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LANDac RESEARCH BRIEF 01
Introduction
Local-level land use planning is (LUP) is often promoted as
a means of addressing several objectives simultaneously,
such as improved land tenure security, and increased
agricultural productivity, including through identification
of areas for commercial agricultural investment. There is
currently renewed focus on local LUP due to a variety of
factors including increased foreign direct investment in
land (the ‘global land grab’), the impacts of climate change,
food security shortfalls in some areas, and the potentials
(and, arguably, risks) posed by the REDD+ process. Land use
planning is included as a key component within the Land
Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF).
From the mid-2000s onwards, Tanzania has encouraged
foreign land acquisition within a broadly neoliberal
governance framework. The LUP process has been put forward
as a way to facilitate investment, while reducing negative
impacts of large-scale land acquisition, for example in the
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT).
Analysts argue that LUP can assist villagers to know the
dimensions of village land and identify plots to be leased to
investors. Lack of LUP is blamed for allocation of much larger
amounts of land to investors than was agreed by villagers.
By 2014, the Ministry of Land had trained some 25 district
participatory land use plan Management Teams in SAGCOT
districts, and completed 391 Village Land Use Plans in SAGCOT
districts. In villages in the SAGCOT which have completed
VLUPs, an average of 15% of village land was set aside for
potential external investment, prompting a forum of CSOs to
wonder, ‘whether the aim of identifying land for investments
risks taking over the planning process’ (TNRF/iied, 2014).
However, published case studies of particular LUPs are rare.
This study provides examples from Arusha and Kilimanjaro
regions, which have long been effected by disputes over
large-scale land acquisition, including between villagers and
large-scale commercial farmers, farmers and pastoralists, and
villagers and conservation agencies. Arusha and Kilimanjaro
Land Governance for Equitable and
Sustainable Development RESEARCH BRIEF 01
Village land use planning and
commercialization of land in Tanzania
Chris Huggins
March 2016
Key points
- Some organizations have suggested that local level land
use planning could lead to win-win outcomes from large-
scale land acquisition in Tanzania
- Fieldwork in Arusha District suggests that District
authorities and/or external facilitating organizations play
important roles in village land use planning, meaning that
it is not a completely decentralized process
- The District authorities emphasize the issuance of forms of
individual land title to a greater degree than they monitor
or support follow up of land use zoning or other elements
- Village land use planning (VLUP) is not systematically
connected with higher-level government planning or
other activities
- The ability of land use planning to ensure win-win
outcomes from large-scale land acquisition is questionable
in Tanzania
- Reform of policies and practices is needed if VLUP is to
‘empower’ local people
- In some cases (e.g. rangeland areas) ‘group’ rights to land
should be considered, not just individual rights
2LANDac RESEARCH BRIEF 01
regions are the main exporting areas for the Tanzanian
horticultural industry.
Local-level Land Use Planning in Tanzania
Land use planning varies from country to country; it can
be informal, based on customary management norms and
institutions; or formalized, documented, and aligned with
national and global norms. In countries such as India, local-
level land use plans do not have legal status, whereas in
Tanzania, VLUPs can be approved by the state and used as
formal planning tools. The Village Land Act (1999) and the
Land Act (1999) provide for different types of land tenure in
Tanzania including village lands, urban lands, public lands,
and protected public lands. Village lands include communal
areas as well as areas for individual use. As of 2010, there were
approximately 11,000 villages in the country, which altogether
controlled about 70% of the total land area (Isaksson and
Sigte, 2010). The Village Land Act (1999) gives villages the
responsibility to conduct participatory land use planning,
and draw-up by-laws for approval by District authorities.
Village land use planning involves the election of up to
fourteen villagers to a Village Land Committee; demarcation
of village boundaries, after which time the village receives
a village certificate of customary occupancy, and can issue
Certificates of Customary Right of Occupation (CCRO), a form
of land title, to individual inhabitants. VLUP also necessitates
assistance of a multi-sector District team; production of land
use maps; finalization of land use by-laws; submission of
these and associated documents to the District Authorities for
approval; and printing of a booklet containing all the relevant
information.
