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Community-Based Approaches to Herbicide-Resistant Weed Management: Lessons from Science and Practice

July 2016
Weed Science 64(sp1):609-626

DOI:10.1614/WS-D-15-00122.1

Authors:

David E. Ervin

Portland State University

George Frisvold

University of Arizona

When herbicide-resistant weeds are highly mobile across farms, delaying resistance becomes a common-pool resource (CPR) problem. In such situations, it is in the collective long-term interest of farmers to conserve an herbicide's usefulness. Yet, each farmer has an individual short-run incentive to use the herbicide without considering effects on resistance. This study considers the potential for community-based (CB) approaches to address problems of herbicide-resistant weeds. Here, growers actively participate in designing, financing, and implementing programs, usually in collaboration with industry, government, and universities. CB approaches have certain advantages over top-down regulatory or subsidy-based approaches. Scholars and practitioners have developed effective governance mechanisms for many CPRs that could aid in developing effective resistance management programs. Successful CB management programs for insect pest eradication and areawide invasive weed control offer additional lessons about the potential and challenges of such efforts. Lessons from these examples can inform the design and implementation of successful, voluntary programs for herbicide-resistance management. Key research, education, and outreach priorities to help implement successful CB programs are identified at the close.

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Weed Science 2016 Special Issue:609–626

Community-Based Approaches to Herbicide-Resistant Weed Management:

Lessons from Science and Practice

David E. Ervin and George B. Frisvold*

When herbicide-resistant weeds are highly mobile across farms, delaying resistance becomes a

common-pool resource (CPR) problem. In such situations, it is in the collective long-term interest of

farmers to conserve an herbicide’s usefulness. Yet, each farmer has an individual short-run incentive

to use the herbicide without considering effects on resistance. This study considers the potential for

community-based (CB) approaches to address problems of herbicide-resistant weeds. Here, growers

actively participate in designing, ﬁnancing, and implementing programs, usually in collaboration

with industry, government, and universities. CB approaches have certain advantages over top-down

regulatory or subsidy-based approaches. Scholars and practitioners have developed effective

governance mechanisms for many CPRs that could aid in developing effective resistance

management programs. Successful CB management programs for insect pest eradication and

areawide invasive weed control offer additional lessons about the potential and challenges of such

efforts. Lessons from these examples can inform the design and implementation of successful,

voluntary programs for herbicide-resistance management. Key research, education, and outreach

priorities to help implement successful CB programs are identiﬁed at the close.

Key words: Areawide, community-based, common-pool resources, herbicide resistance.

Herbicide-resistant (HR) weeds are not a new

problem. Episodes of resistance date back to the

1950s with 2, 4-D, and have continued periodically,

such as for the triazine herbicides in the 1970s. As

of 2015, there has been conﬁrmation of 244 weed

species that are resistant to one or more herbicides

(Heap 2015). However, the widespread adoption of

HR crops (especially glyphosate-resistant corn (Zea

mays L.), cotton (Gossypium hirsutum L.), soybeans

[Glycine max (L.) Merr.], sugar beets (Beta vulgaris

L.), and canola (Brassica napus L.) led to dramatic

reductions in the diversity of weed control tactics

used (Frisvold and Reeves 2014; Norsworthy et al.

2012). This in turn created enormous selection

pressure for several weeds to develop resistance

(NRC 2010). The reduced diversity in weed-control

tactics over so many cropping systems and hectares

also means that the geographic and economic scope

of resistance problems have become comparably

vast. Further, the likelihood of a ‘‘ silver bullet’’

solution from a new herbicide discovery appears nil,

according to industry sources (Duke 2012).

In response, the search for cost-effective ap-

proaches to control HR weeds has taken on new

urgency. Scientiﬁc and practitioner task forces have

produced best management practice (BMP) guides

to help growers and their public and private advisers

address resistance development on their lands

(Burgos et al. 2006; HRAC 2015; Norsworthy et

al. 2012). Despite this, HR weed problems continue

to spread across cropping systems throughout North

America, affecting more and more farmers. Thus

far, offering BMP recommendations alone has not

changed this trajectory. Now, interdisciplinary

groups of scientists are arguing that greater

integration of the human and social dimensions of

the problem with biophysical aspects is key to

creating more effective control strategies (Ervin and

Jussaume 2014; NRC 2012; Shaw et al. 2011).

The seminal work of Miranowski and Carlson

(1986) highlighted the critical role of pest mobility

in designing appropriate policy responses to manage

resistance. Early research on managing pest resis-

tance concluded that mobility was a problem with

insect pests, but not weeds (Carlson and Wetzstein

1993; Clark and Carlson 1990; Gould 1995;

Pannell and Zilberman 2001). A growing body of

evidence, however, indicates that weed mobility is

more signiﬁcant and widespread than previously

thought (Michael et al. 2010; Wilson et al. 2008). If

herbicide-resistance traits are mobile across farms,

the susceptibility of those weeds to herbicides is a

resource shared by all operators in the community.

DOI: 10.1614/WS-D-15-00122.1

* First author, Senior Fellow, Institute for Sustainable

Solutions and Professor Emeritus of Environmental

Management and Economics, 241 Cramer Hall, 1721 SW

Broadway, Portland State University, Portland, OR 97201;

Second author, Professor and Extension Specialist,

Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 319

Cesar Chavez Building, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ

85721. Corresponding author’s E-mail: ervin@pdx.edu

Ervin and Frisvold: Community-based approaches to manage resistance 609

It is in the collective interest of farmers to delay

resistance and to conserve the usefulness of an

herbicide as a weed management tool. Yet, steps

taken by individual farmers in the short run to

conserve the usefulness of an herbicide (such as

using alternative weed control tactics) can be costly.

Delaying resistance becomes a ‘‘ common-pool’’

problem—each farmer has an individual incentive

to use the herbicide in the short run without

considering effects on resistance. Just as every

farmer pumping groundwater knows that over-

drafting can deplete an aquifer in the long run, each

still has an individual incentive to pump in the short

run. As such, individual farmers might not manage

resistance because they are not assured their

neighbors will match their actions. This situation

sets up the well-recognized ‘‘ tragedy of the

commons’’ where the susceptible weed gene pool

will be exhausted without some form of interven-

tion (Hardin 1968; Webster and Sosnoskie 2010).

The common-pool nature of weed susceptibility

means that managing resistance is not just an

agronomic problem, but a social one as well. A

fundamental question then becomes, ‘‘What type of

social organizations can effectively manage com-

mon-pool resources?’’ Early scholarship on the

tragedy of the commons focused on the need for

public action of some sort, but further study

documented success of privately-led, community-

based (CB) initiatives (Ostrom, 1990).

This paper analyzes the scientiﬁc and policy

ramiﬁcations of CB approaches to managing

herbicide resistance. First, we review the state of

evidence on the mobility of herbicide-resistant

weeds and explain the causes of common-pool

resource failure. Then, we discuss different ap-

proaches to common-pool resource management

and their advantages and limitations, ranging from

government regulation to private grower and

commodity-association efforts. Third, we discuss

the design principles that have emerged from case

studies in the United States and around the world.

In the fourth section, we examine community-based

programs for insect pest and invasive weed

management. Lessons from these programs can

inform the design and implementation of effective

and socially acceptable applications to herbicide

resistance. We conclude by summarizing the

potential for community-based resistance manage-

ment and the research and education implications

for weed science and collaborating disciplines.

Sizing up the Evidence on Weed Mobility

Earlier writings by economists did not view

common-pool issues as problematic for managing

herbicide resistance (Carlson and Wetzstein 1993;

Clark and Carlson 1990; Pannell and Zilberman

2001). Llewellyn et al. (2001) noted, ‘‘it is generally

assumed that growers ‘raise and own’ their weed

problem as a private property resource.’’ Clark and

Carlson (1990) developed a theoretical model and

statistical tests of whether growers managed differ-

ent pesticides as open-access resources or private

property. For the United States, they found support

for the joint hypothesis of resistance build-up and

open-access problems for insecticides, but not for

herbicides. Clark and Carlson’s (1990) analysis

covered 1950 to 1984, however. It appears to have

captured behavior just before the period of sharp

increase in cases of herbicide resistance (Heap

2015). From an entomologist’s perspective, Gould

(1995) suggested that common-pool problems

would be less of an issue for weeds than insects

because the ‘‘tighter population structure’’ of the

former, and that ‘‘herbicide abuse on one farm will

have less of a direct effect on other farms’’ (p. 834),

although he conceded that more studies on this

issue were needed.

Although resistant weeds might be less mobile

relative to insects, this does not mean that mobility

is not a problem in an absolute sense. Resistant

weed seed can be transported great distances via

movement of farm equipment (Diggle and Neve

2001; McCanny and Cavers 1988). Seed also can be

transported via shipments of hay (Schmidt and

Pannell 1996). This mechanism can be more

pronounced during drought when hay is often

transported over greater distances (Diggle and Neve

2001). Palmer amaranth seed can spread via

irrigation and other water ﬂows, with the movement

of animals, and through plowing, mowing, harvest-

ing and spreading compost, manure, or cotton gin

trash (Barber et al. 2014; Norsworthy et al. 2009).

Weed scientists have also documented cases of

resistant alleles transferred to susceptible popula-

tions through pollen movement, seed, or other

propagules, in some cases at great distances (Beckie

et al. 2013, 2015; Borger et al. 2007; Busi et al.

2008; Dauer et al. 2006, 2007; Lu et al. 2007;

Rieger et al. 2002; Shields et al. 2006; Sosnoskie et

al. 2007, 2012; Watrud et al. 2004).

In response, weed scientists have begun to

acknowledge common-pool problems and call for

more collective regional responses, considering

participation of neighboring farms (Beckie et al.

610 Weed Science 64, Special Issue 2016

2015; Shaner and Beckie 2014). Similarly, social

scientists are increasingly acknowledging common-

pool problems in herbicide-resistance management

(Ervin and Jussaume 2014; Frisvold and Reeves

2010; Llewellyn and Pannell 2009; Marsh et al.

