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Lacan's La Troisieme: English Translation

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La troisi`eme
Jacques Lacan
VII`eme Congr`es
De l’´ecole freudienne de Paris
Rome
1er novembre 1974
Translated by Yolande Szczech
I am not a French scholar. I was just frustrated at the lack of an English translation of
this key text, so I took matters into my own hands. I apologise for any mistakes.
This translation is based on Pierre-Alain Lecat’s transcription of Lacan’s lecture, known
henceforth as the Staferla version (Lecat, 2015) but I have also made use of Patrick
Valas’ version (Valas, 2015). When I was in doubt about the text, I referred to Valas’
audio recording (Lacan, 1974).
Any text placed in square brackets in either language was not spoken by Lacan.
Footnotes in French are those of the original transcripts, prefixed (in bold) by ‘Valas:’
or ‘Staferla:’. I also record any instances where Valas’ text differs (materially) from
Staferla’s in the footnotes
Footnotes in the English are translations of the French (with the appropriate prefix) as
well as (for what it’s worth) my own comments.
All the wonderful diagrams are from the Staferla version.
1
[D´ebut : 1’ 20”]
La Troisi`eme,1c’est le titre. La troisi`eme, elle revient, c’est toujours la premi`ere,
comme dit G´erard de Nerval.2Y objecterons-nous que ¸ca fasse “disque”? Pourquoi pas,
si ¸ca “dit ce que”. Encore faut-il, ce “dit-ce-que”, l’entendre, ce quelque chose que le
disque “ourdrome”.3
Si j’injecte ainsi un bout de plus d’onomatop´ee dans la langue, ce n’est pas qu’elle
soit4en droit de me retoquer: il n’y a pas d’onomatop´ee qui d´ej`a ne se sp´ecifie de
son syst`eme phon´ematique, `a la langue. Vous savez que pour le fran¸cais, Jakobson l’a
calibr´e: c’est grand comme ¸ca [matrice phonologique]. Autrement dit, que c’est d’ˆetre
du fran¸cais que le disque “ourdrome”.5 ,6 Je temp`ere ¸ca `a remarquer qu’“ourdrome” est
un ronron qu’admettraient d’autres lalangues, si j’agr´ee bien de l’oreille `a telle de nos
voisines g´eographiques, et que ¸ca nous sort naturellement du jeu de la matrice, celle de
Jakobson, celle que j’en sp´ecifiais `a l’instant.
1Valas: Intervention au Congr`es de Rome (31.10.1974/3.11.1974) parue en Lettres de l’ ´
Ecole freu-
dienne, n.16, 1975, pp.177-203.
2Valas: G. de Nerval, “Po´esies et souvenirs”, Paris, Gallimard, Collection Po´esie, 1974, p. 139. “La
treizi`eme revient... C’est encore la premi`ere’
3Valas: ‘ce quelque chose que le disque-ours de Rome’.
4Valas: ‘ce n’est pas qu’elle ne soit’.
5Valas: ‘c’est d’ˆetre du fran¸cais que le discours de Rome peut s’entendre disque’ourdrome’.
6Valas: Qui s’entend: “disqu’ours d’Rome”, “discourdrome”, “dit-ce-que-court”, “dit qui secourt’.
2
La Troisi`eme,7 ,8 that’s the title. The third, it returns, it’s always the first as G´erard
de Nerval says.9,10 Are we complaining that it makes a “record” [disque]?11 Why not,
if that’s what it says [dit ce que]. Provided you hear this “dit-ce-que” as something like
disque “ourdrome”.12
If I insert a bit more onomatopoeia into language like this, it’s not that it has the
right to reprove me:13 there is no onomatopoeia which has not already been specified in
its phonetic system, in language. You know that for French, Jakobsen has measured it:
it’s as big as this [the phonological matrix].14 In other words, it is to be in French that
the disque “ourdrome”.15,16 I temper this by noting that “ourdrome” is a purr which
occurs in other lalangues—if my ears agree with those of our geographic neighbours—and
naturally that takes us out of the game of the matrix, that of Jakobsen, which I will
specify right away.
7Valas: Talk at the Congress of Rome (31.10.1974/3.11.1974) published in Lettres de l’ ´
Ecole freu-
dienne, n.16, 1975, pp.177-203.
8“The Third” of Lacan’s three registers is the real. The first is the symbolic and ‘what is not
symbolized reappears in the real’ (Lacan, 1993, p83). Perhaps also, this is “The Third” of three lectures
Lacan presented at the University of Rome. The first—the “Rome Discourse”—published as “The
Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” (Lacan, 2006c) was given at the Rome
Congress of the Institute of Psychology in 1953. This set out Lacan’s vision for psychoanalysis and
marked his break with the Soci´et´e Psychanalytique de Paris (SPP) and the formation of the Soci´et´e
Fran¸caise de Psychanalyse (SFP). The second, “From Rome ‘53 to Rome ‘67: Psychoanalysis. Reason
for a defeat.” was given at the University of Rome in December 1967 (Lacan, 1967) and refers back to
the first Rome Discourse.
9Valas: G. de Nerval, “Po´esies et souvenirs”, Paris, Gallimard, Col lection Po´esie, 1974, p. 139.
‘The thirteenth returns... It’s still the first.’.
10The “thirteenth” that returns in de Nerval’s poem is the thirteenth card in a pack of tarot, i.e.
Death (Madrid, 2012).
11I have translated disque as “record”, since a record is always returning to the same place when it
is played on a turntable.
12I prefer Staferla’s disque “ourdrome” to Valas’ le disque-ours de Rome here, although the audio
sounds more like Valas’ transcription. The way Lacan uses the neologism “ourdrome” throughout in
the text, to me seems to imply a kind of meaningless noise or droning. So a disque “ourdrome” is a
scratched record, perhaps.
13Valas’ transcription, which is confirmed by the audio, is ‘ce n’est pas qu’elle ne soit’. Staferla drops
the “ne” here, and does so throughout the text, though it is too tedious to note all instances.
14Roman Jakobson’s classificatory matrix of phonemes (Michel Dispagne, 1997).
15Valas inserts a phrase here to try and make Lacan’s meaning clear: ‘it is to be in French that the
discours de Rome” is heard as “disqu’ourdrome”’.
16It’s hard to translate Valas’ comment in which he lists possible transcriptions of disque “ourdrome”,
but I’ll give it a go. Valas: One hears: disqu’ours d’Rome [= disque +ours (boorish (adj) bear (noun))
+d’Rome], discourdrome [= disque +ourdir (weave) + drome (arena/race course)], dit-ce-que-court [=
say what runs/circulates/drives?], dit qui secourt [= say who is helping?].
3
Bon... Comme il faut pas que je parle trop longtemps, je vous passe un truc. C¸ a
me donne l’occasion simplement, ct’“ourdrome”, de mettre la voix sous la rubrique des
quatre objets dits—par moi—petit (a), c’est-`a-dire de la revider de la substance qu’il
pourrait y avoir dans le bruit qu’elle fait, c’est-`a-dire la remettre au compte de l’op´eration
signifiante, celle que j’ai sp´ecifi´ee des effets dits de m´etonymie. De sorte qu’`a partir de l`a,
la voix—si je puis dire—la voix est libre, libre d’ˆetre autre chose que substance.17 Voil`a!
Mais c’est une autre d´elin´eation que j’entends pointer en introduisant ma “Troisi`eme”.
L’onomatop´ee l`a, qui m’est venue d’une fa¸con un peu personnelle, me favorise—
touchons du bois—me favorise de ce que le ronron, c’est sans aucun doute la jouissance
du chat. Que ¸ca passe par son larynx ou ailleurs, moi j’en sais rien, quand je les caresse
¸ca a l’air d’ˆetre de tout le corps, et c’est ce qui me fait entrer `a ce dont je veux partir.
Je pars de l`a, ¸ca vous donne pas forc´ement la r`egle du jeu, mais ¸ca viendra apr`es, hein.
“Je pense... donc se jouit”: Ha! C¸ a rejette le “donc” usit´e, hein, qui se dit “je souis”.
Bon, je fais un petit badinage l`a-dessus. Rejeter, hein, si c’est `a entendre comme
ce que j’ai dit de la forclusion: que rejet´e18—le “je souis”—¸ca reparaˆıt dans le r´eel. C¸a
pourrait passer pour un d´efi `a mon ˆage, `a mon ˆage o`u depuis trois ans—comme on dit
¸ca aux gens `a qui on veut l’envoyer dans les dents—depuis trois ans Socrate ´etait mort!
Mais mˆeme si je d´efuntais, hein, `a la suite... ¸ca pourrait bien m’arriver, c’est arriv´e `a
evi-Strauss,19 comme ¸ca, `a la tribune ... Descartes n’a jamais entendu—`a propos de
son “je souis”—dire qu’il jouissait de la vie. C’est pas ¸ca du tout. Quel sens ¸ca a, son
“je souis”? Ben exactement mon sujet `a moi, le “je” de la psychanalyse. [8’ 30”]
17Valas: Lacan passe ici d’une d´efinition de l’objet petit a comme contingence corporelle `a sa con-
sistance logique. Staferla: La d´esubstantialisation de la voix, son ´evidement, montre l’objet a comme
inter-dit dans la m´etonymie.
18Valas: ‘rejeter’.
19Valas: Lapsus de Lacan, il parle en fait de Merleau-Ponty.
4
As I must not speak for too long, I’ll leave something out. This simply gives me the
opportunity, this “ourdrome”,20 of putting the voice into the rubric of the four objects
that I call petit a, that is, of evacuating it [the voice] of any substance that there might be
in the noise that it makes, meaning, to re-attribute to the signifying operation that which
I have specified as the speech effects [effets dit] of metonymy. So, what follows from this
is that the voice—if I may—the voice is free, free to be anything but substance.21 But
there is another delineation that I mean to point out in introducing my “Troisi`eme”.
This onomatopoeia, which came to me in a rather personal way, supports me—touch
wood—supports me in that the purr, it’s without any doubt the jouissance of a cat.
What passes through its larynx or wherever when I stroke it—I don’t know anything
about it myself—seems to be passing through its whole body, and its this that’s brought
me to where I want to begin. I will begin from here, this doesn’t give you strictly
speaking the the rules of the game, but these will come later.
“I think... therefore it enjoys itself”.22 It discards the usual “therefore” [donc] that
says to itself “je souis”.23
I was joking just now. In discarding—if this is to be understood in the sense of
what I said about foreclosure—in discarding the “je souis”, “it” reappears in the real.
It could be taken as a challenge, a challenge to my age, to my age at which for three
years—as you say to people when you want to rub it in their faces—at which for three
years Socrates was dead!24 But even if I died, after... it could well happen to me, it
happened to L´evi-Strauss,25 like that, on the podium... Descartes, regarding his “je
souis”, never meant to say that he enjoyed life. That’s not it at all. What’s the meaning
of his “je souis”? This is precisely my topic, the “I” of psychoanalysis.
20In the audio, this sounds like “ce tour de Rome”, or “this tour of Rome” to me.
21Valas: Lacan arrives here at a definition of objet petit a as corporeally contingent to its logical
consistency. Staferla: The desubstantialization of the voice, its evacuation, shows objet a as forbidden
[interdit = inter-said] in the metonymic chain.
22Se jouit : it (the Other, the unconscious) enjoys itself. In other words, thinking is the jouissance of
the unconscious, or ‘the unconscious thinks by enjoying in language’ (Ragland, 2004, p. 71).
23Perhaps the neologism je souis can be broken down as je suis sous, i.e. I am under it, or I am
subject to it?
24In November 1974 Lacan was 73 years old, three years older than Socrates was when he died.
25Valas: Lacan’s mistake. He was in fact talking about Merleau-Ponty.
5
Naturellement il le savait pas, le pauvre, il le savait pas, ¸ca va de soi, il faut que je
lui interpr`ete: c’est un symptˆome. Car de quoi est-ce qu’il pense, avant de conclure qu’il
suit... la musique de l’ˆetre sans doute? Il pense, il pense du savoir de l’´ecole dont les
esuites, ses maˆıtres, lui ont rebattu les oreilles. Et il constate que c’est l´eger.
Ce serait meilleur tabac, c’est sˆur, s’il se rendait compte que son savoir va bien plus
loin qu’il ne croit, `a la suite de l’´ecole, qu’il y a de l’eau dans le gaz, si je puis dire, et
du seul fait qu’il parle, car parler, car parler de la langue, il a un inconscient, et paum´e,
comme tout un chacun qui se respecte, ce que j’appelle un savoir impossible `a rejoindre
pour le sujet, alors que lui, le sujet, y’a qu’un signifiant seulement qui le repr´esente
aupr`es de ce savoir. C’est un repr´esentant—si je puis dire—de commerce, avec ce savoir
constitu´e pour Descartes—comme c’est d’usage `a son ´epoque—de son insertion dans
le discours o`u il est n´e, c’est-`a-dire le discours, le discours que j’appelle du maˆıtre, le
discours du nobliau. C’est bien pour ¸ca qu’il en sort pas avec son “j’pense donc je souis”.
C’est quand mˆeme mieux que ce que dit Parm´enide. L’opacit´e l`a, l’opacit´e de la
conjonction du νoιν [la pens´ee] et de l’ιναι [l’ˆetre].26 Il en sort pas, hein, ce pauvre
Platon, il en sort pas parce que si y’avait pas lui, qu’est-ce qu’on saurait de Parm´enide?
Mais ¸ca empˆeche pas qu’il en sort pas, et que s’il ne nous transmettait pas l’hyst´erie
eniale de Socrate, ben qu’est-ce qu’on en tirerait, hein? Moi je me suis ´echin´e l`a
pendant ces pseudo-vacances, je me suis ´echin´e sur le Sophiste. Je dois ˆetre trop sophiste
probablement pour que ¸ca m’int´eresse. Il doit y avoir l`a quelque chose `a quoi je suis
bouch´e, hein. J’appr´ecie pas... Il nous manque des trucs pour appr´ecier, enfin il nous
manque de savoir ce qu’´etait le sophiste `a cette ´epoque, il nous manque le poids de la
chose.
26Valas: Respectivement la pens´ee et l’ˆetre.
6
Naturally, he doesn’t know it, poor thing, he doesn’t know it, that goes without saying.
I must interpret it for him: it’s a symptom. Because, what was he thinking about,
before concluding that it follows... the music of being, no doubt?27 He was thinking, he
was thinking of the knowledge he learnt at school, what the Jesuits, his masters, kept
harping on about. And he thought that this was unimportant.28
It would have been better, certainly, if he had taken into account that his knowl-
edge went much further than he thought, after school, that trouble was brewing, so to
speak—and the very fact that he spoke, because speaking of language, he has an un-
conscious, and is clueless like all self-respecting people. What I call a knowledge that
is impossible for the subject to encounter, well for him, the subject, there is only one
signifier that represents him along with his knowledge. It’s a representative, so to speak,
of commerce, with this knowledge constituted for Descartes—as was customary in his
time—of his insertion into the discourse in which he was born, namely the discourse, the
discourse of what I call the master,29 the discourse of the little nobleman [nobliau]. It’s
just as well that he didn’t come out with his “j’pense donc je souis ”.
All the same, it’s better than what Parmenides said. The obscurity of the conjunction
of νoιν [thinking] and ιν αι [being],30 it doesn’t work out, poor Plato, it doesn’t work
out because if it wasn’t for Plato, what would one know of Parmenides?31 But this
doesn’t stop him, that it doesn’t work out, and if it doesn’t give us a sense of Socrates’
brilliant hysteria,32 then what else can we infer from it? As for me, I have worn myself
out during these so-called holidays, I have worn myself out with the Sophist. I must be
too much of a sophist, most likely because it interests me. There must be something to
which I am blocked. I don’t like it... we lack things to enjoy. In the end, we don’t know
what it was to be a sophist in that time. The gravity of the thing is lost to us.
27Lacan is pointing out that when Descartes was formulating “I think therefore I am” he was thinking
and therefore was not being, since they are mutually exclusive. See Fink (1996, pp. 42-48).
28Descartes claimed in his Discourse on Method that he had learned nothing at the Jesuit school he
attended. In later life he engaged in a philosophical “war” with the Jesuits (Ariew, 2003, pp. 157-8).
29The master’s discourse (Lacan, 1969): S1
SS2
a, in which the representative (S1) of the subject
(
S) is in relation to knowledge (S2).
30Valas: Thought and Being, respectively.
31Refers to Plato’s Parmenides. Parmenides was a monist who formulated the equality between being
and thought and the disjunction between being and non-being. From Plato onwards, philosophers have
tried to justify a middle ground. Though Lacan is in opposition to both Plato and Parmenides, he agrees
with much of the latter’s conclusions regarding the nature of language (Braungardt, 2013).
32Lacan sees Socrates as a model of hysterical desire, see e.g. Lacan (1961, 21-2-62).
7
Allez, revenons au sens du “souis”. C’est pas simple, hein, ce qui dans la grammaire
traditionnelle se met au titre de la conjugaison d’un certain verbe ˆetre. Pour le latin,
alors l`a tout le monde s’en aper¸coit, que fui—comme on dit en Italie—que fui ne fait
pas somme avec sum, comme on dit aussi ici. Sans compter le reste du bric `a brac. Bon
enfin je vous en passe, je vous passe tout ce qui est arriv´e quand, quand les sauvages l`a,
les Gaulois se sont mis `a avoir `a se tirer d’affaire avec ¸ca. Ils ont fait glisser le “est” du
ot´e du “stat”.33 Ils sont pas les seuls d’ailleurs. En Espagne je crois, je crois, je crois
que ¸ca a ´et´e le mˆeme truc, enfin bon... [13’ 40”]
Enfin la linguisterie se tire de tout ¸ca comme elle peut. Je m’en vais pas maintenant
vous r´ep´eter ce qui fait “les dimanches” de nos ´etudes classiques. Il n’en reste pas moins
qu’on peut... on peut se demander de quelle chair ces ˆetres... qui sont d’ailleurs des ˆetres
de mythe, enfin ceux dont j’ai mis le nom l`a: les Un-deux europ´eens, on les a invent´es
expr`es, enfin c’est des myth`emes ...qu’est-ce qu’ils pouvaient mettre dans la copule? Ce
qui partout ailleurs que dans nos langues, c’est simplement n’importe quoi qui sert de
copule, enfin quelque chose comme la pr´efiguration du “Verbe incarn´e”, on dira ¸ca ici.
C¸ a me fait suer, enfin, n’est-ce pas. On a cru me faire plaisir en me faisant venir `a Rome,
j’sais pas pourquoi. Il y a trop de locaux [loco?]34 pour l’“Esprit Saint”. Qu’est-ce que
l’ˆ
Etre a de suprˆeme si ce n’est par cette copule? [15’ 30”]
33Valas: Lacan fait apparaˆıtre dans la conjugaison du verbe “ˆetre” diff´erents radicaux qui montrent
que celui-ci, en fran¸cais, s’origine de plusieurs verbes latins (fui, sum, stat).
34Valas: Ou loco en italien.
8
Let us return to the meaning of “souis”. It’s not easy, this thing which, in traditional
grammar, falls under the remit of the conjugation of the verb to be [ˆetre]. In Latin, well,
everyone knows that fui —as one says in Italy—that fui is not the same as sum, as one
says here also. Even without taking into account the rest of the mess. Well finally,
I’ll spare you, I’ll spare you from everything that happened when these barbarians, the
Gauls, began to wash their hands of it. They made the “est” slide into the “stat”.35
They are not the only ones. In Spain I believe... I believe that the same thing happened.
In the end, linguisterie makes use of everything that it can. I am not going repeat
now what was made of “les dimanches” [Sundays] in our classical studies. It nevertheless
remains that we can wonder about what flesh [chair] these beings [ˆetres] are made of,
these beings that are, moreover, mythical beings, and upon which I have conferred
this name: the Un-deux europ´eens.36 They were invented for this purpose, they are
mythemes; what would they use as a copula?37 For practically all languages other than
ours, anything serves as a copula, which, in the end, is something like the prefiguration
of the “Word incarnate”,38 as one says here.
This makes me sweat. You thought you were doing me a favour by making me come
to Rome, I don’t know why. There are too many places39 for the Holy Spirit.40 What
does Being have that’s supreme except through this copula?41
35Valas: Lacan underlines that in French there are several different stems in the conjugation of the
verb “ˆetre’ ’, the origins of which are found in many Latin verbs (fui,sum,stat).
36Lacan is playing on the homophony between Indoeuropeans and Un-deux europ´eens [One-two-
Europeans]
37In linguistics, a copula is a word that links subject and predicate. All Indoeuropean languages have
at least one copula, a form of the verb “to be”, hence the “One-two Europeans”, since the copula links
two terms. Some languages, e.g. Arabic, are considered to have no copula. For Lacan, the phallus is a
copula, a the third term that links two others whilst itself being evacuated of meaning (Ragland, 2004,
p4).
38Lacan sheds a bit more light on this in the press conference: les choses ne commencent, pour cet
ˆetre charnel... que quand il y a le Verbe dans le coup... quand le Verbe s’incarne. C’est quand le Verbe
s’incarne que ¸ca commence `a al ler vachement mal. Il n’est plus du tout heureux, il ne ressemble plus du
tout `a un petit chien qui remue la queue ni non plus `a un brave singe qui se masturbe. Il ne ressemble
plus `a rien du tout. Il est ravag´e par le Verbe. (Valas, 2015, pp. 27-29). ‘things only start for this
carnal being... when there is the Word in the game... when the Word becomes incarnate. It is when
the Word became incarnate that it starts to go really bad for him. He is not at all happy, he does not
look at all like a little dog who wags its tail nor a brave monkey who masturbates. He does not look
like anything. He is ravaged by the Word.’ So I imagine that the Word becoming incarnate signals the
arrival of language and the symbolic. Languages in which anything serves as a copula, or third term,
are therefore only “prefigurations” of the full symbolic, in which there is only one copula, the phallus.
