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a Corresponding author: kees.vanruiten@deltares.nl
EU-INTACT-case studies: Impact of extreme weather on critical
Infrastructure
Kees van Ruiten1,a, Thomas Bles1, Jan Kiel2
1 Deltares, Boussinesqweg 1, 2629 HV Delft, The Netherlands
2 Pantea, Bredewater 26, 2715 CA Zoetermeer, The Netherlands
Abstract. The resilience of critical infrastructures (CI) to Extreme Weather Events (EWE) is one of the most salient
and demanding challenges facing society. Growing scientific evidence suggests that more frequent and severe
weather extremes such as heat waves, hurricanes and droughts and their effects such as flooding are having an ever
increasing impact, with the range and effects on society exacerbated when CI is disrupted or destroyed. Disruptions of
CI systems frequently cause major social and economic losses, both directly and through failures in one system
leading to disruptions in another (cascading effects). The ability to ensure continuity in services provided by CI
directly relates to the resilience of communities to withstand and recover from disasters. The approach adopted by the
INTACT-project recognizes that a European-wide coordinated and cooperative effort is required because of cross
border CI-activities and impacts as well as an integrated EU-policy.
The INTACT-case studies and their expected outcomes ar e designed to bring added value for the concerned
stakeholders locally and demonstrate the validity and applicability of the INTACT approach at the broader
(European) scale. To achieve this, the selected case studies are geographically spread across Europe encompassing
different climate, landscape and environmental zones, as to provide coverage of a representative range of CI types
and also including different levels of governance.
One of the case studies is located in the Netherlands and deals with the port of Rotterdam. The situation in Rotterdam
is representative for many other main ports in Europe. These ports are all situated in a delta area, near the sea and
rivers or canals. Also, these ports are close to urban areas and industrial complexes. Finally, these ports have a
multimodal transport infrastructure to and from its hinterland, which is also vulnerable for extreme weather events.
The case study is not only significant for the development of methods and tools, but also of direct interest for the
region itself. The combination of the National Water safety policy and the best practices from the INTACT cases
offer challenges to create better adaptation options and coping capacity to these relatively unforeseen and unexpected
impacts based on climate c-economic megatrends.
1. Introduction and definitions to CI-
vulnerability under natural disasters
The summer floods of 2007 in the UK (Pitt [1]) had a
dramatic effect on electricity power substations, water
and sewage treatment works, and the road and rail
network. As a consequence of the events there was a
strong possibility of the loss of power to 750,000 people
leading to discussions about evacuation. Drinking water
was lost to 350,000 people for up to 17 days. Tens of
thousands of people lost power; some for more than two
days, and tens of thousands of people were stranded as
the road and rail networks ground to a halt.
From these lessons learned it is obvious that
vulnerability of critical infrastructure due to flood
hazards has a dramatic impact on the response and
recovery processes of extreme events by non-functioning
of CI.
This paper, as a result of the EU-FP7-Project
INTACT, starts with a broader scope of multi hazard
impacting Critical Infrastructure (CI). The project started
with the development of a database on past EW-related
events causing damage to CI in Europe. It encompasses
27 Extreme Weather Events (EWE) and more than 200
impacts on CI. The events cover data from Norway,
Finland, Sweden, Germany, Spain and the USA with
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© The Authors, published by EDP Sciences. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution
License 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
main effects on transportation (rail and road) as well as
electricity (transmission). Respective key EW types are
storms with extreme precipitation, extreme wind speeds,
extreme temperatures as well as droughts causing floods,
landslides and wildfires.
The definition of CI brings focus: Tightly coupled
asset, network, system or part thereof located in Member
states and subject to multiple hazards which is (perceived
as) essential and provides non-substitutable services to
maintain vital societal functions, health, safety, security,
economic or social well-being of people. The disruption
or destruction of these infrastructures for an extended
period of time may have cascading effects across scales.
Vulnerability is the predisposition of exposed
elements (e.g. infrastructures), as well as human beings
and their livelihoods, to be negatively impacted by a
hazard event. In most literature the vulnerability is more
oriented to communities and individual citizen in less
develop countries [2]).
Risk governance in the context of critical
infrastructures embraces stakeholders, rules, conventions,
processes, and mechanisms concerned with and
governing risk. It is concerned with assessing,
communicating and managing risks.
