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T. Kochegarova, R. Simonyan
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7
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Integration is one of the main conse-
quences of globalization. Elements of mi-
crosystems are growing closer, which
brings to the foreground problems of in-
teraction and — in a longer perspective —
those of close cooperation between differ-
ent social systems. The article considers
the case of North-West Russia, the only
territory having a common border with the
EU, in order to examine the issue of Russia
using the geographical factor, which Otto
von Bismarck called the most powerful and
intrinsic factor in history. The significance
of this factor increased after the Cold War.
It was then when the independent Baltic
States became a platform for emergence
and recognition of the Baltic Sea region.
The author focuses on the social and cul-
tural integrity of the region and considers
the traditional Nordic countries and the
Baltic Sea states as interrelated compo-
nents of a single region, different from
other European regions in terms of eco-
nomic interests, as well as its natural and
sociocultural landscape.
Key words: global challenges, region-
alization, cooperation, partnership, inter-
civilization border areas, Western and Rus-
sian values, sociocultural diffusion, con-
vergence, European integration
The inter-civilisation interaction
has always been an important factor of
the development of humanity. The
world is developing along the path of
convergence and globalisation. The
development of interconnections and
interdependences between different
countries, peoples, and their cultures
has spread to various aspects of social
life. In the modern risk-fraught world,
the role of inter-civilisation and cross-
culture interaction in ensuring the
world stability is constantly increasing.
NORTH-WEST RUSSIA
IN THE CONTEXT
OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION
T. Kochegarova
R
. Simonyan*
* Institute of Sociology of the Russian
Academy of Sciences
24/35, Bldg. 5, Krzyzanowski St., Moscow,
117218, Russia
Submitted on December 28, 2012.
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2013-2-6
© Kochegarova T., Simonyan R., 2013
B
altic Region. 2013. No. 2 (16). P. 57—65.
International cooperation
58
In this context, border areas are of special interest. It is the border areas
where an immediate contact of different sociocultural communities takes
place. Russian social scientists are especially interested in this since Russia’s
unique geographical feature is a significant number countries bordering on it.
Effective cross-border cooperation with the neighbouring countries is rele-
vant both for Russia and its border regions. Given the genesis of the Russian
state and the historical development of Russia, the country’s interaction with
uniting Europe seems to be of special importance for the efficient use of its
geostrategic resources. The country benefits from its location on two conti-
nents when modernising its social system (the economic, social, political,
and legal aspects).
As a result of the 1990s reforms, Russia is faced with the choice whether
to further develop the country or maintain its current state. Today, Russia
needs neither the deifying of the West, in which some have succeeded, nor
the idolising of its own uniqueness, in which others strive to succeed even
more. Russia rather needs a clear understanding of reality and maximum use
of modern achievements without losing the country’s individuality, as has
already been done by the most advanced Asian countries and is being done
by advanced states of South America. Russia, as well as Ukraine and Bela-
rus, is following a special, but still European path of development. A wider
interaction with united Europe increases Russia’s chances of modernisation
and, thus, establishes more fruitful relations with China, India, the Pacific
Rim, the USA, Latin America, and, of course, post-Soviet states, first of all,
Ukraine. Today’s Russian nomenklatura gets irritated when the European
Union pursues a policy based on such values as democracy, supremacy of
law, human rights, competition without the exploitation of administrative re-
sources, etc. towards the former-Soviet space. But does it contradict the ob-
jectives set for the new, democratic Russia by its leadership in 1991? Aren’t
these the values that have been constantly declared by Russian politicians
today? And, finally, aren’t these the values stated in the Constitution of the
Russian Federation? One can hope that the expanding integration of the Rus-
sian Federation and the EU will make it possible to move from declarations
to actions.
As for the European Union, despite all complications in relations with
Russia, cooperation with Russia does not only save the EU from its energy and
raw material dependence on the Middle East and North Africa and self-im-
posed relations with unstable and dangerous regions of the world, but also a
necessary condition for a dignified response to the American, Japanese, Chi-
nese, and other global challenges and the preservation of its geostrategic
standing. Throughout centuries, Europe set the tune for the world, but today
the pressing issue is not that of leadership, but that of the role of Europe in the
globalized world. For Europe, the eastern enlargement of the EU is the only
opportunity to find its place in the international architecture of the future.
