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The Unintentional Procrastination Scale
Bruce A. Fernie
1,2
•Zinnia Bharucha
1
•
Ana V. Nikc
ˇevic
´
3
•Marcantonio M. Spada
4
Published online: 11 August 2016
ÓThe Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Procrastination refers to the delay or postponement of a task or decision
and is often conceptualised as a failure of self-regulation. Recent research has
suggested that procrastination could be delineated into two domains: intentional and
unintentional. In this two-study paper, we aimed to develop a measure of unin-
tentional procrastination (named the Unintentional Procrastination Scale or the
‘UPS’) and test whether this would be a stronger marker of psychopathology than
intentional and general procrastination. In Study 1, a community sample of 139
participants completed a questionnaire that consisted of several items pertaining to
unintentional procrastination that had been derived from theory, previous research,
and clinical experience. Responses were subjected to a principle components
analysis and assessment of internal consistency. In Study 2, a community sample of
155 participants completed the newly developed scale, along with measures of
general and intentional procrastination, metacognitions about procrastination, and
negative affect. Data from the UPS were subjected to confirmatory factor analysis
and revised accordingly. The UPS was then validated using correlation and
regression analyses. The six-item UPS possesses construct and divergent validity
and good internal consistency. The UPS appears to be a stronger marker of psy-
chopathology than the pre-existing measures of procrastination used in this study.
Results from the regression models suggest that both negative affect and
metacognitions about procrastination differentiate between general, intentional, and
&Bruce A. Fernie
bruce.fernie@kcl.ac.uk
1
Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King’s
College London, Henry Wellcome Building, De Crespigny Park, London SE5 8AF, UK
2
HIV Liaison Service, South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK
3
Kingston University, Kingston upon Thames, UK
4
London South Bank University, London, UK
123
J Rat-Emo Cognitive-Behav Ther (2017) 35:136–149
DOI 10.1007/s10942-016-0247-x
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
unintentional procrastination. The UPS is brief, has good psychometric properties,
and has strong associations with negative affect, suggesting it has value as a
research and clinical tool.
Keywords Procrastination Metacognition Unintentional procrastination
Depression Anxiety
Introduction
Procrastination is a term familiar to many. It refers to the postponement or
avoidance of starting, engaging in, and completing a task or a decision-making
process. It is not a behaviour limited to students, despite high estimates of its
prevalence in this population (up to 70 % according to Ellis and Knaus 1977). For
example, the prevalence of procrastination has been found to be as high as 20 % in
an adult sample (Harriott and Ferrari 1996). Within psychology, procrastination has
been conceptualised as a failure of self-regulation (Baumeister and Heatherton
1996; Baumeister et al. 1994) associated with poor academic and work performance
and mental ill health (Sto
¨ber and Joormann 2001).
The measurement of procrastination is vital to aid research that aims to
understand this common and injurious behaviour. A range of self-report scales have
been developed to measure this construct in general (e.g., the General Procrasti-
nation Scale or ‘GPS’: Lay 1986), in specific aspects (e.g., the Decisional
Procrastination Scale or ‘DPS’: Mann 1982), and in specific populations (e.g., for
students with the Tuckman Procrastination Scale or ‘TPS’: Tuckman 1991). More
recently, the construct of intentional procrastination has been delineated and
measured using the active procrastination scale (APS: Choi and Moran 2009). This
separation of sub-types of procrastination is similar to that proposed by Ferrari
(1993) who distinguished between functional and dysfunctional procrastinators,
where the latter are characterised by their tendency to chronically delay starting or
completing tasks.
The APS was developed to advance earlier work by Chu and Choi (2005) that
proposed that there are two types of procrastinator: passive and active. A passive
procrastinator was described as similar to more ‘traditional’ conceptualizations of
the behaviour: i.e., the term refers to individuals who typically leave tasks to the last
minute despite their good intentions, impairing performance. On the other hand,
active procrastinators choose to delay task initiation or completion; they intend to
procrastinate as a means of optimising performance. Indeed, Choi and Moran (2009)
reported evidence that active procrastination was distinct from traditional procras-
tination, finding different relationships between measures of the former and latter
with other study variables, such as participants’ self-reported performance and
ability to structure their time (in a sample of Canadian university students).
