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The Trouble with Memes: Inference versus Imitation in Cultural Creation
Abstract
Memes are hypothetical cultural units passed on by imitation; although nonbiological, they undergo Darwinian selection like genes. Cognitive study of multimodular human minds undermines memetics: unlike in genetic replication, high-fidelity transmission of cultural information is the exception, not the rule. Constant, rapid "mutation" of information during communication generates endlessly varied creations that nevertheless adhere to modular input conditions. The sort of cultural information most susceptible to modular processing is that most readily acquired by children, most easily transmitted across individuals, most apt to survive within a culture, most likely to recur in different cultures, and most disposed to cultural variation and elaboration.
... Novamente em contraste com a teoria matemática, a teoria linguística da comunicação, mais efetivamente como formulada por Sperber e Wilson (1995), não se projetou nos limites da biologia evolutiva, ao menos como preconizada por Dawkins e simpatizantes, mas no domínio da antropologia evolutiva e cognitiva. Inspirados pela teoria linguística da comunicação humana, mais precisamente conhecida como o modelo inferencial ou ostensivo-inferencial da comunicação (GRICE, 1975;WILSON, 1986WILSON, /1995SPERBER, 1995;SPERBER, 2012), em substituição ao modelo de códigos, antropólogos, psicólogos e cientistas cognitivos desenvolveram trabalhos de interesse ao estudo da disseminação de informações em níveis culturais, propondo alternativas aos modelos meméticos, como discutido por Sperber (1985, Tomasello (1999), Atran (2001), Jablonka e Lamb (2010), Claidière, Scott-Phillips e Sperber (2014) e Morin (2016). ...
... A regra na evolução cultural é a mutação permanente e rápida da informação, ou seja, a variação. Conforme Atran (2001), ao contrário dos genes, as ideias raramente são copiadas sem algum grau de modificação durante a comunicação, permanecendo algum espectro de mistério como as pessoas atingem algum grau mútuo de entendimento, já que a transformação de ideias durante a transmissão é a regra, e não a exceção. ...
Viral analogy models for the study of information distribution in the scope of human communication have been interdisciplinarily debated in different academic spheres, from naturalistic epistemiology (DENNET, 1995, 2017), through evolutionary biology (DAWKINS, 1976, 1993), genetics population (CAVALLI-SFORZA, 2000), mathematical modeling in evolutionary anthropology (BOYD; RICHERSON, 2005) and cultural epidemiology (SPERBER, 1985, 1994, 1996; WEISS, 2001; MORIN, 2016). In this essay, I propose the idea that in the same way - in a globalized world - diseases in human populations have the potential to spread pandemic orders (UJVARI, 2011), the globalized flow of information, under the impact of new cognitive technologies (DASCAL, 2005) also had ecological distribution potential exceeding epidemiological scales, reaching pandemiological levels. Therefore, I will seek to articulate the still embryonic notion of pandemiology (CASTIEL, 1995; ISPIR, 2020; AKERMAN; CASTIEL, 2021) and the Epidemiology of Representations (SPERBER, 1985, 1996; LERIQUE, 2017) in what I am proposing as a Pandemiology of Representations. Initially, I will introduce two well-established theories that characterize communication and how they are directly implicated in viral models for the study of ecological information distribution. Next, I will present the epidemiology of representations in their original formulation, suggesting its expansion towards a pandemiology of representations, in order to monitor/analyze projected information beyond an ecological boundary. Finally, I will seek to typify some of the phenomena that could be more closely studied in the context of the worsening public health crisis that is plaguing Brazil in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
... This emphasis can be sustained with some credibility as long as emphasis is only on behaviors as phenotypes that are genetically driven. Too often evolutionary explanations that rely on biological evolution are just-so stories with very little evidence to support claims (Gould and Lewontin 1979;Richardson 2007); and Richard Dawkins' idea of cultural memes as the counterpart for human societies as the notion of genes is for the human body simply fails the evidentiary standards of biological evolution (Atran 2001). Therefore, many behaviors that create and sustain, or change, sociocultural formations are not under genetic control but, in fact, are an outcome of some traits that have a genetic basis but many more that do not (see Tables 1.2 and 1.3 on pages 23 and 29 in Chapter 1 listing the biologically driven traits of great apes that, as humans evolved, were increasingly mixed with cultural and structural traits of societies via the elaboration process presented in Figure 1.3). ...
