The evolution of the Pakistani Taliban

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This is the published version
Rakisits, Claude 2012, The evolution of the Pakistani Taliban, in Pakistan's
stability paradox : domestic, regional, and international dimensions,
Routledge, Abingdon, England, pp.137-152.
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Copyright: 2012, Taylor & Francis

Car
Bomb
Plot',
rd,
'U.S.
blames
May
2010.
rber',
New York
in Times
Square
365.
)olitical Science
Said to Expand
d S. Paul
Kapur,
[he Washington
9 The
evolution
of the
pakistani
Taliban
Claude Rakisits
Pakistan
has
been in the news a lot lately. Unfortunately, it has generally
been for
the wrong reasons.
Regularly, there
are horrific stories
of suicide
bombings
killing
scores
of civilians or armed attacks
against
military targets,
but more often than
not innocent civilians going about their daily lives are the victims. The media -
western and Pakistani - generally blame these terrorist acts on the pakistani
Taliban. However, while reliable information about these
religious extremists
is
sketchy and not always reliable, a picture has begun to emerge about who the
Pakistani Taliban are and the extent of the militant threat to the stabilitv of
Pakistan.
This chapter argues that the growth of pakistani militancy and religious
extremism, which is principally, but not solely, based
in the triLal areas, is the
result of the confluence and the mutual reinforcement of internal and external
factors. The intemal factors include: the poor govemance
of pakistan,s
Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the socio-economic under-development
of
FATA and its lack of political integration with the rest of the country, and the
domestic and foreign policies of successive
central governments,
civilian and
military. The external factors include: the presence
in pakistan's western prov-
inces
ofthe anti-Soviet mujahideen (freedom fighters) in the l9g0s, the establish-
ment of Al-Qaeda and raliban safe
havens in FATA following the ousting of the
Afgian Taliban from power in october 2001, and washington,s political and
military strategies
for dealing with these
safe
havens.
I will also arsue
that while
this Pakistani militancy is still dominated by the pashtuns,
it hal increasingly
attracted
militants and religious extremists
from other parts of the country, partic-
ularly from southern Punjab. Iniportantly, there is also an increasing level of
cooperation
between FATA-based militant groups and those from other parts of
the country whose previous focus
used to be limited to Kashmir. Accordingly, this
Islamic militancy, or Talibanization,
has
now not only grown but it has
spiiled out
of the tribal areas
into the 'settled' areas
of North west Frontier province (NwFp)
and other parts of the country, in particular in Karachi.t The long-term ramifica-
tions of this development are extremely worrisome for the future stability of
Pakistan,
in particular, and the region, in general.
I will first briefly turn to the political administration and economy
of FATA as
it is important to understand
the context in which militancy has
incubated
over the

138 Claude
Rakisits
last
60 years.
I will then
examine
the four discreet
political
periods since
1947,
specifically
as
they
rerate
to FATA, and
analyse
how developments
during
each
period
assisted
in the eventual
'creation,
of the
pakistani
raiiban problem
with
which
we are
now
confronted.
Political administration of tr'ATA
FATA, which is less
than
half the size
of Tasmania
with a population
of over
3 million, is composed
oflwen tribal
agencies.
It is separated
from
Afghanistan
lv.ft: Durand
Line, the 2,5O0-kilomeie
border
estabiished
in lggzr--95
by the
British
colonial
rulers
of India
between
today,s
pakistan
and
Afghanistan.
while
the
Durand
Line has
been
the
defactoborder
between
pakistan
ind Afghanistan,
the government
in Kabul
has
stilito recognize
it officially.
The British policy towards
the tribal 6elt was
based
on a mix of persuasion,
pressure
and
armed
intervention.
Britain instituted
its ,Forward
policy,, which
essentially
consisted
of 'paciffing' the
tribes
as
far
west
as possible.
This
eventu_
ally led to the 1897-98
Tribar wars. Realizing
it would'rr"u", be possible
to
completely
subdue
the frontier tribes,
the colonial administration
decided
to
implement
the 'close Border
policy', which involv"a ".tuutirt irrg
a numuer
or
tribal
agencies,
enclosed
by a chain
tf posts
and
cantonments,
*t eie
tt e pakhtun
tribes
would
be allowed
to govern
their society
according
to their
own laws
and
customs.2
To ensure
control,
London
stationed
troops
in these
agencies
but arso
granted
these
areas
a semi-autonomous
status
in return
for tribal
icquies""rr""
a colonial
ru1e.3
This
special
status
was
codified
in treaties
that
required
z arirrs
(trbarelders)
to
keep
the
borderpasses
open
for hade
and
strategic
purposes
in return
for allow-
ances
and subsidies
they could
distribute
among
thiir tribes.
Nevertheless,
the
hibal areas
showed
some
of tre strongest
anti-British
resistance
on the sub-
continent
during
British
rule.
- Following
Partition
in rg4T,thefounder
and
first
Govemor-General
ofpakistan,
Mohammad
Ali Jinnah,
withdrew
pakistan's
army
from FATA, but the
govern-
ment
of Pakistan
retained
the
colonial
administrative
and
legal
structures,
codified
in a special
legal framework
known as the Frontier crimes Regulations
(FCR)
I 901
. The
FCR,
which
is still in force
today,
mixes
haditional
customs
and
norms
with discretionary
police,
judicial and
executive
authority
in the
political agent
(PA),8.y maintaining
th3
Fc& the
pakistan
government
chose
to heat
FATA,s
population
as separate
from, and
unequal
to,-other
pakistani
citizens.
The deal
after
Partition
was
that
Islamabad
continued
to provide
allowances
and
subsidies,
and
in return the local tribes
declared
their loyaity to pakistan.
- The PA, a federal, and at times provincially recruited,
bureaucrat
heads
the
local
administration
of each ug"o"y.
He is all_powerful.
Backed
by khas_
sadarsa
and levies (hibal militiar;, u-s
*"tt as paramilitary forces that operate
under
army
control,
the
pA exercises
a mix of extensive
eiecutive,
judicial and
revenue
powers
and has the responsibility
of maintaining
law ani order and
suppressing
crime in the tribal areas.
The pA grants
tribal elders
the status
of
malil
PAc
the ir
the P
and t
colla
Th
whic
Cuilt
basis
agen'
ment
This
form
popu
the n
H(
are I
crimr
ades.
seize
reas(
malll
crim
offer
At
zens
tuti(
unde
it. M
legis
natic
FAT
The
FAT
incor
per
(
deve
deve
cent
liter:
4l hr
coml

