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From securitization moves to positive outcomes: The case of the spring 2010 Mekong crisis
Abstract
Full securitization has largely been regarded as something negative that should be avoided. While acknowledging this, the present article adds that securitization moves that fail to succeed (i.e. that end in securitization failure) can, at least in the environmental sector of security, trigger positive outcomes if a given issue becomes (re)politicized rather than depoliticized. This is because securitization moves can be helpful in raising sufficient awareness of an issue to gain the attention of the relevant audience(s). Subsequently, the article argues, different audience strategies determine whether securitization moves are turned into securitization failure as (re)politicization or securitization failure as depoliticization. The article introduces different behavioral strategies that audiences can employ to reject securitization moves: the passive recipient strategy, the blocking strategy, and the active reshaping strategy. Only the latter indicates that an audience not interested in letting securitization moves succeed simultaneously seeks to have the issue in question be, or remain, a part of the political agenda. The article uses the spring 2010 Mekong crisis as a test case to support its theoretical arguments.
... While many hydrological studies [11][12][13] and international scientists [14][15][16] consistently warn against various negative consequences associated with the rapid hydropower development, most attention was paid to the Chinese mainstream dams [17][18][19] and several controversial water projects in downstream countries, particularly the Lower Sesan II, Xayaburi, Xepian-Xenamnoy and Yali Falls dams [20][21][22][23]. Perhaps the biggest politicization of the hydropower dams arose after April 2020, when a team of two researchers published a study regarding the negative impact of upstream mainstream reservoirs on the natural water flow [24]. ...
... Despite the fact that many scholars believe that these water insecurities were mainly driven by hydro-meteorological reasons rather than man-made projects [86][87][88], calling the Chinese hydropower dams as the main culprit for amplifying the environmental risks is a very popular preconception in recent years. Whenever both scientists and non-scientists applied this narrative to emphasize China's utilitarianism [89,90] and other geostrategic intentions in Southeast Asia [71,91], this narrative was more often used to transfer various responsibilities for joint river management and multiply the fears from upstream countries [16,17,21]. ...
... To conclude, whenever the hydropower dams are interpreted as good or bad, feasible solutions to overcome the existing challenges within the Lancang-Mekong Basin are a shared priority among all multi-stakeholders. Moreover, despite the fact that upstream mainstream dams are widely considered a renewable source of energy with negligible economic benefits and high socio-environmental costs for the downstream countries [16,17,21,71,91], abandoning or decommissioning hydropower dams is not a viable option. Instead, multi-stakeholders should deeply re-consider what they want and what they need before levelling their demands from upstream countries. ...
To date, hydropower dams raise numerous interpretations about their impact on the Lancang-Mekong River. While most research studies analyze the negative aspects of hydropower development on people’s livelihoods and local environments, the hydropower sector was historically one of the most iconic economic segments facilitating transboundary water cooperation for decades. By using the constructive discourse analysis and critical political ecology approach, the presented text (1) outlines the current environmental narratives over the Lancang-Mekong hydropower development and (2) explores the politicization of the Chinese mainstream dams. The data were collected upon the multi-level content analysis of relevant sources and double-checked with the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation and Conflict Database (LMCCD) monitoring over 4000 water-related events among six riparian countries between 1990 and 2021. Our data show that (i) there is a stark contrast in positive and negative narratives over the rapid hydropower development, (ii) the impact of mainstream dams on the river is more often discussed than that of tributary dams, (iii) implications of the hydropower dams are often interpreted upon the non-traditional research inputs rather than widely accepted studies, and (iv) developing the contradictory arguments through social and public media contributes to greater polarization of the multi-stakeholders’ viewpoints in the accountable research dialogue.
... The downstream states within the Lancang-Mekong Basin are historically very sensitive to any alteration of the water flow. Since March 2003, many observers have studied the impact of the Chinese mainstream dams on the water flow (Biba, 2016(Biba, , 2012Binh et al., 2020;Gunn & McCartan, 2008;Lu et al., 2014;Wei, 2017). However, such criticism always bounced on the lack of robust evidence (e.g., International Centre for Environmental Management (ICEM), 2010; Mekong River Commission (MRC), 2017) and misinterpretation of the research findings (e.g., Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Thailand (PRC-ET), 2016, 2019). ...
... These challenges can be well illustrated with the hydrological data-sharing and interpreting the hydrological changes in the Lancang-Mekong Basin where many stakeholders tailor the jargon and content for the target audience (PRC-ET, 2016, 2019Biba, 2016;Bohannon, 2013;Sneddon & Fox, 2006). For example, whereas numerous nongovernmental organizations (e.g., Scientists for the Mekong, Save the Mekong Coalition (SMC), International Rivers or Mekong Watch) may simplify the complex research conclusions to provide better understanding for laic people and use more alarming nonscientific jargon to attract public attention (e.g., Corredor, 2017;Mekong Watch, 2014;SMC, 2017), the political authorities may rely more on promises, guarantees and other proclamations to reflect the current political environment and achieve certain national goals (Molle, Foran et al., 2009;Rieu-Clarke, 2015;Sangkhamanee, 2015). ...
