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Estudos de Psicologia
DOI: 10.5935/1678-4669.20160010 ISSN (versão eletrônica): 1678-4669 Acervo disponível em www.scielo.br/epsic
Human memory research: Current hypotheses and new
perspecves
Antônio Jaeger. Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais.
Cesar Alexis Galera. Universidade de São Paulo (Ribeirão Preto).
Lilian Milnitsky Stein. Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul.
Ederaldo José Lopes. Universidade Federal de Uberlândia.
Estudos de Psicologia, 21(2), abril a junho de 2016, 92-103
Palavras-chave: memória; memória humana; hipóteses.
Resumo
Pesquisa em memória humana: Hipóteses atuais e novas perspectivas. A pesquisa em memória humana aumentou
signicavamente nas úlmas décadas. Inconsistências e controvérsias inerentes a pesquisas com este foco, entretanto, são
raramente arculadas nas publicações especializadas. O objevo do presente argo é apresentar e discur uma série de questões
abertas relacionadas aos principais tópicos de pesquisa em memória humana, e que podem vir a ser abordados por pesquisas
futuras. Os tópicos abordados no presente estudo são memória operacional visual, memória de reconhecimento, interação
entre emoção e memórias e aspectos metodológicos do estudo de falsas memórias. De forma geral, o presente trabalho revela
uma série de questões em aberto e análises alternavas que podem ser úteis para o processo de geração de hipóteses, e
consequentemente para o desenvolvimento de pesquisas futuras sobre a memória humana.
Abstract
Research on human memory has increased signicantly in the last few decades. Inconsistencies and controversies inherent to
such research, however, are rarely arculated on published reports. The goal of the present arcle is to present and discuss a
series of open quesons related to major topics on human memory research that can be addressed by future research. The
topics covered here are visual working memory, recognion memory, emoon and memory interacon, and methodological
issues of false memories studies. Overall, the present work reveals a series of open quesons and alternave analysis which
could be useful for the process of hypothesis generaon, and consequently for the design and implementaon of future research
on human memory.
Keywords: memory; human memory; hypotheses.
Resumen
Invesgación en la memoria humana: Hipótesis actuales y nuevas perspecvas. La invesgación en la memoria humana ha
aumentado signicavamente en las úlmas décadas. Las inconsistencias y controversias inherentes a la invesgación con este
enfoque, sin embargo, rara vez se arculan en publicaciones especializadas. El objevo de este trabajo es presentar y discur
una serie de cuesones abiertas relacionadas con los temas principales de la invesgación en la memoria humana, y que pueden
ser abordados por invesgaciones futuras. Los temas tratados en este estudio son la memoria de trabajo visual, la memoria de
reconocimiento, la interacción entre la emoción y las memorias y los aspectos metodológicos del estudio de las falsas memorias.
En general, este estudio revela una serie de cuesones abiertas y alternavas de análisis que pueden ser úles para el proceso
de generación de hipótesis, y en consecuencia para el desarrollo de futuras invesgaciones sobre la memoria humana.
Palabras clave: memoria; memoria humana; hipótesis.
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Estudos de Psicologia, 21(2), abril a junho de 2016, 92-103
Hypotheses in human memory research
Research on human memory has greatly
proliferated in the last few decades. Such intense
proliferaon, however, may paradoxically overshadow
some unanswered quesons in the eld of memory
research. While this increase in volume of research may
supply interested readers with an abundance of data
and results, it may not necessarily be helpful in terms
of revealing for him or her the main controversies and
inconsistencies in the eld. Thus, our goal in this paper
is to discuss some hypotheses that we consider central
to the advance of the study of human memory from a
cognive psychology perspecve. Instead of focusing on
new data, we pursued to reveal a set of controversies and
open quesons in the eld of human memory research.
Such controversies and open quesons, we believe, may
be useful as bases for generang hypothesis for future
research (McGuire, 1997).
The first controversy we approach concerns
current theories of visual working memory. We
discuss unexpected eects in visual working memory
tasks apparently generated by task-irrelevant visual
informaon (Logie, 1995; 2011). That is, task-irrelevant
visual informaon causes deleterious eects on working
memory capacities for information that cannot be
semancally encoded. Smuli that can be semancally
encoded, on the other hand, tend to be more resistant
to such visual interference. This nding, nonetheless, is
not consistently replicated, and characteriscs of task
and smulus may underlie such inconsistency. Thus, we
suggest that an important approach for future research
is to idenfy smuli dimensions that can be determinant
to make such short-term visual representaons either
resistant or suscepble to irrelevant visual inputs.
