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Regime transition, value conflicts and the left-right divide at the mass level: The Baltic States and Southern Europe compared
Abstract
By comparing the Baltic States with Greece, Portugal and Spain, we seek to discover whether the type of authoritarian legacy and regime transition has any effect on the way citizens think about the left-right (L-R) divide in new democracies. We argue that while the authoritarian legacy is important, the type of transition and, particularly, the kind of political alliances and party-politicization of issues during the new regime's formative years is more important. Evidence confirms our expectations, even after several cross-validating tests.
... Accordingly, the nature of populism in Poland, where it is connected almost solely with right-wing politics, has also been charged with cultural factors, lately by those concerning liberal cultural policies and trends politicized in partisan debates on European integration (Fitzgibbon and Guerra 2010;Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016;CBOS 2017). Authoritarian conservatism is often displayed by individuals supporting right-wing policies and parties in Poland and abroad (Swindal 2011;CBOS 2012;CBOS 2015;Freire and Kivistik 2016). These cultural and historical identities, rather than economic factors, were argued to be the most efficient weapons of the Right on the political battleground (Markowski and Cześnik 2002; Skarży nska and Henne 2011; Kwiatkowska et al. 2016), and were accordingly emphasized in the explanations of its recent political success in 2015 (Matthes 2016). ...
Scholars studying the electoral breakthroughs of right-wing illiberalism have arrived at two general conclusions: while they largely rejected the hypothesis that this phenomenon is grounded in voters’ attitudinal shift, they have shown that those voting for the illiberal Right have distinguishing socio-economic and attitudinal characteristics. My analysis reconciles these two sets of findings by documenting the gradual emergence and transformation of the right-wing electorate in Poland in the period 1993–2018 and points to the consolidation of a right-wing partisanship as an organizing factor of the “illiberal moment.” Using the POLPAN panel dataset I find that populist and authoritarian attitudes indeed emerge in Poland in the twenty-first century to distinguish those supporting the Right more and more centered around the PiS party. These attitudes, however, have been incorporated in the context of partisan rivalry—right-wing voters, for example, are more supportive of limiting democratic procedures but only when the Right is in power. In the first decade of the twenty-first century PiS also politicized the lack of partisan consensus on the expansion of the welfare state. PiS incorporated this demand in its stance legitimizing the expansion of the welfare state through what was available in its ideological repertoire: national solidarity, national victimhood, and the idea of a sovereign nation-state joined under the umbrella of Catholic symbolism. This post-consensus polarization and asymmetrical political radicalization resembles the “illiberal moment” in Western Europe that followed the convergence between center-left and center-right parties but they lack a crystallized class-based political identity and social-democratic understanding of political economy to build on.
... These studies conclude that the left-right dichotomy is multi-dimensional and often distinguish between a socioeconomic and a cultural dimension. Moreover, these studies show that the meaning of left and right varies greatly across geographic areas (Markowski 1997;Colomer 2005;Jou 2010;Freire and Kivistik 2016). The major drawbacks of these studies are that they have no theoretical basis for what is left and right (they are based on assessments of individuals, sometimes supported by briefly outlined statements) and that they refer to parties from assumptions of voters D. Jahn or experts, which risks ecological fallacy (for a comparison of these approaches see: Bakker and Hobolt 2013). ...
The extent to which the left–right dimension still structures party systems in highly developed, industrialized democracies is a contested field in comparative politics. Most studies in this area take the position that a stable and universal left–right dimension is either still the most important game in town or has become obsolete and replaced by other policy dimensions. Although country-specific studies focusing on voters’ left–right self-placement discover different meanings of left and right that vary between countries and change over time, few macro-comparative studies focusing on parties or governments take this aspect into account. Using a left–right concept for party politics from the PIP project on Parties, Institutions and Preferences that distinguishes an ideological core derived from political theory, as well as country- and time-specific issues uncovered through empirical analysis, the article demonstrates fundamental differences in the relevance and meaning of left and right by analyzing 34 party systems from 1945 to 2020. The article shows that the thesis of the decline of the left and right is premature. An important aspect for the continued high relevance of the left–right dimension is the fact that left and right changes their meaning by including controversial issues such as European integration, migration and environmental degradation.