However, we argue that the items comprising the measure of passive procrastination
used in their study did not clearly distinguish between intentional and unintentional
procrastination, offering further justification of the need to develop a scale that
entirely focuses on the latter. Indeed, a brief and informal content analysis of many
The Unintentional Procrastination Scale 137
123
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of the extant procrastination scales appeared to offer support for the contention that
several of their items fail to clearly distinguish between intentional and uninten-
tional procrastination (e.g., the DPS, GPS, and TPS).
Intentional or active procrastination thus alludes to the idea that procrastination is
to some extent a voluntary strategy, possibly aimed at self-regulation (Fernie and
Spada 2008). If this were the case, active procrastination should correlate with
positive beliefs about the benefits of engaging in procrastination, such as
‘‘Procrastination helps me cope’’ and ‘‘Procrastination allows to creativity occur
more naturally’’ (Fernie and Spada 2008; Fernie et al. 2009). Research has also
shown that individuals hold negative beliefs about procrastination, such as ‘‘When I
procrastinate, I find it difficult to concentrate on other tasks’’ and ‘‘My
procrastination is uncontrollable’’ (Fernie and Spada 2008; Fernie et al. 2009),
concurrently with positive beliefs. This suggests that although procrastination may
be voluntarily initiated for some, it later becomes, or is perceived as becoming,
involuntary. These beliefs further support the conceptualisation of two domains of
procrastination: intentional, or active, and unintentional.
Distinguishing unintentional from intentional procrastination may help to explain
the strong relationship between worry, metacognitions pertaining to worry, and
general procrastination (e.g., Spada et al. 2006; Sto
¨ber and Joormann 2001). Indeed,
mindfulness, which can be defined as an awareness of the present (Brown and Ryan
2003) and thus, in some sense, representative of a meta-level of cognition, has been
shown to mediate the relationship between procrastination and stress (Sirois and
Tosti 2012). In addition, it is possible that procrastination may be appear to be
uncontrollable because an individual’s cognitive resources are engaged in worry,
leaving less mental assets available for task initiation or completion. If an individual
is engaged in what they perceive as unintentional procrastination, they may attempt
to regulate their predicament with further procrastination, leading to its
perseveration.
Despite the myriad of pre-existing measures of procrastination, there is arguably
a need for a brief, domain-specific measure of unintentional procrastination
appropriate not just to students, but also to the general population. We hypothesized
that unintentional procrastination is likely to be a stronger marker of psychopathol-
ogy than general procrastination because it encapsulates perceived involuntary and
not voluntary control of this behaviour, thus a measure of unintentional procras-
tination might not only be beneficial for research, but also for use in clinical
settings. The current paper reports two studies that trace the development of the
Unintentional Procrastination Scale. The first study incorporates a principle
components analysis and an assessment of internal consistency to construct the
scale. The second details a confirmatory factor analysis using data from a second
sample as well as assessment of the construct and divergent validity of the newly
constructed scale, specifically considering the likelihood of shared proportion of
variance explained by general and unintentional procrastination. We also explored
the relationships between negative affect with intentional, unintentional, and general
procrastination.
138 B. A. Fernie et al.
123
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Study 1: Construction of the Unintentional Procrastination Scale
Method
Participants
A convenience sample of 139 (111 female; mean age =29.5 years [SD =11.5;
range 18–72 years]) participants was recruited for this study and completed a
battery of online questionnaires. Eligibility criteria were minimal to attract a sample
that represented a broad range of individuals. Participants were required: (1) to be at
least 18 years of age, (2) to possess adequate English language skills, and (3) to
consent to participate.
The sample was international, with participants reporting nationalities from six
continents, although the distribution of participants’ nationalities was skewed, with
46.8 % (65) reporting to be British. The ethnicity of the sample was also skewed,
with 67.6 % (94) of participants reporting to be white. Because an international
sample was anticipated, it was thought likely that for many of the participants
English would not be their first language. Indeed, 38.8 % (54) of the sample
reported a first language other than English. As a result, participants were asked to
rate their confidence in their ability to speak, read, and write in English. 96.4 %
(133) of the sample rated their confidence in all three of these domains as either
‘confident’ or ‘very confident’.