Finally building resilience of CI within the framework
of the project is a logical step to get effective risk
reduction. I.e. resilience for energy infrastructure refers
to robustness and ability to recover operations to
minimise interruptions to services. Resilience also
implies the ability to withstand extraordinary events,
secure the safety of equipment and people, and ensure the
reliability of energy system as a whole.
As guidance to cover the whole range of measures the
various elements of CI-resilience have been gathered in
Table 1. They will become integral parts of the technical
literature and will be easily found online [4, 9].
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2. Project Approach
2.1 INTACT-project
INTACT is an EU funded project which aims to offer
Decision Support to CI operators and policy makers
regarding Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) against
changing Extreme Weather Event (EWE) risks caused by
climate change. The objectives for the INTACT-project
are:
Assess regionally differentiated risks throughout
Europe associated with extreme weather;
Identify and classify, on a Europe wide basis, CI and
to assess the resilience of such CI to the impact of EWE;
Raise awareness of decision-makers and CI operators
about the challenges that current and future EW
conditions may pose to their CI; and,
Indicate a set of potential measures and technologies
to consider and implement, for planning, designing and
protecting CI or for effectively preparing for crisis
response and recovery.
The expected impact of INTACT on an EU-scale is:
bringing together climate researchers, meteorologists,
first responders, with critical infrastructure owners,
operators and planners;
Measures should be suggested, in order to prevent
major catastrophes and/or cascading effects;
Simulations are to be performed and the effectiveness
of the measures needs to be quantified to inform decision
makers
The INTACT project will realise this through
providing guidance how to determine future risks due to
climate change, and best practices on protective measures
as well as crisis response and recovery capabilities. The
INTACT Wiki serves as the portal to this information.
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2.2 Introduction to INTACT cases
The INTACT project incorporates five case studies,
each based in different European countries in order to
attain different regional settings and extreme weather
conditions. The INTACT team prepares and organises
workshops with stakeholders and organisations in
different regions and with different responsibilities for CI
(see for example [6]).
The cases provide requirements, to develop a chain
of tools and test a Wiki-based support method for
decision making. The stakeholders are engaged in the
project to give information on EWE-indicators,
Vulnerability factors and existing measures to reduce the
impact of EWE (early warnings, Exceeding thresholds
for various threats (like water depth, wind speed) and
trigger levels for measures to keep up the level of
services provision). By using questionnaires information
has been collected and used to fill the risk framework and
perform gap analyses with respect to simulation methods
or Cost Benefit Analysis-tools.
2.3 Stakeholders
Stakeholder engagement during local workshops was
supported by methods to reach interaction between
stakeholders (CI-owner, CI-operator, and CI-user) on all
levels from local to National and EU-sectorial
organisations. This has resulted in knowing the system
(i.e. CI- chain from production, distribution to users) and
responsibilities of CI-owners and operators, systems
vulnerability for multi-hazard. Special attention was paid
to contingency plans and sharing of responsibility for
cascading effects.
Methods used are:
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Important for interaction is the geographical
information like hazard maps, vulnerable CI and social
exposure. Questionnaires were used to gather detailed
information on CI and risk methods.
The expected responsibilities and the areas where
INTACT will offer support is well expressed in figure 1.
The support accessible through the INTACT-Wiki will be
scaled to an EU-level.
Figure 1. Basic elements of responsibilities of CI-owners,
operators and authorities for reduce risks in multi-hazards
situations.
3. Risk framework
The INTACT project has adopted the IEC-standard
for the risk framework (see figure 2). It covers the
complete range of activities in the case study to gather
relevant information and it is also the guidance
framework in the INTACT Wiki tool for decision
support. This includes modelling and risk structure for
simulation of hazards on infrastructure operations and
testing mitigation to support decision making by CI
owners and operators.
Figure 2. Intact RISK-Framework
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The definitions and taxonomy of various terms
concerning risk in the project are based on figure 3. CI-
related impact of EWE has social consequences in terms
of expected annual damage.
For EWE/Hazards input from meteorological and
climatological models with expected precipitation of
wind speed hydrological and hydrodynamic models is
used. Water depth for specific return periods resulting in
pluvial, fluvial or coastal flooding, flash floods or
landslides are dealt with in the INTACT case studies.