2006). Whether or not a given weed species is

especially mobile is an empirical question, but

common-pool problems might exist simply if

growers believe that weeds are mobile. There is

evidence that growers believe managing resistant

weeds is largely beyond their control and dependent

on neighbor actions (Llewellyn and Allen 2006;

Wilson et al. 2008). Such beliefs might be sufﬁcient

to discourage growers from proactively managing

resistance.

Why Community-Based Approaches?

Common-pool resources (CPR) pose special

management challenges, primarily because resource

users have open or unregulated access to the

resource. Individual users have no assurance that

other users will match their good stewardship

efforts. These uncoordinated actions can exhaust

the resource stock over time. In the case of herbicide

resistance, the weed gene pool that is susceptible to

the herbicide(s) in question is the resource stock of

concern. That stock is inﬂuenced by the herbicide

applications of all users in the community. Without

some type of program that controls how much

farmers apply, the selection pressure can produce

signiﬁcant weed resistance and higher costs for

current and future producers in the community.

Hardin’s 1968 essay in Science gave widespread

recognition to the CPR issue with the ‘‘ tragedy of

the commons’’ language. After this introduction,

the literature and policy discussions focused on the

need for some type of public (government)

regulatory scheme to avoid degradation of the

common resource. Nonetheless, one can envision at

least three stereotypical approaches to control access

to the resource: (1) top-down government regula-

tion; (2) public or private payment schemes to

discourage practices that diminish the resource

stock; and (3) bottom-up, community-based pro-

grams. Brief discussions of these three approaches

show why the last could be attractive for dealing

with herbicide resistance.

Many environmental programs use top-down

regulations authorized by law as a basis for

controlling access to common-property resources.

The Clean Air and Clean Water Acts are prime

examples. The regulations typically prescribe ac-

ceptable production practices (practice-based) or

emission discharge (performance-based) limits.

They are enforced by monitoring compliance and

by assessing monetary and sometimes even criminal

penalties for noncompliance. This legalistic ap-

proach can be socially preferred when depleting a

resource (e.g., air or water quality) threatens public

health or when authorities want to avoid the risk of

catastrophic damages (e.g., hazardous spills). In

such cases, the regulatory costs imposed on the

parties causing the resource degradation can pale in

comparison to the substantial beneﬁts. For example,

U.S. air pollution regulations were estimated to

deliver an estimated 30 to 1 beneﬁt-cost ratio for

1990 to 2020 (US EPA 2011). However, their

stringency can turn into one of the chief criticisms

of top-down regulations, (i.e., their inﬂexibility

stymies innovation and keeps compliance costs

high). Studies have found that the command-and-

control approach taken in the Clean Air Act and

Clean Water Act has dramatically improved U.S. air

and water quality, but that these improvements

could have been achieved at much lower cost if

programs had been designed more efﬁciently (Field

and Field [2012] provide examples and references).

Granting the regulated entities some ﬂexibility in

how to meet the practice requirements or pollution

limits can signiﬁcantly lower compliance costs, as

sulfur dioxide pollution-permit trading schemes

have demonstrated (Field and Field 2012).

In general, farmer production practices have not

been directly regulated through command-and-

control regulations. This is because for such

regulations to be feasible, the pollution sources

must be clearly identiﬁed and monitored. This

applies, for example to dairies and feedlots. It is not

practical and extremely costly, however, to monitor

the on-farm production practices of the more than

two million U.S. farms. This would be particularly

difﬁcult for on-farm resistance management (Fris-

vold and Reeves 2014). For example, it would be

difﬁcult to monitor and enforce a requirement that

farmers control weed escapes, start with a clean

ﬁeld, control weeds when small, clean equipment,

or other resistance-management practices. Farm

practices could be regulated indirectly, through

pesticide regulations. For example, certain pesticides

might be approved for use only in alternating years.

However, pesticide cancellations or use restrictions

could be quite blunt and expensive policy instru-

ments. Uniform restrictions that do not account for

the differences across regions and crops can be

particularly costly (Sunding 1996).

Ervin and Frisvold: Community-based approaches to manage resistance 611

A more common approach to altering farm-level

production practices is to provide farmers with

public or private payments to adopt more environ-

mentally benign practices. This payments-based

approach has been more common in agriculture

because costs of monitoring on-farm practices is

prohibitively expensive and because of agriculture’s

signiﬁcant political power in state and federal

policy-making (Ervin 2013). Since the 1980s, farm

legislation has introduced a variety of programs to

provide farmers with government payments to

conserve resources, with a mixed record of success

(Ervin 2013). These include programs such as the

Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the Wet-

lands Reserve Program (WRP), the Environmental

Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), and the

Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) (Claas-

sen and Ribaudo 2007). Under these programs,

payments are based on adoption of particular

practices or technologies, not on actual environ-

mental performance (such as soil erosion or fertilizer

runoff), because the latter is very difﬁcult to

monitor over space and time at the farm level.

One problem of payments for practices rather

than performance is that practice adoption might

not have desired environmental outcomes in many

settings. Payment schemes can also have limited

ability to actually change behavior, termed addi-

tionality (Claassen et al. 2014; Segerson 2013).

Payments are additional only if they induce farmers

to adopt practices that they would not undertake

without the payments. If producers receive pay-

ments for practices that they have already adopted

or for practices that it would be proﬁtable to adopt

anyway, these payments do not lead to any

additional resource conservation. Here, the pay-

ments simply become income transfers to farmers.

This has been the case with a number of U.S.

agricultural conservation programs (Ervin 2013).

Similarly, payment levels might be too low for some

farmers, so that they provide insufﬁcient incentives

to conserve resources. Achieving additionality and

therefore cost effectiveness, requires signiﬁcant

monitoring and data collection to assure the

payments result in the desired changes in behavior

(Segerson 2013). Thus, payment schemes can have

many of the same problems of command-and-

control regulations. Adoption of uniform practices,

either by mandate or encouraged by subsidies, can

be highly inefﬁcient if production systems are highly

diverse, as they are in agriculture. Further, both can

have high monitoring and enforcement costs, given

the sheer number and diversity of producers. A ﬁnal

issue with using public payments is the costs of such

inefﬁciencies are borne by taxpayers rather than by

those regulated.

Some payment-based programs have already been

implemented by industry to improve resistance

management. Monsanto has begun offering price

rebates to growers who purchase residual herbicides

to be used in conjunction with glyphosate. These

subsidies apply to herbicides with modes of action

that differ from glyphosate, and even apply to some

herbicides sold by competing companies (Volk-

mann 2010). Whether and how much additionality

these rebates have achieved awaits formal evalua-

tion. Another question is the ultimate cost of

payments large enough to encourage widespread

residual use. Mitchell (2011) estimated that if only

10% of farmers using Roundup Readytcotton and

soybeans received maximum rebate levels, total costs

would have been nearly $39 million for 2011 alone.

The third approach of community-based efforts

stands in contrast to top-down regulation or

incentive schemes that appear frequently in the

tragedy of the commons literature. This strand of

scholarship and practice emerged from scientists

and practitioners who observed that open-access

resource situations do not always lead to uncoordi-

nated and competitive exhaustion of the common

resource. They set about to analyze what situations

and conditions were most likely to spawn cost-

effective and sustainable community-based initia-

tives (e.g., Ostrom 1990).

In CB programs, resource users are actively

involved in the design, ﬁnancing, and implementa-

tion of programs. Usually, there is collaboration

with industry, government, and universities. The

role of government here is distinctly different from

that of the top-down, command-and-control or

payment-based approaches. It is often as a facilitator

and provider of scientiﬁc knowledge and comple-

mentary investments. Implementation and compli-

ance still require signiﬁcant design and monitoring

effort and cost, as well as a clear delineation of the

relevant community of stakeholders. Although

resource users might beneﬁt from government

technical and ﬁnancial assistance, they often must

also provide their own additional funds through

internal support schemes.

The development of community-based approach-

es for resistance management rests primarily on

three rationales. First, the resource appropriators, or

farm operators, have the most intimate knowledge

of the local natural resource and social conditions.

Second, as such, they are more likely to develop

612 Weed Science 64, Special Issue 2016

resistance-management practices that ﬁt their local

agronomic, economic, and social circumstances.

Third, resource users have a direct stake in creating

institutions that are fair and effective because they

need assurance that their neighbors will reciprocate

their good stewardship actions. This last argument

implies that the resource users have an interest in

conducting monitoring and applying appropriate

penalties when some operators do not comply with

locally prescribed resistance-management practices.

That inclination will likely lead to more reasonable

monitoring and enforcement costs than with top-

down approaches.

Despite these persuasive rationales, not all

community-based approaches succeed. Elinor Os-

trom, corecipient of the 2009 Nobel Prize in

Economics, synthesized the ﬁndings of diverse

studies around the globe to identify 10 factors that

signiﬁcantly affect the likelihood that resource users

will self-organize for collective action (Ostrom

2009). The factors can be used to evaluate the

feasibility of CB approaches to resistance manage-

ment.

1. Size of the resource system. Very large systems are

unlikely to self-organize because of the high cost of

deﬁning boundaries, monitoring and assembling

ecological knowledge. Small systems might not

produce enough valuable services to induce such

action. For these reasons, moderate sized systems are

most conducive to self-organization.

2. Productivity of resource system. There is an inverted

U-shaped relationship between resource productiv-

ity and self-organization. If a resource is either

abundant or already exhausted, users perceive few

incentives to pursue collective action for conserva-

tion. Some scarcity (value) is necessary to induce

their efforts.

3. Predictability of system dynamics. Resource system

dynamics need to be understood well enough so

that the effects of management actions on the

resource can be accurately predicted. Unpredict-

ability can deter users from self-organization

because of a lack of assurance of effective group

actions.

