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Nationalism, Threat and Support for Trade
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The processes involved in well-being maintenance among African Americans who differed in their attributions to prejudice were examined. A rejection–identification model was proposed where stable attributions to prejudice represent rejection by the dominant group. This results in a direct and negative effect on well-being. The model also predicts a positive effect on well-being that is mediated by minority group identification. In other words, the generally negative consequences of perceiving oneself as a victim of racial prejudice can be somewhat alleviated by identification with the minority group. Structural equation analyses provided support for the model and ruled out alternative theoretical possibilities. Perceiving prejudice as pervasive produces effects on well-being that are fundamentally different from those that may arise from an unstable attribution to prejudice for a single negative outcome.
Two experiments investigated how in-group identification, manipulated with a bogus pipeline technique affects group members' desire for individual mobility to another group. In the first experiment (
N = 88), the in-group had low status, and group boundaries were either permeable or impermeable. Low identifiers perceived the group as less homogeneous, were less committed to their group, and more strongly desired individual mobility to a higher status group than did high identifiers. The structural possibility of mobility afforded by permeable group boundaries had no comparable effect. The second experiment (
N = 51) investigated whether in-group identification can produce similar effects when relative group status is unknown. Even in the absence of an identity threat, low identifiers were less likely to see the groups as homogeneous, felt less committed to their group, and more strongly desired individual mobility than did high identifiers. Results are discussed with reference to social identity and self-categorization theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
How do citizens respond to the reallocation of authority across levels of government? This article investigates the relative importance of economic versus identity bases of citizen support for the most far-reaching example of authority migration—European integration.
The present study is one of a series exploring the role of social categorization in intergroup behaviour. It has been found in our previous studies that in ‚minimal' situations, in which the subjects were categorized into groups on the basis of visual judgments they had made or of their esthetic preferences, they clearly discriminated against members of an outgroup although this gave them no personal advantage. However, in these previous studies division into groups was still made on the basis of certain criteria of ‚real' similarity between subjects who were assigned to the same category. Therefore, the present study established social categories on an explicitly random basis without any reference to any such real similarity.
It was found that, as soon as the notion of ‚group' was introduced into the situation, the subjects still discriminated against those assigned to another random category. This discrimination was considerably more marked than the one based on a division of subjects in terms of interindividual similarities in which the notion of ‚group' was never explicitly introduced. In addition, it was found that fairness was also a determinant of the subjects' decisions.
The results are discussed from the point of view of their relevance to a social‐cognitive theory of intergroup behaviour.
The study comprises an analysis of processes of psychological change among participants at an environmental protest. A participant observation study found evidence of a radicalized self concept among a number of crowd members, and indicates a link between radicalization, an asymmetry of categorical representations between protesters and the police, and the subsequent interaction premised on these divergent representations. The analysis supports an elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour (Reicher, 1996, 1997a, 1997b; Stott & Reicher, 1998). It is argued that, in order to account for both social determination and social change in collective behaviour, it is necessary to analyse crowd events as developing interactions between groups. Where crowd members hold a different understanding of their social position to that held by an out-group (e.g. the police) and where the out-group has the power to treat crowd members in terms of its understandings, then those members who act on the basis of one understanding of their social relations find themselves in an unexpected and novel set of social relations. This then provides the basis for a series of changes, including the self-understanding of crowd members.
We design an experiment to study the effects of social identity on preferences over redistribution. The experiment highlights the trade-off between social identity concerns and maximization of monetary payoffs. Subjects belonging to two distinct natural groups are randomly assigned gross incomes and vote over alternative redistributive tax regimes, where the regime is chosen by majority rule. We find that a significant subset of the subjects systematically deviate from monetary payoff maximization towards the tax rate that benefits their group when the monetary cost of doing so is not too high. These deviations cannot be explained by efficiency concerns, inequality aversion, reciprocity, social learning or conformity. Finally, we show that behavior in the lab helps explain the relationship between reported income and stated preferences over redistribution observed in survey data.
