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Why we fight: Understanding the counter-jihad movement: Understanding the counter-jihad movement
Abstract
This survey article deals with a network that can be loosely described as the “counter-jihad movement” (CJM). CJM activists are a loose collection of bloggers, political parties, street movements, think tanks, campaign groups, and pundits across several countries, all united by the shared belief that, to some degree, the “Muslim world” is at war with the “West.” Overall, the CJM shares a great deal with right wing extremism more broadly. However, the movement is varied enough that not all components sit easily alongside traditional conceptions of right wing extremism. Occasionally, the CJM have been indirectly implicated in violence. In July 2011, 77 people, the majority members of the left-wing Workers Youth League, were murdered in Norway in attacks carried out by Anders Behring Breivik. Breivik attempted to justify his attacks in a compendium of political thought that drew heavily on the writings of CJM sources. This article attempts to provide an overview of the CJM and highlight some of the key research debates in the area, including the potential rhetorical relationship between state-backed counterterrorism and the CJM, links to violence, and the similarities and contrasts between the CJM and traditional far-right narratives.
... The normalization of Islamophobia in conservative politics across the Atlantic was the careful work of the transatlantic counterjihad, developed through networks of video sharing sites, blogs, conspiracy websites, think tanks, civil society organizations, alternative media, opinion leaders, and street activists with a heterogeneity of ideological positions (Bangstad 2014;Gardell 2014;Lee 2016;Önnerfors 2017). Here, the fuzzy collectivity problem became more challenging and increasingly entangled with digital technology (Al-Rawi 2017; Berntzen 2019; Chao 2015; Ekman 2015; Lee 2015). ...
The rise of the far right has captured the attention of scholars across media studies, political science, and sociology. Digital technology played an important role in the rise of the far right and has deeply shaped this global movement. Focusing on research in Western societies (primarily Europe and North America), this review takes stock of how scholars in these three disciplines have studied the intersection of the far right and digital technology. The review introduces the problem of fuzzy collectivity to understand how scholars have made sense of the far right as an assemblage of increasingly complex networks of actors distributed across websites, alternative media, and platforms. Exploring solutions to the problem of fuzzy collectivity in the literature, the review proposes that far‐right engagement with digital technology should be conceptualized as a racial project engaging in metapolitics, a term used by far‐right ideologues that understands cultural movements to be prefigurative of political change. The review then explores the intersection of the far right and digital technology today, examining how it uses technology and the context of this use. The review then identifies pathways to reintegrate critical perspectives on racism in future research on the far right and digital technology.
... These are otherwise known as lone attacks or lone-wolf attacks (Danzell & Montanez, 2015;Khan & Nhlabatsi, 2017). The increasing phenomenon of lone-wolf terrorism has been regarded as a serious threat to public safety in recent years (Catherine, 2014;Weimann, 2014 (Appleton, 2014;Catherine, 2014;Lee, 2016). ...
The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 introduced the Prevent Duty, which places a legal duty on schools to have due regard in preventing students from radicalisation. The Act also places a legal obligation for schools to promote Fundamental British Values (FBVs) including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. This research investigates how Citizenship Education is organised and taught in a Muslim-majority state school in London in response to the Prevent Duty. This study examines how school leaders and teachers in this school perceive the planning and delivery of citizenship and the promotion of British values across the curriculum. This research also looks at how pupils are responding to issues surrounding Prevent with their understanding and development of citizenship. My findings demonstrate that the school does not offer Citizenship Education as a discrete subject. Instead, Citizenship Education is organised through a combination of the PSHE (personal, social, health and economic) curriculum, Religious Education, Humanities Education, history, and SMSC (spiritual, moral, social and cultural) development. I find that Citizenship Education is given low priority in the school timetable. Although the school promotes British values across the curriculum, all participants in the study disagree with the usage of the term ‘fundamental British values’. Instead, they introduce FBVs to students as universal liberal values. Some teachers are hesitant about what to teach and how to teach them. The school attempts to enhance pupils’ awareness of Islamist and far right extremism, online grooming, and social media. However, some students find themselves subject to scrutiny when they wish to debate on the country’s foreign policy or extremism matters. The Prevent Duty has created a securitisation mentality amongst some staff and potential tension between some teachers and students in the school.