As early as in the post-war years, there appeared signs of Europe lagging
behind, first the USA and, then Japan in terms of economic development. In
the official documents, the EU leadership sets the task of turning the EU into
the driving force of the world economy based on knowledge, sustainable
T. Kochegarova, R. Simonyan
59
economic growth, and a higher employment rate, which is set out in the Lis-
bon Declaration of 2000. However, the economic achievements of Europe
turned out to be mediocre. Over the last 15 years, the average rate of the EU
economic growth has reached only 2.1 % against the world average of 3.7 %,
and the US average of 3.2 %.
Thus, both the European Union and the Russian Federation are facing
the same global challenges, responses to which largely depend on the com-
bination of the existing resources. Over the last decade, both Moscow and
Brussels have gradually understood the fact. In 2003, an agreement on the
formation of four “common spaces” between the Russian Federation and the
EU was reached at the EU-Russia summit. These spaces include the com-
mon economic space, the common space on freedom, security and justice,
the common space on external security, and the common space on research,
education, and culture. The EU leadership believes that the economic coop-
eration with Russia is a necessary condition for a dignified response to the
American and Japanese challenges [11, p. 14].
The border area of immediate contact between the RF and the EU com-
prises North-West Russia, whose considerable part belongs to the Baltic Sea
region and North-East Europe, which also constitutes a significant part of the
region. The Baltic Sea region countries are immediate neighbours of Russia.
Historically, they are not only EU member states. Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Finland, Estonia, and Russia used to be one state over a long period. Thus,
relations in this region feature elements of sociocultural homogeneity, a feel-
ing of common fate and common state interests.
The processes taking place in these areas largely exemplify the interac-
tion of Western and Eastern Christian values, which is manifested in the
economic, political, legal, ethnocultural, moral and psychological aspects of
the social practice traditional for these countries. These areas exhibit trends
towards increasingly conflict-prone situations, on the one hand, and proc-
esses of sociocultural diffusion, on the other. It results in the accelerating
trend of civilizational convergence of Western and Eastern Christianity. This
latent motive behind the formation of a united Europe is taking on a tangible
form alongside the economic and political considerations. For Europeans,
Christian values are uniting values. A vivid example of this trend is the
meeting of the leaders of two confessions — those of Orthodox Russia and
Catholic Poland — whose relations have been strained for a rather long time.
One should emphasise that the significance of cross-border neighbour-
hood is determined by features of adjacent regions. The territorial structure
of the Russian economy is of pronounced Eurocentric nature; Russia faces
the European Union with its most developed part, which shows a cultural
and innovative potential of global significance. A study into different areas
of cooperation between Russia and its neighbours is a relevant task for mod-
ern Russian social science, since Russia has to find a proper position within
the new geopolitical configuration.
The merging of all European ethnic groups without ignoring the unique
nature of each of them into a common organisational space is a response to
global challenges and a natural course of history. The need for European in-
International cooperation
60
tegration in order to preserve Europe’s standing in the world was clearly un-
derstood by the best Russian thinkers as early as the 19th century. S. Yu. Wit-
te wrote: “Imagine… the European countries united in one entity, one that
does not waste vast sums of money, resources, blood, and labour on rivalry
among themselves... If that were done, Europe would be much richer, much
stronger, more civilized, not going downhill under the weight of mutual ha-
tred, rivalry, and war. The first step toward attaining this goal would be the
formation of an alliance of Russia, Germany, and France. Once this was
done, other countries of the European continent would join the alliance...
But, if the European countries continue on their present course, they will be
running a risk of great misfortune” [1, p. 122—123]. A mere five decades
later, in 1939, this prophecy of the outstanding Russian reformer tragically
came true.
Interaction between North-West Russia and North-East Europe is widen-
ing due to a number of factors, first of all, due to their immediate neighbour-
hood. The American economist and a Nobel Laureate, Paul Krugman, be-
lieves that the trade volume between the USA and Canada would be
13.5 times as little if these countries did not border on each other [4, p. 208].
