A drunken guest in Europe?: The influence of populist radical right parties on democratic quality

Abstract

This paper examines the influence of populist radical-right parties (PRRPs) on the democratic quality in Europe. We build on both, theoretical work and qualitative evaluations on the influence of populism on democratic quality. We follow Cas Mudde and Cristobál Rovira Kaltwasser’s (2012) distinction between populism in government and populism in opposition. We expect populism in opposition to function as a corrective. That is to say, it acts as a “drunken guest” who blurts out painful truths (e. g. issues which are ignored by other parties or shortcomings of policy outputs). In government, however, it is likely to harm democratic quality since it does not respect the rules of public contestation (e. g. undermining the legitimacy of democratic institutions). Furthermore, we contend that the effect’s size is moderated by the level of consolidation, and in the case of PRRPs in government, by the specific type of government.
Our empirical tests reveal evidence for the effects of PRRPs in government. We further demonstrate the moderating influence of the cabinet type, adding to the existing literature by offering a comparative, large-n study and testing qualitative derived theory in a cross country setting.

Full text

1
A Drunken Guest in Europe?
The Influence of Populist Radical Right Parties on
Democratic Quality
Robert A. Huber
1
Christian H. Schimpf
2
Please find the definitive version of this article at:
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12286-016-0302-0.
Abstract: This paper examines the influence of populist radical-right parties (PRRPs) on the
democratic quality in Europe. We build on both, theoretical work and qualitative evaluations
on the influence of populism on democratic quality. We follow Cas Mudde and Cristobál Rovira
Kaltwasser’s (2012) distinction between populism in government and populism in opposition.
We expect populism in opposition to function as a corrective. That is to say, it acts as a “drunken
guest” who blurts out painful truths (e.g. issues which are ignored by other parties or
shortcomings of policy outputs). In government, however, it is likely to harm democratic quality
since it does not respect the rules of public contestation (e.g. undermining the legitimacy of
democratic institutions). Furthermore, we contend that the effect’s size is moderated by the
level of consolidation, and in the case of PRRPs in government, by the specific type of
government.
Our empirical tests reveal evidence for the effects of PRRPs in government. We further
demonstrate the moderating influence of the cabinet type, adding to the existing literature by
offering a comparative, large-n study and testing qualitative derived theory in a cross country
setting.
Keywords: Populism, Democratic Quality, Europe, Comparative Politics
1
ETH Zurich. Email: robert.huber@ir.gess.ethz.ch
2
GESIS Leibniz Institut für Sozialwissenschaften | Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences (University
of Mannheim). Email: christian.schimpf@gesis.org

2
“...Populism acts like a drunken guest at a dinner party: While usually it does not respect the
rules of public contestation, it spells out painful but real problems of the existing political
order” (Arditi (2005), in: Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012, p. 209))
Introduction
Populism plays a major role in European political systems and is extensively debated among
politicians, scholars, and members of the public. In the latest national elections in Denmark,
Finland, Greece, Sweden, or Switzerland, for instance, populist parties, both from the left and
the right, were capable of securing large victories at the ballot box. Aside from the shift in
political power, these elections once again were accompanied by discussions that centered on
the question of whether populism is a threat or corrective to liberal democracy and democratic
quality respectively.
This discussion provides the starting point for our paper in which we seek to answer the
following research question: What effect do populist radical-right parties (PRRPs) have on
democratic quality in European countries? While the discussion on whether populism would
pose a threat or corrective to liberal democracy remained on a theoretical level for some time
(Abts and Rummens 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012), as of late scholars have looked
to provide an empirical evaluation to the discussion using qualitative research approaches (e.g.
Albertazzi and Mueller 2013; Heinisch 2008). Based on these studies, we contend that PRRPs
can be both threat and corrective. First, we argue that when PRRPs are part of a government,
they tend to harm democracy as they may, for instance, elude the system of checks and balances
(Albertazzi and Mueller 2013). Second, PRRPs in opposition are expected to enhance
democratic quality, for example, by articulating issues that are not on the agenda but are high
priorities for a specific segment of the society (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). Third, we
expect the effects of PRRPs to be moderated by the level of democratic consolidation, leading
to a smaller effect in more consolidated democracies. Finally, we add to the literature by
suggesting that the effect size of PRRPs in government is conditional on the cabinet type.
Specifically, we anticipate the effects to be smaller in surplus governments compared to all
other types as PRRPs possess less weight relative to all other government parties.
We use linear mixed-effects regression models to test our hypotheses against data from 30
European countries over a time period of 23 years (1990-2012). Our results indicate that
populist actors in government have a substantial negative effect on democratic quality, whereas

3
these actors lack such an effect in opposition. The empirical outcome corroborates our argument
regarding the moderating influence of cabinet type on the effect of PRRPs. By advancing the
existing arguments and with the application of this specific research design, this paper
contributes to the existing research by elucidating the influence of PRRPs in a comparative and
quantitative perspective.
We begin by defining the important concepts of this work and describe the ambivalent
relationship between democracy and populism. We proceed by laying out our theoretical
arguments and hypotheses. This is followed by an overview of our research design and
methodological approach. The ensuing section includes our empirical results and a discussion
of its meanings and implications. We conclude with a summary and highlight potential starting
points for future research.
Defining Populism and Democratic Quality
In this paper, populism is conceptualized as a “thin-centered ideology that considers society to
be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups” (Mudde 2004, p. 543).
The term groups in this case refers to “the corrupt elite” on one side and “the people” on the
other. Populism argues that politics should be a mirror of the peoples’ volonté générale.
3
We
acknowledge that the concept of “populism” is contested and will likely remain so. However,
using this specific definition initially defines the concept using a minimal set of attributes. Thus,
it enlarges the realm of applicable cases (Sartori 1970). Second, Rooduijn (2014) shows that
essentially all definitions of populism converge on four key elements our definition also
encompasses: a) emphasis on the central position of “the people,” b) an anti-elite attitude, c)
the perception of the people as a homogeneous society, and d) the proclamation of a serious
crisis.
Other scholars have defined populism as a strategy in light of their strong leading figure
(Weyland 1999, 2001). This leader mobilizes politically disenfranchised and unorganized
followers with a direct approach, resulting in weaker or less important party organizations.
While this definition is useful in the Latin America context, populism in Europe differs
fundamentally with respect to central elements of this definition. For example, with very few
exceptions, populism in Europe manifests itself in stronger party organizations, although the
focus on one leader remains (see Albertazzi and Mueller 2013).
3
Similarly, Hawkins (2003, p. 1140) defines populism as „a charismatic mode of linkages combined with a
democratic discourse that emphasizes the embodiment of a popular will”.

