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The Rise of Special Operations Forces: Generalized Specialization, Boundary Spanning and Military Autonomy
Abstract
The special operations forces (SOF) of the industrial democracies have suddenly and rapidly grown in numbers and resources during the past decades. Most explanations for this growth focus on factors external to the armed forces. We argue that the enlargement of SOF is also the result of internal organizational dynamics. First, we compare SOF to other units and military appendages that have grown over the past 30 years in order to delineate what is unique to their development and the special adaptive potential they bring to the armed forces: generalized specialization, boundary spanning roles, and enlargement of military autonomy. Second, we analyze the actions of internal military entrepreneurs and their organizational mentors to show how they use this adaptive potential to “sell” the use of SOF to key policy-makers and decision-makers.
... In particular, we develop our argument by contrasting remote/clean war as framed by armed drones with warrior ethos as represented by Special Operations Forces (SOF). 10 We relate this to SOF as these units have become a particular vector for military innovation in a number of countries including Israel, the United States and the United Kingdom (Shamir and Ben-Ari 2018), and have consequently been at the forefront of more direct and intimate interfacing with private technology companies. In the final section we show how these distinct cultures of remote/clean war and warriorship map to Silicon Valley technologists, who are now directly involved in reshaping innovation practices across defence. ...
... Similarly, Lohaus (2016, p. 82) argues that it is an 'SF mind-set' which emphasises intelligence as much as physical prowess that enables Special Forces to operate at the 'lower end of the escalatory spectrum'. According to Shamir and Ben-Ari, likewise, the combination of skills, experience, cohesion, agility, speed and intellect in SOF units are variables that constitute pivotal 'adaptive advantages' in modern warfare (Shamir & Ben-Ari 2018). These traits have benefits when trying to conduct military activity at a point below the threshold of war. ...
Armed forces are now in a race to exploit the technologies associated with Artificial Intelligence. Viewed as force multipliers, these technologies have the potential to speed up decision making and roboticise warfighting. At the same time, however, these systems disintermediate military roles and functions, creating shifts in the relationships of power in military organizations as different entities vie to shape and control how innovations are implemented. In this article we argue that new innovation processes are sites of emerging forms of public–private interaction and practices. On the one hand this is driving entrepreneurialism into government bureaucracy even as it forges new bonds between defence and industry. On the other, as technologies replace soldiers, a new martial culture is emerging, one that reframes the warrior geek as an elite innovation corps of prototype warrior. We seek to map these relationships and explore the implications for civil-military relations in the twenty-first century.
... M. Peters & Plagakis, n.d.) and the State Department (Risen & Williams, 2009), where they have carried out roles as diverse as static guards at installations, through to convoy protection and close protective details. Rapid and significant growth in numbers and funding for SOF and PMCs (See R. J. Scott, 2014;Shamir & Ben-Ari, 2018) has been accompanied by a significant level of migration from the SOF community to the PMC community, with over 45% of US and UK contractor casualties in Iraq being former members of the US and UK SOF -a significant statistic when SOF represent just 4.66% of the US activeduty population (Swed et al., 2018). These factors, along with a growing number of reported indiscretions within both the SOF (Keating, 2020;Lenthang, 2019;staff, 2019;USSOCOM, 2020) and PMC (Department of Justice, 2014) communities makes this research timely, appropriate, and relevant. ...
... See Isenberg, 1992;Johnson, 2006;Shamir & Ben-Ari, 2018); 2) the political control and accountability of SOF (SeeBurgos, 2018;Moran, 2016;Nevitt, 2019); 3) the operational useand action of SOF (See Campbell et al., 2017; Helmus, 2015; Long et al., 2015; Madden et al., 11 2016); and 4) the search for what makes SOF operators unique (See Dalgaard-Nielsen & Holm, 2019; Osterberg et al., 2018). ...
The confirmation report submitted as part of the confirmation process for full admission to the PhD programme at Massey University
... By means of increasing numbers of personnel and of more frequent deployments, SOF units have wielded considerable influence in conflicts around the world [3]. The remarkable growth of SOF is part of the military organizations and has had to dramatically adapt to their diversity and changing external and internal environments [4]. As Shamir and Ben-Ari [4] argue, SOF are unique in that they are specialized generalists, local-level integrators that link between the tactical operational and strategical levels of actions, therefore being hybrid forms of organizational response to environmental pressures. ...
... The remarkable growth of SOF is part of the military organizations and has had to dramatically adapt to their diversity and changing external and internal environments [4]. As Shamir and Ben-Ari [4] argue, SOF are unique in that they are specialized generalists, local-level integrators that link between the tactical operational and strategical levels of actions, therefore being hybrid forms of organizational response to environmental pressures. ...
... SOF's use in peacetime is ideal due their ability to establish connections quickly with disparate groups, their ability to work autonomously utilizing streamlined decision cycles, and their ability to perform a variety of complex tasks with high proficiency (Shamir & Ben-Ari, 2016). Subsequent research by Breede (2018) agreed with Shamir and Ben-Ari's (2016) framework and suggested SOF capabilities during peacetime should focus on military assistance activities. ...
... The preponderance of research indicates special forces are best suited to counter gray zone activities within Alliance countries, in partner nations, and in occupied territory if necessary (Andreassen et al., 2016;Breede, 2018;James, 2016;Moon, 2018;Shamir & Ben-Ari, 2016;Vores, 2012). Special operations teams are likely to be a primary resource to infiltrate enemy territory for intelligence collection, but their ability to exploit adversary communication systems for intelligence value must equal the sophistication of their adversaries' capabilities (Long, 2014). ...
Russian hybrid warfare has become the principle threat to NATO over the last decade. From the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, Russia has exercised its will across Europe; inciting tensions while limiting its activities to below the Article 5 threshold, an armed attack on one is an attack on all. The balance of power favors those who embrace inevitable technological advancement while enduring the discomfort presented by its evolution. Hybrid warfare creates complex problems requiring an unconventional mindset and while NATO Special Operations (NSOF) inherently possess this trait and are rightly-suited to contribute to NATO’s counter-hybrid strategy, little research examines how NSOF tactical activities can deliver strategic effects through the exploitation of technology. This capstone collates expansive research on Russian gray zone activities of hybrid warfare, NATO’s cyber deterrence and counter hybrid threat strategy, and NSOF’s doctrine and capabilities, to present a focused area for capability enhancement of Special Operations Forces (SOF). NSOF’s embrace of Technical Exploitation Operations (TEO) facilitated evidence-based operations in Afghanistan with great success and subsequently led to the establishment of TEO programs in Alliance nations. However, sub-disciplines like biometrics have received preference over data-rich sources like digital media, cellular phones, and other more complex exploitation forms. An appreciation of the value of digital artifacts and their ability to illuminate hybrid warfare and gray zone activities, intent, and attribution is necessary to accurately position NSOF in NATO’s cybersecurity and hybrid warfare framework.
... 28 The importance of SOF in enhancing national response capabilities highlights their ability to swiftly deploy and neutralize threats before they escalate. 29 This strategic effect is particularly relevant in a changing security landscape where non-state actors and asymmetric threats pose significant challenges to CF. 30 The integration of SOF within the broader military structure requires comprehensive joint planning and interoperability to fully leverage the capabilities of SOF, to maximize their strategic utility. 31,32 Additionally, scholars suggest that the strategic effect of SOF extends beyond their combat capabilities. ...
This study investigates the potential of Norwegian Special Operations Forces´ (SOF) contribution to strategic effect in an armed attack on Norway, with a focus on their role in the country’s ’first line of defense’ before allied reinforcements arrive. The methodology involves a qualitative analysis of an original dataset, involving expert interviews with high-ranking officials responsible for shaping Norway’s military strategy. A realistic scenario allowed the experts to explore the complexities of integrating SOF within defense strategies in Arctic environments. The study presents three main findings regarding the utilization of SOF in homeland defense: (1) SOF can support the main effort as effectors and sensors, providing critical intelligence and operational capabilities to enhance the overall effectiveness of the defense. (2) SOF can conduct shaping operations in approaches to the joint operations area, disrupting enemy supply lines and creating opportunities for conventional forces to gain strategic advantages. (3) SOF can independently target high-value assets to degrade the enemy’s ability to wage war. The findings have implications for defense planners and policy makers in Norway and other small states, highlighting the need to develop and integrate SOF into their defense strategies to enhance their ability to deter and respond to emerging threats.