Across 6 studies, factors signaling potential vulnerability to harm produced a bias toward outgroup categorization--a tendency to categorize unfamiliar others as members of an outgroup rather than as members of one's ingroup. Studies 1 through 4 demonstrated that White participants were more likely to categorize targets as Black (as opposed to White) when those targets displayed cues heuristically associated with threat (masculinity, movement toward the perceiver, and facial expressions of anger). In Study 5, White participants who felt chronically vulnerable to interpersonal threats responded to a fear manipulation by categorizing threatening (angry) faces as Black rather than White. Study 6 extended these findings to a minimal group paradigm, in which participants who felt chronically vulnerable to interpersonal threats categorized threatening (masculine) targets as outgroup members. Together, findings indicate that ecologically relevant threat cues within both the target and the perceiver interact to bias the way people initially parse the social world into ingroup vs. outgroup. Findings support a threat-based framework for intergroup psychology.
The authors explore consensus among economists on specific propositions on the basis of a fall 2000 survey of American Economic Association members. Because some propositions are drawn from earlier studies, the results illustrate the dynamics of opinion within the profession. The authors generally find consensus within the profession, although the degree of consensus varies between propositions that are international, macroeconomic, and microeconomic in nature. Consensus is particularly strong for propositions of free international trade and capital flows. In contrast, macroeconomic propositions exhibit a lower degree of consensus, partly because of increased agreement with monetarist and supply-side propositions over time. The profession displays substantial skepticism concerning claims of the “New Economy.â€
Four investigations examined the dynamics between the individual self (self-representation independent of group membership) and the collective self (self-representation derived from group membership). Relative to participants whose collective self was threatened, participants whose individual self was threatened (a) considered the threat more severe, (b) experienced a more negative mood, (c) reported more anger, and (d) derogated to a greater extent the source of threat. In addition, a self-description task indicated that participants generate more aspects of their individual than collective self. These effects occurred even when confounding variables (i.e., accessibility of the selves, group identification, individualism and collectivism, importance of threat domain) were controlled. The individual self is motivationally primary.
In this chapter, we examine the self and identity by considering the different conditions under which these are affected by the groups to which people belong. From a social identity perspective we argue that group commitment, on the one hand, and features of the social context, on the other hand, are crucial determinants of central identity concerns. We develop a taxonomy of situations to reflect the different concerns and motives that come into play as a result of threats to personal and group identity and degree of commitment to the group. We specify for each cell in this taxonomy how these issues of self and social identity impinge upon a broad variety of responses at the perceptual, affective, and behavioral level.
The authors suggest that the traditional conception of prejudice--as a general attitude or evaluation--can problematically obscure the rich texturing of emotions that people feel toward different groups. Derived from a sociofunctional approach, the authors predicted that groups believed to pose qualitatively distinct threats to in-group resources or processes would evoke qualitatively distinct and functionally relevant emotional reactions. Participants' reactions to a range of social groups provided a data set unique in the scope of emotional reactions and threat beliefs explored. As predicted, different groups elicited different profiles of emotion and threat reactions, and this diversity was often masked by general measures of prejudice and threat. Moreover, threat and emotion profiles were associated with one another in the manner predicted: Specific classes of threat were linked to specific, functionally relevant emotions, and groups similar in the threat profiles they elicited were also similar in the emotion profiles they elicited.
Suppose that an opportunity arises for two countries to negotiate a free-trade agreement. Will a free-trade agreement between these countries be politically viable and, if so, what form will it take? The authors address these questions using a political-economy framework that emphasizes the interaction between industry special-interest groups and an incumbent government. They describe the economic conditions necessary for a free-trade agreement to be an equilibrium outcome, both for the case when the agreement must cover all bilateral trade and for the case when a few politically sensitive sectors can be excluded from the agreements. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
This article investigates economic factors and non‐economic factors of individual attitudes toward free‐trade agreements with different countries. Based on the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, highly skilled workers in Taiwan should be more supportive of free trade with China and less supportive of free trade with the United States than should unskilled workers in Taiwan. Using survey data from Taiwan, we find that highly educated people in Taiwan are more supportive of free trade with both the United States and China, and the effects of education are much stronger with respect to free trade with China. We also find that individual risk attitudes, national identity, and ethnicity play important roles in explaining trade preferences.
