Predicting pleasure at others’ misfortune: Morality trumps sociability and competence in driving deservingness and schadenfreude

Abstract

Schadenfreude occurs when people feel pleasure at others’ misfortunes. Previous research suggested that
individuals feel such a malicious pleasure when the misfortune befalls social targets perceived as highly competent but lacking human warmth. Two experiments explored whether the two components of warmth (i.e., sociability and morality) have distinct roles in driving schadenfreude. Study 1 (N = 128) compared a competent but immoral individual to a competent but unsociable person and found that people felt more schadenfreude when a misfortune befell an individual lacking morality. Study 2 (N = 199) confirmed the primary role of morality in driving schadenfreude by manipulating not only morality and sociability, but also competence. Moreover, both experiments showed that social targets lacking moral qualities elicited higher levels of schadenfreude because their misfortunes were perceived as deserved. Overall, our findings suggest that morality has a primary role over other basic dimensions of person perception (i.e., sociability and competence) in driving schadenfreude

Full text

ORIGINAL PAPER
Predicting pleasure at others’ misfortune: Morality trumps
sociability and competence in driving deservingness
and schadenfreude
Marco Brambilla
1
•Paolo Riva
1
Published online: 21 October 2016
Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016
Abstract Schadenfreude occurs when people feel pleasure
at others’ misfortunes. Previous research suggested that
individuals feel such a malicious pleasure when the mis-
fortune befalls social targets perceived as highly competent
but lacking human warmth. Two experiments explored
whether the two components of warmth (i.e., sociability
and morality) have distinct roles in driving schadenfreude.
Study 1 (N=128) compared a competent but immoral
individual to a competent but unsociable person and found
that people felt more schadenfreude when a misfortune
befell an individual lacking morality. Study 2 (N=199)
confirmed the primary role of morality in driving
schadenfreude by manipulating not only morality and
sociability, but also competence. Moreover, both experi-
ments showed that social targets lacking moral qualities
elicited higher levels of schadenfreude because their mis-
fortunes were perceived as deserved. Overall, our findings
suggest that morality has a primary role over other basic
dimensions of person perception (i.e., sociability and
competence) in driving schadenfreude.
Keywords Emotion Schadenfreude Social cognition 
Morality Sociability Competence
Introduction
The term schadenfreude indicates the malicious joy people
feel when other individuals or groups suffer misfortune
(Heider 1958; Leach et al. 2003; Smith et al. 2009; Van
Dijk and Ouwerkerk 2014). A good deal of work has
provided important insights into the conditions that elicit
this emotion, revealing that it stems, for instance, when
observers gain from the others’ failure (Smith et al. 2006).
In a similar vein, schadenfreude is evoked by misfortunes
befalling envied targets (Smith et al. 1996; Van Dijk et al.
2006) disliked targets (Hareli and Weiner 2002), or when
another’s misfortune is perceived as deserved (Feather and
Sherman 2002; Van Dijk et al. 2005).
A more recent line of research has shown that
schadenfreude is elicited by mere information regarding
the characteristics of those suffering failures. Indeed,
people feel joy when a setback occurs to high-status and
competitive targets, as they are envied for their high
competence and low warmth (Cikara and Fiske
2012,2013). Integrating these findings with recent evi-
dence showing that warmth encompasses two distinct
evaluative components (i.e., sociability and morality), we
argue that the moral character of those who suffer the
misfortune should have a leading and dominant role over
other basic dimensions of social perception (i.e., sociability
and competence) in driving schadenfreude. However,
although schadenfreude has been considered a moral wrong
feeling because it violates the obligation to feel compassion
(Van Dijk and Ouwerkerk 2014), no prior research has
investigated whether the moral qualities ascribed to an
individual person have a prominent role over other quali-
ties in driving the pleasure at his/her failure. Thus, in light
of recent research showing the distinctive role of moral
characteristics in shaping social perception (Brambilla and
&Marco Brambilla
marco.brambilla@unimib.it
1
Department of Psychology, University of Milano-Bicocca,
Piazza dell’Ateneo Nuovo, 1, 20126 Milan, Italy
123
Motiv Emot (2017) 41:243–253
DOI 10.1007/s11031-016-9594-2

Leach 2014), we tested the hypothesis that morality should
be key in driving schadenfreude and that people are more
prone to be pleased when a setback befalls an individual
who lacks morality.
Morality and schadenfreude
Research has long noted that when people interact with
others, they are mainly interested in responding to two
critical questions basic to surviving in the social world.
First, actors need to establish whether someone’s intentions
are beneficial or harmful, that is, whether they represent an
opportunity or a threat; second, actors need to know others’
capabilities, that is, whether they are able to pursue their
intentions (Cuddy et al. 2008). These two evolutionary
necessities correspond to perceptions of warmth and
competence, respectively (Abele and Wojciszke 2014;
Fiske et al. 2007). Whereas warmth pertains to benevo-
lence in social relations and involves qualities such as
friendliness, honesty, cooperativeness, and trustworthiness,
competence refers to the power to perform and to influence
others and involves qualities such as efficiency, intelli-
gence, strength, and capability (Cuddy et al. 2008; Woj-
ciszke 2005). Although under the guise of slightly different
labels, warmth and competence have emerged as basic
dimensions in person and group perception and together
predict a wide range of emotional and behavioral responses
(for a review, Fiske et al. 2007). Based on this distinction,
research on group perception has shown that mere infor-
mation on stereotype content is sufficient to elicit
schadenfreude. Indeed, individuals feel schadenfreude
when misfortune befalls envied social groups perceived as
highly competent but lacking warmth (Cikara and Fiske
2012,2013).