... A key tactical capability in urban warfare is Close Quarters Battle (CQB), which involves operations in confined spaces with the aim of neutralizing threats fast and minimizing risks to both combatants and civilians. Once exclusive to special forces, CQB skills are increasingly required in regular infantry due to the prevalence of urban conflicts (Shamir & Ben-Ari, 2018). ...
Close Quarters Battle (CQB) is an operational approach in confined spaces gaining increasing significance in urban combat missions. Due to its high psychophysiological demands, the CQB ability is an essential selection criterion for special forces. Until now, there has been no research on predictors of CQB capability. This study examined the influence of the Big Five personality traits, self-esteem, resilience, attentional ability, 2D:4D digit ratio, and mindfulness on the CQB performance. The German sample comprised a total of n = 45 individuals (n = 29police special forces; n = 16 unspecialized soldiers) who conducted psychometrics and a CQB test consisting of three scenarios. In these scenarios, two independent experts evaluated tactical behavior, weapon handling, gaze behavior, response time, and failures using a standardized behavioral observation instrument based on video recordings (external cameras and mobile eye-tracking). The results revealed that only extraversion predicted the CQB performance (β = -.40, p = .035). However, the mean 2D:4D ratio was strongly associated with gaze behavior (r = .45, p = .007), tactical behavior (r = .41, p = .019), and attentional ability (p = .57, p < .001). Surprisingly, the findings indicate that CQB, as a high-risk and analytical task, is better performed by introverted personnel.
... [44] Based on their key characteristics of being team-based, versatile, self-reliant, extremely fit, and highly professional, the range of SOF missions has broadened and diversified as the years passed. [45] Ruling SOF doctrine lists a related mixture of enemy-centric and population-centric core activities, namely direct action, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, psychological operations, CA operations, information operations, and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. [46] In current times, where asymmetric threats predominate, SOF are still seen as a crucial part of the security answer. ...
Recent international military deployments have shown the prevalence of population-centric task settings. For Special Operations Forces (SOF) engaging with local populations is part of their nature. The undisputed existence of a separate Civil Affairs branch within SOF, proves the military relevance of knowledge and skills on the civilian domain. Bridging the gap between police and military, gendarmerie-type forces (GTF) also have a strong societal focus. The rise of population-centric missions has raised the popularity of GTF, since they are capable of conducting critical public order tasks for which the military is not traditionally equipped. This article aims to analyze if collaboration between SOF and GTF could be beneficial. Based on two empirical cases, namely the village stability operations program in Afghanistan and SOF in a civilian law enforcement role, occurring public order issues will be unraveled. These insights are then used to fuel a discussion on how collaborating with GTF could help SOF overcome such problems.
... Indeed, the effective performance of soldiers has perennially represented a major challenge for armed forces worldwide (Sellman et al., 2010). However, the landscape of military effectiveness is evolving, with increasing emphasis on individual contributions of soldiers (Shamir and Ben-Ari, 2018). This transition towards recognizing the key role of individual actions within the military domain highlights the need for more comprehensive and nuanced research efforts. ...
Background
The primary objective of this study was to empirically examine the influence of cadets’ resilience on their professional achievement within the unique context of a Military Academy. In doing so, the study sought to delineate the role of self-efficacy as a key mediator in the intricate relationship between the resilience of cadets and their professional achievements. The main focus of this study was to clarify the causal and effect relationships between the psychology and behavior mechanisms of the cadets. This was achieved through rigorous scrutiny of the moderated mediating effect of vocational calling within the multifaceted relationship involving cadets’ resilience, self-efficacy, and professional achievement.
Methods
The study’s participant pool consisted of 121 individuals, comprising cadets in their third and fourth years of study, all of whom aspired to attain the rank of officer within the Military Academy. To rigorously investigate the hypotheses presented, a series of causal relationships among the four core variables were evaluated using a robust regression analysis methodology. To facilitate this analysis, the PROCESS macro 3.5v, a Hayes-developed tool, was effectively used.
Results
The findings of this study revealed several critical insights. First, vocational calling emerged as a potent moderating factor in shaping the relationship between cadets’ resilience and self-efficacy. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that vocational calling exerted a conditional influence on the impact of cadets’ resilience on their professional achievement, with self-efficacy serving as a crucial mediating mechanism in this relationship. In particular, the study affirmed that self-efficacy functioned as a comprehensive mediator, elucidating the pathway through which the resilience of the cadets ultimately influenced their professional achievements.
Conclusion
The results of this research contribute significantly to enhancing our understanding of the intricate connection between the resilience levels exhibited by cadets and their corresponding professional achievements. Furthermore, these findings have valuable implications for the ongoing refinement of military education and training programs. They offer insights that could inform the development of more effective testing and selection protocols for military personnel, ultimately benefiting the armed forces in their pursuit of excellence.
... This is the reason why the armed forces of various countries pay serious attention to their selection and training of military personnel (Haralambie, 2016;Rodden-Aubut and Tracey, 2022). Despite the fact that successful performance of warriors has always been one of the main challenges of the armed forces (Sellman et al., 2010), the individual effective actions of soldiers are becoming more and more significant (Shamir and Ben-Ari, 2018). Military professionals, including soldiers and officers, are expected to meet high standards that can help them deal with difficult situations. ...
Background
The current operational military environment is changing, complex, unpredictable, and ambiguous. Due to such situations, soldiers are constantly forced to think about their values, norms, and roles that should be part of their profession. Consequently, they must first be educated and trained on how to behave in a particular operational military environment. Pursuing an officer’s education at military academies is very difficult not only physically but also psychologically. Cadets are required to be prepared to lead in extreme environments upon graduation. Despite the fact that military tasks are technically complex, the individual operational activities of soldiers are gaining more and more strategic meaning. Therefore, the importance of selecting the process and military education programs of soldiers is increasingly stressed. Cognitive abilities and skills individually predict performance in academic and professional settings, but it is less clear how personality can influence performance. Therefore, this study focused on the explanation of the individual factors that affect the achievements of the cadets. Specifically, the objective of this study was to examine direct and mediated relationships between personality traits and the military and academic performance of cadets.
Methods
This study followed a quantitative method analysis. The research models were assessed using the structural equation modeling technique. Bootstrap was applied to evaluate a 95% level confidence interval on estimates with 5,000 bootstrap samples, and to evaluate direct and indirect effects. The analysis was based on a sample of 120 cadets from the Lithuanian Military Academy. The effects on military and academic performance were evaluated using the Self-Efficacy scale, the Big Five personality trait scale, academic performance was evaluated through academic grades and military performance was evaluated using instructor ratings.
Results
To support our hypotheses, it was found that self-efficacy has a mediating effect on the performance of cadets. Additionally, the traits of conscientiousness, openness to experience and extraversion were related to both military and academic performance. Furthermore, self-efficacy appeared as a partial mediator of the relationship between personality traits and cadet performance.
Conclusion
The findings of this study help clarify the relationship between the personality traits of the cadets and the military and academic performance. In addition, these results may be useful for the further development of military education and training, for the development of testing, and selection of military personnel.
... This is related to the gaining of new capabilities, especially in the airborne and engineer troops. Breaching was also solved before (e.g. in the special forces) [1], but the last years have shown a new direction and expansion of the issue within the land forces [2,3]. Breaching is a part of urban tactics and is also related to combat in built-up areas [4,5]. ...
... It may seem a remarkable coincidence that two approaches should have as much overlap as HRO principles and SOF Truths. Yet, the happenstance is really a byproduct of different explanations for the same concept ( Figure 1 20 Still, Special Operations also developed an important contribution to HRO development through the five SOF Truths. These ideas overlap with the HRO principles without repeating them in a way that makes exploring both approaches a valuable training tool in teaching high reliability principles. ...
