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Why do we have lobbying rules? Investigating the introduction of lobbying laws in EU and OECD member states

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Michele Crepaz at Queen's University Belfast
Michele Crepaz
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Read only version: http://rdcu.be/t1aI. Why do political systems introduce lobbying rules? Previous literature has analysed the determinants of the introduction of lobbying laws in the US states. However, the last 15 years have witnessed a booming popularity of lobbying laws across the world. Building upon the existing literature, this study seeks to explain the introduction of lobbying laws in EU and OECD member states from 1995 to 2014. The analysis considers variables related to the presence of lobbying scandals, the external promotion by international organizations, and corporatism. The causal mechanisms follow the theoretical arguments developed in the literature on political agenda-setting effects, policy diffusion and theories of interest representation. The empirical investigation is based on an original dataset and a statistical investigation using event history analysis and multinomial regression models. The results suggest that policy diffusion variables influence the likelihood of passing lobbying laws. While, scandals only affect the presentation of proposals for lobbying regulation in Parliament, corporatism shows no effects on the passage of such laws.
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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Why do we have lobbying rules? Investigating
the introduction of lobbying laws in EU and OECD
member states
Michele Crepaz
1
Published online: 7 July 2017
Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2017
Abstract Why do political systems introduce lobbying rules? Previous literature
has analysed the determinants of the introduction of lobbying laws in the US states.
However, the last 15 years have witnessed a booming popularity of lobbying laws
across the world. Building upon the existing literature, this study seeks to explain
the introduction of lobbying laws in EU and OECD member states from 1995 to
2014. The analysis considers variables related to the presence of lobbying scandals,
the external promotion by international organizations and corporatism. The causal
mechanisms follow the theoretical arguments developed in the literature on political
agenda-setting effects, policy diffusion and theories of interest representation. The
empirical investigation is based on an original dataset and a statistical investigation
using event history analysis and multinomial regression models. The results suggest
that policy diffusion variables influence the likelihood of passing lobbying laws.
While scandals only affect the presentation of proposals for lobbying regulation in
Parliament, corporatism shows no effects on the passage of such laws.
Keywords Lobbying Lobbying regulation Corporatism Pluralism Political
agenda-setting Policy diffusion
Lobbying regulations are a form of regulatory policy that lets citizens and all policy-
making stakeholders know who is lobbying whom about what (Greenwood and
Thomas 1998; Chari et al. 2010). More precisely, political scientists have placed
lobbying regulations in the category of transparency laws, anti-corruption laws and
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1057/s41309-017-0025-x)
contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
&Michele Crepaz
crepazm@tcd.ie
1
Department of Political Science, Trinity College Dublin, 3 College Green, Dublin 2, Ireland
Int Groups Adv (2017) 6:231–252
DOI 10.1057/s41309-017-0025-x
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
... Over time, these limited regulations evolved into comprehensive instruments (usually but not always enacted at the national level) aimed at promoting integrity and anti-corruption. As a result, initial 'mild' approaches to regulation are increasingly replaced by demands for more robust frameworks (Holman and Luneburg 2012;Crepaz 2017;Chari et al. 2019;Strickland 2023). ...
... These two ideal-types of lobbying reform, which we label as 'participation' agenda and 'integrity' agenda, have been empirically recognised as distinctive exogenous determinants of lobbying regulation (Crepaz 2017;De Francesco and Trein 2020). In practice, however, lobbying regulations blend both agendas, goals, and related instruments. ...
... With the paradigm shift towards institutional quality and emerging standards of good governance (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2010), legislative robustness also evolves within a context where policy models for lobbying regulation are internationally and domestically promoted and transferred across countries and levels of governance. Incorporated into integrity or participation agendas, regulatory models often trickle down from international organisations (Crepaz 2017;De Francesco and Trein 2020). ...
Incremental lobbying reform: the patchy case of Italy
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The regulation of lobbying serves the dual ambition of ensuring a level playing field for participation in policymaking while reducing risks of corruption and undue influence. International organisations, such as the EU, OECD and Council of Europe, have promoted this regulation by relying on such different agendas and frames. This variation is magnified within the Italian political system, where registers have been introduced in several institutions such as the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House), three ministries, and seven regions. By distinguishing two models of lobbying regulation, we trace the evolution of successive adoptions at the national and regional levels, characterised by the interplay between international organisations, domestic agenda-setting events and domestic policy entrepreneurs. The first group of lobbying regulation adopters concern what we define as the ‘participation agenda’, composed of voluntary rules and weak provisions for restricting legislator–lobbyist interactions. Following a sequence of influence-peddling scandals and the emergence of anti-corruption policy, a second wave of rules adoption reflects the ‘integrity agenda’ with a focus on mandatory registration requirements, disclosure requirements, and provisions on conflict-of-interest prevention. We observe that the sequence of adoptions is not separated and independent but rather characterised by policy layering whereby integrity instruments of the second period of adoption are added on to the participation goals of the first historical period.
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... This corresponds to findings from research on lobbying regulation, further emphasizing the need for a combination of factors to explain the processes leading to stricter transparency measures. In line with Crepaz (2017), we can affirm that policy change does not occur from scandals alone and that these scandals need to be combined with other explanatory factors. We show, however, that instead of a combination with other factors on the macro-level, such as the pursuit of public trust, symbolic politics or a favorable political culture, we need micro-level explanations that focus on how political action is channeled by key actors that make use of these scandals to increase pressure to act and generate further attention. ...
