No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Introduction: researching networked insurgencies and foreign fighters in Eurasia
Abstract
Introducing this special issue of Caucasus Survey on networked insurgencies in Eurasia, this article discusses some of the key themes discussed in the issue. We present the case for the networked character of insurgencies in Eurasia, in which distinct insurgent fronts borrow, incorporate and transform ideas, goals and human experiences among themselves in a constantly shifting constellation. We briefly discuss the shifting role of networks and ideology in mediating Caucasian foreign fighter pathways to varying insurgent fronts in Iraq, Syria and Ukraine, the role of religious repression and the securitization of Salafism in security governance as a push factor, and the role and possible security threats that returning foreign fighters could present to their states of origin.
This article reviews and discusses the Russian foreign policy towards several countries in the Post-Soviet Space (Tajikistan, Ukraine and Georgia), and the Middle East (Syria). The Russian policy towards its near abroad shows elements of both (neo-)realism and constructivism. A realist perspective of Russian foreign policy seems evident as Russia pursues its own national (or imperial) geopolitical interest. However, it may not explain the Russian interventions satisfactorily. Analysing Russia’s intervention in these conflicts, it is important to look also at Russia’s own geopolitical vision; i.e. how Russia views the world, notably its near abroad, and Russia’s place, role or even mission in it. Russia has reacted to the NATO and European Union (EU) enlargements in its (former) geopolitical spheres of influence and has helped its ally Bashar Assad remain in power in Syria. The conflict in Ukraine is not irrelevant to that in Syria and the Russian experience in Chechnya and Tajikistan may have codetermined Russian intervention in Syria.
Despite their small number, foreign fighters in jihadist groups from the country of Georgia fighting in Syria and Iraq have played a significant role in the formation and leadership of several militant organizations. This study utilizes a sample of 29 Georgian citizens who died in the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts to ascertain the overall dynamics that shape foreign fighter mobilization and recruitment in Georgia. Notably, the study finds that substantial percentages of the foreign fighters originally came from small, isolated rural villages in various regions of Georgia, had family or friendship ties to other foreign fighters prior to leaving for the Middle East, and spent time in a country outside Georgia before progressing onwards to Syria and Iraq. Close, in-person connections and similar experiences and demographics amongst the fighters in the sample provide strong evidence for the thesis that offline personal networks determine foreign fighter mobilization rather than any large-scale socio-economic factor or by “online radicalisation,” thus adding to broader debates concerning foreign fighter mobilization in the post-Soviet space and around the world.
Exactly one year ago, the first edition of this Egmont Paper was released. Its aim was to explore the wider circumstances that could help explain the decision of thousands of, mostly young, European volunteers to journey to a faraway war theatre in the Levant.
This Egmont Paper is a thoroughly revised, updated and expanded version. Several new features have been introduced. It proposes, firstly, a more systematic attempt at understanding why people with different social backgrounds feel attracted by IS, also known by its Arabic acronym Daesh. Two categories of Syria travellers (a more general term than ‘foreign fighters’) can be identified. For a first group comprises pre-existing kinship and friendship gangs. For them, joining IS is merely a shift to another form of deviant behaviour, next to membership of street gangs, rioting, drug trafficking, and juvenile delinquency. But it adds and opens a thrilling, bigger-than-life dimension to their way of life – indeed transforming them from delinquents without a future into mujahedeen with a cause.
Whereas most individuals of the first group are known to the police, this is not necessarily the case for the second group. Before suddenly deciding to leave for Syria, the youngsters in this group didn’t show any sign of deviant behaviour and nothing seemed to distinguish them from their peers. But frequently they refer to the absence of a future, to personal difficulties they faced in their everyday life, to feelings of exclusion and absence of belonging, as if they didn’t have a stake in society. They are often solitary, isolated adolescents, frequently at odds with family and friends, in search of belonging and a cause to embrace. At a certain point, the succession of such estrangements resulted in anger.
The relative share of both groups may differ according to national backgrounds. But, however different in background and motivations, they share common characteristics. Together these constitute the subculture on which IS’ force of attraction thrives. ‘No future’ is the essence of the youth subculture that drives the majority of Syria travellers from the West. The explanation for their decision is found not in how they think, but in how they feel. Going to Syria is an escape from an everyday life seemingly without prospects. Vulnerability, frustration, perceptions of inequity, and a feeling that by traveling to Syria they have nothing to lose and everything to gain, are common traits among both groups.
Religion is not of the essence. As of lately, Europol has also begun to acknowledge the declining role of religion in the foreign fighters issue. Religion has systematically decreased as a driver of terrorism as the waves of foreign fighters succeed one another.
This is indeed the second new feature of this updated Egmont Paper. On closer examination, the current foreign fighters movement represents the fourth wave of jihadi terrorism, as originally conceived by Marc Sageman in 2008. The first wave fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan and became the companions-in-arms of Osama bin Laden. The second wave were often elite expatriates from the Middle East who went to the West to attend universities. Motivated by the suffering of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Philippines, they volunteered to fight in those hotspots. But by 2004–2005, the first two waves of truly global jihadi travellers had reached their limits.