Special Operations medicine must provide highly reliable healthcare under intense and sometimes dangerous circumstances. In turn, it is important to understand the principles inherent to building a High Reliability Organization (HRO). These principles include (1) sensitivity to operations; (2) preoccupation with failure; (3) reluctance to simplify; (4) resilience; and (5) deference to expertise. Understanding them is crucial to turning good ideas into sound practical benefit in operational medicine. A prime teaching opportunity involves an interesting coincidence that occurred during the emergence of HROs. Specifically, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) adopted five Special Operations Forces (SOF) Truths that contribute to success in Special Operations, including (1) humans are more important than hardware; (2) quality is better than quantity; (3) SOF cannot be mass produced; (4) competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur; and (5) most Special Operations require non-SOF support. These five Truths have more in common with the five HRO principles than merely quantity. They describe the same underlying ideas with a key focus on human performance in high-risk activities. As such, when presented alongside the five HRO principles, there is an opportunity to improve the overall health and performance of SOF personnel by integrating these principles across the range of Special Operations medicine from point of injury care to garrison human performance initiatives. The following discussion describes in greater detail the five HRO principles, the five SOF Truths, and how these similar ideas emerged as more than just a useful coincidence in illustrating the key concepts to produce high performance.
... Special Operations Forces (SOF) are elite military personnel with specialized skill sets that enable them to conduct high-risk missions under arduous conditions (Shamir & Ben-Ari, 2018). As such, SOF personnel undergo a grueling selection process and extensive training to develop attributes that enable mission success. ...
This longitudinal study examines the growth of psychological characteristics and adaptation of physiological markers of stress during a six-month assessment and selection course for U.S. Navy SEALs. Resilience, hardiness, and grit instruments were used to evaluate the psychological characteristics. Blood samples were taken to determine physiological markers related to stress adaptation; specifically, evaluating DHEA, DHEA-to-cortisol ratio, BDNF, NPY, and cortisol. Data was collected at four timepoints throughout the assessment and selection course from 353 students over three classes. Results indicated that resilience and hardiness grow after an initial decline, DHEA and DHEA-to-cortisol increased suggesting physiological adaptation. However, psychological and physiological markers do not exhibit the same growth patterns for participants in the course. This study enhances the understanding of psychological growth and physiological adaptation in a high-stress environment over an extended duration.
... 30 In regard to who is tasked with such operations, Shamir and Ben-Ari name three main characteristics: 1. small team units operating behind enemy lines with special capabilities to find innovative solutions to complex problems; [and] 2. specially selected and highly trained personnel. 31 In short, at least two core characteristics of SOF units are their multi-purpose role and readiness to deploy across various scenarios and contexts, as well as their relative autonomy and responsibility to independently adapt to ad hoc challenges or new threats especially in high-risk operational contexts involving extreme stress and intense combat over a long period of time. Naturally, these exceptional tasks and high demands require personnel that is both physically and mentally resilient and trained to highest standards. ...
This article explores potential vulnerability factors for extreme right radicalization of Special Operation Forces (SOF) and Special Weapons and Tactics (S.W.A.T.) personnel in Western countries. Drawing on inquiry commissions reports regarding extreme right behavior or ethical misconduct by six elite units from four countries (Germany, Canada, Australia, the U.S.), this article argues that a lack of diversity in gender and ethnicity, elite warrior subcultures, echo chamber effects and cognitive rigidity can become vulnerability factors for extreme right radicalization. Further, the need for targeted resilience among SOF and S.W.A.T. units designed to counter such processes is highlighted.
... As in the Nordic countries (Jarvenpaa, 2016), the IDF has encouraged conscripts with potential in ITrelated areas to undertake such roles. Similarly, complex cooperation and coordination between special forces, air force, intelligence units, and civilian security actors has required troops with advanced competences and know-how (Shamir & Ben-Ari, 2016). One example of this trend is the formation in 2019 of the "multidimensional unit" combining infantry, engineering, anti-tank warfare, air, and intelligence as a laboratory for combat technological experimentation (Limor, 2020). ...
p>This article develops an analytical model of force-composition that combines the advantages of conscription with those of an all-volunteer force. Using Israel as a hypothesis-generating case study, it argues that mandatory military service has undergone changes centered on five key organizing principles: selective conscription, early discharges, elongated lengths of service, forms of voluntary service and differing pay-scales and other material and non-material incentives for conscripts. These principles are “grafted” onto conscription creating a hybrid, “volunteer-ized”, model. The utility of the theoretical model lies in explaining how these principles facilitate mobilizing a needed number or recruits, providing an adequate level of military expertise, as well as maintaining the legitimacy of the armed forces by meeting domestic social, economic and political expectations about its composition and the use of personnel at its disposal. The system is adaptive and flexible, as shown in throughout the comparisons throughout the paper.</p
... As in the Nordic countries (Jarvenpaa, 2016), the IDF has encouraged conscripts with potential in ITrelated areas to undertake such roles. Similarly, complex cooperation and coordination between special forces, air force, intelligence units, and civilian security actors has required troops with advanced competences and know-how (Shamir & Ben-Ari, 2016). One example of this trend is the formation in 2019 of the "multidimensional unit" combining infantry, engineering, anti-tank warfare, air, and intelligence as a laboratory for combat technological experimentation (Limor, 2020). ...
p>This article develops an analytical model of force-composition that combines the advantages of conscription with those of an all-volunteer force. Using Israel as a hypothesis-generating case study, it argues that mandatory military service has undergone changes centered on five key organizing principles: selective conscription, early discharges, elongated lengths of service, forms of voluntary service and differing pay-scales and other material and non-material incentives for conscripts. These principles are “grafted” onto conscription creating a hybrid, “volunteer-ized”, model. The utility of the theoretical model lies in explaining how these principles facilitate mobilizing a needed number or recruits, providing an adequate level of military expertise, as well as maintaining the legitimacy of the armed forces by meeting domestic social, economic and political expectations about its composition and the use of personnel at its disposal. The system is adaptive and flexible, as shown in throughout the comparisons throughout the paper.</p
... As in the Nordic countries (Jarvenpaa, 2016), the IDF has encouraged conscripts with potential in ITrelated areas to undertake such roles. Similarly, complex cooperation and coordination between special forces, air force, intelligence units, and civilian security actors has required troops with advanced competences and know-how (Shamir & Ben-Ari, 2016). One example of this trend is the formation in 2019 of the "multidimensional unit" combining infantry, engineering, anti-tank warfare, air, and intelligence as a laboratory for combat technological experimentation (Limor, 2020). ...
This article develops an analytical model of force composition that combines the advantages of conscription with those of an all-volunteer force. Using Israel as a hypothesis-generating case study, it argues that mandatory military service has undergone changes centered on five key organizing principles: selective conscription, early discharges, elongated lengths of service, forms of voluntary service and differing pay-scales, and other material and non-material incentives for conscripts. These principles are “grafted” onto conscription creating a hybrid, “volunteer-ized” model. The utility of the theoretical model lies in explaining how these principles facilitate mobilizing a needed number or recruits, providing an adequate level of military expertise, as well as maintaining the legitimacy of the armed forces by meeting domestic social, economic, and political expectations about its composition and the use of personnel at its disposal. The system is adaptive and flexible, as shown through the comparisons throughout the paper.
... The challenge in the UK of integrating full-time and part-time forces has, it is argued, been exacerbated by a trend in Western Armed Forces toward smaller and more overtly "professionalized" armies with a "concentration" of combat forces where the proportion of "elite" combat troops have become powerful internal shapers of institutional culture (Edmunds, 2010;King, 2009King, , 2011King, , 2013Shamir & Ben-Ari, 2018). These forces are defined as "highly unified; they display dense professional solidarity, demanding greater commitment from their members" (King, 2011, p. 203). ...
Recent changes in the British Army mean part-time reservists and full-time regulars need to become better integrated. However, there has been a long history of workplace tensions between the full-time and part-time elements in the British Army. This mirrors those found in many civilian workplaces. Focus group data with 105 full-time regular British Army soldiers confirmed that time and emotional commitment are strongly linked in a full-time professional workplace that has strong, definite, and enduring boundaries. This, alongside demands for conformity and stratification by rank explained the high risk of marginalization of part-time reservists. The legitimacy of part-time reservists, especially in the combat arms, was often challenged. Using this explanatory framework, some implications and practical ways that tensions may be reduced between full-time and part-time members of the British Army, and other armed forces facing similar tensions, were highlighted.