4. Resource unit mobility. Self-organization is less

likely for highly mobile resources, such as wildlife or

water in an unregulated river, that range over great

distances. As argued above, herbicide resistance

often exhibits spatial mobility. This means resis-

tance-management organizations would need to

cover a large enough area to encompass the major

factors contributing to resistance.

5. Number of users. Larger groups of resource users

have higher costs to organize, but also can assemble

labor and other resources to cover administration,

monitoring, and other costs. The effect of group

size on self-organization depends on the particular

socioecological system and is indeterminate a priori.

6. Leadership. When some resource users have

entrepreneurial skills and enjoy the respect of

others, the likelihood of collective action increases.

For example, the presence of college graduates and

local elders in the resource system can exert positive

effects.

7. Norms/social capital. Users of resource systems

who share moral and ethical standards of group

behavior, including the norms of reciprocity and

trust, will have lower transaction costs in reaching

agreement and be more likely to self-organize and

carry out effective monitoring.

8. Knowledge of the socioecological system. When users

share common knowledge of the resource system—

its vulnerabilities to excessive use, how their actions

affect each other, and the rules used in other

systems—they will perceive lower costs of organiz-

ing. If this knowledge is lacking and the resource

system regenerates slowly, the risk of excessive

degradation rises.

9. Importance of the resource to users. If the resource

in question plays a signiﬁcant role in the welfare of

the users, they are more likely to perceive that the

gains from collective action to conserve the resource

will outweigh the costs of organizing and maintain-

ing.

10. Collective choice (governance) rules. If users have

full authority and autonomy to take collective

action to develop and enforce rules, they face lower

transaction costs of organizing and less expense in

implementing controls to defend the resource from

exploitation by external parties.

Design Principles for Community-Based

Approaches

Ostrom collaborated with scientists both in the

United States and from around the world during

her career to synthesize eight design principles for

stable local CPR institutions (Ostrom 1990).

Understanding the content of each principle is

critical to building successful community-based

programs. We build on the introductory discussion

Ervin and Frisvold: Community-based approaches to manage resistance 613

of the principles related to herbicide-resistance

management (HRM) in Ervin and Jussaume

(2014).

1. Establish clearly deﬁned boundaries. Implementing

this principle requires the deﬁnition of two types of

boundaries: identifying the geographic area that

must be governed by the CB program, and

identifying the parties within the boundary who

must be engaged in the CPR effort (Cox et al.

2010). For application to HRM, the geographic

region over which the selected herbicide and weed

resistance travels must be delineated in approximate

terms. In doing so, the population of relevant

growers will be assured that all people who can

affect the resource have been identiﬁed for

involvement in the CB effort. This assurance is

key to stimulating reciprocity and effective HR

stewardship. The boundaries of the region will

depend upon the zone of weed pollen and seed

mobility in question, and therefore will depend on

the state of the science on that speciﬁc topic. If the

boundaries cannot be identiﬁed with acceptable

conﬁdence, then sufﬁcient participation and assur-

ance will not be achieved, and the CB approach will

be problematic.

2. Develop congruence between the appropriation and

provision rules for the common resources that are

adapted to local conditions. This principle also has

two dimensions: the ﬁrst is that appropriation and

provision rules conform to local social and

environmental conditions, and the second that

appropriation and provision rules are in alignment

(Cox et al. 2010). Following the ﬁrst capitalizes on

the local knowledge and experience of farm

operators who understand the biophysical and

social intricacies of weed development and mobility

in their area. This enables the population of farmers

who use the herbicide(s) in question to adapt the

CPR institution to the requirements and conditions

on the ground. The second dimension involves

achieving proportionality between the inputs of

labor, material, or money provided by resource

users (in this case farmers) and the beneﬁts they

receive from participation in the community-based

collective action (e.g., the avoidance of extra costs

once resistance develops and possibly averting added

costs from top-down regulations). In essence, this

involves meeting both beneﬁt-cost and fairness tests

for the rules.

3. Implement collective-choice arrangements that allow

most resource appropriators to participate in the

decision-making process. Similar to principle 2,

following this principle would empower most

resource users to participate in the CPR decision

process and thus take advantage of the local

knowledge of the special resource and social

conditions. In general, their knowledge and expe-

rience provide lower cost information to administer

the system of controlling resource access. Some

commentators feel the principle is good in concept

but in practice can be thwarted by the uneven

distribution of local power or external bureaucratic

actors who see gains from promoting particular

management practices.

4. Conduct effective monitoring by monitors who are

part of or accountable to the resource appropriators.

This principle has two components: (1) monitors

must be appointed by the community-based effort,

and (2) monitors must be part of the community

and accountable to the full set of appropriators (Cox

et al. 2010). Following the principle makes

monitoring an integral part of managing the

common resource and engages those who have

extensive knowledge of the resource situation. This

generally leads to lower costs than if an external

party (e.g., state or federal agency) monitors. In

addition, the monitors should beneﬁt (either by

improved resource condition or other rewards) if

they perform satisfactorily (i.e., monitoring is

incentive-compatible). Finally, the monitoring sys-

tem performs two key functions, identifying

resource appropriators who are not in compliance

and collecting information on the common resource

condition that can inform the CB activities.

5. Institute a scale of graduated sanctions for resource

appropriators who violate community rules. This

principle of imposing sanctions on resource appro-

priators who do not comply with the rules imposed

by the CB program is critical to success. Without a

credible threat of the sanctions, experience indicates

that some portion of the appropriators will not

comply (Ostrom et al. 2012). Social cohesion of the

group is insufﬁcient. Research on business environ-

mental management has found that the threat of

regulatory sanctions is associated with an increased

intensity of ‘‘voluntary’’ environmental manage-

ment (Ervin 2013; Segerson 2013). Hence, if the

sanctions for noncompliance with CPR rules to

foster improved HRM are visible and signiﬁcant, a

higher level of participation and compliance should

ensue. Imposing graduated penalties sends a signal

to resource appropriators that larger departures

impose proportionately higher costs on other

resource users. Although not speciﬁed in the

614 Weed Science 64, Special Issue 2016

principle, the body responsible for imposing the

sanctions can be within the private community-

based organization or codiﬁed in legislation and

administered by a public agency.

6. Create mechanisms of conﬂict resolution that are

cheap and easily accessible. Conﬂicts between

appropriators using a common resource are inevi-

table. Access to cheap and easy conﬂict resolution

procedures at the local level enhances the probabil-

ity of decentralized solutions to CPR management

problems, rather than elevating dispute resolution

to higher and more distant bodies. The principle

does not specify the form of the conﬂict-resolution

mechanism, except that it is low-cost and easy to

access. Some CPR institutions rely on the state and

federal court systems (e.g., water sharing arrange-

ments), whereas others have privately administered

bodies that adjudicate appeals or charges about

noncompliance.

7. Higher-level authorities recognize self-determination

of the community. To implement effective commu-

nity-based efforts for managing CPR issues, local

and state laws must grant the rights to private

nongovernmental organizations to be free from

challenge by external parties. This surety is necessary

to foster long-term planning and vests the local

parties with ownership of the issue. It also conveys

tenure security to the resource appropriators, a

condition that promotes long-term investment from

a longer planning horizon.

8. For larger common-pool resources, organization in

the form of multiple layers of nested (polycentric)

enterprises might be required. When CPR issues are

large enough to span multiple jurisdictional bound-

aries, single local CB initiatives might be insufﬁcient

to exercise sufﬁcient control over resource appro-

priation. This does not mean that local CB efforts

would not be part of an effective solution. Rather,

other entities at distant points or at higher levels of

administration could be required to assure sufﬁcient

coordination and effective action to conserve the

common-pool resource. The approach in these cases

can be thought of as nested or polycentric

governance, and the nesting can run either in

horizontal or vertical directions. For HR problems,

this type of approach might be necessary when weed

seed dispersal occurs through climatic, water, or

mechanistic (e.g., transport) processes, and requires

control across space and perhaps coordination at the

state or federal level.

Generalization of principles from diverse cases is

always challenging and subject to scrutiny, as any

good scientiﬁc investigation should be. Agrawal

(2003) has critiqued the synthesis work in that the

implied cause-and-effect relationships are not as

robust as the principles imply. He argues, for

example, that smaller groups do not always form

CB programs that are more effective, even though

transaction costs likely are lower. Further, in-

creased group heterogeneity does not necessarily

impede collaboration. He also notes problems with

CB efforts. These include: (1) monitoring and

enforcement are still needed and possibly could be

costly (institutional capacity and resources to

monitor and enforce might be limited); (2)

comanagement programs with government entities

might give local communities only very limited

scope for decision and rule making; (3) locally

agreed-upon rules can be essentially nonbinding

constraints and amount to too little action; (4)

boundaries of resource management problem can

be unclear; and (5) identifying noncompliance is

difﬁcult (Agrawal 2003). Each of these complica-

tions reinforce the importance of designing HRM

approaches to ﬁt local socioecological conditions.

Despite these challenges, the design principles

have received signiﬁcant support. In one of the

most ambitious studies of CPR management, Cox

et al. (2010) assessed the performance of 91

programs to evaluate the statistical support for

each of the eight design principles. Their over-

arching ﬁnding was that each of the design

principles was well-supported empirically. They

recommended, however, that three of the princi-

ples (1, 2, and 4) be split into two components as

described above to improve analytical power and

insight. Although this meta-analysis provides a

measure of conﬁdence for using them to inform

CB experiments for HRM, we note that careful

analysis will be necessary, because previous appli-

cations in agriculture have not focused on weed

resistance, but insect management and other

common-pool resource issues. Indeed, Cox et al

(2010) conclude that three main critiques of the

principles are valid: (1) they are incomplete; (2)

they might not apply to a wide range of cases

beyond those used to develop the principles; and

(3) the principles abstract from the heterogeneity

and messiness of environmentally and socially

embedded CPR situations. We turn next to some

experiences in agriculture to discern possible

lessons for forming effective community-based

approaches to HRM.