39Valas: Or loco (mad) in Italian.
40 ˘
Zi˘zek (2005, p. 42) equates the Holy Spirit with the Big Other, i.e. the phallic order.
41If the verb ˆetre is a copula, then the l’ ˆ
Etre suprˆeme, is the supreme copula, i.e. the phallus?
9
Enfin je me suis amus´e `a y interposer ce qu’on appelle des “personnes”. C¸ a... ¸ca
foire `a ˆetre, enfin j’ai trouv´e un machin qui m’a amus´e comme ¸ca: “m’es-tu-me...”,
“mais-tu-me...”, ¸ca permet de s’embrouiller: “m’est me tu?”.42 En r´ealit´e, c’est le mˆeme
truc. C’est l’histoire du message que chacun re¸coit sous sa forme invers´ee. Je dis ¸ca
depuis tr`es longtemps et ¸ca a fait rigoler.
`
A la v´erit´e, c’est `a Claude L´evi-Strauss que je le dois. Il s’est pench´e vers une de
mes excellentes amies, qui est sa femme, qui est Monique, pour l’appeler par son nom,
et il lui a dit `a propos de ce que j’exprimais, que c’´etait ¸ca, enfin que chacun recevait
son message sous une forme invers´ee. Monique me l’a r´ep´et´e. Je pouvais pas trouver
de formule plus heureuse pour ce que je voulais dire juste `a ce moment-l`a. Enfin c’est
quand mˆeme lui qui me l’a refil´e. Vous voyez, je prends mon bien o`u je le trouve.
Bon, alors je passe sur les autres temps, sur l’´etayage de l’imparfait, hein: j’´etais. Ah!
qu’est-ce que tu ´etaies? Et puis le reste... Enfin, passons parce qu’il faut que j’avance.
Le subjonctif, c’est marrant. “Qu’il soit”—comme par hasard. Bon...
Descartes, lui, ne s’y trompe pas, hein: Dieu, c’est le dire. Il voit tr`es bien que
dieure, c’est ce qui fait ˆetre la v´erit´e, ce qui en d´ecide, `a sa tˆete. Il suffit de dieure
comme moi, c’est la v´erit´e, pas moyen d’y ´echapper. Si Dieure43 nous trompe,44 tant
pis, c’est la v´erit´e par le d´ecret du dieure, la v´erit´e en or. Bon passons. Parce que je
fais l`a, comme ¸ca, juste `a ce moment-l`a quelques remarques `a propos des gens, comme
¸ca, qui ont trimball´e la critique, l`a de l’autre cˆot´e du Rhin, pour finir par baiser le cul
d’Hitler. C¸ a me fait grincer des dents. Bon...
42Valas: “‘m’es-tu-me...”, “mais-tu-me...”, ¸ca permet de s’embrouiller: “m’aimes-tu mm?”’.
43Valas: Lacan le prononce: “Diiieueu ...”.
44Valas: ‘Si Dieure me trompe’.
10
Anyway, I’ve had fun introducing these so-called “individuals”. This “shambles of
being” [¸ca foire `a ˆetre],45 well I’ve found a thing that entertains me, like this: “are
you me...” [m’es-tu-me...], “but-you-me” [mais-tu-me...], one gets confused, “is it me
you?” [m’est me tu?].46 Actually, it’s the same thing. It’s the story of the message that
everyone receives in inverted form.47 I’ve said this for a very long time and it makes me
laugh.
The truth is that I owe this one to Claude L´evi-Strauss. He leaned towards one of
my very good friends, who is his wife, Monique to call her by her name, and he said to
her, regarding what I have been revealing, that it was this: that everyone receives their
message in inverted form. Monique repeated it to me. I couldn’t think of a better recipe
for what I wanted to say at that moment. All the same, it was he who foisted it on me.
You see, I get my kicks wherever I can find them.
Good, I will not mention other tenses, the support [´etayage] of the imperfect: I was
[j’´etais]. Ah, what were you supporting [tu ´etaies]?48 And then the rest... Let’s move
on because I must make progress. The subjunctive, it’s strange. Qu’il soit49—would
you believe?
Descartes himself, makes no mistake: “God” [Dieu], that is the claim. He knew very
well that dieure,50 ,51 that’s what created truth, that’s what decides it, it get’s its way.
It is enough to dieure, like me, it’s the truth, no way of getting around it. If Dieure
confuses us, too bad, it’s the truth by decree of dieure, the golden truth. Good, let’s
move on. Because right this minute, I’m on the verge of making some remarks about
the sort of people who have dragged criticism to the other side of the Rhine, and who
end up kissing Hitler’s ass.
45Later on in the text, and in the press conference, Lacan plays on the homophony between foire
(shambles, fair) and foi (faith).
46Valas’ transcription of the last phrase, “Do you love me, mm?” [m’aimes-tu mm?], seems to be
more accurate.
47Lacan appears to be talking about transference as the mirroring of desire: the analysand receives
her message back from the analyst in inverted form. Hence the inversion of me and tu, and the wordplay
between ˆetre [to be] and aimer [to love].
48The imperfect of the verb ˆetre (to be), e.g. j’etais, is homophonous with the present of the verb
´etayer (to support), e.g. j’´etaie.
49Third person singular of the present subjunctive of the verb “to be”.
50Valas: Lacan pronounces it: ” Diiieueu... ”.
51Dieure =Dieu +dire (to say) or even durer (to last, continue)? A nod to “In the beginning there
was the Word...”?
11
Alors le symbolique, l’imaginaire et le r´eel, ¸ca c’est le n 1. L’inou¨ı c’est que ¸ca ait
pris du sens, et pris du sens rang´e comme ¸ca. Dans les deux cas c’est `a cause de moi,
c’est ce que j’appelle “le vent”, le vent que... le vent dont je sens que moi je peux mˆeme...
je peux mˆeme plus le pr´evoir, le vent dont on gonfle ses voiles `a notre ´epoque. Car c’est
´evident, ¸ca n’en manque pas, de sens, au d´epart.
C’est en ¸ca que consiste la pens´ee: que des mots introduisent dans le corps quelques
repr´esentations imb´eciles, voil`a vous avez le truc, vous avez l`a l’imaginaire, et qui en
plus nous rend gorge—¸ca veut pas dire qu’il nous rengorge, non—il nous re-d´egueule
quoi? Comme par hasard une v´erit´e, une v´erit´e de plus. C’est un comble! Que le sens se
loge en lui, nous donne du mˆeme coup les deux autres, comme sens. L’id´ealisme—dont
tout le monde a r´epudi´e comme ¸ca l’imputation—l’id´ealisme est l`a derri`ere. Les gens ne
demandent que ¸ca, hein: que ¸ca les int´eresse, vu que la pens´ee c’est bien ce qu’il y a de
plus cr´etinisant `a agiter le grelot du sens.
Comment vous sortir de la tˆete l’emploi philosophique de mes termes—c’est-`a-dire
l’emploi ordurier—quand d’autre part faut bien que ¸ca entre? Mais ¸ca vaudrait mieux
que ¸ca entre ailleurs. Vous vous imaginez que la pens´ee, ¸ca se tient dans la cervelle.
Enfin, je vois pas pourquoi je vous en dissuaderais. Moi je suis sˆur—je suis sˆur comme
¸ca, c’est mon affaire—que ¸ca se tient dans les peauciers du front, chez l’ˆetre parlant
exactement comme chez le h´erisson. J’adore les h´erissons. Quand j’en vois un, je le
mets dans ma poche, dans mon mouchoir. Naturellement il pisse, jusqu’`a ce que je l’aie
ramen´e sur ma pelouse, `a ma maison de campagne. Et l`a j’adore voir se produire ce
plissement des peauciers du front. `
A la suite de quoi, tout comme nous, il se met en
boule. Bon, enfin si vous pouvez penser avec les pens´ees du front,52 vous pouvez aussi
penser avec les pieds.
52Valas: ‘les peauciers du front’.
12
Well then, the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real—that’s the number one. The
incredible thing is that this took on meaning, and took on an orderly meaning in this
way. Either way, it was because of me, because of what I call the “wind”, the wind that
I feel that I no longer even predict, the wind with which we swell our sails in these times.
Because it is obvious, this does not lack meaning, right from the start.
This is what thought consists of: words introduce some idiotic representations into
the body and voil`a you have the thing, you have the imaginary, and what’s more, that’s
what makes us stuffed—that’s not to say that it doesn’t puff us up, no—it makes us
throw up what?53 Would you believe it, a truth, another truth. It’s the last straw! When
meaning is lodged in it, it gives us, at the same time, the two others as meaning.54
Idealism—whose imputation everyone has repudiated—idealism is behind it. People
only ask for what interests them, given that thought, well, it’s the most idiotic thing for
shaking the rattle of meaning [`a agiter le grelot du sens].55
How can I get the philosophical use of my words out of your heads—meaning the
obscene use—when on the other hand it is necessary for it to enter? But it would be
better that it went elsewhere. You imagine that thought resides in the brain. In the
end, I can’t see why I should dissuade you of this. Me, I am sure—I am sure about this,
that’s my business—that it resides in the skin of the forehead [les peauciers du front],
as much for the speaking being as for the hedgehog. I love hedgehogs! When I see one,
I put it in my pocket, in my handkerchief. Of course he pisses, right up until I get him
to my lawn, at my country house. And there, I love to see him wrinkling his forehead.
After this, just like us, he rolls himself up into a ball. Good, anyway, if you can think
with the skin of your forehead,56 you can also think with your feet.
53Meaning occurs at the intersection of symbolic and imaginary—if every (symbolic) signifier has
a corresponding (imaginary) representation then the symbolic is “stuffed”, i.e. there is no lack and
therefore no room for movement/metonymy of signifiers and the fluidity of meaning.
54The two others being the symbolic and the real, perhaps?
55Thinking alone is not enough to dislodge the pinning down of meaning caused by ideology?
56The audio agrees with Valas’ “peauciers”, rather than Staferla’s “pens´ees”.
13
Eh ben c’est l`a que je voudrais que ¸ca entre, puisqu’apr`es tout l’imaginaire, le sym-
bolique et le r´eel, c’est fait pour que ceux, ceux dans cet attroupement qui sont ceux
qui me suivent, pour que ¸ca les aide `a frayer le chemin de l’analyse. Ouais... Ces ronds
l`a, ces ronds de ficelle dont je me suis esquint´e `a vous faire des dessins, ces ronds de
ficelle, il s’agit pas de les ronronner, eux. Faudrait que ¸ca vous serve, que ¸ca vous serve
justement `a l’erre dont je vous parlais cette ann´ee, que ¸ca vous serve `a vous apercevoir
ce qui—la topologie que ¸ca d´efinit—ce qu’il y a entre, `a ˆetre non dupes de l’autoroute.
Ouais...
Ces termes, ces termes ne sont pas “tabou”. Ce qu’il faudrait c’est que vous les
pigiez. Et ils sont l`a depuis, depuis bien avant la... celle que j’implique de la dire “la
premi`ere”, enfin la premi`ere fois que j’ai parl´e `a Rome. Je les ai sortis, ces trois, apr`es
les avoir—enfin, comme ¸ca—assez bien cogit´es, je les ai sortis tr`es tˆot, bien avant de m’y
ˆetre mis, `a mon premier discours de Rome.57
Que ¸ca soit ces ronds du nœud borrom´een, c’est quand mˆeme pas une raison non
plus pour vous y prendre le pied. C’est pas ¸ca que j’appelle “penser avec ses pieds”.
Il s’agirait que vous y laissiez quelque chose de bien diff´erent d’un membre—je parle
des analystes, hein—il s’agirait que vous y laissiez cet objet insens´e que j’ai sp´ecifi´e du
petit a: c’est ¸ca, ce qui s’attrape au coincement du symbolique, de l’imaginaire et du
eel comme nœud. C’est `a l’attraper juste, que vous pouvez r´epondre `a ce qui est votre
fonction: l’offrir comme cause, comme cause de son d´esir `a votre analysant. C’est ¸ca
qu’il s’agit d’obtenir. Mais si vous vous prenez la patte, ben c’est pas terrible non plus,
hein. L’important c’est que ¸ca se passe `a vos frais. Pour dire les choses, apr`es cette
epudiation du “je souis”, et ben je m’amuserai `a vous dire que ce nœud, il faut l’ˆetre
[a]. [28’ 40”]
Alors si je rajoute en plus ce que vous savez, d’apr`es ce que j’ai articul´e pendant,
pendant un an des discours discours sous le titre de “L’envers de la psychanalyse”, il
n’en reste pas moins que de l’ˆetre [a], il faut que vous n’en fassiez que le semblant. C¸ a,
c’est cal´e, hein! C’est d’autant plus cal´e qu’il suffit pas, qu’il suffit pas d’en avoir l’id´ee
pour en faire le semblant.
57Valas: Lacan fait, ici, r´ef´erence `a sa conf´erence prononc´ee le 8 juillet 1953 `a la Soci´et´e fran¸caise de
Philosophie, intitul´ee: “Le symbolique, l’imaginaire et le r´eel”.
14
Well, it’s here that I would like to introduce this, because after all the imaginary,
the symbolic and the real, it’s for them—for those in this crowd who follow me—to
help them to pave the way for analysis. These rings here, these rings of string that I
have been messing with so that I could draw them for you, these rings [ronds] of string,
its not a question of them purring [ronronner ]. They should serve you precisely with
the wandering [l’erre ]58 that I have been talking about this year, they should help you
to realize what—the topology which defines it—what is in between, in order not to be
fooled [ˆetre non dupes ] by the highway.59
These terms are not “taboo”. You need to get the drift of them. And they were
here well before what I implied by the term “The first”, that is the first time I spoke in
Rome. I brought them out, these three, after having thought about them a fair amount.
I brought them out very early, well before I knuckled down to it, at my first talk in
Rome.60
Whatever they are, these rings of the Borromean knot, it’s still no reason for you to
take a stand [prendre le pied]. It’s not what I call “thinking with one’s feet”. You would
be letting go of quite a different kind of limb—I am talking of analysts—you would be
letting go of this ridiculous [insens´e] object which I have denoted petit a: it’s this which
is caught at the conjunction of the symbolic, the imaginary and the real in the knot. It’s
in catching it right there that you can answer for what is your function: to offer yourself
to your analysand as the cause, as the cause of their desire. This is what you are aiming
at. But if you take hold of the paw, it’s not so bad either. The important thing is that
it happens at your expense. I put it to you that, after this dismissal of “je souis”, I will
amuse myself by telling you that this knot, you need to be it [objet a].
Well, if I am to add more to what you know—after what I said for a whole year
on the four discourses, entitled “The Other Side of Psychoanalysis” [L’envers de la
psychanalyse]—the fact remains that in being it [objet a], you must take it as nothing
more than a semblance [semblant]. This is quite a job! It’s all the more difficult in that
it’s not enough, it’s not enough to have an idea of it, in order to make a semblance of it.
58I have translated “erre” as “wandering” in order to contrast it with “highway”. However, Lacan
also uses it in the sense of “momentum” or “headway”, and “error” (Lacan, 1973, 13-11-73).
59Lacan is referring to his contemporaneous 1973-74 seminar Les non dupes errent [Those who are
not duped are mistaken/wander]. The non-dupes, or psychotics, who are not fooled by the symbolic
order and the Name of the Father (the homophonous Le nom du p`ere) that supposedly guarantees it
are paradoxically those who are most mistaken. However, here Lacan is exhorting the analysts present
to be non-dupes of the “highway”... perhaps taking the position of objet a in an analysis is one way of
being a non-dupe, of not subscribing to the “highway” of the symbolic order, without foreclosing it in
the manner of a psychotic.
60Valas: Lacan makes a reference here to his conference, delivered on the 8th of July 1953 at the
French Philosophical Society, entitled: “The Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real”.
15
[Ne] Vous imaginez pas que j’en ai eu—moi—l’id´ee, j’ai “´ecrit”: objet a,61 c’est tout
diff´erent. C¸a l’apparente `a la logique, c’est-`a-dire que ¸ca le rend [de l’´ecrire] op´erant dans
le r´eel au titre de l’objet dont justement y’a pas d’id´ee. Parce qu’il faut bien le dire,
c’´etait un trou—jusqu’`a pr´esent—dans toute th´eorie quelle qu’elle soit: l’objet dont il
y’a pas d’id´ee.
C’est ce qui justifie mes r´eserves, celles que j’ai fait tout `a l’heure `a l’endroit du
pr´e-socratisme de Platon. C’est pas qu’il en ait pas eu le sentiment: le semblant il y
baigne sans le savoir, ¸ca l’obs`ede. Car mˆeme s’il le sait pas, ¸ca ne veut rien dire qu’une
chose: c’est qu’il le sent, mais qu’il sait pas pourquoi c’est comme ¸ca. D’o`u cet insupport,
cet insupportable [insu portable] qu’il propage.
Figure 1: Les 4 discours.
Il n’y a pas un seul discours o`u le semblant ne m`ene le jeu. On ne voit pas pourquoi
le dernier venu, le discours analytique, y ´echapperait. C’est quand mˆeme pas une raison
pour que dans ce discours, sous pr´etexte qu’il est le dernier venu, vous vous sentiez si
mal `a l’aise, que de faire—selon l’usage dont s’engoncent vos coll`egues de l’“Interna-
tionale”—un semblant plus semblant que nature... affich´e! Si vous vous rappelez quand
eme le semblant de ce qui parle—comme esp`ece—il est l`a toujours, dans toute esp`ece
de discours qui les occupe, c’est quand mˆeme une seconde nature.
Alors, j’sais pas... soyez plus d´etendus, plus naturels quand vous recevez quelqu’un
qui vient vous demander une analyse. Vous sentez pas si oblig´es `a vous pousser du
col. eme comme “bouffon” vous ˆetes justifi´es d’ˆetre. Vous n’avez qu’`a regarder ma
“T´el´evision”: je suis un clown. Ben prenez exemple l`a-dessus, et ne m’imitez pas! Le
erieux qui m’anime, c’est la s´erie que vous constituez. Vous ne pouvez `a la fois en ˆetre
[de la s´erie] et l’ˆetre [s´erieux].
61Valas: ‘objet petit a’.
16
Don’t think that I had any idea of it myself. I have “written” objet petit a,62 it’s
completely different. It’s related to logic, namely, it makes it [the writing of it] effective
in the real, as the object about which precisely there is no idea. Because it has to be
said that, until now, it was a hole in any theory whatsoever: the object about which
there is no idea.
It’s this that justifies my reservations, those which I made known just now regarding
the pre-socratism of Plato. It’s not that he did not have any feeling for it: the semblance,
he was immersed in it without knowing it, he was obsessed with it. Because even if he
didn’t know it, there is only one thing worth saying: it’s that he sensed it, but he
didn’t know why it was like that. Hence this intolerance, this insufferable thing that he
disseminated.63
There is not a single discourse in which the semblance does not call the shots. One
can’t see why the last one, the analyst’s discourse, should be an exception. Anyway,
there’s no reason why, in this discourse, using the excuse that it is the last one, you
should feel ill at ease, when you display—in the nomenclature to which your colleagues
at the Internationale64 restrict themselves—a semblance more pretence than life itself !65
Remember all the same that the semblance of what speaks—as a species—is there always,
in every kind of discourse that occupies them. It’s even second nature.
Well, be more relaxed, more natural when you see someone who comes to you asking
for analysis. Don’t feel so obliged to stick your neck out. You are excused, even for
acting like a fool. You have only to watch my “T´el´evision” :66 I am a clown. Well take
my word for it, and don’t copy me! The seriousness [erieux ] that drives me on is the
series [erie] that you constitute. You can’t be both a part of [a series] and be [serious].
62Staferla quite often drops the word “petit” when talking about objet a, even though it is clearly
audible. I am going to follow Valas’ version which retains the “petit” from now on.
63Staferla proposes the homophone insu portable or ‘transferable unknown’ for insufferable [insup-
portable], which is apt since objet a is metonymic and it cannot be “written”.
64The International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA), with which Lacan had a long-running feud
over, amongst other things, his continued use of the variable length session.
65Lacan is criticising the Ego Psychology movement and the tendency of its analysts to get caught
up in imaginary transference whilst ignoring the symbolic aspects of analysis. See e.g. Fink (2004,
pp. 38-62).
66Lacan (1990).
17
Le symbolique, l’imaginaire et le r´eel, c’est l’´enonc´e de ce qui op`ere effectivement
dans votre parole quand vous vous situez du discours analytique, quand analyste vous
l’ˆetes. Ils n’´emergent, ces termes,67 vraiment que pour et par ce discours. J’ai pas eu
`a y mettre d’intention, j’ai eu qu’`a suivre, moi aussi.. C¸ a veut pas dire que ¸ca n’´eclaire
pas les autres discours, mais ¸ca les invalide pas non plus. Le discours du maˆıtre par
exemple, sa fin c’est que les choses aillent au pas de tout le monde.