More recently, it has been shown that warmth comprises
two distinct evaluative components, namely sociability and
morality (Brambilla and Leach 2014; Brambilla et al. 2011;
Goodwin et al. 2014; Leach et al. 2007). Whereas socia-
bility pertains to being pleasant to people in ways that
facilitate affectionate relations with them, morality pertains
to being benevolent to people in ways that facilitate correct
and principled relations with them (Brambilla and Leach
2014; Goodwin et al. 2014). Sociability involves traits like
friendly, and kind, while morality involves traits like
honest and trustworthy. Based on this distinction, research
on person and group perception has revealed that socia-
bility and morality have distinct roles in shaping social
judgment and that morality tends to be far more important
than sociability in determining the impressions we form of
others (Brambilla and Leach 2014; Goodwin et al. 2014).
Thus, individuals rate moral qualities as the most desirable
characteristics for an ideal person to possess (Cottrell et al.
2007) and as crucial qualities to establish the other’s
perceived intent in the social context (Brambilla et al.
2013). As a consequence, people lacking moral qualities
are more easily avoided and kept at distance than indi-
viduals lacking other human qualities (Brambilla et al.
2016).
Building on the distinction between sociability and
morality, the present research sought to extend prior work
by investigating whether the moral character of an indi-
vidual might be the key characteristic driving malicious
pleasure at his/her failure. However, this has not been
addressed by prior works, as they have tended to conflate,
under the general label of ‘‘warmth’’, moral characteristics
like honesty and trustworthiness and less moral but more
sociable traits like kindness and friendliness (Cikara and
Fiske 2012,2013). Thus, such previous studies implicitly
suggested that sociability and morality are equally impor-
tant in shaping schadenfreude. Indeed, while existing
studies have treated morality and sociability as separate in
predicting impressions, they have not yet examined the
relative importance of sociability and morality character-
istics in driving schadenfreude. This might have obscured
the fundamental role of morality in driving schadenfreude.
Here, we sought to bridge this gap by investigating whether
the sociability and morality components of warmth might
play distinct roles in driving the malicious pleasure at
others’ misfortunes. By doing so, we further aimed at
complementing and extending the studies assessing
morality free of sociability in driving schadenfreude (see,
Feather and McKee 2014; Powell and Smith 2013). Indeed,
while these studies have shown that moral character pre-
dicts schadenfreude, they did not test whether the moral
character of an individual has a leading role over other
characteristics in driving malicious pleasure at his/her
failure. Thus, our approach helped us to connect the liter-
ature on the sub-components of warmth with that on
schadenfreude, as a way to extend prior work on the
emotional implications of sociability and morality, as well
as prior insights on the determinants of schadenfreude.
Thus, we first tested whether schadenfreude is primarily
driven by the sociability or morality characteristics ascri-
bed to an individual. Furthermore, we investigated how the
sub-components of warmth relate to competence in shaping
schadenfreude. Although it has been shown that intelli-
gence and high capability to achieve results is a key factor
promoting schadenfreude (Brigham et al. 1997; Cikara and
Fiske 2013; Feather 1989; Van Dijk et al. 2005; see also
Smith 2013; Van Dijk and Ouwerkerk 2014), it is untested
whether competence information is more important than
sociability and morality information ascribed to a social
target in driving pleasure at his/her failure.
We anticipated that the target’s moral qualities should
be the key predictor of the malicious feelings of schaden-
freude. A good deal of work has revealed that
244 Motiv Emot (2017) 41:243–253
123

deservingness is the strongest predictor of the pleasure at
others’ misfortune (Feather 1994,2006; Feather and
Sherman 2002; Portman 2000) and the royal road to
schadenfreude (Smith et al. 2009). Moreover, the more
misfortune is perceived as deserved, the more it pleases the
observer, as it reestablishes a sense of justice and fairness
(see also, Lupfer and Gingrich 1999). Importantly, immoral
targets are more disliked than other targets, as they pose a
threat to the stability and the integrity of the whole com-
munity (Brambilla et al. 2013). Thus, immoral targets
typically evoke more negative global impressions than
others targets, as they promote unfair and unprincipled
relations with others (Brambilla and Leach 2014). Conse-
quently, immoral individuals and groups might be per-
ceived as undeserving their achievements and success
because they base their relationships with others on unfair
and fraudulent bases (Brambilla and Leach 2014). In line
with this reasoning, it has been shown that when the
valence of the overall impression about an individual does
not match the valence of the outcome occurred to that
individual, such an outcome is perceived as undeserved. By
contrast, when the valence of the overall impression mat-
ches the valence of the other’s outcome, the actor is
thought to be deserving of the outcome (Lupfer and Gin-
grich 1999). Considering that morality has a primary role
(over sociability and competence) in shaping interpersonal
impressions (Goodwin et al. 2014) and that immoral targets
evoke more negative global impressions than others targets
(Brambilla and Leach 2014), we anticipated that the more a
target is perceived as immoral, the more his or her failure
should be perceived as deserved, which in turn should
trigger schadenfreude. Given that unsociable and compe-
tent targets do not build relationships with others on unfair
and fraudulent bases and that sociability and competence
are less relevant in shaping interpersonal impressions
(Goodwin et al. 2014), misfortunes occurred to those tar-
gets should be perceived as less deserved and therefore
should elicit lower levels of schadenfreude. In short, we
expected that morality should be key in driving schaden-
freude and that such a direction of influence from (im)-
morality to schadenfreude should be mediated by the
perception of deserving the misfortune.