Ervin and Frisvold: Community-based approaches to manage resistance 615

Lessons from Community-Based Efforts in

Agriculture

In this section, we examine four types of

community-based efforts to control insects and

weeds to consider what lessons they might provide

for resistance management. The four are: (1)

areawide insect control programs, (2) insect erad-

ication programs, (3) areawide invasive weed

control programs, and (4) weed districts and

Cooperative Weed Management Areas. In what

sense are these programs ‘‘community-based?’’ First,

local, private land managers are actively involved in

deﬁning the design and geographical scope of these

programs, in addition to monitoring and imple-

menting the program. Second, local entities do not

just participate in these programs, but have key

leadership roles in program implementation and

evaluation. Third, successful implementation of

these programs often relies on social networks at

the community level to affect change. Fourth, even

though these programs have (to varying degrees)

mandatory requirements and regulatory authority,

local farmers, ranchers, or political jurisdictions

agreed upon these mandates and regulations

beforehand.

These types of programs are not new. Programs

to eradicate cotton insect pests—pink bollworm in

California and the boll weevil in the U.S. South—

were initiated in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Weed districts, local entities authorized through

state legislation to impose taxes and land use

regulations to control weeds, date back further, at

least to the 1930s (Fairchild 1935; Fiege 2005).

Why consider such programs? First, they arose

speciﬁcally to address common-pool resource man-

agement problems associated with agricultural pests.

Second, they were frequently established in response

to resistance to pesticides (Calkins and Faust 2003;

Chandler 2003; Hardee and Henneberry 2004).

Third, some have been quite successful at achieving

their objectives, providing both economic and

environmental beneﬁts. Fourth, despite the differ-

ences in the contexts and goals of these programs,

they share many common structural features and

prerequisites for success. These features and prereq-

uisites can guide the design and implementation of

successful programs to manage herbicide resistance.

Finally,notallprogramshavebeencomplete

successes, and even successful programs had, at

times, met with difﬁculties. One can learn from

difﬁculties as well as successes.

Areawide Programs for Insect Control. There has

been a long history of areawide programs to control

cotton insect pests. An early Community Manage-

ment program was initiated in the mid-1970s to

control cotton bollworm and tobacco budworm

(Hardee and Henneberry 2004). One key program

feature was pest scouting with treatment thresholds

based on community-wide evaluations rather than

ﬁeld-speciﬁc thresholds. Another was treatment of

the entire community with chemical or microbial

insecticides. By improving pest control, the pro-

gram increased areawide grower proﬁts by an

average of nearly $46 per hectare (Cochran 1996).

In 1989, cotton growers in California’s Imperial

Valley implemented a short-season cotton program

to control pink bollworm. The program called for

mandatory dates for earliest planting, latest date for

defoliant application, and latest date for plow-

down. The program reduced larvae per boll and

insecticide use, while increasing lint yields and

quality (Chu et al. 1996). In Arizona, a 1989 to

1995 areawide program relied on adoption of

gossyplure for mating disruption (Antilla et al.

1996). Larval infestations in cotton bolls fell from

23% in 1989 to ,1% by 1995. Hectares

chemically treated to control pink bollworm fell

dramatically and costs of pink bollworm control fell

from historic highs of more than $170/ha down to

$70/ha. (Antilla et al.1996; Frisvold 2009; Henne-

berry 2007). Growers in southern California and

Mexico’s Mexicali Valley implemented similar

gossyplure-based programs (Staten et al. 1987).

In 1993, as part of an overall Integrated Pest

Management (IPM) Initiative, the USDA, Agricul-

tural Research Service (ARS) began developing a

formal framework to encourage collaborative area-

wide, pest control programs (Faust 2008; Faust and

Chandler 1998; Hendrichs et al. 2007). USDA

provided technical support and ﬁnancial support to

cooperating entities and made direct public invest-

ments in project activities. Project implementation

was carried in multiple stages. First steps included

deﬁning the geographic scope of the project and

selecting of initial demonstration sites. Selected

projects shared a number of requirements and

objectives. They addressed speciﬁc barriers to

implementing pest control on a needed, regional

level. There was extensive collaboration between

(multiple) USDA agencies, land-grant universities

(including cooperative extension), and local agri-

cultural producers. Projects were also to have formal

mechanisms to ensure cross-entity communication

and collection of biological, environmental, and

616 Weed Science 64, Special Issue 2016

economic baseline data. The impetus for a number

of projects was the emergence of pests resistant to

pesticides (Calkins and Faust 2003; Chandler

2003).

Projects also shared a number of critical program

elements (Calkins and Faust 2003; Keenan and

Burgener 2008; Keenan et al. 2007). There was an

appreciation of the role of economic and sociolog-

ical factors in inﬂuencing farmer and landowner

participation and intensity of effort. Although

challenging, the projects recognized the need to

demonstrate the economic beneﬁts of areawide and

individual participation. Beneﬁts needed to be

demonstrated clearly and within a period short

enough to encourage adoption. Next, projects made

extensive use of remote sensing and geographical

information system (GIS) technology to actively

and continually monitor program performance.

Private and public entities each played key roles in

implementation. Farmers and land managers were

often those on the ground directly implementing

practices. The public sector’s role was primarily to

provide services that individuals did not have the

capacity or incentive to provide to others. These

public goods included scientiﬁc understanding of

the problem, technical support, and coordination

services among multiple groups. Public agencies

could also provide a broader perspective than

individual farmers, ranchers, or producer groups

might have. Finally, there was recognition that a

speciﬁc person was often needed to serve a constant

coordinating function. In some cases, this duty fell

to areawide cooperative extension personnel. In

others, full time coordinators were hired (Calkins

and Faust 2003).

Eradication Programs. Pest eradication programs

for insects can be thought of as extensions or special

cases of areawide control. What makes them

different? First, pest eradication is a weakest-link,

public-good problem (Caplat et al. 2012; McCoy

and Amatya 2005; Perrings et al. 2002). Eradication

is a public good because all affected derive beneﬁts

from it; individuals have an incentive to ‘‘free

ride’’—to undersupply their own effort. Eradication

is a ‘‘weakest link’’ problem because the success of

the program depends on the performance of those

putting in the least effort. For pest control in

general, Knipling (1972) noted: ‘‘Uniform suppres-

sive pressure applied against the total population of

the pest. . . will achieve greater suppression than a

high level of control on most, but not all of the

population.’’ Hendrichs et al. (2007) note further,

‘‘A few free riders or ‘refuseniks’ can negate many

positive impacts of AW [areawide] programs.’’

For eradication, a high level of effort by only

some producers might completely fail. As has been

observed with disease eradication, nonparticipation

by pockets of individuals with the least capacity or

incentive to participate can thwart eradication

(Perrings et al. 2002). This means that the adoption

and diffusion of eradication measures will not

proceed under patterns discussed by Rogers (2003)

where diffusion proceeds from early stage innova-

tors to early adopters to later adopters and

nonadopters. In the Rogers framework, later

adopters witness and learn from the success of

earlier innovators, whereas late- or nonadopters do

not affect adoption beneﬁts of others. In weakest-

link problems, however, there might be few early

beneﬁts to observe without widespread participa-

tion, so incremental learning is less possible.

Further, nonadopters can negatively affect returns

to those who attempt to innovate (Rebaudo and

Dangles 2011; Thomas, 1999).

Eradication requires something closer to universal

participation from all growers. For this reason, pest

eradication programs in the United States have

instituted mandatory compliance and practice

adoption for all growers. For boll weevil and pink

bollworm eradication programs, growers have voted

for the program in referenda on a state-by-state

basis. Adoption of the eradication program required

that two-thirds of the growers in the state (or

region) approve the program (Bordelon 2005;

Dumas and Goodhue 1999; Grefenstette et al.

2009). Once approved, however, all growers in

eradication area are subject to the program

mandate. Compared to other areawide programs,

eradication programs rely more on mandatory

requirements and regulatory authority. This regu-

latory authority, however, is granted by a vote and

support of a super-majority of the group and is not

imposed top-down. The regulatory authority of the

state and federal government here is in the

background in a supporting role, to prevent

individuals from free riding once an agreement

has been reached.

Eradication programs also share a number of key

elements. First, they are ﬁnanced jointly by the

federal government, state governments, and by

growers themselves (Dumas and Goodhue 1999;

Szmedra et al. 1991). Growers are assessed charges

either per acre or per unit of output to partially

support the program. Because grower groups have

‘‘skin in the game,’’ they have greater incentive to

Ervin and Frisvold: Community-based approaches to manage resistance 617

design and implement cost-effective programs. The

USDA has provided technical expertise and

ﬁnanced additional public investments, such as

sterile moth releases (Grefenstette et al. 2009;

Walters et al. 2009). Cooperative extension staff

(in counties and at land grant universities) are also

actively involved. A scientiﬁc understanding of how

the eradication program would work, and an

economic understanding of the beneﬁts and costs

of the program both short- and long-term are

critical. Eradication programs often involve a short-

term increase in pesticide use and so can meet with

criticism. They have tended, however, to signiﬁ-

cantly reduce long-term pesticide use. Thus, an

understanding of short- and long-term environ-

mental effects is also critical. Continual monitoring

and reporting of program activities are also crucial.

Successful programs have moved from eradication

to ‘‘posteradication’’ phases. In the latter, pest

population monitoring, inspections, and prophy-

lactic measures are maintained to prevent reinfesta-

tion into areas where the pest has been eradicated

are maintained. Thus, although program activities

and costs are signiﬁcantly curtailed in the poster-

adication phase, the programs have never complete-

ly ended.

Growers have not always been convinced of the

value of eradication programs, and there are

instances of referenda failing on their ﬁrst attempts

(Haney et al. 2009; Myers et al. 1998). Kazmierczak

et al. (1996) cite lack of landowner cooperation

with producers as an impediment to participation in

eradication programs. They also found that provid-

ing detailed information did not necessarily en-

courage participation and that demand for

participation was lower in areas where the target

pest was less of an immediate problem. In a study of

Georgia cotton farmers, Ahouissoussi (1995) found

important effects of grower heterogeneity on

willingness to participate. Larger-scale, more edu-

cated growers were more likely to have already

adopted proactive pest control measures. These

same growers were less pleased with the Boll Weevil

Eradication Program (BWEP) program because

they felt there were lower additional gains from

group control efforts. Smaller-scale producers

favored group control measures if these measures

reduced complexity of management decisions.

