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Why Did Suleyman the Magnificent Execute His Son Sehzade Mustafa in 1553?

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Abstract

This article examines the reasons why Suleyman the Magnificent executed his son Sehzade Mustafa during the Nahgvan military campaign of 1553. According to the dominant narrative in both Ottoman sources and academic literature, Suleyman's concubine and later wife Harem Sultan and her closest ally, Suleyman's son-in-law Rustem Pasha, plotted against Mustafa in order to save the throne for one of Hurrem's own sons. Though the latter was widely beloved, this scheme cost him his father's favor. Afterward, however, the sultan regretted the decision and dismissed Rustem Pasha from his position as grand vizier. This article examines the roles of Sultan Suleyman, Sehzade Mustafa, Harem Sultan, and Rustem Pasha in the Ottoman, Venetian, Habsburg, French, and Persian sources, investigating why the sultan executed the prince in the context of the Ottoman succession experience. Adding complexity to the common narrative, this article concludes that the sultan, who was losing his authority to the prince, desired to consolidate his power and to remove his dynasty from the competition between social groups that had characterized earlier succession struggles.
OSMANLI ARAŞTIRMALARI
THE JOURNAL OF OTTOMAN STUDIES
OSMANLI ARAŞTIRMALARI
THE JOURNAL OF OTTOMAN STUDIES
SAYI / ISSUE 48 • 2016
İSTANBUL 29 M AYIS ÜNİVERSİTESİ
Yayın Kurulu / Editorial Board
Prof. Dr. Halil nalcık – Prof. Dr. smail E. Erünsal
Prof. Dr. Heath Lowry – Prof. Dr. Feridun M. Emecen
Prof. Dr. Ali Akyıldız – Prof. Dr. Bilgin Aydın
Prof. Dr. Seyfi Kenan – Doç. Dr. Baki Tezcan
OSMANLI ARAŞTIRMALARI
THE JOURNAL OF OTTOMAN STUDIES
stanbul 2016
Baskı / Publication TDV Yayın Matbaacılık ve Ticaret letmesi
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Articles in this journal are indexed or abstracted in Arts and Humanities Citation Index – AHCI
(Thomson Reuters), Scopus (Elsevier) Turkologischer Anzeiger, Index Islamicus and
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Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of Ottoman Studies
Sayı / Issue XLVIII · yıl / year 2016
Sahibi / Published under TDV slâm Aratırmaları Merkezi ve stanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi adına
the auspices of Prof. Dr. Rait Küçük – Prof. Dr. brahim Kâfi Dönmez
Yazı leri Müdürü Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kavas
Yayın Kurulu / Prof. Dr. Halil nalcık, Prof. Dr. smail E. Erünsal, Prof. Dr. Heath Lowry,
Editorial Board Prof. Dr. Feridun M. Emecen, Prof. Dr. Ali Akyıldız, Prof. Dr. Bilgin Aydın,
Prof. Dr. Seyfi Kenan, Doç. Dr. Baki Tezcan
Yayın Danıma Kurulu / Prof. Dr. Engin Deniz Akarlı (stanbul ehir Üniversitesi)
Review Board Prof. Dr. Evangelia Balta (Yunanistan)
Prof. Dr. Kemal Beydilli (stanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi)
Prof. Dr. Ali Birinci (Polis Akademisi, Ankara)
Prof. Dr. Suraiya Faroqhi (Bilgi Üniversitesi-stanbul)
Prof. Dr. Pal Fodor (Macaristan)
Prof. Dr. François Georgeon (Paris Dou Dilleri ve Medeniyetleri Enstitüsü)
Prof. Dr. ükrü Haniolu (Princeton Üniversitesi)
Prof. Dr. Mehmet pirli (stanbul Medipol Üniversitesi)
Prof. Dr. Ahmet Karamustafa (Washington University, St. Louis)
Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kavas (stanbul Medeniyet Üniversitesi)
Prof. Dr. Metin Kunt (Sabancı Üniversitesi)
Prof. Dr. Mihai Maxim (Romanya)
Prof. Dr. Ahmet Yaar Ocak (TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji Üniversitesi)
Prof. Dr. Abdülkadir Özcan (Fatih Sultan Mehmet Vakıf Üniversitesi)
Prof. Dr. Mustafa Sinanolu (stanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi)
Prof. Dr. Abdeljelil Temimi (Tunus)
Prof. Dr. Bahaeddin Yediyıldız (E. Hacettepe Üniversitesi)
Kitâbiyat / Book Review Editor Doç. Dr. Emrah Safa Gürkan
Yay. Kur. Sekreteri / Sec. of the Ed. Board Yrd. Doç. Dr. Erturul Ökten
Sekreter Yrd. / Ass. Sec. of the Ed. Board Yrd. Doç. Dr. Özlem Çaykent,
Cengiz Yolcu, Abdullah Güllüolu
Teknik Redaksiyon
/ Control Nurettin Albayrak
Style editor Adam Siegel
Tashih
/ Correction Mustafa Birol Ülker – Prof. Dr. Bilgin Aydın
Sayfa Tasarım / Design Ender Boztürk
ISSN 0255-0636
Bayezid Paşa: Vezir, Entelektüel, Sanat Hamisi / Bayezid Pasha: An Ottoman
Statesman, Intellectualist and Art Patron1
Mustafa Çahan Keskn
Two 15th Century Ottoman Sufi Mysteries – An Historiographical Essay
Part II: The Case of Ümmi Kemal / XV. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Sufiliinde ki Esrarlı
Nokta – Tarih Yazıcılııısından Bir Deneme
Bölüm II: Ümmi Kemal Örnei39
Bll Hckman
Why Did Süleyman the Magnificent Execute His Son Şehzade Mustafa in 1553? /
Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Olu ehzade Mustafa’yı 1553te Neden Bodurttu?67
Zaht Al
İbrahim Müteferrika’nın Lehistan Elçiliği ve Bilinmeyen Sefaretnâmesi /
brahim Müteferrika’s Embassy of Poland and His Unknown
Ambassadorial Account105
Erhan Afyoncu – Ahmet Önal
Translating Science in the Ottoman Empire: Translator-educators as
Agents of Change” in the Ottoman Scientific Repertoires (1789-1839) /
Osmanlı mparatorluu’nda Bilimi Çevirmek: Osmanlı Bilim Repertuarlarında
“Deiim Özneleri” Olarak Mütercim-Hocalar (1789-1839)143
Ceyda Özmen
Global Market Orientation of the Ottoman Agriculture Sector:
An Interregional Comparison (1844) / Osmanlı Tar ım Sektörünün Dünya Pazarlarına
Oryantasyonu: Bölgelerarası Bir Karılatırma (1844)171
Derv Turul Koyuncu - A. Mesud Küçükkalay
İÇİNDEKİLER / CONTENTS
“Such a Koran no individual might own”: The Biography of a Mamluk Qur’an
from Ottoman Jerusalem / “Kimsenin sahip olamayacaı bir Kur’an”:
Osmanlı Kudüs’ünden bir Memluk Kur’an’ının Biyografisi229
Esra Akn-Kvanç
Special Section
Introduction: Contacts, Encounters, Practices:
Ottoman-European Diplomacy, 1500-1800 / Giri: Temaslar, karılamalar
ve uygulamalar: Osmanlı-Avrupa Diplomasisi, 1500-1800269
Mchael Talbot - Phl McCluskey
His Bailos Kapudan: Conversion, Tangled Loyalties and Hasan Veneziano
Between Istanbul and Venice (1588-1591) / Balyosunun Kapudanı:
htida, Çetrefilli Sadakatler ve stanbul ile Venedik Arasında
Uluc Hasan Paa (1588-1591)277
Emrah Safa Gürkan
Navigating the Qabusnamahs Journey from Istanbul to Weimar:
Ottoman-European Philosophical Exchange in the Age of Enlightenment /
Qabusnamah’nin Istanbul’dan Weimar’a Yolculuu: Aydınlanma Çaı’nda
Osmanlı ve Avrupa arasındaki Felsefi Alıveriler321
Lela Gbson
An Ottoman envoy in Paris: Süleyman Ağa’s mission to the court
of Louis XIV, 1669 / Paris’te Bir Osmanlı Elçisi: XIV. Louis’nin Sarayında
Süleyman Aa, 1669337
Phl McCluskey
A Treaty of Narratives: Friendship, Gifts, and Diplomatic History
in the British Capitulations of 1641 / Anlatıların Antlaması: 1641 ngiliz
Ahdnamesi’nde Dostluk, Pike, ve Diplomasi Tar ihi357
Mchael Talbot
The Diplomats’ Debts: International Financial Disputes between
the Ottoman Empire and Prussia at the end of the Eighteenth Century /
Diplomatların Borçları: Onsekizinci Yüzyılın Sonunda Osmanlı mparatorluu
ve Prusya Arasındaki Uluslararası Mali htilâflar399
Irena Flter
DEĞERLENDİRME / REVIEW ARTICLE
Batılı İki Seyyahın Kaleminden İstanbul Masalları: Cyrus Adler ve Allan Ramsay’nin
Kahvehane Ziyaretleri
Melike Tokay-Ünal • 417
KİTÂBİYAT / BOOK REVIEWS
Noel Malcolm, Agents of Empire: Knights, Corsairs, Jesuits and Spies in the
Sixteenth Century Mediterranean World
Molly Greene431
Mohammad Gharipour and Nilay Özlü (eds.), The City in the Muslim World:
Depictions by Western Travel Writers, Culture and Civilization in the Middle East
Enno Maessen436
Isabella Lazzarini, Communication and Conflict: Italian Diplomacy in the
Early Renaissance, 1350-1520
Emrah Safa Gürkan441
Suraiya Faroqhi, Travel and Artisans in the Ottoman Empire: Employment and
Mobility in the Early Modern Era
Nalan Turna446
Elina Gugliuzzo, Economic and Social Systems in the Early Modern Age Seaports:
Malta, Messina, Barcelona and Ottoman Maritime Policy
Hüseyin Serdar Tabakoğlu451
Palmira Brummett, Mapping the Ottomans: Sovereignty, Territory, and Identity in the
Early Modern Mediterranean
Gregory C. McIntosh456
Kecia Ali, The Lives of Muhammad
Merve Uçar Nurcan461
Kenan nan, “Mahmiye-i Trabzon Mahallâtından”: Onyedinci Yüzyıl Ortalarında
Trabzon’da Sosyal ve İktisadi Hayat
Zeynep İnan Aliyazıcıoğlu466
Thomas Gaskell Allan ve William Lewis Sachtleben, Accross Asia on a Bicycle
Özlem Çaykent471
Maurits van den Boogert, Aleppo Observed: Ottoman Syria Through the Eyes of
Two Scottish Doctors, Alexander and Patrick Russell (Studies in the Arcadian Library)
Seyfi Kenan477
Nükhet Varlık, Plague and Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean World:
The Ottoman Experience, 1347-1600
Chris Gratien482
Bilgin Aydın, lhami Yurdakul, Ayhan Iık, smail Kurt, Esra Yıldız, İstanbul Şer‘iyye
Sicilleri Vakfiyeler Katalogu
Kenan Yıldız487
Julia Phillips Cohen, Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship
in the Modern Era
Cihangir Gündoğdu490
Özgen Felek (haz.), Kitā’l-Menāmāt, Sultan III. Murad’ın Rüya Mektupları
Aslı Niyazioğlu495
VEFEYÂT / OBITUARY
Osmanlı Edebiyatı Tarihçisi Akün Hoca’nın Ardından
Abdullah Uçman • 497
Seyfi Kenan • 499
ANMA / IN MEMORIAM
To the memory of Prof. Nejat Göyünç
Evangelia Balta • 501
67
Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Oğlu Şehzade Mustafa’yı 1553’te Neden Boğdurttu?