... This encounter frame too, therefore, displays a dual dynamic characterized by elements of both cleavage and convergence. On the one hand, civil-military disparities are sustained by the High Command's policy of feeding the most battle-worthy products of combat basic training programs into the numerous "special forces" that now spearhead all infantry brigades, each of which promotes an esprit de corps emphasizing the uniqueness of its personnel (Shamir & Ben-Ari, 2018). ...
This article modifies the framework for the analysis of civil–military “gaps” proposed in Armed Forces & Society (Vol. 38, 2012) by Rahbek-Clemmensen, Archer, Barr, Belkin, Guerro, Hall, and Swain, who depicted a continuum of four binary fissures (“gap dimensions”) dividing two hypothetically homogeneous communities: civilians versus military personnel. Extrapolating from Israel’s experience, this article instead visualizes a more dynamic and fissured landscape, inhabited by several heterogeneous clusters of population groups, each comprising impromptu coalitions drawn from both the armed forces and civilian society. That environment, we argue, although certainly influenced by the traditional penetrability of Israel’s civil–military boundaries, more directly reflects current technological and cultural processes, which are transforming encounters between civilians and military personnel in other countries too. We therefore suggest replacing the predominantly dichotomous taxonomies that generally characterize studies of civil–military relations in contemporary democratic societies with the fractured format observed in the Israeli case.
... Special Operations Forces (SOF) Operators have expert training that exceeds the training and capabilities of traditional military Soldiers. [1][2][3][4] As part of their essential job duties, Operators are required to carry out military operations in austere environments (Table 1). 3 SOF Operators must be experts in engaging military targets at various distances, often within a few feet of both friendly and enemy personnel. They must demonstrate superior marksmanship, with the ability to identify, engage, and eliminate threats while under significant mental and physical duress. ...
Background: The purpose of this investigation was to determine if Army Special Operation Forces (ARSOF) Operators who participate in the Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid Rehabilitation and Reconditioning program perform significantly better on a simulated stress shoot scenario than ARSOF Operators who do not participate in the program. Methods: Deidentified archival data from 64 male ARSOF Operators (mean ± standard deviation: age, 31.1 ± 4.96 years; SOF experience , 3.44 ± 4.10 years) who participated in the Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat stress shoot were assessed to determine if differences in performance existed between program users (n = 25) and nonusers (n = 39). A series of boot-strapped analyses of variance in conjunction with effect-size calculations was conducted to determine if significant mean score differences existed between users and nonusers on raw and total course completion times, high-value target acquisition (positive identification time), and penalties accrued. Results: Small to medium effect sizes were observed between users and nonusers in raw time, penalties, and total time. Although there were no significant differences between users and nonus-ers, there was less variation in raw time and total time in users compared with nonusers. Conclusion: Our findings becomes a question of practical versus statistical significance, because less performance variability while under physical and psychological duress could be life saving for ARSOF Operators.
This volume explores issues involving heroism and how it has both continued and changed as a military ideal, a motivational factor and a public symbol. It focuses on the question of whether, in the recent past, new kinds of ideals of heroism (and by association, valor, sacrifice or bravery) have been added to older forms? This question inquires whether new criteria have emerged to acknowledge and highlight exceptional military behavior. Evidence of the continued importance of heroism is presented and seven (non-exclusive) theses about its contemporary manifestations are presented and linked to scholarship and the book’s chapters: Post-heroism and casualty aversion; professionalization; changing organizational locus; post-patriotic heroism; a shift to rescue and recovery; individualization; and democratization. Next the politics or heroism as a resource is explored and the conclusion argues for cumulative model in which newer forms are added to older forms of heroism.
With the growth of democracy promoting respect for human rights, military heroism has been declining in South Korea. Neither the commanders nor the citizens are willing to put their soldiers at risk of death. This study assumes that conformity to the Soldier’s Creed is a good indicator of the extent to which service members embrace military heroism because the Creed includes military values constituting military heroism. Based on this, survey data on 530 South Korean active service members were analyzed to identify promoters of military heroism. Major findings go as follows. First, the Army is moving away from the Modern military model in which heroic combat leaders are admired, indicating that the attitude towards military heroism will never be the same as it used to be. Second, military heroism is not changing into a different form. Traditional military values such as masculinity, institutional bonding, and military professionalism are positively associated with conformity to the Creed. In other words, individuals who align with traditional military values will adhere more closely to the heroic mindset. Finally, collective memories and experiences of female service members and army civilians impede military heroism from being cultivated into them, as relatively lower conformity scores for them showed.
Special forces have always captured the imagination of the world. This comes as no surprise, as there is a lot of literature and movies on special forces available. The terror attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America, and the subsequent declaration by George W. Bush of a Global War on Terrorism, has brought the special forces of the United States and other Western powers out of the shadows and into the limelight as the force of choice to combat the new security threat. It also focussed the international concern on the security threats of ungoverned spaces, failed states, and the use of terror. This in turn created a merging of failed states and counter-terrorism agendas, which resulted in a powerful new framework for humanitarian actors. Third party interventions in the form of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), to mention but one example, appeared. The subsequent deployment of European special forces to Mali in 2013 as part of MINUSMA was in an effort to restore constitutional order to the Malian government. The mission is still ongoing and thus relevant as a case study to relate the role of special forces to peace missions. The aim of the article is to explore the role of special forces in peace missions, using the role of European Special Forces in MINUSMA as case study.
Across the world, Special Operations Forces (SOFs) play a leading role in asymmetric warfare. The unique trainings, skills, weapons, and equipment of these elite Tier 1 operators, differentiates them from conventional forces, making them the preferred choice in complex environments. SOFs are ideally deployed for short operations, which include direct action missions, hostage rescue, hunting high-value targets (HVTs), mobility operations, intelligence operations, airborne operations, counterterrorism (CT), counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, and covert operations among others. While the literature has mostly focused on the utility of major powers’ SOFs in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), with little attention on Africa’s SOF’s, this paper examines the origins, evolution, composition, and deployments of Nigeria’s SOFs specifically in the Northeast, Northcentral, and Northwest theatres of operation, against the Boko Haram insurgency and armed banditry, respectively. Drawing on primary data from interviews with key informants and other secondary data sources, the paper interrogates the successes, challenges, and prospects of Nigeria’s SOFs. The strategic utility and overreliance on Nigeria’s SOFs by political leaders and the Military’s High Command puts a strain on their strategic value which potentially undermines their strategic efficacy as a force-multiplier in the long run, against unconventional threats.
Justice-involved veterans have traditionally been an understudied population. The magnitude of military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq and the post-service challenges faced by these veterans have generated interest in their behavioral health issues and the stress and trauma that contributed to the onset of these issues. This chapter begins with a review of veteran representation in jails and prisons. Then, there is a review of the research on behavioral health issues and traumatic brain injuries among veterans. Next, the chapter provides a description of the sources of stress and trauma that likely cause behavioral health issues in veterans that increase their likelihood of becoming justice-involved. Then, the chapter reviews what is known about veterans’ treatment courts and veterans’ housing units in jails and prisons to address the needs of justice-involved veterans. This chapter concludes with a description of several areas in need of research that might reduce veteran justice involvement and improve outcomes for veterans who do become involved in the criminal justice system.KeywordsVeteransSubstance use disorderMental health disorderTraumatic brain injuryCriminal justice systemVeterans’ treatment courtVeterans housing unit
What role can special operations forces (SOF) play against for-profit, illicit networks in operations with strict rules of engagement? How can small states utilize their SOF units to add value to a military strategy in cases where they take an active role in multinational operations? Based on in-depth interviews with members of maritime SOF units, commanding officers, and archival research, this article unearths the roles that Danish and Dutch maritime SOF units played against Somali piracy networks. Specifically, it analyses how SOF units were able to evolve their tactics, which allowed the international naval task forces to target the piracy networks’ increasingly sophisticated operations. Moreover, the article discusses other potential ways SOF units can influence for-profit, illicit networks. The case study sheds light on an aspect of the utility of SOF often overlooked in the literature, namely the ability to use discriminate and proportional violence in operations that straddle the categories of peace and war. This almost mundane use of SOF units is of special interest in relation to small states, who may take on leadership roles if they are willing to engage in the development of the operational concepts.