... Notes 1. See Bhatt (2012), Denes (2012) and Fekete (2012) for early analyses of the movement. See Ekman (2015) and Lee (2016) for more recent assessments. 2. In total, 418 web pages were analysed from 97 sites. ...
This article explores the “counter-jihad”, a transnational field of anti-Muslim political action that emerged in the mid-2000s, becoming a key tributary of the recent far-right insurgency and an important influence on the Trump presidency. The article draws on thematic analysis of content from counter-jihad websites and interviews with movement activists, sympathizers and opponents, in order to characterize the counter-jihad’s organizational infrastructure and political discourse and to theorize its relationship to fascism and other far-right tendencies. Although the political discourses of the counter-jihad, Trumpian Republicanism and the avowedly racist “Alt-Right” are not identical, I argue that all three tendencies share a common, counterrevolutionary temporal structure. Consequently, like “classical” Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, they can be seen as historically and contextually-specific forms of “revolutionary conservatism”.
Recent years have seen a substantial increase in far-right inspired attacks. In this context, the present article offers an analytical framework for the study of right-wing extremists’ multifaceted and fast-growing activity on the Internet. Specifically, we conceptualize the far-right online presence as a dynamic ecosystem, teasing out four major components that correspond to the different levels of analysis available to future research. We illustrate the benefits of this framework with key illustrative examples from the English-, French-, and German- speaking far-right, revealing the worrying size and breadth – but also heterogeneity – of today’s far-right online ecosystem.
In response to 2017’s terror attacks in Britain, the Football Lads Alliance (FLA) and latterly, the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA) were formed. Self-described as street-protest movements that encourage rival ‘football firms’ to reject acrimonious hostilities to unite against the Islamist extremism and extremists it believes are threatening Britain, its culture, values and way of life. As new incarnations of the British counter-jihad movement, this article affords new insights into how the movement and constituent parts are dynamically identifying and mobilising behind an increasingly diverse range of identities and socio-political issues. Contributing new knowledge about the FLA and DFLA, neither of which have been subjected to scholarly inquiry, this article makes a timely contribution to an embryonic scholarly canon. Contextualising the counter-jihad movement, this article explores how ‘football’ afforded the FLA and DFLA with a shared identity around which to mobilise. Highlighting how this is different to other far-right and counter-jihadi groups, their ideologies and activities are explored in relation to their establishment, support base and function. In conclusion, this article positions both groups within an ‘identity-oriented’ paradigm of new social movements as a means of offering new understanding and explanation.
In light of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent actions and reactions on the part of nation-states in the West and “terrorists” in the East, this paper discusses the concepts of Islamophobia (political and media-manufactured) and multiculturalism in the British context. Rising Islamophobia, state actions, and media reactions to 9/11 have led to changing definitions of the “good multicultural society.” British Muslims are caught in a quagmire: Their loyalties are questioned by a society and polity that is still in the processes of establishing its “Englishness” from its “Britishness,” while growing Islamic political radicalism undermines the already precarious relations between British Muslims and the state.
This article examines the intensely mediated debate on the relationship between ideological affinity and political implication that followed the documenting of the ‘citational ecology’ of Breivik’s 2083 compendium. Focusing on the recurring trope of war in counter-jihad blog posts and mainstream media comment, it argues that the invocation of ‘war’ is important beyond limiting debates on incitement and ‘moral responsibility’. Following Butler (2009), it examines this ‘frame of war’ and its poetics as the condition of counter-jihad networks and as the licence for mainstream polemics on the ‘failed experiment’ of multiculturalism.
Anders Behring Breivik, a lone wolf terrorist, killed 77 people in two terrorist attacks in Norway in 2011. This study uses framing theory from social movement studies to compare his Manifesto with the rhetoric of the anti-Islamic movement that inspired him. The anti-Islamic movement has a dual, and sometimes inconsistent, collective action framing. On the one hand, they portray Islam as an existential threat to the West and a warlike enemy; on the other, they promote peaceful and democratic opposition. The potential for radicalization is thus immanent. This case study reveals the importance of seeing lone wolf terrorists as acting from rhetoric embedded in larger social movements. It further demonstrates, in detail, the subtle and complex ways in which political narratives rejecting terrorism and political violence still end up inspiring such acts.
