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Version 20160727 1
The Relative Importance of Religion and Region in Explaining
Differences in Political Economic and Social Attitudes in Iraq in 2014:
Findings from the Arab Transformations Public Opinion Survey
The Arab Transformations
WORKING PAPER SERIES
NUMBER 1
Andrea Teti and Pamela Abbott | University of Aberdeen, UK | April 2016
The project received funding
from the European Union’s
Seventh Framework Programme
under grant agreement no
#320214 "
The Arab Transformations consortium is an international research project operating within the
European Commission’s FP7 framework. The project looks comparatively at attitudes and behaviours
in the context of the social, political and economic transformations taking place across Middle East
and North Africa since February 2011. The countries covered are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya,
Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. The survey on which this report was based was carried out between 25th
May and 31st August 2014.
Ethical approval for the Project was given through the Ethical Review Procedures of the University
of Aberdeen.
Further details of the project including the Survey Technical Report and the Longitudinal Data Base
and Guide can be found on the project web site at www.arabtrans.eu.
Acknowledgements
The Survey on which this report draws was carried out as part of the Arab Transformations Research
Project funded by the EU under Grant #320214.
The survey for Iraq was carried out by a team directed by Munquith Daghir of the Independent
Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS), based in Amman, Jordan. The survey
team was led by Dr Abdalrazak Ali.
The Arab Transformations Project is coordinated by the University of Aberdeen (UK) and includes
further 11 partners: Dublin City University (DCU), Dublin, Ireland; Análisis Sociológicos Económicos y
Políticos (ASEP), Madrid, Spain; Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), Milan, Italy;
Universität Graz (UNI GRAZ), Graz, Austria; Societatea Pentru Methodologia Sondajelor Concluzia-
Prim (Concluzia), Chisinau, Moldova; Centre de Recherche en Économie Appliquée pour le
Développement (CREAD), Algiers, Algeria; Egyptian Centre for Public Opinion Research (BASEERA);
Cairo, Egypt; Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS), Amman,
Jordan; University of Jordan (JU), Amman, Jordan; MEDA Solutions (MEDAS), Casablanca, Morocco;
Association Forum Des Sciences Sociales Appliquées (ASSF); Tunis, Tunisia
The authors alone remain responsible for the content of this report. It cannot be taken to necessarily
represent the views of the EU, the Court of the University of Aberdeen or any of the project partners
© Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. The report may be
copied and used in whole or part and adapted for non-commercial use subject to the original
publication being acknowledged.
Recommended form of citation
Teti, A. and Abbott, P. (2016). The Relative Importance of Religion and Region in Explaining Differences
in Political Economic and Social Attitudes in Iraq in 2014: Findings from the Arab Transformations Public
Opinion Survey. Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen.
The authors have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patients Act 1988 to be
identified as authors of this work.
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Executive Abstract:
Based on the Arab Transformations survey of Iraq in 2014, this paper examines the relative
weight of religious identification and region of residence in several key areas, including main
challenges perceived by the population, perceptions of security, of economic conditions, of
governance, political mobilisation, corruption, and migration. Contrary to the perception that
sectarian identity is the most important factor in understanding contemporary Iraqi politics,
this analysis shows that religious identification is often a confounding variable, and that
regional location better captures variations in respondents’ perceptions, including in key
areas such as security, the economy, and migration.
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Table of Contents
Table of Contents#4"........................................................................................................
1.Introduction #5".............................................................................................................
2.Support for the Arab Uprisings #10".............................................................................
3.Migration Intentions #12".............................................................................................
4.The Main Challenges Facing Iraq in May/June 2014#14".............................................
5.Public Opinion on the Security Situation in Iraq in May/June 2014#18".......................
6.Public Opinion on the Economic Situation in Iraq in May/June 2014#25"....................
7.Public Opinion on Governance in Iraq in May/June 2014 #29".....................................
8.Public Opinion On Politics in Iraq in May/June 2014#34".............................................
9.Conclusions#39............................................................................................................
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1.Introduction
The main dividing line in Iraq has been said to be sectarian, i.e. ethno-religious. By
contrast, the question this paper tackles is: is there any evidence that region makes
a difference after controlling religion? To answer this question, we use the Iraq
country data from the Arab Transformations Survey, which was carried out between
May 4th and June 22nd 2014. The survey used multistage probability sampling using
residential listings with sample proportionate to size. The sample included 13 out of
19 Governorates: three were excluded because of civil disorder and military conflict,
and one with very low and two with relatively low population density. Primary
sampling units were selected using simple random sampling, households selected
using random number tables and respondents identified using the next birthday
method. The aimed for sample size was 2000 non-institutionalised respondents
aged 18 years and over. All respondents were asked to give verbal informed consent
to participation in the
survey, and ethical
approval was given
through the Ethical
Review Procedures
at the University of
Aberdeen.
Map 1: Iraq
Governorates
Identifying Those
Included in the
Sample"
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The achieved sample was 1,750 representing an 87.5 per cent response rate.
Following quality assurance checks using the Percentmatch routine, 7.8 per cent of
cases were removed from the data set due to the potential for data contamination
(duplication/near duplication ), leaving 1,613 cases. The sample size is adequate to
1
generalise with 95 per cent confidence and a five per cent margin of error at country
level.
In the achieved sample the vast majority in the North are Sunni and in the Southern
Shiites Muslim, but in the Central Region the population is split rough 50/50 Sunni
and Shiite (Table 1). Although there are few reliable data on the Sunni/Shiite split in
2
Iraq, the sample profile (43.6% Sunni, 53.3% Shiite, 3.1% refused) is in line with
other surveys carried out in Iraq in recent years -.
3
Table 1: Region and Religion"
Just over half the sample is male (51.8 per cent) which suggests that it is reasonably
representative in terms of gender. In terms of age it is difficult to get reliable
estimates but comparison with UN population estimates suggests that the sample
probably underrepresents young adults and over represents those in mid-adulthood
but is fairly representative for the oldest age group.
4
Region
Sunni
Shiite
% Sample Total
North
98.2% (374)
1.8% (7)
381 (24.4%)
Middle
49.3% (322)
50.7% (331)
41.8% (653)
South
1.5% (8)
98.5% (521)
33.8% (529)
% Total Sample
704 (45%)
859 (55%)
100~% (1563)
Noble, K. and Robbins, M. (2016). Don’t Get Duped: Fraud through Duplication in Public Opinion Surveys.
1
Journal of the IAOS, preprint, 1-11, http://content.iospress.com/articles/statistical-journal-of-the-iaos/sji978,
last accessed 9th April 2016.
