An International Rule of Law?

Abstract

The rule of law is almost universally supported at the national and international level. The extraordinary support for the rule of law in theory, however, is possible only because of widely divergent views of what it means in practice. Disparate national traditions posed few problems while operating in parallel, but efforts to promote the rule of law through international organizations have necessitated a reassessment of this pluralism. This article proposes a core definition of the rule of law as a political ideal and argues that its applicability to the international level will depend on that ideal being seen as a means rather than an end, as serving a function rather than defining a status. Such a vision of the rule of law more accurately reflects the development of the rule of law in national jurisdictions and appropriately highlights the political work that must be done if power is to be channeled through law.

Full text

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081738
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES
WORKING PAPER NO. 08-11
An International Rule of Law?
Simon Chesterman
April 2008
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081738

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081738
Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56(2) AM. J. COMP. L. __ (2008)
SIMON CHESTERMAN*
An International Rule of Law?
The rule of law is almost universally supported at the national and
international level. The extraordinary support for the rule of law in theory, however, is
possible only because of widely divergent views of what it means in practice. Disparate
national traditions posed few problems while operating in parallel, but efforts to
promote the rule of law through international organizations have necessitated a
reassessment of this pluralism. This article proposes a core definition of the rule of law
as a political ideal and argues that its applicability to the international level will
depend on that ideal being seen as a means rather than an end, as serving a function
rather than defining a status. Such a vision of the rule of law more accurately reflects
the development of the rule of law in national jurisdictions and appropriately highlights
the political work that must be done if power is to be channeled through law.
INTRODUCTION
We ought to expose the shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath the law.
But the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the
defense of the citizen from power’s all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an
unqualified human good.
* Global Professor and Director of the New York University School of Law Singapore Programme;
Associate Professor, National University of Singapore Faculty of Law. B.A. (Hons) (University of
Melbourne) 1995; LL.B. (Hons) (University of Melbourne) 1997; D.Phil. (University of Oxford) 2000.
The author is indebted to Thomas M. Franck for discussing preliminary ideas for this topic and to Surabhi
Ranganathan for research assistance on the early drafts. Konrad Bühler, John Chesterman, David
Dyzenhaus, Angelina Fisher, Margaret Fordham, Michael Fullilove, Alexander Marschik, Gerard
McCormack, Terry Nardin, Randall Peerenboom, Victor Ramraj, Andrew Simester, Stanley Yeo, and two
anonymous referees were kind enough to comment on earlier drafts — though not so kind as to take
responsibility for errors that remain. This article draws upon passages first written for the “rule of law”
entry in the MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed.,
forthcoming).
An_International_Rule_of_Law_revised.doc (9-Jan-08) Page 1 of 39