4
Aslanidis (2015) criticizes Mudde (2004) and proposes defining populism as a “discursive
frame” through which messages are mediated. While this is (partly) in line with our definition
of populism, frames have one practical problem. Almost every politician may at times use
populist rhetoric to a lesser or greater extent. However, to have a lasting effect on democratic
quality, the populist element should be a core feature of a party. Defining populism as a frame
increases the difficulty of classifying parties in this regard.
In line of these discussions, we rely on the definition proposed by Mudde (2004), who
conceptualizes populism as a thin-centered ideology. This also implies that populism usually
occurs in combination with a host ideology. For PRRPs, this means that they are characterized
by elements of radical right wing-ideology, in particular the rejection of individual and social
equality, the appeal to xenophobia, and an element of nativism reflected in an ultra-nationalist
view (Betz 1993; Minkenberg 2011; Mudde 2010).
4
In light of our research question, it is also necessary to distinguish PRRPs from right-wing
extremist parties. Although the former share some features with the latter (Rensmann,
Hagemann and Funke 2011), such as nationalism, ethnocentrism, a Manichean outlook or an
understanding of the people as an exploited entity (see e.g. Backes 2006), these two party types
are different party groups after all (see also Frölich-Steffen and Rensmann 2005; Rensmann
2006). The crucial difference between the two is that PRRPs in comparison to right-wing
extremist parties, are not anti-constitutional (Betz 1994). Rather, they are anti-establishment
parties that criticize representative democracy but try to abide to the democratic rules of the
game (Griffin 1999; Rensmann 2006). PRRPs are also less coherent and strict in terms of their
ideology compared to right-wing extremist parties (Frölich-Steffen and Rensmann 2005) as
highlighted by their ideological flexibility and their willingness to water down in order to
maximize voter appeal (Heinisch 2003). Finally, PRRPs differ from right-wing extremist
parties in their political and institutional goals. Whereas extremist parties seek the establishment
of an autocratic regime, PRRPs demand the extension of direct democracy and seek to weaken
the separation of power (Rensmann 2003, 2006).
The distinction between right-wing extremist parties and PRRPs is not only crucial for our
case selection but also has theoretical implications. Given their anti-democratic character, right-
wing extremist parties are unlikely to have any positive effects on democratic quality. In
contrast, by maneuvering within the framework of democracy, PRRPs can have positive effects
on democratic quality. The reasons for which we elaborate on in the theoretical section suffice
4
This combination contributes to the exclusionary character of these parties (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013).

5
to say that PRRPs can function as representation channels of under-represented groups as well
as they raise awareness of political shortcomings.
For the concept of democratic quality, we adopt a broader concept for both theoretical and
practical reasons. This is necessary in order to distinguish between nuances in democratic
quality among highly developed democracies, a category covering most European states
especially those in Western Europe (see e.g. Beetham 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005;
Jäckle, Wagschal and Bauschke 2012). To conceptualize the quality of democracy, we first
define the term democracy. Given that the literature stresses the antagonistic relationship
between populism and liberal democracy, we focus on the latter rather than a more general
definition. Liberal democracy “stresses the intrinsic importance of transparency, civil liberty,
rule of law, horizontal accountability (effective checks on rulers), and minority rights”
(Coppedge et al. 2011, p. 253). Transparency refers to openly accessible information about
party finances and willingness of political actors to communicate their intentions. Civil liberty
encompasses the right to physical integrity (e.g., ban of torture) and the right to conduct a free
life (e.g., guaranteed religious freedoms or property rights). Rule of law refers to aspects, such
as, equality before the law and the quality of the legal system. It highlights the primacy of law
and order. Horizontal accountability features mutual constraints, designed to balance the power
between the different political branches. Finally, minority rights refer to rules that prohibit the
systematic exclusion of minority groups from political rights (Merkel et al. 2014). While
characterized by a number of specific elements (see Albertazzi and Mueller 2013), the key
principle for liberal democracy is that power can never be absolute (horizontal accountability),
thus establishing limits for the rule of the majority (Sartori 1987).
If these criteria are met, the next step is to elucidate how well each of the criteria is fulfilled
and, additionally, how well standards of such as transparency, legality, and good governance
are implemented (Beetham 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005). A quality democracy thus
provides citizens with “a high degree of freedom, political equality, and popular control over
public policies and policy makers through the legitimate and lawful functioning of stable
institutions” (Diamond and Morlino 2005, p. xi). Consequently, we extend the definition of
democratic quality beyond minimal requirements by adding results to procedure and content.
5
Having established criteria to measure democratic quality, we proceed by distinguishing
between positive and negative effects of populism to establish the theoretical framework.
5
The minimal definition applied by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) tends to be rather problematic for a
quantitative analysis in Europe. Applying a minimal definition leads to minimal variance in Europe since all
countries are fairly democratic.

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Populism in Democracies: A Drunken Guest?
In general, the relationship between populism and democracy, and democratic quality in
particular, is controversial. Views range from positive outlooks (see e.g. Tännsjö 1992) to
arguments considering populism a danger to democracy (see e.g. Urbinati 1998). Consequently,
numerous scholars have emphasized the need for an evaluation of the relationship between
populism and democracy, especially liberal democracy.
Albertazzi and Mueller (2013), for instance, argue that populist parties (in government)
clash with core values of liberal democracy as a consequence of how “the people” is defined.
Taggart (2000, 2002) and Mény and Surel (2000, 2002) highlight the conflict with
representative democracy and populists’ dissatisfaction with it. Since populism is neither anti-
democratic nor anti-constitutional per se Canovan (1981, 1999) and Arditi (2004) expect
populism to have both positive and negative effects. That is to say, populism combines two
perspectives on democracy (pragmatism and redemption) and functions as a corrective at its
intersection (see Arditi 2004).
As briefly mentioned in our definition of democratic quality, we thus focus on the potential
effects of PRRPs on democratic quality measured against an understanding in line with the
concept of liberal democracy. While populism perceives representative democracy as
problematic in Latin America, in an European context this relationship is overstated (Albertazzi
and Mueller 2013, p. 348).
To begin with, we draw on Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) to contend that populism,
in this case PRRPs, can have both positive and negative influences. We expect PRRPs to
positively influence democratic quality when in opposition. In government, however, the
effects are anticipated to be negative. We identify two sources of these expected effects: the
two ideological components of PRRPs, populism and the host ideology. The former refers to
these parties’ populist element. However, we differ from Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012)
in the assumption that it is not only populism that affects democratic quality. Rather, it is the
combination of populism and its host ideology, which in this case is right-wing. This leads to a
stronger focus on nationalism and nativism (Mudde 2007, pp. 16-20).
3.1 Positive effects
In general, PRRPs in Europe are regarded as exclusionary (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser
2013). Akkerman (2012), however, states that the exclusionary character of PRRPs in Europe
is mainly due to cultural cleavage and relates to the integration of foreigners and other ethnic