From earlier research that has developed questionnaires, a frequently identified
limitation is a failure to control for participants’ previous (or current) exposure to
psychological therapies and how this may impact on responses to items in
questionnaires (e.g. Fernie et al. 2014). Thirty-four participants reported that they
had undergone psychotherapy previously that is not on going. Of these, 58.8 % (20)
stated that CBT had been a component in their therapy, 70.6 % (24) had seven or
more sessions, and 14.7 % (five) reported that at least part of their therapy aimed to
address problematic procrastination. 6.5 % (nine) participants reported that they
were currently in psychotherapy, with 22.2 % (two) of these stating that they were
being treated with CBT, 44.4 % (four) declaring that they had completed more than
seven sessions, and 66.7 % (six) revealing that problematic procrastination was
being addressed in their therapy.
In an attempt to control for variations in mental health wellbeing, self-report
mood measures were taken and participants were also asked if they have a
psychiatric diagnosis from a mental health clinician. 9.4 % (13) of participants
reported that they had, with the majority reporting diagnoses of depression and
anxiety disorders.
Materials
Seven items pertaining to unintentional procrastination were derived from a review
of transcriptions of an earlier procrastination study (Fernie and Spada 2008), as well
The Unintentional Procrastination Scale 139
123
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as the authors’ clinical experience and from deductions based on theory to form the
raw version of the Unintentional Procrastination Scale (UPS).
Items were framed as statements to which participants could respond to on a
four-point Likert-type scale to indicate their level of agreement (‘‘1. Do not agree’’,
‘‘2. Agree slightly’’, ‘‘3. Agree moderately’’, and ‘‘4. Agree strongly’’). The items
were preceded by a pre-amble that read as follows:
Please read each statement and select a number 1, 2, 3 or 4 that indicates how
much you agree or disagree with the statement. There are no right or wrong
answers. Do not spend too much time on any statement.
Procedure
Participants were recruited via social media and through a London university’s
fortnightly research volunteer email circular. An additional recruitment strategy
involved emailing a hyperlink to the online questionnaires to individuals on the
authors’ email contact lists and asking recipients to forward this on to others on their
contact lists, in attempt to create a viral-like spread.
Potential participants were directed to the study website containing the
questionnaires. The first two pages of this provided information regarding the
purpose of the study, how responses were anonymous, and that consent would be
assumed once participants click on the ‘submit’ button that followed the battery of
questionnaires. The pages following this information contained a series of questions
to ascertain participants’ demographic details, their exposure to psychotherapy, and
their current mental wellbeing (i.e. do they have a psychiatric diagnosis?).
Participants were not required to record their names.
Results
Principle Components Analysis
The seven original items of the UPS were subject to a principle components
analysis (PCA). Both initial eigenvalues (only a single component had a value over
one) and a Scree plot indicated a one-factor solution. This single factor accounted
for 60.7 % of the variance and all seven items loaded strongly (see Table 1). The
internal consistency of the newly developed scale was .89 and further analysis
indicated that this would not be improved if any of the items were removed.
We re-ran the PCA excluding the participants that reported having current or
previous CBT to control for exposure to procrastination-related cognitions. This led
to the loading of item #2 to fall below .4 to .39. However, because a subsequent
analysis with the ‘no current or previous exposure to CBT’ sample suggested that
the internal consistency would not be improved by removing any of the items, we
retained the original seven-item UPS for the second study where the factor would be
subjected to a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using a new dataset.
140 B. A. Fernie et al.
123
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Study 2: Validation of UPS
Introduction
In order to validate the UPS and provide evidence to support the delineation of
procrastination into intentional and unintentional domains, we tested several
hypotheses. Firstly, we hypothesized that UPS scores would be significantly
correlated with those from a pre-existing measure of procrastination, establishing
concurrent validity, and that this relationship would remain significant when
controlling for negative affect, suggesting divergent validity. Secondly, we posited
that as a test of divergent validity, because we have argued that unintentional
procrastination is a stronger marker of psychopathology than both general and
intentional procrastination, data from the UPS would be a stronger predictor of
negative affect than measures of general and intentional procrastination. Thirdly, we
predicted that the UPS would be more strongly associated with negative beliefs
about procrastination than measures of general and intentional procrastination.