Ben ¸ca, c’est pas du tout la mˆeme chose que le r´eel, parce que le r´eel justement,
c’est ce qui ne va pas, ce qui se met en croix dans ce charroi, bien plus: ce qui ne
cesse pas de se r´ep´eter pour entraver cette marche.68 Je l’ai dit d’abord: ce qui revient
toujours `a la mˆeme place. L’accent est `a mettre sur “revient”. C’est la place [vide]
qui se d´ecouvre, la place du semblant. Il est difficile de l’instituer du seul imaginaire,
comme d’abord la notion de place semble l’impliquer. Heureusement que nous avons la
topologie math´ematique pour y prendre un appui, et c’est ce que j’essaie de faire. [35’
57”]
D’un second temps `a le d´efinir, ce r´eel, c’est de “l’impossible”—d’une modalit´e
logique—que j’ai essay´e de le pointer. Supposez en effet qu’il n’y ait rien d’impossi-
ble dans le r´eel. Ben les savants feraient une drˆole de gueule, hein, et nous aussi! Qui
est-ce qui a quelque chose `a flˆuter? Mais qu’est-ce qu’il a fallu parcourir de chemin, hein,
pour s’apercevoir de ¸ca! Des si`ecles, on a cru tout possible [espace Φ]. Enfin, j’sais pas,
il y en a peut-ˆetre quelques-uns d’entre vous qui ont lu Leibniz. Il ne s’en tirait que par
le “compossible”: Dieu avait fait de son mieux, il fallait que les choses soient possibles
ensemble. Enfin, ce qu’il y a de kombinat, et mˆeme de “combine” derri`ere tout ¸ca, c’est
pas imaginable.
67Staferla: Symbolique, Imaginaire, R´eel.
68Staferla: cf. cyclo¨ıde de Pascal.
18
The symbolic, the imaginary and the real, it’s the statement of what is effectively
operating in your speech when you situate yourself in the analyst’s discourse, when you
become the analyst. These terms do not really emerge except for and by this discourse.
I didn’t have to plan it, I had but to follow, me too... That is not to say that it [the
analyst’s discourse] does not shed light on the other discourses, but it does not invalidate
them either. The master’s discourse, for example, it’s end result is that things march in
step for everyone.
Well, this is not at all the same thing as the real, because the real is properly
what doesn’t work, what gets in the way of the convoy [ce qui se met en croix dans ce
charroi],69 what’s more, it’s what does not stop repeating itself in order to hinder this
progress [pour entraver cette marche]. I said it first: it’s what always returns to the same
place. The emphasis is on “return”. It’s the [empty] place that is revealed, the place
of the semblance. It is difficult to establish the imaginary on its own, as the notion of
place first seems to imply. Luckily we have mathematical topology to support us, and
it is this that I am trying to do.
Defining it for a second time, this real, it’s the impossible of a logical modality,70
as I’ve been trying to point out to you. Suppose, in effect that there is nothing of the
impossible in the real. Well the scholars would pull a face, and we would too! Has
anyone got something to say?71 But what it took to travel this path, in order to realise
this! For centuries it was believed that everything was possible. Well, I don’t know,
there are perhaps some among you who have read Liebniz. He only pulled it off via the
compossible: God had done his best, all things must be possible in combination. Well,
what there was of the kombinat, and also of the “trick” [combine ] behind all this, is
unimaginable.72
69I have translated this literally since I cannot think of a suitable English expression. I am not sure
what Lacan means by this. Perhaps the “charroi” is the signifying chain that the real, as objet a,
disrupts?
70Modal logic is a form of logic developed in the 1960s to extend propositional (based on conjunctions
e.g. “and” or “‘not”) and predicate logic (based on quantifiers, e.g. the universal, , and the existential
). It includes operators that express modality which qualify a statement. For example, alethic modalities
are modalities of truth: a statement can be possible, impossible, necessary or contingent. Lacan subverts
traditional Aristotelian alethic modal logic in his formulae of sexuation.
71Lacan seems to be addressing the audience. I have no idea what Lacan means here, so I consulted
the German translation (Valas, 2015). “Flˆuter” means “to play the flute”, or “to drink (usually alcohol)”
neither of which seems appropriate here.
72The thesis of Liebniz’s De Arte Combinatoria (1666) is that all things are combinations of a relatively
small number of concepts. The book begins with a geometrical proof of God’s existence.
19
Peut-ˆetre l’analyse nous introduira-t-elle `a consid´erer le monde comme ce qu’il est:
imaginaire. C¸ a ne peut se faire qu’`a r´eduire la fonction dite de “repr´esentation”, `a la
mettre l`a o`u elle est: soit dans le corps. C¸ a, y’a longtemps qu’on se doute de ¸ca, c’est
eme en ¸ca que consiste l’id´ealisme philosophique. Seulement, l’id´ealisme philosophique
est arriv´e `a ¸ca, mais tant qu’y avait pas de science, ben ¸ca pouvait que la boucler, non
sans une petite pointe, comme ¸ca, en se r´esignant ils attendaient les signes, les signes de
l’au-del`a, du noum`ene:73 comme ¸ca qu’ils appellent ¸ca. C’est pour ¸ca qu’il y a eu quand
eme quelques ´evˆeques dans l’affaire, l’´evˆeque Berkeley74 notamment, qui de son temps
´etait imbattable, et que ¸ca arrangeait tr`es bien.
Le r´eel n’est pas le monde. Il n’y a aucun espoir d’atteindre le r´eel par la repr´esentation.
Je vais pas me mettre `a arguer ici de la th´eorie des quanta75 ni de l’onde et du corpuscule.
Vaudrait mieux quand mˆeme que vous y soyez au parfum, bien que ¸ca vous int´eresse pas.
Mais vous y mettre, au parfum, faites-le vous-mˆemes, il suffit d’ouvrir quelques petits
bouquins de science.
73Valas: Noum`ene: objet de la raison intelligible, s’oppose `a ph´enom`ene, objet de la r´ealit´e sensible.
74Valas: Pour John Locke (1632–1704), repr´esentant l’empirisme anglais, ‘les id´ees viennent de
l’exp´erience, elles ne sont pas inn´ees’. La mati`ere est appr´ehend´ee par la perception. Il faut distinguer
les qualit´es sensibles premi`eres propres aux choses comme telles (l’´etendue, la forme, le nombre) qui
seules d´ependent de la science des qualit´es sensibles secondes qui ne rel`event pas de la science mais de la
subjectivit´e (l’odeur, la couleur). S’opposant `a Locke, Georges Locke (1685–1753) consid`ere que ‘l’id´ee
de mati`ere est une fiction de langage. La n´ecessit´e n’est pas un concept empirique. Seules existent les
id´ees et l’esprit dont l’ordonnance d´epend de Dieu’.
75Valas: Pour Lacan, la th´eorie moderne des quanta fait apparaˆıtre que la ‘nature n’est pas aussi
naturelle que cela’. La th´eorie des quanta s’est d´evelopp´ee `a partir de la th´eorie de la relativit´e d’Albert
Einstein (1879–1955). La mati`ere n’est pas faite seulement de corpuscules ´el´ementaires—les atomes, par
exemple, sont eux-mˆemes constitu´es d’´el´ements plus ´el´ementaires. Il faut aussi tenir compte de la notion
d’´energie. La physique quantique repose sur le principe selon lequel des ´energies ne sont transmises que
comme multiples entiers du “quantum d’´energie” d´ecouvert par Max Planck (1853–1947). Niels Bohr
(1885–1962) utilise la th´eorie quantique pour expliquer la structure atomique et les spectres lumineux
sp´ecifiques des ´el´ements atomiques. Ainsi la lumi`ere se comporte en partie comme une onde et en partie
comme ”paquets d’´energie”. Louis de Broglie (1892–1975) en d´eduit qu’elle est constitu´ee aussi de
particules qui ont aussi des masses. Il y a donc dans la th´eorie des quanta une dualit´e entre la th´eorie
ondulatoire et la th´eorie corpusculaire. Dans une certaine mesure, ces deux notions doivent s’exclure et
en mˆeme temps se compl´eter, d’o`u l’extraordinaire difficult´e `a d´efinir la mati`ere constituante du monde.
Il r´esulte qu’il est impossible de d´eterminer une substance qui servirait de r´ef´erence absolue `a la th´eorie
moderne des quanta.
20
Perhaps analysis will introduce us to considering the world as it is: imaginary. That
can only be done by reducing the so-called function of “representation”: by putting it
where it is, namely in the body. For a long time this was suspected, it’s even what
philosophical idealism consists of. Only, philosophical idealism grasped this, but as long
as there was no science, it could only keep its mouth shut, but not without this little
remark: resigning themselves to this, they waited for signs, signs from the hereafter, of
the noumenon,76, 77 that’s what they called it. It’s because of this that there were even
some bishops involved in this affair, bishop Berkeley78,79 notably, who in his time was
unstoppable, and this suited him very well.
The real is not the world. There is no hope of reaching the real by representation. I
am not going to get into an argument here over the theory of quanta80, 81 or of waves and
particles. It would be better all the same, if you were in the know, even if this doesn’t
interest you. But get yourselves up to speed, do it yourselves, you just have to open a
76Valas: Noumenon: an object intelligible to reasoon, as opposed to the phenomenon, an object of
physical reality.
77This refers to the transcendental idealism of Kant (1724-1804), who maintained that human ex-
perience is of how things appear to us (the phenomenal world), rather than of things as they are in
themselves (the noumenal world).
78Valas: For John Locke (1632–1704), repesenting English empiricism, ‘ideas come from experience,
they are not innate’. Matter is understood through perception. We should distinguish between pri-
mary physical qualities specific to things (size, shape, number) and which only depend on science, and
secondary physical qualities which are not dependent on science but on subjectivity (smell, colour). Con-
trary to Locke, Georges Locke (1685–1753) considered that ‘the idea of matter is a fiction of language.
Necessity is not an empirical concept. There are ideas and the spirit which is of the order of God’.
79George Berkeley (1685-1783), Bishop of Cloyne and an Anglo-Irish philosopher, held that material
substance did not exist. Objects exist as ideas in the mind of the perceiver. He called this stance
“immaterialism” (later “subjective materialism”).
80Valas: For Lacan, modern quantum theory shows that ‘nature is not as natural as that’. Quantum
theory was developed from the theory of relativity of Albert Einstein (1879-1955). Matter is not made
only of elementary particles—atoms, for example, are themselves made up of more fundamental elements.
One must also take into account the notion of energy. Quantum Physics rests on the principle according
to which energy is transmitted only in multiples of “quanta” discovered by Max Planck (1853-1947). Niels
Bohr (1885-1962) used quantum theory to explain atomic structure and the electromagnetic spectra of
the atomic elements. Thus, light behaves partly as a wave and partly as “packets of energy”. Louis de
Broglie (1892-1975) deduced that it is also made up of particles with mass. There is therefore a duality
in quantum theory between wave theory and particle theory. To some extent, these two concepts are
exclusive yet at the same time complementary, hence the extraordinary difficulty of defining the matter
that makes up the world. It follows that it is impossible to determine a substance which serves as an
absolute reference in modern quantum theory.
81Valas’ comment is not quite correct. For example, quantum theory did not develop from relativity.
The two theories arose independently in early 20th century, and although current quantum field theories
incorporate special relativity, combining general reativity and quantum mechanics in a single “theory of
everything” is still an issue today. Also, it is not quite correct to say that light behaves “partly” as a wave
and “partly” as a particle. It is better to say that behaviour of light can be described mathematically
either by wave mechanics or by particle mechanics, or in some circumstances, both. The nature of
light, how its wave-like or particle-like properties can be reconciled, depends on which interpretation of
quantum mechanics you choose, and is still a matter of debate.
21
Le r´eel du mˆeme coup n’est pas universel, ce qui veut dire qu’il n’est “tout” qu’au sens
strict de ce que chacun de ses ´el´ements soit identique `a soi-mˆeme, mais `a ne pouvoir se
dire παντ σ [pant`es]. Y’a pas de “tous les ´el´ements”, y a que des ensembles `a d´eterminer
dans chaque cas. Pas la peine d’ajouter: c’est tout! C¸a n’a le sens que de ponctuer ce
n’importe quoi de signifiant l’ˆetre,82 qui est ce que j’´ecris S indice 1—signifiant qui ne
s’´ecrit que de le faire sans aucun effet de sens. L’homologue si j’ose dire, de l’objet petit
a. [41’ 04”]
Enfin, quand je pense que je me suis amus´e pendant un moment `a faire un jeu l`a,
entre ce S1 que j’avais pouss´e jusqu’`a la dignit´e du signifiant “Un”, que j’ai jou´e avec
ce “Un” et le petit aen les nouant par le nombre d’or, ¸ca vaut mille! C¸ a veut rien dire
que ¸ca vaut mille, ¸ca veut dire que ¸ca prend port´ee de l’´ecrire. En fait, c’´etait pour
illustrer la vanit´e de tout co¨ıt avec le monde, c’est-`a-dire de ce que on a appel´e jusqu’ici
“la connaissance”. Car y’a rien de plus dans le monde qu’un objet a, chiure ou regard,
voix ou t´etine, qui refend le sujet et le grime en ce d´echet qui, lui, au corps, ex-siste.83
Pour en faire semblant [position de l’analyste] , il faut ˆetre dou´e. C’est partic-
uli`erement difficile comme ¸ca pour... c’est plus difficile pour une femme que pour un
homme, contrairement `a ce qui se dit. Que la femme soit l’objet ade l’homme `a l’oc-
casion, ¸ca veut pas dire du tout que... qu’elle, elle a du goˆut `a l’ˆetre. Mais enfin ¸ca
arrive. C¸ a arrive qu’elle y ressemble naturellement. Il n’y a rien de plus semblable, enfin
qui ressemble plus `a une chiure de mouche, qu’Anna Freud! [rires] C¸ a doit lui servir!
Ouais...
Soyons s´erieux, revenons `a faire ce que j’essaie. Il me faut soutenir84 cette “Troisi`eme”
du r´eel qu’elle comporte, et c’est pourquoi je vous pose la question dont je vois que...
dont je vois que les personnes qui ont parl´e avec moi—avant moi—se doutent un peu,
non seulement se doutent mais mˆeme elles l’ont dit, et qu’elles l’aient dit signe qu’elles
s’en doutent: est-ce que la psychanalyse est un symptˆome?
82Valas: ‘ce n’importe quoi, ce signifiant-lettre’.
83Valas: ‘ek-siste’.
84Valas: ‘Il faut soutenir’.
22
few small science booklets.
The real at the same time is not universal—meaning what is “all” only in the strict
sense that each of its elements are self-identical, but not what can be said to be παν τ σ
[all]. There is no “all the elements”, there are only sets to be determined in each case.
It’s not worth adding to it: that’s it! The only meaning it [S1?] has is to divide this
whatever [the real?] with the signifier being [de signifiant l’ˆetre], which is what I’ve
written S subscript 1—the signifier which is only written so as to have no meaning
effect.85 The counterpart, so to speak, of objet petit a.
Well, when I think that I was amused for a while playing a game, here... between this
S1which I had raised to the dignity of the signifier “One”... that I played with this “One”
and petit a, in linking [nouant] them to the golden ratio, priceless! It’s meaningless to say
that it’s priceless,86 it means that it takes the scope of writing. In fact, it demonstrates
the futility of all intercourse [cıt] with the world, namely what was called up until now
“knowledge” [connaissance].87 For there is nothing more in the world except objet petit
a, the shit or the gaze, the voice or the nipple, which divides the subject and which
smears him in this waste which for him, in his body, ex-ists.
To create a semblance [position of the analyst] you have to be gifted. It’s particularly
difficult... it’s more difficult for a woman than for a man, in contradiction to what is
said. That the woman is the man’s objet petit a occasionally, that’s not at all to say
that... that she has a taste for it. But anyway, it could happen. It could happen that
she naturally is like that. There’s nothing more similar, in the end, nothing that looks
more like fly shit than Anna Freud!88 [laughter] That serves her right!
Let’s be serious. Let’s go back to doing what I am attempting to do. I must support
this “Third” of the real, of which it consists, and this is why I ask you the question, since
I see that... since I see that the people who have spoken with me—before me—suspect
a little, not only do they suspect but they have even said it, and that they have said it
signifies that they do suspect it: is psychoanalysis a symptom?
85The audio seems to support Valas’ version: ‘C¸ a n’a le sens que de ponctuer ce n’importe quoi, ce
signifiant-lettre qui est ce que j’´ecris S indice 1 - ce signifiant qui ne s’´ecrit que de le faire sans aucun
effet de sens’, i.e. ‘The only meaning it [the real?] has is to divide this whatever, this signifier-letter
which is what I have written S subscript 1—this signifier which is only written so as to have no meaning
effect’. Nevertheless I am not at all confident with the translation of this paragraph.
86The ‘C¸ a veut rien dire que’ is missing in the Valas version.
87French distinguishes between savoir, a codified knowledge exterior to the individual and connais-
sance, an individual’s internalised knowledge. Lacan mostly uses savoir in this text; I will point up any
place where he uses connaissance instead.
88Another dig at Ego Psychology, comparing Anna Freud to objet a in the form of shit.
23
Vous savez, quand je pose les questions c’est que j’ai la r´eponse. Mais enfin ¸ca
vaudrait tout de mˆeme mieux que ce soit la bonne, r´eponse. J’appelle “symptˆome” ce
qui vient du r´eel. C¸ a veut dire que ¸ca se pr´esente comme un petit poisson dont le bec
vorace ne se referme qu’`a se mettre du “sens” sous la dent. Alors de deux choses l’une:
ou ¸ca le fait prolif´erer—“Croissez et multipliez-vous!” a dit le Seigneur. Ce qui
est quand mˆeme quelque chose d’un peu fort, qui devrait nous faire tiquer, enfin
cet emploi du terme “multiplication”: lui, le Seigneur, quand mˆeme il sait ce que
c’est qu’une multiplication, c’est pas le foisonnement89 du petit poisson,
ou bien alors, il en cr`eve. [46’ 52”]
Ce qui vaudrait le mieux—c’est `a quoi nous devrions nous efforcer—c’est que le r´eel
du symptˆome en cr`eve, et c’est l`a la question: comment faire? Il y a une ´epoque90
comme ¸ca o`u je me propageais, enfin dans des services que j’nommerai pas... quoique
dans mon machin [texte] j’y fasse allusion, ¸ca passera `a l’impression, ¸ca il faut que je
saute un peu...y’a une ´epoque o`u j’essayais de faire comprendre dans des services de
edecine ce que c’´etait que le symptˆome, je le disais pas tout `a fait comme maintenant,
hein, mais quand mˆeme—c’est peut-ˆetre un Nachtrag—quand mˆeme je crois que je le
savais d´ej`a, mˆeme si je... j’avais pas encore fait surgir l’imaginaire, le symbolique et le
eel.
Le sens du symptˆome n’est pas celui dont on le nourrit pour sa prolif´eration ou
extinction, le sens du symptˆome c’est le r´eel, le r´eel en tant qu’il se met en croix pour
empˆecher que marchent les choses, au sens o`u elles se rendent compte d’elles-mˆemes
de fa¸con satisfaisante, satisfaisante au moins pour le maˆıtre. Ce qui veut pas dire que
l’esclave en souffre d’aucune fa¸con, bien loin de l`a.
L’esclave—je vous demande pardon de cette parenth`ese—l’esclave, lui dans l’affaire,
il est peinard, bien plus qu’on ne croit, hein? C’est lui qui jouit—contrairement `a ce
que dit Hegel qui devrait quand mˆeme s’en apercevoir—puisque c’est bien pour ¸ca qu’il
s’est laiss´e faire par le maˆıtre. Alors Hegel lui promet en plus l’avenir, il est combl´e! C¸ a
aussi, c’est un Nachtrag, un Nachtrag plus sublime que dans mon cas, si je puis dire,
parce que ¸ca prouve que l’esclave avait le bonheur d’ˆetre d´ej`a chr´etien au moment du
paganisme. C’est ´evident, mais enfin c’est quand mˆeme curieux, c’est vraiment l`a, c’est
le b´enef total! Tout, tout pour ˆetre heureux! C¸ a se retrouvera jamais.
89Valas: ce foisonnement’.
90Valas: `
A une ´epoque’.
24
You know that, when I ask questions it’s because I know the answer. But in the
end it would be all the better if it were the right answer. I call the “symptom” that
which comes from the real. Meaning, it looks like a little fish whose voracious mouth
only closes when “meaning” is put between its teeth, So, it’s one of two things:
Either it makes it proliferate—“Be fruitful and multiply!” said the Lord. Which
is all the same a little bit much, which ought to make us wince, anyway, this use
of the term “multiplication”: He, the Lord, he knows even so that this is nothing
but a multiplication, it’s not the abundance of little fish.
Or else, it punctures it.91
What would be best—this is what we should strive for—it’s that the real of the
symptom bursts it, and this is the question: how does it happen? There was a time92
when I spread myself about, at any rate in the service of what shall remain nameless...
although in my thing [text] I make an allusion to it, it will give the impression that...I
must skip over a little bit here... There was a time when I tried, in the service of
medicine, to understand what was the symptom; I didn’t speak of it absolutely in the
way I do now, but even so—it’s perhaps a Nachtrag93—even so I believe that I knew it
already, even if I had not yet come up with the imaginary, the symbolic and the real.