While some laws support decentralized governance, other
laws and policies have re-centralized some aspects of land
governance. For example, the Village Land Use Planning Act
(2007) specifies procedures that require funding, expertise,
and District-level oversight, making VLUP impossible without
District authorities. A VLUP process typically costs 35-40
million Tanzanian shillings (Tshs), or $16-19,000 US.1
Participatory LUP processes, like the Tanzanian model, are
often assumed to address individual differences in social,
environmental, and other values (Lestreline et al, 2011).
However, the assumption that ‘participation’ is necessarily
emancipatory should be treated with caution. The language
of planning emphasizes structure, procedure, and systematic
approaches, and sometimes tends towards a de-politicising
discourse. The reality is often very different. It is messy, and
political, often characterized by power imbalances and the
need to resolve disputes. LUP may be instrumentalized; for
example, to render rural spaces more ‘legible’ and hence
amenable to state intervention and capitalist penetration
(Exner et al, 2015).
1 Interviews with various District personnel and NGO staff, April –
June 2015.
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LANDac RESEARCH BRIEF 01
Fieldwork: VLUPs in Arusha District
A list was provided by the Arusha District authorities of all
villages (13) which had completed VLUP, of which a random
sample of five was taken. They had conducted VLUP activities
from 2010-2012, with assistance from the National Land Use
Planning Commission and the Ministry of Lands in Dar es
Salaam. Interviews were conducted in mid-2015 with Village
Chairpersons, Village Executive Officers, members of village
land committees, and local inhabitants outside of the Village
Council.
Contrary to information provided by the District authorities,
two of these five had not actually completed their land use
plans. In one case the Village Assembly had refused to endorse
the plan, which shows that VLUPs are not simply imposed onto
a passive population. In the past, land claimed by villagers had
been appropriated, without compensation, by the state for
public infrastructure.2 Therefore, the village inhabitants were
suspicious that the VLUP map was another means to deprive
them of land. In another case it appears that the planning
team didn’t try to finalize a VLUP, perhaps because of time
constraints. According to NGO personnel, it is ‘very common’
for external organizations not to finish the VLUP process.3
Discussion of VLUPs in Arusha District
In all the examples, village certificates of customary
occupancy were completed, so villages could start to issue
individual CCROs. This suggests that it is important to the
authorities that each village is legally able to issue individual
CCROs. Many village councils have been ‘raising awareness’
on CCROs, with an emphasis on the economic benefits (e.g.
access to credit). District staff also emphasized the importance
of CCROs during interviews. On average 25 completed
individual CCROs had been issued per village. Research
suggests that:
• The completed VLUPs seem to be an important influence
on village governance in two cases (of the three that were
completed). In one village, the land committee had been
active in raising awareness about enforcement of land-use
zones and related by-laws, and the village gives out ‘many
fines’ for by-law violations.4 In another village, the land
committee had been involved in land dispute resolution.
• External support for land-use related activities, even when
it has been discontinued, may make Village Councils more
likely to enforce LUP by-laws. The village without any
external interventions has done least to enforce the VLUP.
• The examples generally do not suggest that the VLUP
2 Interview with village Chairman, Kimnyak village, Arusha, 8th June
2015 and Interview with village inhabitant, September 9, 2015
3 Interview with NGO personnel, Arusha town, June 8, 2015
4 Interview with former member ‘A’ of village land committee,
Lengijave village, Arusha District, June 25, 2015
exercises are used primarily to make plans for new
infrastructure or new land use categories. Only in one
village was planned new infrastructure (a new school) part
of the VLUP. The VLUPs largely reflected existing land use
zones.
• The VLUP documents were not available at the District
headquarters, and District personnel could not provide
examples of how they had been used to guide District
planning. Links between VLUPs and broader development
planning are weak.
• Most village inhabitants were fairly positive about the VLUP
or boundary demarcation process (including the concept
of CCROs, though they were vague about the benefits of
them) and the role of the Village Councils, with only a few
comments about the need for the Village leaders to be more
forthcoming with information.