Estimated beneﬁts of pest eradication programs

have been substantial. Long-term economic beneﬁts

include higher yields (and gross revenues) and lower

pest control costs (Ahouissoussi et al. 1993; Carlson

et al. 1989; Duffy et al. 1994; Frisvold 2009; Haney

et al. 2009; Larson et al. 2000). In addition to per-

hectare beneﬁts of eradication, hectares planted to

cotton can also increase because of eradication

(Dumas and Goodhue 1999; Tribble et al. 1999).

In addition to economic beneﬁts, there are

additional long-term environmental beneﬁts of

reduced applications of broad-spectrum insecticides

(Bordelon 2005; Frisvold 2009; Haney et al. 2009;

Tabashnik et al. 2010).

Areawide Invasive Weed Programs. The USDA

Areawide Program also included projects addressing

invasive plants. Projects have focused on leafy

spurge (Euphorbia esula L.), melaleuca [Melaleuca

quinquenervia (Cav.) Blake], saltcedar (Tamarix

ramosissima Ledeb.), downy brome (Bromus tecto-

rum L.), and medusahead [Taeniatherum caput-

medusae (L.) Nevski] (Anderson et al. 2003a,b;

Carruthers 2003; Hodur et al. 2006; Prosser et al.

2002; Smith and Sheley 2012). These projects have

much in common with the insect programs in terms

of overall objectives and structures; yet, they also

have some important differences. Most are in the

western United States where most of the land is

managed by federal agencies (Forest Service, Bureau

of Land Management, and the National Park

Service). The melaleuca project in Florida requires

substantial interactions with public land and water

agencies. In these cases, public agencies are not just

providing technical and ﬁnancial assistance, but are

directly responsible for managing public lands

where invasive plants abide. A second, important

difference is that there are many sources and sinks

for these species besides cropping systems. The types

of land uses and land managers can be quite

heterogeneous, forming complex ‘‘management

mosaics’’ which pose special problems (Epanchin-

Niell et al. 2009). With greater subdivisions of land,

each land manager considers a smaller share of

overall damages, and there is greater potential of

reinfestation from neighbors. As land uses and

managers become more diverse, managers will be

less likely to have shared incentives for control.

Further, land controlled by the ‘‘ weakest links’’—

those with the least capacity or incentive—can

become reinfestation sources to other lands.

Local Weed Management Organizations. Weed

districts are local entities usually established under

state legislation, with some dating back to the 1930s

(Fairchild 1935; Fiege 2005). These districts, in

some cases, had legal authority to require landown-

ers to control speciﬁed noxious weeds. If the

landowner failed to comply, the district could treat

618 Weed Science 64, Special Issue 2016

the weeds itself and require the landowner to pay for

the treatment (Clawson 1977). County weed

programs, which receive annual county funding

and operate within the conﬁnes of county borders,

have regulatory authority to enforce local weed

control ordinances. Cooperative Weed Manage-

ment Areas (CWMAs) are partnerships of federal,

state, and local government agencies, tribes, indi-

viduals, and other interested groups that manage

noxious weeds or invasive plants in a deﬁned area

(Midwestern Invasive Plant Network 2011).

CWMAs operate within a deﬁned geographic area

pertinent to control of particular weeds, but they

tend to span administrative boundaries and involve

participation of private landowners and local, state,

and federal agencies. A main function of CWMAs is

coordination of activities across diverse jurisdiction-

al boundaries. Weed Prevention Areas (WPAs) are

similar to CWMAs in overall structure. A key

difference is that WPAs focus on prevention,

whereas CWMAs are often focused on areas where

invasive plants have already become problems

(Goodwin et al. 2012). A number of groups have

provided on-line resources with step-by-step guides

for organizing a CWMA or WPA (e.g., Midwestern

Invasive Plant Network 2011; Christen et al. 2011).

Finally, grassroots weed organizations rely on citizen

volunteers who donate time to control weeds,

frequently on public land.

Hershdorfer et al. (2007) surveyed 53 such local

weed management programs in four southwestern

states to assess how program attributes affected

program performance. Program performance was

measured by the extent of weed control, outreach

activities, weed monitoring, and adoption of

integrated weed management practices. They found

that programs with greater interagency coordination

and greater volunteer participation did more

monitoring. Programs that relied on private citizen

volunteers to carry out weed control treated a

signiﬁcantly smaller proportion of acres. This might

be because volunteer groups often rely on digging or

hand weeding rather than chemical applications.

The former are labor-intensive, meaning fewer acres

can be treated. Volunteers might be averse to

applying chemicals or simply lack adequate training

to make chemical treatments. Hershdorfer et al.

(2007) found interesting differences between three

program types. The ﬁrst possessed regulatory

authority over landowners and actively enforced

regulations. The second type lacked any regulatory

authority. Clawson (1977) had noted that com-

pletely voluntary groups are less divisive, but ‘‘ likely

to be least effective when most needed.’’ The third

type possessed regulatory authority (i.e., it could

issue ofﬁcial written warning letters or ﬁnes), but

chose not to do so. Hershdorfer et al.’s results

suggest that this third group, the group that had

regulatory authority but used a ‘‘light hand’’ to

achieve results treated a signiﬁcantly greater pro-

portion of their infestations than the other two

groups. Respondents in the third group noted that

they relied on persuasion more than direct

regulation because they felt it would be more

effective. Groups following more punitive tactics

had less success.

The State of Delaware Noxious Weed Program

also appears to be following the ‘‘light handed’’

approach. Palmer amaranth and ﬁve other weed

species are on the state’s noxious weed list.

Landowners who do not control noxious weeds

can, under law, be ﬁned $25 per acre ($100

minimum) (VanGessel and Johnson 2015). In

practice, however, ﬁnes are a last resort and no

ﬁnes have been collected in the last 7 yr (T Davis,

Delaware Department of Agriculture, personal

communication). Instead, staff members of the

Delaware Department of Agriculture (DDA) make

visits to farms to develop written compliance plans

with growers. It is felt that ﬁnes are not effective at

achieving compliance. Instead, it is most effective

for local landowners to see DDA spraying noxious

weeds on state lands or roadsides in a timely

manner.

The approach taken by these weed management

programs appear in contrast to many of the insect

programs, especially eradication programs, which

have tighter mechanisms for compliance. Other

work (as noted above) on CPRs has found

graduated sanctions to be a key element in program

success. Eradication programs, however, have had

documented evidence of success. The metrics for

success for the weed control programs to date have

been practice-based rather than performance-based.

Implications for Herbicide-Resistance Manage-

ment Programs. The various programs discussed

above address several common themes with direct

implications for implementation of community-

based programs to manage herbicide-resistant

weeds.

1. Requirement for strong scientiﬁc basis.This

includes both a solid theoretical understanding of

biological mechanisms, as well as understanding of

how strategies might succeed (or fail) in different

agronomic settings. This condition would help meet

Ervin and Frisvold: Community-based approaches to manage resistance 619

the need for predictability of system dynamics to

facilitate self-organization efforts (Ostrom 2009). A

strong scientiﬁc underpinning is essential to receive

ﬁnancial and technical assistance from federal

agencies and acceptance by farmers.

2. Effective communication of scientiﬁc principles.

This requires strong linkages between university and

private sector research and extension programs.

Pilot studies that apply an incremental approach can

help demonstrate program potential to wider areas.

3. Active involvement of social scientists. Understand-

ing socioeconomic dimensions are important for

understanding the social context of current practic-

es, barriers to adopting new practices, and group

dynamics. Economic analysis can aid in demon-

strating the potential gains of program implemen-

tation beforehand and to estimate the economic

beneﬁts of successful, mature programs.

4. Need for strong leader/coordinator. In some cases,

full-time coordinators were hired. This acknowl-

edges the fact that CB efforts entail signiﬁcant

transactions costs that can be an overwhelming time

commitment for most farmers. In some case, this

function is partially fulﬁlled by cooperative exten-

sion staff. Even here, however, coordinating CB

activities is likely a full-time responsibility if it is to

be effective. Having strong leadership has been

found as a signiﬁcant factor in furthering such self-

organized efforts (Ostrom 2009).

5. Need for ongoing monitoring, reporting, and

evaluation.Thisisimportantforestablishing

baselines and monitoring program progress. In

some cases, grower groups might already be in

place with monitoring and practice requirements.

Pest eradication areas are examples. Groups and

institutions active in these prior programs could

serve as a basis for self-organization around

herbicide-resistance management. Certain resis-

tance-management practices are readily observable

to outside evaluators and neighboring growers—use

of crop rotations and cover crops, for example. We

recognize that these land-use practices are only one

part of resistance management. However, readily

observable land-use practices can be monitored over

time and provide neighbors assurance of compli-

ance.

6. Need to establish clear geographic boundaries. This

requirement, supported by theory and experience, is

critical to prevent in-migration of resistant weeds

from outside a resistance-management area. Adopt-

ing comprehensive boundaries presents certain

challenges, however. First, as geographic scope

increases, so does the diversity of agricultural

production systems (cropping systems) and produc-

er types (hobby farms vs. commercial operations).