In this article, we use three case studies, undertaken with young, white, working-class men involved in the English Defence
League, to examine how they construct a specific form of violent masculinity. We argue that these accounts demonstrate that
violence is socio-structurally generated but also individually psychologically justified, because these young men turn experiences
of acute inequality and disenchantment into inner psychological scripts that justify their own ‘heroic’ status when involved
in violent confrontation. We suggest that these feelings of disadvantage and marginalization prompt resentment and anger in
young males who feel their voices are not being heard. This disenchantment manifests itself through externalized hostility,
resentment and fury directed at the scapegoat for their ills: the Islamic ‘other’.
The article argues that we are witnessing a lethal “mainstreaming” trend across Europe that involves previously taboo ideas, frames, and practices becoming the new “common sense” for growing sections of European politics and societies. As in the case of the dramatic slide into dictatorship and the spread of virulent anti-Semitism in the 1930s, the divisive ideas of the contemporary far right vis-à-vis minorities, immigrants, and Muslims/Islam in particular have been crossing multiple boundaries—between “extremist” and “mainstream” politics and voters, between taboo and legitimate views, as well as between countries. As in the 1930s, the success of this putative “far-right contagion” today owes at least as much to the weakening defenses or cynical opportunism of the mainstream as to the dynamics and appeal of the radical right's ideas themselves.
Andres Behring Breivik, the perpetrator of the 22/7/11 terrorist attacks in Norway, was profoundly inspired by what has become known as the Eurabia genre. Behring Breivik's 1516-page cut-and-paste tract, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, makes extensive reference to Eurabia authors, and most prominently to the blog essays of the Norwegian extreme right-wing blogger “Fjordman,” also known as Peder Are Nøstvold Jensen. A popular transnational genre found in both film and literature, the Eurabia genre is central to understanding the worldviews of extreme right-wing “counter-jihadists.” It is a conspiratorial genre in which a central rhetorical trope is that Europe is on the verge of being taken over by Muslims. It alleges that European Muslims want to establish continent-wide Islamic domination in the form of an Islamic state or a caliphate, using higher fertility rates and immigration as their main means of achieving this. The Eurabia genre has, however, hitherto received limited academic attention. In this article, I use the insights of critical discourse analysis in order to analyse some central contributions to this profoundly Islamophobic genre and its popularization and political mainstreaming in Norway in the past decade.
In particular since the turn of the millennium, social scientists have identified anti-Muslim sentiment as a key feature of the European extreme-right. This article will discuss the history and validity of the term 'Islamophobia', and will probe into the development of the theme of 'Eurabia' in extreme-right wing ideology. The author will analyze the manner in which visions of a Muslim settlement and 'takeover' of Europe have the potential to create a cross-national reconfiguration of extreme-right ideology, a thematic shift, and a movement toward convergence between different sides of the ideological spectrum. The author argues that this ideology is not static, and that its potential new direction challenges significant assumptions of the current literature on the extreme-right.
Though the extreme right was not particularly successful in the 1999 European elections, it continues to be a major factor in the politics of Western Europe. This book, now available in paperback, provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the extreme right in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. On the basis of original research -- using party literature--the author concludes that though individual parties might stress different issues, the extreme right party family does share a core ideology of nationalism, xenophobia, welfare chauvinism, and law and order.
No other political party in the history of Britain's fascist tradition has been as successful at the ballot box as today's British National Party (BNP). This thoroughly revised and updated edition of Contemporary British Fascism offers an in-depth study of the BNP and its quest for social and political legitimacy.
The counter-jihad scene can be understood variously as a collection of parties, pundits, and movements all linked by a common belief that the West is being subjected to takeover by Muslims. In this article, I seek to improve academic understanding of this collection of movements, parties, and ideas by analyzing the discourse presented by a collection of online advocates whom I describe as the counter-jihad nebula. The findings suggest a need to at least partially re-evaluate the role of the nebula within the wider counter-jihad scene as well as the relationship between the wider counter-jihad scene and mainstream political discourse as expressed through various media outlets.