... Perhaps, the most comprehensive research studies analysing the impact of rapid hydropower development on the sustainability of the Lancang-Mekong River have been conducted under the auspices of the MRC (e.g., MRC, 2017MRC, , 2019cICEM, 2010). While the majority of scientific papers consider upstream mainstream dams as one of the main factors for altering the natural flow (e.g., Biba, 2016Biba, , 2012Binh et al., 2020;Gunn & McCartan, 2008;Lu et al., 2014;Wei, 2017), the cumulative effects of the tributary dams and other non-dam pressures remain unacknowledged (Soukhaphon et al., 2021, p. 13;ICEM, 2010, p. 10). Otherwise, the hydropower dams will be only interpreted without considering the positive macro-economic influence on downstream countries (MRC, 2017, p. 6), such as energy generation, preventing floods and facilitating other transboundary water management practices. ...
In April 2020, the Eyes on Earth published a comprehensive research study presenting new evidence about the changing dynamics of the Lancang–Mekong River water flow. The Eyes on Earth Study (EoE Study) received significant media attention and raised concerns about hydrological changes that negatively affect the downstream countries. By drawing on the politicization of science theories and using the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation and Conflict Database, we (1) provide an overview the EoE Study’s findings; (2) outline the scientific and non-scientific responses to the EoE Study’s conclusions; and (3) study various implications of the politicization of the EoE Study.
... Depoliticization consists of a passive recipient strategy and the block strategy. According to (Biba, 2016), the former is a denial of securitization initiatives, which the actors are unsuccessful in addressing the issue. The latter is a counter-reaction in which the audience presents an alternate construction highlighting that the problem is not a security matter. ...
... The latter is a counter-reaction in which the audience presents an alternate construction highlighting that the problem is not a security matter. The second strategy, namely (re) politicization, requires the audience to suggest a potential solution that differs from the actors (Biba, 2016). ...
... Securitisation refers to a process whereby a group of 'securitising actors' frame an issue as an existential threat and then attempt to convince an 'audience' that the issue must be resolved (Buzan et al., 1998). Securitising actors are diverse and can include political elites, the media, and members of civil society (Biba, 2016;Collins, 2005), with the political elites tending to exercise much more power than the other groups (Buzan et al., 1998: 32). Audiences are usually the general public (Arifianto, 2009;Collins, 2005;Stritzel and Chang, 2015) but, in some studies, can include government officials (Biba, 2016), local power elites (Curley and Herington, 2011), and humanitarian organisations (Vaughn, 2009). ...
... Securitising actors are diverse and can include political elites, the media, and members of civil society (Biba, 2016;Collins, 2005), with the political elites tending to exercise much more power than the other groups (Buzan et al., 1998: 32). Audiences are usually the general public (Arifianto, 2009;Collins, 2005;Stritzel and Chang, 2015) but, in some studies, can include government officials (Biba, 2016), local power elites (Curley and Herington, 2011), and humanitarian organisations (Vaughn, 2009). Securitising actors use speech to gain audience acceptance and to legitimise, in their eyes, extraordinary emergency measures designed to remove an existential threat (Buzan et al., 1998: 21). ...
We examine the Thai government's politicised COVID-19 containment strategies, which have been challenged by Thai protesters. Although we use securitisation theory as an explanatory framework, we argue that researchers using this theory can explain the issues only if they simultaneously use social-conflict theory to explain the interactions between securitising actors and their audiences. By supplementing securitisation theory with social-conflict theory, we have found that the roles of securitising actors and audiences are not fixed. In our case study of Thailand, the Thai government and protesters have played two roles simultaneously: the role of a securitising actor and the role of an audience. This finding suggests that successful securitisation is impermanent; that is, it is subject to change over time. Securitisation may be successful, but the success can only be temporary because as new actors or resources enter the picture, the previously successful securitisation will, at some point, diminish.
... Not all securitising acts are negative. In some instances, as Biba (2016) has shown, it may result in "positive outcomes." Likewise, not all successful securitisation moves become violent as illustrated by the case of US trade relations discussed by Magcamit (2017). ...
... Likewise, not all successful securitisation moves become violent as illustrated by the case of US trade relations discussed by Magcamit (2017). Nonetheless, Biba (2016) notes that, broadly speaking, de-securitisation of issues is preferred. 4. See https:// cnnphilippines. ...
The Philippine response to COVID-19 has been described as being one of the longest and strictest lockdowns in the world. Why has the Philippine government relied heavily on draconian measures in its “war” against COVID-19? And what discourse informed the framing of its response as a war against the virus? This article argues that the government’s reliance on draconian measures was a consequence of securitising COVID-19, appreciating the virus as an “existential threat.” The securitisation of COVID-19 was reinforced with a narrative characterising the situation of the country as being at war against an “unseen enemy.” This war-like narrative, however, invariably produced a subject, the pasaway. As the perpetual enemy of health and order, the pasaway became the target of disciplining and policing. The targeting of the pasaway was informed by deep-seated class prejudices and Duterte’s authoritarian tendencies.
... The fourth section analyzes empirical findings to highlight two different security strategies and their implications. In the case of China's securitizing the Mekong River, while there has been securitization, in the sense of resonating with and producing consent in its intended (downstream) audience, the effects were generally considered "positive" sensu Floyd (2007) and Biba (2016). 2 In contrast, in the Indian case, securitization has had regionally problematic effects which led to a more militarized policy approach. ...
