No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-level Analysis of the Result
Abstract
Why did Britain vote for Brexit? What was the relative importance of factors such as education, age, immigration and ethnic diversity? And to what extent did the pattern of public support for Brexit across the country match the pattern of public support in earlier years for eurosceptic parties, notably the UK Independence Party (UKIP)? In this article we draw on aggregate-level data to conduct an initial exploration of the 2016 referendum vote. First, we find that turnout was generally higher in more pro-Leave areas. Second, we find that public support for Leave closely mapped past support for UKIP. And third, we find that support for Leave was more polarised along education lines than support for UKIP ever was. The implication of this finding is that support for euroscepticism has both widened and narrowed—it is now more widespread across Britain but it is also more socially distinctive.
... On 23 June 2016, the UK electorate voted to exit the European Union (EU). Support for the Leave option in the Brexit referendum was influenced by a complex interplay of various determinants, including socio-economic factors, cultural identity, and perceptions of sovereignty and immigration (Clarke et al., 2017;Goodwin and Heath, 2016;Hobolt, 2016;Scully et al., 2016). Socio-economic status played a significant role, with individuals from lower-income households being more likely to vote for leaving the EU (Brexit). ...
... Socio-economic status played a significant role, with individuals from lower-income households being more likely to vote for leaving the EU (Brexit). Economic grievances, such as perceptions of declining living standards, job insecurity, and austerity measures, contributed to a sense of disillusionment with the EU, which also fuelled support for Brexit among economically marginalised communities (Goodwin and Heath, 2016). Cultural identity played a significant role, with nationalist values and sovereignty narratives ("taking back control") emerging as important determinants. ...
... These voters were more inclined to prioritise long-term considerations of national autonomy and self-determination over short-term economic uncertainties associated with leaving the EU. Conversely, those with lower risk tolerance tended to support remaining in the EU, perceiving Brexit as a potentially destabilising and unpredictable event that could lead to economic disruptions, trade barriers, and reduced international influence (Goodwin and Heath, 2016). This paper examines the influence of inequality aversion controlling for risk preferences. ...
... Citizens economic, socio-cultural, and political values and attitudes (Hooghe & Marks, 2005;Hooghe & Marks, 2007;Leconte, 2010;Boomgaarden et al., 2011;Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden and De Vreese, 2013;Vasilopoulou, 2013;Vasilopoulou, 2017;Kaufmann, 2016;Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2017;De Vries, 2018) also seem to exercise a significant impact on their feelings towards the EU. The relative importance of each of these factors would appear to be influenced by their socio-economic and demographic characteristics and attendant levels of economic security or insecurity (Goodwin & Heath, 2016;Arnärsson & Zoega, 2016;Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2018). Along with people party allegiances (Hobolt, 2016;Swales, 2016;Ultan, 2023), this then creates opportunities for populist and also mainstream Eurosceptic politicians to exploit (Brack & Startin, 2015), including reserving the use of the law for an arsenal of tools against European integration (Castillo, 2023). ...
... UK Citizen's decision to leave the EU can also be linked to their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (Goodwin & Heath, 2016;Arnärsson & Zoega, 2016;Veltri et al., 2019), including their age, education, employment, income and wealth. These factors appear to have influenced the thinking of voters from insecure, left-behind households, communities, and regions (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2018), for example, who saw themselves as sociocultural and political, as well as economic losers (Coyle, 2016;Goodwin & Heath, 2016;Hobolt, 2016;Dijkstra et al., 2020). ...
... UK Citizen's decision to leave the EU can also be linked to their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (Goodwin & Heath, 2016;Arnärsson & Zoega, 2016;Veltri et al., 2019), including their age, education, employment, income and wealth. These factors appear to have influenced the thinking of voters from insecure, left-behind households, communities, and regions (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2018), for example, who saw themselves as sociocultural and political, as well as economic losers (Coyle, 2016;Goodwin & Heath, 2016;Hobolt, 2016;Dijkstra et al., 2020). They appear to have viewed the EU as distant and irrelevant to their interests and needs (Fetzer, 2019); thus, they voted against continued membership in 2016, if indeed they voted at all (Hobolt, 2016;Calhoun, 2017). ...
This paper explores the economic and non-economic factors that could potentially lead to a Polish decision to remain within or leave the EU, following a future potential Polexit referendum. The study aims to determine the relative impact of Polish citizens’ values and attitudes on their support for their country’s continued EU membership and integration, at such a crucial time. The research is based on a survey conducted in December 2021, with a stratified sample of 1,517 respondents, and a statistical analysis of the findings. The results suggest that the relative importance of these factors could vary considerably, with economic factors potentially playing a less significant role than sociocultural and political elements. We argue that this projected outcome is likely to be influenced by citizens’ socio-demographic backgrounds, their perceived levels of economic security or insecurity, and differences in their economic and non-economic values, thereby creating potential opportunities for future populist Eurosceptic politicians in Poland to exploit, underlining the potential implications of these findings.
... Accordingly, Brexit support has been portrayed as symptomatic of broader anti-immigrant and anti-diversity attitudes (Evans and Kelley, 2019). The so-called 'left behind', economically disadvantaged groups, who did not benefit from globalisation were especially likely to see immigration as a threat (Goodwin and Heath, 2016). ...
... However, there is little research on the relationship between local ethnic structure and the EU referendum vote, while the current evidence base remains somewhat mixed. Studies have shown the share of ethnic minorities in an area has no relationship with Brexit support (Goodwin and Heath, 2016), that the share of immigrants is negatively associated with Brexit support (Chan et al., 2020), or that the findings for local ethnic composition are mixed and conditional on which groups in an area are looked at (Alabrese et al., 2019;Becker et al., 2017). While evidence on how the size of the ethnic outgroup in an area affected Brexit support is mixed, there is more consistent evidence that larger influx of ethnic outgroups in an area was associated with more support for Brexit (Chan et al., 2020;Goodwin and Heath, 2016). ...