The meaning of the symptom is not the one in which you feed it, for its proliferation
or extinction. The meaning of the symptom, it’s the real, the real inasmuch as it gets in
the way [en tant qu’il se met en croix ] in order to prevent things from working, in the
sense that they [things] are realized in a satisfactory way, satisfactory at least for the
master. This is not to say that the slave suffers in any way, far from it.
The slave—I beg your pardon for this digression—the slave himself in this matter has
it easy, much more that one imagines. It is he that enjoys—contrary to what Hegel said,
who ought all the same to have realized it—since this is why he is left to his own devices
by the master. So Hegel promises him more in the future, he is satisfied! That too is
aNachtrag, a more sublime Nachtrag than in my case, I dare say, because this proves
that the slave has the pleasure of already being Christian in a pagan time. It’s obvious,
but in the end it’s curious all the same, it’s really there, it’s total profit! Everything,
everything to be happy! This will never be encountered again.
91“Crever” can mean “to burst” or “to kill’. So feeding the symptom with meaning either makes it
grow, or it kills it.
92The audio is closer to Valas’ ‘`
A une ´epoque’, or ‘At one time’.
93Freud: Nachtrag = retrospective attribution.
25
Maintenant qu’il y’a plus d’esclaves, nous en sommes r´eduits `a relicher tant que nous
pouvons les com´edies de Plaute et de T´erence, et tout ¸ca pour nous faire une id´ee de ce
qu’ils ´etaient bien, les esclaves.
Enfin je m’´egare... Ce n’est pas pourtant sans ne pas perdre la corde de ce qu’il
prouve, cet ´egarement. Le sens du symptˆome d´epend de l’avenir du r´eel, donc—comme
je l’ai dit, l`a `a la conf´erence de presse—de la r´eussite de la psychanalyse. Ce qu’on lui
demande, c’est de nous d´ebarrasser et du r´eel, et du symptˆome. Si elle succ`ede... a du
succ`es dans cette demande, on peut s’attendre... je dis ¸ca comme ¸ca, pardon, mais je
vois qu’il y a des personnes qui n’´etaient pas `a cette conf´erence de presse, alors c’est
pour elles que je le dis... on peut s’attendre `a tout, `a savoir `a un retour de la vraie
religion par exemple, qui comme vous le savez n’a pas l’air de d´ep´erir.
Elle est pas folle, hein, la vraie religion. Tous les espoirs, tous les espoirs lui sont
bons si je puis dire. Elle les sanctifie.
Alors bien sˆur, ¸ca les lui permet. Mais si la psychanalyse donc r´eussit, elle s’´eteindra
de n’ˆetre qu’un symptˆome oubli´e. Elle doit pas s’en ´epater, c’est le destin de la v´erit´e
telle que, elle-mˆeme le pose au principe: la v´erit´e s’oublie. Donc tout d´epend de si le
eel insiste. Ben pour ¸ca, il faut que la psychanalyse ´echoue. Faut reconnaˆıtre qu’elle en
prend la voie, hein, et qu’elle a donc encore de bonnes chances de rester un symptˆome,
de croˆıtre et de se multiplier. Psychanalystes pas morts, lettre suit! [rires] [53’ 53”]
Mais quand mˆeme m´efiez-vous, hein: c’est peut-ˆetre mon message sous une forme
invers´ee. Peut-ˆetre qu’aussi je me pr´ecipite. C’est la fonction de la hˆate que j’ai mis en
valeur pour vous. Ce que je vous ai dit peut pourtant avoir ´et´e mal entendu—ce que je
viens de vous dire—entendu de sorte que ¸ca soit pris au sens de savoir si la psychanalyse
est un symptˆome social. Y’a qu’un seul symptˆome social: chaque individu est r´eellement
un prol´etaire, c’est-`a-dire n’a nul discours de quoi faire lien social, autrement dit sem-
blant. C’est `a quoi Marx a par´e, a par´e d’une fa¸con incroyable. Aussitˆot dit, aussitˆot
fait, ce qu’il a ´emis implique qu’il y a rien `a changer. C’est bien pour ¸ca d’ailleurs que
tout continue exactement comme avant. [55’ 47”]
26
Now that there are no more slaves, we are reduced to scrutinizing [relicher] while
we can the comedies of Plautus and Terence,94 and all that to get an idea of what they
were happy about, the slaves.
Anyway, I digress... This is not yet without not losing the thread of what it is
demonstrating, this digression.95 The meaning of the symptom depends on the future
of the real, and hence—as I said, there, at the press conference—on the success of
psychoanalysis. What is asked of it [psychoanalysis], is for it to rid us both of the real
and of the symptom. If it succeeds... if it is successful in fulfilling this demand, one
can expect... I say this, sorry, but I see that there are individuals who were not at this
press conference, so I’m saying it for their benefit... one can expect everything, namely,
a return of the true religion96 for example, which as you know doesn’t seem to be dying.
It’s not stupid, the true religion. All hopes, all hopes are welcome in it, so to speak.
It sanctifies them.
Well of course, it authorizes them. But if psychoanalysis succeeds thus, it will die
out being nothing but a forgotten symptom. It ought not to be surprised by this, that’s
the destiny of truth, that which [psychoanalysis] itself establishes as a principle: the
truth is forgotten. Thus everything depends on whether the real insists. Of course,
because of this psychoanalysis must fail. Admittedly, it does take that path and thus
there still is a good chance of it remaining a symptom, of growing and of multiplying
itself. Psychoanalysts are not dead, letter to follow! [laughter]
But all the same, beware: this is perhaps my message in inverted form. Perhaps, I
am rushing as well. It’s the property of haste that I have highlighted for you. What I
have told you—what I have just told you—could however be misunderstood... so that
it would be taken in the sense of knowing whether psychoanalysis is a social symptom.
There is only one social symptom: each individual is actually a proletarian, that is to say
he has no discourse with which to make a social connection, in other words a semblance.
It’s this that Marx was working against, was working against in an incredible way. No
sooner said than done. What he produced implies that there is nothing to change. This
is why, moreover, everything continues exactly as before.
94Titus Maccius Plautus (c. 254–184 BC) was a Roman playwright of the early Latin period. ‘The
Clever Slave’ is a stock character that appears in his comedies—a slave that outwits his master. Publius
Terentius Afer (c. 190–c. 159 BC) was a playwright of the Roman republic and a freed slave. Like
Plautus, he also adapted Greek comedies for the Roman stage, and the scheming slave was a frequent
character in his work.
95This digression has not yet lost the plot!
96i.e. Catholicism
27
La psychanalyse, socialement, a une autre consistance que les autres discours: elle
est un lien `a deux. C’est bien en ¸ca qu’elle se trouve `a la place du manque de rapport
sexuel. C¸ a suffit pas du tout `a en faire un symptˆome social puisque le rapport sexuel
il manque dans toutes les formes de soci´et´es. C’est li´e `a la v´erit´e qui fait structure de
tout discours. C’est bien pour ¸ca d’ailleurs que... qu’il y’a pas de v´eritable “soci´et´e”
fond´ee sur le discours analytique. Il y a une ´ecole, y’a une ´ecole qui justement se d´efinit
pas d’ˆetre une soci´et´e. Elle se d´efinit de ce que, de ce que j’y enseigne quelque chose. Si
rigolo que ¸ca puisse paraˆıtre quand on parle de l’ ´
Ecole freudienne, c’est quelque chose
dans le genre de ce qui a fait les Sto¨ıciens par exemple, eme les Sto¨ıciens avaient
quand mˆeme quelque chose comme un pressentiment du lacanisme, eux. C’est eux qui
ont invent´e la distinction du “signans” et du “signatum”. Par contre je leur dois, moi,
mon respect pour le suicide. Naturellement, ¸ca veut pas dire pour des suicides fond´es
sur un badinage, mais sur cette forme de suicide qui en somme est l’acte `a proprement
parler. Faut pas le rater, bien sˆur, sans ¸ca c’est pas, sans ¸ca c’est pas un acte. Ouais...
Dans tout ¸ca donc, y’a pas de probl`eme de pens´ee. Un psychanalyste sait que la
pens´ee est aberrante de nature, ce qui ne l’empˆeche pas d’ˆetre responsable d’un discours
qui soude l’analysant—`a quoi? Comme quelqu’un l’a tr`es bien dit ce matin: “pas `a
l’analyste”, hein... ce qu’il a dit ce matin je l’exprime, je l’exprime autrement, mais je
suis heureux que ¸ca converge... il soude l’analysant au couple analysant-analyste. C’est
exactement le mˆeme truc qu’a dit quelqu’un ce matin.
Bon! Donc le piquant de tout ¸ca, c’est que ce soit le r´eel dont d´epende l’analyste
dans les ann´ees qui viennent, et pas le contraire. C’est pas du tout de l’analyste que
epend l’av`enement du r´eel. L’analyste, lui, a pour mission de le contrer. Malgr´e tout,
le r´eel pourrait bien prendre le mors aux dents, surtout depuis qu’il a l’appui du discours
scientifique.
C’est mˆeme un des exercices de ce qu’on appelle “science-fiction”, je dois dire que je
ne lis jamais, mais souvent dans les analyses on me raconte ce qu’il y a dedans, c’est pas
imaginable. L’eu-g´enique, l’eu-thanasie, enfin toutes sortes d’eu-plaisanteries diverses.
28
Psychoanalysis, socially, has different consistency to the other discourses: it is a link
between two. This is indeed why it finds itself in the place of the lack of the sexual
relationship. This is not nearly enough to make of it a social symptom, since the sexual
relationship is missing in all forms of society. It’s related to the truth which structures
all discourse. This is indeed why, moreover... there is no actual “society” founded upon
the analytic discourse. There is a school, a school which rightly does not define itself as
being a society. It is defined because I taught something there. Although it seems funny,
when you speak of the Freudian School, it’s something of this kind that characterised the
Stoics, for example. Even the Stoics had something of a premonition of Lacanianism. It
was they who invented the distinction between the signans and the signatum. However,
I owe them my respect for suicide. Naturally, that does not mean suicides based on a
joke, but the kind of suicide which in short is an act proper. It ought not to fail, of
course, without that it’s not an act.97
So, in all of this there is no problem with thought. A psychoanalyst knows that
thought is an anomaly of nature, which does not prevent him from being responsible
for a discourse which links the analysand—to what? As someone quite rightly said
this morning: “not to the analyst”... I will express what he said this morning in a
different way, but I am glad to say that it’s the same thing: it links the analysand in an
analyst-analysand couple. It’s precisely the same thing as someone said this morning.
Therefore the crux of all of this is that it is the real upon which the analyst depends
in the years to come, and not the opposite. It’s not at all the analyst on which the arrival
of the real depends. The analyst himself, his aim is to counter it. Despite everything,
the real could easily take the bit between its teeth, especially since it has the support of
the scientific discourse.98
It’s even one of the practices of what one calls “science-fiction”—I ought to say that
I have never read any, but often in analysis they tell me what’s in it, it’s unbelievable.
Eugenics, euthanasia, all sorts of different eu-jokes.99
97An act proper, as opposed to both acting out and the passage a l’acte, is ethical in that the subject
takes responsibility for their actions. A failed suicide is a passage a l’acte in that it is a failed attempt
at separation from the other, whilst acting out is an attempt to elicit a response from the other. See e.g.
Lacan (1990, p. 43).
98I usually take the ‘scientific discourse’ to mean the university discourse S2
S1
a
Sthough I am not
sure what Lacan means here.
99Later, Lacan will equate “eu ” with what makes up for the non-existence of the sexual relationship,
i.e. fantasy.
29
Non, l`a o`u ¸ca devient drˆole c’est seulement quand les savants eux-mˆemes sont saisis,
non pas bien sˆur de la science-fiction, mais ils sont saisis d’une angoisse: ¸ca c’est quand
eme instructif. C’est bien le symptˆome-type de tout av`enement du r´eel. Et quand
les biologistes—pour les nommer ces savants—s’imposent l’embargo d’un traitement de
laboratoire des bact´eries, sous pr´etexte que si on en fait de trop dures et de trop fortes,
elles pourraient bien glisser sous le pas de la porte et nettoyer, enfin au moins toute
l’exp´erience sexu´ee, en nettoyant le parlˆetre. C¸ a c’est tout de mˆeme quelque chose de
tr`es piquant! Cet acc`es de responsabilit´e est formidablement comique, toute vie enfin
eduite `a l’infection qu’elle est r´eellement selon toute vraisemblance, ¸ca c’est le comble
de l’ˆetre-pense! L’ennui c’est qu’ils ne s’aper¸coivent pas pour autant que la mort se
localise du mˆeme coup `a ce qui dans lalangue—telle que je l’´ecris—en fait signe.
Quoi qu’il en soit, les “eu...” un plus haut par moi soulign´es au passage, nous
mettraient enfin dans l’apathie du bien universel et suppl´eeraient `a l’absence du rapport
que j’ai dit impossible `a jamais, par cette conjonction de Kant avec Sade, dont j’ai cru
devoir marquer dans un ´ecrit l’avenir qu’il nous pend au nez—soit le mˆeme que celui
o`u l’analyse a en quelque sorte son avenir assur´e. ‘Fran¸cais, encore un effort pour ˆetre
epublicains’. Ce sera `a vous de r´epondre `a cette objurgation—parce que... Quoique je
sache pas toujours si cet article vous a fait ni chaud ni froid. Il y a juste un petit type qui
s’est escrim´e dessus... C¸ a a pas donn´e grand chose. Plus je mange mon Dasein—comme
j’ai ´ecrit `a la fin d’un de mes s´eminaires—moins j’en sais dans le genre de l’effet qu’il
vous fait.
Cette “Troisi`eme” je la lis, quand vous pouvez vous souvenir, peut-ˆetre, que la
premi`ere qui y revient, j’avais cru devoir y mettre ma parlance, puisqu’on l’a imprim´ee
depuis, ce sous pr´etexte que vous en aviez tous le texte distribu´e, hein? Si aujourd’hui
je ne fais qu’“ourdrome”, j’esp`ere que ¸ca vous fait pas trop obstacle `a entendre ce que
je lis. Si elle est de trop, je m’excuse.
30
No, where it get’s funny is when the scientists themselves are gripped, not of course
with science fiction, but they are gripped with anxiety: even so, this is enlightening. It
is indeed the paradigmatic symptom [symptˆome-type] of every arrival of the real. And
when the biologists—to call these scholars by their name—imposed an embargo on the
processing of bacteria in the laboratory, on the pretext that if one were to make them
[the bacteria] too tough and too strong, they could easily slip under the threshold and
wipe out, well, at the very least the whole of sexuated experience [toute l’exp´erience
sexu´ee], by wiping out the speaking being [le parlˆetre]. Anyway, that’s something very
juicy! This attack of responsibility is very funny, all life in the end reduced to the
infection that it really is, in all likelihood. That’s the last straw for the thinking being
[l’ˆetre-pense]! The trouble is that they don’t notice as long as death is localized at the
same time by what in lalangue—such as I have written it—makes it a sign. [1h 4’ 53”]
In any case, these “eu”—highlighted by me a little earlier incidentally—will in the
end plunge us into the apathy of the universal good,100 and they will supplement the
absence of the relationship that I said was forever impossible, by this convergence of
Kant with Sade,101 whose future I felt I must write down in a ´ecrit, the future which is
looming [nous pend au nez]—namely the same one in which analysis somehow has its
own future assured. ‘Frenchmen, one more effort if you want to be Republicans’.102 It
will be up to you to respond to this reprimand, because... although I do not always know
whether you are indifferent to this thing. There is only one little guy who is slaving away
over it... it doesn’t amount to much. The more I eat my Dasein—as I wrote at the end
of one of my seminars103—the less I know about the kind of effect it has on you.
This “Troisi`eme”, I read it out, so you may remember, perhaps, that the first which
returns here, I felt obliged to put it in my own words, because it has since been printed,
on the pretext that you had the entire text handed out. If today I do nothing but
ourdrome”, I hope it won’t make it too hard for you to understand what I am reading
out. If it’s too much, I’m sorry.
100Kant’s ‘good will’ which he makes into a universal law.
101Lacan (2006a).
102Marquis de Sade, Philosophy in the Boudoir (1795)
103Lacan (2006b)
31
La premi`ere donc, celle qui revient pour qu’elle ne cesse pas de s’´ecrire, n´ecessaire, la
premi`ere—“Fonction et champ...”—j’y ai dit ce qu’il fallait dire. L’interpr´etation, ai-je
´emis, n’est pas interpr´etation de sens, mais jeu sur l’´equivoque. Ce pourquoi j’ai mis
l’accent sur le signifiant dans la langue. Je l’ai d´esign´e de L’instance de la lettre, ce pour
me faire entendre de votre peu de sto¨ıcisme. [1h 08’ 15”]
Il en r´esulte—ai-je ajout´e depuis sans plus d’effet—que c’est lalangue dont s’op`ere
l’interpr´etation, ce qui n’empˆeche pas que l’inconscient soit structur´e comme un langage,
un de ces langages dont justement c’est l’affaire des linguistes de faire croire que lalangue
est anim´ee: “la grammaire” qu’ils appellent ¸ca g´en´eralement ou—ou quand c’est Hjelm-
slev, “la forme”. C¸ a va pas tout seul, mˆeme si quelqu’un—qui m’en doit le frayage—a
mis l’accent sur la grammatologie. Ouais... Bon!
Lalangue, c’est ce qui permet
que le “vœu”—souhait—on consid`ere que c’est pas par hasard que ce soit aussi le
“veut” de vouloir, troisi`eme personne de l’indicatif,
que le “non” niant et le “nom” nommant, c’est pas non plus par hasard,
ni que “d’eux”—d, apostrophe, avant ce “eux” qui d´esigne ceux dont on parle—ce
soit fait de la mˆeme fa¸con que le chiffre 2, ce n’est pas l`a pur hasard, ni non plus
arbitraire, comme dit Saussure.
32
The first, then, that which returns, for it does not stop writing itself, the necessary,104
the first—“Function and field”105 —I said there what ought to be said. Interpretation,
I ventured, is not interpretation in terms of meaning, but a play of equivocation. This
is why I put the emphasis on the signifier in language. I called it the “Instance of the
Letter”,106 so as to make myself understood by your paltry stoicism.
The result is—I’ve since added for no more effect—that it’s lalangue by which inter-
pretation occurs, which doesn’t prevent the unconscious being structured like a language,
one of these languages for which precisely it’s the business of linguists to make-believe
that lalangue is alive: “grammar”, as they call it in general, or when it’s Hjelmslev,107
“form”. It’s not that easy, even if someone–who is indebted to me for the inspiration
[frayage]—put the emphasis on grammatology.108
Lalangue is what allows
– that the “vœu” [wish]—desire—is also the “veut ” [he wants] of “vouloir” [to
want]—third person indicative, this is not considered a coincidence,
that the “non ” [no] negates and the “nom” [name] nominates, neither is this a
coincidence,109
that the “d’eux ” [of them]—a d-apostrophe before this “eux ” designating those of
whom we speak—is the same thing as the numeral 2 [deux], this here is not pure
chance, nor is it arbitrary as Saussure said.110
104The “first”, which does not stop writing itself, i.e. repeating, is the symptom (Lacan, 1973, 19-2-74).
105Lacan (2006c)
106Lacan (2006d)
107Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965), Danish linguist whose ideas formed the basis of the Copenhagen
School of linguistics. He developed a structural theory of language—glossematics,—which developed the
semiotic theory of Ferdinand de Saussure.
108A dig at Derrida here?
109As in the homophony of the Name of the Father [Le nom du p`ere] and the “No!” of the father [Le
non du p`ere].
110Does this also relate to the “eu ” if fantasy, since there are two [deux ] of them [d’eux ] in the sexual
non-relationship?
33
Ce qu’il faut y concevoir, c’est le d´epˆot, l’alluvion, la p´etrification qui s’en marque du
maniement, par un groupe, de son exp´erience inconsciente. Lalangue111 n’est pas `a dire
“vivante” parce qu’elle est en usage, c’est bien plutˆot la mort du signe qu’elle v´ehicule.
Ce n’est pas parce que l’inconscient est structur´e comme un langage que lalangue
n’ait pas `a jouer contre son jouir, puisqu’elle s’est faite de ce jouir mˆeme.
Le sujet suppos´e savoir, qu’est l’analyste dans le transfert, ne l’est pas suppos´e `a tort
s’il sait en quoi consiste l’inconscient, d’ˆetre un savoir qui s’articule de lalangue, le corps
qui la parle n’y ´etant nou´e que par le r´eel dont il se jouit. Mais le corps est `a comprendre
au naturel comme d´enou´e de ce r´eel qui, pour y ex-sister au titre de faire sa jouissance,
ne lui reste pas moins opaque.
Il est l’abˆıme moins remarqu´e de ce que ce soit lalangue qui, cette jouissance, la
civilise, si j’ose dire. J’entends par l`a qu’elle la porte `a son effet d´evelopp´e, celui par
lequel le corps jouit d’objets dont le premier, celui que j’´ecris du petit a, est l’objet
eme, comme je le disais, dont il n’y a pas d’id´ee—d’id´ee comme telle, j’entends—sauf `a
le briser, cet objet, auquel cas ses morceaux sont identifiables corporellement et—comme
´eclats du corps—identifi´es, et c’est seulement par la psychanalyse. C’est en cela que cet
objet fait le noyau ´elaborable de la jouissance, mais il ne tient qu’`a l’existence du nœud,
aux 3 consistances de tores, de ronds de ficelle qu’il constitue.112
111Valas: ‘La langue’.
