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Resilience of critical infrastructure (CI) to extreme weather events, such as heavy rainfall, high temperatures and winter storms, is one of the most demanding challenges for governments and society. Recent experiences have highlighted the economic and societal reliance on a dependable and resilient infrastructure, and the far-reaching impacts that outages or malfunctions can have. Growing scientific evidence indicates that more severe and frequent extreme weather events are likely. The EU-funded INTACT project addresses these CI challenges and attempts to bring together cutting-edge knowledge and experience from across Europe to inform the development of best practice approaches in planning, crisis response and recovery capabilities. The project considers the options for mitigating the extreme weather impacts. A key component of the INTACT project is the development of a risk management structure to support decision-making in the case studies. This structure forms part of the overall INTACT Wiki: the main output of the project. It comprises a risk ‘framework’ that sets out how information and guidance can be accessed by CI owners and operators. Within this there is a step-wise risk assessment process based on best practice from the IEC. The risk framework and process presents: structures for models and data requirements for decision making; identifies tools and methods that support decision making; supports analysis of measures to protect CI through simulation; and indicates gaps in modelling and data availability. This paper outlines the components of the risk framework and process, and illustrates its use in a case study dealing with electricity supply and winter storms.
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a Corresponding author: a.tagg@hrwallingford.com
Impact of extreme weather on critical infrastructure: the EU-INTACT risk
framework
Andrew Tagg1,a, Minna Räikkönen2, Kari Mäki2 and Marta Roca Collell1
1HR Wallingford Ltd., Howbery Park, Wallingford, Oxfordshire, UK
2VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd., P.O. Box 1300, FI-33101 Tampere, Finland
Abstract. Resilience of critical infrastructure (CI) to extreme weather events, such as heavy rainfall, high
temperatures and winter storms, is one of the most demanding challenges for governments and society. Recent
experiences have highlighted the economic and societal reliance on a dependable and resilient infrastructure, and the
far-reaching impacts that outages or malfunctions can have. Growing scientific evidence indicates that more severe
and frequent extreme weather events are likely. The EU-funded INTACT project addresses these CI challenges and
attempts to bring together cutting-edge knowledge and experience from across Europe to inform the development of
best practice approaches in planning, crisis response and recovery capabilities. The project considers the options for
mitigating the extreme weather impacts. A key component of the INTACT project is the development of a risk
management structure to support decision-making in the case studies. This structure forms part of the overall
INTACT Wiki: the main output of the project. It comprises a risk ‘framework’ that sets out how information and
guidance can be accessed by CI owners and operators. Within this there is a step-wise risk assessment process based
on best practice from the IEC. The risk framework and process presents: structures for models and data requirements
for decision making; identifies tools and methods that support decision making; supports analysis of measures to
protect CI through simulation; and indicates gaps in modelling and data availability. This paper outlines the
components of the risk framework and process, and illustrates its use in a case study dealing with electricity supply
and winter storms.
1 The challenge of extreme weather
events and critical infrastructures
Resilience of critical infrastructure (CI) to extreme
weather events (EWEs), such as heavy rainfall, high
temperatures and winter storms, is one of the most
demanding challenges for governments and society.
Recent experiences have highlighted the economic and
societal reliance on a dependable and resilient
infrastructure, and the far-reaching impacts that outages
or malfunctions can have [1]. For example, too much or
too little rainfall, compared to the ‘norm’, results in
droughts or floods, with major disruptions and economic
costs [2]. The cost of developing and maintaining CI is
high given it is expected to perform under most
conditions and to have realistic functional and economic
design lives. Growing scientific evidence indicates that
more severe and frequent extreme weather events are
likely, with increasing disruption on the functioning of
CI.
All of the above challenges indicate that it is
important to share knowledge, experience and best
practices on how best to protect our critical
infrastructures against current and future EWEs.