... Studies have shown the share of ethnic minorities in an area has no relationship with Brexit support (Goodwin and Heath, 2016), that the share of immigrants is negatively associated with Brexit support (Chan et al., 2020), or that the findings for local ethnic composition are mixed and conditional on which groups in an area are looked at (Alabrese et al., 2019;Becker et al., 2017). While evidence on how the size of the ethnic outgroup in an area affected Brexit support is mixed, there is more consistent evidence that larger influx of ethnic outgroups in an area was associated with more support for Brexit (Chan et al., 2020;Goodwin and Heath, 2016). Interestingly, this mixed evidence base for how the ethnic composition of local areas is linked to support for Brexit is mirrored in the mixed evidence base for how local ethnic composition shapes broader attitudes towards immigration (Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes, 2017). ...
This article explores the relationship between ethnic structure of local areas, anti-immigrant sentiment and Brexit vote among White British in England. We focus on two indicators of ethnic structure: ethnic minority outgroup share and minority–majority segregation. Our findings suggest that local minority share plays a key role in shaping anti-immigrant sentiment and Brexit support. However, how it affects these outcomes is conditional on levels of local residential segregation. It is only residents living in high minority share areas that are residentially segregated who report higher anti-immigrant sentiment and Brexit support. In fact, living in high minority share areas that are residentially integrated appears to improve attitudes and reduce Brexit support.
... Indeed, scholars found that "Leavers" and "Remainers" were much more strongly associated with education level than support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) ever was (Goodwin and Heath, 2016). Per capita income and output are other important predictors of leave voting at the aggregate level: the lower average income or per capita GDP in a district, the higher the percentage of vote leave (Arnorrson and Zoega, 2018; Colantone and Stanig, 2018). ...
... One issue, of course loomed large above all others regarding its importance in the public debate, but also as argument that Brexit was not about economics, namely immigration. The academic evidence on the issue is not as clear cut as one might expect: Some scholars find that local levels of inward migration from EU are the single most important predictor of voting for leave (Goodwin & Heath, 2016;Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017). Others do not find evidence that either stocks or flow of immigration in general, or even EU immigration, caused people to vote leave. ...
... Second, over the last few years, we have accumulated a dearth of evidence on how the ruralurban divide affects vote choice. Instead, departing mostly from the 'losers of globalisation' idea (Gordon, 2018;Kriesi et al., 2008;Rodrik, 2018), many studies have considered that some places are left behind by the current economic trends, which leads to a feeling of abandonment and grievances (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). Economic crises, unemployment shocks or the deterioration of social conditions trigger feelings of discontent and, as a consequence, an increase in support for challenger political formations (Rodon & Hierro, 2016), mainly PRRPs (Ferrari, 2021), but also other forms of protest vote (Rickardsson, 2021;Van Der Brug et al., 2000). ...
... The profile of movers tends to be that of a young and higher than average educated voter (González-Leonardo & López-Gray, 2019). The population remaining in the municipality is likely to be older (Di Matteo & Mariotti, 2021;Díez & Pardo, 2020), less educated and more rooted to the place (Anelli & Peri, 2017;Immerzeel & Pickup, 2015;Lee et al., 2018), attributes that tend to be associated with higher support for the PRRPs (De Vries, 2018;Fitzgerald, 2018;Goodwin & Heath, 2016). Yet, in an argument largely overlooked by previous works, following the sociological model of voting, old people are also less likely to change their support as their political allegiances were frozen during the political socialisation they experienced in their youth (Campbell et al., 1976). ...
In many European countries, people increasingly leave rural or small municipalities to live and work in urban or metropolitan environments. Although previous work on the 'left behind' places has examined the relationship between the rural-urban divide and vote choice, less is known about how depopulation affects electoral behaviour. Is there a relationship between experiencing a loss in population and support for the different parties? We investigate this question by examining the Spanish case, a country where the topic of depopulation has become a salient issue in political competition. Using a newly compiled dataset, we also explore whether the relationship between depopulation and electoral returns is moderated by municipality size, local compositional changes, the loss of public services and changes in amenities. Our findings show that depopulated municipalities give higher support to the main Conservative party, mainly in small municipalities. Yet, municipalities on the brink of disappearance are more likely to give larger support to the far-right. Results overall show that the effect of depopulation seems to be driven by compositional changes, and not as a result of losing public services or a deterioration of the vibrancy of the town. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between internal migration and electoral behaviour.
... Populism and nationalism have seen a worldwide surge, posing significant societal challenges to developed democracies by exacerbating feelings of political system failure at both national and local levels. Sentiments of neglect, perceived insignificance-'places that don't matter', 'people and places left behind'-and lack of prospects encapsulate the frustration often manifested in voting patterns (Goodwin and Heath, 2016;Rodríguez-Pose, 2018 Prior work has sought to identify the socioeconomic causes underpinning the rising feeling of discontent. Persistent poverty, growing economic inequalities and lack of opportunities have been identified as drivers of the geography of discontent (De Ruyter et al., 2021;Dijkstra et al., 2020). ...
... The 'feeling of abandonment' has emerged as a crucial factor in interpreting the rise and dominance of populist and anti-establishment narratives. Concepts like 'places that don't matter' (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018 and 'people and places left behind' (Goodwin and Heath, 2016) typically focus on this attitudinal element. However, it extends beyond mere citizen dissatisfaction; it's a profound personal conviction encapsulating 'anger', 'resentment' (Diemer et al., 2022;Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2021), or 'political disempowerment' (Olivas Osuna et al., 2021). ...
Political discontent, frequently mirrored in voting patterns, extends beyond ballot votes. By focusing on Valparaiso, Chile, we introduce a more comprehensive measure, external political efficacy (EPE), capturing a sense of abandonment and gauging public sentiment towards the political system’s responsiveness to their needs. Our analysis addresses individual and area-level factors underpinning individual variations in EPE. The evidence suggests that long-term territorial socio-economic disadvantage, rather than low-paid employment, is significantly related to individual discontent, highlighting lowered beliefs in system responsiveness.
... The GLPLH model predicts that SAMIs for a given city size range are normally distributed, and their variance can be expressed with the complexity parameter q and the number of complementary factors M as σ 2 SAM I = q 2 M b(log N 0 − log N ), where log N is the mean of the logarithm of city sizes. It can also be expressed with the scaling exponent in Britain, where voters living near immigrants develop a tolerance, while those who do not are more likely to reject them 26 . Therefore, we expect that just like other types of diversities in cities, tolerance grows like r(N ) ∼ log N/N 0 , but the number of maximal social diversity is reached at N 0 ≈ 4·10 5 , which is smaller than the diversity N * ≈ 1.8·10 14 observed for the more general type of diversity, characterizing humans in creative aspects. ...