7
minorities.
6
Therefore, and with regard to the inclusion of under–represented groups, PRRPs
can also function as a channel of representation and participation despite their general
exclusionary nature (Abts and Rummens 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). This is
particularly the case when they are in the opposition. For instance, Hanley (2012, p. 82) finds
that the Rally for the Republic/Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ) managed to
politically mobilize and incorporate “young, poorly educated, predominately male” segments
of Czech society, which he claims might not have been politically engaged otherwise.
7
Another aspect is directly related to the PRRPs’ views that “the people” should be
responsible for the decision-making process. This results in a constant demand for direct
democracy and, in consequence, sets the agenda for a discussion over the contemporary style
of democracy as manifested in European countries (Papadopoulos 2002; Taggart 2002).
Although this can have negative consequences as well (see the section on negative effects
below), the initiation of a discourse on how democracy should function must ultimately be
considered as positive, especially as this discussion taps into the dimension of effective
participation.
PRRPs can also lead to an improvement of democratic quality by calling attention to
democratic and institutional shortcomings (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). RPPRs
generally criticize the cartelization of major parties in their respective countries, a direct
consequence of their anti-elite attitude. They point out corruption inside the political elite and
therefore have an attitude of stirring things up (Heinisch 2008; Müller 2002). For example, the
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) used the growing distrust concerning the “permanent coalition”
(of the Social Democratic Party of Austria [SPÖ] and the Austrian People’s Party [ÖVP]) inside
the electorate to mobilize their supporters. In consequence, they raised the awareness among
the people with regard to the lack of accountability of the grand coalition (Müller 2002, p. 158).
Therefore, at least as a byproduct, PRRPs can support the populace’s critical view on the
governing parties and the political system, thereby improving democratic quality with regard
to transparency. It is important to acknowledge that criticism is either entirely positive or
negative for democratic quality. Essentially, its effect depends on the target. Criticizing actors
has mainly positive effects, since it raises awareness and affects accountability. Nonetheless,
criticism can lead to negative effects as well (see section below).
6
For a detailed review of these effects, see subsequent section on negative effects.
7
Recent empirical research, however, also shows that the presence of successful PRRPs in Eastern Europe lowers
propensities of citizens to vote on average (Immerzeel and Pickup 2015).

8
Furthermore, PRRPs address certain issues which may be underrepresented in political
discourses. Hence, they contribute to the enrichment of the agenda by airing hushed-up issues.
As mentioned above, these might concern corruption or systemic shortcomings, or they might
relate to issues that are politically delicate for the elite, such as immigration (Mudde and Rovira
Kaltwasser 2012). Thus, this effect may not always result from the populist ideology; instead,
it might be attributable to the PRRP’s right-wing ideological components or even the
combination of both populism and host ideology. This is illustrated by the Belgian example.
Here, the Flemish Interest (VB) affected the position of the established Belgian parties and
increased their responsiveness and awareness with respect to important but unattended issues
such as immigration, integration, and law and order (de Lange and Akkerman 2012). Moreover,
the electoral success of the Flemish Interest (VB) forced other parties to overcome their inter-
party differences to cooperate (de Lange and Akkerman 2012).
Finally, as PRRPs seek to maximize their share of vote, they can build bridges between
different segments of society (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). The French National Front
(FN) managed to gain substantial support from losers of modernization as well as the middle
class and thereby highlighted these two groups’ common interest (Betz 2015, p. 86). This effect
is more common in Latin America, however.
To sum up, PRRPs can have positive effects on the democratic conditions in a country and
furthermore increase the awareness of political shortcomings, resulting from both their populist
core ideology and their right wing ideological elements. Whereas PRRPs have positive affects
– in particular with respect to their inclusion of underrepresented groups and their highlighting
of institutional shortcomings – they can have negative effects as well.
3.2 Negative effects
In general, populism has a problematic relationship with checks and balances (Hawkins
2003). Although this is strongly associated with the context of presidential systems in Latin
America, where the executive, or president, holds a large share of political power (see e.g.
Roberts 2012; Walker 2008), Europe has seen similar effects. PRRPs in relatively new
democracies, for instance, have tended to undermine the new political system by displaying an
anti-system attitude. The Rally for the Republic/Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-
RSČ), for example, heavily criticized the established parties in the Czech Republic and
therefore de-legitimized the political system as a whole and undermined its checks and balances
(Hanley 2012).