Unfortunately, there is wide variation in EWE impacts
across Europe, both due to the geographical context, but
also the variations in weather that occur seasonally. It is
also the nature of the observed extremes, which can be
seen in variation in intensity, duration or frequency. What
has also become apparent is that CI is often managed in a
compartmentalised manner, with little interaction or
regard for other systems [3]. Therefore the
interoperability that everyone agrees is required for these
connected systems is often lacking. So whilst CIs may
have detailed operational and recovery plans, a detailed
understanding of indirect, cascading effects between
infrastructures may be lacking. The EU project INTACT
[4] sets out to address these challenges, to collate existing
best practices, and provide comprehensive decision
support to CI operators and policy makers, to enhance
business continuity and sustained resilience.
The main output of the project will be the INTACT
Reference Guide, which will be delivered in the form of a
publicly accessible Wiki [5], based on generic
information and specific case study datasets and outputs.
A central part of the Wiki will be a risk framework and
associated risk process that will guide the user through
the various steps in how to assess the vulnerability and
risk of their CI to current and future EWEs, advice on a
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© The Authors, published by EDP Sciences. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution
License 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
range of mitigation measures, and how to best assess
these according to different evaluation criteria.
The next section of the paper describes the challenges
in being able to characterise extreme weather, and the
approach being taken in the INTACT project. This is
followed by a general explanation of the whole project,
before a more detailed section describing the risk
framework and management process: this forms the main
topic of this paper. Finally we provide an example of the
application of the risk approaches to the Finnish case
study dealing with the impact of winter storms on the
electricity network.
2 Climate change and future weather
events
Extremes of climate and temporal variation in weather
are known to have an impact on the natural environment
and society. It is therefore important to be able to detect
the occurrence of such variations in normal behaviour
and be able to predict such variation in the future,
particularly as our observations indicate that weather
extremes are increasing in frequency and intensity against
the historical baseline. However this is not
straightforward, both in terms of defining what extreme
weather is, and in characterising the subsequent impacts,
since these are generally non-linear and more dependent
on the specific context (scale, location, type of CI etc.).
So extreme events are defined not only with respect to
their low frequency, but also with respect to their
intensity. For events characterized by relatively small or
large values (i.e. events that have large magnitude
deviations from the norm), one needs to take into account
that not all intense events are rare.
The severity of climate impacts on infrastructures will
vary across Europe according to specific locations and
their geophysical risk exposure, the existing adaptive
capacity and resilience, and the level of economic
development. Evaluation of potential effects of climate
change on infrastructure is still very limited and further
research and development is required to support decision-
making. Evaluation of vulnerability of infrastructures
requires the analysis of several climatic elements and
their impact on the resilience; this is considered in the
INTACT project [6].
A large reinsurance company has calculated that more
than 90 percent of all disasters and 65 percent of
associated economic damages were weather and climate
related (7). For example, the July 2007 flood in the UK
involved the highest number of people of any flood event
in the EU between 2000 and 2009, and also involved 7
fatalities and economic losses of $4.1 billion (8). The
Insurance industry generally reports an increase in the
number of weather-related events, which have caused
significant losses; for example, wind-storms and floods in
Europe.
Given the complexity in characterising weather
extremes and the predicted impact of climate change, one
approach is the use of EWE indicators which can be
linked to thresholds and observed impacts on CI. In the
INTACT project the indicators are those defined by the
ECA&D project [9], which added extra factors related to
wind, snow and humidity to build on the original 27
indicators developed by ETCCDI. These indices
highlight various characteristics of extremes, including
frequency, amplitude and persistence [10] and are widely
used to assess future changes (e.g. [11]). Some indices
involve calculation of the number of days in a
year/season exceeding specific thresholds. Others use
percentile values as thresholds, above or below which
some form of impact is likely.
However, even with this suite of indicators it can be
difficult to detect meaningful trends that can then be used
in CI planning. This can be due to the lack of consistent
data sets and the climatic diversity found across Europe.
Figure 1a illustrates some significant, general trends for
the period 1980 to 2010 across Europe for precipitation,
wind and temperature [12].
Figure 1. Trends across Europe in rainfall, wind and
temperature (1980 to 2010)
So whilst there is an increase in the intensity of
rainfall, there is a decline in duration of extreme wind
speeds (although latter is associated with a strong decline
in number of calm days). Within the INTACT project,
these indicators are used to characterise extreme weather,
with simulated data sets produced for future climate
epochs over the coming century. Table 1 summarises the
number of indicators considered within the project.