... The human biological phenotype (and underlying genotype) evolves much as described in the Modern Synthesis, as a pool of individual genotypes or gene pool, but behavioral and sociocultural phenotypes are constructed by agency and can be changed by agency in the face of selection pressures; and this makes human sociocultural evolution much different from biological evolution. In sociocultural evolution, there is nothing that is the equivalent of the notion of gene pool (notions of a "meme pool" make little sense in describing the sociocultural universe [Atran 2001]). Rather, it is not the organisms and their underlying genotypes that are evolving (although such evolution does occur at a biological level with humans), but rather the institutional spheres that become the environments in which more and more thinking, feeling, and doing become patterned. ...
... This emphasis can be sustained with some credibility as long as emphasis is only on behaviors as phenotypes that are genetically driven. Too often evolutionary explanations that rely on biological evolution are just-so stories with very little evidence to support claims (Gould and Lewontin 1979;Richardson 2007); and Richard Dawkins' idea of cultural memes as the counterpart for human societies as the notion of genes is for the human body simply fails the evidentiary standards of biological evolution (Atran 2001). Therefore, many behaviors that create and sustain, or change, sociocultural formations are not under genetic control but, in fact, are an outcome of some traits that have a genetic basis but many more that do not (see Tables 1.2 and 1.3 on pages 23 and 29 in Chapter 1 listing the biologically driven traits of great apes that, as humans evolved, were increasingly mixed with cultural and structural traits of societies via the elaboration process presented in Figure 1.3). ...
... The human biological phenotype (and underlying genotype) evolves much as described in the Modern Synthesis, as a pool of individual genotypes or gene pool, but behavioral and sociocultural phenotypes are constructed by agency and can be changed by agency in the face of selection pressures; and this makes human sociocultural evolution much different from biological evolution. In sociocultural evolution, there is nothing that is the equivalent of the notion of gene pool (notions of a "meme pool" make little sense in describing the sociocultural universe [Atran 2001]). Rather, it is not the organisms and their underlying genotypes that are evolving (although such evolution does occur at a biological level with humans), but rather the institutional spheres that become the environments in which more and more thinking, feeling, and doing become patterned. ...
... This emphasis can be sustained with some credibility as long as emphasis is only on behaviors as phenotypes that are genetically driven. Too often evolutionary explanations that rely on biological evolution are just-so stories with very little evidence to support claims (Gould and Lewontin 1979;Richardson 2007); and Richard Dawkins' idea of cultural memes as the counterpart for human societies as the notion of genes is for the human body simply fails the evidentiary standards of biological evolution (Atran 2001). Therefore, many behaviors that create and sustain, or change, sociocultural formations are not under genetic control but, in fact, are an outcome of some traits that have a genetic basis but many more that do not (see Tables 1.2 and 1.3 on pages 23 and 29 in Chapter 1 listing the biologically driven traits of great apes that, as humans evolved, were increasingly mixed with cultural and structural traits of societies via the elaboration process presented in Figure 1.3). ...
... The human biological phenotype (and underlying genotype) evolves much as described in the Modern Synthesis, as a pool of individual genotypes or gene pool, but behavioral and sociocultural phenotypes are constructed by agency and can be changed by agency in the face of selection pressures; and this makes human sociocultural evolution much different from biological evolution. In sociocultural evolution, there is nothing that is the equivalent of the notion of gene pool (notions of a "meme pool" make little sense in describing the sociocultural universe [Atran 2001]). Rather, it is not the organisms and their underlying genotypes that are evolving (although such evolution does occur at a biological level with humans), but rather the institutional spheres that become the environments in which more and more thinking, feeling, and doing become patterned. ...