Another topic concerns the debate about single-
versus dual-process theories of recognion memory
(Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas, 2002). To study recognion
memory, researchers usually let parcipants encode
a set of items (i.e., targets), and later discriminate
them from novel items (i.e., distracters). According to
single-process theories, such discriminaon process is
based primarily on a strength-like signal of familiarity,
whereas according to dual-process theories, such
discrimination is typically based on a combination
of familiarity signal with addional contextual and
detailed episodic information. These conflicting
approaches provide dierent predicons regarding
behavioral performance, and we discuss the potenal
corroboraon (or refutaon) of such predicons by
experimental ndings.
We discuss several unresolved issues concerning
the interacon between emoon and memory in the
secon Emoon and Memory Accuracy of the present
arcle. We discuss rst the parallel increase in memory
accuracy for central and decrease for peripheral details
of emotional events (Pickel, 2007); a phenomenon
oen termed “weapon focus eect”. Although several
studies have shown that emotional information is
more memorable than neutral informaon (Hamann,
2001), the former also appears to be more suscepble
to distoron. Another important topic discussed in the
referred secon, is the methodological limitaons of
extant studies invesgang the interacon between
memory and emoon. Such methodological limitaons
should be carefully approached by future research. In
this secon, we also approach predicons concerning
the inuence of emoon on false memories based on the
Fuzzy-Trace Theory, emphasizing its theorecal relevance
for further research.
Finally, we consider current data analysis
approaches to false memory, and suggest that systemac
analysis of reacon mes could be a successful approach
for future research. Reacon mes data has been rarely
implemented on false memory studies, such as the DRM
paradigm (Roediger & McDermo, 1995). Balota and Yap
(2011) have already shown that reacon me analysis
could have the potenal of bringing relevant advances
for the eld.
In sum, we approach several topics on memory
research in the following secons. In contrast to a typical
review arcle, however, these topics are discussed in
terms of their unanswered quesons, inconsistencies,
and controversial issues. We expect that the discussion
of such issues movate the generaon of new hypothesis
for future research, and consequently help to advance
the comprehension of human memory.
Working Memory and Irrelevant Visual Input
The visual working memory construct (VWM), as
proposed by Logie (1995), contains two structures, the
visual cache and the inner scribe. The visual cache, or
visual short-term store, stores visual representaons, as
color and shape of smuli. The inner scribe, on the other
hand, stores spaal informaon and is responsible for
the rehearsal of the visuo-spaal content stored in the
visual cache. The VWM is analogous to the phonological
memory construct proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974;
see also Baddeley, 1986) containing two subsystems, a
passive store directly accessed by sensory phonological
A. Jaeger, C. A. Galera, L.M. Stein, E.J. Lopes
Estudos de Psicologia, 21(2), abril a junho de 2016, 92-103
94
informaon (Salamé & Baddeley, 1982), and a rehearsal
process that maintains informaon acve in the passive
store. Unlike the phonological memory model, however,
visual sensory informaon cannot reach the visual cache
directly (Logie, 2011). Representaons stored in the
visual cache are acquired through vision, tacle or verbal
descripons of environmental scenes, and interpreted
according to long-term based knowledge. These
representaons contain, in abstract form, the necessary
informaon to reconstruct visual mental images that can
be inspected and manipulated consciously.
The proposal that visual informaon reaches
the visual cache indirectly has been put into queson
in theorecal grounds (Baddeley, 2007; Pearson, 2001;
Quinn, 2008, 2012) and in experimental studies using
irrelevant visual input techniques. One such technique,
the Dynamic Visual Noise (DVN), consists in a ickering
black and white dot paern similar to that produced
by a TV screen out of tune. It impairs performance
in memory tasks wherein mental images are created
from verbal instrucons (pegword). The DVN impairs
performance on these tasks when administered during
both encoding and retrieval (Andrade, Kemps, Werniers,
May, & Szmalec, 2002; McConnell & Quinn, 2000,
2004; Quinn & McConnell, 1996, 2006), but not during
retenon intervals (Quinn & McConnell, 2006). The DVN
also impairs memory performance when smuli are
presented visually, although the eect of noise is less
consistent in this case. For example, the DVN has no
signicant eects on recognion of Chinese characters
(Andrade et al., 2002) or on recognion of randomly
lled matrices (Avons & Seseri, 2005), although it may
aect the condence of parcipants on the accuracy of
their recognion judgments (Kemps & Andrade, 2012).