Parameter Occurrence/count Threshold/value
Temperature 11 7
Precipitation 8 6
Combined T &
P
5 0
a RX1DAY-Max 1 day precipitation; RX5DAY - Max.
consecutive 5 day precipitation; R10 – no. of days when
precip. > 10mm; R20 - no. of days when precip. > 20mm;
FGX1DAY – yearly max. Of daily wind speed; FG15 –
No. of days when wind speed > 15 m/s; FG25 – No. of
days when wind speed > 25 m/s; FGCALM – no. of calm
days; SDII – simple precipitation index; TNX – max.
value of daily min. temperature; DTR – daily temperature
range; EAST, WEST, NORTH indicate no. of days of
predominant wind direction; trend value is given on each
plot.
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Wind 5 3
Snow 3 2
Humidity 1 0
Table 1. Summary of EW indicator types
3 The INTACT project
The INTACT project addresses the challenges posed
by increasing extreme weather on European-wide critical
infrastructure. It aims to bring together innovative and
cutting edge knowledge and experience in Europe in
order to develop and demonstrate best practices in
engineering, materials, construction, planning and
designing protective measures as well as crisis response
and recovery capabilities.
The project consists of a series of 8 work packages
that are linked together in a structured workflow, and
summarised in Table 2.
Workpackage Activities
Framing and
Perspectives
Establishes a consistent
appreciation and taxonomy of the
interaction between Critical
Infrastructure and Extreme Weather
Events, including an understanding
of the current state of the art
Climate and
Extreme Weather
Collects and analyses trends,
patterns and tendencies in extreme
weather, including predictions up to
2100
Vulnerability and
Resilience of
European Critical
Infrastructures
Develops a methodological
framework for CI vulnerability
assessment and an analysis of CI
protection measures
Risk and Risk
Analysis
Develops a framework for risk
management, and presents a
process for risk assessment,
including guidance on tools and
methods
Stakeholder
Engagement and
Dissemination
Collects and disseminates best
practice approaches and brings
together stakeholders
Case Studies
Five case studies to test the
developed methods and provide
useful feedback for inclusion in the
guidance
INTACT Wiki
Collates all information and
knowledge gained within the
project into a comprehensive and
yet practical guide for CI operators
and associated policy makers
Table 2. Overview of INTACT work packages
Using the consistent framework and taxonomy
developed in WP1, there is a logical sequence from the
investigation of extreme weather in WP2, the important
EWE-CI interactions and vulnerabilities from WP3,
which are then used in the central risk analysis and
management work package. These three technical work
areas feed information and outputs into the wiki, which in
turn is tested in the case studies [13]. This paper
concentrates on the risk management activities and
provides a case study example from Finland.
Although all of the many project tasks will be
captured in a series of standard reports, the main output
of the project will be the INTACT Wiki; a decision
support system set in a wiki environment that facilitates
cross-disciplinary and cross-border data sharing and
provides for a forum for evidence-based policy
formulation. The wiki will both contain relevant content
and data related to EWEs and CIs, in addition to guidance
and support on how to navigate this extensive data store,
including links to external sources. Experiences in using
the wiki and the other project outputs will be
demonstrated via five case studies; initial findings from
one of these are described in Section 5.
Overall, the objectives of the INTACT project are to:
xAssess regionally differentiated risk throughout
Europe associated with extreme weather;
xIdentify and classify, on a Europe wide basis, CI
and to assess the resilience of such CI to the
impact of EWE;
xRaise awareness of decision-makers and CI
operators about the challenges (current and future)
EW conditions may pose to their CI; and,
xIndicate a set of potential measures and
technologies to consider and implement, be it for
planning, designing and protecting CI or for
effectively preparing for crisis response and
recovery.