We explain the anomaly of election results between large cities and rural areas in terms of urban scaling in the 1948-2016 US elections and in the 2016 EU referendum of the UK. The scaling curves are all universal and depend on a single parameter only, and one of the parties always shows superlinear scaling and drives the process, while the sublinear exponent of the other party is merely the consequence of probability conservation. Based on the recently developed model of urban scaling, we give a microscopic model of voter behavior in which we replace diversity characterizing humans in creative aspects with social diversity and tolerance. The model can also predict new political developments such as the fragmentation of the left and 'the immigration paradox'.
... This result surprised pollsters and commentators. Aggregate analysis subsequently showed that education was the strongest socio-demographic predictor of the vote [GH16a]. Multi-level analysis of individual data revealed that this was mainly due to the compositional effect of less-educated people voting Leave, but also because of a contextual effect, whereby those with a degree living in areas with lower average education tended to have their opinions shaped by their community and vice-versa. ...
Human dynamics and sociophysics suggest statistical models that may explain and provide us with better insight into social phenomena. Contextual and selection effects tend to produce extreme values in the tails of rank-ordered distributions of both census data and district-level election outcomes. Models that account for this nonlinearity generally outperform linear models. Fitting nonlinear functions based on rank-ordering census and election data therefore improves the fit of aggregate voting models. This may help improve ecological inference, as well as election forecasting in majoritarian systems. We propose a generative multiplicative decrease model that gives rise to a rank-order distribution, and facilitates the analysis of the recent UK EU referendum results. We supply empirical evidence that the beta-like survival function, which can be generated directly from our model, is a close fit to the referendum results, and also may have predictive value when covariate data are available.
... We note that a time series model, which captures statistical patterns, is intended to help us gain a better understanding of the data, as we do not have full knowledge of the variables that affect voters' choices. Thus it is meant to complement rather than replace multivariate analysis [HBBA14], such as the aggregate-level analysis carried out in [GH16] in order to investigate the socio-demographic predictors of the referendum vote. ...
Human dynamics and sociophysics suggest statistical models that may explain and provide us with better insight into social phenomena. Here we propose a generative model based on a stochastic differential equation that allows us to analyse the polls leading up to the UK 2016 EU referendum. After a preliminary analysis of the time series of poll results, we provide empirical evidence that the beta distribution, which is a natural choice when modelling proportions, fits the marginal distribution of this time series. We also provide evidence of the predictive power of the proposed model.
... Within this context, the Brexit referendum campaign was characterised as a fear-based debate designed to advance a 'project' associated with Leave/Remain positions (Daddow, 2016;Galpin & Trenz, 2017;Ruparel, 2016), reflecting a deeply divided nation (Hobolt, 2016). This debate exposed the prevalence of Eurosceptic sentiment (Goodwin & Heath, 2016) and populist fears related to social insecurity (Browning, 2018) or identity ideology (Kenny, 2017). Both sides employed fear-driven narratives centred on the invasion of EU migrants or economic catastrophe following EU departure. ...
... Other studies consider the proportion of tertiary educated or higher income citizens within geographic units of varying size. These studies also yield mixed results (Goodwin and Heath 2016;Zingher 2022;Simon et al. 2024). ...
This thesis advances a relational approach to study the durability of sociocultural polarization between citizens with and without tertiary education in Western democracies, and the severity of partisan animosity in the United States. The broader question is whether these represent enduring lines of division between cohesive social groups with clear identities, or more ephemeral phenomena that will not structure politics for decades to come, let alone cause excessive political conflict. To understand the durability of educational divides, we lack clarity on what is creating cohesive collectives out of citizens with similar educational experiences, especially given the waning of unions and churches that played an important role in creating past collectives. To understand the severity of mass-level partisan conflict, the question is whether partisanship is currently eclipsing other social identities in informing social relationship formation, which can cause widespread social separation and excessive political division. This thesis addresses both questions by advancing a relational approach, studying the importance people attribute to education levels and partisanship in relationship formation, the educational and partisan composition of social networks, and the role played by social network composition in exacerbating or moderating group-based political division. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on educational divides and propose that educationally homogeneous social networks have partly supplanted formal organizations in strengthening and reinforcing initial education-based differences, thereby creating cohesive collectives which consistently care about sociocultural issues, and durably vote for new left and far right parties, suggesting persistent sociocultural conflict. Chapters 4 and 5 shift to partisan divides. In contrast to much current literature, we find little evidence that partisanship supersedes other considerations in real-world relationship formation. Rather, social networks remain politically heterogeneous and heterogeneous networks buffer partisan animosity. These results suggest that mass-level partisan animosity is not as severe as previously thought.
... In this context, territorial factors contributing to the success of illiberal or antiestablishment narratives have been studied across various settings. This is the case, for instance, the rise of far-right support in neglected Austrian neighbourhoods (Essletzbichler & Forcher, 2022), the success of Brexit in England (Alabrese et al., 2019;Goodwin & Heath, 2016;Jennings & Stoker, 2019), the north-south divide and the rise of populism in Italy (Faggian et al., 2021;Urso et al., 2023), and the centre-periphery cleavage and radical right support in Germany (Ziblatt et al., 2023), among others. ...
Social capital has traditionally been viewed as a fundamental driver of democratic vitality. However, since the late-20th century, it has been suggested that social capital may also have adverse effects, potentially fostering totalitarian and populist ideologies. This paper examines the political implications of two different types of social capital —bonding social capital and bridging social capital—, using the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections as a case study. By examining at the county level, we find that the relation between social capital and antisystem voting behaviour is contingent upon the type of social capital involved. Bonding social capital, characterised by close-knit, homogeneous networks, is positively correlated with antisystem behaviours, as proxied by the additional electoral support for Donald Trump. In contrast, bridging social capital, which involves connections across diverse social groups, shows a negative correlation. Furthermore, our analysis reveals a complex interaction between economic and demographic changes, social integration, and political tendencies in a period of economic transition. These findings underscore the multifaceted nature of social capital and its critical role in understanding its origins and effects.