... This emphasis can be sustained with some credibility as long as emphasis is only on behaviors as phenotypes that are genetically driven. Too often evolutionary explanations that rely on biological evolution are just-so stories with very little evidence to support claims (Gould and Lewontin 1979;Richardson 2007); and Richard Dawkins' idea of cultural memes as the counterpart for human societies as the notion of genes is for the human body simply fails the evidentiary standards of biological evolution (Atran 2001). Therefore, many behaviors that create and sustain, or change, sociocultural formations are not under genetic control but, in fact, are an outcome of some traits that have a genetic basis but many more that do not (see Tables 1.2 and 1.3 on pages 23 and 29 in Chapter 1 listing the biologically driven traits of great apes that, as humans evolved, were increasingly mixed with cultural and structural traits of societies via the elaboration process presented in Figure 1.3). ...
... The human biological phenotype (and underlying genotype) evolves much as described in the Modern Synthesis, as a pool of individual genotypes or gene pool, but behavioral and sociocultural phenotypes are constructed by agency and can be changed by agency in the face of selection pressures; and this makes human sociocultural evolution much different from biological evolution. In sociocultural evolution, there is nothing that is the equivalent of the notion of gene pool (notions of a "meme pool" make little sense in describing the sociocultural universe [Atran 2001]). Rather, it is not the organisms and their underlying genotypes that are evolving (although such evolution does occur at a biological level with humans), but rather the institutional spheres that become the environments in which more and more thinking, feeling, and doing become patterned. ...
... Throughout the ages of human civilization, phytomedicine has left enduring cultural imprints. Because they possessed an instinctive understanding of nature's pharmacy, healers from ancient times have exploited the medicinal properties of plants for millennia [51]. From Native American herbalists to Indian Ayurvedic sages, the lengthy history of phytomedicine attests to its ongoing efficacy. ...
Carbon nanodots (CNDs) have garnered significant attention as viable drug delivery vehicles in recent years, especially in the field of phytomedicine. Although there is much promise for therapeutic applications with phytomedicine, its effectiveness is frequently restricted by its low solubility, stability, and bioavailability. This paper offers a thorough synopsis of the developing field of phytomedicine drug delivery based on CND. It explores CND synthesis processes, surface functionalization strategies, and structural and optical characteristics. Additionally, the advantages and difficulties of phytomedicine are examined, with a focus on the contribution of drug delivery methods to the increased effectiveness of phytomedicine. The applications of CNDs in drug delivery are also included in the review, along with the mechanisms that underlie their improved drug delivery capabilities. Additionally, it looks at controlled release methods, stability augmentation, and phytomedicine loading tactics onto CNDs. The potential of polymeric carbon nanodots in drug delivery is also covered, along with difficulties and prospective directions going forward, such as resolving toxicity and biocompatibility issues. In summary, the present review highlights the encouraging contribution of CNDs to the field of drug delivery, specifically in enhancing the potential of phytomedicine for therapeutic purposes.
... È piuttosto difficile ammettere che la trasmissione della cultura avvenga secondo un processo fedele e discreto, contrariamente a quanto accade invece nel DNA, dove l'informazione genetica viene copiata fedelmente in occasione di ogni divisione cellulare. Molti studiosi sostengono che non ci sono prove per dimostrare che le rappresentazioni mentali che supportano i tratti culturali siano entità discrete simili a geni (Sperber 1996, Atran 2001. A differenza dei geni, le idee non vengono semplicemente trasmesse intatte da un cervello all'altro e non vi è alcuna garanzia che, data una particolare rappresentazione pubblica, la rappresentazione mentale di un individuo a cui viene trasmessa tale credenza sia la stessa di colui che l'ha osservata in un altro momento. ...
In the last thirty years, it has been identified a theory corresponding to the biological evolution one which concerns the behavioral traits of men and their social organization (institutions, customs , beliefs, social norms, values and technologies). By tracing back the guidelines of cultural evolution and showing how it differs from biological evolution, this paper focuses on the cultural evolution theory and its capability to explain the emergence and the change of rules and institutions at the bottom of social life. In the last part of the paper, recovering F. A. Hayek's pioneering insights, I will analyze the evolutionary dynamics acting at the level of rules and institutions. I will show, on the one hand, how selection of the rules is driven by a complex process in which emerging macro-systemic effects lend an evolutionary advantage to some human groups and allow us to explain how specific rules have successfully survived over time. On the other hand, I will argue that some behaviors have jointly transformed with the changing of societies by following the increasing degree of complexity in the relationships and human environments.