In other studies, the DVN affected performance in
recognion tasks for the exact size of circles (McConnell
& Quinn, 2003), color shades (Dent, 2010; Pereira &
Galera, n.d.), texture (Dean, Dewhurst, & Whiaker,
2008) and graphical fonts (Darling, Della Sala, & Logie,
2009; Santana, Godoy, Farias, Ferreira, & Galera, 2013).
The simplest account for differences of
DVN effects on memory and visual image tasks is
methodological. In visual image tasks, presentaon of
DVN and generaon of mental images are simultaneous.
Assuming that percepon and generaon of mental
images acvate overlapping brain regions, as proposed
by Kosslyn (1994), the impairment caused by the
presentaon of DVN can result from the interference of
irrelevant perceptual informaon during the generaon
of mental images. In visual memory tasks, the DVN is
presented aer smuli have been moved from percepon
to a more stable representaon, possibly in the short-
term visual memory. Thus, irrelevant informaon aects
the conscious generaon of visual images, but not the
storage of visual representaons in the short-term visual
store, whether arising from percepon or long-term
memory (Borst, Niven & Logie., 2012; Logie, 2011; Quinn,
2008, 2012).
Methodological dierences in visual image and
visual memory tasks may explain the dierence between
eects of DVN in these two types of task. However, it does
not explain why DVN impairs recognion of some types
of smuli, while leaving others unaected. Dierences
between eects of DVN on memory tasks with more
complex smuli, such as Chinese characters or geometric
paerns (Andrade et al., 2002; Avons & Seseri, 2005),
and tasks that rely on recall of size, color or shape details
(Darling et al., 2009; Dent, 2010; McConnell & Quinn, 2004;
Pereira & Galera, n.d.; Santana et al., 2013) have yet to be
explained. Quinn (2012) suggests that dierent systems
may be involved in the storage of these two broad types
of smuli. Complex smuli, such as Chinese characters
and visual paerns, are easier to encode semancally,
whereas smuli involving subtle variaons in size, color,
and shape, remain for longer in a pre-semanc visual store,
which is more suscepble to interference from sensory or
perceptual informaon. Orme (2009), who showed that
more easily nameable visual paerns are less sensive to
the eect of the DVN, obtained evidence that corroborates
this assumpon. Darling, et al. (2009) showed that the
DVN impairs the recognition of graphical fonts, and
suggested that in visual memory tasks the maintenance
of complex smuli requires connuous generaon of
representations, exposing these representations to
deleterious eects of irrelevant visual inputs. Such issues
could be invesgated by future research by assessing the
amount of details required to impair the maintenance of
graphical fonts and Chinese characters (Andrade et al.,
2002) and randomly lled matrices on working memory
(Avons & Seseri, 2005).
In sum, even though some studies aribute the
variable eects of DVN to rehearsal or to generaon
processes involved in the maintenance of memorized
representaons on consciousness (Darling et al., 2009;
McConnell & Quinn, 2003), such dierent eects for
dierent smuli remains an open queson. Thus, the
identification of stimuli dimensions that determine
whether visual representaons are aected by irrelevant
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Hypotheses in human memory research
visual input is an important goal for future research.
Findings from such studies could extend our knowledge
regarding visual short-term memory, as well as regarding
the connecon of such process to the visual buer.
In addion, further studies considering consolidaon
processes (Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2006) can also be
benecial to expand the current knowledge about the
contribuon of early visual processing to visual short-
term memory (e.g., van de Ven, Jacobs, & Sack, 2012).
Recognion Memory: Single Versus Dual-process
Models
In typical recognion memory tasks, individuals
are asked to discriminate previously encoded items from
novel items. Such tasks usually contain an encoding phase
wherein lists of items are presented to volunteers, and
a test phase wherein items presented at the encoding
phase are presented again, intermixed with novel items.
During the test phase, parcipants judge whether each
item has been previously encountered at the encoding
phase or not. There are currently two divergent
theoretical views regarding the cognitive processes
engaged during recognion memory tasks. According to
the ‘single process’ view, recognion memory depends
exclusively on a strength-like memory signal, usually
referred to as familiarity (Benjamin, Diaz, & Wee, 2009;
Verde & Rotello, 2007). According to the ‘dual process’
view, on the other hand, recognion memory involves
a combinaon of familiarity processes and retrieval of
contextual or qualitave details linked to each item, a
process termed ‘recollecon’ (Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas,
2002). In this secon, we discuss arguments in favor and
against each of these models, while highlighng some
topics that can be further explored by future research.