... Further to financial and economic effects, other confounding factors that have been shown to deter international students include the wider socio-political environment. The decision to leave the EU was, in part, driven by campaigns that promoted negative feelings towards immigration (Goodwin and Heath, 2016;Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017;Hobolt, 2016). Immigration was a central component of the debate during the referendum to leave the EU, with dissatisfaction with the EU being associated with anti-immigrant sentiment (Ford and Goodwin, 2017). ...
While the number of international students attending UK universities has been increasing in recent years, the 2021/22 and 2022/23 academic years saw a decline in applications from EU-domiciled students. However, the extent and varying impact of this decline remain to be estimated and disentangled from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Using difference-in-differences (DID) in a hierarchical regression framework and Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) data, we aim to quantify the decline in the number of student applications post-Brexit. We find evidence of an overall decline of 65% in the 2021 academic year in successful applications from EU students as a result of Brexit. This decline is more pronounced for non-Russell Group institutions, as well as for Health and Life Sciences and Arts and Languages. Furthermore, we explore the spatial heterogeneity of the impact of Brexit across EU countries of origin, observing the greatest effects for Poland and Germany, though this varies depending on institution type and subject. We also show that higher rates of COVID-19 stringency in the country of origin led to greater applications for UK higher education institutions. Our results are important for government and institutional policymakers seeking to understand where losses occur and how international students respond to external shocks and policy changes. Our study quantifies the distinct impacts of Brexit and COVID-19 and offers valuable insights to guide strategic interventions to sustain the UK’s attractiveness as a destination for international students.
... They also reported more negative affect, more unfavourable stereotypes and attributions, more contempt and less empathic concern and perspective taking than did Leavers. There was also a significant difference in education, with Remainers overall reporting higher levels of completed education, consistent with previous research 99 . There were no significant differences between groups in age or willingness to compromise. ...
With mounting evidence of the harmful societal consequences of affective polarization, it is crucial to find ways of addressing it. Employing a randomized controlled trial, this study tested the effectiveness of an intervention based on theories of intergroup contact and interpersonal communication in reducing affective polarization in the context of Brexit. Participants were 120 UK self-identified Leavers and Remainers. Sixty Leaver-Remainer dyads were randomized to engage in either a facilitated intergroup interaction or a control interaction, which was equivalent in structure and tone but was unrelated to Brexit identities. Different aspects of affective polarization were assessed one month prior, immediately after, and one month after the intervention. Results indicate that the intervention increased warmth toward the outgroup, reduced unfavourable attributions of the sources of outgroup positions, and increased willingness to compromise, but only short-term. There were no statistically significant longer-term effects of the intervention. Evidence of selective attrition further suggests that those with more extreme baseline opinions were more likely to drop out. Our findings highlight the challenges of designing effective interventions that engender enduring attitude change in polarized contexts and of engaging those with extreme political views. This study can provide a useful framework for future research.
... Representing a large part of the population pyramid in emerging economies, they are the product of 21 st -century economic growth. Unlike developed countries' deteriorating working classes -the Brexiter or Trumpist 'left behind', 'declining middle,' or 'globalization loser' (Antonucci, Horvath, Kutiyski, and Krouwel, 2017;Caiani, Della Porta, and Wagemann, 2012;Kriesi, 2018;Goodwin and Heath, 2016) -these people have experienced some sort of upward mobility or material comfort, and have been labelled as the new/neo This has been a foundational and well-documented debate in social sciences at least since the publishing of Marx andEngels' The German Ideology (1965 [1846]) and Marx's The Eighteenth Brumaire (1963[1852). 1 middle class or the New Class C. These sectors are consumer-driven and characterized by entrepreneurial and material aspirations. ...
In many countries, the political backlash against neoliberalism has mainly been a retreat from democracy, with a decline in independence of the judiciary and the monetary authorities, increased control of the media, and manipulation of elections for purposes of authoritarian control. The economic dynamics and the impact of neoliberalism, i.e. deregulation and liberalized markets, is just one cause of this authoritarian shift. The contributors to this volume examine the impact of neoliberal economic policies in relation to cultural and political factors and how these have promoted the recent authoritarian turn, as well as probing the economic policies and performance of the illiberal regimes.
... The Economist (2016) underscored this political danger, noting that 'regional inequality is proving too politically dangerous to ignore.' The rising importance of populist movements and their support concentration in peripheries, as evidenced in various elections, such as the 2016 Austrian presidential election (Essletzbichler, 2018), Brexit (Goodwin et al., 2016;Gordon, 2018; places that don't matter': a radical response at the ballot box to the consequences of socioeconomic polarisation and ineffective development interventions. ...
Poland presents a compelling case study in the rise of right-wing populism. In 2023, after eight years at the helm, the anti-elitist and Eurosceptic PiS party lost the parliamentary elections. This paper explores the geography of this political shift, analysing election results from 2011 to 2023 against the backdrop of regional socioeconomic divide. Our findings reveal that PiS's support base expanded in areas marked by multidimensional peripherality, while its recent loss is primarily attributed to the political mobilisation of prosperous core areas. The study underscores the perpetuation of territorial disparities, highlighting the challenges of the growing geographic political polarisation.
... In this respect the vote for Brexit was delivered by the 'left behind'-social groups. 22 society are, of course, not. ...
The cleavages and dichotomies of Brexit are evermore numerous. In an attempt to better understand the Leave and Remain vote, this article returns to one of the oldest divides - the rural-urban dichotomy with a focus on the urban and considers the role of belonging, ontological security and the sense of place in what was once Britain’s second city of Empire - Liverpool.1 Making use of quantitative data collected through questionnaires as part of my doctoral research, the importance of place identity and place attachment in the 2016 referendum will be considered in the context of Liverpool. The city is open to the world but with its resonant locale, it remains a ‘Somewhere’ place.
... Although public health officials insisted that a collective response was required to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, an intergenerational divide emerged with younger generations complaining that they were being asked to compromise their lifestyles in order to save older generations (Gustafsson & McCurdy, 2020). In the 2015 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom, less educated individuals were more likely to vote to leave the European Union than their more educated counterparts (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). ...
