Appealing to Frankfurt examples, Peter French concurs that persons can be morally blameworthy for what they have done even if they could not have done otherwise (the “lesson”). However, if “ought not” implies “can refrain from” and “ought not” is equivalent to “impermissible,” it follows that moral impermissibility requires avoidability. But, then, if the popular principle that one is blameworthy ... [Show full abstract] for an action only if it is impermissible for one to do it is true, the lesson should be renounced. In this paper, I suggest that French has the resources to reject this popular principle and, hence, can escape this conundrum. I then give additional reasons against this principle by drawing on some of French’s insightful thoughts about heroism and responsibility. Finally, I introduce cases in which, owing to one’s character, on various occasions one cannot do otherwise. These cases are used as a springboard to explore, briefly, whether determinism or its falsity (indeterminism) threaten obligation.