N.B.: the survey questionnaire did not offer respondents the option of self-identifying as Kurds, rendering the
2
identification of preferences amongst Northern Kurdish populations arduous.
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/18/the-sunni-shia-divide-where-they-live-what-they-believe-
3
and-how-they-view-each-other/
UN data: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DVD , last accessed 2nd December 2015. http://data.un.org/
4
CountryProfile.aspx?crName=iraq last accessed 9th May 2016."
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Figure 1: Age in Broad Age Groups
As with age, it is difficult to get any reliable data on the education attainment of
adults in Iraq. However, comparison with available UNESCO data suggests the
sample underrepresents those that are illiterate. The educational attainment of
5
women is lower than men’s as would be expected (Figure 2). Also as would be
expected younger age groups are better educated. Only two per cent of 18-30 year
olds are illiterate compared to 25 per cent of those aged 60 years and over and
while 45 per cent of 18-30 year olds have at least completed secondary education
this only the case for 24 per cent of those 60 years and older.
Figure 2: Educational Attainment by Gender (%) "
As we have already pointed out there is a strong relationship between religious
identity and region with the North being Sunni, the Southern regions being Shiite-
majority areas, and the Central regions being more religiously mixed. Contrary to
frequent claims made in academic literature, in the media, and in policy-making
http://www.uis.unesco.org/literacy/Documents/UIS-literacy-statistics-1990-2015-en.pdf, last accessed 9th May
5
2016.
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18-30 Years
31-45 Years
46-59 Years
60 Years and Over
6.7%
17.4%
37.2%
39%
Illiterate
Basic Education
Higher Education
10.2
27.4
26.5
29.5
6.5
7.3
22.1
26.3
33.3
10.9
12.9
32.3
26.7
25.9
2.3
Male
Female
Total
circles, survey data also demonstrates a clear relationship between the region a
person lives in and their identity (Figure 3). Region clearly makes a difference to
identity after controlling for religion: for example, while the identity of Shiites living in
the Central Region is similar, it is not identical, to Southern Shiite and Middle Region
Sunnis are very different from Northern Sunni and although more similar clearly still
different from Central Shiites. This is perhaps not surprising as a majority of the
Sunni living in the North are likely to be Kurds and to be less likely to identify
themselves primarily as Iraqi. Not least for this reason, what is perhaps surprising is
the relatively small proportion (30 per cent) that identify themselves with their region
or their local community – the closest possible proxies to ethnic Kurdish
identification, which as noted above is absent from the survey questionnaire.
Figure 3: Identity by Religion and Region (%)"
!
(Note in this and other tables where we look at the relative importance of religion and region we have excluded those
that do not identify as Sunni or Shiite, and for the regions we have excluded those identifying themselves as Shiite
and living in the North and those identifying themselves as Sunni and living in the South.)
Southern Shiite
Centre Shiite
Centre Sunnni
Northern Sunnni
Total
5.2%
11.6%
1.9%
1.8%
4.6%
6.4%
18.5%
1.9%
1.8%
2.9%
24.7%
42.5%
18.8%
18.2%
23.6%
12.7%
15.3%
25.2%
6.8%
6.6%
51.0%
12.1%
52.2%
71.3%
62.3%
Country Arab Muslim Region Local Community
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The vast majority of respondents identify their households as neither very poor
(struggling) or relatively well off (comfortable). There are no noticeable differences by
religion or region.
Figure 4: Estimation of Adequacy of Household Income "
However, on a 10-point Index of Deprivation measuring how often households have
to go without everyday essentials ranging from food to entertainment Sunnis in the
North have a noticeably higher mean score than Sunnis or Shiite in the Central
Region or Shiite in the South Region (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Mean Score on Index of Deprivation by Religion and Region "
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7.8%
41.5%
42.5%
8.2%
Struggling Inadequate Adequate Comfortable
North Sunnni
Central Sunnni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
7.6
7.7
7.8
8.6
2.Support for the Arab Uprisings
Anti-government protests on political, social, or economic issues during 2010-2011
are not easily described as part of the broader regional ‘Arab Uprisings’. The roots of
these protests go back at least to the period immediately after the 2003 US
occupation, and the nature and development of such protests is very different from
those witnessed in ‘Arab Uprisings’ countries such as Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, or
indeed Bahrain. In addition, while at least initially protests were explicitly non-
sectarian in the countries mentioned above (e.g. Bahrain and Yemen) the sectarian
dimension of political elites/leaderships (as opposed to popular sentiment) was
already entrenched in Iraq by 2010. On these grounds, it is prudent to differentiate
between ‘support for the Arab Uprisings’ expressed by Iraqi respondents which is
likely to manifest support for the general movement, and support for political protest
and mobilisation within Iraq itself.
Support for the Arab Uprisings and participation in political mobilization were both
relatively low. In total 16 per cent of respondents said that they had supported the
Arab Uprisings compared with an average across the five AT countries of 32.5 per
cent (varying from a low of 13.6 per cent in Jordan to a high of 72.5 per cent in
Libya) and three per cent of respondents who actually participated in protests,
6
compared with an average of 16.3 per cent across the Arab Transformations
countries, with Iraq having the lowest participation rate and Libya with 64.2 per cent
the highest. There are no significant differences in likelihood of having supported the
Arab Uprisings by religion or region. Interestingly, 24 per cent would go on a
demonstration now, and of these 60 per cent supported the Arab Uprisings. Sunnis
living in the Northern Region and Shiites living in the Southern Region are more likely
to say that they would go on a demonstration now, at 42 per cent in both Regions.
This is a markedly higher level compared to those living in the Central Region, where
28 per cent of Sunnis and 23 per cent of Shiites would go on a demonstration.
Although some nuance is necessary because corruption, economic factors, and
political factors are clearly not unrelated, analysis of the survey data suggests that,
on balance, respondents perceive the region-wide Arab Uprisings as more motivated
by economic and governance concerns rather than political ones per se. It seems
likely that the reasons respondents attribute to those participating in the Arab
Uprisings are likely to provide some clues as to what Iraqis’ main concerns were. On
an open-ended question that enabled respondents to nominate up to two reasons
for people protesting during the Arab Uprisings, half of respondents mention
corruption as the main motivator. However, 62 per cent nominated explicitly
In response to a question on participation in Arab Spring demonstrations in their country 5.8 per cent said that
6
they had. While marginally higher than the AT proportion it still indicates low support.
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economic drivers as first or as second factor, while only 45 per cent nominated a
political driver.
Figure 6: The Two Main Reasons Why People Protested in the Arab Uprisings"
!