9
This effect, however, does not exclusively apply to unconsolidated democracies. In Austria,
for instance, the regional government of Carinthia under the leadership of Austrian Freedom
Party (FPÖ) governor Jörg Haider refused to introduce bilingual place-name signs in
communities with a certain share of Slovenian speaking people. In 2006, the Austrian
Constitutional Court ruled that it was illegal to further delay the introduction of the bilingual
place-name signs. Haider nonetheless refused to give in and claimed that it would be against
the will of the majority and a betrayal of the Carinthian people if he introduced bilingual place-
name signs (see e.g. der Standard 09.02.2006, 27.11.2007). Although this conflict is less
damaging for the system of checks and balances overall, Haider’s actions undermined the
legitimacy of the constitutional court over a longer period of time. This example also exhibits
the difficulty of separating effects resulting from the populism element and the host ideology:
Did the FPÖ oppose the constitutional court because it saw “the people” endangered or did
Haider make his proclamations because an ethnic minority was about to be granted specific
rights? This only demonstrates that we should not look at these effects separately but should
rather examine the interaction between the two.
The necessity of considering the interaction between the populism element and right-wing
ideology is not only evident from the Austrian case. PRRPs are highly exclusive concerning
ethnic minorities. The use of exclusive action and rhetoric is typical for various PRRPs around
Europe (Akkerman 2012). Rydgren (2008, p. 176), for instance, concludes that the French
National Front (FN) proclaims a “form of populist Herrenvolk democracy or ethnocracy.” In
Belgium, de Lange and Akkerman (2012) find that the Flemish Interest (VB) started to
introduce more radical language and rhetoric about foreigners.
These effects are magnified when PRRPs are in government. As Mudde and Rovira
Kaltwasser (2012) argue, populists in government exercises direct control over power. This
allows them to have a larger influence on the agenda but also to implement their xenophobic,
or at least, exclusive policies and to exclude certain groups, even as a junior partner in a
coalition. Although PRRPs are often invited into government by Christian democratic, liberal,
and conservative partners (de Lange 2012), their status as junior partners must not hamper their
substantial influence on policy outcomes (Akkerman and de Lange 2012). In other words, the
cabinet type rather than the role within the cabinet determines whether and how populist parties
affect democratic quality. Empirical evidence lends support to this argument (Albertazzi and
Mueller 2013; Akkerman 2012). Compared to government participation, Akkerman (2012)
shows that in opposition, effects on policies are rather indirect.

10
From this discussion, we derive that the role of populist parties matters. Put differently,
PRRPs are more likely to have positive effects in opposition and negative effects in government
(Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). Thus, we formulate the following two empirical
expectations:
H1a: PRRPs in the government are likely to have a negative influence on democratic quality.
H1b: PRRPs in opposition are likely to have a positive influence on democratic quality.
In addition to the distinction between positive and negative effects, we further expect
PRRPs in government to have a larger effect on democratic quality than PRRPs in opposition.
This expectation is derived, firstly, from the greater public support for the respective populist
parties and, secondly, from their greater political possibilities in government.
H2: RRPs in government have greater effects on democratic quality than PRRPs in opposition.
3.3 Moderating Factors
Adding to our set of empirical expectations, we suggest that the effects of PRRPs are
moderated by the level of democratic consolidation (PRRPs in government and in opposition)
and by the cabinet type (PRRPs in government). First, we expect the influence of PRRPs on
democratic quality to be lower in consolidated democracies, since democratic institutions are
stronger. As a consequence, PRRPs cannot undermine these institutions as easily as they can in
less consolidated states (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). Moreover, political culture is
more established and therefore the electorate might not allow erosion of their democratic
system. In unconsolidated democracies, however, the effect which PRRPs can have is larger.
This results from weaker institutions which possess less capabilities of stopping populism from
shifting power towards the executive branch.
H3: The influence of PRRPs on democratic quality is likely to be lower in more consolidated
democracies than in less consolidated democracies.
Second, we contend that one additional specification to the framework by Mudde and
Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) is necessary in order to evaluate the effect of PRRPs in government
on democratic quality. Specifically, we argue that the cabinet type moderates the influence of
PRRPs in government. Consider the example of the Swiss Peoples Party (SVP). Switzerland is
characterized by a strong culture of consensus government and super-majorities are inherent in
the government (Albertazzi 2008). Thus, the overall influence that the Swiss Peoples Party
(SVP) can exert in its role as a government member is limited due to its relative power compared
to the other government parties. Rather, it must rely on the means of direct democracy,
initiatives and referendums, which the party has launched regularly to advance its agenda.

11
Although the Switzerland example may constitute a special case to some extent, parliamentary
systems with coalition governments are most common in Europe and represent a key
characteristic of parliamentary governments. If a government party’s power is determined by
the number of other cabinet parties (cabinet type), then this should also moderate the effect of
PRRPs in government. We anticipate the moderating effect to be largest for surplus
governments where more parties than necessary govern together. Therefore, the potential
influence and veto power of parties in government is anticipated to decrease since they are not
required for policy making. By contrast, every party is needed to govern in minimal winning
and even more in minority governments. In the latter case, we therefore expect PRRPs to have
a stronger influence on governmental policies. The negative influence of PRRPs in government
is expected to be smaller in surplus governments than in to other cabinet types.
H4: The influence of PRRPs in governments on democratic quality is likely to be lower in
surplus governments than in any other cabinet type.
Research Design
To test the proposed hypotheses, we apply a cross-sectional design and include data from
30 European countries between 1990 and 2012.
8
We chose this time period because it captures
the founding, the first significant electoral results, the rise, and the establishment of numerous
PRRPs in Europe.
9
With the decline in economic growth and the rise of the so called “losers of
modernization”, populism as a political ideology gained significant support across Europe (Betz
1994).
10
Since the arguments are based on the expectation that PRRPs in government and opposition
have different effects on democratic quality, we use cabinets as our unit of analysis. This
approach reflects the change in affiliation with one of the two groups (government or
opposition). Parties in government have to hold some position in it, while parties in opposition
held at least one seat in the national parliament. Thus, parties identified as populist but without
8
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
9
We chose 2012 as an end point because data for both dependent variables are only available until then.
10
See Table A1 in the Appendix for a list of all parties used in the analysis. To distinguish between PRRPs and
other parties, we mainly followed Mudde (2007), de Lange (2008) and Van Kessel (2015), all of whom chose their
cases on the definition which we applied in our paper, too. Further sources were Art (2011), Financial Times
(10.10.2008), Grabow and Hartleb (2014), McGann and Kitschelt (2005), Oesch (2008) and Rydgren (2006).
Obviously, several cases are highly contested. For example, Fidesz in Hungary is populist according to Enyedi
(2015). However, Mudde (2007, p.50) argues against classifying Fidesz as radical-right, since the host-ideology
element is conservative. Very recently, he and colleagues argued that there has been a (slight) shift towards the
radical-right (Jenne and Mudde 2012; Mudde 30.07.15). This shift, however, lies outside our period under review.