Single process models have been tradionally
based on the Signal Detecon Theory (SDT; Macmillan
& Creelman, 2004). Inially proposed as a framework
to account for psychophysics findings (Green &
Swets, 1966), SDT became extensively employed to
accommodate findings from recognition memory
experiments. As can be seen in Figure 1A, according
to the original signal detecon framework, memory
strength can be represented by a connuous horizontal
axis in which informaon more to the le of the axis
have a less intense memory signal (i.e., weak memories),
whereas informaon to the right a more intense memory
signal (i.e., strong memories). Thus, in recognition
memory tests, ‘old’ and ‘new’ items can be described
by two Gaussian distributions (Figure 1A), with the
distribuon to the le represenng new items and the
one to the right old items. In order to perform recognion
judgments, individuals establish an arbitrary cuto point
(criterion), and items falling to the le of this point are
classied as ‘new’ while items falling to the right are
classied as ‘old’ (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004).
Since its initial proposal as a framework to
account for recognion memory, SDT was adopted by
several memory theorists as the framework of choice
for characterizing this phenomenon (e.g., Morrell,
Gaitan, & Wixted, 2002; Turner, Van Zandt, & Brown,
2011). The main reason for this is perhaps the elegance
and parsimony of the model, its consistency with a
number of theories of memory (e.g., Global Matching
Models; Clark, & Gronlund, 1996), and its outstanding
capacity of generating useful indexes to measure
memory performance (e.g., d’ to measure accuracy
and C to response bias, Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). The
queson remains, however, of whether this model can be
Figure 1. Basic equal variance signal detecon model (A), and unequal variance signal detecon model (B). On panels A and B, horizontal arrows represent
strength of memory evidence. The curves represent the distribuon of memory signal from new and old items, and the vercal lines represent criterion.
A. Jaeger, C. A. Galera, L.M. Stein, E.J. Lopes
Estudos de Psicologia, 21(2), abril a junho de 2016, 92-103
96
regarded as a true theorecal descripon of the process
of recognition memory instead of just a pragmatic
framework to measure memory performance. Note
that if one assumes that this model is a true descripon
of recognition memory, one must assume also that
recognition memory is based solely on familiarity
processes. Therefore, the chief queson here is whether
the process of familiarity is enough to account for the
phenomenon of recognion memory or not.
Even though ndings from recognion memory
experiments are roughly consistent with the tradional
SDT framework, subtle inconsistencies advanced
by later memory researchers exposed a number
of limitations inherent to single process models of
recognition (Yonelinas, 1994). That is, unpredicted
asymmetries encountered in analyses of receiver-
operang characteriscs (ROC, Macmillian & Creelman,
2004) indicate that whereas encoded items are
frequently recognized with high levels of condence,
such highly confident judgments are unexpectedly
rare to novel items mistakenly classified as ‘old’
(i.e., false alarms, see Figure 2). Such paern suggests
that high confidence responses to encoded items
are often accompanied by explicit retrieval of vivid
contextual details, indicang the presence of recollecve
processes during their recognion. Further research
showed that the asymmetries brought to aenon by
Yonelinas are remarkably consistent (for a review, see
Yonelinas & Parks, 2007), suggesng that recollecon
plays an important role during recognion of encoded
items (see Figure 2).
These ndings have insgated a heated debate
between proponents of single and dual-process models
of recognion memory, a debate that does not seem to
become resolved anyme in the near future. Researchers
favorable to single process models have proposed
adjustments to the original models in order to account
for the ROCs asymmetries highlighted by Yonelinas
(1994). Perhaps the most accepted updated single
process model is the unequal variance signal detecon
model proposed by Mickes, Wixted and Wais (2007).