This book gathers the proceedings of the Multidisciplinary International Conference of Research Applied to Defense and Security (MICRADS), held at the Military Engineering Institute, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 8 to 10th May 2019. It covers a variety of topics in systems, communication and defense; strategy and political-administrative vision in defense; and engineering and technologies applied to defense. Given its scope, it offers a valuable resource for practitioners, researchers, and students alike.
Jihadist propaganda videos depicting training camps and combat scenes have steadily increased in variety and quality over the years. A small number of these videos attempt to mimic Special Operation Forces (SOF)’s tactics and skills. This subset of jihadist propaganda might go beyond a mere attempt to show prowess and reveal actual operational capabilities. This article analyzes three exemplary jihadist propaganda videos depicting claimed SOF capabilities through expert reviews with active service SOF personnel to assess the actual tactical quality of the content shown. It also discusses the potential reasons for those groups to mimic SOF and implications for counterterrorism.
This paper traces the significant change that has occurred in the balance between offense and defence in Israel’s ‘hybrid’ military strategy in recent decades. Relying on fresh materials concerning the organizational, doctrinal, and procurement processes of Israel’s military, we identify a shift from offense towards defence as the preferred way to protect Israel in the face of new security threats. We also show that due to rapidly changing security challenges, limited resources, and the military’s organizational culture, this change has been gradual, incremental, improvised, and largely informal. We propose that similar changes may characterize other states facing new security challenges.
In the “golden age of special operations,” elite forces have become a “go-to” form of military power. While special operations security practitioners have paid considerable attention to the increasing significance of elite forces in policy and practice, international relations scholars have generally overlooked this evolution in military affairs. In this essay, I argue that special forces, like drones, have become an attractive, “remote” option for decision-makers because of their clandestine nature, lethality, and comparatively small footprint. Because these qualities make it easier for decision-makers to privilege military instruments of power in statecraft, pushing the special forces “easy button” risks lowering the threshold for the use of force and, therefore, risks destabilizing regional and international security orders.
This exploratory study investigates the social and cultural significance of creative nonfiction books about Special Operations Forces. It makes three arguments. First that these volumes are constructed along the classic lines of “hero” narratives that center on the experiences of protagonists overcoming adversity and danger to succeed. Second, with the advent of “post-heroic” warfare. SOF operatives function as a sort of compensatory heroism that at once harks back to classic hero stories and places them within contemporary circumstances. Third, that the importance of cultural entrepreneurship at the base of many publications is aimed at creating and cultivating the unique reputations of SOF.
This monograph is the third of three volumes that follow from an August 2016 JSOU symposium, Theory of Special Operations. This compendium of articles is not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of special operations theory. Rather, it is intended to continue the conversation and, at least, bring to a culminating point the argument over whether a theory of special operations is necessary and if the suggestions are suitable, feasible, and acceptable. The editors of this compendium, JSOU resident senior fellows, highlight opposing views and conclude with an academic, joint special operations perspective on the status of the theory argument. No matter where you stand on the subject, this is worth your time and consideration.
What organisational attributes enhance a military’s ability to effectively adapt on the battlefield? Upon the outbreak of war in July 2014 between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) encountered an expansive network of tunnels from which Hamas was launching large-scale assaults into Israel. This article illustrates that the IDF’s ability to successfully adapt ‘under fire’ to this battlefield surprise was facilitated by several important attributes related to its organisational learning capacity: a dynamic, action-oriented organisational culture, a flexible leadership and command style, specialised commando units which acted as ‘incubators’ for learning and innovation, and a formal system to institutionalise and disseminate lessons learned.
The introduction of a multidimensional approach towards peace missions incomplex emergencies emphasises the importance of coordination between the militaryand the humanitarian components at all levels of interaction. Cooperation andcoordination between the military and humanitarian components are critical toachieve a common goal to alleviate suffering and to save lives. The challenge is howto develop, enhance and sustain an effective working relationship to overcome theconflicting views on coordination from the military and humanitarian perspectives.Humanitarians fear the loss of independence and neutrality when associated with themilitary when the military component becomes directly involved in humanitarianaction. During selection, the military needs to identify members who firstly conformto the generic psychological peacekeeping profile and secondly portray the skills,knowledge and abilities to perform the coordination function between the military andthe humanitarian component. The challenge remains to select competent militarymembers in the absence of a psychological profile for the coordination function. Thisarticle paves the way for research on the psychological profile for a civil militarycoordination officer (CIMIC officer), highlighting the importance of coordinationthrough analysing the environment, challenges and perspectives in defining the rolesand functions of CIMIC officers in complex emergencies.
It is strange to find separate worlds in a shrinking force as small as Canada’s. I am not even referring to the visibly separate worlds of army, navy and airforce, resurrected (some would say regressively) after an innovative experiment with unification. The separate worlds are those of special and conventional forces. In Canada, they may be subject to more mutual suspicion and misunderstanding than even the three clusters of tribal mentalities that we call maritime, land and air environments. In this paper, I suggest means of reconciling the separate worlds of “special” and “conventional” forces. My central premise is that in a small force like Canada’s, we have no room for an independent and sustainable Special Forces community. But neither can we afford to be conventional. In fact, the navy and air force have already put down markers that would bankrupt the defence budget to preserve vestigial conventional capabilities. Space control, National Missile Defence (NMD), and the next generation of fighter aircraft loom ominously on the budgetary horizon, while statutory obligations to quality of life, regional benefits, and equality of opportunity all make inroads on budgets and personnel ceilings that are unlikely to expand. Canada’s situation is not unique. Armies, navies and air forces of many middle powers are being asked to do more with less, and to take on new and unusual tasks. What are “special” forces, what are “conventional” forces, how do the two relate, and how do we integrate them for the future? I’ll begin with a discussion of some of the definitions and conceptions in circulation that, I feel, have led us into a dead end. Then I’ll consider our current understanding of operations necessary to enhance our security, and some of the challenges that the future might hold. There are those who would meet these challenges with a “salvation army” of well-meaning humanitarian workers and non-offensive international peacekeepers, leaving the dirty business of killing to others. My contention is that the capacity for precise and carefully calibrated violence will be essential in our future tasks, but that these tasks will also be unachievable without a “salvation army”. The odd image of laser-guided bombs and meals-ready-to-eat being dropped on Afghanistan by the same airforce in October 2001 is both harbinger and symbol; both sorts of bombs fell short of the desired impact. Our challenge will be to balance the lighter and darker aspects of a small army intimately linked to other departments and agencies at home and abroad in which every soldier and civilian is “special”, but conventional weaponry is still necessary.
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) are growing to meet the increasing irregular warfare challenges posed by violent extremist organizations. Although a tradition of tension exists between conventional military forces and SOF, there is little disagreement within USSOCOM and the broader defense community that the current threats facing the United States require an increased SOF capability. The challenge is how best to implement and manage the growth while retaining the unique capabilities resident in our special operations community. Jessica Turnley wades into the discussion with a short monograph on the concept of organizational identity or organizational culture and the difficulty of developing and, more importantly, retaining these in the face of changing organizational structures and institutional growth. Her discussion cuts to the heart of what it means to be SOF vice what it means to be a member of USSOCOM. In the current organization, they are not synonymous. A significant percentage of the command is made up of non-SOF members assigned from the various services. As the command grows, these "SOF enablers" will remain a critical element within the command and the SOF community at large. Underlying much of Dr. Turnley's discussion is the unique position USSOCOM and SOF have within the Department of Defense. It is the only combatant command with Title 10 "Service-like" responsibilities and authorities as well as operational command authority. Jessica's research highlights how this tension in responsibilities and authorities drove USSOCOM to create what she describes as a "blended" organization. As the tensions of growth and the current global struggle continues over the years, this dichotomy of missions will need to be addressed to ensure that the formal requirements of the "Service-like" requirements do not undermine the inherent flexibility and creativity associated with traditional SOF activities.