On 22 July 2011, as news emerged of a major terrorist attack taking place in Norway, the Wall Street Journal went to press while the identity of the perpetrator was still unknown. On the presumption that only a Muslim could be responsible, the newspaper's editorial claimed that Norway had been targeted because it is 'a liberal nation committed to freedom of speech and conscience, equality between the sexes, representative democracy and every other freedom that still defines the West'.2 The reflexes entrenched by nearly ten years of 'war on terror' rhetoric led the editorial writer to feel confident the attacker's motivation could already be known. As it turned out, the car bomb in Oslo, followed by a shooting spree on the island of Utøya, leaving 77 dead -The worst terrorist attack in Europe since the Madrid bombings of 2004 - had been carried out in the name of a 'counterjihadist' rather than 'jihadist' ideology. Anders Behring Breivik, whose 1,500- page manifesto, 2083 - A European Declaration of Independence, was published online on the day of the attacks, believed that European elites were pandering to multiculturalism and enabling an 'Islamic colonisation of Europe'. Like the Wall Street Journal editorial writer, he believed that Norway's liberal values were under threat from 'radical Islam'.
In recent years, Islamophobia has become a useful tool for right-wing parties to mobilize electors in many European nation-states. The general xenophobic campaigns of the 1980s have given way to Islamophobia as a specific expression of racism. It is not only the new incarnations of right-wing populist parties that are making use of Islamophobic populism, but also right-wing extremist parties, whose traditions hark back to fascist or Nazi parties. This development appears unsurprising, as Islamophobia has somehow become a kind of ‘accepted racism’, found not only on the margins of European societies but also at the centre. Another interesting concomitant shift is the attempt by such parties to gain wider acceptance in mainstream societies by distancing themselves from a former antisemitic profile. While the main focus on an exclusive identity politics in the frame of nation-states previously divided the far right and complicated transnational cooperation, a shared Islamophobia has the potential to be a common ground for strengthening the transnational links of right-wing parties. This shift from antisemitism to Islamophobia goes beyond European borders and enables Europe's far right to connect to Israeli parties and the far right in the United States. Hafez's article explores this thesis by analysing the European Alliance for Freedom, a pan-European alliance of far-right members of the European parliament that has brought various formerly antagonistic parties together through a common anti-Muslim programme, and is trying to become a formal European parliamentary fraction in the wake of its victory in the European elections in May 2014.
This article examines the writings of one of the key voices who influenced Anders Breivik: Peder Jensen. Writing under the pen name Fjordman, Jensen has developed a range of writings, some of which have come to operate at the interface between Islamophobic populism and contemporary fascist terrorism. To explore this interface, this article analyzes the various writings by Jensen/Fjordman that Breivik himself reproduced in his manifesto 2083: A European Declaration of Independence. It concludes that, while not directly instructing Breivik to carry out an act of terrorism, there is nevertheless a looser connection between Jensen's rhetoric, which points toward violent action, and the behavior of others such as Breivik. It explores this link through the lens of “license,” a methodology developed by Aristotle Kallis. This approach allows the analysis to highlight that, beneath a veneer of more moderate anti-Muslim populism, the discourse Peder Jensen has written under the pen name Fjordman evokes many of the tropes of fascism, including coded endorsement of ethnic nationalism, misogyny, conspiracy theories, a concern with profound cultural decadence, and a palingenetic language that idealizes revolution coming about through war.
The synchronized terror attacks on July 22, 2011 was the worst politically motivated assault in post-WW2 Norway. To the perpetrator, Anders Behring Breivik, 22/7 was a “marketing operation,” designed to draw attention to his compendium, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence. While Breivik acted alone, his political philosophy is far from unique. Through a detailed analysis of the compendium's content, identifying the original authors whose texts Breivik used but did not always acknowledge, this essay discusses the political traditions that informed the assailant's worldview: Islamophobia (anti-Muslim racism), cultural conservative nationalism, antifeminism, and selected elements of White Power thought, far Right evangelical theology, and the Knights Templar tradition, all permeated by romantic male warrior ideals. The stunning violence of July 22 was a hyper-masculine performative act aimed at producing a heroic avant-garde of nationalist warriors who will rise to purge Europe from the corrupting influence of its internal enemies and defeat its external enemies. Through the cleansing fire of the civil war, he believes that a reborn Europe will arise to reclaim its ordained position of glory as the world's leading civilization. In the final analysis, Breivik's political philosophy may thus be recognized as a 21st-century articulation of the fascist legacy.