Religion rather than where people live seems to be more important in terms of what
they see as the main drivers of the Arab Uprisings, although region does have an
independent impact in terms of corruption. In general Shiites see economic factors
as the main driver, while Sunnis are more likely to indicate political factors. Sunnis in
the North (both Kurdish and Arab) are more likely to see corruption as a main driver
of Uprisings than those living in other regions, irrespective of religion. Sunnis in the
Central Region are marginally more likely to see corruption as a main driver than
Shiites in the same Region.
Figure 7: Two Main Reasons Respondents think People Protested About During the
Arab Uprisings by Religion and Region"
Promote Foreign Interests
Oppose Authoritatian Leaders
Demand More Political Freedom
Economic Problems
Demand Improved Basic Services
Protest Against Corruption
50.5%
43.4%
29.8%
25.1%
22.9%
14.5%
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Protest against Corruption
Economic
Political
35.1
73.3
43.8
39.6
67.1
46.8
58.1
42.9
51.2
53.7
47.9
63.1
North Sunni Central Sunni Central Shiite Southern Shiite
3.Migration Intentions
An interest in migrating can be a clear indicator about concerns about the economic
and/or political situation in the country. Migration can be motivated by factors such
as fear of political persecution, fear for one’s own and one’s family’s safety, wanting a
better life (economic migration), or on a temporary basis for educational or economic
reasons. Almost a quarter of respondents (23.6%) have considered living abroad,
either permanently or for an indeterminate period (15.7%) or for a limited period of
time (6.3%). Men are twice as likely to have considered migration (30.9%) as women
(15.3%). Younger people and the more educated are also more likely to have
considered migration.
Although detailed analysis is difficult given the numbers, it is clear that giving
consideration to permanent/indeterminate migration is influenced by religion and
region, with Sunnis living in the Central Region much more likely to have considered
permanent/indeterminate migration than Sunnis living in the north Region or Shiites
living in the Central or Southern Region. By contrast, differences in terms of having
considered temporary migration are relatively small.
Figure 8: Permanent/Indeterminate and Temporary Migration by Religion controlling
for Region "
Region seems to be more important than religion in influencing the main reason that
people have for considering permanent temporary migration. The main driver in the
Central region is security concerns, although this seems to be a more important
factor for Sunnis compared to Shiites living in the same Region. A noticeable
proportion of Shiites living in the Central Region are motivated by economic factors.
The main driver for Southern Shiites is economic while Sunnis in the North are as
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North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
6.7
6
9.3
5.1
13.4
15.4
24.5
12.6
Permanent/Indeterminate
Temporary
likely to be motivated by economic as security factors or other factors such as
education or family reasons.
Figure 9: Main Driver of Considering Permanent/Indeterminate Migration by Religion
controlling for Region, % "
!
South Shiite
Central Shiite
Central Sunni
North Sunni
34
87.2
64.7
14.3
36.2
5.1
5.9
1.4
14.9
5.1
23.5
67.1
14.9
2.6
5.9
17.2
12.6
24.5
15.4
13.4
Considering Permanent/Indeterminant Migration Other
Economic Political
Security
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4.The Main Challenges Facing Iraq in May/
June 2014
When it comes to what are seen as the two main challenges facing the country in
May/June 2014, notably before the ISIS/Daesh takeover of Mosul, Figure 10
suggests that the main concerns remain internal security, the economic situation,
and corruption, with less concern about external interference and authoritarianism
(Figure 10).
Figure 10: Nominated as Two Main Challenges Facing Iraq in May/June 2014 (%)"
However, Region seems to make a difference, with those in the Central Region being
much more concerned than those in the North or South about internal security and
those in the South being more concerned about external security. Those living in the
North Region are noticeably more concerned about the economic situation, about
corruption, and about authoritarianism than those in the other two Regions, and
indeed are more likely to nominate the economic situation and corruption as one of
the two main challenges facing the country rather than internal security.
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Internal Security
Economic Situation
Corruption of Public"
Servants/Politicans
External Interference
Authoritarianism
12.8
20.8
48.7
49.3
60
Figure 11: Nominated as Two Main Challenges Facing Iraq in May/June 2014 by
Region (%)"
Religion also seems to make a difference, with Shiites being noticeably more
concerned about internal security and external interference than Sunnis, and Sunnis
being noticeably more concerned than Shiites about authoritarianism.
Figure 12: Nominated as Two Main Challenges Facing Iraq in May/June 2014 by
Religion (%)
"
Internal Security
Economic situation
Corruption of politicians"
and/or Civil servants
Authoritarianism
External Interference
24.7
6.5
47.3
50.6
63.4
16.5
20.6
51
47.6
54.7
Sunni
Shiite
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Internal Security
Economic situation
Corruption of politicians"
and /or Civil servants
Authoritarianism
External Interference
30.5
7.5
45.9
50.6
57.9
15
12
47.1
45.3
75.1
17.8
21.7
55.6
55.1
35.2
North
Central
South
However, when we look at differences by religion while controlling for region, a rather
different picture emerges. For internal security, contrary to expectations, it is clear
that religion is a confounding variable and that the main factor explaining differences
in seeing internal security as one of the two main challenges facing the country is in
fact region of residence. For external interference, it is Shiites in the South that are
noticeably more likely to see it as a major challenge. Sunnis, however, whether they
live in the North or in the Central Region, are more likely than Shiites to see
authoritarianism as a major problem. While the differences are less noticeable for the
economic situation, Sunnis in the North are more likely to see this as a major
challenge and Sunnis in the Central Region least likely.
These results would seem coherent with the political context: Arab Sunnis (which
constitute a majority of Sunnis in the Central and Southern regions, and locally
majorities in mixed areas of the North) have been largely marginalised from
institutional power structures since the 2003 US invasion, and perceive Shiite-
dominated Federal government as responsible for their marginalisation and political
oppression. The focus on the economy in the North is likely to be due to the fact that
‘Sunni’ here captures both Arab and Kurds, with Kurds in greater control of regional
government and concerned with ensuring the viability of their autonomy through
securing access to and profits from oil resources.