12
a seat in parliament during the relevant cabinet were not included in the analysis.
11
We excluded
cabinets lasting less than 6 months and caretaker cabinets (as defined by Doering and Manow
(2015)) from the analysis since we expect cabinets to take a certain amount of time in power or
opposition to affect democratic quality. This leaves us with 251 of the original 303 cabinets
between 1990 and 2012 in the above mentioned countries.
12
To account for country specific effects, we use a linear mixed-effects regression model with
random intercepts, each representing one country.
1314
To test for the moderating effect of the
consolidation level and the cabinet type on the effect of populism, we use interaction effects.
We measure the dependent variable, democratic quality, using two different metrics, Unified
Democracy Scores (UDS) by Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2010), and a metric combining
five dimensions from the Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2014) specifically tailored to
capture liberal democracy. For both measurements, we use the mean of democratic quality for
each cabinet. Although the UDS is not explicitly based on an extensive definition of democracy,
it contains a large amount of information by combining ten extant scales of democracy.
15
The
content of this score reflects our definition of democratic quality by Coppedge et al. (2011).
The usage of such a combined measurement comes with one major advantage: one single index
may not be sufficient in order to determine the nuances and differences between democracies,
which is especially troubling in the case of Europe, given that a large number of highly
developed democracies clusters in Western Europe in particular. The UDS provides the average
across the different indexes (Pemstein, Meserve and Melton 2010). However, although the UDS
addresses the issue of finding a maximalist metric for differentiating among European
countries, we emphasized the ambivalent relationship between liberal democracy and populism.
11
The National Front (FN) in France failed to gain any parliamentary seats at certain times. However, due to its
rather strong election results (over 10 % in most elections since 1990), we decided to count the FN as in opposition.
12
We loose an additional number of eight cases due to missing data.
13
This is in line with Gelman and Hill (2007), who argue that a hierarchical structure within the data justifies
multi-level models, even without further tests. However, we applied an additional analysis of variance between
the null and empty model. The results (Tabel A2 in the Appendix) of this test justifies the introduction of a second
level to our model due to a significant difference in the maximum likelihood.
14
We used the statistical package R (R Core Team 2015b) to create the dataset and for our analyses. Specifially,
we made use of the following R-packages: foreign (R Core Team 2015a), ggplot2 (Wickham 2009), nlme (Pinheiro
et al. 2016), plyr (Wickham 2011), stargazer (Hlavac 2015), texreg (Leifeld 2013), xtable (Dahl 2015), and zoo
(Zeileis and Grothendieck 2005). Data is available upon request.
15
The scales combined in Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2010) are Arat’s measurement of particiaption,
inclusiveness, competitiveness and coerciveness (Arat 1991), the BLM measure for political liberties (Bowman,
Lehoucq and Mahoney 2005), Bollen’s index on political liberties and popular sovereignty (Bollen 2001), the
Freedom House scale on political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2007), Hadenius’ measure for elections
and political freedoms (Hadenius 1992), the PACL on executive elections, legislative elections and party
competition (Przeworski et al. 2000), the Polity index which measures recruitment and independence of the
executive and participation (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2006), Dahl’s Polyarchy concept (Coppedge and Reinicke
1990), the PRC score on competitiveness, inclusiveness and political liberties (Gasiorowski 1996; Reich 2002),
and Vanhanen’s index regarding competition and participation (Vanhanen 2003).

13
Despite a high level of congruence between the UDS and this concept of democracy, we
combined five dimensions of the Democracy Barometer to reflect liberal democratic quality in
greater detail.
16
With regard to our main independent variables, populism in government and populism in
opposition respectively, we apply dummy variables. To test our two conditional hypotheses, we
apply interaction effects. Consolidation is measured as years of democratic existence, available
from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2014).
17
Cabinet type is measured using
a dummy for the presence of a surplus coalition. The reference groups feature minority
governments and minimal winning coalitions. Other concepts, such as public support of the
government, vote or seat share of the governing parties, or number of parties in the government
do not necessarily reflect this argument. Therefore, we use the cabinet type as defined by
Doering and Manow (2015).
Regarding our control variables, we first include a variable for economic development. In
general, it is argued in the literature that a well-developed economy can positively influence the
democratic quality. Conversely, a less developed economy is expected to negatively impact the
latter (see e.g. Boix and Stokes 2003). Additionally, economic circumstances affect populist
parties’ electoral success and, in consequence, impact the likelihood of these parties gaining
seats in parliament and/or joining a cabinet. We measure the economic development using the
mean GDP per capita for each cabinet (Worldbank 2013). Second, we include cabinet duration,
measured in months. Finally, we include a dummy for post-communist states as we expect
democratic quality overall to be lower in these states. Although we expect no direct effect of
geographical location on the democratic quality, we need to control for the differences between
East and Western European countries which, with regard to democratic quality, often exist.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables.
16
These dimensions are: (1) Transparency, (2) Individual Liberties, (3) Rule Of Law, (4) Mutual Constraints, and
(5) Effective Access to Power of Minorities (Merkel et al. 2014).
17
The definition Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2014) apply measures the time since the last major regime change.
Given that all countries in our sample are democracies in terms of Polity IV’s definition, we can use it as the time
since democratization. If a country in our dataset was democratic but fell back to autocracy, we reset the count to
“0” again. Since Malta is not available in the Politiy IV dataset we started counting in Malta’s year of independence
(1964).

14
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic
N
Mean
St. Dev.
Min
Max
Democratic
Qualityuds
246
1.318
0.453
0.098
2.247
Democratic
QualityDB
251
59.424
13.906
20.753
86.723
Government
251
0.108
0.310
0
1
Opposition
251
0.446
0.498
0
1
Consolidation
244
32.012
32.926
0
161
Cabinet Type
251
0.219
0.414
0
1
Cabinet
Duration
251
26.944
15.108
6
61
Economic
Development
250
21,164.640
16,167.760
2,481.758
83,408.640
Post
Communist
251
0.490
0.501
0
1
Transparency
250
56.709
17.948
-5.325
90.567
Individual
Liberties
251
77.725
13.452
42.450
99.265
Rule Of Law
245
56.188
18.054
13.920
95.030
Mutual
Constraints
240
46.746
9.451
28.148
75.412
Minority
Rights
251
60.574
31.401
-5.560
100.000
The following sections describe and discuss our empirical results.
Empirical Results
We now turn to our empirical results. We begin by presenting our general results of the
models calculated using two different measurements for the dependent variable. Next, we also
present findings for effects of PPRPs on distinct dimensions of democratic quality. As Model
1A and 1B (Table 2) show, all else being equal, PRRPs in government negatively affect
democratic quality on average. In contrast, we find no substantive effect of PRRPs in opposition
across either measurement of democratic quality. Based on these results, we can reject the null
hypotheses for H1a but not for H1b.
18
Furthermore, we argued that PRRPs in government
would have a substantially larger effect than PRRPs in opposition (H2). This is supported by
the empirical evidence.
18
However, to ensure that we can conclude different effects independent from the non-statistically significant
effect of PRRPs in opposition, we follow the example of Gelman and Stern (2006) to test the extent to which the
effects between PRRPs in government and opposition, respectively, are statistically significantly different from
each other. The results indicate that this is the case in both Model 1A and Model 1B (see Figure A1 in the
Appendix). This adds further support to our argument that the effects of PRRPs in government and opposition
differ substantially.