What explains how citizens living in young democracies feel about their authoritarian past? While the impact of autocratic legacies on support for democracy and left–right placement has been thoroughly studied, we know less about the determinants of attitudes toward the past in post-authoritarian democracies. This study relies on survey data collected in Southern and Central European countries ten years after their transitions to democracy in order to test context-dependent variance in the relevance of ideology and party identification on citizen attitudes toward the past. The results show that classical factors such as regime type and mode of transition are not the main determinants of the politicization of attitudes toward the past and that the existence of a strong authoritarian successor party is associated with stronger politicization of the past.
Political parties often engage in policy and non-policy activities in the field of memory politics because they believe they help them win more votes, but the extent to which they engage in such activities and develop strong narratives about a recent past varies. In this chapter, we explore how much memory politics matters for political parties in Portugal since the breakdown of the authoritarian regime and the transition to democracy. The analysis of four decades of activities in the Portuguese parliament (1976-2017) reveals the existence of mnemonic groups, particularly mnemonic warriors, roughly divided along the left/right axis, in which the memory of the transition appears as more divisive than the authoritarian past. The Portuguese case is a case of a relative crystallization of parties’ position and behaviour in the field of memory politics, even decades after the democratization process.
By using data from the Comparative National Election Project, we first map how widespread the Western meanings of the left–right (LR) divide are across four continents. Second, using hierarchical regressions, we explain variation in the value anchoring (Western meanings) of LR both across individuals and countries. Finally, we explore the relationships between LR and major ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ value conflicts. Results confirm that the ‘Western’ template of values has a significant impact on the LR divide across the globe, and also that their importance is higher in Europe and the US than in other regions. Additionally, we find that ‘non-Western’ values (namely topics related to state paternalism, attitudes towards the normality of conflict, cultural nationalism and multiculturalism) do structure the LR divide, above all in non-Western regions. Hence, the inclusion of items designed to tap these non-Western issues is more than justified for future research.
Cet article compare l'extension et l'evolution de l'identite gauche-droite des citoyens des nouvelles democraties de l'Europe du sud avec celle des citoyens de huit autres regimes democraties europeens de 1976 a 2004. Prenant en compte l'heritage autoritaire de l'Europe du sud, les conditions pour l'emergence des identites droite-gauche se trouvent reduites. Notre intention est donc d'evaluer d'abord si l'auto identification gauche-droite est moins repandue dans les populations Grecque, Portugaise, et Espagnoles que dans d'autres pays europeens, et en suite de verifier si ces pays presentent des tendances contraires a celles des democraties plus anciennes. Les deux dernieres sections de cet article examinent l'impact de la socialisation dans un environnement democratique sur la formation des identites gauche-droite, utilisant successivement une analyse quantitative multi-nivaux et une analyse par generation. Ces tests empiriques menent a une confirmation systematique du role de la socialisation dans un environnement democratique pour l'emergence d'une identite politique sur l'axe droite-gauche.
The article investigates the differences among West European countries in terms of the degree to which individuals' left-right self-placement is anchored in social, value and partisan factors. The study shows that clarity of party alternatives is much more important than political socialization in structuring citizens' left-right attitudes, i.e. the greater the clarity of party alternatives, the more structured the left-right orientations of citizens. As a first step in the investigation, the article seeks to show that the relative weights of social factors in explaining individual left-right self-placement, vis - vis values and partisan loyalties, are important, contrary to the poor results of previous studies.
A sometimes heated debate between authoritarianism researchers takes place on the issue of authoritarianism on the left. Some researchers argue that authoritarianism is typical for right-wing political orientation while other researchers assert that authoritarianism can also be found at the left side of the political spectrum. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we aim to contribute to the ongoing discussion on left-wing authoritarianism. Using representative samples, the relationship between authoritarianism and political preferences is examined in 13 ex-communist Eastern European countries. Employing six different indicators of left-wing/communist political orientations make clear that, despite cross-national differences, left-wing authoritarianism is definitely not a myth in Eastern European countries. Second, it was aimed to survey whether authoritarian persons in Eastern European countries might be a possible threat for the transition to democracy. Based upon five items it was demonstrated that in general the Eastern European population seems to hold a positive opinion on democracy. However, it becomes also clear that authoritarian persons in the ex-communist countries are significantly less positive towards democracy.