According to this model, the distribuons of novel and
Figure 2. Illustrave ROCs predicted by equal variance signal detecon models (A) and by dual process models (B). ROCs can be derived from recognion memory
experiments in which parcipants rate their condence on each of their responses (i.e., Likert scales from high condent “old” to high condent “new”). Thus, in
panels A and B, the boom le point in the graph represents the proporon of high condence “old” responses for both actual old items (hits – y-axis) and for
new items (false alarms – x-axis). The following point (second from le to right), represents the proporon of medium condence “old” responses for both old
items (hits) and new items (false alarms). The third, forth, and h points from le to right represent the proporons of low condence “old”, low condence
“new” and medium condence “new” responses for actual old and new items respecvely. It is important to note that these proporons are cumulave, thus
the second point from le to right, for example, is the proporon of medium condence “old” responses plus the proporon of high condence “old” responses;
the third point is the proporon of low condence “old” plus the proporons of medium and high condence “old” responses, and so on. Notably, the proporon
of high condence “old” responses for actual old items (hits) is higher in panel B than in panel A, while the proporon of high condence “old” responses to
new items (false alarms) are equivalent in both panels. Such increased proporon of high condence for hits generates an asymmetry in the ROC curve (panel
B), and is interpreted by dual process theorists as resulng from recollecve processes restricted to high condence old responses.
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Estudos de Psicologia, 21(2), abril a junho de 2016, 92-103
Hypotheses in human memory research
encoded items have different variances at test (see
Figure 1B). That is, this model proposes that in typical
recognion tests, the distribuon of novel items is about
20% less variable than the distribuon of encoded items.
Even though this modied version of the original signal
detecon model is capable of account stascally for the
aforemenoned ROC asymmetries, it is not clear what
this dierence in variance means psychologically. One
could suggest that ‘old’ items are encoded with variable
strength, becoming items with variable memory strength
at test (Jang, Mickes, Wixted, 2012; Wixted, 2007).
It is not clear, nonetheless, why novel items
should not exhibit the same paern. Note that as well
as encoded items, novel items in typical recognion
memory tests are common pieces of information
(i.e., words, gures) usually well known to research
participants (e.g., relatively frequently read/spoken
words encoded at a prior point of each parcipant’s
lifetime). So, were not novel items supposed to be
variable as well? Furthermore, in typical recognion
tests old items were all encountered recently in an
encoding list, while new items were encountered for
the last me in dierent moments and contexts in each
parcipant’s natural environment. Then, would it not be
more reasonable to expect the opposite of the paern
proposed by Wixted (2007)? That is, novel items imbued
with a more variable memory signal than old items.
This issue is in need of further research, which could be
determinant to reveal the process or processes engaged
during recognion memory.
The queson under debate is simple. How many
cognive processes people engage during recognion
memory? Despite its simplicity, future studies should
approach this question properly. An undesired but
oen widespread pracce in psychological research is
the reicaon of poorly dened mental constructs. In
cognive neuroscience studies, for instance, a variety
of memory tasks are assumed to engage recollecon
(Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003), and although such process is
likely to be engaged by a signicant part of such tasks,
a stronger agreement about the involvement of this
process in recognion should be reached. Otherwise,
researchers risk assigning brain acvaons to mental
constructs that have theorecal weaknesses in their
most basic assumpons.
Novel experimental paradigms pursuing to
dissociate processes of familiarity and recollecon during
recognion tasks may be a useful approach to invesgate
this issue. The remember-know paradigm, for example,
have been used for several years to invesgate these
processes (Tulving, 1985). In experiments using such
paradigm, parcipants report whether they recollect
qualitative information associated with each item
(“remember”), or just know they encountered the item
in the encoding list, without recollecng any contextual
informaon (“know”). In an interesng version of this
paradigm (Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn,
1998), participants were asked to provide verbal
explanations for a subset of their remember/know
responses. The results suggest that only explanaons
following “remember” responses included descripons
of recollecve experiences, while explanaons following
“know” responses included mostly feelings of familiarity.
Updated versions of this paradigm can be extremely
protable to increase the current knowledge regarding
phenomenological aspects of experiences of recollecon
and familiarity (see Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2014).
Emoon and Memory Accuracy
There is a long history of invesgaon on how
emoon inuences memory. Reisberg and Heuer (2007)
provide a comprehensive review of this issue, which
reveals inconclusive results. That is, emoonal smuli
tend to increase the retenon of both central details and
the gist of events. Such facilitaon, however, does not
necessarily result in accurate memories. The phenomenon
of ashbulb memory illustrates this issue. Talarico and
Rubin (2003) reported that the recall of details of the
terrorist aacks on September 11, a highly emoonal
event, was as accurate as the recall of everyday events,
with parcipants showing signicant forgeng over me.
Interesngly, nonetheless, they also showed that rangs
of recollecon and vividness declined solely for everyday
memories, while remaining constant for the September
11 episode (see also Phelps & Sharot, 2008).