A similar set of concepts has been central to the literatures on the formation of trade policy coalitions and the "new economics of institutions": the political and economic consequences of the degree to which assets are specific to a particular economic activity. In this survey, the authors take the necessary first step of summarizing the main findings of these two literatures and then suggest ways in which the issue might be joined. In addition to providing a more coherent understanding of the findings of these two literatures and some new directions for them, the authors show that many puzzles remain in the field of trade politics - puzzles for which there are no appealing answers or, where there are answers, no strong evidence in support of them. This essay, then, in addition to being a theoretical review of the literature, puts forward an agenda for future study of international trade politics.
We analyze two cross-country data sets that contain information on attitudes toward trade as well as a broad range of socio-demographic and other indicators. We find that pro-trade preferences are significantly and robustly correlated with an individual's level of human capital, in the manner predicted by the factor endowments model. Preferences over trade are also correlated with the trade exposure of the sector in which an individual is employed: individuals in non-traded sectors tend to be the most pro-trade, while individuals in sectors with a revealed comparative disadvantage are the most protectionist. Third, an individual's relative economic status has a very strong positive association with pro-trade attitudes. Finally, non-economic determinants, in the form of values, identities, and attachments, play an important role in explaining the variation in preferences over trade. High degrees of neighborhood attachment and nationalism/patriotism are associated with protectionist tendencies.
Its newly acquired status as the world's second largest economy has entitled China to a more prominent role in global affairs, and increasingly, its behavior has drawn scrutiny from the world in ways that the country is ill-prepared for. The attention to China's rise, however, focuses not only on its economy but also on other aspects, including its military, diplomatic moves, domestic politics and its ‘soft power’, namely, its own image or self-projection and the world's perception or attitudes toward China. And yet, there has been no systematic investigation to evaluate how the world views a rising China. In this article, the authors applied the latest dataset from the Asian Barometer Survey to investigate whether East Asians recognize and welcome the rise of China. The findings suggest that geographical and cultural proximity have a great impact on people's perception of China. Countries which are territorially adjacent or culturally close to China tend to regard China as the most influential country in Asia. With the exception of Japan and Mongolia, most Asian countries hold positive views about the impact of China on the region. However, such benign evaluations are weaker in countries which have potential security conflicts with China, such as Taiwan and South Korea, when only the bilateral impact is considered. The overall picture shows that the rise of China has been largely recognized and welcomed by East Asians, despite some apprehension about China's strategic intentions to its neighboring countries.
This article identifies the explanatory sources of Asians' perceptions about China's rise. The authors try to decipher the relative importance of individual-level explanatory variables such as socio-economic satisfaction, cognitive schema, and ideology and political values vis-à-vis that of the country-level structural variables such as geopolitical tension, economic interdependence and cultural identity. The empirical findings suggest that the growing perception that China has the most influence in Asia is more related to individual-level demographic variables which are associated with greater interest in political affairs, despite the fact that there is also some evidence that contextual factors related to economic interdependence also matter. A favorable perception of China's influence, on the other hand, is more associated with a less negative orientation on geopolitical and cultural factors, which both involve long-term historical memory and political feelings. Economic interdependence might engender adversarial feelings against China if the level of interdependence is high enough to cause economic vulnerability.
If any group of American blue-collar workers has benefited from the growth of trade it is the unionized dockworkers along the US West Coast. Nevertheless, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) representing these workers is vocally opposed to trade liberalization. We examine several competing explanations for this puzzle and evaluate them by tracing the union's stance on trade over several decades. We also use an original survey to compare ILWU affiliates' attitudes on trade with those of nonmembers with otherwise similar characteristics. Consistent with a model of organizational socialization, the data support the hypothesis that ILWU membership affects the members' revealed political opinions; the data are difficult to reconcile with standard theories of international trade. Our findings indicate that the political support for trade depends not just on voters' structural positions in the economy but also on the organizations and networks in which they are embedded.