Different groups might have different incentives

and capacities to manage resistance. Attaining group

cooperation might require additional transaction

costs and transfer and support mechanisms to

encourage adoption. Further, purely commodity-

based organizational structures might be insufﬁ-

ciently comprehensive. Within agriculture, cross-

commodity approaches, could be necessary because

farmers might grow multiple crops simultaneously

and in rotations (e.g., corn, soybeans, and cotton)

that contribute to resistance in synergistic ways. In

addition, different producer groups might not

readily see how their weed management decisions

affect each other. For example, dairy operations

growing silage crops will likely not account for how

their behaviors alter weed resistance facing ﬁeld crop

producers. Groups outside agriculture might also

need to participate, for example. Weed management

along roads, rights of way, and ditch banks requires

actions off farmlands and by nonagricultural land

managers. Agencies with authority over public

lands, such as conservation areas, can affect

herbicide resistance by their management of weeds

and waterways. The participation of public land

managers (especially in the West where much land

is publicly managed) will be necessary for compre-

hensive resistance management. This would include

federal agencies (e.g., Forest Service, Bureau of

Land Management, and the National Parks Service)

as well as state departments of transportation, state

parks, and state lands departments.

Results from other programs suggest some

challenges CB resistance-management programs

can face. Some programs emphasized the impor-

tance of simplicity of practices in encouraging

adoption. This could be a particular challenge for

CB herbicide-resistance programs. Recent trends

have been toward (over) simpliﬁcation of weed

management systems and reduced diversity of

tactics. Diversiﬁed resistance-management programs

will likely be more complex and management-

intensive. Managing to avoid resistance (as opposed

to addressing resistance problems after they arise)

also requires proactive management. However,

other studies have found that demand for partici-

pation in CB programs is relatively low among

farmers not currently facing a problem.

The Zero Tolerance program to address herbi-

cide-resistant Palmer amaranth in Arkansas shares a

620 Weed Science 64, Special Issue 2016

number of core features associated with successful

community-based programs (Barber et al. 2015).

First, there has been substantial research conducted

to gain understanding of how the development and

spread of resistant weeds can be delayed (Jha et al.

2014; Norsworthy et al. 2014). Second, there is an

appreciation (based on science and experience) that

strong local leaders are required to maintain

program focus. Third, there has been emphasis on

developing an identity among local grower groups

committed to addressing resistance. Growers have

established Zero Tolerance zones ranging in size

from just a few hectares to more than 8,000 ha. As

has been the case with other community-based

programs, impetus for the program emerged after

the particular problem (in this case, herbicide-

resistant Palmer amaranth) had already become

acute. The development of proactive community-

based programs aimed at prevention in other areas

will be a challenge. Resources developed to assist the

establishment of Weed Prevention Areas (Christen-

sen et al. 2011; Ransom and Whiteside 2012) can

assist in developing programs to prevent herbicide

resistance.

Summary and Implications

Recent evidence portrays a striking increase in

herbicide resistance, both in terms of the number of

weed species that are resistant and the number of

states and provinces in North America that are

affected (Heap 2015). We argue that when

signiﬁcant weed mobility exists, community-based

actions can help lead to sustainable herbicide-

resistance management. However, knowing that

some form of private or public collective action is

required in such circumstances does not make it

easy. Progress in preventing herbicide resistance will

require experiments that draw on theory and

experience from other common-pool resource

regimes. Approaches that have succeeded elsewhere

will need to be adapted to speciﬁc, local socio-

ecological situations. We summarize key theoretical

insights and experiential lessons that can guide

development of constructive approaches and draw

implications for research and extension.

Research on the adoption and diffusion of

innovations suggest that resistance-management

practices will be more widely adopted if they (1)

exhibit a clear economic advantage, (2) are not too

complex, (3) are adoptable on a limited, trial basis,

(4) have rapidly observable beneﬁts, and (5) are

consistent with pre-existing farming practices (Rog-

ers 2003; Keenan and Burgener 2008). The degree

of weed mobility across weed species and local,

socioecological conditions will affect the degree to

which these factors that facilitate diffusion are

present. Where these facilitating factors are present,

CB approaches might not be necessary. Three cases

that turn on the degree of mobility can be used to

assess the potential usefulness of a CB approach.

In the ﬁrst case, mobility is not a signiﬁcant

problem. Resistance management becomes an

individual farmer problem to solve by comparing

the costs of managing resistance over time, e.g.,

labor and machinery costs of more tillage, with the

yield and other beneﬁts of avoiding resistance in

future years. The solution is a standard extension

approach—give farmers appropriate information so

that they can make better long-run decisions. This

will still be challenging because many resistance-

management practices can entail lower proﬁts in the

short run, with less-certain beneﬁts accruing only in

the future.

In the second case, mobility might be a factor, but

an individual grower still has an incentive to

manage resistance no matter what neighbors do.

In other words, collective adoption across a broader

area might be the best strategy, but individual

growers can still beneﬁt from adoption even when

their neighbors do not. In terms of game theory,

managing resistance on one’s own farm is a

dominant strategy. This outcome was suggested

for corn in a recent analysis by Livingston et al.

(2015). Here, the traditional extension approach

might be effective. It remains a policy question

whether the extra transaction costs of organizing

resistance-management programs for community-

wide compliance generate sufﬁcient additional

collective beneﬁts.

In the third case, mobility is a large enough issue

such that managing resistance is a weakest-link

public good. In this case, a farmer’s beneﬁts from

managing resistance can be negated if neighbors do

not manage as well. Because the welfare of a farmer

is dependent on the actions of all other farmers, the

farmer who manages least determines the outcome

for the community as a whole. This result was

found for soybeans in the analysis of herbicide

resistance by Livingston et al. (2015). In this case,

many of the facilitators of innovation diffusion

(Rogers 2003) will likely be absent.

Our analysis pertains to the two latter cases of

herbicide resistance, for which potential net beneﬁts

of cooperative behavior exist. Three overarching

lessons from the science and experience with CB

Ervin and Frisvold: Community-based approaches to manage resistance 621

efforts can help realize those beneﬁts. A critical early

step is to engage all groups in the locality who have

a stake in managing herbicide resistance. A meta-

analysis of wicked problems involving agriculture

and conservation concluded that strengthened

stakeholder capacity is a key principle in making

progress (Sayer et al. 2013). Stakeholders can extend

beyond farmers and their public and private

cropping advisers (including input suppliers) to

include local government and community organi-

zations and conservation/environmental groups.

Such broad engagement takes more time and

increases cost over traditional extension approaches.

However, the engagement process builds social

capital and lower transaction costs to discover a

more effective and durable approach. Neutral

facilitators and respected local leaders are vital to

conducting a constructive stakeholder process.

Some extension professionals might require profes-

sional training in facilitation if they assume this

role. These same professionals in turn likely have

experience with the local innovators in farming

communities where they work. These local innova-

tors could be crucial to initiating CB programs.

Building the institutional capacity necessary to

design and implement a CB program will take time

and maintenance. The character of the wicked HR

problem requires experimentation and adaptive

management to discover an approach that works

within the local socioecological system. Critical

members for this task include scientists and

professionals who understand the productivity and

system dynamics of the problem being addressed.

Those experts can advise participants about the pros

and cons of CB practices and processes but refrain

from speciﬁc recommendations. This will enable the

stakeholders to take ownership of the institutions

developed and implemented.

It is critical to engage both natural and social

scientists because wicked problems in socioecolog-

ical systems invariably require both sets of expertise

(Ervin and Jussaume 2014). The work of Ostrom

and her colleagues on self-organization and CPR

management provides a rich body of knowledge

that requires interdisciplinary teams to effectively

apply. This integrated approach might be easier for

private sector organizations because they must focus

on problem solving, in contrast to academic

professionals who focus on advancing scholarship

in their own disciplines.

New scholarship is necessary to apply these

lessons to herbicide-resistance problems. As noted

above, few CB programs have been established to

directly address herbicide resistance. Therefore, little

evidence exists on the factors that determine their

success or failure. More research on the processes

that inﬂuence growers’ participation is essential to

understand the biophysical, economic, and social

challenges and opportunities that shape those

outcomes. No single survey will satisfy this need.

Findings from local, state, regional, and national

surveys are necessary to enrich our understanding of

the complex individual and group choice processes.

The surveys will require interdisciplinary approach-

es to unravel the complexities of this coupled

human–natural systems challenge. Further, the

farmer decision for managing HR via CB approach-

es needs to be set within the whole farm system,

rather than as a separate component.

Although few CB programs have addressed

HRM, a large body of knowledge has been

assembled on CPR management that can inform

such efforts (e.g., Ostrom 2009). In short, we do

not have to start from scratch to make progress. To

avoid reinventing the wheel, we propose a clearing-

house of information on successful CPR programs

that can be used to assemble ‘‘ how-to’’ guides to

assist private and public groups to chart a

productive path to progress on this complex

problem. An essential part of that information base

will be insights into what approaches were not

productive and under what circumstances.

With the new knowledge and understanding of

the salient factors inﬂuencing farmer’s decisions to

engage in CB approaches, attention can turn to

education and training programs. The success of

extension education in furthering the development

of U.S. agriculture has been well documented

(Huffman and Evenson 2008). The dominant

approach used by extension professionals and

university researchers working with farmers on crop

production issues has been ‘‘one-on-one.’’ Our

scientiﬁc theory and experiential data suggest that a

different skill set and approach will be necessary to

effectively apply CB approaches to herbicide-

resistance cases involving signiﬁcant mobility.

Increasingly, the literature on innovation diffusion

has emphasized community aspects of adoption and

the role of social networks (Rogers 2003; Keenan

and Burgener 2008). Weed science professionals

will need to use their substantive knowledge but also

engage professionals in the social and behavioral

sciences who have expertise in forming effective

group efforts. For example, we suggest access to

high-quality facilitation services will be necessary in

forming effective CB approaches.

622 Weed Science 64, Special Issue 2016

Acknowledgments

The authors gratefully acknowledge support from

the USDA AFRI grant 1002477 ‘‘Integrating

Human Behavioral and Agronomic Practices to

Improve Food Security by Reducing the Risk and

Consequences of Herbicide Resistant Weeds.’’ We

beneﬁted from valuable review comments by Sarah

Ward, Guest Editor of this special Weed Science

issue, and two anonymous reviewers. We also

gained useful insights from the Herbicide Resistance

Task Force members in preparing for the Summit.