Figure 13: Nominated as Two Main Challenges Facing Iraq in May/June 2014 by
Religion Controlling for Region (%)"
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Internal Security
Economic situation
Corruption of politicians"
and /or Civil servants
Authoritarianism
External Interference
30.7
7.5
45.5
50.1
58.3
15.4
4.8
49.5
51.1
72.2
14.9
19.6
45.7
38.2
78
17.9
21.7
55.3
54.8
35.3
North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
This analysis, taking account of what respondents thought motivated the Arab
Uprisings, what motivated protest/mobilisation in Iraq, and what they see as the
major challenges facing the country in May/June 2014, suggests that at this point in
Iraq there is a complex relationship between public opinion and attitudes to security,
governance, the economic situation, and politics, and that viewing national politics
merely through the prism of sectarian identity is unwarranted. In terms of concerns
about internal security, it is clear that living in the Central region is a major factor, not
surprisingly given that so-called Islamic State (Daesh) was challenging for control of
the Region at this time. In terms of corruption, Sunnis in the North Region are
noticeably more likely to be concerned than those living in other Regions, whatever
their religion. While in terms of the political situation the division seems to be along
religious lines. For attitudes to the economic situation the picture seems more
complex, but Shiites in the Central and Southern regions seem more concerned with
the economic situation than Sunnis in the Central Region. With regards to drivers of
the Arab Uprisings, Sunnis in the Central and Northern Regions both see the
economic situation as less important than Shiites and by 2014 Sunnis in the North
are the most likely to see the economic situation as one of the main problems, while
Sunnis in the Central Region are the least likely. The remainder of this paper explores
the relationship between religion and place in more detail.
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5.Public Opinion on the Security Situation
in Iraq in May/June 2014
Unsurprisingly for a country mired in conflict, there is considerable concern about the
possibility of war, terrorism, and sectarian violence, ranging from over three-quarters
of respondents being concerned about terrorist attacks to just under two-thirds
being concerned about the possibility of a war involving Iraq.
Figure 14: Worried about War, Terrorism and Violence (%)"
However, while there are religious differences, regional differences would seem to be
much more important (Figure 15). This suggests that religion is a confounding
variable rather than a being the most important factor associated with concern about
conflict. Sunnis and Shiites living in the Central Region share a similar level of
concern about the possibility of war, terrorism and violence, and in this regard the
Sunni in the Central Region are clearly very different for those in the North. In
addition, while the difference are not as great, the same can be said for Shiites living
in the Central Region compared with those in the South Region. On regression
analysis on a scale of Fear of War and Violence computed from the four variables
(one factor explaining 67.8% of the variance, Cronbach’s Alpha 0.84) region explains
30.9 per cent (p>0.01) of the variance. Religion, on the other hand, does not make a
significant contribution.
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Sectarian Violence
Civil War
Terrorist Attack
War
64.1%
79.1%
71.5%
71.2%
35.9%
20.9%
28.5%
28.8%
Not Worried Worried
Figure 15: Percentage of people worried about War, Terrorist Attack and Violence by
Religion Controlling for Region "
Concern about security and safety can be at different levels; concerns people might
have for their family and local community as compared with the region in which they
live and their country.
Concern about the security of one’s family is relatively high: Figure 16 shows that
both Sunnis and Shiites living in the Central Region are more concerned about the
security of their families than Sunnis living in the North and Shiites living in the South,
with 25 per cent of respondents saying that they had been concerned in 2009
compared to 34 per cent saying they are concerned in 2014. This increase in
concern about the security of their family was among those living in the Central
Region, especially the Sunni while there was no noticeable increase among Sunni
living in the North Region or Shiite in the South Region.
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South Shiite
Central Shiite
Central Sunni
North Sunni
30.2
74.3
82.7
67.3
47.3
84.9
94.6
85.4
39
87.1
89.1
71.2
33.9
91.7
89.1
70.7
Increase in Ethnic /Sectarian Violence
Civil War
Terrorist Attach
War Involving Country
Figure 16: Concerned about Security of Family in 2009 and 2014 by Religion
Controlling for Region, % Giving 1/5 or 2/5 "
Similarly, there was an increase in concern about the security of the community from
25 per cent in 2009 to 30.4 per cent in 2014. Figure 17 shows much the same
picture for concerns about the security of the local community as for concerns for
one’s family, with the changes between 2009 and 2014 being much the same, and
the proportions being concerned also much the same.
Figure 17: Concerned about Security of Community in 2009 and 2014 by Religion
Controlling for Region, % Giving 1/5 or 2/5 "
Concern about the security of the district where one lives increased from 34 per cent
in 2009 to 40 per cent in 2014 with concern about the security of the district being
much higher among those living in the Central Region in 2009 and 2014. Central
Sunnis are even more concerned than Central Shiites.
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North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
7.2
46.9
72.8
22.3
8.5
35.8
46.8
19.7
2009
2014
North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
4.4
45.7
62.7
22
9.1
38.3
43.6
16.6
2009
2014
Figure 18: Concerned about Security of My Region in 2009 and 2014 by Religion
Controlling for Region, % Giving 1/5 or 2/5"
"
However, when it comes to concerns about national security, the picture is rather
different. There has been an increase in the overall concern from 60 per cent in 2009
to 76 per cent in 2014 with Central Sunnis most concerned about the national
security situation. However, the level of concern about the security of the country is
high across Regions ranging from 71 per cent among North Sunni to 90 per cent
among Central Sunni. Sunnis in the North and Shiites in the Central and Southern
Regions are much more likely to be concerned about the national security situation
than they are about the security situation of their family, neighbourhood or region,
and while the concern was equally high in the North in 2009, it increased noticeably
among Shiites in the Central Region and South Regions between 2009 and 2014.
Figure 19: Concerned about Security of Iraq in 2009 and 2014 by Religion
Controlling for Region, % Giving 1/5 or 2/5 "
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North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
9.6
61.2
80.1
23.4
17.5
48.1
57.9
20.2
2009
2014
North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
74.6
73.4
90
70.7
49.3
57.9
66.7
72.6
2009 2014
There are also concerns that international and regional powers pose a threat to the
stability of the country.
Religion clearly has an influence on what international powers are seen as a threat.
Israel is the frontrunner in terms of being seen as a threat to Iraq’s stability, closely
followed by the US, although Northern Sunnis are less likely to see the US as a
security threat than those living in the Central Region or Shiites generally. Sunnis
irrespective of district are more likely to see Iran as a threat, while Shiites’ concerns
focus on Turkey and on the Arab League. Russia and China are seen as much less
of a threat, although Sunnis are more likely to see them as a threat than Shiites.
Figure 20: Countries that are a Factor of Instability by Religion Controlling for
Region "
Version 20160727 22
China
Russia
EU
Arab League
Turkey
Iran
USA
Israel
88.8
68.8
57.7
43.6
32.1
25.9
17.3
9
79
47.2
83.6
19
24.1
18.6
22.7
12.4
97.5
89.2
92.4
26.1
20.2
38.2
27.1
10.7
95.7
75
36.4
48.7
33.3
17.1
10.9
5.2
98.2
76.5
41.4
81.1
46.6
42.3
11.9
7.6
South Shiite
Central Shiite
Central Sunni
North Sunni
Total
The pattern of responses by region and religion for countries that are seen as factors
promoting stability are the reverse of that for countries that pose a threat to stability,
perhaps not surprisingly. Religious identification is again the main dividing line.