... From a realization that unilateral actions over the shared rivers would not be constructive for long-term national strategic interests, China's acts to promote water security had been expressly noted to develop good-neighborly diplomacy (Shi 2013;Ruan 2014;Shen and Xie 2018), for the country to be accepted as an important partner on issues relating to the uses of the shared river basin and water management. China has also shown transformation in its security practices: China "disarmed" the securitizing move by making unprompted unilateral data-sharing and transparency moves and entering into dialogue with the downstream countries (Biba 2016) and Beijing has started to develop open debate among the Lower Mekong Countries. While the Chinese government expressed its intention to provide more humanitarian assistance in protecting citizens of both China and Lower Mekong Countries from environmental harm and natural disasters, 9 the nature of such debate was to, for the time being, pacify Lower Mekong states sharing the river. ...
Managing transboundary river basins proves a challenge for China when encountering disagreements with its neighbors that experience different political and social conditions. This paper analyses what happens when China characterizes water as a security issue. Unlike past studies that mostly understand China’s water security practices through the prism of normal national politics, this study examines China’s fluid securitization practices, where changes can be identified indicating that the Chinese government values the various water security concerns differently.
Two cases are adopted for comparison. In the case of China’s sharing the Mekong River with the Lower Mekong Countries, the Chinese government has shown a willingness to incorporate more issues found both inside and outside of the water sector. In contrast, in the case of the sharing of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, China’s security agenda has been limited to the consideration of water availability and has then led to military security concerns. A comparison of the cases indicate that China’s water security agenda is not only driven by a concern for water management over specific rivers, but also judgements that incorporate strategic military consideration from the military sector with regard to countries that they are involved with. The case of China thus suggests that water security is a complex domain that demonstrates competing values and concerns in (de)politicizing water. Therefore, water-related security issues cannot be understood solely from an environmental policy perspective.
... Por lo que la conformación , estructuración y contrastación de bases de datos críticos con las bases de datos oficiales y las bases de datos de campo son necesarios (Zeitoun et al., 2019) por los dispositivos de poder foucaultianos que ponen un velo en las cajas negras de la acción biopolítica de dichos espacios (Zeitoun y Warner, 2006), los cuales por definición son difíciles de promover una transformación a la configuración conflictiva, debido a la falta de un diagnóstico sincero de la problemática. (Weinthal et al., 2015;Biba, 2016;Zeitoun et al., 2019) 30 Por lo que se han hecho estudios especializados en las hidrohegemonías (Rojas-Rosales, 2020) Habiendo explicado lo anterior, es imperativo recalcar que la mayoría de las posturas y enfoques presentados tanto en las investigaciones citadas en la INTRODUCCIÓN, ANTECEDENTES y en el CAPÍTULO 1; forman parte de una crítica ontológica hacia la ecología política neomalthusiana y abren un frente de debate epistemológico hacia la visión socioecosistémica del informe de Brundtland (WCED, 1987), el cual promueve el paradigma de la gestión integral de los recursos hídricos (GIRH) y de la sustentabilidad. ...
Water management represents a critical challenge for water security, especially in territories such as Puerto Morelos. This municipality, located in the metropolitan region of northern Quintana Roo, is geostrategic due to its water recharge function that supplies the Holbox-Xelha karst fracture to the coastal cities of Cancun and Playa del Carmen. There are also networks of aqueducts of the ‘AGUAKAN System’, which extract and supply water to these tourist cities.
However, the survival of the hydro-social cycle is threatened by the speculation of the real estate-tourist-financial market on the water-territory.
The main objective was to develop a geospatial index to assess the ungovernability of hydro-social territories, identifying factors that hinder integrated water management.
The hypothesis holds that synthesising the elements that make up the conflictive configuration of the hydro-social cycle in the Northern Metropolitan Zone of Quintana Roo (Torres-Perdigón, 2022) will allow us to determine the levels of territorial ungovernability in this region.
The methodology consisted of developing the concept of the ungovernability of the hydro-social cycle and then synthesising a mixed approach of AHP geospatial research, documentary analysis and fieldwork. Geographic information systems (GIS), participatory mapping, clandestine sampling and Delphi panel were used. The index integrated 15 social, environmental, institutional and territorial indicators.
The results reveal a complex web of tensions between actors-system, showing different dimensions of ungovernability depending on the roughness of the territory. Different intensities of conflicts over access to water, institutional weakness, urban-tourist pressure and socio-ecosystemic vulnerability can be observed. Thus, the geospatial index identified critical zones and gradients of ungovernability in Puerto Morelos.
La gestión del agua representa un desafío crítico para la seguridad hídrica, especialmente en territorios como Puerto Morelos. Dicho municipio localizado en la región metropolitana del norte de Quintana Roo, es geoestratégico por su función de recarga hídrica que suple la fractura kárstica Holbox-Xelha hacia las ciudades costeras de Cancún y Playa del Carmen. También existen redes de acueductos del “Sistema AGUAKAN”, que extraen y suministran agua a dichas ciudades turísticas.
Sin embargo, la supervivencia del ciclo hidrosocial se ve amenazado, ante la especulación del mercado inmobiliario-turístico-financiero sobre el agua-territorio.
El objetivo principal fue desarrollar un índice geoespacial para evaluar la ingobernabilidad en los territorios hidrosociales, identificando factores que obstaculizan una gestión integral del agua.
La hipótesis sostiene que al sintetizar los elementos que componen a la configuración conflictiva del ciclo hidrosocial de la Zona Metropolitana del Norte de Quintana Roo (Torres-Perdigón, 2022), nos permitirá determinar los niveles de ingobernabilidad territorial de esta región.