Öz Bu makalede Kanuni Sultan Süleymanın 1553 yılında Nahçıvan Seferi sırasında
olu ehzade Mustafa’yı neden bodurttuu incelenmektedir. Osmanlı kaynaklarında
ve literatürde hakim olan görüe göre, Süleymanın gözdesi ve sonra ei Hürrem Sul-
tan ve onunla ibirlii içinde olan damadı Sadrazam Rüstem Paa’n ın tahtı Hürremin
oullarından birisi için korumak amacıyla toplumun her kesimince çokça sevilen ehzade
Mustafa’yı babası nezdinde gözden düürüp öldürtmülerdir. Sonrasında piman olan
Kanuni Sultan Süleyman, Sadrazam Rüstem Paa’yı azletmitir. Makalede Osmanlı, Ven-
edik, Habsburg, Fransız ve Fars kaynakları ııında Sultan Süleyman, ehzade Mustafa,
Hürrem Sultan ve Rüstem Paa’nın oynadıkları roller incelenmekte ve Osmanlı veraset
tecrübesi çerçevesinde sultanın ehzadeyi neden bodurduu sorgulanmaktadır. Buna
göre, otoritesini ehzade lehine kaybeden sultan, ehzadeyi öldürterek hem kendi gücünü
yeniden tesis etmek istemi hem de Osmanlı hanedanını daha önceki veraset mücadele-
lerinde var olan toplumsal gruplar arası rekabetin dıına çıkarmıtır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: ehzade Mustafa, veraset, karde katli, Hürrem Sultan, Kanuni
Sultan Süleyman, Rüstem Paa
In the summer of 1553, Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566) left Istan-
bul with the Ottoman army for his third campaign in the east against the Safa-
vids—known as the Nahçıvan campaign. Before his departure, he had dispatched
an order to the governor of Amasya, ehzade (Prince) Mustafa (1515–1553), to
prepare his forces to join this campaign. En route to Ereli, Süleyman sent an-
other messenger to his son indicating that the latter should join him there, where
Süleyman’s forces were scheduled to camp. Despite the warnings from within his
Why Did Süleyman the Magnificent Execute
His Son Şehzade Mustafa in ?
Zahit Atçıl*
Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of Ottoman Studies, XLVIII (2), -
* Istanbul Medeniyet University
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
HIS SON EHZADE MUSTAFA IN 1553?
68
entourage, particularly those of his mother, Mahidevran, Mustafa decided to join
the sultans army, telling advisers that he would not abstain from going “where
destiny cast him.”1 It would not have been easy for Mustafa to decide whether to
obey his father’s orders, given that the sultan seemed to be accusing him of rebel-
lion and of generating sedition.
On 6 October 1553 (27 evval 960), the prince arrived at the sultan’s camp
in order to kiss his father’s hand; he dismounted his horse in front of the sultan’s
tent, leaving his steed with his mirahûr (stable master) and his sword with the
sultans guards. When he entered the fourth section of the imperial tent, he saw
his father seated there with an arrow in his hand. He reverently saluted his father
but received a shocking response: “Ah! Dog, do you still dare to salute me?” Then,
at the sultans order, three mutes caught Mustafa and began to strangle him. He
nearly escaped their hands once, but ultimately he was overpowered and executed.
His mirahûr and another agha who had been waiting outside were also killed. In
the aftermath, the janissaries’ mourning of their beloved prince was superseded
by their fury, and the sultan dismissed Rüstem Pasha (d. 1561) from his position
as grand vizier. It is perhaps for this reason that Rüstem has since been thought
to bear principal responsibility for Mustafa’s demise.
The death of Mustafa was a mournful event not only because he had been
loved by janissaries, bureaucrats, religious scholars, and poets alike—in short, by
almost every influential social group in the empire—but also because it was be-
lieved that he had been murdered in a plot staged by Süleyman’s beloved wife
Hürrem (d. 1558) and his grand vizier and son-in-law Rüstem Pasha. Hürrem
and Rüstem knew that significant number of men loved and supported Süley-
mans eldest son, Mustafa (thirty-eight years old at the time), and it would have
been difficult for one of Hürrem’s sons to ascend the throne as long as Mustafa
was alive. For that reason, the commonly accepted story goes—in both major
Ottoman historical accounts and the modern scholarly literature—Hürrem and
Rüstem craftily planned to frame Mustafa as a rebel in the eyes of the sultan, who
ultimately executed his innocent son.
While Hürrem and Rüstem have been seen as opposing the most talented
“Relazione Anonima della Guerra di Persia dell’anno  e di Molti Altri Particolari,” in Relazioni
degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato, (Firenze: Tipografia e Calcografia all’Insegna di Clio, ), ser.
III, v. ,  [Hereafter “Relazione Anonima”]. Much of the details on the execution of ehzade
Mustafa is available in a Venetian source whose author is unknown. Although some information
provided here is not present in other sources, the argument and certain details agree with others.
ZAHT ATÇIL
69
prince of their time, Süleyman has been criticized severely for allowing this faction
to deceive him and for his selfish decisions to preserve his power that ultimately
turned the Ottoman state from a “progressive” enterprise into a “stagnant” and
“corrupt” one.2 Writing in the late sixteenth century, historian Mustafa Ali, for
example, pointed to the year 960/1553 in reference to Mustafa’s execution as the
moment at which the Ottoman Empire began to decline.3 Based on this general
belief, the dominant narrative recounting the death of ehzade Mustafa holds that
an innocent prince was executed by a naïve and credulous father who had been
deceived by the prince’s stepmother and the sultan’s grand vizier, who wanted to
guarantee the throne to one of Hürrem’s sons (Selim or Bayezid).4 Historians and
poets even marked 960/1553 with the chronogram mekr-i Rüstem (Rüstem’s trick).
This view, which has been accentuated in the Ottoman narrative and literary
sources, as well as in modern scholarly literature,5 was not limited to the Otto-
The elegy (mersiye) of ehzade Mustafa, composed by Yahya Bey immediately after the execution
of the prince starts with “One side of this world was destroyed/The celalis of death took away
Mustafa Khan” (Meded meded bu cihânun yıkıldı bir yanı/Ecel celâlîleri aldı Mustafa Han’ı).
Cornell H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa
Âli (15411600) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ), .
Hürrem gave birth four sons who survived to adolescence. Her eldest son Mehmed died in 
and her youngest son Cihangir was gibbous. So these two were not considered as candidate for
the throne in s. See Alan Fisher, “Süleymân and His Sons,” in Soliman le Magnifique et son
Temps: Actes du Colloque de Paris, Galeries Nationales du Grand Palais, 710 Mars 1990, ed. Gilles
Veinstein (Paris: Documentation française, ), .
See Ali Cevat Bey, Ta rihin kanlı sahifeleri: Şehzade Şehit Mustafa: tarihi bir varaka-i mühimme
(stanbul: timat Kütüphanesi, n.d.); smail Hakkı Uzunçarılı, Osmanlı Tar ihi (Ankara: Türk
Tarih Kurumu, ), v. II: ; smail Hami Danimend, İzahlı Osmanlı Ta r ihi Kronolojisi
(stanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, ), v. II: . The date marking with mekr-i Rüstem, for
example, was immediately adopted in Persian historical sources. See Bdq Munsh Qazvn,
Javāhir al-akhbār: bakhsh-i tārīkh-i Īrān az Qarāqūyūnlū tā sāl-i 984 H.Q. (Tehran: yene-ye
Mr, ), ; Qz Amad Ghaffr Qazvn, Tārīkh-i jahān-ārā: bā muqābalah-i chandīn
nuskhah-i mu‘tabar-i qadīmī va nuskhah-i muģashshá ‘allāmah Qazvīnī (Tehran: Kitbfursh-i
fiž, ), . In European drama and literature, the subject has been treated as a tragedy of an
innocent prince, parallel to the Ottoman sources. In Italy, the most popular tragedy on Süleyman
and the execution of Mustafa, Prospero Bonarelli’s Il Solimano, was first performed in Ancona
in . In addition to Bonarellis drama, other important theatrical works on the subject were
F. Cerone’s Il Solimano (), C. Federici’s Solimano il Magnifico (), Anton Maria Caspi’s
Il Mustafa (), Guido Dezan’s Solimano II () and Michel Angelo Valentini’s Solimano
() etc. See Metin And, Türkiye’de İtalyan sahnesi, İtalyan sahnesinde Türkiye (stanbul: Metis
Yayınları, ), ; Nazan Aksoy, Rönesans İngiltere’sinde Türkler (stanbul: stanbul Bilgi
Üniversitesi Yayınları, ), ; Clarence Dana Rouillard, The Turk in French History, Thought,
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
HIS SON EHZADE MUSTAFA IN 1553?
70
man lands but was also prevalent in neighboring countries. Although some recent
studies have analyzed the subject from different perspectives,6 this view remains
dominant in literature and media.7
Mustafa’s execution still receives attention, however, and many aspects of it
have led historians to continue asking questions. Even if one accepts the dominant
narrative, it is difficult to fault Hürrem for desiring to eliminate Mustafa, consider-
ing her role as the mother of four princes and her responsibility for training, edu-
cating, and preparing them as prospective sultans.8 Moreover, every prince had the
right to ascend the throne, while the land was indivisible; therefore, competition
between surviving princes had in the past led to fratricide, which was even codi-
fied in the Lawbook of Mehmed II (r. 1451–1481).9 If fratricide was an expected
and likely phenomenon after the death of each sultan, it is reasonable that Hür-
rem should act to save the lives of her own sons, given that Mustafa was generally
considered the favorite to become the next sultan. In addition, the asymmetry in
the sources with respect to the actions of Hürrem and Rüstem, on one hand, and
those of Mustafa and his mother, Mahidevran, on the other, may have misled re-
searchers seeking to understand what happened. Almost every act of Hürrem and
Rüstem can be followed in archival documents because they were in Istanbul, the
imperial center; however, the relations, activities, and connections of Mustafa and
Mahidevran were beyond the realm of recording because they had been living in
the provinces. However, I have found documents in the Venetian archives dem-
onstrating that Mustafa was not quietly standing by; indeed, he was as crafty in
and Literature (15201660). (Paris: Boivin, ), ; Linda. McJannet, The Sultan Speaks:
Dialogue in English Plays and Histories about the Ottoman Turks, st ed. (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, ), .
erafettin Turan, Şehzade Bayezid Vakası (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, ) emphasized the
role of displeased groups in Anatolia who supported first Mustafa and then another prince
Bayezid. Leslie Peirce treats the issue in relation to the dynastic reproduction policies and argues
that Süleyman followed a policy of open succession without explicitly favoring any prince. See
Leslie P. Peirce, The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire (New York:
Oxford University Press, ), . See also Feridun M. Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında
Siyaset (Istanbul: Tima, ), -.
Recently, the Turkish TV serial, Muhteşem Yüzyıl (The Magnificent Century), reflected the
dominant narrative on the execution of ehzade Mustafa (Episode ,  February ).
Peirce, The Imperial Harem, .
Halil nalcık, “The Ottoman Succession and Its Relation to the Turkish Concept of Sovereignty,”
in The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society
(Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, ), .
ZAHT ATÇIL
71
consolidating power and recruiting supporters as his competitors in Istanbul were.
The questions that I raise here are why Süleyman the Magnificent gave the
order to execute ehzade Mustafa and what implications this action had for dy-
nastic legitimacy and succession thereafter. I treat the issue from the perspective
that every actor was intentionally behaving according to the role he or she was
expected to play in the system, as it existed. Thus, this study does not blame or
exonerate anybody; rather, it considers the conditions the sultan faced, those he
imagined for the future, and those under which he ultimately decided to execute
his firstborn son. In other words, I explore how the sultan came to his decision
and speculate about what might have occurred if the sultan had spared Mustafa’s
life. A bit of background on succession in Ottoman history leads into a discussion
of each actor’s position toward the mid-sixteenth century. Based on the available
sources, I reconstruct the story of Mustafa’s execution, providing a more nuanced
account than the traditional narrative does. In addition, I identify some implica-
tions of the execution for later developments in Ottoman succession.
