order to demonstrate where the principle of “no harm to the population” was breached.
In 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1540, which acknowledged the non-state acquisition of weapons of mass destruction as a security threat and called on member states to implement “appropriate effective” domestic trade controls. The United States, however, has both promoted the multilateral implementation of strategic trade controls but has also increasingly resorted to extraterritorial enforcement of its counterproliferation rules. How can a multilateral, norms-based international regime like 1540 contend with extraterritorial enforcement based on national interests? We argue that increased U.S. extraterritorial counterproliferation policies are a consequence of the inconsistent implementation of resolution 1540, adaptive and resilient proliferation networks, and a history of expanding legal interpretations of jurisdiction. We find that while U.S. extraterritorial enforcement can effectively disrupt networks hiding in overseas jurisdictions, doing so creates disincentives for states to implement 1540 obligations and undermines broader nonproliferation objectives.
Diplomatics has always been interconnected with economy particularly the development of international trade. However, unlike the previous historical periods, the era of global interaction, developing an intense economic competition, simultaneously contributes to growth of interdependence between economic systems of various countries. Thus, there arises a legitimate question: whether or not the professional diplomats and experts in international relations should be concerned with the state economic administration. What are the practical and theoretical grounds for studying economic coercion from the position of world politics and science on international relations? It is suggested that such articulation of the problem initially implies presence of an objective need for detailed analysis by the expert-analytical community of economic sanctions (same as other instruments of economic coercion) in the context of global and regional international politics. The goal of this research consists in conceptualization of the term “economic sanctions” as a category of international-political science in light of its more relevant analytical angles and theoretical-methodological approaches. A conclusion is made that the effective application of economic sanctions as a regulatory instrument for international politics is often overestimated. The states that initiated sanctions launch a sanction mechanism in such instances, when they do not see other alternatives for various reasons. Sanctions become successful when imposed by an entire coalition, rather than a separate country; then in can affect the political elites and not only the regular citizens. The scientific novelty and practical importance is defined by the fact that the acquired results can be used in scientific and pedagogical activity in studying specific forms and methods of realization of economic diplomacy in Russia and foreign countries, as well as can be of interests for the experts in international political and economic cooperation.
This study first investigates different types of sanctions on energy security by employing data from a panel of target countries covering the period 1996–2014 and using the panel fixed effect model. Our evidence indicates that international sanctions do significantly negatively influence the energy security of target countries in some cases. Specifically, unilateral sanctions, U.S. sanctions, economic sanctions, and the intensity of sanctions have a significantly negative impact on energy security. However, plurilateral sanctions, EU sanctions, UN sanctions, and non-economic sanctions have no significant impact on the energy security of target countries. The results of endogeneity concerns are also consistent with the results of the basic regression analysis. Overall, our empirical findings merit particular attention from policy makers of target countries to ensure their energy security when facing international sanctions.
Аннотация:
В статье рассмотрены теоретические и практические аспекты экономических санкций для оценки и классификации ограничительных мер. Проведен обширный анализ зарубежной и отечественной литературы по вопросам международного опыта и форм противодействия санкциям различными политическими системами. Теоретический анализ международных торгово-политических санкций выявил отсутствие в научных кругах консенсуса по ряду фундаментальных вопросов, таких как мотивы, лежащие в основе введения различных ограничений, их результативность, факторы их эффективности, экономические последствия и др. Несмотря на отсутствие однозначных убедительных аргументов в пользу эффективности подобных методов, государства продолжают активно использовать их в своей практике. Практический анализ международных торгово-политических санкций в разные исторические периоды выявил, что наиболее эффективная политика противодействия разного рода ограничениям состоит не во введении симметричных мер и закрытии рынков товаров, услуг, труда, капитала, а в проведении проактивной политики повышения открытости рынков и развития инвестиционного сотрудничества. Одним из ярких примеров, демонстрирующих справедливость данного утверждения, является опыт Китая. В результате проведенного исследования предложены рекомендации для проведения экономической политики в условиях применяемых ограничительных мер в отношении России.
Summary:
We consider theoretical and practical aspects of economic sanctions for assessment and classification of restrictive measures. We also carried out an extensive analysis of foreign and domestic literature about international experience and forms of countering sanctions by various political system. A theoretical analysis of international trade and political sanctions revealed a lack of scientific consensus on a number of fundamental issues, such as the motives underlying the introduction of various restrictions, their effectiveness, factors of their effectiveness, economic consequences etc. Despite the lack of clear and convincing arguments in favor of efficiency of such methods, states continue to actively use them in their practice. A practical analysis of international trade and political sanctions in different historical periods revealed that the most effective policy to counter all kinds of restrictions is not to introduce symmetrical measures and close markets for goods, services, labor, capital, but to conduct a proactive policy to increase market openness and develop investment cooperation. One vivid example of the validity of this statement is the experience of China. As a result of the study, recommendations are proposed for conducting economic policy in the context of the applied restrictive measures in relation to Russia.