Our prediction fits with prior research on the link
between schadenfreude and resentment. As such, it has
been shown that deservingness predicts schadenfreude
when resentment and dislike are salient. By contrast, such a
link does not emerge when other negative emotions are
salient (i.e., the general feeling of envy) (see, Feather and
Sherman 2002; Feather et al. 2013; Hareli and Weiner
2002). Thus, combining research showing that immoral
targets are more disliked than other targets (Brambilla and
Leach 2014, for a review) with findings showing that the
link between deservingness and schadenfreude emerges
when dislike is salient (Feather and Sherman 2002; Feather
et al. 2013; Hareli and Weiner 2002), we argue that the
predicted direction of influence from (im)morality to
schadenfreude should be mediated by the perception of
deserving the misfortune. We tested these predictions in
two studies. In the first study we compared the levels of
schadenfreude elicited by competent targets depicted as
lacking either morality or sociability qualities, seeking
support for the basic hypothesis that morality should be a
stronger predictor of schadenfreude than sociability. In the
second study, we tested whether morality trumps not only
sociability, but also competence, in driving schadenfreude.
Thus, in the second study, we manipulated competence,
sociability, and morality information ascribed to an indi-
vidual person.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed as a first test of our hypothesis
that morality should be a stronger predictor of schaden-
freude than sociability. To do so, we tested whether people
would experience more schadenfreude when a misfortune
befalls a competent but immoral individual than a com-
petent but unsociable person, by considering an allegedly
real situation (for similar paradigms see: Van Dijk et al.
2011a,2011b).
Method
Participants
An a priori power analysis was conducted for sample size
estimation (using GPower 3.1; Faul et al. 2007). With an
alpha =.05 and power =.80, the projected sample size
needed to detect a medium effect size (d=.50) is
approximately N=128 for a between-groups comparison
(ttest, difference between two independent means and two
groups). In total, we recruited 128 students (M=25.62;
SD =5.49) in an experimental design that was subdivided
into two groups.
Materials and procedure
Participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire con-
cerning academic life. Following recent works (Van Dijk
et al. 2011a,2011b) participants were presented with two
academic documents. In the first document a male student
was described as a highly competent, intelligent, and cap-
able. As such, participants read the academic portfolio of
the student showing his outstanding academic records. The
document further reported an interview with the student’s
Motiv Emot (2017) 41:243–253 245
123

internship advisor. Depending on the experimental condi-
tion, the interview detailed that the student was involved in
a research internship and that his supervisor described him
as either dishonest (low morality) or unfriendly (low
sociability). Considering that competent and cold targets
typically evoke envy (Fiske et al. 2007) and that envy is a
determinant of schadenfreude (Smith et al. 1996), we asked
participants to indicate the extent to which they envied the
target (i.e., Thinking about your impression of the student
described above please indicate the extent to which you
feel envy toward him) using a 7-point scale, ranging from 1
(not at all) to 7 (extremely).
Next, participants read a second document, reporting a
written interview with the student’s thesis advisor. From
this document participants learned that the student recently
had suffered a setback, as the supervisor remarked that the
student had given a very poor presentation of his thesis.
Indeed, due to a technical problem he had to present the
thesis without the laptop. Consequentially, he got a low
mark. We then assessed participants’ reactions to this
misfortune. Three statements assessed deservingness of the
misfortune (i.e., I find it just what happened; I find that
what happened to the target is deserved; I find it right what
happened to the target; alpha: .95) (see Van Dijk et al.
2005) while four statements assessed schadenfreude (i.e., I
enjoy what happened to the target; I couldn’t resist a little
smile; What happened to that person amuses me; I am
happy for what happened; alpha: .88) (see van Dijk et al.
2011b). Participants provided all their responses on 7-point
scales, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). We
further included two items to check the effectiveness of our
experimental manipulations. Indeed, participants rated the
target on perceived morality (i.e., How likely is it that the
target is moral?), and sociability (i.e., How likely is it that
the target is sociable?) on seven-point scales ranging from
1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Finally, participants were
thanked and debriefed.
Results and discussion
Manipulation check
To check the effectiveness of the manipulation, we con-
ducted a 2 (manipulation: unsociable vs. immoral) 92
(manipulation check items: sociability vs. morality) anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA) with the first factor varying
between-participants and the second factor varying within-
participants. The analysis yielded an interaction effect F(1,
126) =82.88, p=.001, g
p
2
=.39; thus, in the unsociable
condition participants rated the target as less sociable
(M=2.66, SD =.99) than moral (M=4.52, SD =1.46),
t(63) =-9.06, p=.001. By contrast, in the immoral
condition participants rated the target as less moral
(M=3.16, SD =1.43) than sociable (M=3.92,
SD =.96), t(63) =-3.77, p=.001. In sum, our manip-
ulation was successful.