Finally, we hypothesized that intentional procrastination would be a stronger
predictor of positive beliefs about procrastination than UPS scores and a measure of
general procrastination.
Method
Participants and Procedure
A convenience sample of a 155 participants (118 female; mean age =32.5 years
[SD =11.4; range 18–68 years]) completed a battery of online questionnaires.
Eligibility criteria and the procedure matched that used in Study 1.
Again, the participants were international and the distribution of participants’
nationalities was skewed, with 46.2 % (72) reporting as British. The majority of the
sample self-reported their ethnicity as white (71.6 % [110]) and 61.9 % (96) stating
that English as their first language. At least 90.3 % (139) of participants rated their
confidence in speaking, reading, or writing in English as either ‘confident’ or ‘very
confident’.
In terms of exposure to psychological therapy, 1.9 % (3) of participants were
currently in therapy and 24.5 % (38) had undergone it in the past. Overall, 7.4 %
(12) of participants reported that they were, or had undergone, CBT. Only 8.4 %
(13) of participants stated that they had a mental health diagnosis, reporting
depressive, anxiety, or eating disorders.
Materials
Emotional Measures The Patient Health Questionnaire 9 (PHQ-9; Kroenke et al.
2001) was used to assess depressive symptoms. The PHQ-9 is a nine-item scale that
possesses good psychometric properties, with higher scores indicating the presence
of greater levels of symptoms (Kroenke et al. 2001). The Generalized Anxiety
The Unintentional Procrastination Scale 141
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Disorder 7 (GAD-7; Spitzer et al. 2006) was administered to measure anxiety
symptoms. The GAD-7 also possesses good psychometric properties and higher
scores again indicate the presence of more anxiety symptoms (Spitzer et al. 2006).
Procrastination Measures In addition to the newly developed UPS, the General
Procrastination Scale (GPS: Lay 1986) was used to assess traditional procrastina-
tion. The GPS is a 17-item questionnaire that taps largely into, arguably, both
intentional and unintentional procrastination. The Active Procrastination Scale was
also used and consists of a total of 16-items equally distributed over four factors,
namely ‘preference for pressure’, ‘intentional decision to procrastinate’, ‘ability to
meet deadlines’, and ‘outcome satisfaction’ (Choi and Moran 2009). This current
study focuses on the ‘intentional decision to procrastinate’ (IDP) factor that consists
of items such as ‘‘I intentionally put off work to maximize my motivation’’ and ‘‘To
use my time more efficiently, I deliberately postpone some tasks’’.
Finally, we used the Metacognitive beliefs about Procrastination scale (MaP) to
assess higher-order thinking about procrastination (Fernie et al. 2009). The MaP
consists of 16-items equally distributed over two subscales: positive metacognitions
about procrastination (PMP) and negative metacognitions about procrastination
(NMP). An example item of the PMP is ‘‘When I procrastinate, I am unconsciously
mulling over difficult decisions’’ and for NMP is ‘‘My procrastination is
uncontrollable’’. NMP has been shown to significantly correlate with both general
and decisional procrastination and PMP to only the latter (Fernie et al. 2009). The
factors have been shown to possess good internal consistency (Fernie et al. 2009).
Table 1 Factor Loadings for the UPS items from Initial PCA, Second PCA, and Second CFA
PCA loading
(total sample;
n=139)
PCA loading (no
CBT exposure;
n=105)
2nd CFA loadings
(total sample;
n=131)
1. I rarely begin tasks as soon as I am given
them, even if I intend to.
.643 .627 1.000
2. I find it difficult to make a decision the
moment I am faced with it.
.411 .392 N/A
3. Often I mean to be doing something, but it
seems that sometimes I just don’t get
round to it.
.760 .749 1.179
4. I often seem to start things and don’t seem
to finish them off.
.605 .590 1.269
5. I intend to get things done, but sometimes
this just does not happen.
.634 .616 1.449
6. Often I will set myself a date by which I
intend to get something done or make a
decision, but miss the deadline.
.577 .577 1.429
7. I really want to get things finished in time,
but I rarely do.