The Scene: Succession in Ottoman History
Ottoman succession was closely related to the Turco-Mongol steppe concep-
tion of political order, according to which, sovereignty was considered the purview
of the whole dynastic family—that is, each male member of the reigning dynasty
possessed the right to rule. In the Turco-Mongol tradition, the ruling sovereign
had usually distributed the land as appanages among the living male members
of dynasty (also known as the ülüş system).10 This arrangement led to competi-
tion and sometimes to civil war between princes who fought for supremacy that
would keep the country united under a single ruler. The Ottoman experience did
not include the division of the land into appanages, but it left the right of suc-
cession open to competition among princes. Having reached adolescence, then,
the princes were sent to take up a provincial governorship and acquire political
experience, as well as to prepare for the upcoming competition for the throne. On
many occasions, unsuccessful brothers were executed by the ascending sultan, the
one considered divinely blessed.11
 senbike Togan, Flexibility and Limitation in Steppe Formations (Leiden: Brill, ); Abdülkadir
nan, ““Orun” ve “Ülü” MeselesiTürk hukuk ve iktisat tarihi mecmuasi, v. (): .
 For example, When Murad I died on the Battle of Kosovo, his son Bayezid who was with
his father at the time assumed the throne for himself and he commanded to kill his brother
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
HIS SON EHZADE MUSTAFA IN 1553?
7
The question of Ottoman legitimacy also contributed from an early date to
this deadly competition between princes. Because Ottoman sultans lacked out-
standing sources of political legitimacy (such as a noble lineage like the Chingizid
line or prophetic descent), the early Ottoman rulers had little to bolster their
claims to legitimacy.12 Although they supported and patronized some efforts to
trace a noble lineage based on the Oghuzid line, together with the Aqqoyunlu
clan, in the fifteenth century,13 the primary source of Ottoman legitimacy was
their efficiency in gaza, the religious zeal to expand Islamdom and acquire booty
that would benefit Muslims.14 The legitimacy of a sultan was to some extent based
on his effectiveness as a gazi sultan—that is, in leading the army to victory in
conquest. When a sultan died, the right to rule ideally passed to the prince who
was most courageous and most capable of leading the army to further success. The
competition between the princes was in a sense an arena in which each had the
chance to demonstrate their competence and capacity to become a gazi sultan.
While the competition was an open “game,” the one who overcame his brothers
was considered to have received God’s dispensation (kut) and to be destined for
(Ya’kub) who was sent heroically to chase the retrieving enemies. Although Ya’kub may be more
courageous and heroic, the God’s favor, from the perspective of the Turco-Mongol tradition, was
on Bayezid and so the fate raised him to the throne. See Neri, Kitâb-ı Cihannümâ, eds. Faik Reit
Unat and Mehmed A. Köymen (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, ), v. I: a-b; Halil nalcık,
“The Ottoman Succession,” .
 See nalcık, “The Ottoman Succession”; Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, chap. .
 Aldo Gallotta, “Il mito oguzo e le origini dello stato ottomano: Una riconsiderazione,in The
Ottoman Emirate (13001389), ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon: Crete University Press,
), ; Colin Imber, “The Ottoman Dynastic Myth,Tu r c ica  (): ; John E.
Woods, The Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire, Revised and expanded edition (Salt Lake
City: University of Utah Press, ), .
 Paul Wittek argues that the rise of Ottomans from principality to the vast empire was a result
of their engagement of gaza and their zeal for expanding the Islamdom. See Paul Wittek, The
Rise of the Ottoman Empire: Studies in the History of Turkey, Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries, ed.
Colin Heywood, Royal Asiatic Society Books (New York: Routledge, ); Paul Wittek, “De la
défaite d’ankara à la prise de Constantinople,” Revue des études islamiques xii (): . Rudi
Paul Lindner criticizes Paul Wittek with his disregard of tribal conditions and inconsistency
between gaza ethos and Ottoman conflicts with neighboring Muslim principalities. See Rudi
Paul Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia (Bloomington: Research Institute for
Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, ). For a critique of Lindner and the
venues for use of Ottoman sources on early Ottomans see Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds:
The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley: University of California Press, ).
ZAHT ATÇIL
73
success.15 ehzade Mustafa appeared more courageous and competitive than his
brothers were, thanks to his military prowess and leadership, attracting extensive
support from diverse segments of society at a time when his father, Sultan Süley-
man, seemed content to settle down in Istanbul and less eager to expand Ottoman
territories (more on this in a moment).
What made princely competition and fratricide more profound, as men-
tioned earlier, was their codification in dynastic law (Kanunname-i Âl-i Osman)
by Mehmed II (r. 1451–1481).16 The law states, “For the welfare of the state, the
one of my sons to whom God grants the sultanate may lawfully put his brothers
to death. A majority of the ulema consider this permissible.”17 With this code,
fratricide gained firmer ground as acceptable and customary, and Mehmed’s law
attempted to entrench its permissibility vis-à-vis Islamic law. The dynastic law
code, further, not only justified the practice of fratricide but also seems to have
rendered it imperative for any would-be sultan. The first thing a new sultan was
 nalcık, “The Ottoman Succession,” ; Nicolas Vatin and Gilles Veinstein, Le Sérail ébranlé:
essai sur les morts, dépositions et avènements des sultans ottomans (XIVe-XIXe siècle) (France: Fayard,
), . For example, As the sons of Bayezid II, Ahmed, Korkud and Selim, began to compete
for the throne in early sixteenth century, Ahmed was most probable candidate for the throne
because of his strong network and support. Both Ahmed and Korkud lost their credit because of
their inertia and failure to suppress the Shahquli/ahkulu rebellion (). Selim effectively
used the rhetoric that he could suppress the rebellion and solve the Safavid problem, thereby
he attracted the support of the janissaries and Sipahis of Rumelia for they believed that Selim
seemed to be more courageous and having more zeal to engage in gaza to expand the lands of
Islam. See M. Çaatay Uluçay, “Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Padiah Oldu?-I,” Tar ih Dergisi, no.
(): ; (II): no.  (): ; (III): no.  (): ; Feridun M. Emecen,
Yavuz Sultan Selim (Istanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, ), ; H. Erdem Çıpa, Yavuz’un
Kavgası: I. Selim’in Saltanat Mücadelesi (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, ).
 The time of the codification of the Kânûnnâme has been a point of dispute among historians.
The existence of some anachronistic elements in the content of the codified law has led some
historians to question its authenticity from the time of Mehmed II. However, the regulation on
the succession has been usually considered as a reflection of a practice that had already been in
practice. See Konrad Dilger, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des osmanischen Hofzeremoniells im 15.
und 16. Jahrhundert. (München: Trofenik, ), ; Abdülkadir Özcan, ed., Kanunname Âl-i
Osman (Tahlil ve Karşılaştırmalı Metin) (Istanbul: Kitabevi, ); Ahmet Akgündüz, Osmanlı
Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukukî Tahlilleri (stanbul: Fey Vakfı Yayınları, ), I: ; Fleischer,
Bureaucrat and Intellectual, .
 “[V]e her kimesneye evlâdımdan saltanat müyesser ola, karındaların nizâm-ı ‘âlem için katletmek
münâsibdir, ekser ‘ulemâ dahi tecvîz etmitir, anınla ‘âmil olalar.” See Özcan, ed., Kanunname-i
Âl-i Osman. For a legal discussion of fratricide in Ottoman history, see Mehmet Akman, Osmanlı
Devletinde Kardeş Katli (Istanbul: Eren, ).
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
HIS SON EHZADE MUSTAFA IN 1553?
74
expected to do, then, was to chase after his brothers and execute both them and
their children—even if no open crime or act of treason had been committed.
The rationale was that leaving a potential contender for the throne might pave
the way for sedition or give neighboring powers a means by which to interfere in
Ottoman politics.18
After Selim I (r. 1512–1520), Süleyman ascended the throne without any
competition: he was the deceased sultans only son. As a result, he was able to
direct his energy and capacity toward conquests and the consolidation of his
power, marking his reign with glory and magnificence. As he grew old, however,
competition among his surviving sons—Mustafa (b. 1515), Mehmed (b. 1521),
Selim (b. 1524), Bayezid (b. 1525), and Cihangir (b. 1531)19—overshadowed
this glory with bitter casualties and executions. The most striking of these was
undoubtedly the execution of ehzade Mustafa by Süleyman’s order. What led
the sultan to kill his own son, rather than leaving matters to take their course
after his death?
 False pretenders was a constant source of problem for the Ottoman sultanate. Two Düzmece
Mustafa affairs in  and  show that these false pretenders could easily gather armed forces
around themselves and they may be a stooge used by a foreign power. Besides, when Mehmed
II died in , Bayezid managed to ascend the throne before his brother Cem. Since the latter
also asserted his claims for the throne and demanded from Bayezid the country be divided into
two parts, the problem of succession grew first to be a civil war and then an international issue
when Cem fled to Mamluk lands. Fearing an Ottoman attack, Mamluks sent Cem to Rhodes,
which was the base of the knights of St. John. The issue became a pretext for a crusade, when
he was transferred from Rhodes to Rome as a captive of the Papacy. Bayezid negotiated with
Pope Innocent VIII to keep his brother safe in Rome. Ultimately, Cem died in  and the
succession problem was resolved. See Halil nalcık, “A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy:
The Agreement between Innocent VIII and Bayezid II on Djem Sultan,” Journal of Turkish Studies
III (): ; Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 12041571 (Philadelphia:
American Philosophical Society, ), II: . Similarly, when Selim I ascended the throne
as his father, Bayezid II, abdicated in his favor, first thing he did was to chase after his brother
Ahmed and Korkud who had supporters among the viziers and learned class. Their presence
would pose continuous threats to Selim and made his rule fragile in the awaiting problems of
the Safavids and qizilbash subjects. Selâhattin Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim (Ankara: Milli Egitim
Basimevi, ), ; Emecen, Yavuz Sultan Selim, .
 Three sons of Süleyman, Murad and Mahmud (d. ) and Abdullah (), died in infancy.
See Fisher, “Süleymân and His Sons”; A. D. Alderson, The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty
(Westport: Greenwood Press, ), Talbe XXX; M. Çaatay Uluçay, Padişahların Kadınları ve
Kızları (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, ), ; Peirce, The Imperial Harem, .
ZAHT ATÇIL
75
The Actors: Süleyman and His Family
Having inherited a vast empire from his father, Süleyman continued to ex-
pand the lands of Ottoman dominion. In his first ten years as ruler, he con-
solidated the newly conquered Arab lands, captured Belgrade and Rhodes, and
destroyed the medieval Hungarian kingdom. The rivalry between Süleyman and
Habsburg Emperor Charles V grew into a competition for ideological innovations,
erupting in heated battles in Europe and the Mediterranean. Amid the raging
currents of apocalypticism in the first half of the sixteenth century, Süleyman was
portrayed not only as “the master of the conjunction” (sahib-qıran) but also even
as the messiah.20 Süleyman’s enterprise was believed to have ushered in a universal
monarchy, something that was expected to occur in the year 960/1553, when great
astral planets (namely, Jupiter and Saturn) would align in a special conjunction.
After completing these ambitious ventures, however, Süleyman began to favor
less bellicose foreign policy starting in the 1540s. In connection with this, his pub-
lic image shifted from universal king to regional emperor; tired of waging war on
the eastern or the western front almost every year, he preferred to stay in Istanbul
for most of the year and to spend winters in Edirne, where he could rest better
than he could in the imperial capital. Adopting a modest lifestyle in his domicile,
he increasingly withdrew from politics and abstained from sumptuous exhibitions
and ventures. Because of his chronic illnesses—particularly, gout and dropsy—Sü-
leyman came to pass his days resting or hunting in the imperial gardens.21
In addition, seeing the growing tension between his sons, the sultan grew
fearful that he would witness their conflict during his lifetime; for this reason, he
did not wish to leave the capital long enough for any of his sons to supplant him,
 Cornell H. Fleischer, “The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the Imperial Image in the
Reign of Süleymân,” in Soliman le Magnifique et son Temps: Actes du Colloque de Paris, Galeries
Nationales du Grand Palais, 710 Mars 1990, ed. Gilles Veinstein (Paris: Documentation française,
), ; Cornell H. Fleischer, “Shadows of Shadows: Prophecy and Politics in s
Istanbul,” International Journal of Turkish Studies , no. (): ; Robert Finlay,
“Prophecy and Politics in Istanbul: Charles V, Sultan Süleyman and the Habsburg Embassy of
,” Journal of Early Modern History , no. (): .