Another factor is similarity in mind-set, natural characteristics of the Nordic
peoples, which ensures mutual understanding. One can also quote the fa-
mous Dutch sociologist, G. Hofstede, who supervised large-scale cross-cul-
tural studies based on the psychological test methodology. When measuring
parameters of organisational culture on the “personal achievement — soli-
darity” scale, the author came to a conclusion that Swedes, Finns, Estonians,
the Danes, Norwegians, and Russians form one cluster, which he called the
“North European solidarity syndrome” [12]. Prof V. A. Yadov, who paid
special attention to the comparative analysis of ehtnocultural features, also
believes that, in general “the Russian cultural matrix is rather distant from
the Romance and Germanic ones and is closer to the mentality of the Nordic
peoples” [8, p. 68].
There are ample data obtained as a result of comparative studies, which
show that the Russian cultural matrix is distant from the Romance and Ger-
man ones and is much closer to the mentality of the Nordic countries. Close
centuries-long cooperation between Russians and Norwegians in ‘the Pomor
zone’ is an example of this closeness, which, at the current turn of the helix
of history, brings to the foreground preservation of the common historical
heritage and centuries-long traditions of cooperation from the Vikings-Va-
rangians and, later the Rurik Dynasty and the Novgorod princes to these
days. Today there is a task to further development this cooperation and form
its qualitatively new character. Close cooperation between two border towns,
Nikel and Kirkenes, may serve as an example of a new matrix of modern
neighbourhood policy, especially in developing the energy potential of the
Arctic, where Russia and Norway play a decisive role. Norway’s interest in
establishing special contacts with Russia through different organizations —
the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Council of Baltic Sea States
(CBSS), and the Northern Dimension (ND) has a tangible manifestation in
the form of investment.
T. Kochegarova, R. Simonyan
61
The centuries-long ties between Russia and Sweden, which were im-
mediate neighbours until 1918, are a subject of many historical and ethno-
graphical works. In particular, the famous economist, G. Myrdal, considers
the Russian commune and traditional Swedish settlements related phenom-
ena [13 p. 33—34]. The Swedish cultural studies scholar Magnus Ljung-
gren emphasises that Astrid Lindgren is Russian at heart and the popularity
of her character Karlsson is explained by the fact that is a Russian arche-
type [2, p. 129].
Interpenetration of cultures of the Baltic peoples was especially pro-
longed and intensive. So, the Old Slavic language was the official state lan-
guage in Lithuania until the 18th century. All fundamental legal documents
of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, including the Statutes and Metrica were
written in the Old Slavic. In 1573, the first Eastern Slavic grammar and the
first alphabet book were printed in Vilnius; almost until the end of the 16th
century, Lithuanians professed Orthodoxy. Prof. A. Juozaits, a former ad-
visor on culture to President Brazausaks, made a brief and categorical com-
ment on the point: “In terms of cultural studies, Lithuania is Baltoslavia”
[5, p. 3], which follows the same pattern as Academician D. Likhachev’s
definition of Russia as “Scandobyzantium” [6, p. 572]. One can give many
more examples emphasising the cultural and civilizational unity of the peo-
ples of the Baltic Sea region. Globalization contributes both to the aware-
ness and preservation of this unity. The Estonian writer K. Kender, when
debating with local Russophobes stressed that when an invasion of
aliens — either from the South or the West began, Estonians would re-
member that Russians are as Ugric as Estonians themselves [10]. Regard-
less of the ethnic component, close cooperation of neighbouring countries
becomes a condition for survival in the globalised risk-prone or, maybe,
even catastrophe-prone world.
History evolved in such a way that Russia — for seventy years — and
the countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic — for 45 years — opposed
Western Europe in the 20th century. However, it was an ideological opposi-
tion. Of course, it continued longer than the ideological opposition with
Germany in the 1930—1940s. Although its ramifications will influence peo-
ples residing in both Europe and the Baltic region for many years to come, it
did not affect the cultural and historical code of these peoples. It has to be
emphasised that the conflict between liberal democracy and Marxism-Len-
inism, which the current generation is so sensitive to, is just a passing his-
torical phenomenon.