.620 .607 1.553
142 B. A. Fernie et al.
123
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Results
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Responses to the seven-items from the UPS were used to confirm its single factor
structure. The Lavaan package (Rosseel 2012) was installed into R Studio (R-Studio
2015) and was used to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). We defined
unintentional procrastination as the single latent variable and the seven-items of the
UPS as congeneric indicators of the latent variable. Using maximum likelihood
estimation, we assumed multivariate normality of item scores and defined them as
continuous indicators within the model. We utilised four indices to evaluate the fit
of the model: a Chi square measure of fit, the Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and the Tucker-Lewis
Index (TFI: also known as the Non-Normed Fit Index).
This initial CFA revealed mixed results regarding the fitting of the data to the
specified model. Two absolute fit indices suggested that the data weakly fitted the
specified model: the Chi square test was significant (v
2
=29.13, df =14, p[.01)
and the RMSEA was 0.09. However, relative fit indices produced an opposite
picture. The CFA generated a CFI of 0.97 and TLI of 0.95 suggesting that
the data better fit the specified model than the baseline model. Parameter estimates
were reviewed and modification indices were calculated. Together, these suggested
that a re-specified model, resulting from the removal of a single item (#2), might
lead to an improvement of fit. The re-specified model was a better fit of the data,
with a non-significant Chi square test (v
2
=10.72, df =9, p=.30), an RMSEA of
0.038, CFI of 0.99, and a TFI of 0.99. See Table 1for the factor loadings for the re-
specified model (note that Lavaan automatically assigns a loading of 1.000 to the
first item).
Construct Validity
Table 2shows the means, standard deviations, and ranges for all experimental
variables. A series of Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests of normality were conducted on
the data that suggested PHQ-9, GAD-7, PMP, NMP, and UPS were significantly
different than normal, while the GPS and IDP were not. As a result a series of non-
parametric, Spearman’s Rho correlation analyses were conducted on the data (see
Table 2). These revealed that the UPS was positively associated with GPS (very
strong), PMP (moderate), NMP (moderate), IDP (weak), PHQ-9 (strong), and GAD-
7 (strong).
In order to further test the construct validity of the UPS, we assessed its
relationship with GPS while controlling for IDP and negative affect. The
relationship between UPS and GPS remained significant (b=0.79, p\.001
[LL =1.96, UL =2.09]). In this model, which accounted for 67 % of the variance
in the pre-existing measure of procrastination, IDP, GAD-7, and PHQ-9 became
non-significant predictors of GPS.
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Unintentional Procrastination as a Marker of Psychopathology
We conducted two further regression analyses, the first with GAD-7 as the
dependent variable and the second with PHQ-9, to test the hypothesis that
unintentional procrastination would be a stronger marker of psychopathology than
measures of intentional and general procrastination. The same sets of predictor
variables were entered into both models: UPS, IDP, and GPS. In both models, only
UPS remained a significant predictor: both with PHQ-9 as the dependent variable
(b=0.52, p\.001 [LL =0.31, UL =0.94]) and GAD-7 (b=0.48, p=.001
[LL =0.23, UL =0.83]). Thus, despite the shared pattern of correlations between
the measures of negative affect and the IDP, GPS, and UPS, these analyses provided
some evidence of divergent validity existing between all three measures.
Metacognitions and Intentional and Unintentional Procrastination
We predicted that unintentional procrastination would be more strongly associated
with negative metacognitions about procrastination than measures of intentional and
general procrastination. We tested this by conducting a regression analysis with
NMP as the dependent variable and UPS, IDP, and GPS as independent variables. In
this model, UPS once more was the only significant predictor of NMP (b=0.52,
p=.001 [LL =0.33, UL =1.17]).
To test our hypothesis that intentional procrastination would be a stronger
predictor of positive metacognitions about procrastination than both general and
unintentional procrastination, we calculated another regression analysis with PMP
as the dependent variable and UPS, IDP, and GPS as independent variables. In line
with our hypothesis, only IDP was a significant predictor of PMP (b=0.27,
p\.001 [LL =0.09, UL =0.40]).