There is increasing attention to the mass public in the politics of trade debate, yet we still know little about how Americans formulate opinion on trade. Scholars are puzzled by the ineffectiveness of traditional dispositional beliefs to account for trade policy judgment, while an emerging economic self-interest perspective contends that opinion on trade is based on material concerns. This article demonstrates how symbolic predispositions provide critical information shortcuts for Americans on trade in which the relationship between trade policy and economic self-interest may be unclear. Symbolic politics theory explains how citizens can rely on accessible symbolic predispositions, including conceptions of national identity, in an unfamiliar and evolving trade policy environment often subject to multiple and conflicting cues, limited political information, and changing economic circumstances.
Margalit, Yotam. (2012) Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the Sources of Popular Discontent. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00747.x © 2012 International Studies Association
What are the sources of popular opposition to economic globalization? A common answer in the literature is the adverse impact of trade liberalization on some people’s labor market standing and earning prospects. Recent studies also note a correlation between nationalist and ethnocentric sentiments and support for trade protectionism, yet do not test whether these non-economic sentiments are actually a cause of the opposition to freer trade. I argue that many individuals fear not only the oft-cited material consequences of trade openness, but also what they perceive to be its social and cultural consequences. I use cross-national survey data and a survey experiment to test this causal claim. The argument also helps explain why less-educated individuals are consistently more apprehensive about international economic integration than more educated individuals, even in the countries in which economic theory predicts otherwise. The findings have implications for the debate over the policy tools for compensating globalization’s losers and sustaining popular support for further economic integration.
This study argues that a central factor in the determinants of citizen attitudes toward trade is the social psychology of the individual in question. Namely, we contend that the level of social trust an individual has will condition the degree to which an individual wants to open her country to imports from other countries. Those individuals with lower relative levels of social trust are less likely to support the notion of freer trade. We base this contention on the logic that those people who are distrustful of people in general are more likely to distrust that which comes from people who are unknown to them, such as goods coming into their country from abroad. This argument is a departure from previous studies of public attitudes toward trade, which have focused on various economic utilitarian considerations and xenophobia that shape citizen attitudes toward trade liberalization. To test our argument, we employ data from the 1995–1997 wave of the World Values Survey. Using a logit regression analysis, we find, as predicted, that the more social trust an individual has, the more likely that person is to support the idea of liberalized trade.
In this article, we introduce the concept of social identity complexity—a new theoretical construct that refers to an individual's subjective representation of the interrelationships among his or her multiple group identities. Social identity complexity reflects the degree of overlap perceived to exist between groups of which a person is simultaneously a member When the overlap of multiple ingroups is perceived to be high, the individual maintains a relatively simplified identity structure whereby memberships in different groups converge to form a single ingroup identification. When a person acknowledges, and accepts, that memberships in multiple ingroups are not fully convergent or overlapping, the associated identity structure is both more inclusive and more complex. In this article, we define the concept of social identity complexity and discuss its possible antecedents and consequences. Results from initial studies support the prediction that social identity complexity is affected by stress and is related to personal value priorities and to tolerance of outgroup members.
Combining the classical theorem of Stolper and Samuelson with a model of politics derived from Becker leads to the conclusion that exogenous changes in the risks or costs of countries' external trade will stimulate domestic conflict between owners of locally scarce and locally abundant factors. A traditional three-factor model then predicts quite specific coalitions and cleavages among owners of land, labor, and capital, depending only on the given country's level of economic development and its land-labor ratio. A preliminary survey of historical periods of expanding and contracting trade, and of such specific cases as the German @'marriage of iron and rye,@' U.S. and Latin American populism, and Asian socialism, suggests the accuracy of this hypothesis. While the importance of such other factors as cultural divisions and political inheritance cannot be denied, the role of exogenous changes in the risks and costs of trade deserves further investigation.
A similar set of concepts has been central to the literatures on the formation of trade policy coalitions and the “new economics of institutions”: the political and economic consequences of the degree to which assets are specific to a particular economic activity. In this survey, the authors take the necessary first step of summarizing the main findings of these two literatures and then suggest ways in which the issue might be joined. In addition to providing a more coherent understanding of the findings of these two literatures and some new directions for them, the authors show that many puzzles remain in the field of trade politics—puzzles for which there are no appealing answers or, where there are answers, no strong evidence in support of them. This essay, then, in addition to being a theoretical review of the literature, puts forward an agenda for future study of international trade politics.