ts
since
1947,
s during each
problem
with
ation
of over
r Afghanistan
94-95 by the
nistan.
While
Afghanistan,
rf persuasion,
olicy', which
. This eventu-
e possible to
n decided to
a number of
E the Pakhtun
rwn laws and
: also granted
ce
to colonial
(tribal elders)
rrn for allow-
ertheless,
the
on the sub-
rl of Pakistan,
t the govern-
ures,
codified
ations (FCR)
ns
and norms
olitical agent
reat FATA's
:ns. The deal
nd subsidies,
rat heads the
kedby khas-
that operate
,
judicial and
rd order and
the status of
The evolution of the pakistani Taliban 139
malik (with the consent
of the governor) on the basis
of male inheritance.
But the
PA can also arbitrarily withdraw, suspend
or cancel malik statts if he deems
the individual is not serving
the interests
of the state.
Like the British before them.
the Pakistan state rewards the loyal maliks with a special status, financial benefits
and other official rewards.s
Needless
to say, the state
relies on the services and
collaboration of these
maliks to administer FATA.
The FCRpreserves the Pakhtun
tribal structure
of jirga (council of elders),6 to
which the political agent
can refer civil and criminal matters.
Tltejirga ascertains
guilt or innocence
after hearing
the parties to a dispute
and
passes
verdicts on the
basis of rauaj (custom).
However, the PA retains
ultimate authority. The political
agent initiates cases,
appoints the
jirga, presides over trials and awards
punish-
ments without even the technical possibility of revision by a regular court of law.
This anachronistic legal arrangement
continues to this day. So while FATA is
formally and legally a part of Pakistan,
it more closely resembles
a colony whose
population lives under laws and administrative arrangements that set it apart from
the rest of the country.
However, particularly relevant
to Pakistan's
involvement in the 'war on terror'.
are FCR clauses
that empower the political agent to punish an entire tribe for
crimes committed on its territory by fines, arrests, property seizures
and block-
ades.7 The political agent can order detention of all or any members
of the tribe,
seize their property or block their access to the settled districts if he has 'good
reason' to believe that a tribe or its members
are 'acting in a hostile or unfriendlv
manner', have 'failed to render all assistance
in their-power, to help appreh"rri
criminals, 'connived at, or abetted in a crime' or 'suppressed
evidence, of an
offence.
And while Pakistan's 1973
constitution guarantees
fundamental
rights for citi-
zens residing in the entire territory of the country, which includes
the hibal areas,s
Article 247 (7) bars the highest
courts of the land from exercising
any
jurisdiction
under the constitution in relation to a hibal area,
unless
parliament by law allows
it. Moreover, not only does FATA have no representation
in NWFp's provincial
legislature, but while the constitution mandates representation for FATA in the
national parliament, the parliament cannot legislate on any matter concerning
FATA. This makes the FATA-elected members
of parliament rather superfluous.
The economy of the tribal areas
FATA is one of Pakistan's
most economically
backward areas. Annual per capita
income is about
$500,
roughly half that of the very low national average;
some 60
per cent of the population lives below the national poverty line. Per capita
public
development expenditure is reportedly one-third ofthe national average. Social
development indicators are shockingly low. The overall literacy rate is 17.42
per
cent compared
with 56 per cent nationally. Male literacy is 29 per cent, female
literacy a mere 3 per cent, compared with 32 per cent nationally. There are only
4l hospitals
for a population of 3.3 million. FATA has a per doctor rate of l:6,762
compared with the
national
l:1,359.e

140 Claude Rakisits
Natural resources,
including minerals and coal, are under-exploited. It is the
most rural of all administrative
units in the country. Most locals depend on subsis-
tence agriculture since there is little industrial development
and few jobs. This
situation is made worse by the fact that about 15 per cent of the population is
between
the
ages of 15
and22.to
The PA is also FATA's chief development
agent
and
planner;
he is all-powerful
in that sphere
as well. one of the PA's main instruments
of economic control is
the granting of export and import permits for each agency.
These export permits
are a much sought-after prize. Import permits for wheat and other basic necessi-
ties are another source of patronage distribution. Moreover, the political agent
approves and carries out developmental
projects based
on political and adminis-
trative considerations.
There is 'almost no input from the local population or even
their parliamentary
representatives
in development
initiatives'. I I
And to make things worse, the economy is completely distorted by the thriving
trade in arms, drugs, as well as other cross-border
smuggling. These are a direct
consequence
of the events
in neighbouring Afghanistan. Poor law enforcement at
FATA's borders with Afghanistan encourages
lucrative smuggling of luxury
consumer goods, causing significant revenue losses in uncollected duties and
taxes.
Not only has the army done nothing or has
been unable to stop this smug-
gling, but this trade provides the Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani
counterparts
in the FATA agencies with funds and arms. Most significantly, the army has not
prohibited the sale of guns
and
ammunition in FATA, which supplies
the whole of
Pakistan.r2
Let me now turn to FATA's four political periods since
partition, high-
lighting the events and issues
which are relevant to understanding the develop-
ment of religious militancy in the tribal areas
and
beyond.
FATA's four political periods
The
first
period:
1947-1979
The inclusion of the NWFP and FATA in the Pakistan
scheme
following partition
was probably one of the most troublesome problems facing the departing British
administration. In NWFP there was the charismatic Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan,
nicknamed the 'Frontier Gandhi', who led a Muslim organization (IGudai
Khidmatgars - servants of God) which advocated
the establishment
of an inde-
pendent
state for the Pakhfuns,
i.e., Pakhhrnistan.rs
This organization considered
Jinnah's Muslim League a British creation and opposed the idea of pakistan as
being
a British invention. on the other hand,
the Pakhtunistan
scheme was ardently
supported by Afghanistan and the Congress Party. The Afghan authorities, not
recognizing the Durand Line, wanted the 'Pakistani' pakhtuns to either join
Afghanistan or create their own state of Pakhtunistan out of NWFp and parts of
Baluchistan
but, interestingly,
without including the
Pakhtun
areas of Afghanistan.
Kabul also demanded that Pakistan provide Afghanistan access
to the sea by
giving it a special
corridor through Baluchistan
or creating a free Afghan zone in
Karachi.ra
A
cam
Gan
Paki
endr
194'
Pah
resu
cenl
ofjr
Drl
that
don
Kha
the
Pak
A
77)
disr
Kh:
was
rea(
rec(
Nat
mer
sub
Tht
Wil
Isla
ofr
NV
and
(
ffiut
lau
toq
An
uil
gro
the
cor
hia
nat