The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 breathed new life in the decaying jihadi terrorist scene. A new wave of radicals emerged, angered by this invasion. This wave was labelled ‘home-grown’. They entered the jihadi scene through local kinship and friendship bonds, and were often connected to the global context via the internet. By 2008-2010, the third wave too had run its course.
The start of the civil war in Syria in 2012 and the emergence of potent jihadi groups in the Levant, in particular IS, once again reinvigorated a waning jihadi movement. It gave rise to a new, fourth wave of militants and wannabe foreign fighters. The fourth wave resembles its immediate predecessor by the local dynamics of the networks. Nowadays too, they are formed among friends and family who have known each other for years. Distinct from the third wave is the opportunity to again link up with one another on the battlefield, as part of a conquering terrorist and insurgent organisation: IS. As a result, technical expertise can again be acquired and skills transferred, in particular training with assault weapons.
Just like the preceding waves, the fourth wave of foreign fighters too will ultimately end, mostly for the same reasons as its predecessors. But the time needed to reach this point depends also on the measures we collectively take in reacting to the phenomenon. A final new section in this update deals with these measures. Five policy recommendations are suggested that might effectively contribute to countering the current wave of foreign fighters – and protect a new generation from following suit.
Firstly, reframe the debate. Unless we understand how the motivations of the fourth wave foreign fighters essentially derive from a ‘no future’ subculture and not simply from a narrative, prevention will fail. Secondly, focus on tailor-made approaches. One-size-fits-all overall deradicalisation initiatives will be of marginal use. Thirdly, separate the discussion on Islam in Europe from deradicalisation initiatives. The discussion on a ‘European Islam’ is a discussion worth to be held for its own merits, on its own terms, and with Muslims in the lead. It should not be pushed within the deradicalisation framework. Not only will this not work as envisaged, it will also harden positions, corrode an already fragile social fabric, and thus backfire. Fourthly, don’t get terrorized by terrorists. Following the July 2005 bombings in London, the London mayor Ken Livingstone reacted in simple and inclusive terms. Inclusiveness is a tough thing to come by in today’s frenzied debates. Finally, invest in intelligence (for a proper long term perspective) and encourage short-term operational information sharing.
In this article, we not only extend the concept of linkages and leverage to the realm of conflict studies, we also add an important linkage – ideas about political power which we call power ideas – and we expand on the causal mechanisms that turns linkages into leverage in a conflict situation. We examine the impact of the power ideas of nationalism and Islamism in the cases of two major conflicts in the region: Crimea and Chechnya. Within-case comparison of episodes of conflict-prevention vs. annexation (Crimea in the 1990s vs. 2014) and violent conflict vs. cooptation in Chechnya (1990s and 1999 onwards) provides the empirical basis to assess the scope and limitations of the international context allowing for the activation of power ideas and their transformation into leverage.
This article examines foreign fighters and the insurgency in the North Caucasus. The first part of the article addresses conceptual issues concerning the ways that foreign fighters are analysed, posing this more widely in terms of transnational activism. Here I examine the importance of kin and relatedness. I develop this argument in the second part of the article, which examines pan-Islamism and transnational activism in the post-Soviet period. The third section draws attention to the different groups of foreign fighters, as part of a wider activist movement in the North Caucasus. Here I show that a complex group of transnational activists from the Greater Middle East, North Africa, parts of Europe, and Central Asia participated in the conflicts in the North Caucasus. Finally, the article turns to examine volunteers from the North Caucasus who travelled to fight in Syria, concluding with some considerations about the reintegration of returnees and former activists.
Facing the Fourth Foreign Fighters Wave: What Drives Europeans to Syria, and to Islamic State? Insights from the Belgian Case
- Rik Coolsaet
Foreign Fighters in Syria: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq The Soufan Group
- The Soufan
- Group
The Soufan Group. 2015. Foreign Fighters in Syria: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign
Fighters into Syria and Iraq. New York: The Soufan Group. http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate_FINAL3.pdf.
North Caucasian Fighters in Syria and Iraq and Russian Language Propaganda
- Europol
Europol. 2015. North Caucasian Fighters in Syria and Iraq and Russian Language Propaganda. 30
September. The Hague: Europol.
); news sites Kavkazskiy Uzel and Radio Free Europe
- Aaron Y Zelin
For examples, see the sites managed by Joanna Paraszczuk (http://www.chechensinsyria.
com), Aaron Y. Zelin (http://jihadology.net/) and North Caucasus Caucus (http://
northcaucasuscaucus.blogspot.co.uk/); news sites Kavkazskiy Uzel and Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty also regularly cover related themes.
The North Caucasus Insurgency and Syria: An Exported Jihad?
ICG (International Crisis Group). 2016. The North Caucasus Insurgency and Syria: An Exported
Jihad? Europe Report No. 238, 16 March. Brussels: International Crisis Group.