Both homophily and heterophily are observed in humans. Homophily reinforces homogeneous social networks, and heterophily creates new experiences and collaborations. However, at the extremes, high levels of homophily can cultivate prejudice toward out-groups, whereas high levels of heterophily can weaken in-group support. Using data from 24,726 adults ( M = 46 years; selected from 10,398 English neighborhoods) and the composition of their social networks based on age, ethnicity, income, and education, we tested the hypothesis that a middle ground between homophily and heterophily could be the most beneficial for individuals. We found that network homophily, mediated by perceived social cohesion, is associated with higher levels of subjective well-being but that there are diminishing returns, because at a certain point increasing network homophily is associated with lower social cohesion and, in turn, lower subjective well-being. Our results suggest that building diverse social networks provides benefits that cannot be attained by homogeneous networks.
... At the time of our research project, scholarship had begun to emerge that focused on macro-level explanations of the referendum result referring, inter alia, to the relevance of socio-economic conditions (Goodwin & Heath, 2016), demographic changes relating to migration patterns (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017), and issues of national identity (Calhoun, 2017). We sought to contribute to the academic debate by shifting our analytical focus from the referendum's macro-level causes to its micro-level effects. ...
The Brexit victory in the referendum on June 23rd, 2016, in the United Kingdom surprised half of the British population and the world’s public opinion, and it was described as an atypical and irrational political behavior. A thorough analysis of the historical context and how the teams for and against leaving the European Union presented their arguments to the voters shows the reasons for the result. This article reflects on them in two facets: 1) the background to the consultation: the way in which the relationship between the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe was constructed and how the British perceived their integration, in addition to the campaign strategies in favor of permanence and exit, and 2) how citizens saw in the consultation an opportunity to change political rules contrary to their interests. I also present their first impressions of the Brexit results. Resumen El triunfo del Brexit en el referéndum del 23 de junio de 2016 en Reino Unido sorprendió a la mitad de los británicos y a la opinión pública del mundo, y se le calificó como un comportamiento político atípico e irracional. Un análisis a fondo del contexto histórico y de la manera en que los equipos a favor y en contra de la salida de la Unión Europea ofrecieron sus argumentos a los votantes muestra las razones del resultado. En este artículo se hace una reflexión sobre ellas en dos aspectos: 1) los antecedentes de la consulta: la forma en que se construyó la relación entre Reino Unido y el resto de Europa y cómo es que los británicos percibieron su integración, además de las estrategias de campaña en pro de la permanencia y la salida, y 2) cómo los ciudadanos vieron en la consulta una oportunidad para cambiar reglas de la política contrarias a sus intereses. Expongo además sus primeras impresiones sobre los resultados del Brexit.
This chapter develops the conceptual base for the book. A two-dimensional framework for a football-related operationalisation of identity is developed, covering different aspects of belonging on the one hand and aspects of local, regional, national and European frames on the other. Furthermore, the research design is elaborated. Eight football fan scenes in four countries are selected based on relevant conditioning factors. The selected cases are briefly described and situated in relation to our core research question. Finally, the chapter is rounded off by a description of our empirical research strategy.
Göç konusu, çağdaş toplumlarda tartışmalı bir konu haline gelmeyi ve dünya çapında siyasi gündemi şekillendirmeyi sürdürmektedir. Bu kitap, göçmen karşıtı duyguların ve politikaların hem Anglosakson hem de Kıta Avrupası üzerindeki etkilerini inceleyerek, iki gelenekteki pratiklerin karşılaştırmalı bir analizini sunmaktadır. Kitap bunu yaparken göçün, siyasi, sosyal ve ekonomik boyutlarına inerek, bu iki gelenekteki göçmen karşıtı hareketlerin nedenler, sonuçlar, benzerlikler ve farklılıklarına ışık tutmayı amaçlamaktadır. Kitap, göçmen karşıtı anlatıların kamuoyu, siyasi söylem ve politika oluşturma üzerindeki etkisini analiz etmek için kapsamlı bir bilimsel literatür incelemesinden yararlanmıştır. Popülist aşırı sağ partilerin yükselişine ve göçmen karşıtı duyguları körüklemedeki rollerine özel önem verilmiştir. Bu amaçla kitapta neoliberalizm, küreselleşme ve bunun yarattığı göç ve eşitsizliklere odaklanılarak bunların günümüz göç krizlerine ve yabancı düşmanlığına etkileri de tartışılmıştır. Çalışmada göçmen karşıtlığının siyasete etkisini belirleyebilmek amacıyla Dünya Değerler Araştırması (WVS), Avrupa Değerler Araştırması (EVS) ve Küresel Parti Araştırması (GPS) verileri ampirik olarak analiz edilmiştir. Kitap, ekonomik şikayetler, kültürel kaygılar, güvenlik endişesi ve ırksal tehdit algısı dahil olmak üzere göçmen karşıtı hareketlerin büyümesine katkıda bulunan temel ajitasyon unsurlarını tanımlamıştır. Ek olarak, ajitasyon araçları olarak ele alınan medyanın ve siyasi retoriğin kamuoyunu şekillendirme ve göçmen karşıtı anlatıları sürdürmedeki rolü vurgulanmıştır. Sonuçlar, göçün bir kriz halini almasında neoliberal küreselleşmenin etkili olduğunu göstermektedir. Neoliberal düzenin oluşturduğu eşitsizliklerin ve yarattığı endişelerin günah keçileri olarak göçmenlerin işaret edilmesinde medya ve aşırı sağın aracılık rolü üstlendiği tespit edilmiştir. Öte yandan sosyal devlet anlayışının var olduğu Kıta Avrupası ülkelerinde, neoliberal düzenin tesis edildiği Anglosakson ülkelerinden farklı olarak göçmen karşıtı partilerin anaakım olamadığı da ortaya konmuştur. Fakat söz konusu partiler anaakım partileri etkileyebilmiş ve anaakım siyasette göçmen karşıtı partilerin popülist retoriğini kullanmalarına yol açabilmiştir. Sonuçlar ayrıca ekonomik şikâyet, güvenlik kaygısı, kültürel tepki ve ırksal tehdit algısı gibi ajitasyon unsurlarının aşırı sağ partiler ve medya gibi ajitasyon araçları aracılığı ile göçmen karşıtlığı oluşturmada ve böylece aşırı sağ partilere desteği arttırmada etkili olduğunu göstermiştir. Kitap böylece göçmenlere yönelik düşmanca tutumun dinamiklerini ortaya koymuş ve bu anlayışın ortadan kalkması için birtakım önerilerde bulunmuştur.