Overall China, Russia and the EU are seen as the main powers that can promote
stability, with Shiites irrespective of Region being noticeably more likely to nominate
China and especially Russia than Sunnis. The EU is seen as a factor for stability by
Northern Sunnis and Central Shiites.
Figure 21: Countries that are a Factor for Stability, by Religion Controlling for Region "
We can conclude from this analysis that region is the most important determinant of
concerns about security for one’s family, community, and region, with those in the
Central Region having the greatest concerns both in 2009 and 2010 and having
Version 20160727 23
China
Russia
EU
Arab League
Turkey
Iran
USA
Israel
3.2
22.1
27.5
34
31.4
37.5
38.3
43.7
8.6
45.1
13
62.5
40.9
59.8
17.4
40.9
1.3
6
5.1
59.5
52.9
28.4
29.5
41.4
2.4
20.7
45.2
27.6
30
59
50.5
51.1
1.2
20.3
46
11.6
24
31.7
62.5
57
South Shiite Central Shiite
Central Sunni North Sunni
Total
seen a noticeable increase in concern between 2009 and 2014, although Central
Sunnis are even more concerned than Central Shiite. In terms of national security in
2014 Region makes less of a difference although Central Sunnis are more concerned
than the other groups.
Differences in security concerns are reflected in how respondents rate the
Government’s performance on security matters. In total, 83 per cent of respondents
thought the Government was performing badly on security matters, but this varied
by region – with virtual unanimity that the Government was doing a bad job in the
Central Region, and not much lower in the South Region, but with a third thinking
that the Government was doing a good job in the North.
Figure 22: % of Respondents Rating the Government’s Performance on Security
Matters by Religion Controlling for Region "
Version 20160727 24
South Shiite
Central Shiite
Central Sunni
North Sunni
37.3%
2.5%
8.9%
14.6%
62.7%
97.5%
91.1%
85.4%
Bad Good
6.Public Opinion on the Economic Situation
in Iraq in May/June 2014
We have already pointed out that 50 per cent of respondents see the economic
situation as one of the two main challenges facing the country, varying from a low of
38 per cent of Central Sunnis and a high of 55 per cent of Northern Sunnis, but with
little difference between Northern Sunnis and Central and Southern Shiites. However,
this does not mean that Sunnis living in the Central Region do not see the economic
situation as problematic, merely that they are less likely to nominate it as one of the
two top challenges facing the country. This section looks in more detail at public
opinion on the economic situation and examine if there are religious or regional
differences. As with security it is important to consider people’s opinions regarding
their own household’s finances in combination with opinions about the country’s
finances more generally.
Respondents seem to generally see their household finances as neither very good
nor very bad: only 10 per cent see them as very bad, and three per cent as very
good. In total, 31 per cent see them as bad, 39 per cent as neither good or bad, and
30 per cent as good. Comparing 2014 with 2009, respondents saw little change – a
marginal increase in those who saw the situation as neither good or bad, and a
comparative marginal decrease in those who saw it as bad and in those who saw it
as good. However, opinion varies by region: Sunnis living in the North Region are the
most satisfied – or least dissatisfied – with their household’s economic situation,
while Sunnis and Shiites living in the Central Region are the most dissatisfied. Shiites
living in the South are closer to Sunnis living in the North than they are to Shiites
living in the Central Region in this respect. The greater satisfaction of Sunnis in the
North Region with the economic situation of their household is perhaps not
surprising given the higher mean on the Index of Deprivation for Sunni Households in
the Region (see Figure 5 above). These similarities appear to confirm qualitative
research suggesting that non-Kurdish (Arab) Sunnis which constitute the majority in
the Central Region and in parts of the North perceive the Federal government and
local government in the North as marginalizing Sunni Arabs.
Version 20160727 25
Figure 23: Opinion About the Household’s Economic Situation in May/June 2014"
The overall view of respondents on the state of the national economy is much the
same as for their household economy: few see it as very good, and nearly a quarter
(23 per cent) see it as very bad. In total 23 per cent see it as good and 50 per cent
as bad, with the remaining 27 per cent seeing it as neither good or bad. Compared
with five years ago overall respondents suggest that there has been a slight shift to
the middle as with opinions on changes in the economic situation of households.
Region does seem to have an impact, with Shiites living in the South having the
most positive – or rather least negative – view about the country’s economy (Figure
24) while Sunnis living in the Central Region have the most negative view, with nearly
three-quarters rating it as bad. Northern Sunnis and Central Shiites have similar
opinions on the state of the national economy and stand somewhere between the
views of Southern Shiites and Central Sunnis.
Figure 24: Opinion About Country’s Economic Situation in May/June 2014"
Version 20160727 26
South Shiite
Central Shiite
Central Sunni
North Sunni
44.9%
19.1%
18.8%
37.0%
35.5%
41.3%
40.4%
39.4%
19.7%
39.7%
40.7%
23.6%
Bad Neither Good
South Shiite
Central Shiite
Central Sunni
North Sunni
19.1%
9.0%
12.2%
30.3%
25.7%
18.1%
31.6%
30.6%
55.2%
72.9%
56.2%
39.1%
Bad Neither Good
Respondents’ general opinion of the Government is that it is not performing well in
terms of economic policies. It is judged to be performing least well on creating job
opportunities, with only 12 per cent of respondents thinking it is going a good job,
13 per cent thinking it is performing well in terms of narrowing the gap between the
rich and poor, and 26 per cent that it is performing well in controlling inflation. Its
best performance is perceived to be the provision of utilities, but even here only 22
per cent of respondents think it is performing well. Figure 25 shows that there is no
overall easily identifiable pattern by religion or region. However, on a scale of
Economic Performance computed from the four variables (variance explained 57.7%,
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.75) religion explains 10.6 per cent of the variance (sig p>0.001)
but region does not make an additional significant contribution to the r2 explained.
This indicates that while religion but not region does make a difference, other factors
are more important in explaining differences.