 Navagero reports that Süleyman adopted a sober diet, rejecting to drink wine unlike he used to do
during the time of Ibrahim Pasha (). See Bernardo Navagero, “Relazione dell’Impero
Ottomano del Clarissimo Bernardo Navagero, Stato Bailo a Costantinopoli Fatta in Pregadi nel
Mese di Febbrajo del ,” in Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato, ed. Eugenio Albèri,
III, v. (Firenze: Tipografia e Calcografia all’Insegna di Clio, ),  [Hereafter: Navagero,
“Relazione”].
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
HIS SON EHZADE MUSTAFA IN 1553?
76
and he was well aware of Mustafa’s prestige and stature, as well as of the people’s
support for him. The sultan’s noticeable absence from the public role of military
commander and his leaving administration to Rüstem provoked many soldiers
who had preferred a conquering sultan. In fact, as Venetian bailo Bernardo Nav-
agero attests, the idea of the sultans inclination to peace can be attributed to a
large extent to Rüstem:
Because of age and the many accomplishments that made him a worthy successor
by virtue of his past—having seized Rhodes and Belgrade, having driven the
unlucky king of Hungary from rule and from life, and having won many regions
in the Persian borders—Süleyman chose, not without good reason, to maintain
peace.… [Rüstem] pasha who is inclined to tranquility … in peacetime is safe to
always keep the reputation he has now and to enjoy the grandeur of the whole
empire…. It clear that in this last war in Transylvania with the most serene king
of the Romans [i.e., Ferdinand of Austria], the sultan several times admitted
with regret that things had gone too far. In sum, it is reasonably believed, as I say,
that the sultan from now on will abhor war and will not resort to it unless he is
forced, and then [will do so] neither by his hand nor by his person, but by the
hand of others—just as this year [], though he had announced the desire to
go in person to Hungary, he decided to send Achmet Pasha.
Süleyman’s eldest son, Mustafa, was born in 1515 to the Circassian concu-
bine Mahidevran,23 who had been Süleyman’s consort from the time of his gov-
ernorship in Manisa when he was still a prince. However, Mahidevran fell from
favor when Süleyman turned his attentions to Hürrem; therefore, Mustafa does
not seem to have been the sultans first choice as a successor. Initially, the eldest
prince was appointed governor of Manisa (1534), his father’s former seat, but he
was transferred to Amasya (1540) just as the time came for Hürrem’s eldest son,
Mehmed, to take up a provincial princely governorate. The greater distance from
 See Ibid., .
 The ethnic origin of Mahidevran is not firmly established. Although most of the sources (Ibid.,
; Domenico Trevisano, “Relazione dell’Impero Ottomano del Clarissimo Domenico Trevisano,
Tornato Bailo da Costantinopoli sulla fine del ,” in Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al
Senato, ed. Eugenio Albèri, III, v. (Firenze: Tipografia e Calcografia all’Insegna di Clio, ),
 [Hereafter: Trevisano, “Relazione”]) state that she was Circassian; there are a few sources
indicating that she was Albanian. Compare in Daniello de’ Ludovisi, “Relazione dell’Impero
Ottomano Riferita in Senato dal Secretario Daniello de’ Ludovisi, a d Giugno del ,” in
Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato, ed. Eugenio Albèri, III, v. (Firenze: Tipografia e
Calcografia all’Insegna di Clio, ),  [Hereafter: Ludovisi, “Relazione”].
ZAHT ATÇIL
77
Amasya to Istanbul, relative to that from the capital to Manisa, now home to
Mehmed’s court, seems to have put Mustafa at a disadvantage in the competition
for succession. On the other hand, however, while Manisa was the first provincial
post for the princes in their youth, Amasya was a strategically important location
along the route to the east; thus, moving from Manisa to Amasya was actually a
promotion.24 It seems that overall Mustafa did perceive himself to be at any disad-
vantage, even when Mehmed’s sudden death (1543) escalated the silent competi-
tion into an overt war among the brothers. Mustafa’s candidacy continued, and,
according to a report from Navagero, even the sultan expected him to succeed,
for he told his youngest son, Cihangir, “My son Mustafa will become the sultan
and will deprive you all of your lives.25
Mustafa held considerable power and great deal of credibility among various
powerful social groups. He earned the goodwill of the janissaries; he also attained
a considerable reputation as a patron of scholars and poets.26 Navagero records
his image as follows:
One cannot describe how much he is loved and desired by all in the empire to
succeed. The janissaries want him, and they let this be known manifestly. There
is no Turk or slave of the Gran-Signor who does not have the same opinion or
desire, because in addition to primogeniture, which should rightfully give him
the empire, his reputation as courageous, generous, and fair makes everybody
yearn for him.
It was not easy to compete with a prince like Mustafa when so many hoped
to see him become sultan. The janissaries, especially, who considered Sultan Süley-
man aged and unable to lead military campaigns, wished Mustafa to ascend the
throne even before the sultan’s death. They hoped to see a Sultan Mustafa resume
conquests in the west and decisively defeat the Safavids.28 In this respect, the
janissaries’ preference recalls the accession of Selim I, Süleyman’s father. Though
Bayezid I (r. 1481–1512) and his viziers had preferred the oldest prince, Ahmed,
 Peirce, Imperial Harem, .
 Navagero, “Relazione,” .
 Hüseyin Hüsameddin, Amasya Tarihi (Istanbul: Hikmet Matbaa-i slâmiyesi, ), III: .
 Navagero, “Relazione,.
 Such an expectation can be followed with the observations of Trevisano who stated that if Mustafa
had become sultan, he could have channeled the enthusiasm and the love of his supporters to
another expedition against the Christians. See Trevisano, “Relazione,.
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
HIS SON EHZADE MUSTAFA IN 1553?
78
Selim—despite his distant governorship in Trabzon—had challenged his father
by attaining the support of the janissaries and the sipahis in Rumeli. Under pres-
sure, Bayezid finally surrendered the throne to Selim in 1512 and left Istanbul
for Dimetoka (though he died on the way).29 The janissaries’ extensive support
of Mustafa must certainly have reminded Süleyman of his father’s success and of
his grandfather’s fate. As I discuss below, however, it was the janissaries’ love for
Mustafa that led to the prince’s demise when the sultan’s authority was put to the
test.
Mustafa, for his part, did not ignore the enthusiasm of the janissaries. He
wanted his rights to the throne respected and gathered important people around
him. He disclosed his ambitions in a letter to Ayas Pasha, the governor of Er-
zurum, expressing his desire for the throne—although he clearly stated that he
would not overthrow his father and wished to be sultan only after Süleyman’s
death. He requested the help of Ayas Pasha, who at the time was a promising
bureaucrat.30 Ayas Pasha responded positively, assuring the prince that he was
worthier of the throne than his brothers were.31
In addition, Mustafa had been in communication with the Venetian bailo in
Istanbul, Domenico Trevisano, and with the Venetian senate. A dispatch Trevisano
sent to the Venetian Council of Ten written on 15 October 1553 indicates that
Mustafa had sent a messenger, Nebi Bey, to the bailo asking for his help gaining
the throne; this man had also traveled to Venice to negotiate with the senate.32 The
bailo had received word on 6 October that Nebi Bey had arrived in Venice on the
first of the month and was scheduled for an audience with the Venetian Collegio
the following day. According to the rumors circulating in Venice, the mission of
Mustafa’s man was to broker a deal with Venetian authorities, who were willing
to support Mustafa with Venetian intelligence and technical services if he would
return to them the former Venetian strongholds in Morea (the Peloponnese).33
 See Uluçay, “Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Padiah Oldu?”; Emecen, Yavuz Sultan Selim, 
 erafettin Turan, Şehzâde Bayezid Vak’ası,  and . For Mustafa’s plan to ascend the
throne after the death of Süleyman, see Hans Dernschwam, Hans Dernschwam’s Tagebuch einer
Reise nach Konstantinopel und Kleinasien (1553/55), ed. Franz Babinger (München and Leipzig:
Duncker & Humblot, ), .
 Turan, Şehzâde Bayezid Vak’ası, .
 Archivio di Stati di Venezia, Consiglio di Dieci, Dispacci Costantinopoli, Busta , r-v.
 See the letter of M. de Selve to the French king Henri II in Ernest Charrière, Négociations de la
France dans le Levant (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, ), II: .
ZAHT ATÇIL
79
Mustafa had sent Nebi Bey with precious gifts to Venice in order to guaran-
tee Venetian support in his struggle for the throne. His messenger delivered the
prince’s letters and those of Mustafas emiralem (standard-bearer), Thomas Michiel,
the son of a Venetian nobleman who had been captured in the battle of Preveza.
Nebi Bey was welcomed and hosted well in Venice; when he set out for Istanbul,
the Venetians accompanied him as far as Ragusa in order to protect him from
Uskok raids. He was carrying two letters from Venice, one for Mustafa and one
for his emiralem, Thomas Michiel.34
However, Mustafa never lived to see his messenger return; he was executed
the same day Nebi Bey set out from Venice, 6 October 1553. The bailos 15 Oc-
tober dispatch reported Mustafa’s death to the Venetian senators.35 The news was a
shock for them, and they lost hope of regaining the old fortresses in Morea.36 This
abortive episode in princely diplomacy, however, demonstrates that just as Hür-
rem (probably in collaboration with Rüstem) did for her sons, Mustafa likewise
was acting to bolster his claim to the throne; moreover, he was more successful
than his half-brothers in gaining valuable support. Forming coalitions and seeking
allies were perfectly legitimate moves for a candidate to the throne, and supporting
a particular claimant constituted a way for various social groups (e.g., janissaries,
viziers, scholars, middle-class citizens) to participate in imperial politics.
Süleyman’s favorite concubine, Hürrem, gave birth to many children; of
these, four sons, Mehmed (b. 1521), Selim (b. 1524), Bayezid (b. 1525), and
Cihangir (b. 1531), and one daughter, Mihrimah (b. 1522), reached adolescence.
Despite the tradition of “one concubine, one son,37 Süleyman’s continued favor-
ing of Hürrem and her bearing multiple sons show that she obtained incredible
power and prestige within the imperial family. Naturally, she desired to retain
this power even after Süleyman’s death; the obvious way to achieve this was for
one of her sons ascend the throne, making her the queen mother (vâlide sultan)
 Copies of the letters are in Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Senato, Deliberazioni Secreti, Reg. ,
v-v.
 Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Senato, Deliberazioni Secreti, Reg. , r-v
 Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Senato, Deliberazioni Secreti, Reg. , r-r. For the
disappointment, see Charrière, Négociations, II: .
 In principle, one concubine was allowed to give birth only to one son, Hürrem as being an
exception gave birth to more than one son, and we know four of them who lived relatively long.
Each concubine, according to the principle, was expected to exert her effort to educate her son
and invest him to be best candidate for the throne. For the working of the ‘single-son concubine’
principle see Peirce, The Imperial Harem, .
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
HIS SON EHZADE MUSTAFA IN 1553?
80
and the most powerful woman in the empire. Hürrem also broke the principle
of a concubine’s accompanying her son to the province, instead remaining in the
capital (close to the center of power) to care for her three younger sons. Hürrem
wished to secure the throne for one of her sons, as any concubine would have,38
but Mehmed’s sudden death in 1543 placed her in a more desperate position
because it rendered Mustafa, the son of Mahidevran, the most powerful candi-
date for the sultanate.
Toward the late 1540s and into the early 1550s, the silent competition be-
tween Mustafa and the sons of Hürrem became more apparent and more public.
The aged sultan, who was struggling with illnesses, preferred to rest, sending his
viziers to conduct military campaigns; he may have been reluctant to leave the
capital, again, because he also feared a war of succession even before his death.