Finally, although cited multiple times, we wish to

acknowledge the late Elinor Ostrom, whose pio-

neering work with multiple collaborators on

community-based approaches to common-pool

resource management, laid the foundation for our

work. Any remaining errors of commission or

omission are of course our sole responsibility.

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626 Weed Science 64, Special Issue 2016

How Does Herbicide Resistance Change Farmer’s Weed Management Decisions? Evidence from the Roundup Ready Experiment

Article

Full-text available

Nov 2024

Adoption of diverse weed management practices is viewed as essential for slowing the spread of herbicide-resistant (HR) weeds. Yet, adoption of diverse tactics has remained low, while there has been explosive growth of resistant weeds. This study analyzes U.S.-farm-level data to identify factors affecting adoption of diverse weed management practices. This study uses directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to consider how practice adoption is influenced by different causal pathways between farmer and farm characteristics and farmer awareness of and concern over HR weeds. This study then uses multiple regression analysis to estimate the direct and indirect pathways that influence practice adoption. Respondents relied more heavily on herbicide-based weed control methods than on mechanical or cultural methods. Concern over herbicide resistance increased the number of practices farmers adopted and the percentage of acres where farmers implemented these practices. Practice adoption was negatively associated with increasing levels of farmer risk aversion. Technological optimism—belief that new herbicides would soon be developed to counter HR weeds—discouraged diverse herbicide use practices that combat resistance, but encouraged use of some non-chemical weed control methods. Perceived weed dispersal externalities (from weed mobility) led to more diverse weed management, running counter to hypotheses that greater mobility reduces incentives for individual resistance management.

Herbicide Resistance Management: A Common Pool Resource Problem?

Article

Full-text available

Feb 2024

Herbicide resistance is often viewed as a complex problem in need of innovative management solutions. Because of the transboundary mobility of many weeds, resistance to herbicides is also viewed as a community-scale issue. Consequently, the idea of greater coordination among resource users – especially growers – is often promoted as a management approach. Recently, scholars have framed herbicide resistance as a commons problem in need of collective action. Specifically, social scientists have explored the utility of adopting bottom-up community-based approaches to help solve the growing problem of herbicide resistance through a framework for interpreting the commons known as common pool resource theory. This article analyzes how herbicide resistance fits – and fails to fit – within common pool resource theory and offers an updated conceptual framework from which to build future work. We argue that the application of common pool resource theory to herbicide resistance management is underdeveloped and approaches based on this theory have shown little success. The relevance of common pool resource theory for informing herbicide resistance management is less settled than existing scholarship has suggested and other frameworks for approaching transboundary resource problems – such as co-production of knowledge and participatory action research – warrant consideration.

Challenges and opportunities for embedding social science in pesticide resistance research and outreach

Article

Full-text available

Feb 2025
PEST MANAG SCI

Pesticide resistance constitutes a growing management challenge across agricultural systems worldwide, as complex interplays between social, biophysical, and technological factors create wicked problems that resist simple solutions. Transdisciplinary approaches that bring together researchers and practitioners with diverse disciplinary repertoires have been proposed to tackle pesticide resistance but, despite increasing interest, remain sporadic and often ineffective. In many cases this is due to an insufficient involvement of social scientists, misconceptions that better management merely requires more information, and limited appreciation for the diversity of social scientific perspectives. This article addresses this dearth by synthesizing relevant scholarship to show how the social sciences can help to better understand and more effectively manage pesticide resistance. Following an overview of the main theoretical and methodological approaches employed by social scientists, we demonstrate their nuanced practical contributions in herbicide and insecticide resistance management. These cases demonstrate that the crux of pesticide resistance management is context, with no one‐size‐fits‐all solutions. Social scientists can offer a diverse range of distinct perspectives and tools to jointly develop context‐specific solutions with biophysical and applied scientists. However, effective transdisciplinarity requires early collaborative problem framing involving all disciplinary partners and meaningful ongoing engagements. The article, therefore, concludes with practical suggestions for how pest management researchers and practitioners can start to connect with social scientists to more holistically address the various aspects that make pesticide resistance management a complex wicked problem. © 2025 Society of Chemical Industry.

Externalities in wild pig damages on U.S. crop and livestock farms: The role of landowner actions and landscape heterogeneity

Article

Full-text available

Apr 2025
PLOS ONE

Invasive wild pigs can impose significant economic costs on crop and livestock farms. Many factors influence the incidence and intensity of these losses, making efforts to reduce or eradicate these populations complex. While farm and ranch operators may perceive wild pigs as agricultural pests, other landowners often see them as wild game with recreational value. This study investigates the relationship between landowner practices that attract wild pigs and the likelihood of pig presence and damage on farm and ranch operations. It considers the farmers’ own actions that attract wildlife, neighboring landowner actions, the heterogeneity of the surrounding landscape, and county-level factors. The findings show a significant and positive associations between neighbors’ actions and the probability of wild pig presence and financial losses from wild pig damage. Additionally, increasingly heterogeneous landscapes may further exacerbate this challenge. This research indicates that the choices made by adjacent property owners can undermine the effectiveness of public and private efforts to manage wild pig populations. Conversely, the impacts of wild pig management likely extend beyond specific management areas. Holistic eradication or population control programs should consider these externalities to adequately and efficiently address their impacts.

Impact of field evolved resistance on biological parameters of non-targeted Aedes aegypti populations

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2024
ECOTOXICOLOGY

The yellow fever mosquito, Aedes aegypti L., known for transmitting viruses causing yellow fever, dengue, chikungunya, and Zika fever, presents a substantial risk to global human health. The development of insecticide resistance in disease vectors has become a significant problem in Ae. aegypti. Monitoring insecticide resistance is essential for resistance management in Ae. aegypti. This study involved the collection of Ae. aegypti populations from four important cotton-growing regions in southern Punjab, Pakistan, for resistance monitoring over a two-year period (2021–2022). This study also assessed the impact of insecticide resistance on biological parameters of Ae. aegypti. Moderate-to-high levels of resistance were observed against all the tested insecticides viz., chlorpyrifos, chlorfenapyr, deltamethrin, flonicamid, spirotetramat, and spinetoram. However, compared to the Lab-susceptible population, higher levels of resistance to buprofezin (59.03–84.40) and imidacloprid (68.49–100.01) were found in all populations. This high resistance can be attributed to increased use of these two insecticides in cotton fields, as compared to other insecticides. In the lab-susceptible population, higher values for the intrinsic rate of increase (r) and the net reproductive rate (R0) i.e., 0.20 per day and 23.24 offspring/female were observed, respectively. This was also validated by population projection data where more than 2.5-fold adults (1,020,361.80 individuals) were calculated in the Lab-susceptible population as compared to the most resistant populations. Sublethal exposure to insecticides may induce physiological or biochemical changes in organisms, subsequently influencing the biological traits. Resistance monitoring provides essential guidance before launching a successful chemical-based vector management program.

Does Social Learning Promote Farmers’ Cooperative Pest Control?—Evidence from Northwestern China

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2024

Pest management is pivotal for ensuring secure grain production and constitutes a fundamental strategy in combating pests that detrimentally affect grain supplies. Given the complexity and dynamic nature of pests, it is imperative that farmers implement coordinated prevention and control strategies. Such measures are essential to augment the efficacy of these efforts and to reduce the risks posed by pests to agricultural crops. This research involved a survey of 1205 agricultural households spanning three representative provinces in Northwestern China. By employing an endogenous switching Probit model and addressing sample selection bias, the study investigates the influence of social learning on the adoption of cooperative pest control strategies by farmers. The findings indicate that social learning significantly enhances farmers’ adoption of cooperative pest control measures. In a counterfactual scenario, introducing social learning to farmers previously unexposed to it would result in a 10.3% increase in the likelihood of adopting these practices. Additionally, factors such as the health status of the household head, income level, and size of land under management are critical determinants of farmers’ participation in social learning. The differential access to scientific, accurate, and systematic information, coupled with resource disparities among farmers, can partially account for the varying average treatment effects observed in different learning methods on the propensity to adopt cooperative pest control practices. Furthermore, social learning plays a crucial role in fostering such adoption by establishing trust among farmers, facilitating consensus in decision-making, and enhancing the dissemination of information.

Herbicides in modern sustainable agriculture: environmental fate, ecological implications, and human health concerns

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2025

Herbicides play a crucial role in modern agriculture by controlling weeds and ensuring sustainable crop productivity. However, the use of herbicides has raised concerns regarding their contamination, posing serious threat to the environment, biodiversity, and food safety. Recent trends indicate a decline in the overall volume of herbicides usage, suggesting a shift towards more specific and targeted formulations of herbicides. Also, there has been an increased use of systemic and pre-emergence herbicides. The global agriculture still faces several challenges because of the adverse environmental impacts caused by herbicide contamination, both at the application site and offsite. In view of the growing concern, it is necessary to develop new herbicides with greater selectivity or bio-based herbicide that can degrade after successful control of the intended weed population and minimize or eliminate the environmental hazards. Furthermore, the adoption of integrated weed management practices rather than prolonged and repeated use of herbicide in agriculture can effectively reduce the growth of herbicide-resistant weed populations. The present review is a single valuable resource, providing insights into the recent trends and future challenges associated with herbicide use in modern agriculture, with a focus on human health and food safety. Also, we emphasize the advancements in herbicide technology, emergence of new herbicide-resistant weed species, regulatory considerations, and alternative approaches in herbicide use, all of which are particularly valuable to agroecology, policymakers, and stakeholders. Graphical Abstract

Tailoring IPM plans to fight a cloaked pest: helping smallholder farmers combat the sweetpotato weevil in sub-Saharan Africa

Article

Full-text available

Mar 2024

Africa accounts for a significant portion of the world’s sweetpotato production where it is widely grown as a staple crop. In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), sweetpotato serves as an important year-round source of calories and nutrition, a form of income for smallholder and pre-commercial farmers, and is increasingly used as silage for animal feed. However, yield per hectare is considerably lower in SSA than from other regions primarily due to sweetpotato weevils (SPW, Cylas spp., Coleoptera: Brentidae). Weevil feeding causes physical damage to the root and can induce chemical responses that give the storage root a bitter taste, both of which make them unmarketable. Commercial growers in many developed countries rely on frequent chemical treatments and strict quarantine regulations to control SPW, however, this approach is currently not practical for many areas of SSA. In this paper we, (1) outline factors that contribute to SPW infestation; (2) review available strategies and ongoing research for control of SPW, including chemical pesticides, biological control (macro-organismal as well as microbial control), cultural practices, selective breeding, and biotechnology; and (3) discuss the potential for implementing an integrated pest management (IPM) approach that leverages a combination of techniques. We rationalize that a multifaceted strategy for SPW control will improve both the quantity and quality of sweetpotato production in Africa.