Although previous studies have concluded that, in comparative terms, Portuguese citizens exhibit low levels of social, value and partisan left-right attitude anchoring, the truth is that the items used in these studies are rather limited. Moreover, the meaning attributed by voters to each ideological camp was never studied. This study seeks to overcome these limitations. The article reiterates that in a comparative perspective, Portugal does exhibit low levels of left-right attitude anchoring. This is the point of departure of the article and also, it is argued, a good reason to try to further understand this case and extract from it inferences about similar cases. One of this study's major findings is that the meanings attributed to the left-right divide are not clear and structured; moreover, this lack of clarity is positively correlated with low levels of media exposure, education and left-right self-placement. Although the article tests hypotheses about how different groups (manual workers versus other social classes; older versus younger cohorts; post-materialists versus other value groups) might give different meanings to the left-right divide, the major finding is that media exposure and education are in any case the crucial factors explaining the more or less structured meanings for ideological conflicts.
This book uniquely enriches and empowers its readers. It enriches them by giving them the most detailed and extensive data available on the policies and preferences of key democratic actors-parties, governments, and electors in 25 democracies over the post-war period. Estimates are provided for every election and most coalitions of the post-war period and derive from the programmes, manifestos, and platforms of parties and governments themselves. Thus, they form a uniquely authoritative source, recognized as such and provided through the labour of a team of international scholars over 25 years. The book empowers readers by providing these estimates on the website http://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/MPP1. The printed text provides documentation and suggested uses for data, along with much other background information. The changing ideologies and concerns of parties trace general social developments over the post-war period, as well as directly affecting economic policy making. Indispensable for any serious discussion of democratic politics, the book provides necessary information for political scientists, policy analysts, comparativists, sociologists, and economists. A must for every social science library-private as well as academic or public.
Résumé Cet article compare l’extension et l’évolution de l’identité gauche-droite des citoyens des nouvelles démocraties de l’Europe du sud avec celle des citoyens de huit autres régimes démocraties européens de 1976 à 2004. Prenant en compte l’héritage autoritaire de l’Europe du sud, les conditions pour l’émergence des identités droite-gauche se trouvent réduites. Notre intention est donc d’évaluer d’abord si l’auto identification gauche-droite est moins répandue dans les populations Grecque, Portugaise, et Espagnoles que dans d’autres pays européens, et en suite de vérifier si ces pays présentent des tendances contraires à celles des démocraties plus anciennes. Les deux dernières sections de cet article examinent l’impact de la socialisation dans un environnement démocratique sur la formation des identités gauche-droite, utilisant successivement une analyse quantitative multi-nivaux et une analyse par génération. Ces tests empiriques mènent à une confirmation systématique du rôle de la socialisation dans un environnement démocratique pour l’émergence d’une identité politique sur l’axe droite-gauche.
Governing New European Democracies is a fully comparative study of decision-making processes in the cabinets of ten post-communist countries of East-Central and South-Eastern Europe. It is based on interviews collected from over 300 ministers. This book provides the first comprehensive panorama of life in cabinet governments. © Jean Blondel, Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and Darina Malovà 2007. All rights reserved.
▪ Abstract Considerable attention has been paid over the past decade to political cleavages in post-communist Eastern Europe. Investigators have attempted to establish whether such cleavages exist, to map their character, and to explain their formation theoretically. Research initially focused on whether communist rule had created distinctive forms of cleavage in the region as a whole, or indeed obliterated social capacity to form any structured social or ideological divisions. The results of this work, however, have tended to support a more differentiated and less sui generis understanding in which the character of cleavages varies considerably across the region. Debate has turned to accounting for the formation and variation in cleavages by reference to factors such as long-standing cultural legacies, forms of communist rule and modes of transition from it, the effects of social structure and individual social experience in the post-communist period, and the impact of institutions and party strategies.