Schadenfreude and deservingness
Preliminary analyses revealed that schadenfreude and
deservingness scores were not normally distributed
(skewness [1). Thus, we used a logarithmic transforma-
tion to normalize the distribution of scores. Next, a t-test
confirmed participants experienced more schadenfreude in
the immoral condition (M=.29, SD =.23) than in the
unsociable condition (M=.09, SD =.16), t(125) =5.35,
p=.001, d=.95, 95 % CI =[.58, 1.32]. In a similar
vein, we found that participants perceived the misfortune as
more deserved in the immoral condition (M=.41,
SD =.25) than in the unsociable condition (M=.12,
SD =.21), t(126) =6.70, p=.001, d=.1.18, 95 %
CI =[.80, 1.55].
Mediational model
We next tested a mediational model (see Table 1for the
correlation between variables) using a bootstrapping pro-
cedure (Hayes 2013). We found that our manipulation
(coded as unsociable =0 and immoral =1) predicted
schadenfreude (B =.19, SE =.03, p=.001). Moreover,
our manipulation predicted deservingness scores (B =.28,
SE =.04, p=.001). When deservingness scores were
included in the regression equation, they predicted
schadenfreude (B =.43, SE =.07, p=.001), whereas the
direct effect of the manipulation on schadenfreude became
marginally significant (B =.07, SE =.04, p=.07). The
analysis revealed that deservingness mediated the rela-
tionship between our manipulation and the subsequent
reported schadenfreude (B =.12, SE =.03, 95 %
CI =[.07, .19], 5000 bootstrap resamples).
Further analyses revealed that participants experienced
more envy (we used a logarithmic transformation to nor-
malize the distribution of envy scores) in the immoral
condition (M=.20, SD =.27) than in the unsociable
condition (M=.08, SD =.19), t(126) =2.84, p=.005,
Table 1 Correlation between variables (experiment 1)
MSD1234
1. Manip 1
2. Envy .14 .24 .25** 1
3. Deservingness .27 .27 .51** .17 1
4. Schadenfreude .19 .22 .43** .09 .61** 1
** p \.01
246 Motiv Emot (2017) 41:243–253
123

d=.50, 95 % CI =[.14, .85]. However, envy did not
mediate the effect we found (B =-.01, SE =.01, 95 %
CI =[-.02, .02] and the mediational model remained
significant even treating envy as a covariate.
Taken together, these findings showed that people
experienced more schadenfreude when misfortune befell a
competent but immoral individual than when it occurred to
a similarly competent but unsociable person. Furthermore,
we found the effect was driven by the perception that the
misfortune occurred to an immoral individual was
deserved.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the findings of experi-
ment 1 by further manipulating competence information.
Prior research has shown that individuals feel more joy
when a setback befalls a highly competent student than an
average student (Brigham et al. 1997; Van Dijk et al.
2005; see also Smith 2013; Van Dijk and Ouwerkerk
2014).ClassicworkbyFeather(1989) further revealed
that people reported feeling more pleased when the set-
back occurs to high achievers (or tall poppies). In a
similar vein, although Cikara and Fiske (2012)found
competent and cold targets elicit the most schadenfreude,
they still found a main effect of competence. Hence, high
status and competent targets elicit more schadenfreude
than targets lacking competence and capability, confirm-
ing these traits promote schadenfreude. Based on the
findings of experiment 1, experiment 2 investigated
whether moral information ascribed to an individual tar-
get is more important, not only than sociability, but also
than competence in driving pleasure at his failure. Thus,
in experiment 2 we provided each participant with
information about sociability, morality, and competence.
In doing so, we further tested the possibility that morality
plays a primary role in driving pleasure at others’ mis-
fortune. Accordingly, we devised a 2 (sociability: high vs.
low) 92 (morality: high vs. low) 92 (competence: high
vs. low) between-participants design.
Method
Participants
We run an a priori power analysis (using GPower 3.1; Faul
et al. 2007) to assure that we had an adequate sample size
to detect the presence of effects. With an alpha =.05 and
power =.80, the projected sample size needed to detect a
medium effect size (f=.20) is N=199 (ANOVA, fixed
effects, special, main effects and interactions). Thus, we
recruited 199 students (141 female; M=22.18;
SD =1.71) in an experimental design that was subdivided
into eight groups.
Materials and procedure
To manipulate three dimensions simultaneously, we fol-
lowed classic (for a review, Smith et al. 2009) and more
recent (Takahashi et al. 2009; van de Ven et al. 2015)
research on schadenfreude, and employed hypothetical
scenarios. Indeed, by using a hypothetical context we were
able to impose specific characteristics of an unknown tar-
get. In particular, participants were asked to fill out a
questionnaire about social perception. More specifically,
participants were first shown a target picture representing
an unknown male individual. Next, participants read a
table showing his characteristics. Specifically, participants
read: ‘‘The person represented in the picture is an Italian
guy who is 27 years-old. Below, we indicate the degree to
which this individual has some characteristics. This person
is…’’. Participants then read a table showing three traits of
each dimension and, for each trait, its corresponding level
(‘high’ or ‘low’) was marked. Depending on the experi-
mental condition, the target was described as high (vs. low)
in morality or as high (vs. low) in sociability or as high (vs.
low) in competence. The order in which we presented
morality, sociability, and competence information ran-
domly varied between participants.