Since the Vietnam War, U.S. policymakers have worried that the American public will support military operations only if the human costs of the war, as measured in combat casualties, are minimal. Although the public is rightly averse to suffering casualties, the level of popular sensitivity to U.S. military casualties depends critically on the context in which those losses occur. The public's tolerance for the human costs of war is primarily shaped by the intersection of two crucial factors: beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of the war, and beliefs about the war's likely success. The impact of each belief depends upon the other. Ultimately, however, beliefs about the likelihood of success matter most in determining the public's willingness to tolerate U.S. military deaths in combat. A reanalysis of publicly available polls and a detailed analysis of a series of polls designed by the authors to tap into public attitudes on casualties support this conclusion.
In the course of the 2006 Lebanon War the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) employed special operations forces (SOF) for raids against Hizb'allah's command and control structure. This article argues that a faulty conceptualization of the value of special operations and misguided expectations determined by the new IDF concept of operations impacted adversely on the employment of SOF for this kind of operations. Both these elements contributed in turn to substantially degrade SOF performance in the context of the war.
The author considers the revised education and training principles in consulting psychology (R. L. Lowman et al; see record
2003-04049-003) from the specific perspective of military psychology. Consulting psychologists in military settings must adopt a cross-cultural framework for consultation, recognizing unique facets such as the distinctive military mission and concerns regarding multiple roles and confidentiality. The revised principles are well-conceived and likely to facilitate consultation in the military. The author recommends further consideration of issues unresolved by the Principles, including the clinical dilemma in organizational psychology (blending clinical and nonclinical roles with organizational clients), the need for more stringent minimal training and experience requirements, and clarification of the essential characteristics of consulting psychologists. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This study integrates military intelligence into the optimal allocation of the government budget. Intelligence activities, defined as including the process of data collection and knowledge analysis for decision making by the military and governmental hierarchies, are perceived as serving three goals: (a) evaluation of the rival's capabilities and intentions; (b) enhancing the capability of the military by increasing the effectiveness of its weapon systems and reducing the effectiveness of the rival's weapon systems; (c) intelligence superiority yields an advantage over the rival, particularly with respect to deterrence and preemption. We develop and analyze static (deterministic, one-period) models in which two rival countries are engaged in an arms race. Current results show that the optimal expenditure on intelligence by each rival is likely, but not necessarily, a monotone increasing function of: (a) the government budget; (b) the efficiency of the intelligence apparatus; (c) the decision makers' degree of conservatism. We also analyze scenarios in which the two rivals participate in a knowledge race in addition to the usual arms race. In such cases, the country with the higher intelligence effectiveness (due to high-quality human capital, say) may force its rival to spend significant resources on intelligence, thus, gaining a substantial advantage in security and welfare. Finally, we present an application of the model to the Israeli-Syrian arms race.
This book provides an insightful introduction to the most important field of military innovation for the 21st century—robotic and drone weaponry.
For centuries, warring nations have sought to lower the risk to highly vulnerable humans on the battlefield, typically by providing protective armor, making soldiers' positions more difficult to detect, or by striking from locations safe from retaliation. Autonomous weaponry has now reached the point where robotic systems can perform some key tasks that previously required direct human involvement.
Military Robots and Drones: A Reference Handbook introduces the lay person to a highly specialized topic, providing the foundation necessary for further study in this field. Appropriate for high school and college-level students, as well as general readers with an interest in the topic, the author explains the many military applications of robotics as well as current limitations and disadvantages. The book also provides a general history of robotic warfare; examines key individuals, agencies, documents, and models; discusses controversies within the field of robotic and drone warfare, such as ethical considerations; and explains how increased reliance on robotics has affected the structure and strategy of the military.
The author considers the revised education and training principles in consulting psychology (R. L. Lowman et al; see record 2003-04049-003) from the specific perspective of military psychology. Consulting psychologists in military settings must adopt a cross-cultural framework for consultation, recognizing unique facets such as the distinctive military mission and concerns regarding multiple roles and confidentiality. The revised principles are well-conceived and likely to facilitate consultation in the military. The author recommends further consideration of issues unresolved by the Principles, including the clinical dilemma in organizational psychology (blending clinical and nonclinical roles with organizational clients), the need for more stringent minimal training and experience requirements, and clarification of the essential characteristics of consulting psychologists.
For those who participate in military campaigns, report on wars, or study the conduct and cultures of conflict, war is largely a foreign-language-free zone. The tacit assumption has been that international wars are generally fought with allies and against enemies who obligingly speak our own language. However, a recent Arts and Humanities Research Council project, Languages at War: Policies and Practices of Language Contacts in Conflict, 1
took as its starting-point the centrality of foreign languages in war and proposed that languages should be seen as key to an understanding of armed conflict — for the military who are fighting, for the civilians who meet the armies ‘on the ground’ of war and for those academics from a range of disciplines who engage with the multiple meanings of war and conflict. This book, Languages and the Military: Alliances, Occupation and Peace Building, brings together these various constituencies to discuss the role of languages in military operations, a dialogue which began in the project’ international conference at the Imperial War Museum, London, in April 2011. The conference provided a forum in which war studies specialists, historians, cultural studies analysts, linguists and translation scholars could focus together on one key theme — the role of languages in war. An integral part of this multi- disciplinary perspective was the contribution of practitioners — the military who deploy soldiers in war, the professional interpreters who seek to protect language intermediaries in conflict zones, the agencies which develop languages as peacekeeping tools and the war museum curators who tell the story of war to the general public.
The United States has participated in special warfare for decades, but the concept has only recently entered formal special operations forces (SOF) doctrine. Special warfare differs from traditional warfare principally in its involvement of the human domain and the importance of psychological operations. It occurs across the spectrum of conflict and in both irregular and conventional warfare. To be successful, special warfare efforts should cooperate with other military organizations, particularly those with intelligence and security assistance capacity, and must be adequately supported by the joint force. Special warfare efforts must also synchronized with the efforts of interagency partners, quite often through the auspices of diplomatic missions because of the involvement of foreign populations. Special warfare has been a tool used by the United States in conflicts around the world for decades. Future SOF warriors will continue to engage in it. To be successful, it is critically important that these professionals understand this other type of war.
This article deals with lawyers in the Israeli military in the context of military operations. Based on an organizational analysis of military lawyers' hybrid roles, it argues that (1) military legal advisors belong to two professional communities that are highly partisan; (2) they fulfill a variety of roles that include mediation between the professions, the interpretation of military law, and the final arbitration of operational decisions; and (3) they represent the only hybrid military role that deals with the core of military expertise: the organized management and deployment of violence.
Examines the combat experience of Israel's ground forces in the Al-Aqsa Intifada in order to offer a set of innovative concepts for understanding irregular warfare. The combat experience of Israel's ground forces in the second Palestinian uprising, the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-2006), is given full critical attention in this engaging study. Based on extensive interviews and observations, Rethinking Contemporary Warfare explores the ongoing debate about how the armed forces of industrial democracies wage contemporary military operations. Irregular warfare presents challenges, as routine activities can suddenly turn into violent action, forcing military forces to quickly adapt under the changing circumstances of the conflict. Such "new wars" are a messy reality consisting of high and low intensity conflict, the involvement of media and human rights movements, and the martial administration of civilian populations. Exploring the broad social and organizational features of these militaries, this volume sets forth new analytical tools to understand the peculiarities of irregular warfare in the post-Cold War era. These critical concepts include loose coupling between units, organizations that mediate between ground forces and civilian environments, and the militarization of civilian environments in urban warfare.
James D. Kiras shows how a number of different special operations, in conjunction with more conventional military actions, achieve and sustain strategic effect(s) over time. In particular, he argues that the root of effective special operations lies in understanding the relationship existing between moral and material attrition at the strategic level. He also presents a theoretical framework for understanding how special operations achieve strategic effects using a unique synthesis of strategic theory and case studies. This study shows how the key to understanding how special operations reside in the concept of strategic attrition and in the moral and material nature of strategy. It also highlights major figures such as Carl von Clausewitz, Hans Delbrück, and Mao Zedong, who understood these complexities and were experts in eroding an enemy's will to fight. These and other examples provide a superb explanation of the complexities of modern strategy and the place of special operations in a war of attrition. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars with an interest in special forces and of strategic and military studies in general.