Some media and political science narratives suggest post-Brexit Britain is locked in a culture war epitomised by the differences thought to divide Leavers and Remainers in terms of their national values, classed and racialised identities. This article sets out to provide a more complex depiction of reality. To do this, we draw on in-depth interviews with individuals across Leave, Remain, national, migrant, racial, ethnic and class identities to trace how they articulate ideas of Empire and nationhood when they discuss Brexit and the legitimacy of statues linked to British histories of colonialism and enslavement. We explore the contrasts and complexities in the ways in which individuals supporting Leave or Remain mobilise what we call their ‘Brexit biographies’ when they think about questions of Brexit, Empire and nationhood. On the one hand, our Remain interlocutors articulate more politically progressive racialised and classed articulations of Brexit, Empire and nationhood compared to some Leave supporters. However, on the other hand, when we switch context to examine the legitimacy of statues commemorating histories of colonialism and enslavement with some of the same individuals this distinction in the values of Leave and Remain supporters begins to break down. Our contention is that detailed sociological attention to the connections uniting Leavers’ and Remainers’ reflexive worldviews is required to properly comprehend how individuals experience, as well as reproduce and dislodge, racial, class and national inequalities that underpin the fabric of British society.
This chapter seeks to illuminate the topicality of Freud’s concept of the uncanny and its conceptual modifications in contemporary critical discourse as well as in recent literary works. For this reason, essential points of ‘The Uncanny’ (1919) are juxtaposed with related discussions about Freud’s theory from the twenty-first century regarding ‘strangerness’ (Levine 2020), the uncanny and contemporary culture (Masschelein 2011) and sociological hauntology (Gordon, 2008). Based on this, two novels that belong to the rising genre of ‘Brexlit’ (Shaw 2021) will be analysed: M. John Harrison’s The Sunken Land Begins to Rise Again (2020) and Niall Griffiths’ Broken Ghost (2019). Both novels depict fragmented experiences of reality, unstable identities or a haunting (national) past, which attest to the social and individual uncertainties in a post-Brexit country and ultimately represent aspects of the contemporary uncanny.
Giriş Zeynep Z. ATAYURT FENGE İngiliz Toplumunda Çokkültürlülüğün Tarihi Funda HAY KILIÇ Birleşik Krallık’ta Ulusal Kimlikler Ayşegül DEMİR On Dokuzuncu Yüzyıl Macera Romanlarında İmparatorluk, Britanyalılık ve Milli Kimlik: Mercan Adası (1857) ve Define Adası (1883) Mürüvvet Mira PINAR DOLAYKAYA Altkültürden Akışkan Kimliğe: İngiliz Gençlik Kültürü Emine ŞENTÜRK Çokkültürlülük, Kültürlerarasılık ve Edebiyat Seda ARIKAN Bir Küçük Adadan Diğerine: Andrea Levy’nin Küçük Ada Romanında Kimliğini Arayan Küçük Adalılar Adem BALCI Çağdaş Britanya Tiyatrosunda Çokkültürlülük Temsilleri Pelin DOĞAN ÖZGER Salman Rushdie’nin Mağriplinin Son İç Çekişi Adlı Romanında Çokkültürlülük ve Tarihe Palimpsest-Ekfrastik Bir Bakış Asya Sakine UÇAR Brexlit: Brexit Sonrası İngiliz Romanında Öne Çıkan İzlekler Cihan YAZGI
This paper looks at the co-evolution of toxic industrial pollution and economic deprivation by means of spillovers from the plant’s production activities. Geolocalised facility-level data from the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR) are used to calculate annual chemical-specific pollution, weighted by its toxicity. We combine the latter with regional data on employment, wages, and demographics sourced from Cambridge Econometrics, covering more than 1200 NUTS‑3 regions in 15 countries, over the period 2007–2018. We employ quantile regressions to detect the heterogeneity across regions and understand the specificities of the 10th and 25th percentiles. Our first contribution consists in giving a novel and comprehensive account of the geography of toxic pollution in Europe, both at facility and regional level, disaggregated by sectors. Second, we regress toxic pollution (intensity effect) and pollutant concentration (composition effect) on labour market dimensions of left-behind places. Our results point to the existence of economic dependence on noxious industrialisation in left-behind places. In addition, whenever environmental efficiency-enhancing production technologies are adopted we observe associated labour-saving effects in industrial employment, but positive regional spillovers. Through the lens of economic geography, our results call for a new political economy of left-behind places within the realm of sustainable development.
The notion of belonging is a central aspect of how we define who we are. Chapter 2 aims to show how young participants construct their sense of identity. It presents the data, narratives and findings collected from the detailed analysis of the UK-funded research project, which took place between 2018 and early 2020. Firstly, it includes the following: details of the project, the process of recruiting participants, the research methodology and the methods employed in the study. Also featured are some of the key themes that emerged from the young participants’ accounts. In doing so, the chapter also highlights some of the minoritised students and teachers’ personal experiences and details how they struggle to be heard and acknowledged. Secondly, the chapter sheds light on how Britishness discourse is perceived by black and brown citizens as divisive and synonymous with hegemonic whiteness. Belonging and citizenship are bound up with concepts of entitlement and status and British values as ‘civic values’, while signifiers of ‘belonging’ are in fact ‘exclusionary’. By sharing young people’s narratives and the impact of government policies on their sense of self, the chapter aims to reveal critical issues that surround the politicisation of culture and faith in contemporary Britain. The data bears testimony to the youth’s capacity to counter the polarising tendencies of such policies and define themselves as diverse citizens of Britain. The discussion, thus, provides a synthesis of ideas and identified themes and sub-categories that emerged from the semi-structured interviews, focus group interviews, school links and roundtable discussions. To conclude, the chapter closes with a summary of recommendations that may tackle the impact of fundamental British values (FBVs) and Prevent discourse on the young participants’ lives and how they—in the run-up and after Brexit—tried to mitigate the divisive effects of the policies that inhibit the British education system.
The UK state has been through many periods of perceived crisis, but the instability of the last decade has shaken some of the foundational institutions of British politics. Our main argument is that the rise of political instability relates to the failure of British politics to respond to structural inequality in society and politics. This includes growing economic and geographic disparities, as well as destabilizing divisions over long-standing social injustices. The infusion of these trends into the political process is the subject of the ‘asymmetric power model (APM)’, which acts as the theoretical underpinning of this paper and the special issue it introduces. In this editorial to the Parliamentary Affairs Special Issue on ‘Instability and inequality in the British state’, we elaborate these arguments and provide a brief overview of the eight papers in the issue, which cover the APM, the constitution, the UK Union, the Conservative Party, public policymaking, gender inequalities, intersectional inequalities, and geographical inequalities. Together, the papers identify the causes and features of the UK’s troubling inequality-instability dialectic and offer various practical and theoretical ways forward.