The Habsburg ambassador Gerhard Veltwyck reported near the end of 1545 that
Rüstem and the other viziers were ready for a peace agreement because of the
discord among Süleyman’s sons.39 Both Veltwyck (in February 1547) and Habs-
burg ambassador in Istanbul, Malvezzi, (in February 1550) reported that Rüstem
wanted to eliminate Mustafa in order to secure the throne for Selim.40 In fact,
Hürrem, Mihrimah, and Rüstem collaborated to facilitate the accession of either
Selim or Bayezid to the throne.41
Süleyman’s grand vizier and son-in-law, Rüstem Pasha, had been taken as a
devşirme boy and trained with an Ottoman palace education. Having acquired the
sultans favor, Rüstem quickly climbed the steps of various positions, rising to the
 The concubines were supposed to accompany their sons, when they leave the capital for
provincial governorship. Mustafa was sent to the governorship of Manisa in  and his
mother Mahidevran accompanied him. When Hürrem’s oldest son Mehmed was of the age
for provincial governorship in , he went to Manisa alone and his mother Hürrem stayed
in Istanbul.
 Srecko M Dzaja, Karl Nehring, and Günter Weiß, eds., Austro-Turcica, 15411552: diplomatische
Akten des habsburgischen Gesandtschaftsverkehrs mit der Hohen Pforte im Zeitalter Süleymans des
Prächtigen (München: Oldenbourg, ), .
 Ibid.,  and .
 For some sources, Hürrem and Rüstem preferred Selim whereas according to some other sources
they were inclined to Bayezid. The other son Cihangir was gibbous and tacitly not considered as
a candidate for the throne. In either case, they want to prevent Mustafa from accession and save
the throne for Selim or Bayezid after the death of Süleyman. Danimend calls them as ‘palace
party’ (saray partisi). See Danimend, Kronoloji, II: ; Peirce, The Imperial Harem, ;
Turan, Şehzâde Bayezid Vak’ası, .
ZAHT ATÇIL
81
grand vizierate in 1544.42 His marriage with Mihrimah Sultan, the only surviving
daughter of Süleyman and Hürrem, made him part of the palace network headed
by Hürrem. Like his mother-in-law, he desired that the aged sultan be succeeded
by one of Hürrem’s sons. It was also to his advantage to prevent Mustafa from
becoming sultan: Rüstem fell outside Mustafa’s network by virtue of his proximity
to Hürrem. Rüstem hoped that if the throne was occupied by one of Hürrem’s
sons, he could maintain his power as grand vizier and control the government.
Therefore, Mustafa’s demise would serve Rüstem’s interests.
It is generally accepted that Rüstem tried to damage Mustafas reputation, at
least in the sultan’s eyes. For example, in 1549, when the Georgians killed the gov-
ernor of Erzurum, Mustafa, from his post in Amasya, requested help from Istanbul
to attack the Georgians. However, Rüstem did not send assistance to the prince,
calculating that Mustafa would gain still more prestige if he defeated the Geor-
gians. In 957/1550, some highway robbers from Iran crossed Ottoman borders and
looted several villages in eastern Anatolia. Mustafa again petitioned for help, and
Rüstem again responded negatively. Being disturbed with constant appeals from
Mustafa, Rüstem recalled Mustafa’s vizier, Lala Cafer Pasha, to Istanbul and sent
the Bosnian Ahmed Pasha to replace him and apparently to act as a spy. However,
this plan disintegrated when Ahmed Pasha earned Mustafas trust and married
one of his daughters.43 According to a document in the Topkapı Palace Museum
Archives, a notice was sent to the sultan informing him that Rüstem had plotted
against Mustafa in an attempt to frame him as a Safavid ally. The notice claims
that Rüstem had forged Mustafa’s seal and sent a letter of friendship, purportedly
from Mustafa, to the Safavid ruler, Tahmasb, who did not know this was a ploy by
Rüstem, responded positively to the invitation. Rüstem’s men found the letter and
delivered it to Rüstem.44 Again, such behavior aligns with the grand viziers ambi-
tions to protect himself and his career interests in a volatile political environment.
 See the career of Rüstem Pasha in inasi Altunda and erafettin Turan, “Rüstem Paa,” İslâm
Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul: Milli Eitim Bakanlıı, ); Zahit Atçıl, “State and Government
in the Sixteenth Century Ottoman Empire: The Grand Vizierates of Rüstem Pasha ()”
(Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Chicago, ).
 These allegations are mentioned in Amasya Tarihi of Hüseyin Hüsameddin (III: ) who
does not cite any source.
 Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arivi, E. . See the transcription of the document in M. Tayyib
Gökbilgin, “Rüstem Paa ve Hakkındaki thamlar,Tar ih Dergisi VIII, no.  (): s. 
and . The author of the document seems to be Remmal Haydar. See more about Remmal
Haydar in Cornell H. Fleischer, “Seer to the Sultan: Haydar-ı Remmal and Sultan Süleyman,
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
HIS SON EHZADE MUSTAFA IN 1553?
8
The Play: Conditions of War, Reasons for Execution
Mustafa was executed during the Nahçıvan campaign against the Safavids;
indeed, the execution somewhat overshadowed the campaign. After the Ottoman
army withdrew from eastern Anatolia in 1549, kızılbaş/qizilbash forces began to
disturb locales around Lake Van; it therefore seemed necessary to fortify Ottoman
holdings in the region.45 The question was who would lead the campaign to the
east this time. The sultan had not headed an expedition for three years; after the
eastern campaign in 1548–1549, he had grown severely ill, as mentioned earlier.46
At Rüstem’s urging, he sent Ahmed Pasha to head the Transylvanian campaign
in 1552. This time he again remained in the capital, appointing Rüstem Pasha
commander in chief for this campaign in the fall of 1552.47 Süleyman’s plan was
probably this: as in the Two Iraqs campaign (1533-1536), the army would go east
with the grand vizier (Rüstem Pasha) for the winter, and if necessary, the sultan
would join him in the spring. Rüstem was likely meant to oversee only the muster-
ing and organization of the soldiers coming from Rumeli.
Rüstem departed from Istanbul with fifty thousand soldiers in about Septem-
ber 1552.48 He was supposed to proceed as far as Kayseri, but the grand vizier did
not want to travel too far from the capital, fearing that ehzade Mustafa would
attempt to ascend the throne with the janissaries’ assistance if the sultan’s health
deteriorated.49 The ambassadorial reports and contemporary sources reflect that
in Cultural Horizons: A Feschrift in Honor of Talat S. Halman, ed. Jayne L. Warner (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, ), .
 Tahmasb and his qizilbash armies looted the countryside and subdued the towns around Lake
Van (particularly, Ahlat, Erci and Adilcevaz). The quarrel between the governor of Erzurum,
skender Pasha and the Safavid prince Ismail Mirza alarmed the government in Istanbul to
have another campaign against the Safavids. Compare in Mustafa Çelebi Celâlzâde, Geschichte
Sultan Süleymān Ķānūnīs von 1520 bis 1557, oder, Šabaķātü’l-Memālik ve Derecā’l-Mesālik, ed.
Petra Kappert (Wiesbaden: Steiner, ), a–b; Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr: Dördüncü
Rükn, Osmanlı Tarihi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, ), a-b; M. Fahrettin Kırzıolu,
Osmanlılar’ın Kafkas-Elleri’ni Fethi (14511590) (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, ), ;
Remzi Kılıç, Kânunî Devri Osmanlı-İran Münâsebetleri (15201566) (stanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat
Yayıncılık, ), .
 Navagero, “Relazione,.
 Celâlzâde, Šabaķāt, a; Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, a. We see that Rüstem’s commandership
had been announced to the provincial governors in Anatolia by early November. See Babakanlık
Osmanlı Arivi, AE.SÜLI, /.
 Celâlzâde, Šabaķāt, a; “Relazione Anonima,” . [
 See “Relazione Anonima,” .
ZAHT ATÇIL
83
the primary mission of Rüstem (and of the sultan) was not to fight the Safavids
but to force them to seek peace with the Ottoman government. As I discuss below,
Rüstem and the sultan anticipated that the threat of war would position the Ot-
tomans advantageously in negotiations, as it had during peace negations with the
Habsburgs.50 For this reason, too, Rüstem was less eager to progress farther east.
It seems that the critical episode deciding the fate of Mustafa took place
while Rüstem was in Anatolia with the army. Hürrem and Rüstems angling to
eliminate Mustafa, like Mustafas negotiating international alliances and his posi-
tive response to the soldiers’ affection, align with the roles each was expected to
play in the existing political system. It has been accepted in the literature that
Rüstem’s true intention was to expose Mustafa as a rebellious prince who wanted
to overthrow his father and beat his brothers to the throne. Rüstem allegedly
manipulated the rumor circulated among the soldiers that the aged sultan was
poised to voluntarily give the throne to Mustafa but that Rüstem had prevented
it. The campaign to the east thus became a perfect opportunity for Mustafa to
eliminate Rüstem on his way to power. If Mustafa made a move against Rüstem,
the absolute representative of the sultan, this could display Mustafa disloyal to his
father, as he would disregard the sultan’s appointment of Rüstem for the position
of commander-in-chief.51
In the winter of 960/1553, Mustafa made a reckless move that gave his ri-
vals an invaluable opportunity. I contend that the sultan considered his soldiers’
show of extreme loyalty to Mustafa and his acceptance of this honor tantamount
to rebellion because it could have altered the source of legitimacy and loyalty in
Ottoman society. What happened when Rüstem was in Anatolia? The narrative
penned by historian Âlî indicates that although it was soldiers who had turned
Mustafa’s head, the prince would ultimately be portrayed as the rebel:
At that time, the grand vizier and glorious royal son-in-law Rüstem Pasha was
appointed commander in chief of the victorious soldiers. This way, they arrived
in Aksaray, a district of the province of Karaman. God knows how [it began],
 For negotiations see Dzaja, Nehring, and Weiß, Austro-Turcica, . For war preparations,
see Halil Sahilliolu, Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi H.951–952 Ta r ihli ve E-12321 Numaralı Mühimme
Defteri (Istanbul: IRCICA, ), passim.
 The view that Rüstem manipulated the circulating rumors among the soldiers to display Mustafa
as rebel to his father is the dominant one in the secondary literature. See Danimend, Kronoloji,
II: ; Turan, Şehzâde Bayezid Vak’ası, ; Kırzıolu, Osmanlılar’ın Kafkas-Elleri’ni
Fethi, ; Kılıç, Kânunî Devri Osmanlı-İran Münâsebetleri, .
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
HIS SON EHZADE MUSTAFA IN 1553?
84
but some news began to circulate in the imperial army. Gloomy consequences
returned to Sultan Mustafa. Somehow, some stupid men among the soldiers
offered obedience to the ehzade and altogether perverted him by saying, “Your
magnificent father has grown old; he is unable to move and lead the campaign.
That is why he appointed Rüstem Pasha as commander in chief and sent him
into Anatolia. This pasha is malicious to you. But now, if you come to the camp
and cut off his head, this will mark the realization of your aim.” Thus although
the ehzade was true, they drove him to futile ambition. By sending continuous
messages in this manner, they prompted the unfortunate prince to the path of
rebellion and lured him to realize his ambition by going to the encampment.
In this account, it appears that Mustafa believed the words of some “stupid”
soldiers, rebelling against his father by attempting to kill the sultan’s grand vi-
zier because he knew that Rüstem did not want him to succeed Süleyman. Why
should he not thus remove the principal impediment to his ascending the throne?
Âlî seems to have thought that Mustafa was innocent, albeit deceived or misled.
Another source, the Relazione Anonima, whose Venetian author apparently
observed closely the stages of the campaign, elaborates in detail what Âlî presented
as Mustafa’s temptation to rebel:
Two days ahead of Iconio [Konya] on the way from Constantinople, they arrived
at a passage in which there was a route leading to Amasya, the city of Cappadocia,
where prince Mustafa, the primogenitor of Turco [i.e., Süleyman] had his resi-
dence. As [Rüstem P]asha arrived at this passage, most of the army having already
moved on toward Iconio, the janissaries who were with him said that they wanted
to go to pay respects to Mustafa, their future sultan. The pasha immediately un-
derstood the situation, and suspecting some threat to himself, issued a command
that no one would leave him but that all the troops would accompany him in
the direction of Iconio. The janissaries, however, did not want to be prevented
from doing what they had decided [only] because of this command, so they all
set out along the path toward Amasya. The pasha continued toward Iconio with
the agha of the janissaries and with those others who had remained.