112Valas: Dans tout ce paragraphe, il est difficile de distinguer “la langue” de “lalangue”.
34
What you must notice here is the deposit, the alluvium, the petrification, which
indicates the exercise, by a group, of its unconscious experience. Lalangue cannot be
said to be “alive” since it is in use. Rather, it is the death of the sign that it conveys.113
It’s not because the unconscious is structured like a language that lalangue doesn’t
have to compete against its [the unconscious’?] enjoyment [jouer contre son jouir], since
it is made from that same enjoyment.
The subject supposed to know, that is the analyst in the transference, is not presumed
to be wrong, if he knows what the unconscious consists of, namely a knowledge which
is articulated in lalangue, the body which speaks it only being linked [nou´e] to it by
the real via which it enjoys. But the body in its natural state is to be understood as
separate [enou´e] from this real, which, in order to ex-sist there insofar as it creates its
[the body’s] jouissance, remains no less obscure to it.
It is the less noticeable abyss that characterizes lalangue, which tames this jouissance
[of the body], I dare say. I mean by this that it [lalangue] takes it [jouissance] to its
refined form [qu’elle la porte `a son effet d´evelopp´e], the one by which the body enjoys
objects, of which the first—the one I write as petit a—is the very object, as I was saying,
about which we have no idea—no idea as such, I mean—unless it shatters, this object, in
which case its pieces are physically identifiable, and identified as shards of the body, and
it’s only by psychoanalysis.114 It’s through this that this object becomes the workable
kernel of jouissance, but it depends solely on the existence of the knot, on the three
consistencies of the toruses, the rings of string that constitute it.115
113The “petrification” of lalangue (Staferla) or language (Valas) is the way in which a particular social
group organizes its speech and discourse into a shared set of meanings. In the same way as the body
is marked by signifiers and jouissance is localized certain areas, so is the voice marked by signifiers and
meanings are condensed out.
114Valas’ transcription has a different emphasis here. He has ‘...comme ´eclats du corps, identifi´es. Et
c’est seulement par la psychanalyse, c’est en cela que cet objet fait le noyau ´elaborable de la jouissance’.
Namely, for Valas, the effect of psychoanalysis is to make the object a workable kernel of jouissance.
115Valas: Throughout this paragraph it is difficult to distinguish between “language” and “lalangue”.
(i.e. from ‘Lalangue, c’est ce qui permet... at 1h 09’ 28” to ‘...de ronds de ficel le qu’il constitue’ at 1h
13” 23”).
35
L’´etrange est ce lien qui fait qu’une jouissance, quelle qu’elle soit, le suppose, cet
objet, et qu’ainsi le plus-de-jouir—puisque c’est ainsi que j’ai cru pouvoir d´esigner sa
place—soit au regard d’aucune jouissance, sa condition.
Voil`a. J’ai fait un petit sch´ema. Si c’est le cas pour ce qu’il en est de la jouissance
du corps en tant qu’elle est jouissance de la vie, la chose la plus ´etonnante, c’est que cet
objet, le a, s´epare... epare cette jouissance du corps de la jouissance phallique. Pour ¸ca
il faut que vous voyiez comment c’est fait, comment c’est fait le nœud borrom´een.
Figure 2: Le nœud Borrom´een.
Que la jouissance phallique devienne anomalique `a la jouissance du corps, c’est
quelque chose qui s’est d´ej`a aper¸cu trente-six fois. J’sais pas combien de types ici
sont un peu `a la page, l`a de ces histoires `a la mords-moi le doigt qui nous viennent
de l’Inde, “kundalini” qu’ils appellent ¸ca.116 Y’en a qui d´esignent par l`a cette chose `a
faire grimpette, grimpette tout le long de leur moelle, qu’ils disent, parce que depuis on
a fait quelques progr`es en anatomie, alors ce que les autres expliquent d’une fa¸con qui
concerne l’arˆete du corps, ils s’imaginent que c’est la moelle et que ¸ca monte dans la
cervelle. Ouais...
116Valas: Selon la spiritualit´e de l’Inde traditionnelle, kundalini est ‘l’ ´
Energie lov´ee, enroul´ee sur
elle-mˆeme comme un serpent’, comme on peut le lire dans les textes de l’´ecole tantrique sur la ‘physiologie
subtile’. Elle est l’Energie fondamentale proc´edant de la division en deux pˆoles de la Conscience divine:
elle s’est ´eloign´ee de l’Etre pur immuable symboliquement situ´e au point le plus haut, puis s’est arrˆet´ee au
point le plus bas, ordonnant d’une part l’Univers entre Ciel et Terre et d’autre part le monde int´erieur
individuel entre sommet du crˆane et ‘fondement’. Elle s’est localis´ee dans le corps humain `a la base
de la colonne vert´ebrale o`u elle gˆıt enroul´ee, ´evoquant tel serpent mythologique ou abyssal. Cet arrˆet
assure un lien interm´ediaire d’activit´e permanente, axe passant par la colonne vert´ebrale et les centres
er´ebraux autour desquels s’´etage et s’organise toute la manifestation individuelle de la Puissance divine.
Cette ´energie latente peut ˆetre r´eveill´ee par des pratiques de yoga. Le Kundalini-yoga en est une forme
tantrique, par quoi la conscience humaine est unifi´ee `a la Conscience divine, soit comme une union
indissoluble o`u la personnalit´e demeure intacte, soit comme la r´ev´elation d’une identit´e o`u le moi humain
se dissout et fait place `a la Conscience suprˆeme et ´eternelle. D’apr`es Tara Michael, in “Dictionnaire
critique de l’´esot´erisme”, dir. J. Servier, P.U.F., 1998.
L’´energie kundalini est aussi celle de la parole. La mont´ee de celle-ci peut ˆetre provoqu´ee par le yoga
sexuel, la fusion en l’absolu co¨ıncidant avec l’orgasme.
36
The strange thing is this link which causes a jouissance—whatever it may be—to
suppose it, this object, and thus surplus jouissance [le plus-de-jouir]—since it’s thus that
I felt I could designate its place—being with regard to any jouissance, its situation.117
There! I’ve made a little diagram [fig. 2]. If it’s the case for what is the jouissance
of the body inasmuch as it is the jouissance of life, the most striking thing is that this
object, petit a, separates this jouissance of the body from phallic jouissance. For this
reason, you must see how it’s made, this Borromean knot.
That phallic jouissance becomes anomalous with respect to the jouissance of the
body, is something that has already been noted hundreds of times. I don’t know how
many of you guys here are a little bit familiar with these trashy [`a la mords-moi le doigt]
stories which come from India, “kundalini”, they call it.118 There are some over there
who refer to this thing that climbs, climbs right up their marrow, as they say. Because
some progress has since been made in anatomy, well, what others explain in a manner
that relates to the edge119 of the body, they imagine that it is the marrow and that this
thing rises to the brain.
117i.e. every jouissance must be situated in relation to objet a, the surplus jouissance at the centre of
the Borromean knot.
118Valas: According to the traditional Indian spirituality, kundalini is ‘Coiled energy, curled back on
itself like a serpent’, as can be read in the texts of the tantric school on the ‘subtle body’. It is the
fundamental energy that emerges from the division of the divine Conscience into two poles: it moves
away from pure immutable being symbolically situated at the highest point, then stops at the lowest
point, dividing on one hand the Universe between Heaven and Earth, and on the other, an individual’s
interior world between the top of the skull and the ‘foundation’. It is localized in the human body
at the base of the spine where it unravels evoking some mythological or abysmal serpent. This point
ensures a intermediate link which is permanently active, the axis passing through the vertebral column
and the brain centres around which it arranges itself and organizes the entire individual manifestation
of divine Power. This latent energy can be awoken by the practice of yoga. Kundalini yoga is a form
of tantra, via which human consciousness is unified with the Divine, as an indissoluble union where the
personality remains intact, as a revelation of identity where the human ego is dissolved and replaced by
the supreme and and eternal Conscience. After Tara Michael in “Dictionnaire critique de l’´esot´erisme ”,
ed. J. Servier, P.U.F., 1998.
Kundalini energy is also that of speech. The kundalini’s rise can be stimulated by sexual yoga, fusion
with the absolute coinciding with orgasm.
119L’arˆete can also mean bone.
37
L’hors-corps de la jouissance phallique, pour l’entendre—et nous l’avons entendu ce
matin, grˆace `a mon cher Paul Mathis qui est aussi celui `a qui je faisais grand compliment
de ce que j’ai lu de lui sur l’´ecriture et la psychanalyse,120 il nous en a donn´e ce matin
un formidable exemple. C’est pas une lumi`ere, ce Mashimi.121 Et pour nous dire que
c’est Saint S´ebastien qui lui a donn´e l’occasion d’´ejaculer pour la premi`ere fois, il faut
vraiment que ¸ca l’ait ´epat´e, ct’´ejaculation.122 Nous voyons ¸ca tous les jours, les types
qui vous racontent que leur premi`ere masturbation, ils s’en souviendront toujours, que
¸ca cr`eve l’´ecran. Ouais... En effet, on comprend bien pourquoi ¸ca cr`eve l’´ecran, parce
que ¸ca ne vient pas du dedans de l’´ecran. Lui, le corps enfin, s’introduit dans l’´economie
de la jouissance—¸ca c’est l`a que je suis parti—par l’image du corps.
Le rapport de l’homme, enfin ce qu’on appelle de ce nom, avec son corps, s’il y a
quelque chose qui souligne bien qu’il est imaginaire, c’est la port´ee qu’y prend l’image, et
au d´epart j’ai bien soulign´e ceci, c’est qu’il fallait pour ¸ca quand mˆeme une raison dans le
eel, et que la pr´ematuration de Bolk123—c’est pas de moi, c’est de Bolk, moi j’ai jamais
cherch´e `a ˆetre original, j’ai cherch´e `a ˆetre logicien—c’est qu’il y a que la pr´ematuration
qui l’explique cette pr´ef´erence pour l’image, qui vient de ce qu’il anticipe sa maturation
corporelle, avec tout ce que ¸ca comporte bien sˆur, `a savoir qu’il ne peut pas voir un de
ses semblables sans penser que ce semblable prend sa place, donc naturellement qu’il le
vomit. Ouais...
120Valas: Paul Mathis, ´
Ecriture et psychanalyse, non publi´e.
121Valas: Lapsus de Lacan, il s’agit bien ´evidemment de Mishima.
122Valas: ‘cette ´ejaculation’.
123Valas: L. Bolk, La gen`ese de l’homme in Littoral no. 27/28, Paris avril 1989.
38
In order to understand this out-of-body character of phallic jouissance [l’hors-corps
de la jouissance phallique]—and we heard about it this morning, thanks to my dear
Paul Mathis, who is also the one to whom I have extended the great compliment of
reading his work on writing and psychoanalysis.124 He gave us this morning a wonderful
example. He’s not enlightening, this Mashimi.125 ,126 And to tell us that it was Saint
Sebastian that allowed him to ejaculate for the first time, it must really have amazed
him, this ejaculation.127 We see it all the time, these guys who tell you that they
will always remember the first time they masturbated, that it burst through the screen
[cr`eve l’´ecran].128 In fact, you can understand very well why it burst through the screen,
because it didn’t come from inside the screen [dedans de l’´ecran]. As for him [Mashimi],
the body at least enters into the economy of jouissance—that’s where I left off—through
the image of the body.
The relationship of man—at least what one calls by that name—with his body, if
there is something that emphasizes well that it is imaginary, it’s the significance that the
image assumes here—from the start I have emphasized this a lot—and it’s that one still
needs for this a cause in the real [une raison dans le r´eel]. And Bolk’s “prematuration”
theory129—it’s not mine, it’s Bolk’s, I have never sought to be original, I sought to be
a logician—it’s only prematuration that explains for him this preference for the image,
which comes from his anticipating his own physical maturation and all that it entails, of
course. That is to say that he cannot see one of his fellows [semblables] without thinking
that this fellow will take his place, then naturally he vomits...130
124Valas: Paul Mathis, Writing and Psychoanalysis, unpublished.
125Valas: Lacan’s mistake, he obviously means Mishima.
126Yukio Mishima (1925-1970) was a Japanese poet and author who committed ritual suicide after
a failed coup d’´etat. His work on his struggles with phallogocentricity and ‘being a woman’ has been
compared to that of Luce Irigaray (Otomo, 2007).
127See e.g. Stokes (2000). Guido Reni’s Saint Sebastian was the image which inspired, apparently,
Mishima’s first ejaculation and years later he was photographed as the saint, in an imitation of the
painting.
128This expression is often used to refer to films or actors, and means ‘has great screen presence’,
‘made his/her breakthrough’, ‘is a blockbuster’ etc. I translated it literally because, the screen refers to
fantasy perhaps?
129Valas: L. Bolk, The Origin of Man in the Littoral n 27/28, Paris, April 1989.
130This refers back to the imaginary that “stuffs” the symbolic, that does not allow movement, hence
causes one to “vomit”.
39
Pourquoi est-ce qu’il est comme ¸ca, si inf´eod´e `a son image? Vous savez le mal que
je me suis donn´e, hein, dans un temps—parce que naturellement vous ne vous en ˆetes
pas aper¸cus—le mal que je me suis donn´e quand mˆeme pour expliquer ¸ca. J’ai voulu
absolument donner `a cette image je ne sais quel prototype chez un certain nombre
d’animaux, `a savoir le moment o`u l’image ¸ca joue un rˆole dans le processus germinal.
Alors j’ai ´et´e chercher le criquet p`elerin, un tas de trucs, l’´epinoche, la pigeonne... [1h
21’ 40”]
En r´ealit´e c’´etait pas du tout, c’´etait pas du tout131 quelque chose comme un pr´elude,
un exercice, c’est des hors-d’œuvre, tout ¸ca. Que l’homme aime tellement `a regarder son
image, ben voil`a, y’a qu’`a dire: c’est comme ¸ca. Mais ce qu’il y a de plus ´epatant, c’est
que ¸ca a permis le glissement, n’est-ce pas, le glissement du commandement de Dieu.
L’homme est quand mˆeme plus... plus prochain `a lui-mˆeme, dans son ˆetre, que dans son
image dans le miroir. Et alors qu’est-ce que c’est que cette histoire du commandement
“Tu aimeras ton prochain comme toi-mˆeme” si ¸ca ne se fonde pas sur ce mirage, qui
est quand mˆeme quelque chose de drˆole, mais comme ce mirage justement est ce qui le
porte `a ha¨ır non pas “son prochain” mais “son semblable”, c’est un truc qui porterait
un peu `a cˆot´e si on ne pensait pas que, que quand mˆeme, Dieu doit savoir ce qu’il dit,
et que y’a quelque chose qui s’aime mieux encore pour chacun que son image. Ouais...
Ce qui est frappant c’est ceci: c’est que s’il y a quelque chose qui nous donne l’id´ee
du “se jouir”, c’est l’animal. On ne peut en donner aucune preuve, mais enfin ¸ca semble
bien ˆetre impliqu´e par... par ce qu’on appelle le corps animal.
131Valas: ‘ce n’est pas du tout’.
40
Why is he like this, so subordinated to his image? You know the trouble that I
took once—because of course you were not aware of it—the trouble I took, anyway, to
explain this. I wanted absolutely to relate this image to some sort of prototype in a
certain number of animals: namely to the moment where the image plays a role in the
developmental process [joue un rˆole dans le processus germinal]. So I had to research
the locust, a load of stuff, the stickleback, the pigeon...
In reality, it was not at all, not at all anything like a prelude, a preliminary exercise,
it’s an hors d’oeuvre, all this.132 That man loves to look at his image so much, there’s
nothing else to say except: that’s the way it is. But what is more astonishing, is that
this allows a sliding, isn’t that so, a sliding of God’s commandment. Man is, at any rate,
closer to himself in his being than to his image in the mirror. So, what is the story of
the commandment “Love your neighbour as yourself” if it is not based on this mirage,
which is at any rate something funny, although it is something exactly like this mirage
that brings him to hate, not his “neighbour” but his “fellow-man”. It’s something that
would be a little off base [porterait un peu `a cˆot´e] if we didn’t believe that after all, God
must know what he is talking about and that there is something everyone can love even
more than their own image.
What’s striking is this: if there’s something that gives us the idea of “enjoying itself”
[se jouir], it’s the animal. There’s no proof, but anyway it seems to be implied by what
is called the animal body.
132Apparently the French distinguish between an appetizer, which is the first course of a meal, and
an hors d’oeuvre which is a small item of food served outside of a meal. So Lacan is debunking Bolk’s
prematuration theory, that the obsession with the image is a developmental stage that leads to something
greater.
41
La question devient int´eressante `a partir du moment, si on l’´etend et si au nom de
la vie on se demande si la plante jouit. C’est quand mˆeme quelque chose qui a un sens,
parce que c’est quand mˆeme l`a qu’on nous a fait le coup, on nous a fait le coup du “lys
des champs”: “Il ne tisse ni ne file...” a-t-on ajout´e. Mais il est sˆur que maintenant,
nous ne pouvons pas nous contenter de ¸ca, pour la bonne raison que justement, c’est
leur cas, de tisser et de filer.
Pour nous qui voyons ¸ca au microscope, ben y’a pas d’exemple plus manifeste que
c’est du fil´e. Alors c’est peut-ˆetre de ¸ca qu’ils jouissent, de tisser et de filer, mais ¸ca laisse
quand mˆeme l’ensemble de la chose tout `a fait flottante. La question reste `a trancher si
“vie” implique “jouissance”. Et si la question reste douteuse pour le v´eg´etal, ¸ca ne met
que plus en valeur qu’elle ne le soit pas pour la parole. Que lalangue o`u la jouissance
fait d´efaut, fait d´epˆot,133 comme je l’ai dit... non sans la mortifier, n’est-ce pas, sans
qu’elle ne se pr´esente comme du bois mort... emoigne quand mˆeme que la vie, dont un
langage fait rejet, nous donne bien l’id´ee que c’est quelque chose de l’ordre du v´eg´etal.
Faut regarder ¸ca de pr`es. Enfin il y a un linguiste comme ¸ca qui a beaucoup insist´e
sur le fait que le phon`eme, ¸ca fait jamais sens. L’emetant c’est que le mot, le mot
ne fait pas sens non plus, malgr´e le dictionnaire. Moi je me fais fort de faire dire dans
une phrase, `a n’importe quel mot, n’importe quel sens. Ouais... Alors, si on fait dire
`a n’importe quel mot n’importe quel sens: o`u s’arrˆeter dans la phrase, o`u trouver, o`u
trouver l’unit´e ´el´ement?
Puisque nous sommes `a Rome, je vais essayer de... je vais essayer de vous... de vous
donner une id´ee l`a de ce que je voudrais dire, de ce que je voudrais dire sur ce qu’il en
est de cette unit´e, `a chercher du signifiant.
Il y a, vous savez, les fameuses “trois vertus” dites justement “th´eologales”. Ici on
les voit se pr´esenter aux murailles sous—exactement partout—sous la forme de femmes
plantureuses. Le moins qu’on puisse dire, c’est qu’apr`es ¸ca, `a les traiter de symptˆomes,
hein, on ne force pas la note, parce que d´efinir le symptˆome comme je l’ai fait, enfin `a
partir du r´eel, c’est dire que les femmes l’expriment aussi tr`es tr`es bien le r´eel, puisque
justement j’insiste sur ce que les femmes sont “pas-toutes”.
133Valas: Est-ce un lapsus de Lacan?
42
The question becomes interesting at this point, if we generalize it and if in the name
of life, we wonder if a plant can enjoy. Still, this is something that has meaning, since
this is at any rate where they pulled the old “lilies of the field” trick on us. “They do
not weave or spin”—they added. But certainly we cannot now be satisfied with this, for
the good reason that it’s precisely their business to spin and to weave.
For us, who look at this down a microscope, there’s no more obvious example than
this of a yarn [fil´e]. So it may be this that they enjoy, weaving and spinning, but that
still leaves the whole thing up in the air. The question remains to be determined as
to whether “life” involves “jouissance”. And if that question remains doubtful for the
vegetable, then that only makes it even more pertinent that it is not so for speech. That
lalangue, where jouissance creates a sediment [epˆot],134,135 as I said... not without
mortifying it [jouissance?], obviously, not without it appearing like dead wood... it
corroborates at any rate that life, whose language grows shoots,136 gives us the firm
impression that there is something plant-like about it.
We must watch this closely. Anyway, there is a linguist like that who has placed
great emphasis on the fact that the phoneme never makes sense. The annoying thing is
that the word, the word does not make sense either, in spite of the dictionary. As for
me, in a sentence I make a point of assigning any meaning to any word. So, if we can
assign any meaning to any word, where do we stop in a sentence? Where do we find the
unit element?137
Since we are in Rome, I will try to give you an idea of what I would like to say here
regarding this unit, by searching for the signifier.
There are, you know, three famous virtues, rightly deemed “theological”. Here we
can see them represented on the walls, precisely everywhere, in the form of buxom
[plantureuses] women. The very least that can be said is that, after this, in treating
symptoms one cannot overdo it, because to define the symptom as I have done, at any
rate from the standpoint of the real, means that women also experience the real very,
very well, precisely because I insist that these women are not-all [pas-toutes].
134Valas: Is this a mistake by Lacan?