In contrast to its eects on central details of
events, emoonal factors can decrease memory accuracy
for peripheral details of episodes, as in the weapon focus
eect (e.g., Pickel, 2007). To further complicate maers,
the level of emoon expressed and/or the degree of
stress experienced during an event must also be taken
into account, as even details that are central to the event
may be subject to distoron under extreme emoonal
conditions as opposed to neutral circumstances
(Deenbacher, Bornstein, Pewnrod, & McGorty, 2004).
Another factor to be considered in the
invesgaon of the inuence of emoon on memory, is
emoonal valence (i.e., posive and negave emoons).
A. Jaeger, C. A. Galera, L.M. Stein, E.J. Lopes
Estudos de Psicologia, 21(2), abril a junho de 2016, 92-103
98
The question at issue here is how the retention of
memories for emotional events compares to the
retenon of memories for neutral events. Many lines
of invesgaon have shown that emoonal events are
more memorable than neutral events (Hamann, 2001;
Kensinger, 2004; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006). Nonetheless,
some studies have demonstrated that emotional
memories are also more susceptible to distortion.
For instance, autobiographical memory studies have
indicated that memories for emotional events are
heavily vulnerable to distoron (Levine, 1997; Schmolk,
Bualo, & Squire, 2000; Talarico & Rubin, 2003). Although
these ecologically relevant studies provide precious
insights about how people remember events in the real
world, they have some methodological disadvantages
in comparison to laboratories investigations. In
autobiographical studies, for example, the exactly
condions in which target events were encoded are
unknown, and thus the accuracy of the autobiographical
event cannot be properly checked (Berntsen, 2002;
Reisberg & Heuer, 2004).
The issue of whether or not memories for
emoonal valenced items are suscepble to distoron
was also invesgated by laboratory studies. Some of
these studies have used the Deese- Roediger-McDermo
paradigm (DRM; Roediger & McDermo, 1995), which
was adapted to the Brazilian populaon (Stein & Perguer,
2001; Stein, Feix, & Rohenkohl, 2006), and was design to
examine whether emoonal crical lures could be falsely
remembered (Budson et al., 2006; Kensinger & Corkin,
2004a; Pesta, Murphy, & Sanders, 2001). The DRM
paradigm involves the presentaon of lists of words (e.g.,
table, sit, legs, seat…), each of which is highly associated
with a single, non-presented word (e.g., chair), referred
to as the crical lure. Aer parcipants read or hear
such lists, they typically show a high tendency to falsely
recall or recognize the crical lures. These researchers
have shown that while emotional lures are falsely
remembered, they have also reached the conclusion that
memory for emoonal informaon are less likely to be
distorted than neutral informaon. Nevertheless, these
studies present some methodological limitaons that
prevent one from making more conclusive assumpons
regarding the eect of emoon on memory distoron.
In the experiments reported by Pesta et
al. (2001) and Kensinger and Corkin (2004a), after
studying lists of non-emoonal words orthographically
associated with a nonpresented neutral lure (e.g., link,
mink, and sink were related with rink) or an emoonal
lure (e.g. cape, nape, tape, related to rape), individuals
were less likely to falsely recall or to falsely recognize
emoonal lures than neutral lures. A limitaon of these
studies, however, is that the majority of studied words
were neutral. Therefore, a decrease in false alarms
to emoonal lures was perhaps an eect of semanc
incongruence with targets, a form of disncveness,
rather than a specic eect of emoon on memory
(Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Schacter, Gallo, & Kensinger,
2007). Budson et al. (2006), in a departure from the two
previous studies, used lists containing both neutral and
emoonal words that were semancally associated in the
study phase. Their ndings indicated no eect of emoon
on false memory reports. Nevertheless, these ndings
might be taken with cauon, since there was no control
for semanc relatedness between studies lists and lures.
Overall, several studies addressing memory
distoron for emoonal informaon have limitaons:
(a) materials are mostly non-emoonal; (b) semanc
relatedness of study and test materials are not
controlled;(c) materials are not standardized for
emoonal dimensions (valence and arousal); (d) posive
and negave valenced materials are not compared.