In the literature about the dimensionality of the left-right political distinction there is some controversy. Some authors argue for unidimensionality (people’s attitudes vis-à-vis equality and inequality; or socioeconomic issues as the fundamental dividing line differentiating the left from the right). Other authors concede that socioeconomic issues are of fundamental importance to structure the left-right divide but, nevertheless, argue for multidimensionality: these latter authors consider that there are other relevant sets of criteria that also contribute significantly to differentiate the left and the right, other than socioeconomic issue, although more in some countries than in others.
Considering these controversies, we defined our two major objectives. First, we want to test the dimensionality of left-right voting alignments among the mass public of several (21) European countries at the individual level. Second, we want to test the differentiation of the dimensionality of the left-right divide as a «dimension of identification» (i.e., as a dividing line of citizens’ voting behaviour) and as «dimension of competition» (i.e., as a dividing line structuring party competition and that might have some impact on citizens’ voting behaviour).
Our fundamental findings are the following. First: as «dimension of identification», LR voting has a multi-dimensional character: it is anchored in multiple sets of values orientations, both economic and non-economic. Second, the same cannot be said when we discuss it as a «dimension of political competition»: LR party-system polarization only has a significant and positive impact on left-right value voting for socioeconomic values.
This study analyzes the development of party identification, left-right tendance, and affect for political leaders in Spain during the transition to the democratic monarchy. Using data from three national surveys conducted in 1978, 1980, and 1984, it demonstrates that the growth of party identification has lagged behind the acquisition of left-right placement and opinions of leaders. It examines a number of variables traditionally associated with partisanship and finds that the most likely explanations for the Spanish puzzle are political rather than personal or social; that is, they relate to the low continuity in party images in Spain, especially on the right. A variety of factors affecting the acquisition of partisanship in Spain are discussed.
Political parties provide a crucial link between voters and politicians. This link takes a variety of forms in democratic regimes, from the organization of political machines built around clientelistic networks to the establishment of sophisticated programmatic parties. Latin American Party Systems provides a novel theoretical argument to account for differences in the degree to which political party systems in the region were programmatically structured at the end of the twentieth century. Based on a diverse array of indicators and surveys of party legislators and public opinion, the book argues that learning and adaptation through fundamental policy innovations are the main mechanisms by which politicians build programmatic parties. Marshalling extensive evidence, the book's analysis shows the limits of alternative explanations and substantiates a sanguine view of programmatic competition, nevertheless recognizing that this form of party system organization is far from ubiquitous and enduring in Latin America. © Herbert Kitschelt, Kirk A. Hawkins, Juan Pablo Luna, Guillermo Rosas, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister 2010.
This article takes Ronald Inglehart's and Hans-Dieter Klingemann's (1976) study regarding party and ideological components of left-right identification as a point of departure for a comparative analysis of the relationship between party choice, value orientations and left-right self-placement. The empirical analysis is based on eight and thirteen countries from 1981 and 1990, respectively. Party choice is still the dominant predictor of left-right self-placement although its dominance is not as large as was shown in Inglehart and Klingemann's analysis. However, if value orientations are considered prior to party choice in a causal sense, value orientations have a larger impact than party choice in most countries. Fragmentation of the party system and the division between advanced and less advanced societies are used to explain the cross-national variations. When the explained variance in the left-right scale is decomposed into unique components explained by party choice and value orientations and a compounded component, a strong compounded component is characteristic in advanced societies, while a strong partisan component is found in less advanced societies and in less fragmented party systems.
Research on post-communist party systems must deal with (1) the extent to which party systems crystallize around programmatic cleavages or are based on clientelistic or charismatic parties and (2) if programmatic competition is high, the content of the major divisions that are represented by the parties. The extent to which programmatic structuring takes place in post-communism depends on countries' democratic experience and the nature of their democratic institutions fostering more personalized or more depersonalized power relations. These institutions, in turn, are influenced by the pathways of transition from communism to democracy, the type of communist rule and earlier traditions of democratization and industrialization in the inter-war era. With regard to the content of cleavage divisions, the paper identifies several configurations of party systems. Determinants are derived from voters' economic interests, the varying salience of socio-cultural conflicts in postcommunist countries and the relations among ethnic groups.