• The idea that the District authorities can maintain control
over the land sector through technological expertise is
Case study
One of the 5 Villages completed a boundary demarcation
and VLUP process. However, the LUP map is kept in the
District Council offices, not the village. Awareness of the
VLUP amongst village inhabitants seems quite low. A
sketch map of village and sub-village boundaries, that had
been drawn-up during the VLUP process, was displayed
at the village office. This map did not have any land-use
categories marked on it except for the areas reserved for
public offices. The village does not have any areas reserved
for grazing land, and the village passed by-laws during
the VLUP process that permit only zero-grazing practices
for livestock. Those grazing their cows outside of their
own enclosures face fines. The land use map is therefore
quite simple, with only a few categories of land – a small
village centre area reserved for commercial buildings; areas
reserved for social services such as schools (which includes
plots of farmland owned by the schools); and privately-
owned farmland, which can also be built upon for housing.
There are no public signs in the village to demarcate
the different areas. One land boundary dispute, with a
neighbouring village, arose during the VLUP process, but
was resolved when pre-existing boundary markers were
identified. Since the boundaries with the neighbouring
private forest area were demarcated during the VLUP
process, disputes over encroachment by pastoralists have
reduced in frequency; and disputes between villagers over
land are relatively uncommon. However, it is clear that the
zero-grazing policy is not popular, and villagers complain
that there is insufficient land to enable them to produce
sufficient grass to feed their livestock. The land committee
meets every month. About ten citizens have received
CCROs in this village. The Village Council had held meetings
in early 2015 to encourage citizens to apply for CCROs.
4LANDac RESEARCH BRIEF 01
challenged by the fact that District staff evidently do not
want to be completely responsible for preparing CCRO
applications. In one village, local ‘youth’ were trained to
record GPS coordinates, and have access to a GPS unit.5
Discussion of Research Findings
The maps and plans produced in VLUP processes are
potentially examples of technologies used to create visual
representations of land as a zone for intervention. It does
not appear that VLUPs are primarily a tool for enhancing the
‘visibility’, or legibility (Scott, 1998) of particular places to the
government of Tanzania. The desire of the state to control
VLUP processes rarely extends to digitization, cataloguing,
or actual use of the maps and visualizations in development
planning.6
Nevertheless, the central government is motivated to control
data; partly due to donor demands for improved monitoring
and evaluation (Death, 2014) but also due to its emphasis
on maintaining hierarchies between different levels of
government (Green, 2014).
Village land use planning has been deployed to show donors,
and local people, that the government is responding to local
priorities; while in reality, legislative and policy changes have
re-centralised control over the VLUP process, giving District
authorities more power. However, realizing that the state
doesn’t have the capacity to respond to all CCRO applications,
District authorities have trained individuals in some villages to
5 Interview with village executive officer, Lengijave village, Arusha
District, June 25, 2015.
6 Interview with NGO personnel, Arusha town, June 8, 2015.
collect GPS coordinates for private CCROs. District staff have at
least in some cases decided to sacrifice ‘control’ for neoliberal
economic development.
The maps and other forms of knowledge produced through
the VLUP represent potentially useful tools for District- and
Regional-level planning. However as noted above, most
districts do not have a land use plan, and the government
lacks capacity to manage land use planning data, such as a
central cadastral system which could link VLUP maps to details
of CCROs issued to inhabitants. As a result, VLUPs are not
systematically stored, compared, analyzed or disseminated
amongst interested parties.
The case studies suggest an emphasis on the capacity of
Village Councils to issue individual CCROs, rather than
other aspects of VLUP, which signals that the Tanzanian
state prioritizes a form of economic development based on
leveraging individual capital through individual CCROs.7
The Tanzanian state is attempting to create a type of citizen
willing to take financial risks in order to become economically
active, particularly in the formal sector. It is doing this through
‘sensitization’ of villagers to the possibilities of financial credit
that CCROs present.
Conclusion
The VLUP process, particularly if conducted flexibly in ways
that emphasize local ownership of the process rather than
7 The Village Land Act allows for CCROs to be issued to legally-
registered groups, or customary institutions. Some NGOs have
been facilitating group CCROs, particularly for rangeland in
pastoralist areas, but only a few have been issued to date.
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LANDac RESEARCH BRIEF 01
strict adherence to a rigid series of ‘steps’, is a useful tool. In
some cases, VLUP has catalyzed villages to have functioning
village land committees which resolve disputes and
encourage particular forms of environmental management.