4 The risk framework and process
In terms of improving the resilience of Europe’s
critical infrastructure to future EWEs, it is necessary to
consider the probability and intensity of such events, as
well as the exposure of the infrastructures and their
vulnerability to disruption. Hence, a standard risk
assessment needs to be undertaken, considering both the
hazard and the consequences. In support of this risk
assessment, it is necessary to assemble a comprehensive
range of information covering: current and future weather
hazards (including induced hazards); data on CI-specific
vulnerabilities; policies and procedures for different CIs;
relevant guidance and legislation applicable to the CI and
the assessment locality. From the state-of-the-art review
undertaken in INTACT [14], a vast amount of
information is available for these risk components:
however, many of the assessment tools are CI-specific,
and there appears to be limited interaction between CI
sectors. As a result, the INTACT project sets out a logical
structure for accessing this information and associated
tools, and to provide guidance on how to conduct a risk
assessment.
4.1 Risk framework
Following the review of risk tools used to assess
weather impacts on CI, a series of questionnaires were
sent to project partners and case study stakeholders to
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further ascertain what tools and information they used in
assessment of CI impacts [15]. A “gap analysis” was also
undertaken, that looked at selected weather events and
what methods had been used before, during and after the
incidents to improve the CI resilience. This identified
areas where additional methods could have assisted in a
better understanding of the risk and in developing
improved response measures. Based on this analysis, a
risk framework was proposed, to support asset owners
and operators and authorities in their aim to make
reliable, cost-effective, efficient, and transparent
decisions. This framework aims to provide information
on the assessment process, appropriate methods and tools
for decision support, and to clarify how different methods
and tools are related to each other. It also includes
information on legislation, regulations, guidelines and
best practices and on the most important standards in the
area of risk, dependability and asset management – all
accessed as part of the INTACT Wiki. Figure 2 below
shows the structure of this framework within the wiki,
with information presented under three headings, and the
associated risk process set above this. The following
sections provide a brief overview of the framework
content.
Figure 2. Layout of INTACT risk framework
(as set out in the wiki)
4.1.1 Climate and extreme weather
This part of the wiki addresses the climate and
extreme weather and provides information on:
x EWE data and indictors (in a variety of spatial
formats),
x Historical trends and RCM performance,
x Future scenarios for extreme weather indicators
x A catalogue of past EW-related events causing
damage to CI in and outside of Europe, extracted
from the INTACT database.
Section 2 above provides a summary of the issues and
output from the project concerning extreme weather.
4.1.2 Requirements, guidance and best practices
This module sets out examples of Europe-wide and
specific guidance and best practices for assessing EWEs
and CI. Furthermore, it describes the factors contributing
to CI vulnerability and resilience as well as global change
and CI vulnerability and resilience. Examples of good
practices in adaptive decision-making (existing projects
and programs) are also presented, based on the results of
the case studies. Finally it includes details of the gap
analysis undertaken for selected EWE events, which
illustrates how to identify problem areas that need
addressing in any risk assessment.
4.1.3 Rules and regulations
This final section of the framework focuses on:
• EU-directives, regulations and rules,
• National laws, acts and regulations,
• Standards etc.
Overall, the INTACT project has identified a large
body of EU-level directives and acts, as well as national
level acts and regulations. Furthermore, in the area of risk
and reliability management and asset management there
are many standards available and published [16, 17];
many of the most relevant documents are produced by the
International Standards Organisation (ISO) and the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
4.2 Risk management process
The risk process in INTACT is based on the IEC
60300 procedures (now superseded by IEC/ISO 31010)
[16]. The representation of this in the wiki is shown in
Figure 3. The main objective is to provide a structured
approach to assess the EWE impacts on CI (focusing on
the ex post performance) and the resilience and
vulnerability of CI as well as deriving and testing
alternative measures and their costs / benefits (focusing
on the on ex ante planning).
Figure 3. Layout of INTACT risk management process
(as set out in the wiki)
The risk process incorporates many elements and
phases and supports the use of a variety of methods and
tools that can be classified as hazard assessment,
vulnerability assessment, risk assessment and cost-benefit
analysis. As the process is not always linear and not all
steps are conducted in series, the tools and methods
integrated in each step can of course also be used
separately. Additionally, some tools and methods may
cover several steps. The INTACT risk process has
retained most of the tools contained in the IEC 31010
standard, supplemented by specific examples that are
being used in the case studies (see Section 4.2.2). Figure
4 summarises the availability of tools in the wiki,
covering each of the six process steps.