Experts are right in considering Northern Europe as a single regional
system. In view of the changes that have taken place over the last decade, the
notion ‘Northern Europe’ has become broader and more multidimensional
than ever before. It would be only natural to consider the traditional Nordic
countries and the Baltic Sea region states as interdependent components of a
single region that is distinguished from other regions not only by its eco-
nomic interests, but also by a common natural and sociocultural landscape.
The regional identity is described as “non-European, non-Catholic, non-
Rome, non-imperialist, non-colonial, non-exploitative, peaceful, small, and
International cooperation
62
social-democratic” [14, p. 21]. The public opinion of many Northern Euro-
pean countries is increasingly in favour of including North-West Russia into
the Nordic space. Consequently, the growth in regional consolidation does
contribute to the integration of European space, and this aspect is of special
significance and relevance to Russia.
The alliance, which emerged in Europe in the 20th century, turned out to
be neither a “Fatherland of Europe”, as Charles de Gaulle expected it to be,
nor a “Europe of Fatherlands”, as K. Adenuaer once wrote, but rather a
“Europe of regions”, as Giscard d’Estaign called it 20 years later. Russia is
also an alliance of regions — and not only in terms of the political and ad-
ministrative organisation of a federative state. The sociocultural and geo-
strategic diversity of Russia stands comparison with that of the European
Union, including in terms of receptivity to social innovations.
North-West Russia has its own regional features distinguishing it from
other Russian regions, so does the regionality of North-East Europe. North-
ern Europe has its specific features that differ the region from other Euro-
pean regions. However, these specific features are quite similar to those of
North-West Russia. At the same time, it is not only the geographical (rela-
tively harsh climate), political, (long-standing social-democratic traditions,
pacifism as a key value), economic (stable, verified competitive economy),
confessional (Christian values), mental and psychological (calm, tolerant,
diligent people), but also ideational and conceptual perception of itself as a
certain and distinctive social and spatial unity and the awareness of belong-
ing to a special collective cultural and historical identity. Russian North-
West, which is quite similar to its EU neighbours in the aforementioned
characteristics, does not only complete the constructive unity of this cross-
border sociocultural zone, but also attaches a greater geocivilisational
meaning to it.
The geostrategic position of North-West Russia as a border region ac-
counts for its specific sociocultural features, which is manifested in the mass
consciousness of the most promising and active part of its population. Both
value systems and attitudes of the respondents make it possible to speak of
additional resources for the expansion of sociocultural interaction between
Russia and the EU. Statism — a common, even hereditary quality of Rus-
sians and the Finnish — has a geographical component: a harsh natural envi-
ronment and low population density. Secondly, it is provincialism, which is
explained by two main reasons: 1) a distant location from the traditional
European centres, and 2) a much later — in comparison to the rest of
Europe — formation of the urban population (earlier, the absolute majority
of the Russian, Baltic, Finnish, and Norwegian population was rural). How-
ever, unlike Russia, the provincialism of our neighbours is aggravated by the
feeling of their “minority” — small territory and sparse population, which
has never (expect for a few periods of European history) allowed them to
make larger European states and, first of all, Russia take their position into
account. The need to compensate for their “minority” was handled by these
countries with different degrees of success. Finland and Norway achieved
the best results.
T. Kochegarova, R. Simonyan
63
The development of regional integration in Northern Europe reflected
the opposition between two political concepts — those of an “outpost” and a
“bridge”. The former suggests that regional integration should contribute to
the transformation of the Nordic countries into a fortress of the West at a
border with the East. The advocates of the latter theory considered these
states as a reducer of tension ensuring the cooperation of two systems;
Finland was the most successful in fulfilling this function.
The North of Europe, which includes North-West Russia, is an exam-
ple of broad development of intergovernmental, multilateral, transbound-
ary, and other heterogeneous ties, which gained a new impetus in the
1990s, when the ideas and practices of regionalism entered the phase of in-
tensive development. It was a result of the concern of the Nordic countries
about an increase in political competition, as well as the trend towards
Euro-construction, which could make the Nordic countries a marginal
Euro-periphery [9, p. 109]. A larger scale of interaction between Russia
and the EU significantly increases this threat. “After the Baltics had en-
tered the EU and 1.5 mln Russians or approximately 2 mln Russian-spea-
king persons had become citizens of united Europe and almost 1 mln resi-
dents of the Kaliningrad exclave had virtually found themselves within its
borders,” T. M. Kochegarove rightfully states, “this cooperation gained ad-
ditional advantages” [3, p. 45].
