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Enhancing Network Centric Operations Doctrine to Support Civil Military Cooperation in Disaster Management
Abstract
Network Centric Operations is a promising command doctrine in both military operations and during civil disaster management. As both sectors started intensifying their joint operational capacity through civil-military collaboration, it becomes increasingly relevant to address the different command doctrines underlying Network Centric Operations in both sectors. In this Chapter I explore the origins of network governance in both sectors and argue what steps need to be taken in order overcome the differences. I argue that governing the heterogeneous set of organizations that operate in disaster response networks requires a new approach for Network Centric Operations that does not only rely upon information sharing and self-synchronization. Instead, it requires negotiation, sensemaking, and network switching in order to overcome the different functional, normative and knowledge boundaries that come into play in heterogeneous disaster response networks.
... HADR networks of militaries are understudied, and publicly available research tends to explore the military's role at the national and local level, not at the regional and international level (Zaw and Lim, 2017;Azhar, Malik, and Muzaffar, 2019). Studies on the networks behind civil-military relations in humanitarian and disaster contexts are not that many either, mostly focusing on ways to improve the interface in similar functional areas like command and control and logistics, rather than on ways in which the actors interact and the relational patterns that emerge (Tatham and Rietjens, 2015;Wolbers, 2016). We propose a framework for analysing regional military HADR governance networks as a contribution to ongoing efforts to narrow the said research lacunae (see Figure 1 above). ...
Behind humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts are governance networks of actors working together to facilitate, coordinate, and deliver joint aid and response initiatives. Militaries are key stakeholders in these networks because of their unique capabilities, particularly in Southeast Asia. This paper explores the role of military governance networks in shaping HADR affairs. It presents a framework for examining military-to-military relational structures in humanitarian and disaster contexts using network theory and social network analysis. It also assesses the nature of military ties and their influence on two capability areas essential to humanitarian activities in the region: (i) the distribution of military assets and equipment used in HADR; and (ii) the coordination of HADR exercises and training. This paper seeks to provide insights into how governance network features and properties affect the capacity of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) militaries to use available resources efficiently and to achieve shared objectives in regional disaster response.
... In fact, governance of the inhomogeneous organizations that work together in disasters needs a novel approach to the central networking operation that can lead to information-sharing and coordination. In order to transcend beyond the normative and knowledge borders of the responding organizations, there is a need for consultation, sensitization, and dislocation of the structures [7]. Moreover, effective disaster management entails a fast and exact exchange of information [8]. ...
Objective: The present study aimed at codifying a native model of civil-military coordination (CIMIC) in natural disasters in Iran.
Methods: This manuscript is a part of a larger study. The present cross-sectional study was conducted in 2019 using a two-stage Delphi technique. The factors confirmed by the technique were prioritized via a pairwise questionnaire. In doing so, 24 elites and experts in civil-military coordination were presented with the indicators in the course of classic Delphi technique and pairwise comparison. At the end, the nationalized model was finalized by sending the model to ten experts and asking their ideas.
Results: The results obtained from the two rounds of Delphi indicated that 36 coordination factors could be classified into three primary classes of staff, stuff, and system. All factors were confirmed by the experts. Considering the weight of each class, “staff” and “stuff” classes were considered to be the highest and lowest priorities, respectively.
Conclusion: Application of the coordination factors in the context of military and civil organizations leads to a better response to natural disasters. The organizations in charge of responding to disasters should be obliged to apply this model in the highest organizational commitment level as the final goals of disaster management. The results of the present study can be applied for codification of a comprehensive plan for assessing the civil-military coordination in natural disasters.
... This means instead of detailed orders, an overarching goal governs the operation that depicts the 'commander's intent', which is found to be increasingly effective in chaotic and turbulent situations (Keithly and Ferris 1999). To support command and control of the operation in progress, a new operational concept of 'network centric operations' is increasingly gaining relevance (Wolbers 2016). In network-centric operations the exchange of information between a heterogeneous set of actors is improved by using a shared information system (Alberts and Hayes 2003). ...
In the aftermath of the devastating earthquakes in Nepal, a large scale humanitarian response was launched. We studied the response operation four weeks after the last quake, using participant observations and interviews. Our findings indicate that the response operation was characterized by two faces: control and collaboration. These are rooted in governance models of chaos, command and control, versus continuity, coordination and collaboration. Using the case of Kathmandu Living Labs, we show how during the first phase of the response formal humanitarian organizations gradually pushed aside important grassroots initiatives. In the second phase, we analyse how the government sought to take control of the response by formally ending the relief phase, having regained itself after the shock of the first impact. Drawing on these results, we theorize consequences for network governance, and identify a new governance mode that transcends the dichotomy between control and collaboration: net-centric governance.