La metodología consistió en elaborar el concepto de la ingobernabilidad del ciclo hidrosocial y después se sintetizó un enfoque mixto de investigación geoespacial AHP, con análisis documental y trabajo de campo. Se utilizaron sistemas de información geográfica (SIG), mapeo participativo, muestreo clandestino y panel Delphi. El índice integró 15 indicadores sociales, ambientales, institucionales y territoriales.
Los resultados revelan una compleja red de tensiones entre actores-sistema, evidenciando distintas dimensiones de ingobernabilidad dependiendo de las rugosidades del territorio. Se aprecian distintas intensidades de: conflictos por acceso al agua, debilidad institucional, presión urbana-turística y vulnerabilidad socioecosistémica. Así el índice geoespacial identificó zonas críticas y gradientes de ingobernabilidad en Puerto Morelos.
... Supported by regional and international activists as well as the media inside and outside the region, local communities propelled a weeklong series of statements, reports, and articles that were harshly critical of China's dam building activities and the opacity surrounding them. They demanded that China stop building dams on the Lancang and that it release data detailing dam operations as well as pre-damming hydrological records (Biba 2016b(Biba , 2018a. ...
Development of energy infrastructure has long been pivotal in shaping contemporary issues in China, and geographically uneven development is a perennial challenge for central, provincial, and local government organs. As China has moved away from reliance on coal power in favour of renewable electricity generation, hydroelectricity development has increased substantially, notably over the last decade. Though many large dams have become mired in a range of social, political, and environmental concerns, small operations have proliferated rapidly. One valuable but insufficiently understood factor in this rapid development of small dams is government rhetoric linking electrification with social change in underdeveloped rural areas, particularly among ethnic minority groups. Consequently, small hydropower-based electrification now reflects an integral component for initiatives promoting development and the modernisation of communities deemed ‘backward’. A lack of empirical field-based research, however, has left gaps in our understanding of on-the-ground outcomes, specifically how electrification has influenced the everyday lives of rural and ethnic minority households. This chapter reflects on seven years of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the Nu River Valley of Yunnan Province, providing insights into how small, rural ethnic minority communities navigate and negotiate modernisation processes resulting from the development of small hydroelectric operations and electricity provision.
... Supported by regional and international activists as well as the media inside and outside the region, local communities propelled a weeklong series of statements, reports, and articles that were harshly critical of China's dam building activities and the opacity surrounding them. They demanded that China stop building dams on the Lancang and that it release data detailing dam operations as well as pre-damming hydrological records (Biba 2016b(Biba , 2018a. ...
Studies of dam resettlement in China tend to focus on those who remain in resettlement sites, producing a distorted discourse of life after resettlement. Households and individuals often move out of resettlement sites but, because they are difficult to trace, there is limited research about them. It is estimated that 30 per cent of resettled households emigrated from the Three Gorges Dam resettlement site. To explore this and contribute to the limited research about emigration after resettlement, this chapter asks: Who left the Three Gorges after resettlement? Why did they leave? Where did they go? To understand what may have led to emigration we analyse the livelihoods of 178 households who responded to a survey in 2003, but were no longer living at the same resettlement site in 2012. We find low-income rural households and higher income urban households were more likely than their cohort averages to have left the resettlement between 2003 and 2011. This provides initial evidence that a range of push and pull factors influence the decision to leave resettlement sites. These dynamics have been overlooked in the resettlement literature, potentially skewing assessments of resettlement outcomes.
... Finally, and adjacently, previous studies on securitization in general have focused on examining cases in which the purposeful securitization of political issues as existential threats have successfully justified the passing of emergency measures to resolve the perceived threat (Hansen 2013;Biba 2016;Kapur 2018;Neo 2020). Even in political circumstances that may still persistsuch as in the securitization of immigration in the European Unionthe measures that are justified by, and are the consequence of, the securitization process have been largely documented (Bigo 2017). ...
Employing securitization theory, this article critically evaluates political discourses in the United States involving US President Donald Trump. It makes two main arguments: first, present political discourses against Trump can be understood as part of a concerted securitization process in which Trump’s presidency is constructed as a threat to US national security. The securitization of an issue gives credence to the need for emergency measures to resolve a purported threat; within this context, the process aims to justify measures including the emergency impeachment of the President. Next, using primary data gathered from an online questionnaire (n = 529) and secondary data from polling agencies, this article demonstrates that there had been popular resonance and acceptance of the securitization discourse, that sufficient institutional support for impeachment was generated and that there was low coherence of counter-narratives opposed to the securitization. This article highlights how securitization can be undertaken over a protracted span of time through both discourses and practices, and in concert by a slew of actors rather than being carried out by a single lead actor. Importantly, it suggests that analysing audience responses to an unfolding securitizing move can generate valuable insights about the securitization processes and its potential outcomes.
... Precisely because it applies to hegemonic actors who may be resistant to changes in the arrangement, the duty of cooperation has been considered the main obligation through which international water law has the potential to address power asymmetries by 'levelling the playing field', thereby giving the possibility of transforming the conflict (Farnum, Hawkins, & Tamarin, 2017). 6. Desecuritization tactics can follow many strategies (Buzan et al., 1998;Roe, 2004), which have been identified by Biba (2016) in relation to transboundary water arrangements on the Mekong as 'passive recipient' (ignoring the securitizing moves until they abate or stop), 'blocking' (asserting that the issue is not securitized), and 'active reshaping' (essentially, the blocking strategy complemented by action to incorporate the securitizing actor's concerns). 7. A typology of cooperation is offered by Zeitoun et al. (2019). ...