Figure 25: Government Performing Duties in Office Well "
Not only is there concern about how well the Government is performing in terms of
economic policies, there is also – perhaps not surprisingly – general dissatisfaction
with how the economy is developing: a mere two per cent of respondents are very
satisfied, while 29 per cent are very dissatisfied. In total, 68 per cent are dissatisfied
compared with just under half that number (32 per cent) expressing at least some
degree of satisfaction. However, satisfaction /dissatisfaction varies with both religion
and region in a manner consistent with claims about the political marginalization of
Arab Sunnis in post-2003 Iraq, particularly in the Central region. The most satisfied
are Southern Shiites, over half of whom are satisfied with the way the economy is
developing. The most dissatisfied are Central Sunnis, only 14 per cent of whom are
Version 20160727 27
North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
56.7
49.6
24.5
41.2
40.4
29.6
13.2
10.3
16
15.1
7.5
8.6
8.4
16.2
7.6
14.4
Creating Employment Narrowing Gap Rich and Poor
Controlling Inflation Provision of Utilities
satisfied. Northern Sunnis and Central Shiites are much the same with about a
quarter of respondents being satisfied with Government performance on the
economy
Figure 26: Satisfaction with the Way the Economy is Developing "
In terms of public opinion on the economy there is some evidence that both religion
and region play a role, but that region is more important than religion. Shiites tend to
be more positive about the Government’s performance than Sunnis, although
Northern Sunnis tend to have a more positive view about the economic situation of
their household and this ties in with their households, on average, being better off as
measured by the Index of Deprivation. Overall, it is Southern Shiites that have the
most positive opinions on the Government’s economic performance, with Central
Shiites being a little less negative than Sunnis in the North or Central Regions. This is
again consistent with accounts emphasizing the marginalization of Sunni Arabs from
post-2003 federal governments.
!
Version 20160727 28
South Shiite
Central Shiite
Central Sunni
North Sunni
3.9%
0.6%
2.8%
1.8%
19.5%
13.1%
20.9%
54.1%
32.0%
40.8%
43.4%
38.0%
44.6%
45.5%
32.9%
6.1%
Very Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Satisfied Very Satisfied
7.Public Opinion on Governance in Iraq in
May/June 2014
There are low levels of general trust, with only just over a quarter of the respondents
7
(27.3%) thinking that other people can generally be trusted. However, this varies by
religion and by Region. A third of Southern Shiites generally trust other people,
compared with only a sixth of Northern Sunnis (Figure 25). Sunnis are less likely to
trust other people than Shiites, and while those living in the Center Region are more
likely to trust other people than those in the North, the difference, although
noticeable, is not large.
Figure 27: General Trust in other People by Religion Controlling for Region "
We have already seen that there is a concern about corruption by politicians and civil
servants. Although by no means the main concern of respondents, nevertheless less
corruption is seen as one of the main drivers of the Arab Uprisings, and one of the
two main challenges facing the country. There is also some evidence that Northern
Sunnis may see corruption as more of a problem than those living in the Central or
the South Regions, irrespective of religion.
Less than one per cent of respondents think there is no corruption in state
institutions, and 90 per cent think that corruption occurs to a significant extent. In
addition, only one third think that the Government is working to crack down on
corruption. Respondents in the Central Region – irrespective of religion – are more
likely than those in the South and the North to think that corruption in state
institutions is a problem. However, Shiites living in the Central or Southern regions
In the 6th Round of the World Values Survey on a comparable question the average score for the pooled data
7
set is 47.2 per cent varying from a high of 83 per cent for Norway and Denmark to a low of nine per cent for
Paraguay.
Version 20160727 29
North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
34.9
31
20.8
16.7
are more likely than Sunni, irrespective of where they live to think that the
Government is working to crack down on corruption, albeit that even then only a
minority think that this is the case. Sunnis in the Central Region are marginally more
likely – a quarter compares to a fifth of respondents – than those in the North to
think the Government is cracking down on corruption.
Figure 26: Corruption a Problem in State Institutions and Government Working to
Crack Down on it by Religion controlling for Region "
Trust in Government (Council of Ministers) and Parliament is very low nationally, with
only a quarter of respondents trusting the Council of Ministers, and an even lower 11
per cent trusting Parliament. However, trust varies by Region and by religion,
especially for trust in the Council of Ministers, where Shiites have much higher levels
of trust than Sunnis, albeit still relatively low. Northern Sunnis have higher levels of
trust than Central Sunnis and for trust in Parliament much the same as Shiites living
in the Central or Southern Region. The two variables scale, explaining 77.9 % of the
variance with a Cronbach’s Alpha of 7.1. In regression analysis, religion accounts for
10 per cent of the variance (R2 p sig>0.001). When region is added to the model, it
makes a significant contribution and increases the R2 to 12 (p sig>0.001) indicating
that both region and religion contribute to explaining differences. However, the
amount of variance explained is relatively small overall, indicating that other factors
are also important.
Version 20160727 30
North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
39.9
49.6
26.2
19.9
83
93.6
98.5
88.1
Corruption A Problem in Government Agencies and Instituions
Government Working To Crack Down On Corruption
Figure 27: Trust in the Government by Religion Controlling for Region "
Trust in local government is somewhat higher at 56 per cent, and although trust
across the country is higher, the same pattern holds, with trust lower among Sunnis
and higher among Shiites, irrespective of location. The very high level of trust in local
government by Southern Shiites is especially notable. Again, although it is important
to differentiate between populations and the parties claiming to represent them,
these patterns appear compatible with accounts emphasising the marginalisation of
the concerns of Sunni Arabs within federal government structures, and/or the
inability of those groups claiming to represent them to effectively influence federal
policy.
Figure 28: Trust in Local Government by Religion controlling for Region "
There is a strong relationship between trust in the army and trust in the law courts
and legal system by religion, with Shiites more likely to trust irrespective of where
they live. Trust in institutions of law and order is relatively high for the courts and the
army, but lower for the police: 57 per cent of respondents trust the army, 40 per cent
the law courts and legal system but only 10 per cent the police. Trust in the army
and in the law courts is relatively high in the South and very high in the army among
Version 20160727 31
North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
14.3
12.1
1.3
14.7
37.3
31.8
5.3
18.4
Council of Ministers
Parliament
North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
87.6
69.7
32.5
34.4
Central Shiites and much lower among Central Sunnis and Northern Sunnis. For the
police, levels of trust are much the same for Northern Sunnis and Central and
Southern Shiites, but noticeable lower for Central Sunnis. It should be noted that the
relationship between security forces (private as well as state), federal government,
and general population is particularly complex, not least due to the changing
configuration of those forces, with politically-affiliated private militias becoming
increasingly prominent since 2003, and with such militias’ changing relation to the
state. Some such forces have at various points been ‘incorporated’ within federal
structures, albeit retaining significant degrees of independence, while at other times
– most spectacularly with the fall of Mosul – federal forces have melted away,
reflecting at least partly the fraught relations between Arab Sunni-majority parts of
those forces, local populations (especially in the Central region) and Shiite-
dominated federal government.