Mfost of social psychology's theories of the self fail to take into account the significance of social identification in the definition of self. Social identities are self-definitions that are more inclusive than the individuated self-concept of most American psychology. A model of optimal distinctiveness is proposed in which social identity is viewed as a reconciliation of opposing needs for assimilation and differentiation from others. According to this model, individuals avoid self-construals that are either too personalized or too inclusive and instead define themselves in terms of distinctive category memberships. Social identity and group loyalty are hypothesized to be strongest for those self-categorizations that simultaneously provide for a sense of belonging and a sense of distinctiveness. Results from an initial laboratory experiment support the prediction that depersonalization and group size interact as determinants of the strength of social identification.
This study examined self-serving and group-serving attribution biases under conditions of individual and group success and failure. Previous research has found evidence for a self-serving bias in the context of laboratory groups, especially in conditions of group success. The present study used 52 male and female intercollegiate athletes involved in team sports who rated the performance of themselves and teammates on a series of questionnaires. Group-serving biases were stronger than self-serving bias, and this effect emerged even in the face of failure.
Discusses the legitimacy/illegitimacy of ingroup bias as a way of transforming social reality. One of the goals of the chapter is to respond to critiques of social identity theory that view it as underpinning social dominance, or that suggest it is ill-placed to account for favoritism toward outgroups. The authors describe their studies on stereotypic generalizations as constrained by sample variability and sample size, and studies on discrimination constraints and justification (the effects of variability and group identification, and the role of legitimacy). They conclude that people seem sensitive to social reality and legitimacy when they represent their group to themselves and to others. There also is a social motivation to see one's own group in positive terms when this is threatened, at least for high identifiers. The evidence shows that ingroup bias shines through when the context provokes it (identity threat) and when it warrants it (weak reality constraints). They note that, although legitimacy is the cement that helps reinforce stability and the status quo, it also is the solvent that justifies ingroup bias on the part of disadvantaged groups. Ingroup bias for low status groups can be viewed as at least part of the resistance necessary to transform reality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Since the rise of mass politics, the role national identities play in international relations has been debated. Do they produce a popular reservoir easily tapped for war or bestow dignity thereby fostering cooperation and a democratic peace? The evidence for either perspective is thin, beset by different conceptions of identity and few efforts to identify its effects independent of situational factors. Using data drawn from new national surveys in Italy and the United States, we advance a three-dimensional conception of national identity, theoretically connecting the dimensions to conflictive and cooperative dispositions as well as to decisions to cooperate with the United Nations in containing Iran's nuclear proliferation and Sudan's humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Attachment to the nation in Italy and the United States is found to associate with less support for militarist options and more support for international cooperation as liberal nationalists expect. This depends, however, on containing culturally exclusive conceptions of the nation and chauvinism.
Recent research on the sources of individual attitudes toward trade policy comes to very different conclusions about the role of economic self-interest. The skeptical view, expressed most pointedly by Mansfield and Mutz (2009), suggests instead that longstanding symbolic predispositions and sociotropic perceptions shape trade policy opinions more than one's own material well-being. We believe this conclusion is premature for two reasons. First, the practice of using one attitude to predict another raises questions about direction of causation that cannot be answered with the data at hand. This problem is most obvious when questions about the expected impact of trade are used to predict opinions about trade policy. Second, the understanding of self-interest employed in most studies of trade policy attitudes is unrealistically narrow. In reality, the close relationship between individual economic interests and the interests of the groups in which individuals are embedded creates indirect pathways through which one's position in the economy can shape individual trade policy preferences. We use the data employed by Mansfield and Mutz (2009) to support our argument that a more complete account of trade attitude formation is needed and that in such an account economic interests may yet play an important role.
Past literature has found evidence that labor market attributes affect individuals' trade policy preferences in a manner consistent with theories of international trade. This paper shows that, with the exception of education, the relationships between labor market attributes and trade policy preferences are not robust in US survey data. This suggests that either our proxies of labor market attributes are poor or our theories for what drives trade policy preferences need to be revisited.