This article proposes and fleshes out an analytical method designed to support efforts to transform inequitable and unsustainable transboundary water arrangements. Such ‘transformative analysis’ leverages socio-ecological thinking to critically evaluate the processes that have established and maintain an arrangement, including hydro-diplomacy itself. Transformative analysis facilitates the interpretation of strategies to deflect transformation, identification of destructive forms of cooperation, and strategic classification of opportunities for transformation. The assertions are premised on an understanding of the particularities of water conflict, and followed by a discussion of ways researchers may overcome the challenges inherent in the method.
The hydro-social cycle of the northern zone of Quintana Roo is in a socio-ecological dilemma due to the configurations of urban, political, social, and environmental patterns of development that have emerged since 1960-2022.
Therefore, in order to satisfy the needs of all the users that live in the hydro-social cycle, it is heading towards a socio-environmental crisis composed of micro conflicts, struggles and latent and manifest conflicts, which develop in a plot of conflictive configuration. This phenomenon of ungovernability has undermined the implementation of land use planning and aquifer protection policies in the State of Quintana Roo, Mexico.
In this research, 6 types of conflicts that compose this conflictive configuration are studied in depth, besides participatory cartographies are made to illustrate in maps these concept of conflictive configuration of the hidrosocial cicle and characterize this conflictive configuration to contribute with political science approaches that can promote aspects of water security in karstic systems.
El ciclo hidrosocial de la zona norte de Quintana Roo se encuentra en un dilema socioecológico por las configuraciones del desarrollo urbano, politico, social, ambiental que se ha gestado desde 1960-2022.
Por lo que para satisfacerse las necesidades de todos los usuarios que habitan en el ciclo hidrosocial se decanta hacia una crisis socioambiental compuesto de micro conflictos, pugnas y conflictos latentes y manifiestos, los cuales se desarrollan en una trama de configuración conflictiva. Fenómeno de ingobernabilidad la cuál ha mermado la implementación de políticas de ordenamiento territorial y de protección al acuífero en el Estado de Quintana Roo, México.
En esta investigación se profundiza en 6 tipos de conflictos que componen a esta configuración conflictiva. Además que se realizan cartografías participativas para ilustrar en mapas a este concepto de la configuración conflictiva del ciclo hidrosocial y se caracteriza a esta configuración conflictiva; para aportar apuntes de ciencia política que puedan promover aspectos de la Seguridad Hídrica en sistemas kársticos.
Transboundary water governance is multiscale and multilevel, involving different actors with diverse powers and politics at different levels and scales. Levels and scales are key governance challenges in transboundary water governance. Although there is considerable literature on scale and level, there is very little on how to operationalize it in a transboundary river basin context. Accordingly, the present study analyses how scale and level complicate transboundary water governance, using a literature review and a case study of Tonle Sap Lake (TSL) in the Mekong River Basin to examine the level and scale affecting transboundary water governance. The present study describes the level of transboundary water governance in terms of global, regional and national implications. There are different functional spaces at each level, including agriculture, fisheries and biodiversity. Spaces are zoned into different spatial scales, based on technocratic interests, specialization, power and the politics of actors. The present study concludes that levels, spatial scales and zoning have made TSL governance more complex, leading to establishment of new institutional and legal arrangements for managing Tonle Sap, some of which compete with, conflict and overlap, meaning sound environmental management and good governance cannot be guaranteed.
Freshwater resources do not respect political boundaries and are frequently shared among countries, making water management an issue of international concern in many places. Worryingly, the number of conflicts between riparian neighbours in international river basins has, overall, been on the rise. In the light of this situation, the role of the most powerful riparian countries, the so-called hydro-hegemons, takes centre stage, as their large power capabilities are arguably accompanied by the responsibility to provide good water governance. In the Asian context, China readily comes to mind as a hydro-hegemon due to its favourable geographical upstream position and superior material power. But how has China made use of these and related assets? Simply put, has China been a good or bad hydro-hegemon? To answer this question, this chapter will apply the framework of hydro-hegemony as introduced by (Zeitoun and Warner in Water Policy 8:435–460, 2006) to China’s performance in the Mekong region. The chapter’s main argument is that China could still do much more to be a better hydro-hegemon in this particular river basin, providing more positive leadership and sharing the Mekong’s resources in a more cooperative way.
This article analyzes China’s Mekong River politics before and after the establishment of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) from a comparative benefit-sharing perspective. China’s pre-LMC approach focused too much on the creation of economic benefits from and beyond the river while neglecting ecological benefits to the river. Moreover, despite the problems this ‘old’ approach caused for China and its downstream neighbours, China’s current LMC strategy seems to essentially replicate its former approach. While sustainable water resources management is identified as a priority area, actual cooperation and benefit sharing in this field remain insufficient.
This piece develops a performative take on securitization theory. It argues that rather than seeing authority as a prerequisite for speaking security, we need to zoom in on how speaking security can be used to claim authority. Such acts of claiming authority are crucial to understand the current political struggles to redefine security. In order to do so, I make two claims taking securitization theory further, an iterative claim and a performative claim. One, following Derrida, we must open up what can be said about security, enabling an analysis of how the security logic is not only used, but also challenged and changed. Two, following Butler, we must open up who can speak security, seeing how speaking security can be used to take authority, rather than seeing authority as a precondition for speaking security.