To manipulate morality, sociability, and competence
information, we used nine traits (3 morality traits: honesty,
sincerity, and trustworthiness; 3 sociability traits: friendli-
ness, warmth, and likeability; 3 competence traits: com-
petence, intelligence, and capability) carefully balanced for
favorability (in order to rule out that our findings might be
due to a general effect of valence; see Brambilla et al.
2012) and for their relatedness with the morality, socia-
bility, and competence dimensions (see Brambilla et al.
2011; Leach et al. 2007; see also Leach et al. 2015). As in
experiment 1, participants were asked to indicate the extent
to which they envied the target using a 7-point scale,
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).
Next, we introduced the misfortune information. Par-
ticipants learned the target has been selected for a job
interview. Unfortunately, he missed the job interview
because of a car accident occurred a couple of hours before
the interview. Next, we assessed participants’ reactions in
terms of deservingness of the misfortune (alpha: 91) and
schadenfreude (alpha: 85) following the procedure of the
first experiment. Given that prior research has shown that
immoral targets elicit more dislike than other targets
(Brambilla and Leach 2014, for a review) and that
deservingness predicts schadenfreude when dislike is made
salient (see, Feather and Sherman 2002; Feather et al.
Motiv Emot (2017) 41:243–253 247
123

2013; Hareli and Weiner 2002), in experiment 2 partici-
pants were further asked to indicate the extent to which
they disliked the target using a seven-point scale ranging
from 1 (not at all disliked) to 7 (extremely disliked).
Finally, given that we manipulated three dimensions
simultaneously, we included three items to check the
effectiveness of our experimental manipulations. Indeed,
participants rated the target on perceived morality (i.e.,
How likely is it that the target is moral?), sociability (i.e.,
How likely is it that the target is sociable?), and compe-
tence (i.e., How likely is it that the target is competent?) on
seven-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7
(extremely).
Results and discussion
Manipulation check
To check the effectiveness of the manipulation, the
morality, sociability, and competence scores were submit-
ted to a 2 (morality: high vs. low) 92 (sociability: high vs.
low) 92 (competence: high vs. low) between-participants
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). The analy-
sis revealed a significant multivariate main effect of
morality F(3, 189) =92.69, p=.001, g
p
2
=.59. At the
univariate level, the main effect of morality was significant
only for the morality scores F(1, 191) =264.97, p=.001,
g
p
2
=.58. Thus, participants rated the target as more moral
in the high morality condition (M=5.26, SD =1.60) than
in the low morality condition (M=2.02, SD =1.18). By
contrast, participants perceived the target as competent in
the high morality condition (M=4.23, SD =2.24) as in
the low morality condition (M=4.05, SD =2.34), F\1,
p=.32. In a similar vein, the target was rated as sociable
in the high morality condition (M=4.07, SD =2.25) as in
the low morality condition (M=3.84, SD =2.38), F(1,
191) =2.47, p=.12, g
p
2
=.01.
The analysis also yielded a multivariate main effect of
competence, F(3, 189) =158.46, p=.001, g
p
2
=.72. At
the univariate level, the main effect of competence was
significant only for the competence scores, F(1,
191) =456.21, p=.001, g
p
2
=.70. Hence, participants
rated the individual as more competent in the high com-
petence condition (M=6.05, SD =1.23) than in the low
competence condition (M=2.22, SD =1.39). Partici-
pants perceived the individual as moral in the high com-
petence condition (M=3.71, SD =2.28) as in the low
competence condition (M=3.53, SD =2.01), F\1,
p=.43. Furthermore, ratings of sociability did not differ
between the high competence condition (M=3.99,
SD =2.39) and the low competence condition (M=3.92,
SD =2.19), F\1, p=.64.
Finally, the analysis revealed a multivariate main effect
of sociability, F(3, 189) =261.73, p=.001, g
p
2
=.81. At
the univariate level, the main effect of sociability was
significant only for the sociability scores, F(1,
191) =673.24, p=.001, g
p
2
=.78. Specifically, partici-
pants rated the target as more sociable in the high socia-
bility condition (M=5.97, SD =1.18) than in the low
sociability condition (M=1.93, SD =.99). In contrast,
ratings of morality did not differ between the high socia-
bility condition (M=3.77, SD =2.13) and the low
sociability condition (M=3.50, SD =2.14), F(1,
191) =1.85, p=.17, g
p
2
=.01. Furthermore, the target
was rated as competent in the high sociability condition
(M=3.99, SD =2.31) as in the low sociability condition
(M=4.28, SD =2.31), F(1, 191) =2.62, p=.11,
g
p
2
=.01. In sum, our manipulation of morality, sociabil-
ity, and competence was successful.
Schadenfreude
Preliminary analyses revealed that schadenfreude, deserv-
ingness, dislike, and envy scores were not normally dis-
tributed (skewness [1). Thus, we used a logarithmic
transformation to normalize the distribution of scores.
Next, we submitted the schadenfreude scores to a 2
(morality: high vs. low) 92 (sociability: high vs. low) 92
(competence: high vs. low) ANOVA with all factors
varying between participants (see Table 2). The analysis
yielded a main effect of morality, F(1, 191) =10.79,
p=.001, g
p
2
=.05. Participants felt more schadenfreude
in the immoral condition (M=.38, SD =.24) than in the
moral condition (M=.26, SD =.25).