135If Lacan makes a mistake as Valas suggests, he begins by saying “That lalangue, where jouissance
is lacking...”, then corrects it to “That lalangue, where jouissance creates a sediment...”.
136The word faire rejet can mean both “to reject” or “to grow a shoot’ (botany). No idea which is
correct here.
137A unit element in this context seems to be a linguistic unit that has no purpose other than to denote
the end of a word, sentence or phrase. For example, in written English a full stop denotes a sentence
boundary, whilst in speech a pause is used.
43
Alors l`a-dessus, l’esp´erance... non, la foi, l’esp´erance et la charit´e, ouais... si je les
signifie
de la foire,
– de laisse-sp`ere-ogne—lasciate ogni speranza [abandonner tout espoir]—c’est un
etamorph`eme comme un autre, puisque t’`a l’heure vous m’avez pass´e “our-
drome”, les d´enommer de ¸ca,
et de finir par le ratage type, `a savoir l’art-chirat´e,138
...il me semble que c’est une incidence plus effective pour le symptˆome, pour le symptˆome
de ces trois femmes, ¸ca me paraˆıt plus pertinent que ce qui, au moment enfin... o`u on
se met `a rationaliser enfin tout, par ce que, est-ce que c’est autre chose que les trois
questions de Kant avec lesquelles j’ai eu `a me d´epˆetrer `a la t´el´evision—`a savoir : “Que
puis-je savoir?”, “Que m’est-il permis d’esp´erer?”—c’est vraiment le comble !—et “Que
dois-je faire?”—c’est quand mˆeme tr`es curieux, enfin n’est-ce pas, qu’on en soit l`a.
Non pas bien sˆur que je consid`ere que “la foi, l’esp´erance et la charit´e” soient les
premiers symptˆomes `a mettre sur la sellette. Enfin c’est pas des mauvais symptˆomes,
enfin ¸ca entretient tout `a fait bien la n´evrose universelle enfin... n’est-ce pas, c’est-`a-dire
qu’en fin de compte les choses n’aillent pas trop mal, enfin qu’on soit tous soumis au
principe de r´ealit´e, c’est-`a-dire au fantasme, hein n’est-ce pas. Mais enfin l’´
Eglise quand
eme est l`a qui veille, et une rationalisation d´elirante comme celle de Kant, enfin c’est
quand mˆeme ce qu’elle tamponne.
138Valas: l’archirat´e
44
So, there we are, hope, no...faith, hope and charity [la foi, l’esp´erance et la charit´e],
if I designate them as
a shambles [foire]
laisse-sp`ere-ognelasciate ogni speranza [Abandon all hope], it’s a metamorpheme
like any other—since you let me have my “ourdrome” earlier;
and finishing with the epitome of failure [le ratage type], namely original-failure
[l’archirat´e].139, 140
...it seems to me that this has serious repercussions for the symptom, the symptom
of these three women, it seems more appropriate to me that this, when finally... when we
try and rationalize everything at any rate, because, is it anything other than the three
questions of Kant141—which I had to wriggle out of when I was on on television—namely:
“What do I know?”, “What can I hope for?”—that’s really the limit!—and “What must
I do?” It’s still very curious, isn’t it, that in the end we have come to this.
Not that, of course, I consider “faith, hope and charity” to be the first symptoms to
be put in the dock. These are not bad symptoms, in the end they do support universal
neurosis pretty well... isn’t that so? That is to say, at the end of the day things don’t go
too badly, we are entirely subject to the Reality principle, that is to say, fantasy. But
all in all, the Church still takes care of things here, and a wild rationalization like that
of Kant is, in the end, what she wipes away [tamponne].142
139I have used Valas’ version here as I can make no sense of Staferla’s. Lacan seems to playing with
la charit´e and l’archirat´e as archi (extreme) and rat´e (failure). Charity or, in other words, Love is the
original failure.
140The three graces could be identified with the three orders: faith is the symbolic whose arrival causes
the shambles, or forced choice, between thinking and being, hope is the imaginary of the metaphor and
charity is the real of the sexual relationship.
141Valas substitutes ‘se formule par exemple comme ces trois questions de Kant’ for Staferla’s ‘par ce
que, est-ce que c’est autre chose que les trois questions de Kant’, but from the audio (1h 30’ 53”) it is
clear that Staferla is right.
142Tamponner can mean to stamp (and rubber-stamp) but also to dab, to mop, to wipe.
45
J’ai pris cet exemple, comme ¸ca, pour ne pas m’empˆetrer dans ce que j’avais com-
menc´e d’abord par vous donner comme “jeu”, comme exemple, enfin de ce qu’il faut pour
traiter un symptˆome, n’est-ce pas, quand j’ai dit que l’interpr´etation, ¸ca doit toujours
ˆetre—comme on l’a dit, Dieu merci, ici et pas plus tard qu’hier, `a savoir Tostain,143 le
ready-made, Marcel Duchamp, qu’au moins vous en entendiez quelque chose—l’essentiel
qu’il y a dans le jeu de mots, c’est l`a que doit viser notre interpr´etation pour n’ˆetre pas
celle qui nourrit le symptˆome de sens.
Et puis je vais tout vous avouer, hein? Je vais tout vous avouer... pourquoi pas? Ce
truc-l`a, ce glissement de “la foi, l’esp´erance et la charit´e” vers la foire—je dis ¸ca parce
qu’il y a eu quelqu’un hier soir `a la conf´erence de presse, ou avant-hier soir, `a trouver
que j’allais un peu fort sur le sujet de la foi et de la foire. C’est un de mes rˆeves `a
moi, j’ai quand mˆeme bien le droit, tout comme Freud, enfin de vous faire part de mes
eves. Contrairement `a ceux de Freud, ils ne sont pas inspir´es par le d´esir de dormir,
c’est plutˆot le d´esir de r´eveil, moi, qui m’agite. Mais enfin c’est particulier. Ouais... [1h
34’ 38”]
Enfin ce signifiant-unit´e [S1], c’est capital, hein. C’est capital mais ce qu’il y a de
sensible, c’est que sans... ¸ca c’est manifeste: que le mat´erialisme moderne lui-mˆeme, on
peut ˆetre sˆur qu’il ne serait pas n´e, si depuis longtemps ¸ca ne tracassait les hommes, et
si dans ce tracas, la seule chose qu’ils montraient ˆetre `a leur port´ee,144 c’´etait toujours
la lettre. Quand Aristote—comme n’importe qui, enfin—se met `a donner l’id´ee de
l’´el´ement, c’est toujours... il fait une s´erie de lettres: ρ,σ,τenfin exactement comme
nous.
143Valas: R. Tostain, Ready-made et objet petit a, in Lettres de l’EFP n 16, pp. 69-78.
144Valas: ‘la seule chose qui se montrait ˆetre `a leur port´ee’.
46
I gave this example so that I didn’t get myself entangled in what I had started first of
all, by giving it to you as a “game”, as an example, at any rate, of how one should treat a
symptom, when I said that interpretation should always be—as we have said, thanks to
God, here and just yesterday, namely Tostain,145 the ready-made, Marcel Duchamp, of
which you understand at least something—the main thing is wordplay, that’s where you
should aim your interpretation at, in order not to be the one that nurtures the symptom
with meaning.146
And now I am going to confess everything to you. I am going to confess everything,
why not? This thing here, this sliding of faith, hope and charity towards a shambles—I
say this because there was someone last night at the press conference, or the night before,
who thought I was a bit over the top on the subject of faith [foi] and the shambles
[foire].147 That’s one of my dreams: I still have the right, just like Freud, to share my
dreams with you. Unlike Freud’s, they are not inspired by the desire to sleep, it’s rather
the desire to wake which disturbs me. But in the end, it’s strange.
Anyway, this signifier-unit [S1], it’s crucial. It’s crucial but it has to be perceptible
because without it... it’s clear: modern materialism itself, one can be sure that it
wouldn’t have been born, if it [S1] hadn’t been troubling men for a long time, and if,
in this trouble, the only thing that they showed to be within their reach148 was always
the letter. So, Aristotle, like everyone in the end, began to introduce the idea of the
element, it’s always... he created a series of letters: ρ,σ,τ, just like we do.149
145Valas: R. Tostain, The Ready-made and objet petit a, in Lettres de l’EFP n 16, pp. 69-78.
146Lacan is comparing the wordplay of analysis, which tries to avoid the dead-end of meaning, with
Duchamp’s work, his ready-mades, ordinary objects that have been elevated to the status of Works of Art
(e.g. Duchamp’s Fountain in Tate Modern, in any other context would merely be a urinal). Duchamp
says of his work: ‘The curious thing about the readymade is that I’ve never been able to arrive at a
definition or explanation that fully satisfies me’.
147Lacan is referring to an exchange with a journalist he had the day before (see (Valas, 2015, pp33-34)),
in which he said ‘Votre extrapolation...votre fa¸con de faire converger le r´eel et le transcendant, je dois dire
que ¸ca me parıt un acte de foi...C’est ¸ca qu’il y a d’horrible, c’est qu’on est toujours dans la foire...Moi,
c’est ma fa¸con de traduire foi. La foi, c’est la foire. Il y a tellement de fois, vous comprenez, de fois
qui se nichent dans les coins, que malgr´e tout, ¸ca ne se dit bien que sur le forum, c’est-`a-dire la foire’
[‘Your extrapolation, your way of merging the real and the transcendent, I have to say that it seems to
me to be an act of faith... It’s this that is horrible, this is why we are always in deep shit... For me, this
is my way of interpreting faith. Faith, it’s a shambles. There are so many faiths, you see, faiths which
nestle in the corners, that, despite everything, it can only be called a forum, namely a fair.’] Lacan is
playing on foi (faith), fois (faiths, time, multiplication), foire (shambles, screw-up or fair).
148Valas: ‘the only thing that appeared to be within their reach’
149For Lacan’s ‘materialism of the signifier’, see Evans (1996, p109-110).
47
Il n’y a pas ailleurs, y’a rien qui donne150 d’abord l’id´ee de l’´el´ement, au sens o`u
tout `a l’heure je crois, je l’´evoquais, du grain de sable—c’est peut-ˆetre aussi dans un de
ces trucs que j’ai saut´e, bon enfin, peu importe—l’id´ee de l’´el´ement, l’id´ee dont j’ai dit
que ¸ca ne pouvait que se compter, et rien ne nous arrˆete dans ce genre: si nombreux
que soient les grains de sable—il y a d´ej`a un Archim`ede qui l’a dit—si nombreux qu’ils
soient, on arrivera toujours `a les calibrer, mais tout ceci ne nous vient qu’`a partir de
quelque chose qui n’a pas de meilleur support que la lettre. Mais ¸ca veut dire aussi,
parce que y’a pas de lettre sans d’lalangue, c’est mˆeme le probl`eme, comment est-ce que
lalangue, ¸ca peut se pr´ecipiter dans la lettre? On n’a jamais fait rien de bien s´erieux sur
l’´ecriture. Mais ¸ca vaudrait quand mˆeme la peine, enfin, parce que c’est l`a tout `a fait
un joint. Ouais...
Donc que le signifiant soit pos´e par moi comme repr´esentant un sujet aupr`es d’un
autre signifiant, c’est la fonction qui s’av`ere de ceci... comme quelqu’un aussi l’a re-
marqu´e tout `a l’heure, et faisant en quelque sorte frayage `a ce que je peux vous dire...c’est
la fonction qui ne s’av`ere qu’au d´echiffrage qui est tel, que n´ecessairement c’est au chiffre
qu’on retourne, et que c’est ¸ca le seul exorcisme dont soit capable la psychanalyse, c’est
que le d´echiffrage se r´esume `a ce qui fait le chiffre, `a ce qui fait que le symptˆome, c’est
quelque chose qui avant tout ne cesse pas de s’´ecrire du r´eel, et qu’aller `a l’apprivoiser
jusqu’au point o`u le langage en puisse faire ´equivoque, c’est l`a par quoi le terrain est
gagn´e qui s´epare le symptˆome de ce que je vais vous montrer sur mes petits dessins, sans
que le symptˆome se r´eduise `a la jouissance phallique. Ouais... Il faut que j’en saute un
bout comme ¸ca.
Mon “se jouit” d’introduction, ce qui pour vous en est le t´emoin, c’est que votre
analysant pr´esum´e se confirme d’ˆetre tel, `a ceci qu’il revienne, parce que—je vous le
demande—pourquoi est-ce qu’il reviendrait—vu la tˆache o`u vous le mettez—si ¸ca lui
faisait pas un plaisir fou? Outre qu’en plus, souvent enfin... il en remet, `a savoir qu’il
faut qu’il fasse encore d’autres tˆaches pour satisfaire `a votre analyse. Il “se jouit” de
quelque chose, et non pas du tout de ce “je souis”, parce que tout indique, tout doit
eme par vous, indiquer, que vous ne lui demandez pas du tout simplement de daseiner,
d’ˆetre l`a, comme moi je le suis maintenant, mais plutˆot, et tout `a l’oppos´e, de mettre `a
l’´epreuve cette libert´e de la fiction de dire n’importe quoi, qui en retour va s’av´erer ˆetre
impossible.
150Valas: ‘Il n’y a ailleurs rien qui donne’.
48
There is nowhere, there’s nothing else that first gives us the idea of the element, in
the sense that I believe I mentioned just now, of a grain of sand—this is also perhaps
in one of those things that I have skipped over, good then, no matter... the idea of the
element, the idea of which I said that it can only be counted, and there is nothing of this
kind that can stop us: however numerous the grains of sand—already one Archimedes
has said so—however numerous they are, we always manage to grade them... but all
this comes only from something which has no better support than the letter. But that
also means, because there is no letter without lalangue—this is the very problem—how
is it that lalangue can be precipitated in the letter? We have never done anything really
serious about writing. But it would be worth it all the same, well, because it’s precisely
there that the link is made.
Therefore, the signifier—defined by me as representing the subject for another signifier—
is the function which proves to be (as someone also mentioned just now, somehow making
an association [frayage] with what I can tell you) it’s the function which proves to be
nothing but decipherment [echiffrage], which is such that one inevitably returns to the
character [chiffre ]. And this is the only exorcism of which psychoanalysis is capable, it’s
because decipherment comes down to what is the character, to what is the symptom,
it’s something which above all does not stop writing itself in the real. And that setting
out to tame it to the point where language can be ambiguous, this is how we here gain
the ground that separates the symptom from that which I am going to show you on my
little drawings, without which, the symptom reduces to phallic jouissance.
I have to skip over a bit here...
My “se jouit” of the introduction, what it bears witness to, is that your presumed
analysand establishes himself as being that to which he returns.151 Because, I ask of you,
given the task that you assigned him, why would he return, unless he gets a kick out of
it? Furthermore, often, in the end... it relies on this, namely that he must perform yet
more tasks to satisfy your analysis. He enjoys [se jouit] something, which is not at all
this “je souis”, because everything indicates, everything must even indicate to you, that
you do not ask him simply to daseiner, to be there, like I am now, but rather just the
opposite: to put to the test his freedom of fabrication to say whatever he likes, which in
turn is going to prove to be impossible.
151i.e. identifies with the symptom.
49
C’est-`a-dire que ce que vous lui demandez, c’est tout `a fait de quitter cette position
que je viens de qualifier du Dasein et qui est plus simplement celle dont il se contente.
Il s’en contente justement de s’en plaindre, `a savoir de pas ˆetre conforme `a l’ˆetre social,
`a savoir qu’il y ait quelque chose qui se mette en travers. Et justement de ce que
quelque chose se mette en travers, c’est ¸ca qu’il aper¸coit comme symptˆome, comme tel
symptomatique du r´eel. Alors en plus y’a l’approche qu’il fait de le penser, mais ¸ca c’est
ce qu’on appelle le b´en´efice secondaire, dans toute n´evrose.
Tout ce que je dis l`a n’est pas vrai forc´ement dans l’´eternel—¸ca m’est d’ailleurs
compl`etement indiff´erent—c’est que c’est la structure mˆeme du discours que vous ne
fondez qu’`a reformer, voire r´eformer les autres discours, en tant qu’au vˆotre ils ex-sistent.
Et c’est dans le vˆotre, dans votre discours, que le parlˆetre ´epuisera cette insistance qui
est la sienne et qui dans les autres, les autres discours, reste `a court.
Alors o`u se loge ce “¸ca se jouit” dans mes registres cat´egoriques de l’imaginaire, du
symbolique et du r´eel?
Voil`a, il faut quand mˆeme pour que vous pigiez. Pour qu’il y ait nœud borrom´een—regardez
l`a ce qui est en haut—pour qu’il y ait nœud borrom´een, c’est pas n´ecessaire que mes 3
consistances fondamentales soient toutes toriques. Comme vous l’avez peut-ˆetre, enfin
comme ¸ca, comme c’est peut-ˆetre venu `a vos oreilles, vous savez qu’une droite peut ˆetre
cens´ee se mordre la queue `a l’infini [Desargues]. Alors du symbolique, de l’imaginaire et
du r´eel, il peut y avoir un des trois—le r´eel sˆurement—qui lui se caract´erise justement
de ce que j’ai dit : de ne pas faire “tout ”, c’est-`a-dire de ne pas se boucler.
Figure 3
50
That is to say, what you ask of him is to absolutely leave his position, which I have
just qualified as Dasein, and which is more simply, that with which he contents himself.
He contents himself precisely by complaining, namely that he does not fit in to society,
that there was something that got in his way. And precisely, this thing that gets in his
way, it’s that which he perceives as a symptom, symptomatic of the real as such. Well,
there is also the approach that he makes to thinking about it, but that is what is called
a secondary benefit in all the neuroses.
All that I have said here isn’t strictly true in the eternal—that is incidentally some-
thing I am completely indifferent to—it’s that it’s the very structure of discourse that
you only establish in order to change it, in fact to change the other discourses, inasmuch
as they ex-sist in relation to yours [the analytic discourse]. And it’s in yours, in your
discourse that the speaking being will exhaust this insistence which is his own and which
in the others, in the other discourses, falls short.
Well then, where is this “¸ca se jouit” located in my categorical registers of the
imaginary, symbolic and real.
Anyway, you must catch on! For the Borromean knot—look above you—for the Bor-
romean knot it’s not necessary that my three fundamental consistencies are completely
circular. As you have perhaps, anyway... as it may have come to your attention, you
know that a line is expected to bite its own tail at infinity [Desargues].152 So the sym-
bolic, the imaginary and the real: there can be one of the three—the real surely—which
characterizes itself precisely by what I have said: by not being “all”, namely by not
completing itself.
152Girard Desargues (1591-1661), French mathematician and one of the founders of projective geome-
try, was one of the first to use the concept of infinity in a systematic way. In the projective plane, the
two ends of an extended line meet at infinity and are therefore cyclical rather than linear.
51
Supposez mˆeme que ce soit la mˆeme chose pour le symbolique. Il suffit que l’imag-
inaire, `a savoir un de mes 3 tores, se manifeste bien comme l’endroit o`u assur´ement on
tourne en rond, pour que—avec deux droites—¸ca fasse nœud borrom´een. Ce que vous
voyez en haut—dont ce n’est pas par hasard, peut-ˆetre, que ¸ca se pr´esente comme l’en-
trecroisement de deux Φ de l’´ecriture grecque—ce que vous voyez en haut c’est peut-ˆetre
bien aussi quelque chose qui est tout `a fait, tout `a fait digne d’entrer dans le cas du
nœud borrom´een. Faites sauter aussi bien la continuit´e de la droite que la continuit´e du
rond, ce qu’il y a de reste, que ce soient une droite et un rond, ou que ce soient deux
droites, est tout `a fait libre, ce qui est bien la d´efinition du nœud borrom´een.
Alors, en vous disant tout ¸ca j’ai le sentiment—enfin je l’ai mˆeme not´e dans mon
texte—que le langage, c’est vraiment ce qui ne peut avancer qu’`a se tordre et `a s’enrouler,
`a se contourner d’une fa¸con enfin dont apr`es tout je ne peux pas dire que je ne donne
pas ici l’exemple. Ouais... [1h 48’ 19”]
Faut pas croire qu’`a relever le gant pour lui—enfin `a marquer dans tout ce qui nous
concerne `a quel point nous en d´ependons—faut pas croire que je fasse ¸ca tellement de
gaiet´e de cœur. Ce qui me paraˆıt comique c’est simplement que on ne s’aper¸coive pas
que y’a aucun autre moyen de penser, et que des psychologues, `a la recherche de la
pens´ee qui ne serait pas parl´ee, impliquent en quelque sorte que la pens´ee pure—si j’ose
dire—¸ca serait mieux.
Dans ce que tout `a l’heure j’ai avanc´e de cart´esien, le “je pense donc je suis ”
nomm´ement, y’a une erreur, y’a une erreur profonde, c’est que ce qui l’inqui`ete c’est que
quand elle imagine que la pens´ee fait “´etendue”, si on peut dire. Mais c’est bien ce qui
emontre qu’il n’y a de pens´ee si je puis dire, de pens´ee pure, de pens´ee qui ne soit pas
soumise aux contorsions du langage, que justement la pens´ee de “l’´etendue”.
Et alors ce `a quoi je voulais vous introduire aujourd’hui, et que je ne fais en fin de
compte apr`es deux heures, n’est-ce pas, que d’y ´echouer, n’est-ce pas, que de ramper,
c’est ceci: c’est que l’´etendue, l’´etendue que nous supposons ˆetre l’espace, l’espace qui
nous est commun, `a savoir les 3 dimensions, pourquoi diable est-ce que ¸ca n’a jamais ´et´e
abord´e par la voie du nœud?