The so-called ‘nexus’ approach has recently been promoted as addressing externalities across the water, food and energy sectors, thus helping to achieve ‘water/energy/food security for all’, ‘equitable and sustainable growth’ and a ‘resilient and productive environment’. While these are noble goals, this article argues that the reality on the ground appears to be taking a different direction, at least when it comes to China and its neighbours in South and Southeast Asia. There, a new era of large-scale water infrastructure development is creating several security-related problems, which represent serious challenges to the nexus goals. These challenges include food–energy tensions, human security threats and ecological risks. These challenges can also be linked to rising friction surrounding the management of water, food and energy resources in the region. The article argues that, in order for the nexus goals to be achieved in China and the countries on its southern periphery, there must first be increased awareness of this nexus among policy-making elites.
At the Labour Party Conference that followed shortly after the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair delivered what is widely perceived as one of the most important – and also most powerful – speeches of his political career. With the televised images of the collapsing Twin Towers still etched on people’s minds, the speech expressed the Prime Minister’s hope that ‘out of the shadows of… evil should emerge lasting good’ and outlined his vision of a new, reordered world founded on justice and ‘the equal worth of all’ (Blair 2001). Central to the construction of this new world order was Blair’s renewed promise to help Africa.’The state of Africa,’ he declared, ‘is a scar on the conscience of the world.’ In his characteristic, almost-messianic style, Blair assured his audience that the scar could be healed ‘if the world as a community focused on it.’ This would entail a much more interventionist role for Britain and what he called the ‘international community ‘, and Blair portrayed the new world order as one where the United Kingdom was always ready to defend human rights and democracy in Africa. Thus, he told his audience, ‘if Rwanda happened again today as it did in 1993, when a million people were slaughtered in cold blood, we would have a moral duty to act there also.’
While the Copenhagen School has provided security analysts with important tools for illuminating processes of threat construction, the reverse processes of un-making security or desecuritization have remained seriously underspecified. Informed by a critical sensibility, this article asks the question ‘how can desecuritization be thought’ and argues, contra the Copenhagen School, that desecuritization has to be tackled first politically and not analytically. I show that the dynamics of securitization/desecuritization raise questions about the type of politics we want, whether that is democratic politics of universal norms and slow procedures or the exceptional politics of speed and enemy exclusion. I subsequently propose a different concept of emancipation, which is informed by the principles of universality and recognition. This concept distances itself from both desecuritization and the equation of emancipation with security by Critical Security Studies since it has a different logic from the non-democratic and exclusionary logic of security and it engages more thoroughly with both democratic politics and the ‘conditions’ in which securitization becomes possible.
Prime Minister Tony Blair has described Africa as a “scar on the conscience of the world.” This article argues that New Labour's increasing attention to Africa is part of an ongoing securitization of the continent; interactions with Africa are gradually shifting from the category of “development/humanitarianism” toward a category of “risk/fear/threat” in the context of the “war on terrorism.” The securitization of Africa has helped legitimize this “war on terrorism,” but has very little to offer for Africa's development problems.
Those interested in the construction of security in contemporary international politics have increasingly turned to the conceptual framework of `securitization'. This article argues that while an important and innovative contribution, the securitization framework is problematically narrow in three senses. First, the form of act constructing security is defined narrowly, with the focus on the speech of dominant actors. Second, the context of the act is defined narrowly, with the focus only on the moment of intervention. Finally, the framework of securitization is narrow in the sense that the nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats. In outlining this critique, the article points to possibilities for developing the framework further as well as for the need for those applying it to recognize both limits of their claims and the normative implications of their analysis. I conclude by pointing to how the framework might fit within a research agenda concerned with the broader construction of security.
In 1993 the first Clinton administration declared environmental security a national security issue, but by the end of the Bush administrations environmental security had vanished from the government's agenda. This book uses changing US environmental security policy to propose a revised securitisation theory, one that both allows insights into the intentions of key actors and enables moral evaluations in the environmental sector of security. Security and the Environment brings together the subject of environmental security and the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory. Drawing on original interviews with former key players in United States environmental security, Rita Floyd makes a significant and original contribution to environmental security studies and security studies more generally. This book will be of interest to international relations scholars and political practitioners concerned with security, as well as students of international environmental politics and US policy-making.
Fresh water has no substitute, and its availability has been declining sharply around the globe. In Asia, China's role as a multidirectional and transborder water provider is unmatched. Analysis of China's behavior towards its transboundary rivers is therefore pivotal. By examining three different case studies—the Mekong River in Southeast Asia, the Brahmaputra River in South Asia and the Irtysh and Ili Rivers in Central Asia—this article seeks to lay the theoretical groundwork for understanding China's behavior. It pits previously applied realist rationales against the more recent notion of desecuritization strategies and makes a case for the latter. While desecuritization implies non- or de-escalation, it does not necessarily mean genuine long-term cooperation. The future of Asia's shared waters may thus be a contentious one.