These hazards with direct consequences: loss of human
life, damage to property, destruction of crops, loss of
livestock, and deterioration of health conditions owing to
waterborne diseases. Indirectly, a hazard can affect the
function of a wide range of critical infrastructure. Indirect
effects are characterized by the event affecting the
performance of critical infrastructure, which in its turn
affect the health, safety, security or economic or social
well-being of people.
livelihoods, species or ecosystems, environmental
functions, services, and resources, infrastructure, or
economic, social, or cultural assets in places and settings
that could be adversely affected.
For INTACT, it is important to include vulnerability
as part of the risk and define it as a function of
susceptibility and capacities of response (see figure 3).
Figure 3. Schematic explanation of CI-Risk elements
Impact/consequences: Electricity generation,
transport and distribution can be hampered or deliberately
shut down to avoid electrocution. Transport modes (road,
rail, pipelines for oil and gas) can be damaged or
rendered inoperative, with ICT and telecom
infrastructures extremely susceptible and vulnerable to
flooding. Production and distribution of drinking water
can be affected and crops and livestock are lost in food
production. Water management infrastructures can be
damaged by water levels beyond their design, access and
availability of health care can be compromised, electronic
payment systems can fail and transport nodes (such as
airports and stations) and connections (such as roads and
rails) lose their function if flooded. The loss of many
infrastructures can in their turn hamper the crisis response
of Public and legal order and safety sector.
4. Case study Port of Rotterdam (NL)
4.1 Scope definition
The Rotterdam Port area forms a good case study
location. It is located in a delta area, near the sea and
major rivers. Like other European ports (including
Antwerp, Hamburg, Valencia and Le Havre) it is
understandably vulnerable to EWE. As such there is good
reason for looking at a representative port such as the one
at Rotterdam to analyse various CI impact scenarios. In
this regard, the project examines the current status of the
EWE and CI hazards in detail, the risk analysis
performed for the current climate situation and mitigation
scenarios, analysis of future risks, and finally an
assessment of measures and strategies to alleviate these
risks. There are several Dutch authorities involved in the
region and the transport activities, the Port of Rotterdam
Authority, ProRail (rail owner), Rijkswaterstaat (road and
waterway owner), LSNed (pipelines owner), EVO
(branch organisation of transport operators) and the
safety region S-Holland-S (first responder). Each of these
organisations fully supports the case study. Detailed
information and experiences gained in the case study can
be found here.
In the comparison to other case studies the situation
in the Netherlands with the high protection level against
flooding has more focus on economic losses. The
extreme weather events which affect the port of
Rotterdam in the Netherlands can be relatively diverse.
Indeed, several types of impacts of hazards on critical
infrastructure can be identified, both culminating in long
and short term effects. This is not surprising given that
the Rotterdam area has a multi-modal transport network
connected with the port hinterland as well as urban areas
and industrial complexes close by. Given the range in
types of CI in place, there is more room for different
types of EWE to make an impact (power supply and
telecommunication network, Emergency coordination
centres, Industry and hospitals).
4.2 Problem exploration and risk analysis
During a stakeholder workshop various tools were
used to get access to or information during the discussion
on cascading effects (CIrcle-tool [8]) and ranking risk
semi quantitative. Based on identification of direct
impacts, Cascading impacts, Disruption/Damage
indicators, Response actions, ranking high, medium and
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low impacts, definition of consequences the top three
CI/EWE combinations with high risk has been selected
for more detailed quantitative analysis (see figure 4 for
ranked risk).
Figure 4. Ordering of risk EWE/CI combination. Numbers
represent specific identified unwanted events specified by
stakeholders during a workshop for the port of Rotterdam
(#1 frequent storm and precipitation resulting in traffic jams;
#11 severe flooding with long term failures in power supply)
Common problems to the port of Rotterdam can
originate from storms and heavy rainfall, local flooding
as induced hazards leading to disruptions in the port and
transport operations, damages and power outages.
Disruptions in the transport chains at the port can have
costly ramifications locally, regionally and nationally.
Extreme weather has also continuously impacted upon
shipping commerce and has necessitated closing the port.
On the long term more frequent disruptions lead to
adverse market position of the port of Rotterdam.
Extremes with long lasting disruption (more than one
week) can lead to blockage of goods to the international
hinterland (i.e. raw materials for German steel industry).