Table 2 Means, SDs, and ranges for all experimental variables and correlation matrix
Means SD Range 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. UPS 13.67 4.91 6 to 24 .78
**
.31
**
.35
**
.25
**
.53
**
.47
**
2. GPS -0.04 14.31 -28 to 37 .26
**
.23
**
.22
*
.47
**
.49
**
3. PMP 14.99 4.57 8 to 32 -.07 .34
**
.28
**
.25
**
4. NMP 18.83 6.97 8 to 32 .02 .45
**
.50
**
5. IDP 15.97 5.11 4 to 28 .25
**
.19
*
6. PHQ-9 14.96 5.9 9 to 35 .73
**
7. GAD-
7
12.36 5.45 7 to 28
UPS Unintentional Procrastination Scale, GPS General Procrastination Scale, PMP Positive Metacog-
nitions about Procrastination, NMP Negative Metacognitions about Procrastination, IDP Intentional
Decision to Procrastinate, PHQ-9Patient Health Questionnaire, GAD-7General Anxiety Disorder-7,
n=118 to 131; * p\.05; ** p\.01
144 B. A. Fernie et al.
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Finally, to see if participants’ exposure to psychotherapy impacted on their scores
on the measures of procrastination used in this study, a series of Mann–Whitney U
or independent ttests were used (dependent on the distribution of data) to compare
these two groups. None of these tests resulted in significant results: i.e., GPS
[t(116) =1.73, p=.08; n
exposure
=32, n
no-exposure
=86], IDP [t(107) =0.42,
p=.68; n
exposure
=30, n
no-exposure
=79], PMP [U =1072, p=.39; n
exposure
=
30, n
no-exposure
=80], and NMP [U =1191, p=.95; n
exposure
=30,
n
no-exposure
=80].
Assumptions of Regression Analyses
A total of five regression analyses were conducted for this study and the suitability of
the data for all the models for this kind of analyses was assessed. Firstly, there was no
evidence of multicollinearity in the dataset for all models: (1) no correlations greater
than r=.9 were identified between the predictor variables used in the regression
analyses (the strongest correlation was found between GPS and UPS at r=.78); (2)
the Tolerance Index (TI) values were all above .20 (e.g., for all of the models, the
predictors’ TIs ranged between .27 and .93); (3) the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs)
for all predictor variables were substantially less than 10 (e.g., again, for all of the
models, the predictors’ VIFs ranged between 1.08 and 3.78); and (4) eigenvalues,
condition indexes, and variance proportions were calculated for all models. Models
that used both GPS and UPS as predictors revealed that both of these variables
explained large variance proportions ([50 %) at the smallest eigenvalues, however
none of these were associated with condition indexes greater than 15. This provided
further evidence that, despite the strong correlation between GPS and UPS, as well as
their shared patterns of correlations between GAD-7 and PHQ-9, multicollinearity
was not problematic for any of the models. Secondly, the Durbin-Watson test
suggested that the assumption of independent errors is tenable. Thirdly, histograms
and normality plots suggested that the residuals were normally distributed and plots
of the regression-standardized residuals against the regression standardized predicted
values suggested that the assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity were met.
Discussion
The central aim of this study was to develop a brief measure of unintentional
procrastination in the form of the UPS. This study resulted in a six-item measure of
unintentional procrastination that appeared to possess construct and divergent
validity and good internal consistency. The final six-item version of the UPS was a
good fit of Study 2 data. The UPS remained a strong predictor of general
procrastination even when controlling for negative affect.
Our second set of hypotheses regarded unintentional procrastination being a
stronger marker of psychopathology than both general and intentional procrastina-
tion. Despite the strong correlation between the GPS and the UPS (acknowledging
that general and unintentional procrastination are overlapping concepts), our tests of
multicollinearity and our regression models supported this hypothesis, as UPS
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scores were independent predictors of both anxiety and depression in models that
contained measures of general and intentional procrastination.
Our final set of hypotheses concerned the role of metacognitions about procras-
tination in the delineation between intentional and unintentional procrastination. Our
results suggested that positive metacognitions about procrastination are more strongly
associated with intentional procrastination, while negative metacognitions are more
relevant to unintentional procrastination. It is possible to speculate a metacognitive
model of procrastination to suggest how these relationships may operate. Firstly, an
individual with positive beliefs about procrastination might respond to being given a
task with intentional procrastination. Examples of these metacognitions might include
‘‘Procrastination allows creativity to occur more naturally’’ and ‘‘Procrastination stops
me from being bored’’ (Fernie et al. 2009), therefore relating to not only to optimising
performance, but also to minimising feelings of discomfort. Secondly, intentional
procrastination, in problematic or dysfunctional procrastinators (Ferrari 1993), could
activate negative beliefs about procrastination, leading to negative affect. Uninten-
tional procrastination might be responded to with cognitive processes that are
‘resource-heavy’ (such as worry, rumination, and distraction) in a maladaptive at-
tempt to control this behaviour. Such responses might be activated because an
individual holds certain other positive metacognitions pertaining to these processes.