Accounts of a unifying European public sphere (EPS) can seem bleak in a social policy literature, emphasizing the need for coherent deliberative processes to legitimate the European Union as an enterprise in transnational democracy. The article confronts this impasse, arguing that a vibrant plurality of EPSs emerges once analytical pursuit is decoupled from normative associations with the EU project, and so from understandings of civil society and communicative democracy as axiomatic characteristics of an EPS. After discussing the limits of theorizing a singular public sphere converging on the EU, the empirical section of the article portrays a contrasting sphere of pan-European political traction, examining an ‘uncivil’ arena of anti-Muslim coalition-building and exchange. Noting parallels between this ‘uncivil’ pan-Europeanism and normative depictions of Europe's absent (civil, singular, and democratic) public sphere, the article suggests that a less pallid account of European political life emerges once the preoccupation with achieving deliberative coalescence yields to allow recognition (and study) of EPSs in the plural and contestual—as politically constitutive expressions of a multiplicity of open narrative claims and systems taking European conditions and destinies as their core.
Anders Behring Breivik, perpetrator of the Norwegian massacre, was motivated by a belief in a Muslim conspiracy to take over Europe. Extreme and aberrant his actions were, but, explains the author, elements of this conspiracy theory are held and circulated in Europe today across a broad political spectrum, with internet-focused counter-jihadist activists at one end and neoconservative and cultural conservative columnists, commentators and politicians at the other. The political fallout from the circulation of these ideas ranges from test cases over free speech in the courts to agitation on the ground from defence leagues, anti-minaret campaigners and stop Islamisation groups. Although the conspiracy draws on older forms of racism, it also incorporates new frameworks: the clash of civilisations, Islamofascism, the new anti-Semitism and Eurabia. This Muslim conspiracy bears many of the hallmarks of the ‘Jewish conspiracy theory’, yet, ironically, its adherents, some of whom were formerly linked to anti-Semitic traditions, have now, because of their fear of Islam and Arab countries, become staunch defenders of Israel and Zionism.
Since Nick Griffin’s appointment as chairman of the far-right British National Party (BNP) in 1999, the party has undergone a drastic makeover in terms of the language it employs in the public domain, adopting a moderate discourse of unobjectionable ‘motherhood and apple pie’ concepts, whilst privately maintaining its core ideology of racial prejudice. This article continues the work previously done examining BNP literature in order to ascertain what discursive techniques the BNP is adopting and how their language is changing to appeal to a wider electoral base. Using Corpus Analysis as a base, and drawing upon aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this study compares the 2005 and 2010 BNP manifestos. Its focus is the way in which ‘in-group’ categories such as nationhood are invoked to imply inclusivity, yet on closer inspection are racially defined. The project of disguising BNP racism in seemingly moderate discourse is continuing apace.
Across Europe, the ‘war on terror’ is having a major impact on race relations policies. New legislation, policing and counter-terrorist measures are casting Muslims, whether settled or immigrant, as the ‘enemy within’. In the process, the parameters of xeno-racism, which targets impoverished asylum seekers, have been extended to Muslim communities. Islam is seen as a threat to Europe, which is responding not only with draconian attacks on civil rights but also with moves to roll back multiculturalism and promote monocultural homogeneity through assimilation. Hence ‘integration’ measures - like France’s banning of the hijab - become an adjunct to anti-terrorist law. This is not just ‘Islamophobia’ but structured anti-Muslim racism.
Copsey examines the ideological development of the British National Party (BNP) under the leadership of Nick Griffin. Until recently, Griffin's programme of 'modernization' had considered ideology a secondary concern. Ideological debates were put to one side as Griffin looked to transform the BNP from a political pariah into a respectable electoral party capable of entering Britain's mainstream. At first, the BNP simply borrowed from the discursive and organizational style of more moderate continental national-populist parties, in particular the French Front National. However, the failure of the BNP to bring about a historic breakthrough at the European and local elections in 2004 occasioned an ideological overhaul and, while Griffin characterizes it as 'popular nationalism', Copsey questions whether the BNP has really transformed itself into a party of the national-populist right. At the outset, he offers some conceptual clarifications regarding fascism, national-populism and neo-fascism before discussing the nature of Griffin's 'modernization' project and the circumstances behind his decision to revamp the party's ideology. He then moves on to a critical examination of the party's new ideological position as revealed in its 2005 general election manifesto Rebuilding British Democracy. He concludes that ideological renewal under Griffin constitutes a recalibration of fascism rather than a fundamental break in ideological continuity. All the same, the party's ideological face-lift lends support to Griffin's broader normalization strategy, which, as the results of the 2006 local elections confirm, is contributing to its electoral success.
