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Who do we think of as good judges? Those who agree with us about us:

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Abstract

The present research considered what leads perceivers to evaluate someone as a good or poor judge of people. In general, we found a substantial role for agreement: perceivers evaluated another person as a good judge when he or she agreed with their perception of someone's characteristics. Importantly, the effect of agreement depended on who this “someone” was. We found that perceivers' evaluation of another individual as a good judge was more heavily shaped by agreement about their own characteristics than by agreement about a third-party target's characteristics. This effect emerged across a range of samples and research designs, including multi-rater evaluations among developing business professionals, experimentally controlled settings, and a survey in which US adults reported on existing relationships. Moderation analyses suggested that the effect of agreement was particularly strong in situations where the agreement could more effectively satisfy perceivers' motives to (a) feel relational connectedness and (b) verify the accuracy of their perception.

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... Although shared reality theory predicts that agreement is preferred to disagreement (Hardin & Higgins, 1996, see also Chun, Ames, Uribe, & Higgins, 2017), we propose that within agreement scenarios, low depersonalization will be preferable to high depersonalization. To date, research has found depersonalization is positively related to WFC and negative affect. ...
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Previous research demonstrates that depersonalization is harmful for employee outcomes. In addition, research is beginning to examine employees’ family context along with their experiences both at work and at home. We advance these literatures using shared reality theory as a foundation for investigating couples’ dyadic agreement surrounding employee depersonalization and its implications. Using polynomial regression and response surface methodology of data from employee‐significant other dyads, in Study 1, we find that agreement between partners on employee depersonalization is associated with lower work‐to‐family conflict (following general shared reality theory arguments) and increased subsequent recovery for the employee. In Study 2, we examine more specific shared reality theory arguments using the same analytic approach. We show that agreement between partners on employee depersonalization is associated with less distress and an increased perception that one's depersonalization is understood, and ultimately increased recovery for the employee via reductions in distress. Taken together, these results suggest the harmful effects of depersonalization are largely minimized if an employee's partner accurately recognizes their depersonalization. Interestingly, our collective results show it is better for employees to have agreement with their partners surrounding a high level of employee depersonalization than have low levels of depersonalization accompanied by disagreement. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
... In terms of convergent validity, we expected high correlations of the SR-T with participants' epistemic and relational assessments of their communication partner (Chun et al., 2017). On a related note, Inclusion of Other in the Self has been shown to have substantial relationship to the SR-T in previous research (Schmalbach et al., unpublished). ...
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... This finding is consistent with the notion that social verification enhances epistemic trust in the source of verification and the likelihood of creating future shared realities with that source [43], see also [22]. Recent studies [44 ] suggest that a source's agreement with one's own opinions about a target enhances the perceived epistemic trustworthiness of the source, especially when the target of agreement is oneself. ...
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