VLUP also has potential to provide village inhabitants and
Village Council members with an opportunity to negotiate
different plans for the future of the village; however, LUP
teams mostly focus on identifying land use zones rather than
encouraging visions of particular development tangents
or ‘projects’. More commonly still, emphasis is less on land
use and more on the ability of the inhabitants to apply
for individual CCROs. It is not necessarily a completely
‘participatory’ process, due especially to the technical
and financial requirements of the process. Further, once
VLUPs have been completed, sustainability of the plan and
enforcement of by-laws are questionable, and the VLUP as
a basis for decision-making. In words of one government
technician, ‘if it is not administered carefully, [the VLUP]
ends up as a white elephant…’8 In Tanzania, then, it does not
appear that VLUP necessarily represents a way to provide
villagers with sufficient control over decision-making over
large-scale land acquisition, or a means to manage land use
disputes that might be exacerbated by the land acquisition.
Promoting VLUP in such situations risks legitimizing the
acquisition process and down-playing the local social and
political dynamics of that process.
8 Interview with former members of Meru District Participatory Land
Use Management (PLUM) team, Usa River, May 7, 2015
References and Further Reading
1. Death, C. (2014) Legitimacy and Governmentality in
Tanzania: Environmental mainstreaming in the developing
world. In: Clive Gabay and Carl Death, editor(s). Critical
Perspectives on African Politics: Liberal interventions, state-
building and civil society. Abingdon: Routledge; 2014.
p. 67-88.
2. Exner, A., Bartels, L. E., Windhaber, M., Fritz, S., See, L., Politti,
E., and S. Hochleithner (2015) Constructing landscapes of
value: Capitalist investment for the acquisition of marginal
or unused land – The Case of Tanzania. Land Use Policy 42
(2015) 652-663
3. Green, M. (2014) The Development State: Aid, Culture and Civil
Society in Tanzania. James Currey
4. Hodgson, D. L., & Schroeder, R. A. (2002). Dilemmas of
counter-mapping community resources in Tanzania.
Development and Change, 33, 79-100
5. Isaksson, R. and I. Sigte (2010) Allocation of Tanzanian Village
Land to Foreign Investors. Umea (Sweden): Umea University
6. Maliasili Initiatives (2012) Securing Community Land Rights:
Local experiences and insights from working to secure hunter-
gatherer and pastoralist land rights in Northern Tanzania.
Pastoral Women’s Council (PWC) and Ujamaa Community
Resource Team (UCRT) with Maliasili Initiatives. Tanzania:
Arusha.
7. Massay, G. E. and T. Kassile (2014) Land-based Investments in
Tanzania: Legal Framework and Realities on the Ground. The
Hague: Land Deal Politics Initiative. Working Paper 56
8. Scott, J. (1998). Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
9. Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF)/iied, (2014)
Land and investment laws: How can communities influence
investment models and get a better deal? Dar es Salaam:
Tanzania Natural Resource Forum
6LANDac RESEARCH BRIEF 01
LANDac
LANDac, the Netherlands Academy on Land
Governance, is one of the Academies for International
Cooperation sponsored by the Netherlands Ministry
of Foreign Affairs that aim at bringing together
researchers, policy makers and practitioners. LANDac,
hosted by the IDS group at Utrecht University, is a
partnership between several Dutch organisations and
their Southern partners involved in development-
related research, policy and practice. The partners
share a concern for increasing land inequality and
new land-related conflicts, and how land governance
– rules and practices on access to land – can be used
to promote equitable and sustainable development in
the Global South. LANDac partners are the IDS group
at Utrecht University, the SDC group at Wageningen
University, Agriterra, KIT, Hivos, the African Studies
Centre and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
More information about LANDac and our activities is
available on our website: www.landgovernance.org.
Contact
LANDac is based at International Development
Studies, Utrecht University
Address
LANDac, attn. Gemma Betsema
Utrecht University / Faculty of Geosciences
Human Geography & Planning (SGPL) /
International Development Studies
PO Box 80 115
NL-3508 TC UTRECHT
The Netherlands
landac.geo@uu.nl
www.landgovernance.org
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