Figure 29: Trust in Institutions of Law and Order by Religion Controlling for Region "
People rely on independent institutions in order to get impartial authoritative
information and to act on their behalf in lobbying government. Virtually all the
respondents said that they had at least one source that they trusted to get
information on politics. However, trust in institutions is low, with only 37 per cent of
respondents expressing trust in political parties, 35 per cent trusting the media, 29
per cent trusting civil society organisations, and 43 per cent trusting religious
leaders. Generally, trust is higher among Southern and Central Shiites than Central
and Northern Sunnis. Trust is notably lower in civil society organisations and religious
leaders among Central Sunnis and higher among Southern Shiites in religious
leaders and the media.
Version 20160727 32
North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
11.6
13.2
1.9
16.3
63.3
45.6
14.8
25.4
67.8
80.6
34.4
23.4
Army
Law Courts and Legal System
Police
Figure 30: Trust in Political Parties, the Media, Civil Society Organisations and
Religious Leaders by Religion Controlling for Region"
Version 20160727 33
North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
75.9
59.8
12.6
41.2
41.3
30.4
8.2
31.9
57.9
39
30.1
33.1
45
47.5
31.3
30.3
Political Parties
Media
Civil Society Organisations
Religious Leaders
8.Public Opinion On Politics in Iraq in May/
June 2014
The political system is not rated very highly by respondents, and is rated even less
highly in 2014 than they rated it for 2009. While 55 per cent of respondents give the
system a mark of 1 or 2 out of 5 for 2009, 73 per cent gave it the same grading for
2014, an increase of about one third.
Figure 31: Political System 2009 and May/June 2014, Marks Out of Five "
Respondents were more likely to rate
the political system as poor in 2014
compared to the rating they gave it for
2009. The difference was marginal in
the North, but increased by 30.3
percentage points among Southern
Shiites, 13.6 per cent among Central
Shiites and 22.5 among Central Sunnis.
In 2014, Central Sunnis are the most
likely to score the political system as
very poor with nearly 90 per cent doing
so, followed by Southern and Central
Shiites where it is just over two-thirds.
Northern Sunnis are least likely to rate
the system as poor, but their rating is
not much lower than that of Southern
Shiites and of Central Shiites. While
Iraqi political history makes clear that
different groups have different reasons
for rating government as poor, it is also
clear that no subset of the population
has a particularly high opinion of the
system and of political elites. Alongside
other data evidenced by the Arab
Transformations survey – particularly
the generalized lack of trust, the challenges respondents perceive, their rating of
their economic condition, and their expectations of political systems and of
democracy – this suggests both a fairly profound disjoin between population and
political elites of whatever ethno-religious background, and commensurately the
Version 20160727 34
2009
2014
0.7%
1.0%
6.9%
8.0%
19.9%
35.7%
35.8%
33.6%
36.8%
21.8%
1
2
3
4
5
possibility of a demand for a social, political, and economic ‘contract’ based on
more than sectarianized agendas.
Figure 32: Give the Political System in 2009 and 2014 a Mark of 1 or 2 out of 5 by
Religion controlling for Region "
Three-quarters of respondents thought that government and parliament should
make laws according to the wishes of the people. Support is high across the country
with Northern Sunnis being most likely to support this proposition with 87 per cent,
while Central Sunnis least likely to support it, albeit still at 73 per cent.
Figure 33: Support for Government to be according to the wishes of the People
Controlling for Region"
A quarter of respondents though that it was necessary for people to obey
government decisions even if they disagree with them. Shiites in the South are
Version 20160727 35
North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
70.7
68.9
88.7
63.6
40.4
55.3
66.2
68.7
2009 2014
North Sunni
Central Sunni
Central Shiite
Southern Shiite
78.9
78.8
73.3
87.2
especially likely to support this proposition, but the differences between Sunnis and
Shiites living in the Central Region are relatively small.
Figure 34: Obey Government Decisions Even if Disagree with them by Religion
Controlling for Region "
Two-thirds of respondents think that Political reform should be introduced gradually
and there is relatively high support across the country for the proposition, but Shiites
are much more likely to support it than Sunnis, irrespective of region where they live.
Figure 35: Political Reform Should be Introduced Gradually by Religion Controlling
for Region "
Support is high for a political system where there is competition between political
parties both secular and religious. This is in line with the strong support for the
government and parliament to take into account the wishes of the people.
Version 20160727 36
North Sunnni
Central Sunnni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
61.6
29.8
24.4
21.1
North Sunnni
Central Sunnni
Central Shiite
South Shiite
81.9
80.6
60.6
65.3
Figure 36: Type of Political System Would Support, % of Respondents "
With regard to the type of political system respondents would favour, there is little
evidence of differences along religious or regional lines. Support for a multiparty
parliamentary system is strong across the country, and although support among
Sunnis in the Central Region is lower than elsewhere, significantly it still remains at
around two thirds (64.6 per cent). Sunnis in the North are most likely to support a
system based on rule by Islamic law with no parties or elections (20.3 per cent), with
Shiites living in the South not far behind (14.6 per cent) but support among Sunnis
and Shiites in the Central Region is far lower.
Three elements of these results appear significant. First and foremost, the high levels
of preference expressed for a ‘liberal’ party system with elections and party
participation without a prior exclusions of particular religious positions or ethnic
groups. Although the lowest level of support for such a system is 64.6 per cent
amongst Central Sunnis, this is still over three times the level of support for the next
most preferred political system (20.3 per cent for a system based on Islamic law with
no parties, amongst Northern Sunnis; and 17.4 per cent for a multiparty system
restricted to Islamic parties again amongst Northern Sunnis).
Version 20160727 37
Government by Islamic Law"
with No Political Parties or"
Elections
A Strong Leader Takes Decisions"
Regardless of the Election Results"
or the Opinion of the Opposition
Parliamentary system with"
Only Islamic Political Parties
Parlamentary System with Nationalist,"
Left Wing, Right wing and"
Islamic Parties Competing
81.9%
10.9%
2.0%
11.0%
18.1%
89.1%
98.0%
89.0%
Not Suitable
Suitable
Second, the comparability of these results across regional and religious divides. In
other words, despite the high levels of conflict and the low levels of trust in
institutions and low opinions of the job political representatives are doing at a federal
level, the vast majority of Iraqis express support for a representative parliamentary
system.