The janissaries who arrived in Amasya and went to kiss Mustafa’s hand were wel-
comed and fêted by him; they received abundant food and one ducat each. Then
the next day, they were sent to Iconia, where they found the grand vizier with
the rest of people; he had arrived some time earlier. At that time, he [Rüstem]
 Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, a. For a slightly different version see Künhü’l-Ahbar, MS
(Nuruosmaniye, ), b.
ZAHT ATÇIL
85
had a letter from Istanbul with the news that Sultan Süleyman was seriously ill
and had little hope of recovering. Mustafa, too, received this news, immediately
understood the situation, and prepared himself to ride [to Istanbul] in case [news
of] the sultan’s death should follow. It was said that he had a hundred thousand
men ready who would mount horses to follow him at the sound of a trumpet.
Actually, this was not so much the truth as a rumor circulated at the direction of
Rüstem Pasha, who took this opportunity to procure the death of the unlucky
prince. [With Mustafa] no more than five thousand men were found at that time,
but all of them were well chosen and counted as three men [in prowess]. It is also
true that the army would not have followed either Rüstem Pasha or the agha of
the janissaries, no matter what they offered as present or promise to keep the
troops together, because Mustafa was so loved by all the imperial soldiers, and
everyone impatiently awaited the moment he would become emperor.
From this passage, it appears that the sultan almost lost control of the janis-
saries and indeed no longer stood as legitimate ruler. Even though he sent the
army headed by his absolute deputy, the grand vizier, who had authority equal to
his own, the janissaries disregarded this delegation of authority and stood ready
to follow the prince. Rüstem warned those who were determined to visit Mustafa,
but his words apparently bore no weight with them. What made the problem
more profound was Mustafa’s acceptance of their allegiance by allowing them to
kiss his hand. If he had rejected this obeisance right away as a display due only
the sultan himself, he could never have been portrayed as a rebel to his father;
rejection of the soldiers’ advances would have communicated that the legitimate
sultan was alive in Istanbul and that he, as his son, by no means disregarded the
authority of the sultan.
Mustafa probably did not intend to undermine Süleyman’s power and pres-
tige, but he almost certainly did not foresee that embracing the people’s love
would result in his demise. In fact, he did not trust Rüstem Pasha at all, believing
that he was in collaboration with Hürrem to bring him down. He was evidently
seeking alliances, as in his correspondence with Ayas Pasha and the Venetians, so
he welcomed and offered his generosity to those who visited him by giving them
each a ducat. Then the soldier’s loyalty to Rüstem as the sultan’s deputy ceased to
exist and was transferred to the man they considered their future sultan, Mustafa.
The author of Relazione Anonima reports that the tension between Rüstem
and the soldiers increased when news of the sultan’s illness arrived in the camp.
 “Relazione Anonima,” .
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
HIS SON EHZADE MUSTAFA IN 1553?
86
The same news also reached Mustafa, who realized that he might need to depart
immediately for the capital in order to reach it before his brothers did. He or-
dered his men to prepare to move quickly, for they would depart at the sound of
a trumpet.54 In addition, when the army reached Aksaray in central Anatolia, the
heavy snow impeded the soldiers who were with Rüstem. Fatigued by Rüstem’s
slow and reluctant movement eastward, they petitioned the grand vizier: “If there
is an enemy, let us go defeat him; if there is not, let us return to Istanbul.” Rüstem
responded that this was not his decision to make; they would go and winter in
Konya, therefore, and he would tell them when he received other orders from the
sultan.55 The soldiers were infuriated by this; Rüstem believed he had lost the
ability to command them. He knew that any move by Mustafa would draw all
the soldiers to the prince, leaving Rüstem alone and defenseless.
The actions of Mustafa and the attitude of the army ultimately benefited
Rüstem and Hürrem. Seeing the state the janissaries were in, Rüstem worried
that a sinister accident might befall him, costing him his life. He refused to move
farther and decided to remain at Konya. He secretly sent Sipahileraası emsi
Agha and Çavubaı Ali Agha to Istanbul to inform the sultan of the stalemate he
faced.56 When the sultan heard about the janissariesinclination toward Mustafa
and about Mustafa’s ambition, he was extremely grieved, though he did not be-
lieve that Mustafa would plot against his father. As Âlî records, Süleyman told the
aghas sent from Rüstem this:
God forbid that my Mustafa Khan should dare such insolence, and for the love
of the sultanate during my lifetime should extend his foot from the quilt! It must
be the idea of some troublemakers. They slander him in order to obtain the rule
for the prince they support. See that you never let similar rumors appear and
never again repeat such a thing.
 Ibid., .
 Göker nan, “Rüstem Paa Tarihi (H./M. ): nceleme-Metin, Vr. b-vr.b”
(Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Marmara University, ), a-b.
 Celâlzâde, Šabaķāt, b; Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, a; “Relazione Anonima,” ; nan,
“Rüstem Paa Tarihi,” b.
 “Hââ ki Mustafa Hanım bu makule küstahlıı irtikâb ede, ve benim zaman-ı hayatımda sevda-
yi mulke payini lihâfından tara uzada. Nihayet ba‘zı muüfsidiînin peydâlarıdır. Kendüler mâyil
olduu ehzâdeye verâset-i mülk münhasır olsun deyu iftiralarıdır. Zinhâr bu makule musâvilere
vücûd verilmesin, bu def‘a tezekkür olunduu gibi kerreten ba‘de uhrâ zikr olunmasın.” See
Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, a.
ZAHT ATÇIL
87
Nevertheless, the sultan apparently wanted to squelch this rumor, which
might increase support for Mustafa at the expense of his own sultanate. He imme-
diately sent the messengers back and recalled Rüstem and the armies, announcing
that he himself would lead the campaign later58 When Rüstem returned to Istanbul,
he was relieved to find the sultan in better health. Preparations were completed,
and the sultan left Istanbul with the army on 28 August 1553 (18 Ramazan 960).59
Rüstem Pasha’s brother Sinan Pasha was appointed deputy (saltanat kaymakamı)
in Istanbul, and ehzade Bayezid was charged with guarding Rumeli in Edirne.60
The Venetian bailo Navagero wrote that Rüstem had appointed Sinan (who was
not experienced in maritime affairs) as grand admiral of the navy in part so as to
prevent ehzade Mustafa from crossing the straits of Istanbul if he arrived in the
capital before one of Hürrem’s sons did. In his words, “There was no more secure
way to prohibit the crossing than with the navy.”61
According to Relazione Anonima, when the sultan and his army arrived at the
passage where the route to Amasya lay, he sent several ciaus (çavuş, messengers) to
Mustafa asking him to join him in Ereli. The same source recounts that Mustafa
discussed the sultans call with his counselors, who unanimously advised him not
to go to his father’s camp, insisting that he would probably lose his life if he went.
His mother, Mahidevran, who had left the harem and accompanied him in his ap-
pointments to provincial government, shared the same opinion.62 Obviously, then,
this could not have been an easy decision for Mustafa to make. The Habsburg
ambassador Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq explained the prince’s dilemma briefly:
Mustafa hesitated between two choices: if he entered the presence of his father
and found him angry and offended, he would certainly be at risk. But if he
 Celâlzâde, Šabaķāt, a–b; Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, a; “Relazione Anonima,” ; nan,
“Rüstem Paa Tarihi,” b-a.
 Celâlzâde, Šabaķāt, b; Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, b; “Relazione Anonima,” ;
nan, “Rüstem Paa Tarihi,” a. Mehmet iolu argues that according to a Rûznamçe
register (Babakanlık Osmanlı Arivi, Kamil Kepeci , a), the sultan departed Istanbul on
 Ramazan  ( August ). It is probable however that the register might imply that
the departure of the sultan was planned on  Ramazan but it delayed two days. See Mehmet
iolu, Kanuni Sultan Süleymanın Nahçıvan Seferi (Ankara: Nobel Yayın Daıtım, ), .
 See, Navagero, “Relazione, . For Sinan Pasha’s appointment for the government of
Istanbul, see Cristóbal de Villalón, Viaje de Turquia (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, S. A., ), I: .
Kırzıolu, Osmanlılar’ın Kafkas-Elleri’ni Fethi, ; Turan, Şehzâde Bayezid Vak’ası, .
 Navagero, “Relazione,.
 “Relazione Anonima,” .
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
HIS SON EHZADE MUSTAFA IN 1553?
88
avoided him, he would publicly admit that he had contemplated an act of treason.
The decision he took is the one that required more courage and risk. Leaving
Amasya, the seat of his government, he headed to his father’s camp, which lay not
far off, relying on his innocence; he was probably also confident that no harm
could come to him in the presence of the army. Be that as it may, he went to
meet an inevitable death.
Mustafa finally decided to obey his father and join the sultan’s army, report-
edly telling his advisers that he did not want to resist going “where destiny cast
him.”64 The sultan’s army had arrived in Ereli on 5 October 1553 (26 evval
960);65 ehzade Mustafa’s entourage camped about two miles away. First, all the
viziers and governors visited Mustafa in his camp, and the next day the prince
was scheduled to appear before his father.66 According to Relazione Anonima, an
arrow was thrown from the sultan’s camp into Mustafas to warn him that he
would die if he visited his father. Mustafa, however, thought that this was another
trick of Rüstem’s and ignored it entirely.67 On 6 October (27 evval), he arrived
in the sultans camp. As he entered to kiss his father’s hand, he was attacked and
strangled to death.68
According to Celalzâde’s account, after Mustafa’s execution but while the vi-
ziers were still waiting in the divan room, the chief gatekeeper (kapıcılar kethüdası)
demanded the grand vizieral seal from Rüstem Pasha and told him and the third
vizier, Haydar Pasha, to return to their tents. The kapıcılar kethüdası went again
to the divan room and handed the seal to the second vizier, Ahmed Pasha, an-
nouncing his appointment to the grand vizierate.69 So Rüstem and Haydar were
dismissed. Regarding the latter, it was rumored that Haydar was the one who had
sent warning to Mustafa about the sultan’s decision to execute him, but the author
 Ogier Ghislain de Busbecq, Les Lettres Turques, trans. Dominique Arrighi (Paris: Champion,
), .
 “Relazione Anonima,.
 Celâlzâde, Šabaķāt, b; Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, b. The date appears in Rûznamçe
register  evval  ( October ). See iolu, Nahçıvan Seferi, .
 Celâlzâde, Šabaķāt, b; Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, b.
 “Relazione Anonima,.
 Ibid., . Also see Celâlzâde, Šabaķāt, b; Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, b; iolu,
Nahçıvan Seferi, .
 Celâlzâde, Šabaķāt, b–a; Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, b; “Relazione Anonima,” 
.
ZAHT ATÇIL
89
of Relazione Anonima doubted the veracity of this “because if he had fallen in such
a suspicion, his head would have been gone [already].70
The Expedition’s Target: Mustafa or the Safavids?
Did the sultan intend to crush the Safavid shah or to execute Mustafa? For
what purpose did he lead the army out once more? Despite the accounts of Otto-
man chroniclers, particularly Celalzâde and Mustafa Âlî, outlining several reasons
for a campaign to the east, there was never an intention to fight the Safavids. I
contend that when the army first left Istanbul under the command of Rüstem
Pasha, the expedition’s purpose was to force the Safavid shah to seek peace with
the Ottoman government. Again, when the army departed from the capital a
second time under Sultan Süleyman himself, the intention to force the Safavids
to plead for peace remained in place, but the secret and perhaps more important
aim in this case was to execute Mustafa. The sultan understood that his authority
was threatened considerably if janissaries openly or secretly wanted to see Mustafa
elevated as sultan even before Süleyman’s death. He knew that they might ask
him to abdicate in favor of Mustafa, just as his grandfather, Bayezid II, had been
forced to abdicate to his father, Selim I, in 1512. Therefore, Süleyman intended
to eliminate Mustafa as a focus of sedition (and thus a cause of internal instability
for the empire), while Süleyman and Rüstem Pasha both hoped at the same time
that the Safavid shah, Tahmasb, would ask for peace. This argument can be sub-
stantiated with some facts that have not attracted much attention from historians.
