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Right Wing Extremism in Canada: An Environmental Scan (2015)
Abstract and Figures
That terrorism associated with right-wing extremists is largely absent from the public agenda in Canada is evident from even a cursory review of the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) website, for example. The list of Terrorist Incidents, while international in scope, includes only one right wing terrorist incident – Anders Breivik’s horrific attacks in Norway in 2011. The list of Terrorist Entities does not include any reference to right wing extremist or white supremacist organizations. Nor do the publications included on the site mention these extremist elements. In contrast, that the extreme right continues to represent a viable and active presence is clear from recent events in Alberta, British Columbia and Quebec, for example, where multiple right-wing attacks, demonstrations and prosecutions have been recorded (e.g., Blood and Honour, White Nationalist Front, and PEGIDA) in recent years.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 shifted terrorism from the periphery to the centre of the public consciousness. What had heretofore been restricted to “fringe” groups, or something that happened “over there,” suddenly appeared to be something much larger, much more threatening, and much closer to home. One significant consequence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks is that they drew attention away from the more typical white domestic terrorist – such as Timothy McVeigh and members of right-wing extremist groups. Now the terrorist is defined by his brown skin, and his Muslim religion. Yet it behoves us, in the interests of domestic security, to continue to pay attention to the more traditional form of “home grown” RWE. Right-wing extremists continue to represent a distinctive threat to the well being of Canada’s diverse communities. This report aimed to paint a picture of the contemporary RWE movement in Canada, providing an analysis of membership, distribution and activities.
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... Most definitions share a number of components that distinguish RWE from other political and ideological stances. In almost all cases, the exclusionary nature of RWE movements is highlighted, whereby minority groups are presented as a threat to the dominant, racially-, ethnically-and sexually defined, primarily White nation (Perry -Scrivens 2015;Jackson 2021). States are perceived as illegitimate since they serve the interest of minorities, and thus undermine the legitimate power of the White man (Perry -Scrivens 2021). ...
... It may also be that general public opinion is strongly xenophobic, anti -immigrant, anti -Muslim, etc., which prevents states from concentrating more effort on far -right extremism that mostly emerges from the majority society (Gaston 2017). In the same vein, the blurring of the mainstream and extremism makes it very challenging to respond to RWE (Perry -Scrivens 2015). The evidence that in many countries extremist violent acts committed by individuals or groups from the far right exceed those committed by Islamists (Perry and Scrivens 2015) has often only become a concern following some major attacks, or other political factors (Blackbourn et al. 2019). ...
... In the same vein, the blurring of the mainstream and extremism makes it very challenging to respond to RWE (Perry -Scrivens 2015). The evidence that in many countries extremist violent acts committed by individuals or groups from the far right exceed those committed by Islamists (Perry and Scrivens 2015) has often only become a concern following some major attacks, or other political factors (Blackbourn et al. 2019). ...
The paper focuses on the question of what it means both conceptually and practically to talk about counter right ‑wing extremism (RWE) measures in an illiberal populist regime while the dominant political ideology or narratives are very close to those of right ‑wing extremists. Through a qualitative analysis of policies in the Hungarian context, the paper explores both the political and the policy scene to understand how the political context and policies identified as counter ‑RWE measures interact. Relying on the categorisation of counter ‑measures, different sets of policies are scrutinised: legal, security, anti ‑terrorism, and public order measures including education, prevention, exit, deterrence, training, and communication programmes. It was concluded that there is a lack of government strategy and policies for countering RWE including almost all relevant policy fields. It was also observed that hate crime incidents have increased under the illiberal regime while at the same time previously strong extremist militant activities have declined. However, as it is argued, it is not due to effective policies but the manipulating political strategy of the incumbent party.
... Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the House, equated aid to families with dependent children or single mothers with the downfall of civilization (Gingrich, 1995). Political fear mongering has made a space in public discourse for hate, to stoke fears of "Islamization" and the characterization of minorities as politically irrelevant at best or scapegoats for society's problems at large at worst (Perry & Scrivens, 2017;Fleras & Elliott, 2002). Increasingly the agenda of Domestic RWE is reflected not only in mainstream political discourse, but in the platforms of RW political parties (Mallea, 2011;McDonald, 2011;Art, 2006, Berezin, 2009, Mudde, 2005. ...