This paper explores how and why China has been perceived as an economic threat in Taiwan through an examination of Taipei’s
post-Cold War economic policy with respect to the mainland. While Taipei’s restriction on trade and investment across the
Taiwan Strait until mid-2008 was widely considered a failure by both opponents and supporters of closer cross-Strait economic
ties, this analysis points to an overlooked function of Taiwan’s economic policy that was not just about tackling the problems
of the security externalities or promoting the island’s economic development. What appeared to be an ineffective policy can
be understood as a successful boundary-drawing practice that discursively constituted a vulnerable Taiwan under Chinese economic
threat, hence conducive to the (re)production of Taiwanese national identity.
KeywordsConstructivism-Economic Statecraft-Relative Gains-Security Externality-Cross-Strait Relations
Stereotype research depicts the generic immigrant as incompetent and untrustworthy. The current research expands this image, specifying key information dimensions (e.g. nationality, socioeconomic status) about immigrants. To see how perceivers differentiate among particular immigrant groups, we extend a model of intergroup perception, the Stereotype Content Model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 878–902), to immigrant subgroups. The SCM predicts that perception centers on competence and warmth, and relates to targets’ perceived status and competition within society. Specified by nationality, race, ethnicity, and class, images of immigrants differ by both competence and warmth, with most groups receiving ambivalent (low–high or high–low) stereotypes rather than the uniform low–low for the generic immigrant. As predicted, ambivalent stereotypes reflect target nationality combined with socioeconomic status, supporting the SCM's ambivalent stereotypes and social structural hypotheses, as well as better defining immigrant stereotypes and their contingencies.
Although it is widely acknowledged that an understanding of mass attitudes about trade is crucial to the political economy of foreign commerce, only a handful of studies have addressed this topic. These studies have focused largely on testing two models, both of which emphasize that trade preferences are shaped by how trade affects an individual's income. The factor endowments or Heckscher-Ohlin model posits that these preferences are affected primarily by a person's skills. The specific factors or Ricardo-Viner model posits that trade preferences depend on the industry in which a person works. We find little support for either of these models using two representative national surveys of Americans. The only potential exception involves the effects of education. Initial tests indicate that educational attainment and support for open trade are directly related, which is often interpreted as support for the Heckscher-Ohlin model. However, further analysis reveals that education's effects are less representative of skill than of individuals' anxieties about involvement with out-groups in their own country and beyond. Furthermore, we find strong evidence that trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by perceptions of how the U.S. economy as a whole is affected by trade.
Capital moves more rapidly across national borders now than it has in at least fifty years and perhaps in history. This article examines the effects of capital mobility on different groups in national societies and on the politics of economic policymaking. It begins by emphasizing that while financial markets are highly integrated within the developed world, many investments are still quite specific with respect to firm, sector, or location. It then argues that contemporary levels of international capital mobility have a differential impact on socioeconomic groups. Over the long run, increased capital mobility tends to favor owners of capital over other groups. In the shorter run, owners and workers in specific sectors in capital-exporting countries bear much of the burden of adjusting to increased capital mobility. These patterns can be expected to lead to political divisions about whether or not to encourage or increase international capital market integration. The article then demonstrates that capital mobility also affects the politics of other economic policies. Most centrally, it shifts debate toward the exchange rate as an intermediate or ultimate policy instrument. In this context, it tends to pit groups that favor exchange rate stability against groups that are more concerned about national monetary policy autonomy and therefore less concerned about exchange rate stability. Similarly, it tends to drive a wedge between groups that favor an appreciated exchange rate and groups that favor a depreciated one. These divisions have important implications for such economic policies as European monetary and currency union, the dollar-yen exchange rate, and international macroeconomic policy coordination.
This article examines the relationship between intergroup threat and negative outgroup attitudes. We first qualitatively review the intergroup threat literature, describing the shift from competing theories toward more integrated approaches, such as the integrated threat theory (ITT; W. G. Stephan and Stephan, 2000). The types of threats discussed include: realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety, negative stereotypes, group esteem threat, and distinctiveness threat. We then conducted a quantitative meta-analysis examining the relationships between various intergroup threats and outgroup attitudes. The meta-analysis, involving 95 samples, revealed that 5 different threat types had a positive relationship with negative outgroup attitudes. Additionally, outgroup status moderated some of these relationships. Implications and future directions are considered.