J. It is the
on
subsis-
jobs.
This
rulation
is
l-powerful
control
is
rrt permits
ic
necessi-
tical agent
l adminis-
on
or even
te thriving
re a direct
rcement
at
of luxury
luties and
lhis
smug-
,unterparts
ny has
not
e
whole
of
tion,
high-
: develop-
g Partition
ng British
lfar Khan,
r (Khudai
,f an inde-
:onsidered
akistan as
n ardently
rrities, not
:ither join
rd parts of
ghanistan.
he sea by
m zone in
The evolution of the pakistani Taliban l4l
A second
soluce of trouble for the Muslim League
around
the time of partition
came from the congress Ministry of Dr Khan sahib, the brother of the 'Frontier
Gandhi' in NWFP. Fearing that a congressled NwFp would opt not to join
Pakistan-to-be, the Muslim League put pressure on the British to call a refer-
endum,
directly asking the people
for their preference.
The plebiscite,
held in July
1947, only offered two choices: to join either India or pakistan; there was no
Pakhtunistan
option. Dr Khan called for a massive
boycott of the plebiscite. The
result was very close: of the 5l per cent of eligible voters who took part, 97 per
cent voted for Pakistan,
i.e., only 50.5 per cent ofthe population voted in favour
ofjoining Pakistan.15
one week after Partition, Governor-General
Jinnah sacked
Dr Khan, as allowed under the adapted
Government of India Act, 1935, for fear
that the Pakhtunistan issue could be used by Afghanistan and India to create
domestic
problems for Pakistan.t6
The new chief minister, Khan Abdul eayyum
Khan, used a heavy-handed approach towards the Pakhtuns, including calling out
the army and air force to suppress
disturbances in the tribal areas.rT
Already then
Pakistan's cenhal authority interfered in FATA's affairs.
Although the cenhal authorities,
particularly under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (lgil_
77) intervened on a regular basis in the provincial affairs of NWFp, including
dismissing the Governor of NWFP on 12 February l973,t8 and arresting Wali
Khan, the National Awami Party (NAP) leader,
on charges
of secession,
FATA
was generally left on its own. Interestingly, Afghan President
Daud was close to
reaching an
agreement
with Bhutto in August I 976, which involved Afghanistan's
recognition of the Durand Line in return for the release of Pakhtun and Baluch
National Awami Party (NAP) leaders
from Pakistani gaols.
However, this agree-
ment was never implemented
as
Bhutto was toppled in 1977
by General
Zia, who
subsequently
released
all imprisoned
NAP leaders.
The second
period: 1979-2001
With the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the political dynamics between
Islamabad and FATA took a dramatic turn. One of the main causes
was the influx
of some 3 million Afghan refugees
who fled the fighting. They mainly settled
in
NWFP and FATA and this inevitably led to clashes
between the local residents
and
the refugees.
Most disputes were, however, settled
by the
jirgas.
Complicating the refugee situation was the presence
in the tribal areas
of the
muj ahideen, the Western-supported anti-Afghan govemment guerrillas, who
launched their attacks against the Soviet and Afghan forces from Pakistani terri-
tory. Bin Laden was one of those
mujahideen leaders
then supported
by the West.
And like the situation some 20 years later, the Pakistan government was unable or
unwilling to control the activities of these insurgents,
with some of these rebel
groups
establishing
quasi-govemment
enclaves in the tribal areas.re Not only did
the introduction of some $66 billion worth of weapons
between 1978 and 1992
compound the gun culture in the country, but the presence of thousands of muja-
hideen led to the creation of a worldwide network of Afghan war veterans of all
nationalities. One of these
organizations
was Al-Qaeda.2o
Many of these fighters

142 Claude Rakisits
would eventually return to Pakistan
following the Taliban's ouster from power in
2001. It is interesting to note that,realizing the damage the presence
of these
mujahideen were having on the local scene,
ajirga of elders
in FATA demanded
in 1985 that Islamabad recognize the soviet-backed government in Kabul and
return the refugees after having come to an acceptable agreement with the Afghan
authorities.2r
The embedding of the mujahideen in the tribal areas
coincided with General
Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization process
in Pakistan
and Islamabad's
close relationship
with saudi Arabia and the UAE. Both factors facilitated the increase
in the polit-
ical clout of the mullahs and the Islamic parties. The conservative mullahs ,
progressively
displaced the maliks as
the principal tribal authority, and thus began
the breakdown of the traditional power structure
in FATA.22
Along with this reli-
gious clout came the very substantial
growth in the number of madrassas
(reli-
gious schools) all over the country, including in the hibal areas.23
The most radical
of these madrassas spawned the mujahideen fighters, Afghans as well as
Pakistanis, who went to fight their jihad in Afghanistan and in Indian-held
Kashmir. Many of these madrassa-educated fighters are now part of the many
extremist religious groups and militants present
in Pakistan.
Given the low level
of socio-economic
development
in the tribal areas,
it is not surprising that up to
80 per cent ofboys still go to these
madrassas
for their education
today.
The overwhelming majority of the madrassas were, and still are, run by the
Jamiat-e-Ulama Islam (JUI), an Islamic party which believes in the revival of
Islamic values
accordingto the
shariah.The JUI is an ideological soulmate
of the
Taliban. Not surprisingly, most of the founders
of the Taliban went through these
JUI-run madrassas.Importantly,
especially
for its long-tenn consequences for the
stability of Pakistan,
these madrassa.r
also
produced
Pakistani
religious extremists
who eventually turned against the very Pakistani state which had promoted
their growth. one of the most notable jihadisls to come out of these religious
schools was Maulana Sufi Muhammad, who founded Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat
Muhammadi (TNSM) in 1992.
By late 1994 the TNSM movement was asserting
itself with thousands
of armed supporters
seeking to impose
by force shariahlaw
in the Bajaur tribal agency of FATA and in neighbouring Malakand division in
NWFP.24 This religious revolt by Pakistani extremists who were supported by
Afghan Taliban fighters who had crossed the border was crushed
by the army.25 A
few years later, the TNSM confirmed yet again its ideological links and affinity
with the Afghan Taliban when some 10,000
of its armed
cadres
from Bajaur, Swat
and other neighbouring areas,
led by Sufi Muhammad, crossed
the border into
Afghanistan in late 2001 to assist the fleeing Taliban forces
fight the US-led forces
and to thank them for their earlier support.26
Another complicating factor in the Afghan-Pakistan relationship at the time
was the thriving heroin trade, which involved a major tribe, the Afridi, whose
members straddle the Durand Line in the area of the Khyber pass. The drug smug-
glers
were given military and moral support by the Soviet-backed
Afghan govern-
ment in return for the Afridi's support in stopping the crossing
into Afghanistan
of the mujahideen. under intense western pressure
to do something about this
growing heroin t
Agency in 1985.
trade and check
law enforcemen
tions.27
This me
interference in F
There was so:
ment that somet
a feeling that th
implementation
franchise, the la
and the low lev
Bhutto's civiliar
ducing adult fra
tion only went
from extending
enjoyed free er
political influen
Importantly,
continued
to usr
as
proxies to fi1
and these radi<
throughout Pal
against some o
Pakistan (SSP)
While many ji
refuge in Afghr
ouster
of the Ti
The third peril
Following thei
across
the bor,
Afghans, Pakir
into local tribe
Nodh Waziris
Western force
from 2005 on
axeas, many .1
confirmed wil
Sindh and Pur
Part of the I
guest is welcc
easy for thest
obvious in tl