... Those who miscegenate or who do not support this white supremacist ideology are labeled "race traitors" and considered by adherents to be worse than non-whites (Aho, 1990;Fielding, 1981). Non-whites are invariably cast as the "other, " dehumanized, compared to animals, characterized as possessing a myriad of "uncivilized" qualities and referred to in unsympathetic, threatening language justifying violent reaction (Perry & Scrivens, 2017;Sharpe, 2000). ...
... Many would be extremists experience feelings of social isolation, low self-esteem, or disillusionment that cause them to actively seek out communities of like-minded individuals online (Seib & Janbek, 2011;Decker & Pyrooz, 2015;Moghaddam, 2008;Gewirtz & Baer, 1958;de Roy van Zuijdewijn & Bakker, 2016;Kailemia, 2016;Roger et al., 2007). These groups can offer membership in a family of peers, privileged information on "the way the world really is" and the chance to craft the user's own unique identity by contributing to an ideal greater than themselves (Roger, et al., 2007;Althusser, 1970;Perry & Scrivens, 2017;Moghaddam, 2008;Koehler, 2014). Group members begin to see the group as their family and strive to advance within it, their goals mesh with those of the group, and the pressure to conform even against social taboos is immense (Berger, 1967;Althusser, 1970;Asch, 1958;Milgram, 1974). ...
... Identification with gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity/nationality, religion, or a political group may be associated with more negative experiences, given how these identities are at the core of polarizing debates in society. In particular, xenophobic and masculinist movements have been on the rise and highly politicized in the past decades in North America and Western Europe (including Quebec; AON, 2020;Perry & Scrivens, 2015); this increase indicates a higher risk of real and/or perceived threat and injustice for individuals who identify or belong to these targeted groups. Regarding religion, despite it being a controversial, politicized, and historically polarizing topic in Quebec (Mancilla, 2011), prior findings in the same population suggest that religious beliefs play a protective role in terms of violent radicalization among students in Quebec, probably because of the affiliation and collective meaning they provide Rousseau et al., 2019). ...
Objective: Group processes and identities play a crucial role in the development of positive attitudes toward violent radicalization (VR). However, we do not know much about the impact of specific group identities on support for violent radicalization and the mechanisms that can explain how such associations unfold. This study investigates the independent and cumulative associations between multiple group identities and support for violent radicalization among Canadian college and university students and the potential moderating role of in-group identification and perceived public collective self-esteem in these associations. Method: Students (N = 5,598; Mage = 22.8; SDage = 7.5; 68.0% women) completed an online survey. Mixed-effects linear regression models and interaction analyses were implemented. Results: Identities related to political, gender, and sexual orientation groups were independently and cumulatively associated with higher support for violent radicalization (polarizing), whereas identities related to religion, profession, ethnicity, age, or leisure activities were cumulatively associated with lower support for violent radicalization (nonpolarizing). Identities related to religion and profession were independently associated with lower support for violent radicalization. The magnitude of associations between cumulative polarizing identities and support for violent radicalization was larger at low levels of perceived public collective self-esteem and high levels of in-group identification. Conclusions: Prevention efforts need to situate students’ identity development within the broader societal context, in a socioecological perspective. Supporting students’ multiple identities is a promising strategy to prevent violent radicalization, if we simultaneously work on local dynamics in order to enhance inclusion in schools and societies.
... The extremist ideologies of patients are aligned with violent extremism sociopolitical trends in the last decade. From 2014 to 2018 the Caliphate and religious extremism was at the forefront of the news and concern of the Canadian government (Jensen & Larsen, 2021;Rousseau et al., 2019), while the threat posed by the extreme right and by anti-system and masculinist movements was characterized as the principal terrorist threats by policy makers in Canada more recently, since 2021 (Artz, 2022;Kelly et al., 2021;National Security Council, 2021;Perry & Scrivens, 2015;Rottweiler et al., 2021). The relatively large group of patients referred for what proved to be non-ideological forms of violence reflects the growing attraction to mass killers and school shooters by youth and the increase in online consumption and glorification of violence (Adam-Troian et al., 2021;Podoshen et al., 2014;Venkatesh et al., 2021). ...