The basic premise of this article is that, contrary to the tabula rasa hypothesis, individuals in the new democracies of post-Communist Eastern Europe have been able to form meaningful political identities even under conditions of great fluidity and uncertainty. These identities are expressed through the pattern of voting choices that individuals make during successive elections. The authors based their analysis on a 1993 panel survey of a national sample of the adult Polish population first interviewed in 1988. They show that when political identity is conceptualized in a dynamic manner, the majority of the Polish electorate exhibit patterns of electoral choice that conform well to interpretable types of political identity. Such political identities are shaped by social group memberships and individuals' experiences under communism. These identities, in turn, shape individuals' orientations toward crucial issues related to the systemic transformation of their society.
Converse proposed a model drawing on an individual's experience with the vote and socialization by the father to explain the strength of political partisanship. This experience-based model, despite varied criticisms, has gained wide acceptance. By focusing on cases in which political experience and age are not collinear, this article finds that the Converse model fails to account for the strength of partisanship found among new electorates, thereby raising doubts about the model in general.
This paper utilises survey data from the 1999 European Value Study to conduct a quasi-experimental analysis of the relationship between the left-right self-identification and policy preferences of Germany's electorate. Given the German division until 1990 it is plausible that citizens from East and West Germany had different ideological socialisation experiences swayed by the political discourse of their times. This paper models the influence of this diverse experience on ideological thinking, and examines the effects on the understanding of political issues. The findings suggest that differences do exist in the ideological consistency and attitude structuring of respondents. Compared to respondents in the West, East Germans are more likely to understand the term 'left' in socio-economic terms. On the other hand, they seem to connect the term 'right' rather to xenophobic issues. These results have crucial implications for political communication in representative democracies, as they question the one-level dimensionality of the left-right concept.
The left–right schema has long been used in analyzing political cleavages in established democracies. This study applies the schema in a post-communist context by examining the structuring of political attitudes in Slovenia and Croatia. Findings from six public opinion surveys in each country during the 1990s demonstrate that left–right orientations in both countries are consistently influenced by religious beliefs, while an additional dimension focusing on democratization is found in Croatia. Economic issues did not constitute a significant axis of political competition. Changes and continuities in party locations and the basis of vote choice according to party supporters' left–right placements are also discussed.
The descriptions of economic policy reforms and performance in the Baltic States and Russia are based on adapted statistical material collected by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
This article focuses on new democracies in Eastern Europe and addresses two questions about the translation of social cleavages into political oppositions. The first question concerns the translation of preexisting cleavages: does the evolution of new party systems influence the politicization of social conflicts? The second question concerns the translation of new social cleavages, that is, cleavages that emerge once a party system freezes: can a new social cleavage be politicized? To answer these questions, the article integrates a formalization of social cleavage theory with a game-theoretic model of a new party system. The first result is that translation of preexisting cleavages depends on which parties survive the early rounds of electoral competition. In fact, depending on which parties survive, the axis of political conflict can shift by 90 degrees. This implies that party systems in new democracies should be seen as important founding moments, during which political actors determine the long-term axes of political conflict. The second result is that once a party system freezes, the politicization of a new social cleavage is difficult. Indeed, it is possible that a new social cleavage will remain politically dormant. In the context of Eastern Europe, this result suggests that political salience of class conflict is likely to be low because competitive elections and political parties predate the entrenchment of property-owning classes.
This study examines the structuring of political attitudes in Serbia through the framework of the left–right schema. Using data from public opinion surveys taken during the 1990s and early 2000s, the impact of socio‐demographic variables, economic interests, democratic support, social values, and nationalistic sentiments on respondents’ left–right orientations is analysed, as well as the relationship between left–right placements and support for individual political parties. Results show that in addition to age and religiosity, evaluation of communist rule and satisfaction with the state of democratic development form the main axis of contestation, while there is little evidence for economic, authoritarian–libertarian, or nationalist cleavages.
Electoral behavior in new democracies has received significant attention, but patterns of party system development in post-communist countries still raise questions about politicization of societal conflicts and their relevance for the configuration of parties. The article discusses political manifestation of emerging cleavages. First, the study conceptualizes the notion of cleavage. The analysis then identifies the main divisive issues and their effect upon the party system. The social structure and electoral behavior helps to identify emerging cleavages. The article concludes that the formation of cleavages has not stabilized yet, and that to date, societal conflicts only have partial influence on the party system in Lithuania.