In the past years devastating terrorist attacks struck major European cities of Olso, Paris, Brussels, Nice, Berlin, London, Stockholm, and Manchester. It pushed the response capacity of Europe's emergency management agencies to its limits. Despite of organizational and technological systems being in place, the emergency response fell short on several occasions. After the attack at Zaventem airport in Brussels, fire and rescue crews operated alongside one of the unexploded suitcase bombs for hours, which later spontaneously detonated. In Manchester, fire crews were ordered to stand down by their commanders who believed the scene was too dangerous, to the dismay of the general public, while police and ambulance crews were working on-site. These cases show that responding to such devasting terrorist attacks typically generates fragmentation: the breakdown of collaborative action and sensemaking. The problem is that we do not really know how to mitigate the negative effects of fragmentation, or pinpoint the circumstances under which fragmentation is functional. This makes fragmentation one of the toughest and least understood challenge in emeregncy response. To overcome this challenge, I will perform a case study of attacks across Europe to explain how crisis managers deal with fragmentation. I will answer the following research question: how do crisis managers adapt their command tactics to manage fragmentation, and to what extent does their adaptation influence the effectiveness of crisis management operations? Answering this question enables a reflection on how to overcome the challenge of fragmentation.
How do emergency responders coordinate the response operation across the boundaries of their organizations in fast-paced environments? Coordination is a key aspect of emergency management that addresses how crisis managers from police, ambulance services and fire department align their mutual interdependencies in an environment that is prone to escalate. This challenges crisis managers to coordinate ad-hoc, under severe time pressure, with experts from different response organizations who have different skills and professional jargons.
In this dissertation, Jeroen Wolbers, explores how such cross-boundary coordination is practiced on the disaster scene based on detailed observations and reconstructions of exercises and real-life response operations. The results of this research indicate that the command and control doctrine emergency organizations employ is based on an integration logic, in which organizational designs are created, plans and protocols are administrated, and centralized command structures are instated. Yet, a different coordination logic appears during the response operation itself. In four empirical chapters Jeroen builds up a detailed account, which illustrates that cross-boundary coordination on the disaster scene is actually based upon a fragmentation logic. Emergent adaptations, the negotiation of the relevance of expert judgments, and the changing configuration of a multi-organizational response network are central aspects of this coordination logic. While fragmentation often has a negative connotation, results of this research indicate it is important not to dismiss it only as failure. Crisis managers utilize fragmentation to keep sufficient speed in managing unexpected situations and unknown threats. As such, fragmentation actually supports the very flexibility, sensitivity to operations, and improvisation that are claimed to be hallmarks of swift and effective crisis management.
This article argues that the federal government lacks a cohesive approach to post-cyber incident mitigation - that is, the closing of vulnerabilities that become apparent during and after a cyber incident. To begin addressing this gap in cybersecurity capabilities, greater legal, cultural, and technological integration among the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and US Intelligence Community would be helpful in achieving a more unified strategy in post-cyber incident mitigation.
We present an integrated theoretical framework that models the development of team situation models and implicit coordination behaviors. We first define these concepts and then examine the role of several team and context variables in facilitating the emergence of implicit coordination patterns, as well as in moderating their effects on team performance. Finally, we discuss the implications of the model for team coordination theory, team cognition research, and effective management of work teams.
The incident command system (ICS) is a particular approach to assembly and control of the highly reliable temporary organizations employed by many public safety professionals to manage diverse resources at emergency scenes. Our inductive study of a fire department's use of the ICS identified three main factors enabling this distinctively bureaucratic system to produce remarkably flexible and reliable organizations for complex, volatile task environments. This research suggests the possibility of new organizational forms able to capitalize on the control and efficiency benefits of bureaucracy while avoiding or overcoming its tendencies toward inertia.
Theory on the use of information technology in military operations assumes that bringing together units in an information network helps units to work together. Decentralized command systems such as mission command have been proposed for these networks, so that units can adapt to changes in their turbulent working environments. Others have proposed centralized command systems that permit higher organizational levels to closely direct military operations. This article uses Perrow’s (1984, 1999) Normal Accidents Theory to propose that increasing interdependencies between units in information networks places incompatible demands on the design of networked military operations. It is concluded that networked military operations require decentralized command approaches, but only under the condition that interdependencies between modules of networked units are weak rather than tight. This precondition is essential for retaining control over networked military operations.