Finally, it seems significant that the highest levels of support for religious government
of some kind come from the Shiite-majority Southern region and from the mixed
Kurdish-Arab Sunni-majority North. In particular, this pattern of preferences raises
questions about the hypothesis according to which Sunni Arabs – the bulk of which
are located in central and Northern (north-western) regions – display lower levels of
trust in institutions, in government action, etc. than their Kurdish and Shiite
counterparts due to their relative marginalization in federal government since the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. Insofar as these systems are a
priori more exclusionary than the pluralistic parliamentary system that nonetheless is
the clear national preference, on might expect these preferences to be displayed by
marginalized groups – Sunni Arabs – whereas groups displaying greater satisfaction
with government performance and with the economic situation might be thought to
have a greater stake in the institutional status quo.
Figure 37: Type of Political System Would Support by Religion Controlling for
Region"
Version 20160727 38
Governed by Islamic Law"
with no political parties or"
elections
A Strong Authotrity that Takes"
Decisions Regardless of the"
Election Results or the"
Opinion of the Opposition
A Parliamentary system in"
which Only Islamic Political"
Parties Compete
Parlament System with Nationalist,"
Left Wing and Right Wing"
and Islamic Poloitical Parties
83.7
17.4
7.1
20.3
64.6
5.8
16.3
5.5
82.6
9.2
7
2.4
91.4
10.9
15.7
14.6
South Shiite Central Shiite
Central Sunnni North Sunnni
9.Conclusions
This paper presents interesting results in several areas, challenging some received
notions about the relative weight of sectarian identity as opposed to other factors –
particularly residential location – in explaining the variation of perceptions of
respondents to the 2014 Arab Transformations survey in Iraq. These regional
variations point to the importance of local conditions rather than – or at least
alongside – identity politics in explaining Iraqi public opinion, which in turn has
potentially significant implications for policy design in and for Iraq.
Main challenges: Nationally, internal security and the economy are the greatest
challenges perceived (60 per cent and 50 per cent respectively) with corruption
trailing at 31 per cent. Internal security is a particular concern for those living in
central areas, regardless of religious identification; in the South, the primary concern
is instead with external security, while the North is more concerned with the
economy, authoritarianism, and with corruption. In addition, although sectarian
identity is a popular spectrum through which to view Iraqi politics, survey data shows
few marked differences in between Sunnis and Shiites, with the exception of Sunnis’
concerns about authoritarianism (20 per cent) outstripping Shiites’ (6 per cent)
nationally.
Security: Nationally, respondents are very concerned about violence, with the least
of these concerns being war (64 per cent) and terrorist attacks, civil war, and
sectarian violence all scoring between 70 and 80 per cent. The least concerned
across all categories are Northern Sunnis, followed by Southern Shiites, with those
by far most concerned being Sunnis and Shiites resident in central regions. With a
‘low’ of just under 60 per cent amongst Northern Sunnis, the federal government’s
performance on security issues is uniformly very poor (85.7 per cent amongst
Southern Shiites, 91.1 per cent amongst central Shiites, and 97.5 per cent amongst
Central Sunnis). At a regional/international level, Israel, the US, and Iran are
perceived as the countries contributing most to Iraq’s instability (with the exception
of Turkey, which predictably scores highly as a concern in the North).
Economics: Northern Sunnis again hold the least negative opinions about their own
economic situation (20 per cent bad, 35 per cent neither, 45 per cent good) and
about government performance in this area. Southern Shiites hold a comparable
position, while inhabitants of Central regions – whether Sunni or Shia – are more
pessimistic (40 per cent bad, 40 per cent indifferent, 20 per cent good). Again,
region seems to be more important than religion. Dissatisfaction with the way the
economy is developing, on the other hand, seems to be relatively lower in the
Central and Southern regions amongst Shiites, compared to Sunnis both in the
Version 20160727 39
Central and Northern Regions.
Governance: Corruption is perceived as a uniformly pervasive problem, with
between 88 and 98 per cent identify it as a problem across regions and religion.
Shiites in the Central and Southern regions are more confident in the government
working towards tackling it, although at 50 per cent and 40 per cent respectively,
these are still low values. Trust in government is highest amongst Shiites in the
Central Region (32 per cent for Council of Ministers) and South (37 per cent), but at
most half these levels for Sunnis in other regions. At sub-national level, over two
thirds of Shiites in the central region and nearly 88 per cent in the South trust local
government, while a mere third of Sunnis in both the Northern and Central Regions
do so. Trust in other institutions is nearly universally lower, with the police scoring
particularly poorly (form 16 per cent among Northern Sunnis, to two per cent
amongst Central Sunnis). The exception is religious leaders, who are little trusted by
Central Shiites (12 per cent), but score significantly higher elsewhere: 41 per cent
amongst Northern Sunnis, 60 per cent amongst Central Shiites, and 76 per cent
amongst Southern Shiites. Political parties also score relatively low, between 30 per
cent and 47 per cent.
Political System: An important result is that Iraqis preponderantly favour a
parliamentary form of government in which all parties – religious and secular, right
and left – can take part. The highest level of support for this system is amongst
Southern Shiites (91 per cent), followed by Central Shiites and Northern Sunnis (both
at 83 per cent), and finally Central Sunnis (64 per cent). While the latter figure is
significantly lower than others, it nonetheless shows that despite often difficult
situations in central regions in terms of security, the economic, corruption, or trust in
state institutions, the space for political inclusiveness remains, at the popular level if
not at the level of political elites.
Uprisings: Perception of reasons for participating in Uprisings focus preponderantly
on economic factors (protest against corruption at 50 per cent, demand for
improved basic services at 43 per cent, and economic problems at 30 per cent)
while explicitly political factors took fourth and fifth place (demand more political
freedom at 25 per cent, oppose authoritarian leaders at 23 per cent)
Migration: Almost a quarter of respondents (23.6 per cent) have considered living
abroad, either permanently/for an indeterminate period (15.7 per cent) or for a limited
period (6.3 per cent). Men are twice as likely to have considered migration (30.9 per
cent) as women (15.3 per cent). Younger people and the more educated are also
more likely to have considered migration. Sunni Arabs from the Central regions are
the group most likely to consider migration. Respondents are more likely to consider
permanent or indeterminate migration rather than temporary migration, reinforcing
the gravity of the factors leading respondents to consider migrating. Region is more
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important than religion in influencing the main reason that people have for
considering permanent temporary migration. The main driver in the Central region is
security concerns, although this seems to be relatively more important for Sunnis
compared to Shiites living. The economy is a greater push factor in the South,
whereas political and security drivers are evenly split (roughly one third) for Northern
Sunnis, with the economy and other factors at 15 per cent each.
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