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Scope
Definition
10
Risk
identification
29
Risk
estimation
35
Risk
evaluation
17
Proposal for
action
28
Figure 4. Summary of risk assessment tools and methods
covered in the Wiki
The INTACT risk process is flexible in the sense of
allowing a user to enter and exit the process at other steps
than the first and the final ones. At all steps, the formal
process is accompanied by framing conditions which
determine, to a large extent, how the described risk
process is followed in a decision situation. This indicates
that different decision rules may also be employed in
each step. The level of detail and type (qualitative,
quantitative, and semi-quantitative) in the assessment
needs to be consistent with the level of the decision
(local, national, EU-level).
The following provides a short commentary on the
content of the process building blocks.
4.2.1 Scope definition
The first stage is to define the scope of the risk
assessment, primarily based on the type of CI the user is
interested in and the timeframe for the assessment. For
each selected CI the process gives advice on the types of
EWE that are of most relevance plus the timeframes and
scale over which these effects are likely to occur. For the
selected parameters, the process will direct the user to
information on the types of assessment possible
(quantitative or qualitative) and relevant guidelines,
policies or legislation that may inform the subsequent
assessment. The output from this step is the defined
problem scope. Table 3 summarises the CI and EWE
types being considered by the risk framework.
Extreme weather events Critical infrastructure
Heavy rain / flooding Energy/Power
Strong winds / storm IT/Communications
Severe cold Transportation
Snow / ice Banking & Finance
Severe heat / heat wave Government Services
Drought Emergency Services
Water Supply
Water Management
Food Security
Table 3. EWE/CI included in the risk framework
4.2.2 Risk identification
Having set out the problem scope, guidance then
assists the user in understanding the specific threats to
their infrastructure, and in defining relevant EW
indicators to characterise the hazard that is most
appropriate for the assessment. It is also necessary to
consider any induced hazards, such as flooding resulting
from high rainfall, or cascading effects from other CI
systems, that may require additional risk assessments.
Vulnerability analysis of CI systems is not
straightforward as they comprise complex interactions,
and a holistic approach is challenging. Nevertheless,
vulnerability should be considered for three perspectives:
technological, societal, and human. Again, several
methods are available to help in the identification, and
subsequent phases: these include the Storyline Method
[18] and the Circle tool [19], both of which have been
used in several of the project case studies.
For the identified risk formulation, information is
provided on the most appropriate approaches to
estimating risk, which may be quantitative or qualitative,
plus guidance on any dimensional characteristics of the
risk problem. The output from this step will be a shortlist
of threats to be taken forward in the risk estimation
4.2.3 Risk estimation
This step involves the calculation of the risk, based on
the selected EWE hazard and CI vulnerability. The
process provides guidance on the various methods
available to the user, with details of the possible outputs
and indicators from each method. There are many
available methods, and the choice will depend on the
level of effort that can be devoted to achieve the
outcome, the availability of data and the required output.
In simple terms, three levels of risk estimation can be
identified [16]:
• Qualitative assessment defines consequence,
probability and level of risk by significance levels
such as “high”, “medium” and “low”, may
combine consequence and probability, and
evaluates the resultant level of risk against
qualitative criteria,
• Semi-quantitative methods use numerical rating
scales for consequence and probability and
combine them to produce a level of risk using a
formula. Scales may be linear or logarithmic, or
have some other relationship; formulae used can
also vary,
• Quantitative analysis estimates practical values for
consequences and their probabilities, and produces
values of the level of risk in specific units defined
when developing the context. Full quantitative
analysis may not always be possible or desirable
due to insufficient information about the system or
activity being analysed, lack of data, influence of
human factors, etc. or because the effort of
quantitative analysis is not warranted or required.
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The issue of uncertainty is important, as this should
form part of the user’s assessment of the level of risk that
is acceptable, covered in the next step.
4.2.4 Risk evaluation
A key aspect in the evaluation phase is the setting of
appropriate thresholds for an acceptable or tolerable risk.