When assessing the prospects of integration of the western and eastern
parts of the North of Europe, which is becoming increasingly relevant in
connection with the future development of Arctic hydrocarbons, the repre-
sentative of the Russian Federation in Finland Prof V. A. Shlyamin empha-
sised that the features and rates of integration would largely depend on the
results of the dialogue on the Russia — EU level [7, p. 30]. As an integral
unity, the North of Europe includes two territorial formations: the North-East
of the EU and North-West Russia. North-West Russia has unique in their
scale deposits of natural resources (19 % of proven national oil reserves and
22 % of proven national gas reserves, ferrous, non-ferrous, and rare-earth
metals, diamonds, apatite, mica, marble, sweet water, timber, etc.). The
Shtokman gas field, which was discovered in 1988, is assessed today at
3.8 trln cubic metres and 30 bln tons of gas condensate. Large gas reserves
were also discovered in the Kara Sea.
The subsoil of North-West Russia is much richer than that of any Euro-
pean country, and a number of gas, oil, diamond, non-ferrous metal fields
are considered unique on the world scale. Its timber resources are esti-
mated at 9.5 mln cubic metres; the quality of timber, according to interna-
tional experts, is one of the highest in the world. North-West Russia has
access to the Baltic and Barents Seas and eight large seaports, being situ-
ated in the vicinity of main industrial centres of the Russian Federation.
According to the customs authorities, 80 % of EU cargo is transported
through North-West Russia. If the specific weight of the EU countries in
Russian international trade amounts to 54 %, in that of North-West, it is
much higher (68 %) [7, p. 39]. The share of foreign investment in the Rus-
sian region is also very high — 70 % of the total foreign investment. As to
International cooperation
64
the cost measurement, the share of foreign trade amounts to 20 % of the
national average; here, North-West Russia yields only to the Central Fed-
eral District. All three main sectors — raw materials, manufacturing, and
research and innovation ones — are well represented in the economy of
North-West.
It has to be noted that Russian enterprises do not aspire to develop cred-
itworthy projects to attract foreign investors. Alongside lack of own capital,
it is a result of lack of knowledge and, sometimes, lack of desire to make
business transparent, since the invitation of a foreign partner requires full
disclosure of accounting documents and financial flows. And of course,
there is still a problem of the unchanged taxation system, customs duties,
and the fiscal policy towards foreign investors. The need for investment is
exacerbated by the fact that most of the largest mineral deposits of North-
West Russia — both those of hydrocarbons and nonferrous and rare-earth
metals (aluminium, tin, titanium, magnesium, nickel, lead, chromium, zinc,
beryllium, bismuth, molybdenum, tungsten, etc.) — are scattered over a
large territory. These deposits often situated at a considerable distance from
railways, transmission lines, and settlements. Considering its rich mineral
resources, North-West Russia — as well as the Scandinavian and the Baltic
countries — is considered today a priority and essential prerequisite for
European economic growth. In terms of achieving this goal, the north-west-
ern region is an invaluable intermediate area between Russia and Europe, be-
tween Eastern Christian and Western Christian civilisations. This Russian
territory can boast a significant intellectual, industrial, and cultural potential,
considerable natural resource deposits, and a developed transport and com-
munications infrastructure.
A comparison of the current trends and developments taking place in
North-West Russia and the neighbouring Baltic States, Finland, and Scandi-
navia, makes it possible to identify the most efficient ways of promoting mu-
tually beneficial cooperation.
References
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T. Kochegarova, R. Simonyan
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About the authors
Dr Tamara Kochegarova, Academic Secretary, Russian-Baltic Centre,
Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia.
E-mail: sim@isras.ru
Prof. Renald Simonyan, Chief Research Fellow, Head of the Russian-
Baltic Centre, Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Russia.
E-mail: sim@isras.ru