Regarding the theorecal accounts for distorons
of memories of emoonal informaon, we hypothesize
that two independent memory traces are responsible
for true and false recognion in the DRM paradigm
(see also Budson et al., 2006). This hypothesis is based
on the Fuzzy Trace Theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005),
which proposes that gist traces store the meaning of
the experience, whereas verbam traces store specic
features of the experience. False memories result
from remembering gist traces while not remembering
verbam representaons. Veridical memories, on the
other hand, result from remembering both item-specic
verbatim and gist traces. Therefore, assuming that
emoon enhances memory for specic features of the
study list (i.e., verbam trace), one would predict that
false recognion of both negave and posive emoonal
lures would decrease relave to emoonally neutral
lures. Conversely, assuming that emoon enhances only
the gist trace of the study list, one would predict that the
false recognion of emoonal lures could actually be
greater than that of non-emoonal lures. That is, levels
of false recognion for emoonal lures would increase
or decrease depending upon the specic memory trace
enhanced by emoon. Such predicon remains in need
of further experiments, which could circumvent the
limitaons of the studies menoned above.
99
Estudos de Psicologia, 21(2), abril a junho de 2016, 92-103
Hypotheses in human memory research
False Memories in Short-Term Tasks:
Contribuons of Reacon Time Measures
Among the distorons encountered in human
memory, the phenomenon of false memories (FM) has
been taking a prominent posion due to its importance
in daily events, as well as in experimental studies
(for a review, see Stein & Cols., 2010). FMs can be
conceptualized either as memories for events that have
never occurred, or memories that dier signicantly
from their original events (Alves & Lopes, 2007;
Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Mazzoni & Scoboria, 2007;
Stein et al., 2010). The experimental procedure used in
most current FM research is the abovemenoned DRM
paradigm (Gallo, 2010; Pezdek & Lam, 2007; Roediger &
McDermo, 1995). Although the FM eects elicited by
this paradigm are considerably robust, the majority of
studies employing such paradigm use tasks of recall and
recognion, having as dependent variable the proporon
of distorons on these indices. Moreover, research using
the DRM has focused on long-term episodic memory
for verbal material, a type of memory that can be
signicantly distorted aer intervals of weeks or months
(Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008).
An open queson regarding FMs is whether such
phenomenon is circumscribed to long-term memory.
There is substanal evidence suggesng that semanc
coding can also be found in short-term memory tasks
(Bartha, Martin, & Jensen, 1998; Flegal, Atkins, &
Reuter-Lorenz, 2010; Haarmann & Usher, 2001; Jones
& Anderson, 1982; Shulman, 1972), a proposal also
supported by neuropsychological studies (R. C. Marn &
Romani, 1994; N. Marn & Saran, 1992). Such evidence
make the possibility of studying FM in short-term tasks
promising, and allow for the use of reacon me (RT) as
a dependent variable in combinaon with the commonly
used accuracy measures (Galera & Lopes, 1995; Lopes &
Garcia, 2014). The greatest advantage of such approach
is that it can provide ner-grained knowledge about basic
memory processes in comparison to accuracy measures
alone (Balota & Yap, 2011; Luce, 1986; Welford, 1980).
The use of RT measures to study cognion grew
steadily since the S. Sternberg’s (1966) seminal paper,
which was among the most cited papers in the 60’s,
70’s and early 80 (White, 1983). A search in PsychINFO
with the keywords memory scanning, memory search
and Sternberg’s task, crossed with the keywords false
memories or false memory, in the period from 1950 to
2010, revealed that only the study of Coane, McBride,
Raulerson and Jordan (2007) used the task proposed by
S. Sternberg to study false memories on DRM lists. Those
authors manipulated smuli set size (three, ve and
seven words) and test type (targets, crical distracters,
and unrelated distracters), having RT and proporon of
errors as dependent variables. This study showed that
crical distracters were both more falsely recognized
than unrelated distracters, and slower to be correctly
rejected than unrelated distracters. As expected, RTs also
increased as a funcon of number of memorized smuli.
Similar ndings were reported by Atkins and
Reuter-Lorenz (2008). These authors showed an increase
in RTs for critical distracters using an interval of 4
seconds between study and test. These results were
further replicated in an experiment wherein task-related
neuroimaging data were collected to examine the role of
prefrontal cortex regions (PFC) during false recognion
versus correct rejecon of crical distracters (Atkins
& Reuter-Lorenz, 2011). Since it has been extensively
demonstrated that PFC regions, such as le ventrolateral
PFC and dorsolateral PFC, are involved in cognitive
control during resolution of semantic interference
(e.g., Badre & Wagner, 2007), decreases in the acvity
of these regions during false recognion may suggest
that false memories are a consequence of reduced
cognive control. The neuroimaging data reported by
Atkins and Reuter-Lorenz showed that these predicons
were supported for the le dorsolateral PFC (i.e., there
was a decrease in the acvity of this region during false
recognion). These authors interpreted this nding as
evidence for the proposal that when items produce high
levels of interference, as in the case of the DRM crical
distracters, cognive control processes supported by the
le dorsolateral PFC are responsible for the maintenance
of accuracy (i.e., they prevent false recognion).