The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Brexit) is one of the cases of a series of waves of global populism which has been widely studied by academics across disciplines, especially social, political and cultural sciences. When examined through the perspective of International Relations, Brexit is one of the case studies that successfully demonstrates the significance of various forms of identity political discourse in influencing a country's foreign policy. Referring to this big picture, this study aims to review academic literature that discusses the discourse of identity politics in Brexit. The type of literature used is in the form of journal articles, books and chapters in academic books. Then, this literature review was then successful in gathering discussions which were later divided into four themes, namely (1) Historical Review of the Relations between Great Britain and Europe, (2) Actors Playing a Role in the Reproduction of Identity Political Discourse, (3) Various Forms of Identity Political Discourse Appears, and (4) Intersection of Identity Political Discourse with Socio-Economic Factors. After describing the distribution of literature in each theme, this paper contains consensus and debate, reflection, and synthesis which are manifestations of the entire literature. In the end, this paper gives birth to a conclusion, namely that the discourse on identity politics which continues to develop will be strongly driven by domestic complexities as a result of interactions between actors at the elite level and at the public level. In addition to domestic complexities, the formation of identity politics discourse in Brexit is also influenced by pressures that arise at the international level – especially because of the UK's membership in the European Union.
The global rise of right‐wing populist [RWP] parties presents a major political concern. RWP parties' voters tend to be citizens who have either experienced or fear economic deprivation. Income change constitutes a viable measure of this deprivation. However, previous contributions examining effects of income change on support for RWP parties have yielded diverging conclusions. This paper challenges previous findings by incorporating considerations of gender and within‐household inequality. We hypothesise a negative relationship between, on the one hand, personal and household income change and, on the other hand, sympathy towards RWP parties. Furthermore, we expect to find a stronger association between personal income change and RWP sympathy among men. Moreover, we expect the relationship between household income change and RWP sympathy to differ between genders. Finally, we hypothesise that this gender disparity can be interpreted by considering who contributes most to the household income. All these hypotheses are grounded in gender socialisation and economic dominance theories. Analysing Dutch LISS longitudinal data spanning from 2007 to 2021 ( N = 7,801, n = 43,954) through fixed‐effects multilevel linear regression models enables us to address various competing explanations. It appears that only for men, personal income change is negatively linked with sympathies towards RWP parties. However, considering who is the highest earner within households reveals that women are also affected by their personal income change if they earn the highest income. For both men and women, household income change is negatively linked with sympathies towards RWP parties. These results lend partial support to both the socialisation and economic dominance theories. The implications of these findings are discussed.
Previous research portrays radical‐right voters as economically, geographically, or politically marginalized. However, it seems implausible that these self‐perceived ordinary people —often overrepresenting historically powerful majorities (Whites, men, Christians)—are also socially marginalized. In the present article, I theorize why they may still feel socially excluded: Optimal distinctiveness research posits that individuals feel included in society if they experience (1) belonging to it and (2) uniqueness within it (i.e., feel their background is recognized). I argue that historical power and self‐perceived ordinariness satisfy most majority members' belonging need, but recent diversification and liberalization leave their uniqueness need unsatisfied. Indeed, cluster analyses of American National Election Studies (ANES) data show that a substantial share of majority members experiences firm belonging to society but lacks uniqueness therein. This group is more likely to support Trump than individuals whose needs are satisfied. This article contributes a social‐inclusion perspective on radical‐right voters' position in society.
It is commonly argued that divides based on value-based identity politics are now the defining characteristic of the contemporary era, capable of explaining everything from the rise of Donald Trump to Brexit. Both the Conservative and Labour parties have sought to appeal to values over policy in an attempt to appeal to ‘identity conservative’ voters in marginal seats. Yet they have also recognised the need to address the grievances underpinning these attitudes, notably regional economic inequality and over-centralisation. This article seeks to critically assess whether the Conservatives’ ‘levelling up’ agenda1 and Labour’s plans to address economic inequality and devolve power downwards, as outlined in the recent Labour report by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown2, are capable of providing the recognition to voters from ‘left behind’ areas that is thought to be the principal driver of regressive identity politics. It then discusses the capacity of alternative locally-based projects that seek to address economic decline – such as community wealth building – to restore that sense of recognition and to foster a positive form of identity politics that might overcome division.
Populist attitudes are frequently tied to a specific social position, namely the constituent’s status as a “loser of globalization.” Adding nuance to this explanatory framework, we investigate whether and how resentment mediates between social positions and populist attitudes. We distinguish three constitutive components of resentment—status insecurity, relative deprivation, and powerlessness—and analyze to what extent these sentiments explain the prevalence of two key populist attitudes: anti-elitism and demands for popular sovereignty. Using survey data from the Belgian National Election Study 2014, we show that although both populist attitudes are more likely among individuals of low socioeconomic status, this effect is mediated by a sense of group relative deprivation (anti-elitism and popular sovereignty) and feelings of powerlessness (anti-elitism). The effect of individual-level status insecurities on populist attitudes is, however, not significant. These results suggest that people do not simply adhere to antagonistic and people-centric views about politics because they experience economic precariousness; they embrace populist attitudes if their vulnerability is perceived in terms of a threatened sense of group position and understood as the outcome of an unjust society, wherein they feel powerless to alter their circumstances.
With mounting evidence of the increase and harmful societal consequences of affective polarization, it is crucial to find ways of addressing it. This proof-of concept study tested the effects of a theory-based intervention on affective polarization in the context of Brexit. Sixty Leaver-Remainer dyads were randomized to engage in either a facilitated intergroup interaction or a control interaction, which was equivalent in structure and tone but was unrelated to Brexit identities. Different aspects of affective polarization were measured one month prior, immediately after, and one month after the intervention. Results indicate short-term intervention effects on intergroup affect and cognition, and willingness to compromise with the outgroup, but these mostly decayed over time. Evidence of selective attrition suggests that those with more extreme baseline opinions were more likely to drop out. The findings are of considerable importance for efforts to reduce affective polarization and highlight the challenge of engaging those who could benefit the most.