From the Korean War to the current conflict in Iraq,Paying the Human Costs of Warexamines the ways in which the American public decides whether to support the use of military force. Contrary to the conventional view, the authors demonstrate that the public does not respond reflexively and solely to the number of casualties in a conflict. Instead, the book argues that the public makes reasoned and reasonable cost-benefit calculations for their continued support of a war based on the justifications for it and the likelihood it will succeed, along with the costs that have been suffered in casualties. Of these factors, the book finds that the most important consideration for the public is the expectation of success. If the public believes that a mission will succeed, the public will support it even if the costs are high. When the public does not expect the mission to succeed, even small costs will cause the withdrawal of support.Providing a wealth of new evidence about American attitudes toward military conflict,Paying the Human Costs of Waroffers insights into a controversial, timely, and ongoing national discussion.
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Winner of the 2011 Roy C. Palmer Civil Liberties Prize, as given by the Chicago-Kent College of Law. Selected as a Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2011 in the U.S. Politics category. Over the past decade, states and international organizations have shifted a surprising range of foreign policy functions to private contractors. But who is accountable when the employees of foreign private firms do violence or create harm? This timely book describes the services that are now delivered by private contractors and the threat this trend poses to core public values of human rights, democratic accountability, and transparency. The author offers a series of concrete reforms that are necessary to expand traditional legal accountability, construct better mechanisms of public participation, and alter the organizational structure and institutional culture of contractor firms. The result is a pragmatic, nuanced, and comprehensive set of responses to the problem of foreign affairs privatization.
Many scholars have recognized the growing likelihood of urban military operations in the future. Understandably, given the seriousness of this prospect, most commentators have focused on the operational and political difficulties of fighting in cities. At the same time, precisely because of the intense challenges of urban operations, these scholars have also emphasized that urban operations increasingly require highly professionalized infantry and especially Special Forces. Nevertheless, they have tended to ignore recent innovations at the tactical level among these specialist infantry units. This article seeks to address this oversight. It examines contemporary developments in urban micro-tactics among Western forces. Specifically, this article addresses the dissemination of Close Quarters Battle techniques, originally developed by Special Operations Forces in the 1970s, to regular infantry in the last decade as a result of urban operations Iraq and Afghanistan. In this way, this article contributes to contemporary debates about professionalization in Western armed forces today.
Since the late 1970s Israel has been operating postheroically, with postheroic behavior gradually becoming an integral part of its strategic culture and way of war, and often coming at the expense of mission fulfillment. In the Israeli case, the strongest explanation for such behavior has been the marriage of two factors: Israel's engagement in low-intensity conflicts (LICs), which have not threatened its basic security, let alone its existence, and sophisticated technology, which has played a significant facilitating role in applying postheroic warfare. Sparing the lives of the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF's) own troops and of enemy civilians helped gaining greater domestic and legitimacy, as well as greater sustainability in LICs. On the other hand, living up to postheroic warfare's rules had a price not only in terms of fulfilling the military missions, but also in terms of sensitivity to unexpected, sometimes sudden leaps in casualties and/or collateral damage; the danger of lowering the threshold war; and asymmetry with enemies that do not cooperate with postheroic rules and rather fight heroically. The analysis of the Israeli case covers the LIC events Israel has been engaged in from the 1978 Operation Litani, in which postheroic warfare was detected for the same time, to the more recent 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense.
The Cold War culture of military restraint has given way to increasing atrocities. By remaining a passive witness in the former Yugoslavia, Central Asia, and Chechnya, the United States damages its moral economy. Yet none of these conflicts sufficiently threatens U.S. interests to rouse the nation to arms. The United States should therefore return to the calculating siege craft common before Napoleon, which stressed minimal casualties, partial results, and patience. Every war need not be a heroic national crusade.
1. The International Context When the Cold War ended some ten years ago, it was rather obvious that the conflictual energies that had previously been a bsorbed by the US-Soviet macro-conflict (resulting in nothing, because of mutual nuclear deterrence) would be released in lesser conflicts. 1 Far from obvious on the other hand, was the distribution of the conflictual energies released. One possibility was that armed conflict would be displaced by bloodless "geo-economic" rivalries between the major trading states previously united in bloc solidarity by the pressure of the Soviet threat. That, clearly, has not happened because the acute trade "frictions" and economic tensions of the immediate post-Cold War years (naturally between the US and Japan first of all, but also US-EU, EU-Japan etc.) were soon dissipated by the US recovery, Japan's recession and an increased effort of positive economic cooperation (as e.g. the creation of the WTO); within the EU, the Euro-currency plan was specifically meant to replace the lost Cold War solidarity of France and Germany. The second possibility was that the conflicts previously repressed and absorbed inside each bloc would be released within them. In other words, that the end of the Cold War would reverse the millennial channeling of conflict outward & upward, from tribe against tribe, to nation against nation, to state against state, and finally to world-bloc against world bloc –-a process which each time pressured former enemies into some degree of cooperation, practical solidarity, even harmony. Now political and even violent conflict would instead devolve downward and inward, all the way back to nation-to-nation, or even tribe to tribe. That has clearly happened inside the ex -Soviet bloc, once there was no longer a powerful USSR to suppress lesser conflicts, and impose solidarity. The separation of the six East European states was non-violent, the separation of the three Baltic states was only briefly resisted, but violence did break out when Moldavia separated; far more serious was the Azeri-Armenian state/nation-to-state/nation warfare, the nation against nation conflict inside Georgia, internal war in Tadjikistan, and then the Chechen conflict inside the Russian Federation itself.
Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have re-opened the debate about the strategic utility of special operations forces (SOF). This article follows the debate and identifies the main factors that contribute to the strategic utility of SOF in various types of conflicts. Drawing upon Israeli experiences with special operations it demonstrates that, contrary to the commonly held view that Israeli SOF have significant strategic utility, Israel is has difficulties utilizing its SOF during large-scale military campaigns, despite their impressive utility in discrete operations. The article draws inferences from the Israeli case regarding the tension between the potential for unique strategic utility of SOF and the desire to have special operations complement the general military effort. The article concludes that the geostrategic environment informs the SOF's strategic utility: the operational concept determines expected strategic utility, and the organizational setting shapes the SOF's ability to fulfil their potential utility.
This article reviews debates surrounding the Military Covenant and explores its salience for contemporary British civil–military relations. It explores why the concept of the Military Covenant was created, the nature of subsequent debates, and finally it reflects on the wider implications of this research. Locating the Covenant in debates concerned with the changing nature of the military profession, this article argues that the Covenant was created in 2000 as a response to a challenge to the Army’s right to be different and thus its jurisdiction. However, tensions caused by new missions in Iraq and Afghanistan subsequently transformed the Covenant’s use and meaning. Senior commanders extended the use of the Covenant to establish the boundaries of their expertise and legitimacy, whilst external actors with a variety of competing interests used the Covenant to contest “authoritative discretion” of the military within a clearly delineated professional space.
Throughout most of the 20th century, warring nation—states generally had two options to increase their military strength. They could create a coalition—as the United States did in World War II—or institute a draft—as it did in Vietnam.
Today, though, countries have a third option. Rent.
Hiring private military corporations, sometimes called private security corporations or private security firms, has fast become a popular way for nations to fight wars.
In the past decade, Special Operations Forces have attracted much public attention, and, in the United States, a significant academic literature has developed about them. By contrast, few scholars have analyzed 22 Special Air Service Regiment (SAS), Britain's prime Special Operations Forces unit. This is unfortunate. From a peripheral position during the cold war, the SAS has attained a central position in British defense posture. This article analyzes the rise of the SAS as an example of organizational transformation in the armed forces today. The SAS's new prominence may also illustrate the contemporary dynamics of military change more widely.