n power in
€ of these
demanded
Kabul and
he Afghan
:h General
rlationship
r the polit-
e mullahs
hus began
h this reli-
ssas (reli-
ost
radical
s well as
rdian-held
the many
low level
that up to
un by the
revival of
rate
of tle
rugh these
;es for the
:xtremists
promoted
religious
-e-Shariat
r
asserting
ariahlaw
ivision in
ported by
army.2s
A
td affinity
iaur, Swat
rrder into
led forces
. the time
Ji, whose
ug smug-
n govern-
ghanistan
rbout this
The evolution of the pakistani Taliban 143
growing heroin trade,
General
Zia-ul-Haq sent
paramilitary forces
into the Khyber
Agency in 1985.
Moreover, with the aim of preventing a resurgence
of the illicit
trade and check arms smuggling, the government
decided
to permanently station
law enforcement
agents
in the agency and build fortified posts in strategic
loca-
tions.27
This marked the beginning of the central authoiities, rezular militarv
interference
in FATA.
There was some support for the military action, as there was a genuine senti-
ment that something
had to be done to arrest the heroin trade.
But there
was also
a feeling that the root cause
of the heroin problem in FATA was the continued
implementation of the Frontiers crime regulations, the lack of universal adult
franchise, the lack of social and political integration with the rest of the counrry
and the low level of development,
which only benefited a few malil6.2a
Benazir
Bhutto's civilian govemment
attempted
to deal
with some
of these
issues
by intro-
ducing adult franchise in FATA in 1996.
However, Bhutto's political liberaliza-
tion only went so far. Political parties were - and still are - formally forbidden
from extending their activities into the agencies.
However, mullahs have always
enjoyed free entry. This assisted
the Islamic parties to further consolidate their
political influence in the area.
Importantly, even during the civilian governments
of the 1990s,
the military
continued to usethe madrassa-educatedjihadists,mostbut
not all based in FATA,
as
proxies to fight in Indian-held Kashmir or to assist
the Taliban in Afghanistan,
and these radical Sunni groups continued to grow in strength and in numbers
throughout Pakistan. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did however try to move
against some of the more radical Sunni groups, particularly the sipah-i-sahaba
Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) (an offshoot of the SSp) in t99g-99.
while manyTihadists were arrested,
rily more fled across the border to find
refuge in Afghanistan. Most of these
eventually
returned
to pakistan
following the
ouster of the Taliban from power in2}0l.2e
The third period: 2001-2008
Following their ouster
in october 2001, the Taliban and Al-eaeda fighters
escaped
across the border into the tribal areas of Pakistan. Hundreds of these fighters -
Afghans, Pakistanis,
chechens,
uzbeks, Arabs and
uyghurs - settled
and married
into local tribes. They established
safe
havens in FATA, especially in South and
North waziristan and Bajaur agencies,
and from there launched attacks against
western forces in southern and eastem Afghanistan with success, particularly
from 2005 onwards. while most of the Taliban fighters remained in the hibal
areas, mrury Al-Qaeda operatives settled in other parts of pakistan. This was
confirmed with the subsequent
arrest of top Al-Qaeda leaders in Balochistan,
Sindh and Punjab.3o
Part
of the Pakhtun's tribal honour is to offer hospitality, regardless
whether the
guest is welcomed or not, a criminal, a friend or an enemy. Accordingly, it was
easy for these militants to settle down in FATA. Nevertheless.
it has become
obvious in the last few years that some of these militants, particularly the

144 Claude Rakisits
non-Pakhtun, are starting to overstay their welcome. For example,
deadly battles
causing scores
offatalities broke out between the local residents
and these non-
Pakhtuns,
particularly in early 2007.31
Notwithstanding some local differences, an Afghan Taliban mini-state was
established
in the tribal areas. This progressively led to the Talibanization of
FATA, and
increasingly into the non-tribal areas
of NWFP, by Pakistani militants
and religious extremists who shared the same religious beliefs as the Afghan
Taliban. This included imposing shariah law, attacking music and video shops,
closing barber shops
and killing women working in schools
or for NGOs. From
then on it did not take much for the pro-Taliban Pakistani militants to flex their
muscles,
including assassinating
politicians, killing innocent Pakistani civilians,
murdering tribal leaders who disagreed with the militants' political agenda,
attacking army personnel and assassinating
govemment officials, including by
using suicide bombers. This Talibanization of parts of Pakistan
continues
today
and should come as no surprise to anyone as it is a logical continuation of the
Sunni Deobandi militancy whose ideological tenets are derived from the same
orthodox Sunni-Hannafi interpretations of Islam which were promoted under
General
Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization process
of the 1980s.32
So who are these
pro-Taliban fighters in the tribal areas?
Simply put, they are
Pakhtun tribesmen who have been radicalized by the rhetoric of jihad which
started almost 30 years ago with the anti-Soviet jihad, continued during the
Afghan civil war and the subsequent Taliban rule and finally today with the pres-
ence of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the region. These pro-Taliban fighters also
include retuming Pakistani fighters and commanders who had participated in
fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviets and later, between 1996 and 2001,
against the Northern Alliance.3r Worryingly, an increasing number of Punjabi
militants, especially from the southern part of the province, have also joined
forces with these Pakhtun
militants. Many of these Punjabis already belonged
to
banned extremist religious militant groups which were - and some still are -
suppoded behind the scenes by elements of the Pakistani
military establishment.
These groups, which include Sipah-i-Sahaba
Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-i-Jhangvi
(LJ), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Harkatul Jihadul
Islami (HUJI), are sometimes referred to collectively as the Punjabi Taliban.3a
These groups have played an extremely useful role for the Pakistani military as
Jihadi proxies' in Afghanistan and India since the 1980s.35
However, since
2001
these Punjabi-based groups have increasingly turned their attention away from the
Kashmir issue and focused on spreading terror in the Punjab and Karachi.36
So
while the LeT - now renamed Jamaat-ud-Dawa after President Musharraf banned
the organization in 2002 - has not completely abandoned
its attacks against Indian
targets as confirmed with its suicide attacks
in Mumbai in November 2008, it is
now increasingly concentrating its attention on the home front. And even though
it is considered one of the most extreme
jihadist groups
in Pakistan
today,
it is still
allowed to openly operate in the country.37
The common thread between all these different militants, regardless of their
ethnic or national origin, is their belief that it is lawful to wage
jihad against
a
government or
Importantly, ma
gaining a livelil
particularly wor
oftenunemploy
erate
closely wi
goes
back to th
Afghanistan to
training camps
members of tht
In an attemp
areas under on
leaders
establit
headed
by Bai
operations by t
declared
amor
as its goal to e
member of tht
eventually crei
tant point to rt
ofNWFP, Pa}
used to attract
interpret it. M
tity it would
support from
The establi
that there is a
in Pakistan
ar
On the contrt
controlled an,
often, but no'
the case follc
August 2009
which confin
up the TTP.
close aide to
opponents, !
among TTP
number of
Mohammad
assisting thr
Others, sucl
compunctio:
There are
the TTP bu