... Although this seemingly straightforward connection can be observed in some countries, comparative studies reveal a more complex link. Most notably, Crepaz (2017) argues that while scandals are the trigger for discussions about stricter transparency regulations, they do not necessarily have a direct impact on the adoption of new laws. Scandals therefore have an indirect impact on the policymaking process (see also Burkhardt 2018), and only in combination with other factors lead to stricter laws. ...
Explaining the German lobbying register law and its reform: combining insights from the Multiple Streams Framework and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
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This paper explains the adoption and reform of the German lobbying register law in 2021 and 2023 as a major policy change in German lobbying regulation. Using the Multiple Streams Framework and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory as theoretical lenses, we conduct a congruence analysis of 87 policy documents in a time period from 2017 to 2023. Empirical results show that the lobbying register law represents a quick solution to a different problem (a conflict of interest scandal) and explain the time it took the reform to re-emerge on the policy agenda due to shifted legislative priorities. In line with previous studies on lobbying regulation, we find that scandals need to be combined with other explanatory factors in order to elucidate the introduction and strengthening of transparency measures. These factors are on the micro-level and focus on how political action is channeled by key actors that make use of these scandals to increase pressure to act and generate further attention. With regard to our theoretical lenses, our analysis illustrates that both theories are needed to fully investigate the policy processes.
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... The first is more global in nature, examining developments in three or more continents. For example, Chari et al (2010; comparatively examine all lobbying laws across Europe, the Americas, Australia, Asia and the Middle East, while Crepaz (2017) and De Francesco and Trein (2020) assess which factors help explain why EU and OECD member states pursued regulations. A second line of investigation was more intercontinental, where authors such as Holman and Luneburg (2012) and Korkea-aho (2022) compare regulatory developments in the US and Europe. ...
New perspectives on lobbying regulation and reform: two generations of research
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Lobbying regulation is a transparency policy that sheds light on which lobbyists seek to influence public actors during policy development. Over 65 years of scholarship on it has seen the evolution of what can be broadly conceptualized as two generations of research. This paper conceptualizes the different themes in these two generations, where the developed classification system serves as a basis to understand common trends and differences to better situate the state of the art in the lobbying regulation literature today. After examining and explaining both generations in the first two sections of the paper, this is used as a basis to introduce the papers of this Special Issue/Collection in the third.
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... However, existing research on lobby regulation has largely focused on the analysis of public regimes (e.g. Chari et al. 2007Chari et al. , 2019Holman & Luneburg 2012;Crepaz 2017). We currently know very little about how public and private 1 forms of lobbying regulation relate to each other. ...
A tale of two cities: regulating lobbying through public and private instruments in Brussels and Washington D.C
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This article explores the relationship between public (i.e. government-led) and private (i.e. industry-led) forms of lobby regulation, by inquiring over the conditions that render a mix between these two regulatory forms more likely. Drawing on the governance of professions scholarship, it presents a theoretically informed comparison between two jurisdictions—the US (federal level) and the EU (supranational level)—where the public regulation of lobbying is built on different models, namely a command-and-control model based on legally binding rules in the US and a cooperative model based on incentives and rewards in the EU. Findings show that, although formal public–private regulatory mixes are not present in either jurisdiction, the EU regulators have hewn closer to this arrangement by coopting lobbyists’ professional associations as semi-permanent but unofficial governance ‘allies’. This outcome is due to an amalgam of factors, chief among which is the severity of political scandals involving lobbyists, which affects policymakers’ reputational incentives for framing the public regulation of lobbying as a punitive or cooperative intervention. Methodologically, the article uses a combination of documentary analysis and expert interviews with lobby practitioners and public regulators on both sides of the Atlantic.
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... The result is that Bills often tend to languish and Acts with loopholes go unamended. Nevertheless, regulations extant in neighbouring jurisdictions, or emanating from international institutions, can serve to stimulate countries into considering the introduction of their own lobbying regulations (Crepaz, 2017). Of course, the election of a reform-minded administration, coming to office with a transforming mandate and agenda (Keeling et al., 2017;McGrath, 2011), or the activities of a reforming political entrepreneur (Hogan and Feeney, 2012), can impel the introduction of lobbying regulations. ...
Regulation of lobbying: comparative state of the art and developments
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Lobbying regulation is a public policy approach capable of enriching participatory democracy while decreasing the dangers of corruption sometimes associated with lobbying. Here we present some insights into the state of lobbying regulations around the world today for scholars, practitioners and for society at large. We discuss the challenges in terms of defining lobbying and its regulation both academically and legislatively. We explore the broad context of lobbying regulation and the range of lobbying registers that have emerged over the years. The motivations for the introduction of lobbying regulations are also considered. The chapter finishes by comparing and classifying the robustness – the level of transparency and accountability – of contemporary lobbying regulations found in various jurisdictions. We will see from this chapter that lobbying regulations constitute part of the broader category of transparency regulations that aim to strengthen confidence in public institutions and enhance democratic accountability.
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