This can then be compared to the estimate made in the
previous step. For example, an economic framework can
be employed to present the EWE impacts as monetary
values, and these can be compared to a range of
mitigation options to assess what level of cost is
acceptable. Although a full economic risk assessment is
desirable, it does require the evaluation of both tangible
and intangible impacts, some of which may be difficult or
impossible to monetise. Hence, a semi-quantitative or
mixed assessment may be preferable. The risk process
provides guidance on setting suitable thresholds. This
will make use of examples from the case studies, the gap
analysis described above, and examples from the
published literature. The output of this step will be
whether some form of intervention or action is required
to try and reduce the assessed risk level.
4.2.5 Proposals for action and risk
reduction/control
The penultimate stage involves the provision of
guidance on the possible mitigation measures or actions
that could be taken to reduce the estimated risk. Possible
ways of managing the risk include adaptation, coping,
mitigation and risk transfer. This is central to the whole
INTACT project, in that the derivation of a suite of
measures is one of the main outputs, based on the
assembled EWE/CI database and the experiences from
the case studies. A key consideration will be what stage
or stages of the disaster cycle the CI user is considering
(or advised to consider). Based on the CI vulnerability
study, a series of generic mitigation measures have been
assembled, covering all four disaster phases (mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery), and the weather
types of: cold snap; heat wave; intense rain; high snow
cover and wind storm.
There are many ways to assess the suitability of any
measure, which can include Cost Benefit Analysis, multi-
criteria methods, indices and ranking, and the wiki
provides guidance on all of these, including when they
are most appropriate, and providing examples from the
case studies or wider literature.
A final stage in the IEC process concerns risk
reduction and control, for which the INTACT process
will provide guidance in the wiki, although this will not
form part of the main risk process. This step relates to the
on-going assessment of risk and appropriate mitigation,
balancing operational and capital measures.
5 Finnish case study application
The Finnish case study in the INTACT project
considers the impacts of extreme winter conditions on
electricity distribution in Pirkanmaa (also known as The
Tampere Region) in South-West Finland. Due to the
criticality of power supply for society, strengthening the
resilience of electricity networks to withstand and to
survive unwanted situations is extremely important.
The electricity distribution system in Finland includes
some 800 substations, 150,000 km of medium-voltage
lines, 100,000 distribution transformers and 240,000 km
of low-voltage lines (20). 80 % of the medium-voltage
network is overhead lines, 7 % of it is overhead cables
and 13 % of it consists of underground and underwater
cables. 3 % of the low-voltage distribution network is
overhead lines, 58 % of it is overhead cables and 39 % of
it underground cables (22). The overhead lines are often
located in forests, creating a threat to security of supply
of electricity. Moreover, the power sector is one of the
few sectors that have the potential to cause major and
widespread breakdowns in many other sectors (25).
Snow storms and heavy snowfalls are typical winter
extremes that affect critical infrastructure in Pirkanmaa.
Especially a blizzard (defined by low temperature,
sustained wind or frequent wind gust and considerable
falling or blowing snow blizzards) can represent a great
challenge for the electricity networks (26). In terms of
projected future climate the winter extremes, frequency
and intensity of weather and climate extremes are likely
to continue. For example, there will be a slight increase in
heavy snowfalls (over 10 cm/24 hour) in future. (24)
Furthermore, strong winds can involve extreme gusts that
can topple trees and fly branches onto the overhead lines
and cause disruptions in electricity distribution.
Several steps of the proposed INTACT risk
management process have already been conducted in the
Finnish case study. The process gives guidance on
assessing risks associated with and the vulnerabilities of
electricity networks in order to improve the preparedness
and effective response on winter extremes. Vulnerability
assessment is an important subset of the entire process. In
the Finnish case study, the vulnerability assessment was
made in close co-operation with the distribution network
operator. The aim was to identify network vulnerabilities
and potential failure modes and their likelihoods in the
situation where the electricity network is exposed to snow
storms and leading to an electricity blackout (23). The
operator uses SCADA and DMS (Network manager)
systems for real-time monitoring and control and such
systems provide also a lot of data on reliability,
availability, and maintainability of the electricity
network. However, the data is typically confidential and
owned by the operator.