The use of English has rapidly been growing in the Expanding Circle of world Englishes. This situation is especially true in Vietnam. In order to know what affects the use of English, including its role in code-switching in classrooms in Vietnam, a case study was conducted to address the main question, “What is the impact of the tertiary education context on code-switching in classrooms in Vietnam?” The subject was one teacher of two English classes (one in a public university and the other in a private one). The data for this study include document analysis, classroom observations, the teacher’s stimulated recalls, and the students’ written feedback. The study found that more code-switching (CS) happened in the public school than in the private school due to (1) the in-class time budget, (2) the students’ English levels, (3) cultural factors, (4) the teacher-evaluation system, and (5) teacher cognition. The study also found that inter-sentential CS was dominant compared to intra-sentential CS.
The purpose of this article is to revisit the normatively defined debate over securitization as a negative conception. Claudia Aradau’s work has largely served to define this debate, with Aradau arguing that securitization/security is an inherently negative conception inasmuch as its mode of extraordinary politics necessarily both institutionalizes fast-track decisionmaking (‘process’) and produces categories of enemy others (‘outcome’). In making evident the main assumptions therein, my argument is that this debate has taken place not only in terms of a specific – and indeed contestable – rendering of the securitization concept, but also in terms of a more general acceptance of an essentialized (Schmittian) logic of security. The article thus seeks ultimately to demonstrate the value of de-essentializing the practices evoked by speaking security and to show how this enables meaningful engagement with other emerging conceptions of ‘positive’ security.
This article analyses China's hydro-politics along the Mekong River. It seeks to explain why China's unilateral dam-building projects on the upper reaches of the river have not been met with sustained criticism on the part of the downstream riparian countries, for which upstream dams are likely to have severe negative consequences. It is held that China has embarked on a strategy of implicit and broadly conceived actor-reversed issue linkage as a means to nip any loud disapproval of its dams in the bud. By downplaying its dam-building projects and instead promoting common development goals with the Mekong riparian countries through highly increased political and economic engagement, Beijing has successfully defused any potential counter-measures against its dams, at least for the time being. The sustainability of this strategy and its transferability to others of China's trans-boundary rivers must be questioned.
The concept of securitization has produced a considerable amount of debate over the meaning of security. However, far less attention has been paid to the role of audiences and their relationship to actors in the securitization process. Informed by the work of Thierry Balzacq (2005), and through analysis of the decision of the UK government to join with the USA in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, in this article I show that although the general public can indeed play a valuable role in providing an actor with `moral' support concerning the `securityness' of an issue, more crucial, however, is the `formal' support provided by parliament concerning the `extraordinaryness' of the means necessary to deal with it. My argument is thus that securitization can in this way be seen as a distinct two-stage process marked by a `stage of identification' and a `stage of mobilization'.
This article offers a constructive critique of the Copenhagen School's ‘securitization’ framework by applying it in an analysis of the role of international organizations seeking to counter the trafficking of narcotics and persons in post-Soviet Central Asia. The study discovers common and divergent motivations that explain international attempts and failures to securitize. In the case of human trafficking, significant clashes created obstacles to international efforts. In both cases, international organizations advanced their agendas through the language of security, but also through institutional changes and increased resource allocation. These processes led to the adoption of mostly traditional security strategies. The analysis concludes that although the securitization framework makes significant contributions as an analytical tool, its definition is too vague and it is too narrow in focus. ‘Security dichotomies’ need to be taken into account in a comprehensive analysis of why international attempts to securitize issues sometimes succeed and sometimes fail. The influence of rhetoric on the development of policy should also be taken into account if the securitization framework is to provide a complete understanding of the issues or be useful for policymakers.
The article discusses Paul Roe's argument that minority rights are always problems of (societal) security. According to Roe, a Huysmans-type deconstructivist strategy, which can be used in desecuritization of migration, is not possible in minority situations, because maintenance of a collective identity is central for minorities; therefore, the desecuritization of minority rights may be 'logically impossible' in certain cases. The present article focuses on Roe's arguments and attempts to find ways to avoid his determinism. It introduces a reconstructivist strategy for the desecuritization of minority rights, based on the process and discursive aspects of identity. It is possible for the stories of ethnically defined collective identities to be told in such a way that they do not exclude other such identities from the territory of a state. With this strategy, the author tries to show that desecuritization of minority rights is always logically possible, though in some cases it might be practically impossible in the foreseeable future.
Securitization theory has evolved over the past 10–15 years and has fuelled much exciting research, demonstrated through recent contributions by Balzacq, Stritzel, Taurek, and Floyd. Despite a growing number of case studies of successful securitization and desecuritization processes, scholars have retained the statist view of securitization: actors identify an existential threat that requires emergency executive powers, and, if the audience accepts the securitizing move, the issue is depoliticized and is considered a ‘security’ issue outside the rules of normal politics. This article demonstrates that there are multiple settings of securitizing moves and parses the audience within securitization theory, suggesting a model of at least four distinct types of audiences and speech contexts (popular, elite, technocratic, and scientific). The process of securitization is not a moment of binary decision but rather an iterative, political process between speaker and audience. We must not ask, ‘was a securitizing move made’ but ‘how does a securitizing move mean?’ Particularly if one adopts a more interventionist or activist notion of scholarship, a key question for experts must be: how are securitizing moves accepted or rejected? What are the politics of that successful process of (de)securitization? Using dramaturgical analysis, we suggest that securitizing moves take place within different sociological settings that operate with unique rules, norms, and practices. The example of the Canadian Air Transport Security Association is provided.Journal of International Relations and Development (2008) 11, 321–349. doi:10.1057/jird.2008.20
The prime claim of the theory of securitization is that the articulation of security produces a specific threatening state of affairs. Within this theory, power is derived from the use of ‘appropriate’ words in conformity with established rules governing speech acts. I argue, however, that a speech act view of security does not provide adequate grounding upon which to examine security practices in ‘real situations’. For instance, many security utterances counter the ‘rule of sincerity’ and, the intrinsic power attributed to ‘security’ overlooks the objective context in which security agents are situated. As a corrective, I put forward three basic assumptions — (i) that an effective securitization is audience-centered; (ii) that securitization is context-dependent; (iii) that an effective securitization is power-laden. The insights gleaned from the investigation of these assumptions are progressively integrated into the pragmatic act of security, the value of which is to provide researchers in the field with a tractable number of variables to investigate in order to gain a better understanding of the linguistic manufacture of threats.