For example, an individual might respond with worry because they believe it helps
them to organize their thoughts (Cartwright-Hatton and Wells 1997) or with
rumination because of metacognitions such as ‘‘Ruminating about the past helps me to
work out how things could have been done better’’ (Papageorgiou and Wells 2001).
Responses such as these could result in a depletion of mental resources that inhibit an
individual from achieving their optimal performance, reinforcing negative self-
efficacy beliefs and maintaining the postponement of starting or completion of a task
or the making of a decision (see Fig. 1), resulting in what Ferrari (1993) referred to as
dysfunctional procrastination.
This study is subject to several limitations that will have to be addressed by
future research. First, social desirability, self-report biases, context effects, and poor
recall may have contributed to errors in the self-report measurements. Future studies
could involve Ecological Momentary Assessment to test whether UPS scores predict
real-time procrastination, further establishing construct validity. Second, a cross-
sectional design was adopted and this does not allow causal inferences. Third, this
study utilized self-report measures to assess subjective experience and meta-
Fig. 1 Speculative metacognitive model of procrastination
146 B. A. Fernie et al.
123
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awareness and, as such, like much cognitive research, there is always doubt whether
we are measuring the constructs we intend. Fourth, there were issues with the
sample characteristics: it was moderate in size and this impacted on the power of the
statistical analyses; the majority of participants were female; and participants
predominately ethnically identified themselves as ‘white’ and in terms of
nationality, British. This impacts on our ability to generalize these findings to
other ethnicities and nationalities, though a significant proportion of participants
self-reported as non-white and non-British. Fifth, the lack of homogenous sample
nationality risked leading to increased error measurements due to the self-report
measures all being written in English; however, participants’ ratings of their
language abilities suggested that very few were not confident in English. Finally, the
strong correlation between GPS and UPS data raises concerns that they are
measuring similar constructs. However, we assumed that general procrastination
would encapsulate both intentional and unintentional aspects (e.g., the GPS was
significantly correlated with both IDP and UPS). Furthermore, our collinearity
diagnostics that we employed for our regression models provided evidence that the
GPS and the UPS measure similar but distinct constructs.
Despite these limitations, we believe that the UPS is promising research tool. It is
brief and easy to administer; its use is not limited to specific samples (e.g., students)
and it strongly correlates with pre-existing measures of procrastination. Perhaps the
most important contribution this scale makes is by providing further evidence for
the delineation of procrastination into intentional and unintentional domains, and by
suggesting that the latter is stronger marker of psychopathology than the former.
Unintentional Procrastination Scale
Please read each statement and select a number 1, 2, 3 or 4 that indicates how much
you agree or disagree with the statement. There are no right or wrong answers. Do
not spend too much time on any statement.
Do not
agree
Agree
slightly
Agree
moderately
Agree
very
much
1. I rarely begin tasks as soon as I am given them, even if I
intend to.
12 3 4
2. Often I mean to be doing something, but it seems that
sometimes I just don’t get round to it.
12 3 4
3. I often seem to start things and don’t seem to finish them
off.
12 3 4
4. I intend to get things done, but sometimes this just does
not happen.
12 3 4
5. Often I will set myself a date by which I intend to get
something done or make a decision, but miss the
deadline.
12 3 4
6. I really want to get things finished in time, but I rarely
do.
12 3 4
The Unintentional Procrastination Scale 147
123
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Acknowledgments Author BAF receives salary support from the National Institute for Health Research
(NIHR) Mental Health Biomedical Research Centre and Dementia Research Unit at South London and
Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and King’s College London. The views expressed are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the NHS, the NIHR or the Department of Health.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of interest All authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.
Humans and Animal Rights This study involved human participants. All procedures performed in this
study were conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional research committee and
with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.
Informed Consent Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
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