Event tree analysis (ETA) was used to analyse the
probability of electricity blackout in Finland. The idea
was to estimate blackout probabilities resulting from a
snow storm in forests dominated by different types of
trees. The structure started from the first factor affecting
the Pirkanmaa region’s electricity distribution network’s
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vulnerability to snow storms, i.e. the portion of overhead
lines built in forest areas and ended in blackouts resulting
from several different factors. Each of these factors has
been given an estimated probability. In the end,
probabilities for each outcome were calculated to see
which outcomes are the likeliest. The analysis was done
by the researchers by the help of spatial and other data
provided by the distribution network operator. The main
focus was not so much on the end results but rather on
testing out the method where each step is reviewed
independently by experts and to see how adjusting the
probabilities of these factors impacts the blackout
probabilities of the complete chains of events. (21) The
results of the vulnerability assessment (information on
vulnerabilities, probabilities for electricity blackout) can
be used as an input for risk estimation and evaluation
phases of the INTACT risk process.
Risk estimation and evaluation phase in the Finnish
case study added the consideration of the probability of
snow storms coupled with the economic, societal and
environmental consequences of the power outage. The
main public and private actors who contributed to this
step of the process were rescue department / services,
municipalities, health care district, Centre for Economic
Development, Transport and the Environment, Finnish
Red Cross, the distribution network operator and the ICT
Company that builds up the new Finnish emergency call
system. The analysis was done in a workshop with the
above mentioned stakeholders and the focus was on the
organisational, co-operation and communication related
aspects. This was because both preparedness and
response of the crisis situations due to electricity blackout
require an extensive co-ordination between power and
other sectors of society and the authorities. Consequently,
as the impacts of snow storms to society can be huge, it is
important to ensure that the preparedness and response
activities for these situations are well planned, enough
trained and smoothly performed.
Action Error Analysis (AEA) was used to find out the
worst shortcomings of the actions during electricity
blackout due to snow storm. Moreover, the stakeholders
of the Finnish case study argued that the probabilities for
snow storms in Finland are not necessarily needed in the
evaluation because winter storms recur almost every
winter somewhere in Finland. The base case for the AEA
was the snow storm that occurred in the end of November
2015 in Pirkanmaa. The aim was to analyse the gap
between planned and real actions to support the
preparedness and response planning and decision-making
for winter storms induced black-outs. The results were
reported in a table form covering several aspects for each
action error:
x Agreed way of working
x Action error and its roots
x Consequences
x Actors
x Planned preparedness activities
x Consequence class and consequence likelihood,
risk class
x Actions to be done.
During the next steps of the Finnish case study, the
INTACT risk process will be applied to analyse the
future risk that future snow storms can pose to the
electricity network. Both the situation with current
strategies and actions and the situation in which new
measures to reduce future risk are implemented will be
considered. In the final step of the INTACT risk process,
the cost-benefit analysis for the measures will be
conducted. In the Finnish case study, for example,
placement of the overhead lines and underground cabling
as well as improved co-operation and co-ordination
practices and strategies can reduce the risk of how winter
extremes affect the electricity network.
Based on the experiences of applying the INTACT
risk process in the Finnish case study so far, it can be
concluded that the process provides a practical approach
to the assessment of risks and impacts of snow storms
induced black-outs and the resilience of the electricity
network. We believe that the developed approach fills its
intended purpose as an easy-to-apply and -follow
assessment approach. Furthermore, the approach
enhances the transparency of risk management and
contributes to the more comprehensive use of available
tools, methods and information affecting the
effectiveness of preparedness planning and response
actions.
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7 Acknowledgement
The research leading to these results has received
funding from the European Union Seventh Framework
Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n°
606799. The information and views set out in this paper
are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the official opinion of the European Union. Neither the
European Union institutions and bodies nor any person
acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the use
which may be made of the information contained therein.
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is
acknowledged.
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Factors Contributing to CI Vulnerability and Resilience
  • K Mäki
  • K Forssen
  • Vidar Vangelsten
Mäki, K., Forssen, K. and Vidar Vangelsten, B. (2015). Factors Contributing to CI Vulnerability and Resilience, INTACT Deliverable D3.2, project cofunded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme, Tampere, Finland.