52
Suppose even that it’s the same thing for the symbolic. All it takes is that the
imaginary, namely one of my three tori, is represented as as a place where one surely
turns in circles, because—with the two lines—it makes a Borromean knot [fig. 3]. What
you see up there—it’s perhaps no coincidence that it looks like the juxtaposition of two Φ
in the Greek script—what you see up there is perhaps also something which is absolutely
worthy of being included as an example of the Borromean knot. Whether you want to
break the continuity of the line or the continuity of the ring, what remains is—whether
it’s one ring and one line, or two lines—is completely free, which is the definition of the
Borromean knot.
So, in saying all that, I have the feeling—anyway I have even noted it down in
my text—that language, it’s really that which can only move forwards by twisting and
curling in on itself, by contorting itself in a way that... anyway, I cannot say that I have
not given an example of it here.
Do not believe, that by taking up the gauntlet for it [language]—at any rate by
noting in all that concerns us how much we depend on it—do not believe that I do this
altogether willingly. What I find funny is simply that we don’t realize that there is no
other way of thinking, and that psychologists, in search of thought that is not spoken,
imply in a way that pure thought—I dare say—would be better.
In this which I put forward just now about the Cartesian, namely, “I think, therefore
I am”, there is a mistake, there is a profound mistake. What’s worrying is is that it
supposes that thought is “extended”, so to speak. But’s it’s great, it demonstrates that
there is no thought, so to speak, no pure thought, no thought that is not subject to the
distortions of language, other than precisely the thought of “extension”.153
And now, what I wanted to introduce you to today, and what after two hours,
ultimately, I am failing to do—I’m grovelling—it’s this: it’s that the extension, the
extension that we assume to be space, space which is common to all, namely the three
dimensions, why the devil was it never addressed by way of the knot?
153Extension here refers to the three cartesian coordinates which, according to Descartes are occupied
by matter whilst thought and consciousness are in the realm of the mind. The contradiction that Lacan
refers to is, I presume, that “I think therefore I am” implies the coexistence of material being and
thought, and hence that thought is “extended”.
53
Je fais une petite sortie, comme ¸ca, une ´evocation citatoire du vieux Rimbaud et de
son effet de “Bateau ivre”, si je puis dire:
‘Je ne me sentis plus tir´e par les haleurs’.154
Y’a aucun besoin de rimbateau, ni de poˆate, ni d’ ´
Ethiopoˆate, y’a aucun besoin de
¸ca pour se poser la question de savoir pourquoi des gens qui... qui incontestablement
taillaient des pierres—et ¸ca c’est la g´eom´etrie, la g´eom´etrie d’Euclide—pourquoi ces gens
qui quand mˆeme, ces pierres, avaient ensuite `a les hisser au haut des pyramides, et ne
le faisaient pas... et ne le faisaient pas avec des chevaux: chacun sait que les chevaux
ne tiraient pas grand-chose tant qu’ils n’avaient pas, tant qu’on n’avait pas invene le
collier, comment est-ce que ces gens, qui donc tiraient eux-mˆemes tous ces trucs, c’est
pas d’abord la corde et du mˆeme coup le nœud, qui est venu au premier plan de leur
eom´etrie?
Comment est-ce qu’ils n’ont pas vu que grˆace au nœud et `a la corde,155 cette chose
dans laquelle les math´ematiques les plus modernes elles-mˆemes, c’est le cas de le dire:
perdent la corde, car on ne sait pas comment formaliser ce qu’il en est du nœud, y’a un
tas de cas o`u on perd les p´edales et o`u le math´ematicien... C’est pas le cas du nœud
borrom´een, ¸ca le math´ematicien s’est aper¸cu que le nœud borrom´een c’´etait simplement
une tresse, et le type de tresse du genre le plus simple. Bon... [1h 53’ 15”]
Figure 4: La tresse brunnienne.
154Valas: En citant A. Rimbaud, Lacan dit: ‘Je ne me sentis plus tir´e par les haleurs’, or Rimbaud
n’a pas ´ecrit “tir´e” mais “guid´e”. Le bateau ivre, 1871, in Po´esie, Œuvres Compl`etes, Paris, Gallimard,
collection La Pl´eiade, 1972.
155Valas: ‘vu l’usage du nœud et de la corde’.
54
I’m making a little digression, a literary reminder of old Rimbaud and his effect of
the drunken boat, so to speak:
Je ne me sentis plus tir´e par les haleurs156
There is no need of the rimbateau, neither of the poet nor of the Ethiopoˆate 157, no
need of this to ask oneself why these people who undoubtedly carved stones—and that’s
geometry, Euclidean geometry—why these people who anyway had then to hoist these
stones to the top of the pyramids, did not do it with horses: everyone knows that horses
didn’t haul big items as they hadn’t... as the collar wasn’t invented. How is it that these
people, who therefore hauled all those things themselves... was it not the cord158 first
of all and at the same stroke the knot, that came to the fore in their geometry?
How is it that they didn’t see thanks to the knot and the cord,159 this thing in which,
it’s true to say, even modern mathematics loses its thread [perdent la corde], because we
do not know how to formalize what is the knot.160 There are lots of cases where one
loses the plot; it’s not the case for the Borromean knot, the mathematician realizes that
the Borromean knot is simply a braid, and the simplest kind of braid.161
156Valas: In citing A. Rimbaud, Lacan says: ‘I no longer felt myself being pulled by the hauliers’,
but Rimbaud didn’t write “tir´e ” but “guid´e” (guided). Le bateau ivre, 1871, in Poetry, The Complete
Works, Paris, Gallimard, collection La Pl´eiade, 1972.
157A combination of poˆate [poet] and Ethiopian. Rimbaud finally settled in Ethiopia in 1880.
158Corde means at the same time “rope” and a geometric “chord”, i.e. a straight line whose start and
end points lie on a circle.
159Valas has ‘given the use of the knot and the cord’, but the audio supports Staferla’s version.
160There is no universally accepted way of classifying a knot mathematically. For example, Alexander-
Briggs notation simply defines knots by the number of crossings (where the ‘string’ goes over/under
itself); however there may be many unique knots for each crossing number. In Dowker notation, a knot
is defined by a series of integer pairs, denoting the sequence of crossings—but the knot recovered from
its Dowker notation might differ from the original knot by being, for example, its mirror image.
161The Borromean knot is not a knot in a mathematical or topological sense. Rather, it is the simplest
non-trivial example of a Brunnian link, formed by interconnected rings such that if one ring is cut all
the other rings are set free. They are related to Brunnian braids (the simplest example of which is the
everyday hair braid, see fig. 4). Removing a single strand of the braid ensures the remaining strands are
not braided. The classification of Brunnian links and braids is far simpler than that of knots proper.
55
Alors il est ´evident que—par contre—ce nœud l`a, tel que je vous l’ai mis l`a en haut,
enfin de cette fa¸con162 d’autant plus saisissante, n’est-ce pas que c’est elle qui nous
permet de ne pas faire d´ependre toutes les choses de la consistance torique de quoi que
ce soit, mais seulement au moins d’une, et cette au moins une, c’est elle qui, si vous
la rapetissez ind´efiniment, peut vous donner l’id´ee, l’id´ee l`a sensible,163 sensible en ceci
que si nous ne supposons pas le nœud se manifester du fait que le tore imaginaire que
j’ai pos´e l`a se rapetisse, se rapetasse `a l’infini, nous n’avons aucune esp`ece d’id´ee du
point, parce que les deux droites telles que je viens de vous les inscrire l`a, les droites que
j’attribue... que j’affecte des termes, des termes du symbolique et du r´eel, elles glissent
l’une sur l’autre, enfin si je puis dire, `a perte de vue.
Pourquoi est-ce que deux droites, deux droites sur une surface, sur un plan, se crois-
eraient, s’intercepteraient? On se le demande! O`u est-ce qu’on a jamais vu quoi que ce
soit qui ressemble—sauf `a manier la scie, bien sˆur, et `a imaginer que ce qui fait arˆete
dans un volume, ¸ca suffit `a designer164 une ligne—comment est-ce que, en dehors de ce
ph´enom`ene du sciage, on peut imaginer que la rencontre de deux droites c’est ce qui fait
un point? Il me semble qu’il en faut au moins trois.
Bon alors ceci, ceci bien sˆur nous emm`ene un tout petit peu plus loin. Vous lirez ce
texte qui vaut ce qu’il vaut, mais qui est au moins amusant.
162Valas: ‘d’une fa¸con’.
163Valas: ‘l’id´ee sensible du point’.
164Valas: ‘dessiner’.
56
Well, it is obvious on the other hand that this knot—that I have put up there for you
[fig. 3], at any rate, in this way that is all the more startling, is it not—it’s what allows
us to make all things of toric consistency [i.e. rings] independent of anything, except for
at least one [ring]. And this at-least-one, if you shrink it indefinitely, can give us the
concept, the tangible concept here,165 tangible in the sense that, if we do not assume
that the knot occurs because the imaginary torus—which I have shown there—is shrunk,
is joined up [se rapetasse] at infinity, then we have no concept of the point. Because
these two lines which I have just drawn for you there, these lines to which I attribute...
to which I assign the terms symbolic and real, they slide over each other, so to speak,
as far as the eye can see.166
Why is it that two lines on a surface, on a plane, would cross each other, intersect?
One wonders! Where have we ever seen anything that looks like it—except of course
when handling a saw, and imagining what makes an edge from a volume, that’s enough
to indicate a line.167 How, apart from this phenomenon of sawing, can we imagine that
the meeting of two lines is what makes a point? It seems to me that there should be at
least three [lines?].
Good, well, this of course takes us just a little bit further. You will read this text,
for what it’s worth, yet at least it’s entertaining.
165Valas: ‘the tangible concept of the point’.
166Pulling the rings of a borromean apart to the greatest extent shrinks the hole where the three
intersect to a point. However, in the diagram, where symbolic and real are shown as lines, pulling the
three apart does not create a point, since the lines representing the real and symbolic slide over each
other. Therefore, only by shrinking the imaginary ring can we get the point. Morever, unless at least
one of the orders is joined up (se rapetasse ), then we can get no idea of the point at all since all three
lines slide over each other.
167A cut in 3D space creates a 2D surface, which when cut creates a 1D edge. Cutting the edge creates
a point.
57
Bon... Faut quand mˆeme que je vous montre... Ceci bien sˆur naturellement, vous
esigne, vous d´esigne la fa¸con dont en fin de compte le nœud borrom´een rejoint bien
enfin ces fameuses trois dimensions que nous imputons `a l’espace, sans d’ailleurs nous
priver d’en imaginer tant que nous voulons, et voir comment ¸ca se produit, ¸ca se produit
un nœud borrom´een, quand justement nous le mettons dans cet espace. Vous voyez l`a
une figure `a gauche, et c’est ´evidemment en faisant glisser d’une certaine fa¸con ces trois
rectangles, qui font d´ej`a parfaitement nœud `a soi tout seul, c’est en les faisant glisser
que vous obtenez la figure d’o`u part tout ce qu’il en est de ce que je vous ai montr´e
tout `a l’heure, et de ce qui constitue un nœud borrom´een, et dont je vais vous donner
l’exemple `a simplement retourner cette page... Voil`a! C¸a c’est le nœud borrom´een tel
qu’on se croit oblig´e de le dessiner. [1h 57’ 20”]
Figure 5
Alors tˆachons quand mˆeme de voir, enfin, de quoi il s’agit, `a savoir que dans ce
eel se produisent des corps organis´es et qui se maintiennent dans leur forme, c’est ce
qui explique que des corps imaginent l’univers. C’est pourtant pas surprenant que hors
du parlˆetre, nous n’ayons aucune preuve que les animaux pensent au-del`a de quelques
formes, `a quoi nous les supposons ˆetre sensibles, de ce qu’ils y r´epondent de fa¸con
privil´egi´ee.
Mais ce que nous ne voyons pas et ce que les ´ethologistes—chose tr`es curieuse—
mettent entre parenth`eses... vous savez ce que c’est que les ´ethologistes, c’est les gens
qui ´etudient les mœurs et coutumes des animaux ...c’est pas une raison pour que nous
imaginions nous-mˆemes que le monde est monde, pour tous animaux le mˆeme, si je puis
dire, alors que nous avons tant de preuves, enfin, que mˆeme si nous, enfin, si notre corps,
l’unit´e de notre corps nous force `a le penser comme univers, c’est ´evidemment pas monde
qu’il est, c’est immonde.
58
I must all the same show you... This of course [fig. 5], naturally shows you the way in
which the Borromean knot ultimately leads to those three famous three dimensions that
are allocated to space, without incidentally depriving us of the opportunity to imagine
everything that we want, and of seeing how this thing is produced, this Borromean knot,
precisely when we put it into this space. You see there a figure on the left, and it is
obvious that, in making the three rectangles—which already without doubt form a knot
by themselves—slide over each other in a certain way... it’s in making them slide that
you get the shape from which everything that I showed you earlier follows and which
constitutes a Borromean knot, and of which I’ll to give you an example by simply turning
this page over... There! This is the Borromean knot as one feels obliged to draw it.
So, anyway let us try to see, finally, what this is all about, namely that organized
bodies occur in this real and that they retain their shape, this is what explains why
bodies imagine the universe. However it’s not surprising that, apart from the speaking
being, we have no proof that animals think beyond certain forms of which we assume
that they are aware, to which they respond in a privileged way.
But, what we do we not see and what the ethologists—a very curious thing—put it
in parentheses, you know what ethologists are, they are people who study the manners
and customs of animals... this is not a reason why we cannot imagine for ourselves that
the world is the world, the same for all animals, so to speak, while we have so much
evidence in the end, that even if we, if our body, the unity of our body forces us to think
of it as the universe, it’s obviously not the world [monde ], it’s vile [immonde].
59
C’est quand mˆeme du malaise que quelque part Freud note—du “Malaise dans la
civilisation”—que proc`ede toute notre exp´erience. Bon... Ce qu’il y a de frappant,
n’est-ce pas, c’est que le corps, puisque, puisque pour le d´esigner, le corps c’est celui-ci,
c’est ce rond l`a, ce rond c’est le r´eel... Bon, le corps, c’est tr`es frappant que, `a ce malaise
il contribue, il contribue d’une fa¸con que... dont nous savons tr`es bien l’animer—animer
si je puis dire, animer les animaux—de notre peur. De quoi nous avons peur? C¸a veut
pas simplement dire: `a partir de quoi avons-nous peur? De quoi avons-nous peur? De
notre corps! Ouais...
C’est ce que manifeste ce ph´enom`ene curieux sur quoi j’ai fait un s´eminaire toute
une ann´ee et que j’ai d´enomm´e de l’angoisse. L’angoisse c’est justement quelque chose
qui se situe ailleurs dans notre corps, c’est le sentiment qui surgit de ce soup¸con qui nous
vient, de nous r´eduire `a notre corps. Comme quand mˆeme c’est tr`es tr`es curieux que
cette d´ebilit´e du parlˆetre ait r´eussi `a aller jusque-l`a, enfin, n’est-ce pas... c’est que, on
s’est aper¸cu que l’angoisse c’est pas la peur de quoi que ce soit dont le corps puisse se
motiver. C’est une peur de la peur, et qui se situe si bien par rapport, enfin, `a ce que je
voudrais aujourd’hui vous... pouvoir quand mˆeme vous dire—puisque sur les 66 pages
que j’ai eu la connerie de pondre pour vous, naturellement je m’en vais pas me mettre `a
parler comme ¸ca encore ind´efiniment—ce que je voudrais bien vous montrer c’est ceci,
c’est que, dans ce que j’ai imagin´e pour vous, `a identifier chacune de ces consistances
comme ´etant celles de l’imaginaire, du symbolique et du r´eel, ce qui fait lieu et place
pour la jouissance phallique, est ce champ qui, de la mise `a plat du nœud borrom´een, se
sp´ecifie de l’intersection que vous voyez ici [JΦ] (fig. 6).
Figure 6
60
Anyway, it’s discontent, as Freud remarks somewhere, it’s “Civilisation and its Dis-
contents” upon which all our experience is based. Good... What’s striking, is it not, is
that the body, since to designate it, the body is this here, it’s this ring here, this ring is
the real... Good.168 The body, it’s very striking in that it contributes to this discontent,
it contributes in a way that... as we know very well, brings it to life [l’animer], brings
it to life so to speak, brings to life the animals [animer les animaux ] of our fear. What
are we afraid of? That doesn’t simply mean: what is our fear based on? Of what are
we afraid? Of our body!
It’s this which demonstrates this curious phenomenon, on which I gave a seminar
for a whole year, and which I named anxiety.169 Anxiety, it’s precisely something which
is located elsewhere in our body, it’s the feeling that arises as a result of this suspicion
that comes to us, of being reduced to our body. All the same, as it’s very curious that
this debility [ebilit´e ]170 of the speaking being has managed to get so far in the end, of
course... it’s that we have realized that anxiety is not the fear of anything via which the
body is stimulated [se motiver ].
It’s a fear of fear, which in the end sits so well in relation to what I would like today...
at any rate, to be able to say to you—since, of course, I am not going to begin talking
indefinitely like that again about the 66 pages that I had the stupidity to prepare for
you—what I would very much like to show you is this [figure 6], it is that by identifying,
in what I dreamt up for you, each of these consistencies as being the imaginary, symbolic
and real, what creates a place for phallic jouissance is this field, which in the flattening
of the Borromean knot is located at the intersection you see here [JP hi].
168Valas misses out this sentence where Lacan is obviously pointing out something on the board.
169Lacan (1962)
170As in mental debility but also frailty, stupidity, foolishness.
61
Cette intersection elle-mˆeme, telles que les choses se figurent du dessin, comporte
deux parties, puisqu’il y a une intervention du troisi`eme champ, qui est ce point dont
le coincement,171 le coincement central d´efinit l’objet(a). Comme je vous l’ai dit tout `a
l’heure, c’est sur cette place du plus-de-jouir que se branche toute jouissance, et donc
ce qui... ce qui est externe dans chacune de ces intersections, ce qui est externe `a un de
ces champs, en d’autres termes la jouissance phallique, ce que j’ai l`a ´ecrit du JΦ, c’est
¸ca qui en d´efinit ce que j’ai qualifi´e tout `a l’heure de “l’hors-corps”.172
De mˆeme, le rapport est le mˆeme de ce qui est le cercle de droite173 o`u se gˆıte le r´eel,
par rapport au sens. C’est bien—et c’est l`a que j’insiste, que j’ai insist´e notamment lors
de la conf´erence de presse—c’est que, `a nourrir le symptˆome, le r´eel, de sens, on ne fait
que lui donner continuit´e de subsistance. C’est en tant, au contraire, que quelque chose
dans le symbolique se resserre de ce que l’ai appel´e “le jeu de mots, l’´equivoque”—lequel
comporte l’abolition du sens—que tout ce qui concerne la jouissance, et notamment la
jouissance phallique peut ´egalement se resserrer, car ceci ne va pas sans que vous vous
aperceviez de la place dans ces diff´erents champs, du symptˆome. [2h 10’ 00”]
La voici telle qu’elle se pr´esente dans la mise `a plat du nœud borrom´een:
Figure 7
171Valas: ‘qui donne ce point, dont le coincement’.
172Valas: ‘son caract`ere de l’hors-corps’.
173Valas: ‘gauche’.
62
This intersection itself, as things are represented in the drawing, is composed of two
halves, since there is an intervention of the third field, which is this point, whose confine-
ment,174,175 whose central confinement defines objet petit a. As I said to you earlier, it’s
to this place of surplus jouissance that all jouissance is connected, and therefore what...
what is external to each of these intersections, what is external to one of these fields, in
other words phallic jouissance, what I have here written as JΦ, it’s that which defines
what I called earlier its out-of-body character [l’hors-corps].176
Likewise, the relationship is the same for the circle to the right177 where the real is
located, in relation to meaning [sens]. This is—and it’s here that I insist, that I insisted
in particular at the press conference—it is that in feeding the symptom, the real, with
meaning, we only give it continuity of subsistence. On the contrary, it’s inasmuch as
something in the symbolic is strengthened by something that I have called “wordplay”
[le jeu de mots], “ambivalence”—of which the abolition of meaning is comprised—that
all that concerns jouissance and particularly phallic jouissance can also be strengthened,
for this doesn’t work unless you notice the place of the symptom in these difference
fields.
Here it is, as it appears in the flattening of the Borromean knot [figure 7].
174Valas: ‘which gives this point, whose confinement’.
175The verb coincer implies a jamming or wedging, and this is probably what Lacan meant since he
talked about pulling the rings apart and reducing the central hole to a point (Lacan, 1973, 11-12-73). In
the latter text, Gallagher translates it as “squeezing”. All of these are quite clumsy as nouns, though,
so I have chosen “confinement”.
176I have resorted to Valas’ transcription which is incorrect, but easier to translate, i.e. ‘son caract`ere
de l’hors-corps”. The out-of-body character of phallic jouissance, is illustrated by the fact that JΦ is in
the intersection of the real and symbolic, but outside the imaginary ring, which is identified with the
body.
177Lacan’s mistake. The circle of the real is on the left of the figure, and Valas corrects this in his
transcription.