First, expeditions against the Safavids had always been difficult and painful
while producing fewer gains than expected. The Ottoman armies had been unable
to destroy the Safavid state in any of their campaigns since the 1514 Çaldıran cam-
paign, and Ottoman conquests rang hollow because the Safavid forces routinely
evacuated the regions and burned the crops behind them. Whenever the Otto-
man army captured Tabriz and other cities in the region, Safavid forces regained
those locales as soon as the Ottoman army withdrew. This proved true once more
in the last campaign of 1548–1549, after which Shah Tahmasb regained some of
the territory Ottoman forces had occupied and began disturbing Ottoman fron-
tiers. As contemporary observer Hans Dernschwam stated, the Ottoman army
marched against the Safavids reluctantly because of the difficult, mountainous
 “Relazione Anonima,” . The explanation of Haydar’s dismissal based on his alleged attempt
to warn Mustafa exists in Trevisano, “Relazione,” .
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
HIS SON EHZADE MUSTAFA IN 1553?
90
terrain and because of the provisioning problem along the way caused by the
Safavids’ scorched-earth tactics. These hardships made imperial soldiers less eager
to fight the Safavids than they were to fight in Hungary.71 Therefore, it was in
the best interests of the Ottoman government to make peace with the Safavids
in order to establish stable borders; peace would also have allowed the empire to
allocate funds to other, more productive campaigns. The army’s departure under
Rüstem Pasha was thus intended to force Shah Tahmasb to seek peace.
It seems that the bluff initially worked well. Having learned that the Ottoman
army had left Istanbul with Rüstem at its head, Tahmasb released a captive, Biga
Sancakbeyi Mahmud Bey, carrying a letter seeking peace with the Ottoman sul-
tan.72 As both the sultan and his grand vizier were inclined to peace, they replied
that the Safavid shah should send an authorized representative to negotiate terms.
Accordingly, Tahmasb sent as his ambassador Sayyid Shams al-Din Diljn, who
arrived in Istanbul on 19 August 1553,73 after all of the Ottoman war preparations
had been completed. The sultan and the army left Istanbul on 28 August, and the
ambassador was told that he would receive the sultan’s response during the expedi-
tion.74 On the way, Rüstem and Shams al-Din Diljn continued to negotiate the
terms of peace.75 The Safavid ambassador was then released to inform Tahmasb of
Ottoman requests—but not before Mustafa was executed.76
The sultans actions clearly demonstrate that he was not inclined to fight the
Safavids; if he had wanted war, he would have rejected outright both the letter and
the ambassador sent by Shah Tahmasb. If there was a target when the army left
Istanbul under Süleyman, it was Mustafa. The Venetian bailo Domenico Trevisano
 Hans Dernschwam, Tagebuch, .
 Charrière, Négociations, II: ; “Relazione Anonima,” ; Celâlzâde, Šabaķāt, b–b;
Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, a–b; Kırzıolu, Osmanlılar’ın Kafkas-Elleri’ni Fethi, .
 Ghaffr Qazvn, Tārīkh-i jahān-ārā, ; asan Rml, Aģsanu’t-Tawārīkh, ; Tahmsp,
Taźkirah-’i Shāh Tahmāsb (Qum: Mašbt-i Dn, ), .
 Celâlzâde, Šabaķāt, a–b; Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, a–b; “Relazione Anonima,” ;
Charrière, Négociations, II: ; nan, “Rüstem Paa Tarihi,” a.
 Charrière, Négociations, II: .
 Although Celalzade and other Ottoman sources relying on him tell that the ambassador was
released with the message of war, the Venetian and other European sources whose authors were
also present on the army camp state that the ambassador went to Tahmasb with Ottoman terms
for peace. Compare in Celâlzâde, Šabaķāt, b; Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, a; “Relazione
Anonima,” ; Antal Verancsics, Összes Munkái, ed. Szalay László (Pest: Eggenberger Ferdinánd,
), III: .
ZAHT ATÇIL
91
agreed: the principal goal of this undertaking was to kill Mustafa; the sultan made
peace with the Safavids on his way to this final objective. If the ambassador had
been sent back immediately after arriving in Istanbul, Süleyman’s reluctance to
fight would have been apparent and his secret plan to kill his son might have been
thwarted.77 In that case, Mustafa would not have gone to his father’s camp, and
the sultan would have lost control of the army forever.
If the target of the campaign was Mustafa, when did the sultan actually
decide to execute his son? The sources provide no hint as to the time of this deci-
sion. Busbecq reports that Süleyman had received the legal opinion (fetva) of the
şeyhulislam (chief jurist-consult) Ebussuud Efendi, though no other source verifies
this information.78 In fact, even if the sultan had decided to execute Mustafa very
early on, either he did not mention this decision until the last minute, or those
who knew about it faithfully kept the sultan’s secret. That no one knew or that
they were very effectively keeping up appearances of normalcy is attested by the
ordinary processes of salutation followed when the viziers visited Mustafa; even
Mustafa’s salutation of his father and the regular gift exchanges had nothing ex-
traordinary about to them. According to the Rûznamçe register, on the day Musta-
fa visited his father, the gifts the sultan had been planned on presenting to him
were registered; only after the execution was a note added that the gifts “remained
in the imperial treasury” (hızâne-i âmire mânde).79 Therefore, it seems that the
sultans decision was certainly kept secret until the moment it was implemented.
Who Was Responsible: Rüstem Pasha or Süleyman?
News of Mustafa’s execution came as an extreme shock to the soldiers who
had longed to see him as their sultan and had expected his accession very soon.
The soldiers’ affection for Mustafa had been even greater than that for the sultan,
and grief in the camp continued for a long time. At the center of the criticism
stood the sultan and especially Rüstem, whom the soldiers widely blamed for
Mustafa’s demise. It is reported that the grand vizier secretly escaped from the
camp at night; had he remained there, he would almost certainly have lost his
life when the janissaries attacked his tent the following day.80 The sorrow of the
 Trevisano, “Relazione,” .
 Busbecq, Les Lettres Turques, .
 iolu, Nahçıvan Seferi, .
 “Relazione Anonima,” ; Busbecq, Les Lettres Turques, .
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
HIS SON EHZADE MUSTAFA IN 1553?
9
janissaries was alleviated by Rüstem’s dismissal, which they supposed indicated the
sultans awareness of the grand vizier’s “crimes.
But the change in the grand vizierate could calm the popular anger only to a
degree, and emotions surrounding Mustafa’s death soon found a voice in poetry.
Many mersiyes (elegies) were composed openly criticizing the sultan and Rüstem;
among them, the most famous and perhaps most severe is the mersiye of Yahya
Bey.81 The poet blames Rüstem Pasha for the prince’s death, claiming that all of his
intrigues depicted ehzade Mustafa as evil and disloyal, and that these eventually
brought death to him in the year of “Rüstem’s trick.” Yahya calls Rüstem a con-
spiring devil, and he refers to the story of the forged letters sent to Shah Tahmasb
in ehzade Mustafa’s name, a ploy that only intensified the negative image of the
şehzade in the sultans eyes.
Busbecq mentions, however, the possibility that Rüstem himself asked the
sultan dismiss him in order to preserve his life from the janissaries’ fury.82 It is
unknown exactly whose idea it was to remove the grand vizier, but contemporary
accounts imply that Süleyman and Rüstem may have made a deal that would serve
them both. Since the soldiers were extremely grieved at the loss, they were angry
with the sultan; the author of Relazione Anonima relates that the men in the army
began to curse and criticize Süleyman so loudly that the sultan could hear them
 Yahya Bey was of Albanian origin and joined, following his father, the janissary army where he
became a pupil of the janissary clerk/scribe ahabeddin Bey, who exempted him from the regular
duties and obligations of other janissaries. He participated in numerous campaigns starting with
the Çaldıran () and ending with the Nahçıvan campaign (). The historian Âlî reports
that Yahya Bey composed the poem during the campaign, which began to circulate in the army
very quickly though he tried to hide it. Yet, the satire to Rüstem was so harsh that Rüstem grew
grudge on Yahya Bey and wanted to punish him with death but the sultan urged to forgive
him. Later he was forced to retire in Izvornik. For Yahya Bey’s life and mersiye see Mustafa
Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, a–a; KA, a–a; Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr’ın Tezkire Kısmı, ed.
Mustafa sen (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, ), ; Âık Çelebi, Meşāiş-Şu‘arā, ed.
G. M Meredith-Owens, E. J. W. Gibb Memorial New Series, XXIV (London: Luzac, ),
b; A. Atillâ entürk, Yahyâ Beğin Sehzâde Mustafa Mersiyesi Yahut Kanuni Hicviyesi (stanbul:
Enderun Kitabevi, ). In fact, the number of mersiyes composed on the death of ehzade
Mustafa exceeds that of mersiyes composed for others in the Turkish literature. For the mersiyes
on the tragedy of Mustafa composed by other poets see Mehmed Çavuolu, “ehzade Mustafa
Mersiyeleri,” Tar ih Enstitüsü Dergisi, no.  (): ; Ayhan Gülda, “Bilinmeyen ehzade
Mustafa Mersiyeleri,” Kubbealtı Akdemisi Mecmuası , no. (): ; Mustafa sen, Acıyı
Bal Eylemek: Türk Edebiyatında Mersiye (Ankara: Akça, ),  and .
 Busbecq, Les Lettres Turques, .
ZAHT ATÇIL
93
from his pavilion.83 However, in a historical moment when the sultan was officially
at war with the Safavids, he needed the loyalty of his army more than at any other
time. Dismissing Rüstem transferred the criticisms from the sultan to the deposed
grand vizier, allowing Süleyman to consolidate his control over the army once
more, as the soldiers interpreted this action as indicating that the sultan had finally
realized Rüstem’s “wickedness” and regretted giving the command for execution.84
The possibility of a secret agreement between Süleyman and Rüstem is also
supported by some sources that depict Rüstem’s days following these events. He
arrived in Istanbul on 31 October 1553, and although he had no official title at
the time, he maintained his grand lifestyle, living much as he had done during his
grand vizierate. According to the Venetian bailo Tre visano, Rüstem continued to
grant audiences to the ambassadors and others, went to the mosque with the same
pomp as before, and received visitors at his residence in Üsküdar.85 Rüstem also
told many in the capital that he would be restored to his position very soon.86 This
news circulated rapidly in Istanbul, and the new Habsburg ambassador Busbecq,
who arrived in Istanbul on 20 January 1554, wrote that he needed to make an
official visit to Rüstem’s mansion “owing to his previous authority and the hope
of a rapid restoration.87 Similarly, the Venetian bailo Tre v isano recommended in
a dispatch to the Venetian senate dated 16 March 1554 that the newly elected
Antonio Erizzo, who was to succeed him as bailo in Istanbul, should demon-
strate great reverence to the former official and even bring with him two letters
of credence—one of which he should submit to Rüstem.88 Indeed, Rüstem was
reappointed as grand vizier almost immediately, when the sultan returned from
his campaign on 29 September 1555.89
 “Relazione Anonima,” .
 Celâlzâde, Šabaķāt, a–b; Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, a.
 Tr e v isano, “Relazione,” .
 Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Senato, Deciferazioni dei Dispacci da Costantinopoli, Reg. , fol.
 and . Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Senato, Deliberazioni Secreti, Reg. , fol. v.
 Busbecq, Les Lettres Turques, .
 Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Senato, Dispacci Costantinopoli, Filza -A, n. , fol. r and also in
Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Senato, Deciferazioni dei Dispacci da Costantinopoli, Reg. , fol. .