Using integrated weed management systems to manage herbicide-resistant weeds in the Canadian Prairies

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2023

Although herbicides have been a dominant and effective weed control strategy for decades in Western Canada, herbicide resistance and the lack of new modes of action have resulted in weed management challenges. Integrated weed management strategies have been shown to be successful in controlling certain weed species that are problematic in cropping systems. The objective of this study was to investigate integrated weed management strategies that have been successful on individual species to determine their applicability to a multiple weed species that may coexist in a field. In addition, harvest weed seed control was incorporated into these integrated weed management strategies to determine its impact in western Canadian cropping systems. A 5-year rotational study was conducted from 2016 to 2020 at Beaverlodge, Lacombe, and Lethbridge, AB; Scott and Saskatoon, SK; and Carman, MB, that incorporated integrated weed management strategies such as rotational crop diversity (including winter annuals and perennials), increased seeding rates, crop silaging, chaff collection, and with or without in-crop herbicides. This research confirmed success in managing some species of weeds such as wild oat when increased seeding rates, 2 years of early cut silage barley, and competitive winter cereals were incorporated into a cropping system, even when no in-crop herbicides were applied. However, some weed growth morphologies (e.g., twining weeds) or life cycles (e.g., facultative winter annuals) were not managed successfully with this combination of strategies. Chaff collection provided incremental weed control benefits but did not serve as a replacement for herbicidal weed control. Weed densities had an apparent impact on the success of these integrated weed management strategies, suggesting that the sooner they are adopted, the more likely they are to be successful at maintaining or reducing weed densities. This study not only showed the ability to reduce reliance on herbicides with strategies that can be effective in Western Canada but also highlighted the need for further understanding of different weed species and their responses to integrated weed management strategies, as well as the complexity of managing a weed community with integrated weed management.

Grower attitudes and practices toward area-wide management of cropping weeds in Australia

Article

Feb 2024
LAND USE POLICY

Managing the herbicide resource: An evaluation of extension on management of herbicide-resistant weeds

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2009

The threat of herbicide-resistant weeds to crop production makes sustainable weed and herbicide management an important issue for agricultural extension agencies throughout the world. In this study, we examined the effectiveness of an intensive training workshop in modifying the weed-management-related perceptions and adoption intentions of farmers. We found that the extension activity had significant impacts on farmers' perceptions about several aspects of the herbicide resource management decision, including the speed of resistance development, the potential for a population of herbicide-resistant weeds to return to herbicide-susceptibility, and the economic value of several treatments. As a consequence, the workshop appears to have altered the adoption intentions of a significant number of participating farmers, including adoption of a strategy to prevent development of resistance to the herbicide glyphosate. We argue that extension can be more effective if it targets grower perceptions identified as being influential in the adoption decision, particularly if those perceptions are known to be inaccurate.

The Population Dynamics and Genetics of Herbicide Resistance — A Modeling Approach

Chapter

Mar 2001

Economic and Sociological Factors Affecting Growers’ Decision Making on Herbicide Resistance

Chapter

Mar 2001

Economic and sociological aspects of herbicide resistance have received little attention in the published literature; the only published studies to date are those of Schmidt and Pannell, 1,2 Gorddard et al., 3,4 and Orson. ⁵ The published literature on economic and social aspects of insecticide and fungicide resistance is a little larger e.g., 6-13 but, apart from general concepts, contains little that can readily be applied to the case of herbicide resistance.

Voluntary Resource Conservation and Environmental Management in Agriculture and Forestry

Chapter

Jan 2013

David E. Ervin

Voluntary programs have been used extensively to foster resource conservation and environmental improvements in the United States (US) agriculture and private forestry sectors of many developed countries. Their nonmandatory nature contrasts sharply with the regulatory approaches used in most other industries due to various political, technical, and economic factors. For example, agriculture has long enjoyed policies favoring voluntary incentives ever since resource conservation programs were introduced during the Great Depression Dust Bowl era. Furthermore, pollution flows from agricultural and forestry lands, such as fertilizer residues in water runoff from farm fields and sediment from harvested forest lands, generally do not have identifiable 'point' sources - making regulation technically infeasible or extremely costly. Voluntary programs usually grant farmers and foresters the flexibility to select practices that best fit their operations, offering the potential for improved efficacy and lower net cost. Despite their flexibility, evaluations of voluntary programs have found a mixed record of success. Their impacts and costs vary across operators depending upon the farmer's or forester's personal values, objectives, and resource situations. However, evaluations show a mixed record of success. Research has identified several lessons for improving voluntary program performance, for example targeting resources to priority problem areas. Current trends suggest more collaborations between non-profit organizations, industry and perhaps government, such as environmental certification schemes, will emerge.

Additionality in U.S. Agricultural Conservation and Regulatory Offset Programs

Article

Jan 2014

Conservation payments lead to improvement in environmental quality only if farmers and ranchers who receive them adopt conservation practices that would not have been adopted without the payment. When a voluntary payment causes a change in practice(s) that lead(s) to improved environmental quality, these changes are “additional.” We estimate this “additionality” for a number of common conservation practices that are frequently supported by existing conservation programs. We find that the level of additionality varies by practice and that additionality is high for structural and vegetative practices while the risk of nonadditionality appears to be higher for management practices. While the risk of nonadditionality cannot be completely eliminated, it can be reduced. We discuss a number of approaches to managing nonadditionality in both conservation programs and environmental offset programs.

Area-Wide Management of Insects Infesting Cotton

Chapter

Jan 2004

Since 1992 insects have consistently cost cotton, Gossypium hirsutum L., producers US$ 0.8–1.6 billion annually in direct management costs and associated yield losses (Beltwide Cotton Conference Reports, National Cotton Council, Memphis, TN). In the mid-1980s and continuing to the present, cotton entomologists and producer organizations realized the difficulty in managing all of the major complex and persistent cotton insect problems on a local basis (Henneberry and Phillips 1996). In an attempt to overcome these challenges, management programs were organized on an area-wide concept rather than on an individual field basis. These programs were inspired by the amazing success of eradicating the screwworm fly, Cochliomyia hominivorax (Coquerel) (Diptera: Calliphoridae) from the southeastern United States (Knipling 1960a). In addition, the propensity for development of insecticide resistance in several cotton insects, especially boll weevil, Anthonomus grandis grandis Boheman (Roussel and Clower 1955; Walker et al. 1956; Fye et al. 1957; Smith 1998), tobacco budworm (TBW), Heliothis virescens F. (Elzen et al. 1992; Elzen and Hardee 2003), tarnished plant bug, Lygus lineolaris (Pali-sot de Beauvois) (Snodgrass and Elzen 1995; Snodgrass 1996) and sweetpotato whitefly, Bemisia tabaci (Gennadius) (Prabhaker et al. 1996) created an urgency for development of improved management techniques for cotton insects. We report herein, case histories of attempts to manage six cotton insects in an area-wide system.

Future programs in areawide pest management

Article

Oct 1998

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Agricultural Research Service's (ARS) Areawide Pest Management Program is a coordinated partnership between the federal and state systems with active grower participation. Two highly ranked proposals were selected for initiation in 1995 and 1996-one involving the codling moth [Cydia pomonella (L.)] and the other, corn rootworms (Diabrotica spp.). In 1996, the ARS expanded the program. Based on peer reviews of proposals, followed by full proposal evaluations, two new projects targeting the weed leafy spurge (Euphorbia esula L.) and insect pests in stored wheat (Triticum spp.) were implemented in 1997. The ARS plans to expand its integrated pest management (IPM) research activities in areawide pest management as funds become available, either from new congressional appropriations or from the completion of ongoing projects. New areawide pest management projects judged to be of highest priority and merit will be implemented for insect, mite, tick, plant pathogen, or weed pests. The vision of the USDA-ARS Areawide Program is to provide farmers, consultants, and local organizations with mature areawide pest management systems that are affordable, operational, and adoptable, and that contribute to the overall goals of the USDA IPM Initiative.

Grower perspectives on areawide wheat integrated pest management in the southern us great plains

Article

Jan 2007

Proactive EBIPM

Article

Dec 2012
Rangelands

Comparisons Between Resistance Management Strategies for Insects and Weeds

Article

Dec 1995

Fred Gould

Problems with insecticide resistance have long plagued the field of economic entomology. Genetic, biochemical, and ecological information on insects has been used to develop strategies to slow the rate of insecticide resistance evolution. Documented cases of herbicide resistance have increased dramatically over the past 10 yr. This paper compares some aspects of insect and weed biology that can be used in determining whether or not resistance management strategies developed for insects are likely to be useful in combating herbicide resistance. Differences between insects and weeds in terms of genetic architecture, mating systems, and population structure lead to differences in the expected efficacy of some resistance management strategies. Because of the localized population structure of some weeds, it may be easier to get farmers to participate in herbicide resistance management programs and avoid a “tragedy of the commons.” A review of the herbicide resistance literature reveals a number of areas of basic research on ecology and genetics of weeds that could help in designing more appropriate resistance management programs.

Community-Based Approaches to Herbicide-Resistant Weed Management: Lessons from Science and Practice

Abstract

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