The association of ideologically motivated violence with mental health disorders raises specific challenges for security agencies and clinical services. The aim of this paper is to describe the clientele of a specialized intervention program based in Montreal, Quebec, in terms of type of violent ideology and clinical presentation. We conducted a retrospective chart review of 156 individuals referred for violent extremism who received clinical services between 2016 and 2021. Univariate statistics were used to present a description of client sociodemographic and clinical characteristics. Roughly a third of clients referred for violent extremism presented non-ideologically based violence (32.6%), followed by 31.4% affiliated with far-right extremist ideology and over a quarter (25.6%) holding extremist views on gender. Over a third of these individuals had a stress-related (35.7%) and/or mood and anxiety disorder (36.9%), followed by 28% with an autism spectrum disorder diagnosis. The majority had some previous contact with mental health services. A significant number of clients displaying extremist discourses and/or actions needed psychiatric services but often failed to receive them because of the reluctance of clinicians to work with individuals perceived as high risk; in addition, individuals may be reluctant to engage in services perceived to be part of a socio-political system they reject. Specialized services are important as a means to provide mental health care to this group and also to develop knowledge and best practices for working with this clientele and provide consultation to mainstream mental health service providers.
... A large proportion of the programs have been created in the last four years, and only about ten of them had reached the rollout phase at the time of the interviews. That said, the absence of programs in several provinces and territories-particularly the Maritimes and central Canada-is a concern considering that active right-wing extremist groups have been identified in all areas, including Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba (Perry & Scrivens, 2015). Despite this, no secondary or tertiary prevention programs in the context of violent radicalization could be identified in these provinces through this mapping. ...
... Public opinion is divided around government decisions to decrease immigration numbers or to proscribe the use of personal religious symbols in apparel by public servants in positions of authority (Kirmayer, 2019). In addition, xenophobic policies in the United States and the increasing polarization in Europe have also contributed to creating divisions in the province that benefit, among others, white supremacist extremist organizations, which feed on this tense social context (Perry & Scrivens, 2015), and contribute to a rhetoric depicting immigrants and refugees as potential criminals rather than as vulnerable populations (Rousseau et al., 2011). ...
This article presents a preliminary evaluation of training sessions promoting a systemic approach to violent radicalization (VR) offered to first-line health and education professionals in Quebec. We describe the rationale and content for the training program, its general principles and implementation modalities. The mixed-method evaluation indicated that the participants felt the training increased their level of confidence in dealing with VR in their work. It appeared that training also shifted participants’ attitudes significantly on four items with decreases: (1) worry about the extent of VR of young people in Quebec; (2) belief that VR should automatically be reported to the police; (3) thinking that Islam favors VR; and (4) assumption that enhanced security measures would have a deterrent effect on VR. The conclusion discusses the challenges associated with violent radicalization training programs, emphasizing the delicate ethical and political questions related to the provision of training on this socially divisive topic.
The Western world has witnessed an enormous rise of exclusionary populism; some of it expressed by politicians, and much of it promoted by online extremist groups. The Internet can be seen as a suitable medium for delivering hate speech anonymously and without penalty. Such hate speech encourages fear and hatred towards Muslims. Contemporary anti-Muslim racism has its roots in colonialism and Orientalist ideology. Although hate crimes are thought of as being physical and in-person, they often involve public speech, much of which now happens online. In the Canadian context, hate speech has gained public expression with the emergence of the People's Party of Canada (PPC) and through the growth of online groups that advocate the exclusion of non-white or non-Western people, especially Muslims. Using critical discourse analysis, we analyze the expressions of such sentiments on the Facebook page of Pegida Canada. We consider how the group's Facebook presence contributes to anti-Muslim racism and what this tells us about the rise of exclusionary populism. Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West-PEGIDA Pegida Canada is a group of like-minded Canadians that are bringing awareness to the people in regards to threats to our great country. We want to preserve our culture. We are labelled by the leftists as a white supremacist or neo-Nazi-based movement, and that is so far from the truth. We respect the First Nations cultures that were here before colonisation. We also respect Veterans and those men and women who still serve to protect our great country.-Pegida Canada, Disclaimer
This chapter opens with a brief definition of key terms such as “Muslim diasporas,” “prevention of violent extremism” (PVE), “countering violent extremism” (CVE) and discusses the role of Islamophobia in radicalization and its impacts on the prevention of radicalization. The size of the Muslim population in each of the selected five Western countries and the appearance of jihadist, left- and right-wing-groups, as well as the number of attacks resulting from these milieus are briefly discussed at the beginning of the country reports. The main body of this chapter discusses academic, governmental, and civil society approaches to PVE/CVE. For each country, some PVE examples are presented which might be helpful to policymakers and practitioners. A literature review regarding PVE/CVE approaches in each country seeks to provide an overview of the academic state of the art concerning the prevention of radicalization. Finally, a number of recommendations with regard to future PVE initiatives are provided, based on the author’s field research in Salafi milieus in various European countries.