This article discusses what it is that makes some soldiers overcome the challenges and suffering of combat to such an extent as to master rather than being overcome by it. It adds insights to the combat motivation literature emphasising the properties of combat while presenting a theoretical definition of the difference between soldiers and warriors. The implications of the existence of warriors for organising, recruitment, selection, motivation, leadership and training, equality, cost and employment are discussed, and it is found that there are two basic ways of organising warriors, the most prevalent being into Special Operations Forces. The paper concludes with reflections on the circumstances in which even warriors refuse to fight.
Can democracies any longer tolerate casualties? The question has important implications for national decision-making and for international politics. This article examines how and why governments take casualties into account in decisions about military commitments—the casualty factor. This is a phenomenon that goes beyond the normal military desire to reduce losses. The article explores the wide range of popular theories put forward to explain why the casualty factor appears to have become casualty aversion or even casualty phobia in democratic nations. Explanations are classified under four headings: national interest, strategic calculus, internal politics, and long-term social change. Each type of explanation has strengths and weaknesses. Finally, an assessment is made of the overall influence of casualty aversion in democratic decision-making.
The U.S. military is frequently called on to respond to domestic or international crises. Typically, it uses joint task forces (JTFs) as the organizational structure to oversee the forces employed in these crises. The use of JTFs has been common over the past four decades but their use has increased over the past decade and the range of situations they have been called on to deal with has widened. Recent, well-known examples include operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and, domestically, the response to Hurricane Katrina. In spite of this long-term and growing use, senior policymakers in the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Army have expressed concern over shortcomings associated with using JTFs to provide the command and control in operations. Specific concerns included the amount of time it takes to establish these headquarters, the ability to staff them appropriately, and their ability to coordinate the efforts of their forces with those of other Services, U.S. government agencies, and forces from other countries. Given recent history and an uncertain future, military leaders understand that the demand for JTFs is likely to continue, the notice to supply them will be short, and the range of tasks they might be asked to accomplish will be wide.
The African sun had just risen above the hills surrounding the sprawling city and sent its already dazzling rays streaming into the dusty alleyway. Corporal Hernandez felt the sun on his face and knew that today would, again, be sweltering. He was a squad leader in 2d Platoon, Lima Company and had, along with his men, spent a sleepless night on the perimeter. For the past week his platoon had provided security to the International Relief Organization (IRO) workers who manned one of three food distribution points in the American Sector of Tugala -- the war-tom capital of Orange -- a Central African nation wracked by civil unrest and famine. The situation in Orange had transfixed the world for nearly two years. Bloody tribal fighting had led first to the utter collapse of the government and economy, and ultimately, to widespread famine. International efforts to quell the violence and support the teetering government had failed, and the country had plunged into chaos. The United States had finally been compelled to intervene. A forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) was ordered to assist the efforts of the ineffective Regional Multi-National Force (RMNF) and the host of international humanitarian assistance organizations that struggled to alleviate the suffering. The MEU's arrival had stabilized the situation and allowed the precious relief supplies to finally reach the people who needed them most. The Food Distribution Point (FDP) manned by 2d Platoon serviced over 5,000 people daily. The Marines had, at first, been shocked at the extent of the suffering, by the constant stream of malnourished men and women, and by the distended bellies and drawn faces of the children. The flow of food and medical supplies had, however, had a dramatic impact. The grim daily death tolls had slowly begun to decrease and the city had begun to recover some sense of normalcy. Within a month the lives of the Marines had assumed a sort of dull routine.
The U.S. military faces an era of enormous complexity. This complexity has been extended by globalization, the proliferation of advanced technology, violent transnational extremists, and resurgent powers. America's vaunted military might stand atop all others but is tested in many ways. Trying to understand the possible perturbations the future poses to our interests is a daunting challenge. But, as usual, a familiarity with history is our best aid to interpretation. In particular, that great and timeless illuminator of conflict, chance, and human nature--Thucydides--is as relevant and revealing as ever. In his classic history, Thucydides detailed the savage 27-year conflict between Sparta and Athens. Sparta was the overwhelming land power of its day, and its hoplites were drilled to perfection. The Athenians, led by Pericles, were the supreme maritime power, supported by a walled capital, a fleet of powerful triremes, and tributary allies. The Spartan leader, Archidamius, warned his kinsmen about Athens' relative power, but the Spartans and their supporters would not heed their king. In 431 BCE, the Spartans marched through Attica and ravaged the Athenian country estates and surrounding farms. They encamped and awaited the Athenian heralds and army for what they hoped would be a decisive battle and a short war. The scarlet-clad Spartans learned the first lesson of military history--the enemy gets a vote. The Athenians elected to remain behind their walls and fight a protracted campaign that played to their strengths and worked against their enemies. Thucydides' ponderous tome on the carnage of the Peloponnesian War is an extended history of the operational adaptation of each side as they strove to gain a sustainable advantage over their enemy.
The American mission in Somalia presented U.S. forces with a variety of difficult operational challenges as they tried to bring peace to a country ravaged by natural and man-made disasters. After initial success in the summer of 1993 in restoring order and saving thousands of lives. American soldiers clashed with Somali forces and were withdrawn in the spring of 1994. In the months that followed, we have studied what the Somalia experience can teach us about peace missions and learned how we might improve our capabilities across the spectrum of joint operations. The book represents the first time a new tool- the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System-is being used to evaluate an operation in its totality.
As we enter the seventh year of the current conflict against violent-extremist terrorist networks, the importance of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in this fight remains crucial. SOF were the lead element in Afghanistan as the initial response to the 9/11 terror attacks. It is likely that U.S. leadership will increasingly turn to SOF, in conjunction with other government departments and agencies, to prosecute the campaign against violent extremists. In many ways, SOF will be the force of choice, because SOF skill sets and capabilities are optimized to conduct operations against these types of terrorist groups. Building on Rear Admiral William McRaven's seminal work "Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice," Dr. Spulak expands McRaven's theory beyond direct action and small raid concepts and builds a theory of SOF looking at SOF as a whole and across the spectrum of operations. He focuses on SOF attributes and how they allow SOF to accomplish missions beyond the capabilities of conventional forces. Through the prism of the principles of war, the author argues that SOF's inherent capabilities allow them to overcome the risk and obstacles that would preclude conventional forces from undertaking the mission. The challenge today is how to focus SOF on these "special" missions. Throughout history, leaders have a tendency to overuse or misuse SOF. By the very nature of SOF attributes, SOF will always be a limited force vis-a-vis conventional forces. Consequently, care must be taken to use SOF where its special skills and capabilities are best suited.
For almost two decades, experts and defense establishments the world over have been predicting that cyber war is coming. But is it? This article argues in three steps that cyber war has never happened in the past, that cyber war does not take place in the present, and that it is unlikely that cyber war will occur in the future. It first outlines what would constitute cyber war: a potentially lethal, instrumental, and political act of force conducted through malicious code. The second part shows what cyber war is not, case-by-case. Not one single cyber offense on record constitutes an act of war on its own. The final part offers a more nuanced terminology to come to terms with cyber attacks. All politically motivated cyber attacks are merely sophisticated versions of three activities that are as old as warfare itself: sabotage, espionage, and subversion.
The use of force in international relations by the West is increasingly witnessing a greater reliance on Special Forces. This trend has profound implications for state action because Special Forces represent a very different kind of soldier and they possess the inherent ability to transgress traditional boundaries in peace and war. The development and participation of UK Special Forces in the Global War on Terror provides a microcosm of the positive and negative dimensions of using secret military units as the force of choice against insurgents and terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq and indeed on the streets of London.
This paper argues that military law has undergone a long-term process of change. Previously an autonomous legal system with little civilian input at the administrative, judicial and policy-making levels, military law became subject to a consensual policy of civilianisation from the early 1960s, reflected primarily in the adoption of civilian criminal law norms by the military justice system. More recently there has emerged the juridification of significant areas of military relations in respect to discipline and certain other terms of service which hitherto have not been subject to externally imposed legal regulation. Explanations for the shifts from autonomy, through civilianisation, and then to juridification, ranging from political and social developments to new human rights and equal opportunities discourses, are offered for such changes.