Birleşik Krallık’ta etkileri uzun yıllardır hissedilen ağır vasıta sürücüsü açığı 2021 yılına gelindiğinde akut bir hal alarak krize dönüşmüştür. Birleşik Krallık hükümeti söz konusu krizle mücadele noktasında çeşitli politikalar uygulamaya koymuştur; ancak güncel veriler dikkate alındığında ağır vasıta sürücüsü açığının halen devam ettiği görülmektedir. Bu çalışma, Birleşik Krallık’ta 2021 yılında kriz ortamı yaratan ve etkileri halen hissedilen ağır vasıta sürücüsü açığının nedenlerine odaklanmaktadır. Çalışmanın temel araştırma sorusu, 2021 yılında zirve noktasına ulaşan ağır vasıta sürücüsü açığının Brexit’in yarattığı bir semptom olup olmadığıdır. Çalışma sonucunda elde edilen iki temel bulgu vardır. İlk bulgu, ağır vasıta sürücüsü açığının çok yönlü ve çok boyutlu olduğudur. Bu bakımdan Brexit, kriz boyutuna ulaşan bu açığın tek başına sorumlusu değildir. İkinci bulgu ise, Brexit’in ağır vasıta sürücüsü açığının krize dönüşmesinde diğer faktörlerin etkisini arttırıcı bir işlev gördüğü ve esasında etkileri küresel çapta da hissedilen sürücü açığının Birleşik Krallık’ta daha derinden hissedilmesine neden olduğudur.
Social policy in the European Union (EU) remains sidelined in the debates on the future of Europe. In the last decade, EU has faced numerous crises having significant repercussions for its social policies, including immigration waves, the Brexit and the Covid-19 pandemic. As an area of direct concern to EU citizens, with its features on employment, education/training, non-discrimination and equality bearing crucial implications for their daily lives, social policy should be re-considered from an angle that encompasses the citizens’ perspective and effectively addresses the major challenges it faces in the new global order. The main objective of this study is to explore the implications of these challenges for EU social policy, which in turn, has a key role in shaping the future of the EU.
In addition to immigration grievances, research shows that radical right voters grieve societal developments regarding gender equality and sexual freedom. Adding to research treating these grievances separately, this article advances a joint understanding of these grievances. I analyse interviews with voters of the German radical right Alternative für Deutschland for perceptions about discrimination and (dis)advantages of natives versus immigrants, men versus women and cis‐hetero versus LGBTQI+ people. I find similar argumentations about these social groups: Most interviewees do not perceive existing structural discrimination. They further perceive zero‐sum dynamics between advances for outgroups and losses for ingroups. In doing so, they consider different ingroup and outgroup characteristics, resulting in perceptions of different material and symbolic (dis)advantages for different groups and a hitherto under‐researched perception of legal (dis)advantages. Additionally, some interviewees jointly refer to various social groups in an expression of ‘multidimensional’ grievances, and some refer to the intersections between several ingroup and outgroup identities in determining a person's (dis)advantages. The parallels in argumentation and the perceptions of multidimensional and intersectional grievances highlight the importance of jointly studying different kinds of cultural grievances.
Prior research has examined the relationship between ethnic outgroup-size at the neighbourhood level and Brexit support, yet there is a lack of understanding on the factors that moderate these effects. This paper critically extends prior debate by focusing on how personality traits moderate not only the extent to which the levels (2011) of ethnic outgroup-size in individuals’ residential neighbourhoods but also the increase thereof (2001-2011) are associated with individuals’ preferences about the 2016 Brexit referendum. Using data from Understanding Society, we find that two personality traits, agreeableness and openness, are key moderators affecting the above-mentioned relationship. High-agreeable and high-open individuals are less likely than low-agreeable and low-open individuals to support Brexit. However, while the gap between low and highly agreeable individuals shrinks as ethnic outgroup-size increases, the gap widens between those higher vs. lower in openness. Our findings highlight the multifaceted role of personality traits as a driver of heterogeneous effects on political behaviour. In sum, this paper shows that analysing the complex and intertwined nature of both contextual and individual factors is fundamental for a better understanding, not only of the Brexit referendum but, more broadly, of anti-immigrant sentiment.
Konsekwencje nierówności przestrzennych stanowią zagrożenie dla spójności społecznej oraz niesprawiedliwości i marginalizacji, mogąc przyczyniać się do rozłamów politycznych. Odzwierciedleniem niezadowolenia społecznego jest wzrost znaczenia partii populistycznych i kontestatorskich, skierowanych przeciwko establishmentowi. Artykuł dotyczy problematyki społeczno-ekonomicznych nierówności przestrzennych w skali regionalnej i wynikającej z nich geografii niezadowolenia społeczności, które czują się „pozostawione w tyle”. Dokonano analizy preferencji politycznych porównując ze sobą dwa okręgi wyborcze znajdujące się w obszarach problemowych (cechujących się opóźnieniem urbanizacyjnym – okręg chełmski – i szokiem transformacyjnym – okręg koszaliński). Przeanalizowano wyniki czterech ostatnich wyborów do Sejmu (2011, 2015, 2019, 2023). Rezultaty skonfrontowano z ogólnopolskimi orientacjami politycznymi oraz jednej z najbardziej elitarnych, w domyśle najmniej populistycznej miejscowości w Polsce (okręg poznański). Na tej podstawie można potwierdzić tezę o bardziej populistycznych preferencjach wyborczych ludności obszarów problemowych. Populizm nie zawsze reprezentuje jednak określoną ideologię na osi lewica-prawica i wykazuje potencjał do przyciągania wyborców zarówno w lokalnych środowiskach konserwatywnych, jak i bardziej postępowych. Ugrupowania bardziej wyraziste ideowo, zarówno prawicowe, jak i lewicowe uzyskiwały na obszarach problemowych porównywalne i wyższe od ogólnopolskiego rezultaty w obu typach społeczności. Z kolei partie mainstreamowe zdając sobie sprawę z potencjału ugrupowań populistycznych dostosowują swój program wyborczy by zawalczyć o głosy „niezadowolonych” społeczności obszarów „pozostawionych w tyle”.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.