Democracies inherit distinctive configurations of cleavages underlying differentially divisive issues. This article develops an empirical model that accounts for support for and opposition to postauthoritarian and postcommunist governments as a function of conflicts based on identities, ideologies, and interests. While conflicts inspired by regional identities have troubled Spanish politics, antagonism over alternative economic ideologies had already begun to fade under the authoritarian capitalism of the last decades of Francoism, and the religious factor has been largely peripheral. By now interests rather than ideologies or identities are at stake. In many postcommunist societies in which the absolute level of economic development is inferior to that reached by Spain at the time of its transition, polarities between market and command models endure, and these are often entangled with regional and religious divisions. In others, such as Hungary, where market experimentation preceded political democratization and preindustrial cleavages are less acute, new regimes come under less strain.
This article examines the emerging structure of party competition in the new democracies of Eastern Europe. It argues that the relationship between the social bases, issue dimensions and stability of party competition in countries in the region will vary depending on their differing experience of marketization, ethnic homogeneity and established statehood. In some countries, the predicted framework of party competition will derive from socio-economic divisions and will resemble that found in the West; in other countries, ethnicity and nation-building will provide the principal structuring factors; in yet other cases, where severe constraints exist on the emergence of any clear bases or dimensions, competition will centre on valence issues from which high voter volatility may be expected. Except where Western-type competition obtains, considerable doubts exist about the future stability of political systems in the region.
How can scholars select cases from a large universe for in-depth case study analysis? Random sampling is not typically a viable approach when the total number of cases to be selected is small. Hence attention to purposive modes of sampling is needed. Yet, while the existing qualitative literature on case selection offers a wide range of suggestions for case selection, most techniques discussed require in-depth familiarity of each case. Seven case selection procedures are considered, each of which facilitates a different strategy for within-case analysis. The case selection procedures considered focus on typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, most similar, and most different cases. For each case selection procedure, quantitative approaches are discussed that meet the goals of the approach, while still requiring information that can reasonably be gathered for a large number of cases.
This article analyzes the structuring of party systems of four East Central European countries. At the outset an assumption is proposed that the region is by no means homogeneous (as is often treated) but exhibits different levels of ideological articulation and party formation. First, we concentrate on the left-right ideological identities and its' attitudinal-issue correlates as well as the social roots of left-right ideological orientations. The main part deals with socio-political attitudes as predictors of ideological orientations, both on mass and elite level. The results indicate different levels of ideological structuration and political divisions of the party systems in Eastern Europe, which are explained not only by socio-economic factors, but mainly by varying experiences of pre-communist rule, communist governance and pathways to democracy.
The left-right political spectrum sits at the heart of political analysis. Yet questions remain as to the appropriateness of the left-right spectrum for the comparative analysis of party systems: does the left-right spectrum mean the same thing in different political contexts, and in particular is it appropriate to compare left-right self-placement in post-communist countries with left-right self-placement elsewhere? In this paper, we advance our understanding of this topic in three important directions. First, we demonstrate that (a) post-communist citizens have a leftist bias relative to the rest of the world but (b) they are more likely to rely primarily on economic attitudes in making that self placements than citizens elsewhere, who bring a combination of economic and social attitudes to bear on their left-right self placement. Second, we explore the socio-demographic and attitudinal profile of the post-communist left and the right in comparative perspective. Finally, we do not merely identify these distinctions, but rather seek to explain them in a systematic fashion by applying a theoretical framework we have previously developed (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010) for analyzing the effects of communist era legacies on political values, attitudes, and behavior in post-communist countries. We find that while neither the demographic legacies of communism nor macro-economic conditions associated with the transition can account for much of the leftist-bias of post-communist citizens, theories based on political socialization under Communism and Bayesian updating that takes account of experiences in the pre-communist, communist, and post-communist eras do help us to understand the sources of this left-wing bias. Taken together, we conclude that living through communism may indeed have conditioned the way in which citizens thought about their left-right ideological orientation, but it did not permanently fix these attitudes, and nor did it do so independent of prior, pre-communist, developments.
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