15
Table 2: Regression Results - Model 1 and 2
Model 1A
Model 1B
Model 2A
Model 2B
UDS
DB
UDS
DB
Government
-0.087**
-1.958**
-0.067
-1.752
(0.043)
(0.928)
(0.054)
(1.147)
Opposition
0.031
-0.018
0.027
0.074
(0.032)
(0.704)
(0.033)
(0.729)
Gov x
Consolidation
-0.001
-0.008
(0.001)
(0.025)
Consolidation
0.004**
0.168***
0.005***
0.170***
(0.002)
(0.050)
(0.002)
(0.027)
Cabinet Duration
0.002*
0.027
0.002*
0.027
(0.001)
(0.018)
(0.001)
(0.019)
Cabinet Type
(surplus)
0.014
-0.080
0.019
-0.032
(0.031)
(0.662)
(0.032)
(0.682)
Economic
Development
0.000***
0.000
0.000***
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Post Communist
-0.194
-7.130
-0.193
-7.155
(0.120)
(4.252)
(0.121)
(4.250)
(Intercept)
1.043***
56.112***
1.040***
56.129***
(0.111)
(3.281)
(0.111)
(3.282)
AIC
-25.259
1445.020
-11.944
1452.461
BIC
9.336
1479.616
26.065
1490.469
Log Likelihood
22.630
-712.510
16.972
-715.230
Observations (N)
243
243
243
243
Number of
Countries
30
30
30
30
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <0.1. Entries are unstandardized estimated, standard errors in
parentheses. The reference category for carbinet type (surplus cabinets) is minority government
and minimal winning coalition.
In models 2A and 2B (Table 2) and models 3A and 3B (Table 3), we test the moderating
effect of democratic consolidation on the effect of PRRPs. Model 2B illustrates that the effect
of PRRPs in government is not statistically significant at a consolidation level of zero years
since democratization which also applies to the result in Model 2A. Consolidation has a
statistical significant effect whereas the interaction effects between the two terms are not
statistically significant in either model.
19
Thus, contrary to our theoretical expectations,
consolidation does not moderate the effect of PPRPs in government on democratic quality.
19
This becomes clearer, when plotting the interaction effects (Berry, Golder and Milton 2012; Brambor, Clark and
Golder 2006). See Figure A2 in the Appendix.

16
Table 3: Regression Results – Model 1 and 2
Model 3A
Model 3B
Model 4A
Model 4B
UDS
DB
UDS
DB
Government
-0.085*
-2.127**
-0.120**
-2.565**
(0.044)
(0.941)
(0.048)
(1.016)
Opposition
0.024
0.525
0.041
0.168
(0.041)
(0.876)
(0.033)
(0.713)
Opp x
Consolidation
0.000
-0.019
(0.001)
(0.018)
Gov x Surplus
0.157
3.026
(0.097)
(2.098)
Consolidation
0.004**
0.175***
0.004**
0.169***
(0.002)
(0.050)
(0.002)
(0.050)
Cabinet Duration
0.002*
0.025
0.002*
0.026
(0.001)
(0.018)
(0.001)
(0.018)
Cabinet Type
(surplus)
0.015
-0.175
-0.005
-0.446
(0.031)
(0.668)
(0.033)
(0.707)
Economic
Development
0.000***
0.000
0.000***
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Post Communist
-0.194
-7.240
-0.187
-6.854
(0.120)
(4.285)
(0.120)
(4.296)
(Intercept)
1.045***
56.055***
1.038***
55.865***
(0.110)
(3.296)
(0.111)
(3.301)
AIC
-11.041
1452.097
-23.039
1441.632
BIC
26.968
1490.106
14.969
1479.641
Log Likelihood
16.520
-715.049
22.520
-709.816
Observations (N)
243
243
243
243
Number of
Countries
30
30
30
30
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <0.1. Entries are unstandardized estimated, standard errors in
parentheses. The reference category for carbinet type (surplus cabinets) is minority government
and minimal winning coalition.
In models 3A and 3B (Table 3), we test the moderating effect of democratic consolidation
on the effect of PRRPs in opposition on democratic quality. At a consolidation level of zero,
PRRPs in opposition have no statistically significant effect on democratic quality whereas
consolidation does. The results suggest no substantial interaction effect for these two
variables.
20
In light of these results we fail to reject the null hypothesis for H3 to conclude that
consolidation does not moderate the effect of PPRPs on democratic quality.
Finally, we test for a moderating effect of the cabinet type on the influence of PRRPs in
government on the democratic quality with model 4A and 4B (Table 3). The results indicate
20
Again, we plot the interaction for greater clarity in Figure A3.

17
the following. First, if PRRPs are part of a cabinet type other than a surplus coalition, the effect
remains negative and statistically significant. If, however, PRRPs must share the government
with a large number of parties, their negative effect diminishes. We plot the interaction effect
in Figure 1. The graph corroborates our interpretation of the findings. In sum, while the
evidence is indicative of the proposed interaction effect, the results urge for caution when
rejecting the nil hypothesis of H4.
Fig.1 Interaction Effect between Populism in Government and Cabinet Type
Given that we applied two related, yet, different measurements for our dependent variable, we
are confident that our results are robust. In a final step of our analysis, we show effects of PPRPs
on single dimensions of liberal democracy, using the disaggregated measurements of our
combined Democracy Barometer Score.
5.1 Disaggregating the Effects
As expected, PRRPs in government are generally associated with negative effects on all
dimensions but Individual Liberties.
21
And although this effect is only statistically significant
for Transparency, the p-values barely exceed 0.1 for Rule of Law and Mutual Constraints,
21
See Table A3 in the Appendix for the regression results. For differences of effects see Figure A4 in the Appendix.
For Transparency, Individual Liberties, and Minority Rights, we dropped eight cases due to missing data entries
on the dependent variable. For Rule of Law and Mutual Constraints, the number of missing cases are 13 and 16
for identical reasons.