As China expands its development assistance in Southeast Asia, is Chinese aid beginning to emulate international norms and practices or sustaining its own distinct approach to development assistance? This essay argues that China's socialization into international norms varies with the thickness of the institutional environment. In Laos and Cambodia, China's enhanced collaboration with international consortia, improved transparency, and project diversity point to nascent socialization. China's aid to Myanmar, however, remains opaque and largely self-interested. At the regional level, Beijing is bolstering its influence over the norms and practices of regional developmental institutions.
This article constitutes an attempted bridge-building between the so-called
‘Copenhagen School’ and the so-called ‘Welsh
School’ of security studies. The thesis of communality rests upon an
evaluative bifurcation of the concept of securitisation into positive and
negative securitisation. In tandem with this lies a bifurcation of the concept
of desecuritisation into positive and negative desecuritisation. The two
positive concepts are believed to be of equal value, with both trumping over the
two negative concepts.This evaluative strategy of securitisation/desecuritisation, it is hoped will
combine the optimistic perception of security by ‘Welsh
School’ critical security theorists, with the more pessimistic
perception of security associated with the Copenhagen School –
particularly with that of Ole Wæver, the originator of securitisation
theory. Such a strategy is seen as advantageous for three reasons. First, it is
believed that the more unified these critical theories are, the stronger a
challenge they can offer to the mainstream of security studies; second, the more
united the academy the more adoptable are its theories for policymakers (EU or
otherwise) and third the strategy proposed here paves the way for a more
evaluative engagement with security on the part of the analyst, allowing for
normative – but denying infinite – conceptualisations of
security.In order to show that there are differences between the utility of securitisation
and desecuritisation, this article demonstrates the distinctions by way of
illustrative examples, all of which are taken from the environmental security
sector. By means of this practical application, the article will show that
neither securitisation nor desecuritisation are, in and of themselves positive
or negative. It is rather the case that the outcome of a
securitisation/desecuritisation is always issue dependent – something
reflected here in the suggested two-tier structure of securitisation.
The concept of desecuritisation – the move of an issue out of the sphere of security – has been the subject of heated international political theory debate and adopted in case studies across a range of sectors and settings. What unites the political theory and the applied literature is a concern with the normative-political potential of desecuritisation. This article documents the political status and content of desecuritisation through four readings: one which shows how desecuritisation is a Derridarian supplement to the political concept of securitisation; one which traces the understanding of the public sphere's ability to rework the friend-enemy distinction; one which emphasises the role of choice, responsibility, and decisions; and one which uncovers the significance of the historical context of Cold War détente. The last part of the article provides a reading of the varied use of desecuritisation in applied analysis and shows how these can be seen as falling into four forms of desecuritisation. Each of the latter identifies a distinct ontological position as well as a set of more specific political and normative questions.
The theory of “securitization” developed by the Copenhagen School provides one of the most innovative, productive, and yet controversial avenues of research in contemporary security studies. This article provides an assessment of the foundations of this approach and its limitations, as well as its significance for broader areas of International Relations theory. Locating securitization theory within the context of both classical Realism influenced by Carl Schmitt, and current work on constructivist ethics, it argues that while the Copenhagen School is largely immune from the most common criticisms leveled against it, the increasing impact of televisual communication in security relations provides a fundamental challenge for understanding the processes and institutions involved in securitization, and for the political ethics advocated by the Copenhagen School.
Low river levels caused by extreme low rainfall
- J Bird
China taps upper Mekong water resources reasonably
- China Daily
Freshwater under threat: Southeast Asia. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Program & Asian Institute of Technology
- M Babel
- S Wahid
China drives water cooperation with Mekong countries. China Dialogue
- S Biba
Drought paralyzes power supplyaccessed 23 February 2012
- China Daily
Record-low rivers strand farmers
- Thanh Nien News
The EU as a security actor: Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereign security orders
- O Wæver
When the Mekong runs dry
- Asia Times Online
Yunnan, Guangxi reel from severe drought.
- China Daily
China denies dams worsen drought in Mekong basin
- China Daily
Fishermen fear financial ruin as Mekong continues to ebb
- Phnom Penh Post
Conflict, cooperation and the trans-border commons: The controversy of mainstream dams on the Mekong river
- C Middleton
When securitization fails: The hard case of counter-terrorism programs
- M Salter
Remarks at the first MRC summit
- T Song
China to be asked Mekong questions at regional summit
- Thanh Nien News
Securitization and desecuritization
- O Wæver
Coalition weighs in on China’s dam plans
- Phnom Penh Post