This paper traces the meanings and impacts of the increased and transformed visibility of Muslim communities in Canada, as evidenced through their experiences of surveillance and violence. It explores the contours of this visibility as well as the consequences. Relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims are shaped in and through hostility, harassment and violence which is directed toward increasingly visible Muslim communities. Guiding the analysis of the connections between visibility and hate crime is a frame that draws upon Brighenti's ideal types of visibility: media-type, control-type and social-type.
This study examines whether the presence of hate groups increases the likelihood of serious ideologically motivated violence committed by far-rightists. While hate crime research has generally focused on a single state or made comparisons across several states, we seek to examine this relationship within the context of U.S. counties. A smaller unit of analysis allows for the simultaneous consideration of several social processes operating at the community level, which might also influence ideologically motivated offending by far-right extremists. We test the relationship using data from the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) for the dependent measure, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) for the hate groups measure, and various other sources for additional variables. We find that the existence of a hate group in a county is significantly related to the occurrence of far-right ideologically motivated violence.
Little is known about the nature of far-right lone wolf terrorism and how this form of violence varies across different types of suspects. Relying on data from the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), we comparatively examine characteristics of far-right homicides in the United States perpetrated by suspects with no evident affiliations with domestic terrorist organizations. Surprisingly, we found that this form of lone wolf terrorism has generally not increased during the past decade. We also found important differences, such as in suspects’ mental health, in statuses of homicide offenders who operate alone compared to those who associate or act with others.
This article addresses Alberta’s conservative political and social milieu with attention to teachers engaged with their students in school activism on social justice issues. Its purpose is to shed light on the experiences of teachers who address extremism through school-based activism with young people. A brief historical overview of Canada’s racist past includes a focus on Alberta’s specific regional political scene and on hate-group activities over the past several decades. The effect is traced of this past on contemporary discourses about diversity. Examples of responses to diversity backlash and extremism are offered with reference to a particular student social justice program and current research that studies diversity activism in Canadian schools. Excerpts from interviews with teacher activists address how their work is affected by this context as they implement social justice initiatives in schools.
Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies covers key foundational topics by defining terrorism and introducing its history and causes. The book introduces readers to the modern landscape of terrorism and discusses terrorist environments (domestic, international, religious, etc.), as well as tactics, targets, and counterterrorism. Included in the Sixth Edition is an added focus on U.S. hate crimes and homeland security, in addition to new introductory discussions, information, and data throughout each chapter.
This paper explores the extent to which the hate movement in the United States has taken on a new, modern face. The strength of the contemporary hate movement is grounded in its ability to repackage its message in ways that make it more palatable, and in its ability to exploit the points of intersection between itself and prevailing ideological canons. In short, the hate movement is attempting to move itself into the mainstream of United States culture and politics. I conclude by arguing that antiracist and antiviolence organizations must continue to confront hate groups through legal challenges, monitoring, and education.
The rise in lone wolf terrorist attacks worldwide in recent decades makes understanding the types of targets lone wolves choose a crucial locus of research, yet this topic remains understudied. In light of this lacuna, this article analyzes 84 lone wolf terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States between 1940 and 2012, identifies patterns in lone wolf target selection, and proposes and tests causal explanations for these patterns. I find that (1) a majority of lone wolves select civilian targets in familiar areas and (2) this is due to their relative weakness and their ideology.