le, deadly battles
.s
and these
non-
r mini-state was
lalibanization of
rkistani militants
's as the Afghan
md video shops,
for NGOs. From
ants to flex their
kistani civilians.
rclitical agenda,
rls, including by
continues today
rtinuation of the
I from the same
promoted under
ply put, they are
of jihad which
nued during the
ay with the pres-
ban fighters also
I participated in
1996 and 2001.
nber of Punjabi
nve also joined
:ady
belonged to
some still are -
y esiablishment.
mhkar-i-Jhangvi
{arkatul Jihadul
rnjabi Taliban.3a
stani military as
ever,
since
2001
)n
away from the
rd Karachi.36
So
usharrafbanned
<s
against
Indian
,mber
2008. it is
tnd even though
n today, it is still
gardless
of their
:
jihad against a
The evolution of the Pakistani Taliban 145
government or other fellow Muslims who support the west's 'war on terror'.
Importantly, many unemployed youth have been drawn to the
jihad'as a way of
gaining a livelihood or enhancing their social importance and power'.38
This is
padicularly worrisome especially
for Pakistan
with such alargeunemployed (and
often unemployable) youth population. Finally, all these
pakistani militants coop-
erate closely with the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda.3e
This terrorist cooperation
goes back to the 1990s
when some of these
groups,
particularly the LJ, went to
Afghanistan to avoid arrest
from the Pakistan
authorities.
There they established
training camps and worked closely with the Taliban and Al-eaeda to become
members
of the globalTihadist network.{
In an attempt to bring together the various Taliban-oriented groups of the tribal
areas under one umbrella organization, a shura (assembly) of 40 senior Taliban
leaders established
on 14 December 2007 the Tehrik-i-Taliban pakistan (TTp)
headed by Baitullah Mehsud. The TTP demanded
an immediate end to military
operations by the Pakistani army and the withdrawal of troops from FATA. It also
declared a more intense
jihad against US and NATo forces in Afghanistan as well
as its goal to enforce shariah law in the areas
under its influence.ar An important
member of the TTP is the TNSM, which we discussed
above and which would
eventually create a lot of trouble for the Pakistan government in 2009. An impor-
tant point to remember about the TTP is that, while it is based in FATA and parts
ofNWFP, Pakhtun
ethno-nationalismhas
notbeen specifically and systematically
used to attract new recruits. And this is because its main focus is Islam - as they
interpret it. Moreover, on a more practical level, were they to stress Pakhtun iden-
tity it would deprive the TTP of potential sources of income and manpower
support from other parts ofPakistan and beyond.a2
The establishment
of the TTP, however, could give the misleading impression
that there is a unified and centralizedorganization to which all the militant groups
in Pakistan
answer to, similar to the Afghan Taliban. This is certainly
not the case.
On the contrary, not only is the FATA-based TTP itself not a disciplined, well-
controlled and homogeneous
grouping,
but it is characterized
by much in-fighting,
often, but not solely, along tribal and sub-tribal affiliation. This was particularly
the case following the death of Baittulah Mehsud in an American drone attack in
August 2009. The selection of his successor
was a long and difficult process,
which confirmed the deep-seated
differences between the various groups making
up the TTP. Eventually the succession went to Hakimullah Mehsud, a friend and
close aide to Baitullah and known for his ruthless approach
to dealing with his
opponents, whether Pakistani officials or other militant leaders.a3
One major rift
among TTP members is the approach they take vis-d-vis the Pakistan army. A
number of prominent militant leaders, such as Turkistan Bittani and Faqir
Mohammad,a are opposed to attacking Pakistani troops and prefer to focus on
assisting the Afghan Talibans' jihad against Western forces in Afghanistan.
Others, such as the late Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud. have no
compunction in targeting
the Pakistani
military and government
officials.as
There are other militant Islamist groups based
in FATA which are not part of
the TTP but are lumped together and referred to collectively as the Pakistani

146 Claude Rakisits
Taliban. The most important ones include Laskar-e-Islam, headed by Mangal
Bagh, which is based in the Khyber Agency, and Ansar-ul-Islam, which is a
Barelvi Sunni group, also based in the Khyber Agency. As these
two extremist
groups belong to the two main competing sunni schools
of thought in pakistan,
Deobandi and Barelvi, their members
not only target Shias (whom they consider
beyond the pale),46
non-Muslims (especially AhmidiyahsaT
and christians) and
Pakistani
authorities,
but also each
other.
Finally, there are militants in FATA and NWFp with whom the pakistan
govemments of President Musharraf and president zardan have overt or tacit
agreements
of convenience
because
they play what the military considers
impor-
tant strategic
roles. The two most important of such militant leaders
are Maulvi
Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur.
They have not only been
ardent
rivals of Baitullah
Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud, but they have opposed
the TTp's policy of
targeting
the Pakistan
military and other state
symbols.
Moreover, they have been
strong supporters of the Afghan Haqqani network, which is a ruthless group based
in North waziristan whose fighters have been very successful
in the attacks they
have launched against western forces in Afghanistan. This association between
these Pakistani militants and Haqqani has been useful to the pakistani military
because
the latter has some important intelligence and military links with the
Haqqani militants developed since the days of the Soviets' occupation of
Afghanistan. It cercainly
does not want to lose such an important Afghan asset,
which could be particularly useful following the eventual departure of the western
forces from Afghanistan. The Haqqani network is also valuable to the pakistan
military because
its top leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is the main liaison with the
Afghan Taliban based in Quetta, Baluchistan, other pakistani militants and
Al-Qaeda.a8
under intense American pressure, President pewez Musharraf sent about
100,000 arrny troops into the tribal areas to hunt down the Taliban and Al-eaeda
fighters. The government also erected
fences in selected
areas
along the border
and set up some 1,000 checkpoints. It organized the formation of anti-militant
lashkars (militias), comprising volunteers, in the hibal areas
and in the .settled'
areas
of NWFP.ae
while the army has lost more troops in the process than western
forces have in Afghanistan, the military has generally been more effective and
keener in going after the non-Pakhtun Al-eaeda than after the Afghan Taliban.5'
And this was (and still is) principally because
the military - which had developed
close links with the Taliban since
the early 1990s
when it had created it with the
help of the Islamic parties - did not wish to destroy a potential ally after the
inevitable departure
of the Coalition forces from Afghanistan.sr
Unfortunately, not only did the Pakistan army suffer a very high number of
military casualties
and fatalities, but in the process
of using military means it also
killed many innocent civilians. This has - and continues to provide - political
ammunition to the Pakistani
Taliban militants in the tribal areas.
Similarly, the use
of American Predator strikes - often unilaterally without the pakistan govem-
ment's prior agreement
- has fuelled an already strong anti-American mood in
Pakistan,
in general,
and in the tribal areas,
in particular.
A negative
c,
displacement
o
in favour of the
of administrati,
And the break<
of the Islamic
fighters have e
As we noted al
begun with thr
favour of the z
Realizing th
these
sanctuar:
Accordingly, i
Waziristan (A
2006).
These
r
cross-border
a
ations
in those
accords were
following th,
Furthermore,
Waziristan, k
major flaws
the areas whe
provisions.
However, i
cant militant
Mosque) in I
capital and w
people in tht
themselves
v
capital.
It cor
had been too
had to be dor
facto alliancr
that it had gi
Thefoarth 1
Since about
centre whic.
dealing with
which the la
in August P
widow, Asil
of attitude 1
:

:d by Mangal
n, which is a
two extremist
rt in Pakistan,
they consider
hristians) and
the Pakistan
overt or tacit
rsiders
impor-
rs are Maulvi
s of Baitullah
P's policy of
rey have been
s group based
e attacks they
rtion between
stani military
inks with the
,ccupation of
Afghan asset,
rfthe Western
' the Pakistan
.ison
with the
militants and
rf sent about
md Al-Qaeda
rg the border
'anti-militant
r the 'settled'
than
Western
effective and
nn Taliban.so
ad developed
ed it with the
ally after the
th number of
means
it also
le - political
ilarly, the use
istan govern-
Lcan
mood in
The evolution of the Pakistani Taliban 147
A negative
consequence
of the use of the military has
been the gradual political
displacement of the Political Agent and the maliks, who kept the system
working,
in favour of the
Pakistani
raliban militants, who have
established
aparallel system
of administration,
justice, summary hial courts and taxation in the tribal areas.52
And the breakdown of the tribal structure has been reinforced with the influence
of the Islamic parties and the presence of the Taliban and Al-eaeda, whose
fighters have executed tribal leaders
who disagreed
with their policy or agenda.
As we noted above, this breakdown of the traditional kibal structure had already
begun with the influx of the mujahideen and the displacement of the matiks in
favour of the mullahs in the 1980s.
Realizing that the deployrnent
of armed forces
was not effective in dealing
with
these sanctuaries, the Musharraf government decided to try a different approach.
Accordingly, it entered into agreements
with local leaders and
mullahs in South
Waziristan (April 2004 and February 2005) and North Waziristan (September
2006). These
deals called on the tribesmen to expel the foreign militants and end
cross-border attacks into Afghanistan in return for the army stopping major oper-
ations in those agencies
and pulling most of its soldiers
out of the tribal area. The
accords were a failure, as there were more attacks across into Afghanistan
following those agreements and the Taliban maintained its sanctuaries.
Furthermore, the Pakistani militants continued to rule in North and South
Waziristan, killing and attacking officials and military personnel at will. The
major flaws with the deals were: first, it assumed that the hibes conholled
the areas
when in fact the Taliban did; and, second,
there were no enforcement
provisions.
However, in July 2007 one event was the catalyst for the beginning of signifi-
cant militant activity against the Pakistan state: the siege of Lal Masjid (Red
Mosque) in Islamabad
by radical mullahs who wanted to impose shariah in the
capital and which ended with the army storming the mosque
and killing scores of
people in the process. The people of Pakistan had great difficulty reconciling
themselves with this event, which took place in the very heart of the counfiry's
capital.
It confirmed in the eyes of the public that successive national governments
had been too tolerant towards these radical religious groups and that something
had to be done to stop their power from growing. It also demonstrated thatlhe de
facto alliance between the military and the mullahs had not only broken down but
that it had given the religious extremists
the political space to grow.
The
fourth period: 2008-present
Since about 2008 Pakistan has undergone significant political changes at the
centre which have had an impact on the Pakistan govemment's approach to
dealing with the militancy. In February 2008,
parliamentary
elections
were held in
which the late Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party won the most seats,
and
in August Pewez Musharraf resigned as president,s3
to be replaced by Bhutto's
widow, Asif Zardai. With the change
in political leadership
also came a change
of attitude towards the militant threat. While General Musharraf had officially
,

148 Claude Rakisits
joined the west's 'waf, on terror', his administration,s approach to this battle
against
terrorists was at best inefficient and at worst dupliiiious. However, with
the change of the guard in the military and politicar spheres,
there was also a
change
of attitude
towards this worsening home-grown militancy. But this did not
happen quickly.
Even though the agreements
in North and South
waziristan failed, the military
mistakenly believed that agreements
could still be entered
into with ihe militants.
Accordingly, not only did the pakistan govemment release on 2r April 200g
Maulana Sufi Mohammad, leader
of the TNSM, whose
armed
activities have
been
discussed
above,
but also sigrred
an accord,
dubbed the ,
shariah for peace' agree-
ment with the TNSM in February 2009. The agreement
consisted
of enfoicing
rhe shariah in the swat valley region and in retum the TNSM followers would
renounce violence. However, the TNSM militants did not lay down their
weapons
and instead
attacked
the surrounding
districts of Dir and Buner.ro
Given
that this militant activity was taking place only about 150 kilometres from
Islamabad,
the army decided
to act. It sent
in some
40,000 troops and
managed
to
expel the fighters from the towns in the Swat valley, most ofihom simply fled
to FATA' especially South waziristan and orakzai agencies. However, this
military assault
came
at a great
price for the civilian populution. some 2.5 million
people had to flee the heavy fighting and seek refuge elsewhere. This was
the world's biggest and most sudden movement or peopte since the Rwandan
genocide
in1994.55
The reneging
of the swat accord
was a turning point for the military as it finally
confirmed that there
was no point in signing agreements
with the militants as they
would simply break them. The government henceforth determined to deal force-
fully with the militants. Accordingly, following the army,s intervention into Swat,
it decided
to also go into south waziristan and
orakzai in the second
half of 2009
and in the first half of 2010. It is important to remember
that the US administra-
tions of Presidents
Bush and obama had been pressing hard for the pakistani
government
to take forceful action against
the Taliban and the pakistani militants
hiding in those
areas
of FATA.56
Given the harsh
terrain and the dispersion
of the
militants' forces, the military operations were difficult to execute. And while
the army did score
some
tactical victories and eliminated many militants, most of
the TTP fighters fled to North waziristan. Nevertheless,
the b*irturri army has
declared victory in these operations, even though the evidence on the ground
suggests quite the contrary.s7
Nevertheless,
in May the pakistani govemment
decided in principle to laurch a full-fledged military operation again-st
the mili-
tants hiding in North waziristan. while this decision was taken-
reluctantly in
response
to persistent
American pressure
on the pakistan authorities to go into
North waziristan, it is nevertheless
an important development in the pakistani
government's determination to deal with the
jihadisr mililancy threat facing the
country.s8
In addition to using military means
to deal
with the militants in the tribal areas,
the civilian govemment in Islamabad
is developing political and socio-economic
prograrnmes to bring the tribal areas into mainstream pakistan political and
economic lif
years
aims tc
The governn
willing to pu
that is poor.
non-lethal m
integrated w
southern anr
Taliban-type
comrpt adm
restore order
Two of th,
to drop their
Frontiers
Cr:
tribal areas i
Pakhtunkhw
sition to the
the whole w
Islamic part:
militants car
The people
And more ir
incompetenr
Conclusio
Pakistan is
people
kille
still domina
on board ol
parts
of the
TTP, other
state,
they
a
is an extren
role Islam s
This mil
mainly, bu
October
20
and have
c
ments
in P:
such as the
such as the
with thatpt
ings
are
cle
This is far

this battle
'ever,
with
vas also a
his
did not
te military
:militants.
pril 2008
have
been
rce' agree-
enforcing
ers would
own their
:r.54
Given
rtres from
nnaged to
imply fled
'ever, this
1.5
million
This was
Rwandan
.s
itfinally
rts as
they
leal force-
into Swat,
.lf
of 2009
Jministra-
Pakistani
i militants
;ion of the
rnd while
.s,
most of
army has
re ground
rvemment
: the mili-
ctantly in
to go into
Pakistani
lacing the
ibal areas,
economic
itical and
The evolution of the Pakistani Taliban 149
economic life. washington's aid package of US$7.5 billion over the next five
years
aims to assist Islamabad
meet some
of these
economic development
needs.
The government's approach also includes negotiations with Pakistani militants
willing to put down their arms.se
However, we have seen
that the success
rate for
that is poor. The government's aim is to convince the local population, through
non-lethal measures,
that there
is much more to be gained
forihim by being fully
integrated
with the rest of Pakistan than by supporting the Taliban. As in parts of
southern and eastem Afghanistan today, local residents have acquiesced to
Taliban-type rule out of fear of the militants combined with resentment
against
a
comrpt administration and draconian laws. The Pakistani militants are able to
restore order quickly and dispense speedyjustice - as they see
it.60
Two of the measures
the federal
government
is considering
to induce the locals
to drop their support for the Taliban and their fellow travellers are repealing the
Frontiers Crimes Regulations (FCR) in FATA and fully integrating
politically the
tribal areas into the neighbouring province of NWFP. Renaming
NWFP 'Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa' is a positive step in that direction. While there
has
been some oppo-
sition to the repeal of the FCR in some quarters,
these
are measures that are on
the whole welcomed by the local residents
of FATA.6I Importantly, following the
Islamic parties' crushing defeat in the 2008 provincial and national elections,
the
militants can no longer rely on their political support to promote their agenda.62
The people of NWFP have made very clear that they reject religious extremism.
And more importantly, they have also rejected the religious parties' comrpt and
incompetent rule in NWFP.
Conclusion
Pakistan is faced with a growing religious militancy threat, with some 3,000
people killed in terrorist attacks
over the last three years.
While this militancy is
still dominated by Pakhtuns and its home base
is FATA, it has increasingly taken
on board other ethnic groups and moved beyond the tribal areas and into other
parts of the country. And although these
extremist Sunni Deobandi groups
- the
TTP, other militant groups and regionalTihadists - are not about to take over the
state, they are nevertheless gaining ground. In many ways, this militancy problem
is an extreme
manifestation of the unresolved issue
- around since 1947
- of the
role Islam should have in the administration of the country.
This militancy problem has been compounded by the presence
in Pakistan,
mainly, but not solely, in FATA, of the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda since
October 2001. All these
groups, indigenous and foreign, have helped each
other
and have cross-pollinated
for years. Nevertheless,
civilian and military govern-
ments in Pakistan have tried to artificially differentiate between 'good' terrorists,
such as the LeT, who act as proxies on the Kashmir front, and 'bad' terrorists,
such
as the TTP and the LJ, who threaten
civilians and
the state alike. The problem
with that
policy is that it assumes that the constituent members
of these two group-
ings are clearly separate and that their agendas have remained the same
over time.
This is far from being the case;
the 'good' and 'bad' terrorists have increasingly