18
indicating that we should not diminish the effect on these dimensions completely.
22
Contrary,
PRRPs in opposition show a more diverse picture. While we can observe positive effects of
PPRPs for Individual Liberties, it seems that these parties have negative effects in opposition
as well, as the results regarding the Rule of Law show. The latter could result from indirect
effects on governmental policies. This has been pointed out with regards to other policy fields.
As Akkerman (2012) shows, PRRPs seldom affect immigration policies, for instance, directly
(even when part of the government). They have indirect effects, meaning that they set the
agenda and changes the discourse in a more immigration hostile direction. Therefore, we could
potentially even see negative effects of PRRPs in opposition on minority rights since the other
parties have to adapt. However, our results indicate no such effect here.
In sum, we find supporting evidence for Hypotheses 1a, 2, and 4. PRRPs in government on
average have a negative influence on democratic quality. The evidence with regard to these
parties in opposition does not support Hypothesis 1b and we cannot reject the respective null
hypothesis. As expected, the average effect of PRRPs in government is substantially larger than
PRRPs’ effect in the opposition which supports Hypothesis 2. We do not find that consolidation
moderates the effects of PRRPs on democratic quality. Finally, we show that the effect of
PRRPs in government is additionally moderated by the type of cabinet which they are part of.
The effect is negative if PRRPs are part of any type of cabinet except a surplus cabinet. In the
latter case, however, the effect is moderated to the extent that it remains no longer statistically
significant (Hypothesis 4). We end with a discussion of these findings in light of our research
questions.
Discussion
We began by asking whether populism is a drunken guest at a dinner party. Although this
question seems rather negative, it implicates that populists can have positive effects, “spilling
out the painful truths”, on democratic quality, based on an understanding of liberal democracy,
too. Focusing on populist radical right parties in Europe, our empirical tests reveal mixed
effects. On the one hand, PRRPs in government tend to harm democratic quality. On the other
hand, when in opposition, these parties appear not to affect democratic quality in a substantial
way. Additionally, we observe that the effect of PRRPs in government is substantially large.
22
Figure A5 illustrates this point graphically. The exact p-values are: Rule of Law p=0.12; Mutual Constraints
p=0.12. For Minority Rights, we observe greater uncertainty that manifests itself in relatively large standard errors.

19
Yet, it is moderated by the type of government in which these parties govern. Democratic
consolidation does not moderate the effect.
These results, aside from their substantial meaning, also lend some empirical support to the
theoretical framework by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012). Yet, our results in combination
with the qualitative examples, especially the Austrian case of bilingual place-name signs, raise
the question to what extent the effects of populism on democratic quality can be treated in
isolation from the host-ideology. Rather, we suggest to consider populism and its host ideology
in tandem. This tweak to the theory, we believe, could offer a valuable refinement to Mudde
and Rovira Kaltwasser’s (2012) framework and opens up the question of how left-wing populist
parties influence democratic quality. If the effects are driven by the populist elements only, we
would expect marginal differences at best. However, if the combination is pivotal, than the
effects might vastly differ. While some existing work on left-wing populist parties suggests that
these parties emphasize their host ideology more than their right-wing counterparts (March
2011), Rooduijn (2014) finds no differences. The moderating effect of consolidation is rather
weak in the European context unlike in Latin America (Huber and Schimpf 2015). This,
however, is not very surprising given the rather high level of democratization in Europe
compared to Latin America.
Another component we added to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s (2012) framework was a
second moderating factor. We argued that the influence of populism in government on
democratic quality is moderated by the type of cabinet. The empirical evidence corroborates
our argument, indicating that PRRPs in government can have a negative influence but that this
effect is statistically insignificant in the case of a surplus government. To return to our analogy
of the drunken guest, PRRPs may not respect the rules of public contestation when in
government but when in a surplus government their friends can take them by the hand. This is
well exemplified by the Italian example. After the 2008 Italian national elections, the Northern
League (LN) became essential “to the survival” of the government (Albertazzi and Mueller
2013, p. 353). Not coincidentally, the 2008 elections marked a switch from a surplus
government (pre-2008 election) to a minimal winning coalition (post-2008 election). This
enabled the Northern League (LN) to exert its political power better and to put issues about
which it cared most on the agenda. We are aware, however, that this theoretical component is
Europe-specific. In the context of presidential systems in Latin America, it would not have any
additional use. Regarding the theoretical framework this means that while there are certainly
elements that can and should be compared across continents, regionally specific factors should
nonetheless be taken into consideration, as they can be influential in their specific contexts.

20
Finally, we discuss our findings in light of different theories of democracy. Regarding
democracy in general, Schmidt (2010, p. 486) argues that the neglect of rule of law and mutual
constraints could unleash an unlimited power of the people in a potentially destructive way.
Related to our findings, this gains particular relevance when PRRPs are in government and base
their policies on the volonté générale. However, while problematic to those in favor of liberal
democracy, democratic theorists that propose and argue in favor of other type of democracies
may be more concerned. Canovan (1999, p. 14), for instance, assesses how populism and its
consequences relate to radical theories of democracy that emphasize rational deliberation.
Theories of participatory democracy regard the direct link between the people and policy
outcomes as essential. Both participatory theories of democracy and populism share a “furious
revulsion against pragmatic party politics and its compromises” (Canovan 1999, p. 15).
Nonetheless, theories of participatory democracy would reject the direct empowerment of the
people prior to intense deliberative processes. Hence, although we wish to emphasize that
radical democratic theories and populism are by no means equal, certain actions of PRRPs may
be considered less problematic from a liberal democratic perspective.
To sum up, the relationship between PRRPs and democracy, in particular democratic
quality, is considerably more complex than suggested by some authors. Having evaluated
PRRPs in the European context, we propose understanding these parties with more nuance than
merely as friend or foe, but instead keeping in mind that their influence is determined by both
their role and their host-ideology. These parties, due to ideological differences, may affect
democratic quality differently. Thus, future research could ask the following questions: First,
in order to obtain a full picture of populism’s influence on democratic quality in Europe, it
seems fruitful to extend the analysis to left-wing populist parties, which in general have not yet
received the same attention as PRRPs (March 2008, 2011). Second, and related to the first
question, it is subject to debate whether the effects of PRRPs and left-wing populists on
democratic quality, and in general, may cancel each other out (March 2011).
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Zorzeta Bakaki, Martin Dolezal, Andreas Duer, Franz Fallend,
Jessica Fortin-Rittberger, Corinna Kröber, Reinhard Heinisch, Liam F. McGrath, Gert Pickel,
Gabriele Spilker, Steven M. Van Hauwaert, the editors of the journal and two anonymous
reviewers for their helpful comments. We presented earlier versions of this paper at the Annual
Austrian Political Science Conference (Vienna/November 2014), the Comparative Section