1
We also found a
marginal main effect of competence, F(1, 191) =3.77,
Table 2 Mean ratings of schadenfreude as a function of morality,
sociability, and competence manipulation (experiment 2)
Low morality High morality
Low competence
Low sociability .36 (.26) .27 (.26)
High sociability .28 (.24) .24 (.22)
High competence
Low sociability .50 (.18) .27 (.24)
High sociability .38 (.26) .27 (.27)
Standard deviations are provided in parentheses
1
A follow up study (N =50) manipulated only moral information
(high vs. low) and included a control condition (i.e., no information
about the target person was provided unless the basic information
provided in the previous studies: ‘‘An Italian guy who is 27 years-
old’’). It revealed that participants felt more schadenfreude in the
immoral condition than in the moral condition and control condition,
p=.001. By contrast, scores did not differ between the moral and
248 Motiv Emot (2017) 41:243–253
123

p=.053, g
p
2
=.02. Participants reported more schaden-
freude in the competent condition (M=.35, SD =.25)
than in the incompetent condition (M=.29, SD =.25).
By contrast, the analysis did not yield neither a main effect
of sociability [F(1, 191) =2.64, p=.11, g
p
2
=.01] nor
any interaction effect (all ps[.16). Importantly, the main
effect of morality was stronger than the main effect of
competence. According to Cohen’s (1977) conventional
criteria, the effect size of morality was ‘‘medium’’
(d=.49) whereas that of competence was ‘‘small’’
(d=.24). These findings support our hypothesis that
morality has a primary role in predicting schadenfreude.
Deservingness
Next, we submitted the deservingness scores to a 2
(morality: high vs. low) 92 (sociability: high vs. low) 92
(competence: high vs. low) ANOVA with all the factors
varying between participants (see Table 3). The analysis
revealed the expected main effect of morality, F(1,
191) =21.45, p=.001, g
p
2
=.010. Participants reported
higher levels of deservingness in the immoral condition
(M=.34, SD =.27) than in the moral condition
(M=.17, SD =.22)
2
.
Dislike
Next, we submitted the dislike scores to a 2 (morality: high
vs. low) 92 (sociability: high vs. low) 92 (competence:
high vs. low) ANOVA with all the factors varying between
participants (Table 4). The analysis revealed only a main
effect of morality, F(1, 186) =20.62, p=.001, g
p
2
=.10.
Participants reported higher levels of dislike in the immoral
condition (M=.32, SD =.29) than in the moral condition
(M=.15, SD =.23). By contrast, the analysis did not
yield neither a main effect of competence [F\1, p=.77]
nor of sociability [F(1, 186) =2.64, p=.11, g
p
2
=.01],
nor any interaction effect (all ps[.23).
Envy
Next, we submitted the envy scores to a 2 (morality: high
vs. low) 92 (sociability: high vs. low) 92 (competence:
high vs. low) ANOVA with all the factors varying between
participants. The analysis did not yield any significant
result (all ps [.09).
Mediational models
Finally, we tested our mediational model (see Table 5for
the correlation between variables). We found that the
manipulation of morality predicted schadenfreude
(B =-.11, SE =.04, p=.002). Moreover, the manipu-
lation of morality predicted the deservingness scores
(B =-.16, SE =.04, p=.001). When deservingness
scores were included in the regression equation, they pre-
dicted schadenfreude (B =.59, SE =.06, p=.001),
whereas the direct effect of the morality manipulation
became no longer significant (B =- .02, SE =.03,
p=.59). This supported the idea that deserving misfortune
mediated the relationship between the morality manipula-
tion and schadenfreude (B =-.09, SE =.02, 95 %
CI =[-.14, -.05]). By contrast, the model was not sig-
nificant when we considered the manipulation of compe-
tence (B =.02, SE =.02, 95 % CI =[-.01, .06]) and
sociability (B =-.01, SE =.02, 95 % CI =[-.04, .03])
as independent variables. We further tested an additional
mediational model considering dislike and deservingness
as two potential mediators in series. We found that the
manipulation of morality predicted dislike scores
Table 3 Mean ratings of deservingness as a function of morality,
sociability, and competence manipulation (experiment 2)
Low morality High morality
Low competence
Low sociability .35 (.31) .21 (.24)
High sociability .22 (.22) .14 (.19)
High competence
Low sociability .34 (.24) .13 (.20)
High sociability .42 (.28) .21 (.24)
Standard deviations are provided in parentheses
Table 4 Mean ratings of dislike as a function of morality, sociability,
and competence manipulation (experiment 2)
Low morality High morality
Low competence
Low sociability .32 (.31) .22 (.27)
High sociability .27 (.29) .12 (.21)
High competence
Low sociability .37 (.29) .16 (.23)
High sociability .33 (.29) .11 (.19)
Standard deviations are provided in parentheses
Footnote 1 continued
control condition, p=.72. Together, these findings confirmed the key
role of negative moral information in driving schadenfreude.
2
The analysis also revealed an unexpected two-way interaction
between sociability and competence, F(1, 191) =6.51, p=.01,
g
p
2
=.03. Participants reported higher levels of deservingness when
the target was depicted as highly competent and highly sociable than
when the target was depicted as highly sociable but lacking
competence. Despite this interaction, deservingness scores did not
play any mediational role neither when competence, nor when
sociability were taken into account as independent variables.