This article raises some doubts as to whether the contemporary extreme right in France, Italy and the UK should be perceived as something particularly novel, and instead the image of a Janus-faced party family and a contemporarized neo-fascism is proposed as a more realistic conceptual model. This article challenges the assumption of the existence of a specific national-populist party family in France as well as the idea that populism should be perceived as the main and foremost feature of certain extremist parties. It is also suggested that the use of labels such as populism as a political category may serve as an indirect, and unintended, form of democratic legitimization for such parties that still manifest neo-fascist, xenophobic and undemocratic tendencies. The article also calls for the use of other methodologies—including a long-term historical enquiry—to complement pure political science in the study of modern extremism.
In recent years, an increasingly influential intellectual consensus on both sides of the Atlantic has presented Europe as a doomed and decadent continent that is being transformed into an Islamic colony called ‘Eurabia’. The term was originally coined by the British-Swiss historian Bat Ye’or to describe what she identified as a secret project between European politicians and the Arab world for the ‘Islamicisation’ of Europe. What began as an outlandish conspiracy theory has become a dangerous Islamophobic fantasy that has moved ever closer towards mainstream respectability, as conservative historians and newspaper columnists, right-wing Zionists and European neofascists find common cause in the threat to ‘Judeo-Christian’ civilisation from Muslim immigrants with supposedly incompatible cultural values.
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the far right in Britain, under the auspices of the British National Party (BNP), has made noteworthy electoral gains. Under the leadership of Nick Griffin, the party has placed great emphasis on modernization. The concentration of BNP electoral gains within specific areas such as Burnley, Barking and Dagenham, Epping Forest, and Stoke-on-Trent has meant that academic enquiries into the party's activities have a more localized emphasis. As well as examining the ideological shifts within the BNP, an emergent body of literature has sought to focus on the means by which the party has been able to assume greater levels of legitimacy within particular locales. This focus on the party apparatus has yielded some interesting insights into the way in which the BNP has sought to embed itself within particular communities. Great stock has been placed on traditional forms of community-based politics. By tapping into everyday concerns and by selecting local residents as candidates, it appears that the BNP has been able to deflect charges of racism and extremism. Drawing on qualitative interviews with BNP voters and ex-candidates in Burnley, Rhodes suggests that it is the banality of the party, its discourses and its candidates at a local level that has enabled the BNP to acquire a degree of 'respectability'. The party and its supporters have seemingly been able to exploit traditional conceptions of racism and nationalism as something out of the ordinary or 'other'. There appears to have been a recognition that it is everyday articulations and representations of white racism that seem able to escape the label of extremism, appearing as more 'legitimate' forms of expression. Similarly, the way in which BNP voters, as well as the party itself, have been able to locate powerful tales of identity and entitlement within routine narratives will be explored in relation to the reconfiguration of the 'local' and the 'global' in the contemporary period.
From the moment that Nazi Germany launched its attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, a pandemonium of violence seized many areas of Eastern Europe. The crimes of the Einsatzgruppen and of Wehrmacht troops are well-documented. The brutality, however, of the pogroms in 1941, their frequency and geographic scope, the level of local participation in the acts, the vehemence with which they were carried out and the almost ritualistic ‘carnivalesque’ qualities of the spectacle, all point to deeper, more complex agencies at work. This paper explores the notion of ‘licence’ as the primary facilitator of genocidal violence in the eastern territories immediately after the launch of Operation Barbarossa. It argues that this ‘licence’ should be understood as a crucial facilitator of already formed (if latent or contained) violent eliminationist predispositions and intentions. This in turn helped demolish political, social and moral impediments to violent behaviour and catalysed a veritable ‘carnival’ of elimination against particular ‘others’, in which ‘ordinary’ people joined much more for ideological, cultural and/or rational reasons than because of blind conformity or coercion.
Targeting of London Muslims triples after Paris attacks
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