Sene, Lopes and Rossini (2014), using the Brazilian
version of the DRM lists (Stein & Perguer & 2001; Stein
et. al, 2006), showed that RTs were signicantly increased
as a funcon of test type due to an increase in memory
load, and this increase was higher for crical distracters
(FMs) with a memorized set of seven words. Similarly,
the percentage of errors signicantly increased due to
increase in memory load and this increase was higher in
the crical distracter condion with the memorized set of
seven words. From the memorized set of size three to size
seven, percentage of false alarms to crical distracters
increased eight mes! (Sene et al., 2014).
Current reacon me ndings regarding false
memories in short-term tasks is a promising ground
A. Jaeger, C. A. Galera, L.M. Stein, E.J. Lopes
Estudos de Psicologia, 21(2), abril a junho de 2016, 92-103
100
for future invesgaons. Such invesgaons can focus
on analysis of RT distribuons for dierent types of
tests, focus on the study of processing types (serial x
parallel, e.g., Galera & Lopes, 1997; Townsend, 1990),
manipulaons of retenon interval and memory load
in the Sternberg’s task, or interfering tasks in working
memory paradigms. Results from such experiments,
combined with exisng theories of long-term memory,
short-term memory and working memory can shed new
light on the rich and interesng phenomenon of false
memories.
Concluding remarks
Currently, a major challenge faced by students
and researchers is to idenfy what is really important
or relevant among the ever increasing amount of
publications on a given research field. This can be
especially dicult when instead of novel and potenally
promising results, the student or researcher is interested
in the limitaons and inconsistencies inherent to a given
research eld. Unfortunately, dicules like this are also
common for those who are interested in human memory.
Our goal here was to expose such inconsistencies, and to
summarize unanswered quesons that can be especially
relevant for the process of hypothesis generaon on
human memory research (McGuire, 1997). Thus, in
the present arcle we exposed and discussed several
issues concerning the study of human memory that can
potenally become raw material for the development of
future research. The arcle focused on issues inherent
to the study of working memory processes, long-term
memory recognion, emoon and memory interacon,
and analysis of false memory data. All approached topics
revealed puzzling inconsistencies and open quesons,
suggesng that theorizing on human memory would
prot greatly from further and improved studies on
these topics.
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Estudos de Psicologia, 21(2), abril a junho de 2016, 92-103
Hypotheses in human memory research
Antônio Jaeger, Doutor em Psicologia pela Universidade Federal
do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Pós-doutorado em Psicologia na
Universidade de Washington em St Louis (WASH-U/EUA), Pós-
doutorado em Biociências na Universidade de São Paulo (USP) e
Pós-doutorado em Psicologia na Poncia Universidade Católica do
Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), é Professor Adjunto na Universidade
Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG). Endereço para correspondência:
Av. Antônio Carlos, 6627, UFMG, Departamento de Psicologia.
Fone: (31) 3409-6279. E-mail: antonio.jaeger@gmail.com
Cesar Alexis Galera, Doutor em Psicologia Experimental pelo
Instuto de Psicologia da Universidade de São Paulo, Pós-Doutorado
na Concordia University (Montreal, Québec, Canadá), é Professor
Titular da Faculdade de Filosoa, Ciências e Letras de Ribeirão Preto,
Universidade de São Paulo (FFCLRP-USP). E-mail: algalera@usp.br
Lilian Milnitsky Stein, Doutora em Psicologia
Cogniva pela University of Arizona (EUA) e
Pós-doutorado em Psicologia na Universidad de Barcelona
(UB/Espanha), é Professora Titular do Programa de Pós-
graduação em Psicologia da Poncia Universidade Católica
do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS). E-mail: lilian@pucrs.br
Ederaldo José Lopes, Doutor em Psicobiologia pela Universidade de
São Paulo (USP/, Ribeirão Preto, SP), Pós-Doutorado em Filosoa da
Mente e Ciências Cognivas na Universidade Federal de São Carlos
(UFSCAR/São Carlos, SP), é Professor Titular do Instuto de Psicologia,
Universidade Federal de Uberlândia (UFU). E-mail: ederaldo@ufu.br
Recebido em 14.Mai.15
Revisado em 07.Abr.16
Aceito em 30.Jun.16