150 Claude Rakisits
been,working together, the.
membership of these groupings is fluid and their
agenda
and targets
have evolved over time.
A critical factor that has
assisted
the growth of this militancy is the failure since
the creation of pakistan to integrate rara pohtically, legally and economically
with the rest of the country. This has hadihree negative consequences:
it has
made
it easier
for foreign elements
to embed
themselves
in the tribal areas
_ a safe
physical environment,
with its rugged terrain and difficult access
for the pakistan
army; it has meant that the local pakhtuns have had no stake
in the development
of Pakistan;
and it has made it easier
to recruit disaffected locals to the
jihadist
cause.
But Pakistan
does
not exist in a vacuum. Developments
in pakistan
are intrinsi_
cally linked to events in Afghanistan. Accordingly, it is in putirturi, long-term
national interest for the -army to vigorously and'unswervingly hunt down the
frsh* Taliban, Al-eaeda and their pakistani allies uno prrri*"ntry shut down
their network in pakistan
while at the same
time extending
democratic
freedoms,
upholding human rights, extending the rule of ta* ana"promoiinf sustainaule
economic development
for the residents
of the tribal areas.
Needless
to say,
the negative
blowback effect on pakistan of a Taliban victory
in Afghanistan would be immeasurable.
It would encourage
and invigorate the
Pakistani militants' But, importantly, a Taliban-dominatedlovernment in Kabul
- probably harbouring
Al-Qaeda - would not necessarily
be iriendly to Islamabad.
on the contrary, it would not be sympathetic
to a pakistan government
officially
an ally of the west. The civilian govirnment must now use its popular mandate
- and
the people's rejection of the Islamic parties
- to assist
the
people
of the hibal
areas to integrate economically and politically with the rest of pakistan. That
would be a good first step towards dealing with the militancy ,"o*g" fa"irrg
Pakistan.
Notes
I The
name.of
the province
yas.lhSqed to.'Khyber
pakhtunkhwa,
on lg April 2010,
lvit!.jhe signing
into law the rgth lmendment to the 1973
constitution.
However,
ilyf|;;*" the name
of NWFp for the sake
ot conrirtencv *"rt "ii".'"r,apters in
2 clatde Rakisits,
'National
Integration
in pakistan:
The
Role
of Religion,
Ethnicity
and
the
Extemal
Environment',
fh.D._2issertation,rJniversity"iauee.n.fiil'ieSl;ZZt.
For an informative
discu_s,sion
of British policy towaras
the tribal areas
as well as
Baluchistan,
see:
James
w. Spain,
'political p-bl"n,, of a Borderland,
in Aisnrie
T.
Embree
(ed.),
pakistan's
western
Bordertands,-vikas
pruiirrri"g lir"ie, New oerhi,
1977:1_23.
3 Mumtaz
A. Rqngash,
'Administrative
and
polificar
Development
of the
Tribar
Areas:
A Focus on Khyber and Kurram', ph.D. Dissertation, Area
Study centre (central
Asia),
universitv
of peshawar,
1996,
as
cited
in .p;k#;ti;iii.i"r:ipp."r,ng
ilroyll,u"r' in Intemationar
crisis
Group's
)sia Report,N"
izslo"".mber,
lr,
4 Khassadars are an-irregurar force underthe pA's overall command to protect roads and
other govemment installations
and perform guard duties.
5 'Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing ttre Ultitants,, p. +.
6 Thejirga
Areas:
A1
7 FCR(19(
8 These
inr
speech
ar
form orb
9 'FATAT
Departmr
l0 Khalid A
of Policy
1l 'Pakistan
12 Ahmed
F
2003,
as
13 N. Entesr
14
Aziz,'Ct
15 Rakisits,
16 SharifA
Azam A<
17 L. Ziing
1980:77
18 His disrn
Baluchis
19 Hafeez
I\
Asian an
20 Aziz,'Ct
2l TheMus
22 Nasreen
West Frr
Decembr
23 The num
unregiste
in Centrt
24 Ashok I
Journal,
25 Ghufran.
26 Behuria,
27 Rakisits,
28 lbid:34!
29'Pakistar
No 164,
30 Behuria,
3l 'Waziris
32 'Pakistar
33 Behuria,
34 Ghufran
35 'Pakistar
36 lbid: 6ff
37 lbid:1fr
38 'Pakistar
39 Rohan
(
Areas:4
40 'Pakistar
4l Ghufran
42 lbid: ll(