This paper explores the interface between central banks and cryptocurrencies. Focusing on the European Central Bank (ECB), it identifies the potential threats that the rise of cryptocurrencies would pose to the basic and ancillary tasks of the ECB, in particular, its monetary policy operations and the exercise of its supervisory functions over credit institutions and payment systems. The paper finds that cryptocurrencies can potentially have both direct-through their potential impact on the price stability and monetary policy, and central banks' monopoly over issuing base money-and indirect effects on central banks, mainly through the institutions and systems that fall under the ECB's scope of competence.
To address the challenges posed by cryptocurrencies, the ECB may take both legal (including supervisory and oversight) measures and non-legal (or technical) measures. With respect to technical measures, the ECB-to the extent falling within the scope of its competence-may focus on improving the efficiency of existing payment systems and addressing the existing frictions in market infrastructures to indirectly affect the cryptocurrency markets. Alternatively, it can venture into issuing Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). Regarding legal measures, central banks could envisage regulating cryptocurrencies either directly or indirectly. However, as the most significant potential impact of cryptocurrencies on central banks is likely to be indirect through the impact of cryptocurrencies on the banking and payment systems, and given the limitations on the ECB's mandate and its regulatory and supervisory tools, it is apposite for the ECB to consider using indirect strategies and tools to influence cryptocurrency markets. This indirect approach can be implemented through the ECB's existing supervisory and oversight powers over the banking and payment systems. This paper specifies the direct and indirect measures and assesses their merits in addressing the concerns about cryptocurrencies.
From the dawn of civilization, the ever-growing sophistication of human society, division of labour, specialization, and comparative advantage rendered trade an indispensable part of any human enterprise. The need for trade begets the need for finance, and as trade becomes globally indispensable, so does finance. Indeed, trade and finance midwifed the birth of globalization, foster- mothered its infancy, and nurtured it into its prime age. Although globalization has seen ebbs and flows and has faced numerous disruptions by its enemies, in the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC), it was not the globalization’s discontents but the masters of trade and finance who were about to push globalization off the precipice. To understand why globalization suffered a blow by its friends rather than its foes, the book successfully attempts to promote a better understanding of the workings of global finance, to unearth covert fault lines in its crust, to highlight serious flaws in its governance and regulation, and to propose remedies for the deficiencies in the governance and regulation of the global financial system. This is made possible by highlighting the gap between virtually seamlessly-globalized finance and its fragmented, unsystematic, inconsistent, and incomplete regulation and governance.
The proliferation of sanctions programmes over time, each with its own set of regulations and its own peculiar blacklist, makes it more difficult for OFAC to administer the controls in a smooth, consistent and efficient manner. Additionally, unlike other agencies involved in international trade — such as the Commerce Department's BXA, or the State Department's DTC — OFAC has been slow to develop a cooperative relationship with those who must comply with its regulations. While OFAC's singular focus on economic and financial sanctions has enabled it to avoid some of the problems the Commerce Department sometimes experiences as a result of its dual missions of both promoting and controlling trade, it has also fostered a more adversarial relationship with the trading community. As OFAC has focused on each sanctions programme individually, rather than as part of a comprehensive system of controls, it has tended to be insensitive to the needs of those who must integrate its diverse regulatory requirements into an overall business compliance process.
The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act was enacted on 3rd December, 1999, as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. The Kingpin Act calls for the imposition of a series of US economic and financial sanctions — with a worldwide reach — on ‘foreign narcotics traffickers’, their related ‘organisations’, and those ‘foreign persons’ who support their activities, enforced by penalties ranging up to fines of $10m and imprisonment for ten years. In passing this legislation, Congress specifically looked to the example provided by an earlier set of economic sanctions that prohibited dealings with Colombian narco‐traffickers or entities which they controlled, established by the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and administered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC). The controls established by the Kingpin Act, and the associated Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations (FNKSR), accordingly, are neither a unique nor an isolated programme. Rather, they represent the latest step in the evolution of a series of distinct, but related, economic sanctions programmes administered by OFAC.
Those parties who do become caught up in the sanctions and are blacklisted face a daunting situation. Their property and accounts are often blocked, and dealings with US parties, and frequently their overseas affiliates as well, are essentially cut off with little or no warning by virtue of decisions made by a relatively small and obscure office within the Treasury Department. US as well as foreign parties can be blacklisted, and these restrictions can even extend to a firm's employees. The practical consequence of being touched by one of the Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC) economic sanctions programmes may be the economic equivalent of capital punishment. By virtue of the restrictions, the blacklisted business may cease to exist as a viable entity.
International sanctions, understood as coercive means imposed by the United Nations, or by States, individually or collectively, against a country responsible for violating fundamental rules of international law, have been extensively analysed in the legal literature.1 A survey of such literature shows that particular emphasis has been put on the nature of sanctions, their status in international law and the very controversial issue of the legality of their adoption either by regional organisations, or by a State
motu proprio
, unilaterally.