63
Le symptˆome est irruption de cette anomalie en quoi consiste la jouissance phallique,
ce pour autant que s’y ´etale, que s’y ´epanouit ce manque fondamental que je qualifie du
non-rapport sexuel. C’est en tant que dans l’interpr´etation, c’est uniquement sur les sig-
nifiants178 que porte l’intervention analytique, que quelque chose peut reculer du champ
du symptˆome. C’est ici dans le symbolique, le symbolique en tant que c’est lalangue,
c’est lalangue qui le supporte,179 et que le savoir inscrit de lalangue qui constitue `a pro-
prement parler l’inconscient s’´elabore, qu’il gagne sur le symptˆome, ceci n’empˆechant
pas que le cercle marqu´e l`a du S ne corresponde `a quelque chose qui de ce savoir ne
sera jamais r´eduit, c’est `a savoir l’Urverdr¨angt de Freud, ce qui de l’inconscient ne sera
jamais interpr´et´e.
En quoi est ce que j’ai ´ecrit au niveau du cercle du r´eel le mot “vie”? C’est que
incontestablement de la vie, apr`es ce terme vague qui consiste `a ´enoncer “le jouir de la
vie”, la vie nous ne savons rien d’autre et tout ce `a quoi nous induit la science c’est de
voir qu’il y a rien de plus r´eel, ce qui veut dire rien de plus impossible, que d’imaginer
comment a pu faire son d´epart cette construction chimique qui, d’´el´ements r´epartis dans
quoi que ce soit et de quelque fa¸con que nous voulions le qualifier par les lois de la science,
se serait mis tout d’un coup `a construire une mol´ecule d’ADN, c’est-`a-dire quelque chose
dont je vous fais remarquer que tr`es curieusement, c’est bien l`a qu’on voit d´ej`a, qu’on
voit la premi`ere image d’un nœud, et que s’il y a quelque chose qui devrait nous frapper,
c’est qu’on ait mis si tard `a s’apercevoir que quelque chose dans le r´eel—et pas rien: la
vie mˆeme—se structure d’un nœud.
Comment ne pas s’´etonner qu’apr`es ¸ca, nous ne trouvions justement nulle part, nulle
part ni dans l’anatomie, ni dans les plantes grimpantes, qui sembleraient express´ement
faites pour ¸ca, aucune image de nœud naturel? Je vais vous sugg´erer quelque chose:
Est-ce que ¸ca serait pas l`a180 le signe d’un autre type de refoulement, d’Urverdr¨angt?
Enfin quand mˆeme, ne nous mettons pas trop `a rˆever, nous avons avec nos “traces” assez
`a faire.
178Valas: ‘le signifiant’.
179Valas: ‘le symbolique en tant que c’est la langue, c’est lalangue qui le supporte’.
180Valas: ‘ne serait-ce pas l`a’.
64
The symptom is an irruption of this anomaly of which phallic jouissance consists,
insofar as it spreads, it unfolds this fundamental lack which I have described as the sex-
ual non-relationship. It’s to the extent that, in the interpretation, it’s only on signifiers
that analytic intervention depends, that something can push back the field of the symp-
tom. It’s here in the symbolic—the symbolic inasmuch as it’s lalangue,181 it’s lalangue
that supports it, and [inasmuch as] knowledge, inscribed with lalangue, which consti-
tutes strictly speaking the unconscious, is produced—that it [analysis] will win over the
symptom. This does not prevent the circle marked here by an S, from corresponding to
something that will never be distilled from this knowledge, namely the Urverdr¨angt182
of Freud, that which will never be interpreted from the unconscious.
How is it that I have written at the level of the circle of the real, the word “life”?
What’s undeniable about life, apropos this vague term which involves announcing “the
enjoyment of life”, is that we know nothing else. And all that science leads us to is to
see that there is nothing more real, meaning nothing more impossible, than to imagine
how this chemical construction could begin—with elements distributed into whatever
and however we want to describe them, according to the laws of science... how it would
all of a sudden begin to construct a molecule of DNA. Namely, something of which I
would point out to you, that very curiously it’s indeed here we already see the first image
of a knot, and if there is anything that should grab our attention, it’s that it took us
so long to realize that something in the real—and not just anything, but life itself—is
structured like a knot.183
How can you not be astonished when, after this, we can find precisely nothing,
nothing either in anatomy, or in climbing plants, which seem expressly made for this
purpose, not one image of a natural knot? I am going to suggest something to you: isn’t
this here the sign of another type of repression, of Urverdr¨angt ? In the end though, let
us not start dreaming too much: with our own “traces”184 we have enough to do.
181Here, Valas has la langue while Staferla has lalangue. I have chosen to go with Staferla.
182i.e. primary repression.
183DNA is well known to have a double-helix structure of two intertwining strands. However, in
chromosomes, DNA is additionally coiled around itself and must unravel in order to replicate. The
mathematics of knot theory has been applied to this process in order to visualize and understand it.
184The “trace” is a distinguishing mark that is ‘empty of signifying value’ (Moncayo, 2012, p23). It
allows differentiation between subjects yet paradoxically is not associated with any particular character-
istic. In other words, the letters “a” and “b” are different but there is nothing about “a” that gives us
a sense of its “a”-ness. The trace gives birth to the signifier and thus is linked to primary repression.
65
Que la repr´esentation—jusques et y compris le pr´econscient de Freud—soit justement
ce qui fait que la JA que j’ai ´ecrit et qui veut dire jouissance de l’Autre, jouissance de
l’Autre en tant que para-sexu´ee, jouissance pour l’homme de la suppos´ee femme, et in-
versement pour la femme que nous n’avons pas `a supposer puisque La femme n’existe pas,
mais pour une femme par contre, l’homme qui,185 lui, est “tout” h´elas, il est mˆeme toute
jouissance phallique [JΦ], que pour que cette jouissance de l’Autre [JA], para-sexu´ee, qui
n’existe pas, ne pourrait, ne saurait mˆeme exister que par l’interm´ediaire de la parole,
de la parole d’amour notamment, qui est bien la chose, je dois dire, la plus paradoxale
et la plus ´etonnante et dont il est ´evidemment tout `a fait sensible et compr´ehensible
que Dieu nous conseille de n’aimer que son prochain, et non pas du tout de se limiter `a
sa prochaine, car si on allait `a sa prochaine on irait tout simplement `a l’´echec, c’est le
principe mˆeme de ce que j’ai appel´e tout `a l’heure l’art-chirat´e186 chr´etienne.
Cette jouissance de l’Autre, cette jouissance de l’Autre c’est l`a que se produit, c’est
l`a que se produit ce qui montre qu’autant la jouissance phallique [JΦ] est hors corps
[a], autant la jouissance de l’Autre [JA] est hors langage, hors symbolique... car c’est `a
partir de l`a, `a savoir `a partir du moment o`u l’on saisit ce qu’il y a—comment dire—de
plus vivant ou de plus mort dans le langage, `a savoir la lettre, c’est uniquement `a partir
de l`a que nous avons acc`es au r´eel.
185Valas: ‘le jouissance de l’homme’.
186Valas “l’archirat´e”.
66
That representation, up to and including the preconscious of Freud, is precisely
what makes JA, which I have written and which means the jouissance of the Other, the
jouissance of the Other qua parasexual,187 for the man the jouissance of the supposed
woman.... and inversely for the woman—that we haven’t supposed, since Woman does
not exist—but on the other hand for a woman, [the jouissance of] the man—who himself
is “all”, alas—it is wholly phallic jouissance... in order that this parasexual jouissance
of the Other—which doesn’t exist—couldn’t, should’t even exist except through the
intermediary of the word,188 the word of love in particular... this is indeed, I must
say, the most paradoxical and most striking thing, and of which it is obvious that it is
completely apparent and understandable that God advises us to love only our neighbour
[son prochain] and not at all to limit ourselves to the next one [`a sa prochaine], because
if we were to go to the next one, we would quite simply fail189 ... this is the very principle
of what I earlier called Christian arch-failure [l’archirat´e chr´etienne].190
This jouissance of the Other, this jouissance of the Other, it’s here that it occurs, it’s
here that occurs what demonstrates that, just as phallic jouissance is out of the body,
so the jouissance of the Other is outside language, outside the symbolic... because it is
from here, namely from where one grasps what is—how can I put it?—what is the most
living or the most dead in language, namely the letter, it’s only from here that we have
access to the real.
187Parasexual reproduction involves the recombination of genes from different individuals without
meiosis (cell division) and fertilization. For example, bacterial conjugation involves direct cell-to-cell
transfer of genetic material, thus conferring genetic benefits (e.g. antibiotic resistance) on the recipient
bacterium. It is not strictly speaking reproduction as no new individuals are formed. Hence Lacan’s char-
acterisation of Other jouissance as parasexual is very apt: it differentiates it from phallic or reproductive
jouissance, yet it involves an Other in the transfer of DNA.
188i.e. as phallic jouissance requires an imaginary intermediary, Other jouissance requires the word, a
symbolic intermediary.
189The ‘next one’ I believe refers to phallic jouissance, as the jouissance that follows Other jouissance
(which is the jouissance of loving one’s neighbour). It could also refer to its object, since in phallic
jouissance the object is metonymic, transferable. So, Lacan is saying that we should not limit ourselves
to phallic jouissance, because ultimately it fails no matter what its object is, since it involves the sexual
non-relationship. This implies that Other jouissance does not fail?
190I have gone with Valas’ archi-rat´e rather than Staferla’s art-chirat´e here.
67
Cette jouissance de l’Autre, dont chacun sait `a quel point c’est impossible, et con-
trairement mˆeme au mythe, enfin qu’´evoque Freud, qui est `a savoir que l’´
Eros ¸ca serait
de faire Un, mais justement c’est de ¸ca qu’on cr`eve, c’est qu’en aucun cas deux corps ne
peuvent en faire qu’Un, de si pr`es qu’on le serre, j’ai pas ´et´e jusqu’`a le mettre dans mon
texte, mais tout ce qu’on peut faire de mieux dans ces fameuses ´etreintes, c’est de dire
“serre-moi fort” mais on ne serre pas si fort que l’autre finisse par en crever quand mˆeme!
[rires] De sorte qu’il n’y a aucune esp`ece de r´eduction `a l’Un. C’est la plus formidable
blague.
S’il y a quelque chose qui fait l’Un, c’est quand mˆeme bien le sens, le sens de l’´el´ement,
le sens de ce qui rel`eve de la mort. Je dis tout ¸ca parce qu’on fait sans doute beaucoup de
confusion, `a cause d’une certaine aura de ce que, de ce que je raconte, on fait sans doute
beaucoup de confusion sur le sujet: que le langage, je trouve pas du tout que ce soit la
panac´ee universelle. C’est pas parce que l’inconscient est structur´e comme un langage,
c’est-`a-dire que c’est ce qu’il a de mieux, n’est-ce pas, que l’inconscient ne d´epend pas
´etroitement de lalangue, c’est-`a-dire de ce qui fait que toute lalangue, toute lalangue est
une langue morte,191 eme si elle est encore en usage. [2h 20’ 07”]
Ce n’est qu’`a partir du moment o`u quelque chose s’en d´ecape qu’on peut trouver un
principe d’identit´e de soi `a soi, et c’est non pas quelque chose qui se produit au niveau
de l’Autre, mais quelque chose qui peut se produire au niveau de la logique. C’est en
tant qu’on arrive `a r´eduire toute esp`ece de sens qu’on arrive `a cette sublime formule
math´ematique de l’identit´e de soi `a soi qui s’´ecrit x=x.
Pour ce qui est de la jouissance de l’Autre, y’a qu’une seule fa¸con de la remplir, et
c’est `a proprement parler le champ o`u naˆıt la science, o`u la science naˆıt pour autant,
pour autant que bien entendu, comme tout le monde le sait, c’est uniquement `a partir
du moment o`u Galil´ee a fait des petits rapports de lettre `a lettre avec une barre dans
l’intervalle, o`u il a d´efini la vitesse comme la diff´erence, comme la proportion d’espace et
de temps, ce n’est qu’`a partir de ce moment-l`a, comme quelque chose, comme un petit
livre que je crois a commis ma fille le montre bien, ce n’est qu’`a partir de ce moment-l`a
qu’on est sorti de toute cette notion en quelque sorte intuitive et empˆetr´ee de “l’effort”,
qui a fait qu’on peut arriver `a ce premier r´esultat qu’´etait la gravitation. Nous avons fait
quelques petits progr`es depuis, mais qu’est-ce que ¸ca donne en fin de compte, la science?
191Valas: ‘qui fait que toute la langue, toute lalangue est une langue morte’.
68
This jouissance of the Other, everyone knows is to what extent it is impossible, and
contrary even to the myth, at any rate, that Freud reminds us of, namely that Eros
would make One, but it is precisely because of this that one bursts,192 because in any
case two bodies can only make One when they are so closely squeezed. I have not quite
put it in my text, but the best we can do in these notorious embraces, is to say “hold
me tight” but we cannot hold so tight that the other all the same fit is to burst [l’autre
finisse par en crever ]! [laughter] So, there is no sort of reduction to the One. It’s the
most wonderful joke.
If there is anything that makes One, anyway, it is meaning, the meaning of the
element, the meaning of that which falls under the remit of death. I say all this because
there is without a doubt a lot of confusion, because of a certain aura to do with what I
say. Undoubtedly, there is a lot of confusion on the subject: as for language, I think it
not at all to be a universal panacea. It’s not because the unconscious is structured like
a language—namely its best feature, of course—that the unconscious does not depend
strictly on lalangue—that is to say what makes all lalangue, all lalangue a dead language,
even if it is still in use.
It’s only from the moment when something is stripped down that we can find a law of
self-identity, and it’s not something that occurs at the level of the Other, but something
that can occur at the level of logic. It is insofar as we get to strip away any kind of
meaning, that we approach this sublime mathematical formula of self-identity, which is
written x=x.
Regarding the jouissance of the Other, there is only one way to satisfy it, and that’s
strictly speaking the field where science is born, provided that, of course, as everyone
knows, it’s only from the time that Galileo formulated little relationships between letters
with a bar in between, when he defined speed as the difference, as the ratio of space and
time.193 It’s only from that moment—as something, as a little book, which I believe
that my daughter has scribbled, down demonstrates very well194—it’s only from that
moment when we entirely left behind this somehow intuitive and entangled notion of
“force”, which allowed us to arrive at this first result, which was gravity. We have made
some progress since then, but what has science given us at the end of the day?
192Crever” means both “to burst” and “to die”.
193Galileo (1564-1642) is the first person believed to have measured speed as distance achieved over
time taken, i.e. v=s
t, or in terms of differential calculus v=ds
dt .
194Miller (2007)
69
C¸ a nous donne `a nous mettre sous la dent, `a la place de ce qui nous manque dans le
rapport, dans le rapport de la connaissance, comme je disais tout `a l’heure, ce qui nous
donne `a cette place en fin de compte ce qui pour la plupart des gens, tous ceux qui sont
l`a en particulier, se r´eduit `a des gadgets, hein: la t´el´evision, le voyage dans la lune, et
encore le voyage dans la lune, vous y allez pas, il n’y en a que quelques-uns s´electionn´es.
Mais vous le voyez `a la t´el´evision. C’est ¸ca! C’est ¸ca, la science part de l`a. Et c’est pour
¸ca que je mets espoir dans le fait que, passant au-dessous de toute repr´esentation, nous
arriverons peut-ˆetre `a avoir sur la vie quelques donn´ees plus satisfaisantes.
Alors l`a la boucle se boucle et ce que je viens de vous dire tout `a l’heure: c’est
`a savoir... que l’avenir de la psychanalyse est quelque chose qui d´epend de ce qu’il
adviendra de ce r´eel, `a savoir si les gadgets par exemple gagneront vraiment `a la masse,195
si nous arriverons `a devenir nous-mˆemes anim´es vraiment par les gadgets. Je dois dire,
je dois dire que ¸ca me paraˆıt peu probable, ¸ca me paraˆıt peu probable. Nous n’arriverons
pas vraiment `a faire que le gadget ne soit pas un symptˆome, car il l’est pour l’instant
tout `a fait ´evidemment.
Il est bien certain qu’on a une automobile... comme une fausse femme, on tient
absolument `a ce que ¸ca soit un phallus, mais ¸ca n’a de rapport avec le phallus que du
fait que c’est le phallus qui nous empˆeche d’avoir un rapport avec quelque chose qui
serait notre r´epondant sexuel. C’est notre r´epondant para-sexu´e, et chacun sait que le
“para”, ¸ca consiste `a ce que chacun reste de son cˆot´e, que chacun reste `a cˆot´e de l’autre.
Bon ben voil`a, c’est `a peu pr`es—je vous r´esume ce qu’il y avait l`a, dans mes 66
pages—avec ma bonne r´esolution de d´epart qui ´etait de lire. Je faisais ¸ca, comme ¸ca
dans un certain esprit, parce qu’apr`es tout, accaparer la lecture, c’´etait vous en d´echarger
d’autant, et peut-ˆetre faire que vous pourriez—et c’est ce que je souhaite—enfin lire
quelque chose. Si vous arriviez `a vraiment lire ce qu’il y a dans cette mise `a plat du
nœud borrom´een, je pense que ¸ca serait l`a dans la main vous toper quelque chose qui
peut vous rendre service autant que la simple distinction du r´eel, du symbolique et de
l’imaginaire.
Pardon d’avoir parl´e si longtemps. [2h 25’ 11”: fin]
195Valas: ‘gagneront vraiment `a la main’.
70
It gives us plenty to get our teeth into, as a substitute for what we lack in the
relationship, in the relationship of knowledge [connaissance]. As I said earlier, what it
[science] gives us in its place at the end of the day, what for most people, in particular
everyone here present, is reduced to gadgets: television, the moon landings, and yet,
the moon landings, you won’t go there, it’s only for a selected few. But you saw it on
television. That’s it! That’s science, right there. And that is why I place my hope in the
fact that, in bypassing any representation, we will achieve, perhaps, more satisfactory
information about life.
Now we have come full circle and what I have said to you just now: it is namely...
that the future of psychoanalysis is something that depends on what will come out of
the real, namely if gadgets for example, will really get the upper hand,196 if we ourselves
actually come to be brought to life by gadgets. I must say that it appears to me unlikely.
We will not actually get to the point when the gadget is not a symptom, because for the
time being it is absolutely obvious that it is one.
For sure, when you have a car... as a fake woman, you absolutely insist that it is a
phallus, but that has nothing to do with the phallus except that it is the phallus that
prevents us from having a relationship with something that would be our sexual partner.
This is our parasexual partner, and everyone knows that the “para” entails that everyone
keeps to themselves, that everyone remains by the side of the other.
Good, there we are, it’s basically... I will summarise for you what I had here, in
my 66 pages, with my initial good resolution, which was to read. I did this in a certain
manner, because after all, by hogging the lecture, I unloaded everything onto you, and
perhaps made you able—and it’s this that I desire—in the end to read something. If
you manage to really read what there is in this flattening of the Borromean knot, I think
that this would hand you on a plate [¸ca serait l`a dans la main vous toper]197 something
that can be as useful as the simple distinction between the real, the symbolic and the
imaginary.
Sorry, for having spoken for so long.
196From the audio (at 2h 22’ 58”) appears that Valas’ “`a la main” is correct, rather than Staferla’s `a
la masse.
197Really not sure how to translate ‘¸ca serait dans la main vous toper’. Toper means to shake someone’s
hand.
71
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Chapter
A reassessment of the Jesuit contributions to the emergence of the scientific worldview. Founded in 1540, the Society of Jesus was viewed for centuries as an impediment to the development of modern science. The Jesuit educational system was deemed conservative and antithetical to creative thought, while the Order and its members were blamed by Galileo, Descartes, and their disciples for virtually every proceeding against the new science. No wonder a consensus emerged that little reason existed for historians to take Jesuit science seriously. Only during the past two decades have scholars begun to question this received view of the Jesuit role in the Scientific Revolution, and this book contributes significantly to that reassessment. Focusing on the institutional setting of Jesuit science, the contributors take a new and broader look at the overall intellectual environment of the Collegio Romano and other Jesuit colleges to see how Jesuit scholars taught and worked, to examine the context of the Jesuit response to the new philosophies, and to chart the Jesuits' scientific contributions. Their conclusions indicate that Jesuit practitioners were indeed instrumental in elevating the status of mathematics and in stressing the importance of experimental science; yet, at the same time, the Jesuits were members of a religious order with a clearly defined apostolic mission. Understanding both the contributions of Jesuit practitioners and the constraints under which they worked helps us to gain a clearer and more complete perspective on the emergence of the scientific worldview.
Book
In The Logic of Sexuation, Ellie Ragland offers a detailed account of Jacques Lacan's theories of gender, sexuality, and sexual difference. Exploring Lacan's rereading (via Aristotle) of Freud's major essays on feminine sexuality, Ragland demonstrates that Lacanian theory challenges essentialist notions of gender more effectively than do current debates in gender studies, which are typically enmeshed in an imaginary impasse of one sex versus or interchanged with the other. Although much American feminist thought on Lacan has portrayed him as anti-Woman, Ragland argues that Lacan was, in fact, pro-Woman, as he felt that no advances in analytic cure, or in thinking itself, could evolve except by embracing the feminine logic of the "not all," with its particular modes of jouissance. Ragland also aims to make sense of the terms phallus, castration, sexuation, the object a, jouissance, and so on, in relation to the question of sexual difference. In doing so, she uncovers Lacan's theory that the learning of sexual difference is what makes it possible to think dialectically at all.