id and their
failure since
conomically
:nces:
it has
Lreas
- a safe
the Pakistan
levelopment
the
jihadist
are intrinsi-
's long-term
rt down the
y shut down
ic freedoms,
sustainable
iban victory
vigorate the
:nt in Kabul
r Islamabad.
:nt officially
lar mandate
of the tribal
kistan. That
,urge facing
) April 2010,
n. However,
r chapters
in
Ethnicity
and
7,
1986;221.
s as well as
in Aisnlie
T.
, New Delhi,
Iribal Areas:
ntre (Central
s:
Appeasing
:cember,
1
l,
ect
roads
and
The
evolution of the Pabistani Taliban l5l
6 The
jirga relies on the Pakhtun
code of honour (Pakthunwal), see
'Pakistan's
Tribal
Areas: Appeasing the Militants'
in Asia Report, No 125,
l1 December
2006: 6.
7 FCR
(1901),
sections 21-24.
8 These include equality of citizens before law, equal
protection
of law, freedom of
speech and expression, right to association, right to assemble
peacefully,
and
right to
form or be a member
of a political party.
9 'FATA Development
Statistics 2005', Bureau of Statistics,
Planning
and Development
Department,
govemment
of NWFP,
Peshawar.
l0 Khalid Aziz, 'Causes
of Rebellion
in Waziristan' in Policy
Report,
Regional
Institute
ofPolicy Research and Training,
Peshawar,
2007:37.
'Pakistan's
Tribal
Areas: Appeasing the Militants': 9.
Ahmed Rashid,
'Who's winning
the war on terror', Yale
Global
Online,5 September
2003, as cited
in 'Pakistan's
Tribal
Areas:
Appeasing
the Militants':
9.
I 3 N. Entessar,'Baluchi Nationalism', I sian
Affairs, 7 (2) (197
9): 7 9.
14 Aziz.'Causes of Rebellion in Waziristan': 14.
15 Rakisits,
'National
Integration
in Pakistan': 225.
16 Sharif
Al Mujahid,
Quaid-i-Azam
Jinnah,
Studies in Interpretation,Karachi,
Quai-i-
Azam Academy,
l98l: 135.
17 L. Ziring, Pakistan: The enigma
of political development,
Folkestone, Wm Dawson,
1980:77.
18 His dismissal
was related
to the low-intensity
guenilla
war that was being waged
in
Baluchistan.
19 Hafeez Malik, 'The Afghan
Crisis and
its Impact
on Pakistan', The
Journal
of South
Asian
and Middle Eastern
Studies,5
(3) (198\: a6.
20 Aziz. 'Causes
of Rebellion inWaziistan':22.
2l The Muslim,27 December 1985.
22 Nasreen
Ghufran,
'Pakhtun
Ethnonationalism and the Taliban
Insurgency in the North
West Frontier Province
of Pakistan',
Asian Surtey, Vol. XLIX, No. 6, November/
December 2009: 1 106.
23 T\enumberofMadrassas
increasedfrom900inl9Tl to8,000registeredand25,000
unregisteredby
1988. AhmedRashid,Taliban, Militantlslam,
OilandFundamentalism
in Central Asia,
Yale
University Press,2001: 89.
24 Ashok K. Behuria,
'Fighting the Taliban:
Pakistan
at War with ltself, Australian
Journal of International Affairs, 61 (4) (2007): 533.
Ghufran,
'Pakhtun
Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency': 1
103.
Behuria,
'Fighting
the Taliban':
533.
Rakisits,
'National
Integration in Pakistan': 342.
Ibid: 343.
'Pakistan:
The Militant Jihadi
Challenge',
International
Crisis Group's Asia Report,
No 164, 13 March 2009,p.4.
30 Behuria,
'Fighting
the Taliban':
531.
31 'Waziristan
Clash
toll ises', Dawn
- the Internet,22March2007.
32 'Pakistan:
The Militant Jihadi Challenge':72.
33 Behuria,
'Fighting
the Taliban': 531 .
34 Ghufran,
'Pakhtun
Ethnonationalism
and
the Taliban Insurgency':
1094.
35 'Pakistan:
The Militant Jihadi Challenee':
i.
36 Ibid: 6ff.
37 lbid:7ff.
38 'Pakistan's
Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants': 22.
39 Rohan Gunaratna
and Amir Rana, Al Qaeda
Fights back inside Pakistani Tribal
Areas:49.
'Pakistan:
The Militant Jihadi Challenge': 7ff.
Ghufran,
'Pakhtun
Ethnonationalism
and
the Taliban Inswgency':
I107-l 108.
Ibid:1108.
1t
12
25
26
27
28
29
40
4l
42

152 Claude Rakisits
43 claude
Rakisits,
'Taliban
down
but
not yet
out', The
Ausnalian,
l0 Auzust
2009.
44 Another prominent
-ifrgt reader
opposed
t" 1t".tirt g";;;;il:s was
eari
f,lil:lliit"hsud untit
his
assassination
on
z: rune
zobe:;;;;;;"i,ly by
someone
45 Most
analysts
believe
that
Baitullah
Mehsud
masterminded
the
assassination
of Benazir
Bhutto
in Rawalpindi
on
27
Decemb
er 2007.
46 Attacks
against
Shias
in the tribal agencies
of Kurram
and
orakzai,
where
there
is a
significant
shla population,
*. u
r"grilu.
o"curence.
see
.pakistan:
The
Militant
Jihadi
Challenge':
15ff.
47 ln an -attempt
to placate
the religious parties, Zllfiqar Ali Bhutto declared
the
Ahmadiyahs
a non-Muslim
sect
in l-974.
TLis
*as r"affi.ir"a i, r
sga
;"dJ. tne
r"gime
of General
zia. Ahmadiyahs
are
regularly
the target
of attacks,
*itr, tr,lluiot ueing
on
.- 28May 2010
when
some
g0
worsh'ippers
were
killed in Lahorl.
48 Anand
Gopal,
Mansur
Khan
Mahsudand
B.iun
rirrr,nun,
inrioe trr"
uuqquni
Network,,
Foreign
Policy,
3 June
2010.
49 Ghufran,
'pakhtun
Ethnonationalism
and
the
Taliban
Insurgency,:
1
l l 1 .
50 claude Rakisits,
'pakistan.
- Afghanistan:
Breaking
tnJ iaiiu* bonnection,, in
Alexandre vautravers (e.d.), Gtibaraafion of seciity rr"rilna-'F)rspectives,
Geneva,
Webster
University,
200g:
71.
51 For an excellent
discussion
of the continuing
lSl-Taliban relationship,
see Matt
waldman,
'The sun in. the
sky: The
RelationslJp
u.n .r" pur.i.tun'"r'rtT?a Afghan
Insurgents',
crisis states
Disiussion
papers,
Lo'ndon
s.ho"i ;i;;;olrrJr, ronaon,
June
2010.
52 Aziz,'Causes
of Rebellion
in Waziristan,;
39.
53 Musharraf had arready
relinquished
his position as chief of Army staff in
November
2007.
Ghufran,
'Pakhtun
Ethnonationalism
and
the
Taliban
Insurgency,:
I I 13.
claude
Rakisits,
'Battle
with the
Bad
Guys',
rne ,eiitratian l7 June
2009.
claude Rakisits,
'pakistan_.stanf9
to uir rrom "upto* of raliban leader,,
Nationar
lmey Zl! 9\ntary
20
10,
<http://www.nationaltimis.com.au/opinion>
Zeeshan
Haider,
'No Pakistan
victory
in Orakz_aidespit"
Lu" uri .rV:',
Reuters,l4
June
20 I 0' <http://www.reuters.com/article/iduSTRE65D
l r20l 006
r 4>
F:q{ S-":tq9
Syed, 'Accord for operation in North Waziristan,,
Dawn.com,
Part III
Intern
54
5)
56
JI
58
59
60
6l
62
irr"-yg""r"r^'j;*n/*f ;gy*g{1qsf lcnvcgi;;t;#;;ilir_nt:,itlk1iij
the-
waziristan-050>
'Pakistan
_Taleban
praise
release',
B B
C New
s, 22 Apnl 200g.
'Pakistan's
Tribal
Areas:
Appeasing
the
Miliiants,:2.
Interview
with a local
membir
of th-e
NWFp provincial
Assembly,
April 200g.
The Islamic
parties
had 10.
out of the 12 seats
allocated
to FATA in the National
Assembly.
In the
2008
elections,
these
parties
lost
aii their
seats.