Are most voters opposed to globalization? A growing body of empirical research, using data from available surveys of public opinion, suggests that antiglobalization sentiments are strong, especially among blue-collar workers. This article reports the findings from a survey experiment aimed at measuring the impact of issue framing on individuals stated attitudes toward international trade. Respondents given an antitrade introduction to the survey question, linking trade to the possibility of job losses, were 17 percent less likely to favor increasing trade with other countries than were those asked the same question without any introduction at all. Curiously, respondents who were given a protrade introduction to the question, suggesting that trade can lead to lower prices for consumers, were not more likely to express support for trade than those who received no introduction. In addition, the responses of less educated individuals were more sensitive to framing effects than those of highly educated individuals. Without measuring and taking these types of framing effects into account, opinion surveys offer unreliable guides to gauging the extent (and distribution) of opposition to trade among voters. Results from a second experiment reveal that knowledge of the endorsement of trade openness by economists mitigates framing effects and raises overall support for trade liberalization by a substantial degree.I would like to thank Adam Berinsky, Mac Destler, Jeffry Frieden, Judith Goldstein, Jens Hainmueller, Helen Milner, Diana Mutz, Dani Rodrik, Ken Scheve, Mike Tomz, and seminar participants at Harvard, Duke, Columbia, Stanford, Princeton, Berkeley, the University of Minnesota, and the University of Pennsylvania for helpful comments on earlier drafts. My thanks also go to Lisa Martin and two anonymous IO reviewers.
If factors of production are mobile between industries, the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem predicts that cleavages over trade policy will form along factor lines. Conversely, if factors are immobile, cleavages will form along industry lines. These two hypotheses are empirically examined using micro-data from a survey conducted during the 1988 Canadian federal election-a de facto referendum on free trade. Factors of production are found to be important determinants of preferences on trade policy. However, the industry of employment also helps determine preferences on trade policy. These results are consistent with partial factor mobility. Copyright 2002 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
This article provides new evidence on the determinants of individual trade-policy preferences using individual-level survey data for the United States. There are two main empirical results. First, we find that factor type dominates industry of employment in explaining support for trade barriers. Second, we find that home ownership also matters for individuals' trade-policy preferences. Independent of factor type, home ownership in counties with a manufacturing mix concentrated in comparative-disadvantage industries is correlated with support fur trade barriers. This finding suggests that, in addition to current factor incomes driving preferences as in standard trade models, preferences also depend on asset values.
Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism
- Ha-Joon Chang
Chang, Ha-Joon. 2008. Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History
of Capitalism. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press.
Analyzing Taiwanese Public Opinion toward Future Cross-Strait Relations: Choice under Ambiguity and Uncertainty
- Eric Yu
- Lin Chen-Hua
- Kah-Yew
Yu, Eric Chen-Hua, and Lin Kah-Yew. 2013. "Analyzing Taiwanese Public Opinion
toward Future Cross-Strait Relations: Choice under Ambiguity and Uncertainty." Taiwanese
Journal of Politcial Science 17(2): 165-230.
Survey on the Internet: Theory and Practice
- Chen-Hua Yu
Yu, Chen-Hua. 2012. "Survey on the Internet: Theory and Practice." In On Public
Survey, ed. Lu-Huei Chen. Taipei: Wu-Nan Press, p. 90-110.
Political Changes in Taiwan under Ma Ying-Jeou: Partisan conflict, Policy choices, External Constraints and Security Challenges
- Jean-Pierre Cabestan
- Jacques Delisle
Cabestan, Jean-Pierre, and Jacques deLisle. 2014. Political Changes in Taiwan under Ma
Ying-Jeou: Partisan conflict, Policy choices, External Constraints and Security Challenges.
New York: Routledge.
The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence
- Kevin H O'rourke
- Richard Sinnott
O'Rourke, Kevin H., and Richard Sinnott. 2001. "The Determinants of Individual Trade
Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence." In Brookings Trade Forum, 2001, eds.