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Mancur Olson and the tragedy of the unbalanced commons

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Abstract

Mancur Olson offered us big thoughts on big subjects. Today, he might well attack the problem of climate change and the current failure of nations to act effectively. Olson would note the incentives of nations to ride free or cheaply. He would observe that climate change is an alliance problem, one where some nations have much more at stake than others. With climate change, the alliance problem is redoubled, since the asymmetries among nations fall along multiple dimensions, including those of vulnerability to climate change, history of greenhouse emissions, emissions per dollar of GNP, level of economic development, and cultural environmental concerns. Each nation, valuing primarily its own concerns, advances principles favoring itself in the apportionment of painful cuts. Not surprisingly, the cuts that nations have agreed upon for the heralded 2015 Paris Accords will be woefully insuffi cient to avoid exacerbating climate change. Thus, despite much international discussion and many platitudinous agreements, concerns about the distribution of painful cuts will continue to prevent the nations of the world from even approaching an effi cient agreement. Our threatened planet needs a more sophisticated approach to this and other collective action problems, a fi eld pioneered by Mancur Olson.

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Article
: The report presents a new theoretical model of military alliances and other international organizations. The assumptions basic to the model are that nations act in their own best interests and that there is a 'public goods' aspect to all joint undertakings. The main conclusions drawn from the analysis are that (1) a less than optimal amount of resources will be devoted to an alliance or other international organization; (2) the burden of an alliance will be borne in a disproportional way, the larger members paying more than their proportional share. Empirical data from NATO and the United Nations are presented in support of these conclusions.
Citations referring to this article should include the following information
  • Thomas C Schelling
Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Citations referring to this article should include the following information: Zeckhauser, Richard. (2015). Mancur Olson and the tragedy of the unbalanced commons. In: Decyzje 24 (December), pp. 191-202, Kaminski Marek M., ed., Warsaw: Kozminski Academy.