Motiv Emot (2017) 41:243–253 249
123

(B =-.16, SE =.04, p=.001), which in turn predicted
the deservingness scores (B =.34, SE =.06, p=.001),
which in turn predicted schadenfreude (B =.50, SE =.06,
p=.001). When the mediators were included in the
regression equation, the direct effect of the morality
manipulation became no longer significant (B =-.001,
SE =.03, p=.96). The analysis revealed that the indirect
effect via the mediators was significant (B =-.02,
SE =.01, 95 % CI =[-.05, -.01]) and that dislike and
deservingness mediated the relationship between our
manipulation and the subsequent reported schadenfreude.
Moreover, the model was not significant when we con-
sidered the manipulation of competence (B =.01,
SE =.01, 95 % CI =[-.02, .02]) and sociability
(B =-.01, SE =.01, 95 % CI =[-.03, .01]) as inde-
pendent variables. In line with experiment 1, envy did not
mediate the effects we found, and the mediational models
remained significant even treating envy as a covariate.
Thus, experiment 2 showed that the more a target is per-
ceived as immoral, the more his failures cause pleasure to
an observer. In line with previous studies, it also showed
that the more a target is perceived as competent, the more
his failures are pleasing. However, moral information
ascribed to an individual target had a stronger impact on
schadenfreude than competence information. Moreover,
experiment 2 shows that perception of dislike and deserv-
ingness uniquely account for the role of morality in driving
schadenfreude.
General discussion
Two studies provided consistent support for our hypothesis
that morality trumps sociability and competence in driving
pleasure at others’ misfortunes. Experiment 1 found indi-
viduals feel more joy when misfortune occurred to a
competent but immoral individual than to an equally
competent but unsociable person. As predicted, we further
found that such an effect was driven by the perception that
the misfortune occurred to an immoral individual was
deserved. Experiment 2 further corroborated these findings
by showing that morality trumps not only sociability, but
also competence, in driving schadenfreude.
Strengths and implications
Together, these findings add new evidence to the growing
literature on schadenfreude. Previous studies have shown
that people feel joy when misfortune occurs to social tar-
gets perceived as highly competent but lacking warmth.
However, these prior works failed to differentiate between
the sociability and morality components of warmth and did
not test the relative importance of these characteristics in
driving schadenfreude. Extending these findings, we show
the key role of moral characteristics in driving joy at oth-
ers’ failure. Thus, we show that the failure to differentiate
the various ways in which people can be judged to be warm
obscures the important role played by morality in driving
joy at others’ setbacks.
Our data further complemented prior research evidence
showing that competence is a key factor driving schaden-
freude. Indeed, it has been shown that misfortune occurring
to highly competent targets elicit more schadenfreude than
misfortune occurring to targets lacking ability and intelli-
gence (Cikara and Fiske 2012,2013; Van Dijk et al. 2005;
see also Smith 2013; Van Dijk and Ouwerkerk 2014). Our
findings confirmed these prior insights, but further revealed
the primary role of morality in driving schadenfreude.
Indeed, the feeling of schadenfreude was more strongly
affected by the manipulation of moral qualities than com-
petence qualities ascribed to an individual person. Impor-
tantly, the target information we used was carefully
selected to convey equal favorability. Thus, the leading
role of morality information in shaping the malicious
pleasure was not driven by its greater favorability.
In a similar vein, our findings complement and extend
prior work by Feather on deservingness and the structure of
action/outcome relations (Feather 1999). Research on this
Table 5 Correlation between
variables (experiment 2) MSD1234567
1. Morality manip. 1
2. Sociability manip. -.02 1
3. Competence manip. -.01 .09 1
4. Envy .12 .21 .05 .02 .12 1
5. Dislike .23 .27 -.30** -.11 .01 .41** 1
6. Deservingness .24 .25 -.31** -.02 .08 .16* .43** 1
7. Schadenfreude .31 .25 -.22** -.08 .12 .14* .43** .61** 1
** p \.01
*p\.05
250 Motiv Emot (2017) 41:243–253
123

tradition has suggested that moral individuals tend to be
perceived as less likely to initiate the negative event that
leads to the setback, and in that sense less responsible for
the event and less deserving the misfortune when compared
with a person lacking moral character (Feather and Atch-
ison 1998; Feather and Deverson 2000). However, such
prior work did not test whether individuals perceive the
misfortune occurred to an immoral target as more deserved
than the misfortune occurred to social targets lacking other
human characteristics. Moreover, such prior works did not
address whether the feeling of deservingness might account
for the effects of the trait-content information about a
social target on the feeling of schadenfreude at his/her
misfortune. Building on such prior work, we showed that
that moral character and the perception of deserving the
misfortune are inherently linked and that morality has an
exclusive and distinctive role that goes over and beyond
other human characteristics.
Moreover, extending prior insights on the determinant of
schadenfreude in general, we found that two predictors
identified by prior research might interact with each other
in eliciting such a malicious joy. Combining prior research
on the target characteristics in leading pleasure at his/her
misfortune (Cikara and Fiske 2012,2013) with that
showing that deservingness is the strongest predictor of
schadenfreude (Feather and Sherman 2002; Van Dijk et al.
2005), we show that these two factors might interact to
each other. Indeed, we found that the key role of morality
in driving schadenfreude is accounted by the perception
that the misfortune occurred to an immoral individual is
deserved.