21
Conference of the DVPW (Hamburg/February 2015) and the Contemporary Populism in
Europe Conference (Prague/May 2015) and are grateful for the comments by all participants of
the panels. This work was supported by the University of Mannheim’s Graduate School of
Economic and Social Sciences funded by the German Research Foundation. All mistakes
remain ours.
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26
Appendix A
Table A1: List of Populist Parties in Europe
Country
Party
Time Span
Populist
AT
Freedom Party Austria (FPÖ)
since 1956
since 1986
AT
Alliance for the Future of Austria
(BZÖ)
since 2005
since 2005
BE
Flemish Block(VB)
1979 - 2004
1979 - 2004
BE
Flemish Interest (VB)
since 2004
since 2004
BE
National Front (FNb)
1985 - 2012
since 1985
BG
Attack
since 2005
since 2005
HR
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)
since 1989
1989 - 2000
HR
Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)
since 1990
since 1990
CH
Swiss Democrats (SD)
since 1961
since 1990
CH
Freedom Party of Switzerland
(FPS)
since 1984
since 1994
CH
Swiss People’s Party (SVP)
since 1971
since 1980
CZ
Coalition for Republic –
Republican Party (SPR-RSC)
1989 - 2013
1989 - 2001
CZ
Republicans of Miroslav Sládek
(RMS)
1989 - 2010
2001 - 2010
CZ
Public Affairs (VV)
since 2001
since 2001
DK
Progress Party (Frp)
1972 - 2011
1972 - 2011
DK
The Danish People’s Party (DFP)
since 1995
since 1995
EE
Estonian Citizens (EKo)
1992 - today
1992 - 1995
EE
Estonian National Independence
Party (ERSP)
1988 - 1995
1988 - 1995
FI
Finnish Rural Party (SMP)
1959 - 1995
1959 - 1995
FI
Finns Party (PS)
since 1995
since 1995

27
FR
National Front (FN)
since 1972
since 1972
GR
Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)
since 2000
since 2000
HU
Hungarian Justice and Life Party
(MIEP)
since 1993
since 1993
IT
Lombard League (LL)
since 1984
1984 - 1991
IT
Northern League (LN)
since 1991
since 1991
LV
For Fatherland and Freedom
(LNNK)
1993 - 2011
1993 - 1995
LI
Young Lithuania (JL)
since 1992
1996 - 2000
LI
Order and Justice (TT)
since 2002
since 2002
NL
Party for Freedom (PVV)
since 2006
since 2006
NO
Progress Party (Fr)
since 1973
since 1973
PL
Movement for Reconstruction of
Poland (ROP)
1995 - 2012
since 1995
PL
Law and Justice (PiS)
since 2001
since 2001
PL
League of Polish Families (LPR)
since 2001
since 2001
RO
Greater Romania Party (PRM)
since 1991
since 1991
RO
Romanian National Unity Party
(PUNR)
1990 - 2006
1990-2006
SK
Slovak National Party (SNS)
since 1989
since 1993
SL
Slovenian National Party (SNS)
since 1991
1991 - 2000
SE
New Democracy (ND)
1991 - 2000
since 1991
SE
Sweden Democrats (SD)
since 1988
since 1988
Table A2: Comparision of Null and Empty Model
AIC
BIC
logLik
Test
L.Ratio
p-value
Null
316.513
323.516
-156.257
Empty
-24.390
-13.887
15.195
1 vs 2
342.904
0.000

28
Table A3: Disaggregation: Model 5 to 9
Transparency
Individual
Liberties
Rule Of Law
Mutual
Constraints
Minority
Rights
Government
-3.937*
0.086
-1.676
-1.433
-2.850
(2.326)
(1.490)
(1.063)
(0.917)
(2.357)
Opposition
0.338
2.017*
-1.518*
-0.870
-0.880
(1.746)
(1.121)
(0.795)
(0.695)
(1.789)
Consolidation
0.163*
0.095
-0.250***
0.173***
0.436***
(0.097)
(0.066)
(0.063)
(0.051)
(0.128)
Cabinet
Duration
0.006
0.005
-0.017
0.025
0.088*
(0.046)
(0.029)
(0.020)
(0.018)
(0.047)
Cabinet Type
(surplus)
-2.183
-1.529
-0.295
1.266**
1.789
(1.663)
(1.065)
(0.747)
(0.639)
(1.682)
Economic
Development
0.001***
0.000
0.000
-0.000
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Post Communist
11.735
-3.088
-32.854***
1.944
-20.495*
(7.193)
(4.938)
(6.379)
(4.755)
(10.975)
(Intercept)
32.052***
74.723***
79.020***
41.585***
61.558***
(6.379)
(4.271)
(4.507)
(3.444)
(8.425)
AIC
1853.710
1648.290
1479.412
1382.449
1884.167
BIC
1888.306
1692.886
1513.793
1416.699
1918.763
Log Likelihood
-916.855
-814.145
-729.706
-691.225
-932.084
Observations
(N)
243
243
238
235
243
Number of
Countries
30
30
30
29
30
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <0.1. Entries are unstandardized estimated, standard errors in
parentheses. The reference category for carbinet type (surplus cabinets) is minority government
and minimal winning coalition.

29
Fig. A1 Differences between Populism in Government and Opposition Model 1A & 1B
Fig. A2 Interaction Effect of Government with Consolidation

30
Fig. A3 Interaction Effect of Opposition with Consolidation
Fig. A4 Differences between Populism in Government and Opposition in Disaggregation

31
Fig. A5 Coefficient Plot for Model 5–9