City of Rotterdam is also ambitious under the
Rockefeller Initiative of 100 resilient cities [12] to be
climate prove on all natural threads. This makes it easier
to combine the ports commercial activities and urban
community to build resilience and reduce impacts of
potential change in risk reduction approach (adaptive
Delta scenarios, Haasnoot [13]). It will result in measures
where governance becomes more important by
combining Flood mitigation (i.e. room for the river -
focussing on robustness and reducing CI physical
vulnerability) with building (community) resilience (i.e.
operational response action and self-reliance for citizens)
4.3 Results and Lessons learned
Problem exploration and Risk identification was
effectively arranged by a stakeholder workshop using
quick assessment tools and maps with relevant
geographical information on hazards and CI-networks.
Proposals for action/ Risk reduction control should
be based on Multi-hazard and best practices in sectorial
CI-business continuity and preferable embedded in a
National risk assessment for CI. Governance on National
level should bridge the gap in quantative assessment of
risk and stimulate cross sectoral approaches at EU-level.
With focus on flooding affecting our critical
infrastructure and considering ways in which the
resilience of CI- systems can be enhanced:
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Adaptation measures are structured according to their
applicability in a phase in the disaster risk cycle (ranging
from pro-active to reactive) and different categories
(planning, robust construction, legislation/regulation,
resilient construction, maintenance and management,
traffic management, capacity building, monitoring and
research). Different strat
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Specific characters of CI financial arrangement on
Public-Private partnership for design, construct, operate
and maintain national road systems
7. Setting a framework for financing
resilience (World Energy Council)
Adaptation measures often lack regulatory or legal
guidance regarding the necessity to increase resilience.
There is currently no agreed goal or metric for adaptation,
or specific responses to extreme weather. Nor is there
agreement on how much resilience is sufficient and how
increased resilience can be related to an additional
revenue stream and so become attractive for investors.
Government and regulators should implement regulatory
frameworks to clearly define the levels of resilience
required for energy infrastructure. This could enable the
finance sector to create suitable financial vehicles which
would help the private sector to carry their responsibility
in resilience. Currently institutional investors like pension
and insurance companies cannot invest substantially in
energy infrastructure because of solvency regulations.
Introducing a new asset class that includes long-term
investments in infrastructure can make large funds
available for future energy supplies. With greater
transparency, insurance companies and banks could take
advantage of extreme weather risks to create unique
financial vehicles that help fill project financing gaps.
Long-term and institutional investors could use this
approach to overcome regulatory restraints by
incorporating extreme weather and climate in investment
planning, by using responsible investment standards, to
help de-risk energy investments,3E4"
8. Call to action
Increasing the resilience of energy infrastructure to
extreme weather events is not an option it is a must.
While stakeholders are driven by diverse objectives,
everyone has a role to play, and there are some common
obstacles to be overcome together to ensure that energy
supply is secure and reliable, now and in the future. The
energy system will only be able to play its crucial role as
the backbone of the global economy if all stakeholders
work together. Continuity Plan for disturbance of power
supply or ICT connections including the guaranty of
safety for CI-users. Citizens during extreme events are
vulnerable due to absence of live saving condition.
Contingency planning during long lasting CI-disruptions,
coping capacity and training/ exercising of 1st responders
and disaster management experts are no-regret measures.
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9. Discussion
High level of knowledge on climate change and real
action to adapt to climate change happens at the national,
regional, and local levels. Still, many member states and
local governments which are proactive in identifying how
extreme weather affects transportation, have not yet
integrated climate change challenges into their planning
and operations. Increase of societal resilience by offering
better operational perspectives should not wait for the
next disaster.
It is important to realise that national Infrastructure
has an important role during evacuations related to
natural disasters. Even a multi-hazard evacuation
scenario is giving constrains to CI.
In relation to flooding evacuation by leaving the
exposed area means explicit decisions on the measures to
fulfil requirements for national roads under predicted
thread of a flood scenario. In case of vertical evacuation
(staying in the area under thread) the requirements for CI
in safe heavens or private houses needs to be taken into
account for procedures of rescuing citizens from their
house. It means a good communication strategy for
informing persons at risk on their possibilities for action
and operation of first responders. It concerns the present
of primary needs to survive a number of days
(information provision, heating, drinking water, food
supply, etc.)
These measures for an evacuation scenario can be
incorporate as part of asset management for single
transport mode or an optimized approach for
combinations of modes of transport (rail, road, and
shipping).
Acknowledgements
The research leading to these results has received funding
from the European Union Seventh Framework
Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n°
606799. The information and views set out in this article
are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the official opinion of the European Union. Neither the
European Union institutions and bodies nor any person
acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the use
which may be made of the information contained therein.
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is
acknowledged.
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