The current findings go hand in hand with prior evidence
investigating the relationship between schadenfreude,
deservingness and negative emotions. Indeed, some studies
have revealed that deservingness predicts schadenfreude
when dislike is salient (Feather and Sherman 2002;
Feather, et al. 2013; Hareli and Weiner 2002). By showing
that morality directly affected dislike feelings in experi-
ment 2 and that dislike and deservingness mediated the
effect of morality on schadenfreude, our data confirmed
and extended such prior insights. Indeed, extending such
prior insights, we show that immorality may be a factor
that triggers the causal chain of dislike, deservingness, and
schadenfreude.
As they stand, our findings extend prior evidence on the
debate concerning the basic dimensions underlying social
cognition. In particular, our data complements recent work
showing that morality and sociability represent two distinct
characteristics in predicting impressions (Brambilla and
Leach 2014; Goodwin et al. 2014; Leach et al. 2007; see
also Ellemers 2012). By showing that moral information
has a leading role over sociability trait-characteristics in
predicting schadenfreude, we show that sociability and
morality are distinct characteristics, not only in predicting
impressions, but also in predicting specific emotional
reactions. Thus, examinations of social cognition and its
emotional routs may be better served by attending to the
more specific ways in which people judge others’ warmth
and competence.
The current findings go hand in hand with recent
research investigating the several features of the social
target that can influence people’s empathy for others’ pain.
Riva et al. (2016) found that people ascribe lower capacity
to experience pain following socially stressful events (e.g.,
the death of a loved one) to those who lack moral qualities
compared with those who are highly moral. Our findings
complement this recent line of research. Indeed, observers
attribute less capacity to suffer to social targets they per-
ceive as lacking moral qualities and—at the same time—
enjoy more their misfortunes. Based on this evidence, we
argue that social actors should aim at conveying their moral
qualities. In this way, perceivers will likely have higher
empathy and experience less schadenfreude for their pain.
In a similar way, a possible strategy that could be imple-
mented to decrease the likelihood that perpetrators engage
in acts of denigrations of social targets is to increase the
saliency of these targets’ moral qualities. Our research
suggests that the best antidote to lack of empathy and the
experience of schadenfreude might be the perception that
someone is a moral person.
Limitations and directions for future research
There are some limitations to the present research. First,
considering that envy is a key predictor of schadenfreude
(Smith et al. 1996; Van Dijk et al. 2006) elicited by targets
highly competent but lacking human warmth (Fiske et al.
2007), we included a single item measure of envy in our
studies. However, our data suggested that envy did not play
any role in driving the effects we found. By contrast, the
perception of deserving misfortune explained the direction
of influence from (im)morality to schadenfreude. Thus,
while envy does play a role in driving schadenfreude when
the two general dimensions of warmth and competence are
considered (Cikara and Fiske 2012), envy seems to be less
important when the two evaluative components of warmth
(i.e., sociability and morality) are taken into account. Thus,
we further showed that the distinction between sociability
and morality within the broader dimension of warmth is not
trivial, as these dimensions drive different emotions.
Nevertheless, our results should be taken with caution
considering that we used a single item to measure envy.
Motiv Emot (2017) 41:243–253 251
123

Our strategy was in line with Cikara and Fiske (2012) that
used a general measure of envy (see also Feather and
Sherman 2002; Feather et al. 2013; Hareli and Weiner
2002). However, considering research showing that envy
has two distinct components (i.e., benign and malicious
envy) and that the malicious component is more related to
schadenfreude than the benign one (van de Ven et al.
2015), an interesting avenue for future research would be to
test how morality, sociability, and competence character-
istics relate to these facets of envy by employing a multi-
item measure of envy.
Second, in our studies, before presenting the misfortune
event, we provided a male target picture supplied with
some information about his characteristics. This method-
ology is comparable to that used by Cikara and Fiske
(2012). However, whereas Cikara and Fiske (2012) focused
on intergroup perception by considering stereotype content
in eliciting schadenfreude, we focused on interpersonal
perception by considering the personality characteristics of
a male stranger. Thus, extending prior research our data
show that not only stereotype content of known group, but
also information of personality characteristics of a stranger
is sufficient to elicit schadenfreude. It should be noted,
however, that while Cikara and Fiske (2012) used facial
electromyography to measure schadenfreude, we employed
self-report scales that are more susceptible to be influenced
by demand characteristics. This might explain why in our
studies schadenfreude means were low (for similar find-
ings, see Leach et al. 2003; Van Dijk et al. 2005; Van Dijk
and Ouwerkerk 2014). Future research should test the
prediction that morality trumps sociability and competence
in driving schadenfreude by considering physiological
measures (e.g., facial electromyography) of schadenfreude.
Finally, it should be noted that we used hypothetical
scenarios or an allegedly real situation involving a male
stranger. Although these methodologies are commonly
used by research on schadenfreude (Smith et al. 2009;
Takahashi et al. 2009; van de Ven et al. 2015; Van Dijk
et al. 2011a) we realize that these paradigms prevent par-
ticipants to actually experience schadenfreude. Thus, an
important challenge for future research would be to test the
factors promoting the insurgence of schadenfreude by
considering more naturalistic settings.
Compliance with ethical standards
Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of
interest.
Ethical approval The studies reported in this paper have been
approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of Milano-Bic-
occa, and informed consent was obtained from all participants. All
procedures were in accordance with the ethical standards of the
institutional and national research committee and with the 1964
Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical
standards.
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