The Venetian Senate took the advice of Trevisano and issued two copies of letters of credence
for Antonio Erizzo to show his new position as bailo in Istanbul, and Erizzo too presented
his letter on his first visit to Rüstem Pasha in his residence. See Archivio di Stato di Venezia,
Senato, Deliberazioni Secreti, Reg. , fol. r and Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Senato, Dispacci
Costantinopoli, Filza -A, n. , fol. r.
 Babakanlık Osmanlı Arivi, A.RSK , fol. . Celâlzâde, Šabaķāt, b; Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-
Ahbâr, a.
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
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94
If the sultan had been angry about Rüstems alleged deceptions and had dis-
missed him as punishment, how could Rüstem have been so sure of his restoration
to the office? Did he not fear the anger of the sultan who had recently executed
his own son? It is much more likely that Süleyman, needing the janissaries’ loyalty,
deliberately diverted their anger to his grand vizier in order to regain their support
in the wake of a war with the Safavids. Though Rüstem became the main target
of criticism, the sultan would have promised to reinstate him once conditions
normalized.
Conclusion and Implications for Ottoman Succession
The most obvious observation to be made about the context in which Musta-
fa was executed is that Sultan Süleyman had lost control of the Ottoman army; the
legitimacy of his sultanate was being questioned by those with the power to end it.
In the majority view, Mustafa was superior to his brothers in leadership capacity,
and he was even considered preferable to the aging and ill sultan. Mustafa had
apparently gained the favor of janissaries, scholars, poets, and many others who
wanted to see him take the throne—perhaps even before Süleyman’s death. Dern-
schwam asserts that if the sultan had not acted when he did, Mustafa would have
taken the initiative to dethrone his father; he certainly had the military support
needed to do so, and the janissaries would have installed him as sultan.90 Popular
love for Mustafa grew to the extent that troops could disregard the reigning sul-
tans command when the interests of Mustafa (and their own) were threatened.
The author of Relazione Anonima describes the janissaries’ devotion to Mustafa in
such a way that they could defend Mustafa even against the sultan himself:
Some important men in this army … assured me that if poor Mustafa had left
his father’s tent alive when he escaped from the hand of the mutes who wanted
to murder him, the majority of the army would have run to his aid against the
sultan, his father.
Some might argue that the army would naturally shift its devotion to the
promising prince, perhaps especially considering that he had once been the ill
sultans own favorite. However, were not the janissaries supposedly the most loyal
 Dernschwam, Tagebuch, .
 “Relazione Anonima,” .
ZAHT ATÇIL
95
of the sultans soldiers? How did they dare to ignore the command of the ruler to
whom they owed absolute obedience? Even before the prince’s execution, when
Rüstem Pasha was in command of the army, a group of soldiers set out despite
warnings to salute Mustafa, whom they considered the future sultan. They bla-
tantly disregarded the command of the sultan’s absolute deputy in order to pay
respects to a prince who had not yet become sultan. All these actions might be
considered simple errors of judgment committed by janissaries and other soldiers
who had lost touch with the empire’s hierarchical authority, but Mustafa himself
welcomed these men and allowed them to kiss his hand. Did he consider himself
to be sultan at the time? Or was he not aware that these soldiers had disobeyed
their legitimate sultans deputy by coming to greet him?
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that Süleyman was oblivious to the pos-
sible succession scenarios, including one in which Mustafa, backed by unequivocal
military support, could overthrow the sultan, ascend the throne, and send his
father into retirement or perhaps even to death. From either perspective, it seems
that the sultan was convinced that Mustafa was a threat to his authority. Even if
the prince never openly rebelled against his father, events positioned him as the
potential leader of a rebellion, at least from the sultan’s perspective. It is also worth
remembering that the memory of Selim I’s succession through the support of the
janissaries and the provincial cavalry would still have been vivid in the 1550s. Even
though Mustafa underlined, in his letter to Ayas Pasha, that he had no intention
of overthrowing his father but hoped to ascend the throne when the sultan died,
conditions appeared strikingly similar to those surrounding Selim’s rise to power.
Like his courageous grandfather, Mustafa appeared to be the prince who
could satisfy the various groups with a stake in choosing the next emperor. Given
the importance of gaza and its role in Ottoman legitimacy, Mustafa’s military
prowess and leadership abilities were virtues seen necessary to a sultan’s legitimacy.
But while courage and enthusiasm for gaza fit the ideology of the Ottoman state
in the early sixteenth century, when Selim had ascended the throne,92 in the mid-
 Selim during his princehood displayed a figure of war leader (gazi) who could resume the
conquests, which had been mostly stopped during the reign of Bayezid II (). Since
the other claimants, Ahmed and Korkud, seemed pacifist to the provincial cavalry forces and
the janissaries, the rhetoric of resuming conquests and ambitious policy against the Safavids
propaged by Selim raised him to the status of most able candidate. This led to the abdication
of Bayazid who had to leave the throne for Selim thanks to his popularity in the army. Then,
on his way to the retirement resorts, Bayezid became sick and died, due to a poisonous meal
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
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96
sixteenth century those virtues seemed to conflict with an emerging state ideology
and an Ottoman foreign policy characterized by peace agreements with foreign
powers (including the Habsburgs, France, Venice, and even the Safavids).93 How
could Mustafa’s willingness to engage in gaza be reconciled with this new reality,
in which the sultan and his grand vizier were attempting to end hostilities and to
sign treaties with rivals in both the west and the east?
If Mustafa had survived to sit on the imperial throne, he would have satisfied
a wide spectrum of Ottoman society. The role of social groups in a prince’s suc-
cess cannot be denied, and various stakeholders (e.g., janissaries, governing elites,
religious scholars) were involved in the accession of each sultan. For example,
toward the end of Bayezid II’s reign (1481–1512), while the governing elite and
viziers supported ehzade Ahmed, the janissaries and provincial forces supported
ehzade Selim. In this competition, Selim’s triumph was also the triumph of the
janissaries and the provincial forces. Similarly, ehzade Mustafa’s success would
have paralleled the success of the social groups that supported him and marked
the failure of the harem-palace faction.
It is worth asking whether by this time an Ottoman prince still needed sup-
port from outside sources. Given all of its military conquests and victories, had
the Ottoman dynasty not yet achieved political legitimacy beyond competition
between social groups? Recent historiography shows that the dynastic legitimacy
of the Ottoman household had gained full legitimacy by the middle of the six-
teenth century, when the focus of politics shifted from the identity of the sultan
to that of viziers and bureaucrats—that is, by the end of Süleyman’s reign.94 Such
full dynastic legitimacy can largely be attributed to Süleyman’s lifting the Otto-
man dynasty out of the realm of competition by executing Mustafa, who had in
some ways been used by politically active janissaries, bureaucrats, and scholars.
Süleyman’s message may have been this: the dynasty would no longer tolerate in-
vestment in a princely enterprise that tested the legitimacy of the reigning sultan.
according to some rumors. See Emecen, Yavuz Sultan Selim, ; M. C. ahabeddin Tekinda,
“Bayezid’in Ölümü Meselesi,Ta r ih Dergisi, no.  (): .
 For a discussion on the emerging “peace consciousnessin international relations, see Zahit Atçıl,
“State and Government in the Sixteenth Century Ottoman Empire,” chap. , especially pp. -
.
 Fleischer, “The Lawgiver as Messiah”; Hüseyin Yılmaz, “The Sultan and the Sultanate:
Envisioning Rulership in the Age of Süleymân the Lawgiver ()” (Unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation, Harvard University, ).
ZAHT ATÇIL
97
If a prince intended to increase his power, or if any social group encouraged a
prince, his chances of rule would only decrease because of his threat to the reign-
ing sultan. Süleyman thus established the dynasty’s absolute legitimacy, shifting
the competition for power away from members of the imperial family and onto
other social groups.
Indeed, the sultan’s attitude in the following period, especially toward ehzade
Bayezid in the late 1550s, suggests that he wished to reassert his authority as well
as to remove the dynasty from social competition. The sultan probably would not
have begrudged Mustafa the throne, for he was the most capable and most tal-
ented of Süleyman’s sons, but the problem of authority would not then have been
resolved. If Mustafa had ascended the throne by overthrowing Süleyman, this
would have strengthened the precedent, rendering it a standard course of action in
every succession. How then could a sultan have secured his power against socially
aggrieved groups who supported one of his children in a claim to the throne, even
before his own death? Any person or any group that was disenchanted with the
reigning sultan or his viziers would then gather around a promising prince and
convince him to oust the current sultan and his court.
Beginning in the second half of the sixteenth century, the sultan gradually
withdrew from daily politics and delegated his power to the imperial court, headed
by the grand vizier: thus, the focus of politics shifted from the sultan to the rul-
ing elite. The viziers came to control imperial politics, taking on full power and
responsibility, while the sultan came to hold a symbolically lofty place. Related
to this, books on politics written during this period increasingly focused on the
qualities and responsibilities of the viziers rather than on those of the sultan.95
Describing the age of Rüstem Pasha in the 1550s, Mustafa Âlî wrote that “at that
time, the only point of recourse and refuge was the grand vizier’s gate, and those
who were in need had only to have his dispensation.96 Thus, for Ottoman intel-
lectuals, the identity of the grand vizier became more important than the identity
of the sultan; the latter was no longer a question.
Could Mustafa have revived the image of the gazi sultan and resumed suc-
cessful military conquests? It seems unlikely. Given the difficulties of provisioning
the army and the slim returns that recent conquests had yielded, the empire’s zeal
for territorial gains was waning by his time, and conquest was growing marginal
 Yılmaz, “The Sultan and the Sultanate,” chap. .
 Mustafa Âlî, Künhü’l-Ahbâr, a.
WHY DID SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT EXECUTE
HIS SON EHZADE MUSTAFA IN 1553?
98
to the Ottoman enterprise as its ideological contribution faded. By the middle of
the sixteenth century, peace treaties with the Habsburgs, Venetians, and Safavids
were signed in order to avoid wasting funds on extravagant, unrealistic ambitions.
Even if Mustafa had ascended the throne, it would have been very difficult for him
to expand Ottoman lands farther east or west without technological or strategic
innovations. In addition, it is clear that by the time of his death, controlling the
government and a growing Ottoman bureaucracy had become a task well beyond
the capacity of one individual, be he powerful sultan or vizier. If he had over-
thrown his father, sealing the precedent of deathly fraternal competition for rule,
Mustafa himself could hardly have guarded his authority against socially aggrieved
groups backing one of his own children. Although the execution of Mustafa was a
bitter and tragic event, it resolved these questions for the Ottoman dynasty forever.
Why Did Süleyman the Magnificent Execute His Son Şehzade Mustafa in 1553?
Abstract This article examines the reasons why Süleyman the Magnificent executed
his son ehzade Mustafa during the Nahçıvan military campaign of 1553. Accord-
ing to the dominant narrative in both Ottoman sources and academic literature,
Süleyman’s concubine and later wife Hürrem Sultan and her closest ally, Süleyman’s
son-in-law Rüstem Pasha, plotted against Mustafa in order to save the throne for one
of Hürrem’s own sons. Though the latter was widely beloved, this scheme cost him
his father’s favor. Afterward, however, the sultan regretted the decision and dismissed
Rüstem Pasha from his position as grand vizier. This article examines the roles of
Sultan Süleyman, ehzade Mustafa, Hürrem Sultan, and Rüstem Pasha in the Otto-
man, Venetian, Habsburg, French, and Persian sources, investigating why the sultan
executed the prince in the context of the Ottoman succession experience. Adding
complexity to the common narrative, this article concludes that the sultan, who was
losing his authority to the prince, desired to consolidate his power and to remove his
dynasty from the competition between social groups that had characterized earlier
succession struggles.
Keywords: ehzade Mustafa, succession, fratricide, Hürrem Sultan, Kanuni Sultan
Süleyman, Rüstem Paa
ZAHT ATÇIL
99
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... See also Syros, 2020. 34 For further discussion, see Atçıl, 2016. See also Andrews and Kalpaklı, [Anonymous], 207-12. ...
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