In this paper, the compaction densification process of Al and Sc composite powers was studied using the finite element method (FEM). The effects of compaction pressure and temperature on the compaction process, macro and micro properties of the AlSc composite compacts were systematically studied. And those properties such as relative density and distribution, stress and distribution, and residual elasticity were quantitatively characterized and compared. The results show that the relative density of AlSc composite powder compact increases with the temperature to a high value and then keeps constant, and the high local relative density in the compact locates at the top region of the axial cross section when the pressure is fixed. And the axial and residual elasticity decrease with the temperature.
These experiments tested object permanence in 3-12- and 4-12-month-old infants. The method used in the experiments was similar to that used by Baillargeon, Spelke, and Wasserman (1985). The infants were habituated to a solid screen that rotated back and forth through a 180° arc, in the manner of a drawbridge. Following habituation, a box was placed behind the screen and the infants were shown two test events. In one (possible event), the screen rotated until it reached the occluded box; in the other (impossible event), the screen rotated through a full 180° arc, as though the box were no longer behind it. The 4-12-month-olds, and the 3-12-month-olds who were fast habituators, looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they understood that (a) the box continued to exist after it was occluded by the screen and (b) the screen could not rotate through the space occupied by the occluded box. Control experiments conducted without the box supported this interpretation. The results of these experiments call into serious question Piaget's (1954) claims about the age at which object permanence emerges and about the processes responsible for its emergence.
The authors suggest that with slight modifications, the concept of systemic culture pattern as originally defined by Kroeber provides one ideal basic unit of study for culture. Prototypic examples of systemic culture patterns include phonemic structure and kinship terminological structure, both of which are paradigms. The significant elements in each may be partitioned in terms of a limited number of universal features. Kroeber’s original list provided an important guide for kinship studies; Jakobson, Fant, and Halle provided such a universal list for phonemic studies. Some coherent substructures characterized by a subset of features may themselves be treated as basic units, such as vocalic or consonantal phonemes, or subunits of kinship terminology, such as sibling terminology. Paradigms may be mapped perfectly into Euclidean spatial models. Elements of cultural patterns with large or uncountable numbers of features may be mapped directly into Euclidean spatial models on the basis of judged similarity data.
Une épreuve adaptée du Sigel Cognitive Style Test a été appliquée à 316 élèves américains et 221 élèves chinois (Taiwan) du quatrième et cinquième degré de l'école élémentaire. Il était supposé que, par rapport à leurs condisciples chinois, les écoliers américains obtiendraient des résultats 1) supérieurs pour le style descriptif-analytique; 2) inférieurs pour le style descriptif-global; 5) inférieurs pour le mode relation-contexte; 4) supérieurs pour le style inférence-catégorie. Les résultats ont confirmé les hypotheses (1), (3) et (4) pour les deux niveaux scolaires et pour les garçons aussi bien que les jeunes filles. On a pu conclure que les élèves chinois ont préféré catégoriser les stimuli selon leur interdépendance ou leurs rapports, tandis que les sujets américains ont classifié les stimuli D'après les caractéristiques inférées de ces stimuli, en analysant les composantes observables de l'assemblage-stimulus.
This chapter determines a major empirical hurdle for any future discipline of memetics. It mainly shows that one can find very similar copies of some cultural item, link these copies through a causal chain of events which faithfully reproduced those items, and nevertheless not have an example of memetic inheritance. In addition, the stability of cultural patterns is proof that fidelity in copying is high despite individual variations. It is also believed that what is offered as an explanation is precisely what needs to be explained; what is offered as a solution is in fact the very problem to be solved. Moreover, the issue is whether the relative stability observed in cultural transmission is proof of replication. The example of the acquisition of language is briefly addressed. The Darwinian model of selection is informative, and in various ways, for thinking about culture. Imitation is of course well worth investigating. On the other hand, the grand project of memetics is misled.