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081738
E.P. Thompson1
It would not be very difficult to show that the phrase “the Rule of Law” has become
meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use. It may well have become
just another one of those self-congratulatory rhetorical devices that grace the utterances
of Anglo-American politicians. No intellectual effort need therefore be wasted on this
bit of ruling-class chatter.
Judith Shklar2
What, if anything, is meant by terms such as “the international rule of law”? At
the United Nations World Summit in 2005, Member States unanimously recognized the
need for “universal adherence to and implementation of the rule of law at both the
national and international levels” and reaffirmed their commitment to “an international
order based on the rule of law and international law.”3 The rule of law has been
embraced across the political spectrum: on the right, Friedrich Hayek placed it at the
heart of development policy;4 on the left, the Marxist historian E.P. Thompson called it
an “unqualified human good.”5 It is a term endorsed by both the World Social Forum
and the World Bank.
Such a high degree of consensus on the virtues of the rule of law is possible only
because of dissensus as to its meaning. At times the term is used as if synonymous with
“law” or legality; on other occasions it appears to import broader notions of justice. In
1 E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266 (1977).
2 Judith Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1, 1
(Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987).
3 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/summit2005, para. 134.
4 FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 220-33 (1960).
5 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 266. Prominent challenges to the rule of law have, of course, been offered
by other Marxist scholars, critical legal theorists, feminist theorists, critical race theorists, queer theorists,
and others. In particular the notion of sameness is seen as reifying biases and positions of privilege.
Against this, as Thompson argued, even if the rule of law serves an ideological function it must promote
values that are, in fact, valuable, and capable of being at least partially realized. See JEREMY WALDRON,
THE LAW 21-25 (1990). For an examination of criticisms of Thompson, see Daniel H. Cole, “An
Unqualified Human Good”: E.P. Thompson and the Rule of Law, 28 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 177
(2001).
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still other contexts it refers neither to rules nor to their implementation but to a kind of
political ideal for a society as a whole. This article will briefly survey its evolution in
discrete cultural traditions before exploring these formal, substantive, and functional
conceptions of the rule of law.6 It will then turn to how the rule of law at the national
level has been implemented through international organizations, and the extent to which
those international organizations have internalized the rule of law in their own
procedures. It will conclude with an examination of what may be signified by terms
such as “the international rule of law” or “the rule of international law.”
To conceive of the rule of law in a manner coherent across the many contexts in
which it is invoked requires a formal, minimalist understanding that does not seek to
include substantive political outcomes—democracy, promoting certain human rights,
redistributive justice or laissez-faire capitalism, and so on—in its definition. These
outcomes are more properly sought in the political realm.7 Nevertheless, examination of
the functional manner in which the rule of law is deployed in international forums
suggests important qualifications on how the rule of law may be adapted as a
meaningful concept at the international level. In other words, agreement on the meaning
of rule of law requires a formal conception of its content, but how that content is applied
to international law—where the primary challenge is not the vertical relationship of
subjects to a sovereign, but the horizontal relationship of subjects to other subjects—
requires a functionalist understanding of its use.8
6 Cf. Matthew Stephenson, The Rule of Law as a Goal of Development Policy (World Bank, Washington,
DC, 2001), http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/ruleoflaw2.htm.
7 Cf. Joseph Raz, The Politics of the Rule of Law, 3 RATIO JURIS 331 (1990).
8 Cf. Souren Teghrarian, Wittgenstein, Kripke and the “Paradox” of Meaning, in WITTGENSTEIN AND
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY 187-202 (Souren Teghrarian & Anthony Serafini eds., 1992); Bede
Rundle, WITTGENSTEIN AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1990) (problematizing the glib
rendering of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language as “ask not for the meaning, but the use”).
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I. EVOLUTION OF THE RULE OF LAW
AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
The early history of the rule of law is frequently conflated with the history of
law itself. The Code of Hammurabi, promulgated by the king of Babylon around
1760 BC, was one of the first sets of written laws; the fact that it was inscribed in stone
and made publicly available was a significant advance toward a legal system.9 Yet few
would argue that Babylon was governed according to the rule of law in any modern
sense. That modern conception may be understood at its most basic by a distinction
from the “rule of man,” implying power exercised at the whim of an absolute ruler, and
from “rule by law,” whereby a ruler consents to exercise power in a non-arbitrary
fashion. In neither case is the ruler him- or herself bound by law in any meaningful
sense.
Plato held in the Republic that the best form of government was rule by a
philosopher king, but allowed that rule by law was a second option warranted by the
practical difficulties of locating an individual with the appropriate qualities to reign.10
Aristotle surveyed various Greek constitutions before concluding in The Politics that
“the rule of law” was preferable to that of any individual,11 a position later quoted by
John Adams on the eve of the American Revolution as the definition of a republic: that
it is “a government of laws, and not of men.”12
Throughout this early period, however, law continued to be seen largely as a
means by which to rule rather than a constraint on the ruler as such. Despite occasional
9 H.-DIETER VIEL, THE COMPLETE CODE OF HAMMURABI (2005).
10 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Benjamin Jowett trans., Clarendon Press 1892) (360 BC). By The Laws, Plato
endorsed a stronger position: “Where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own,
the collapse of the state, in my view, is not far off; but if law is the master of the government and the
government is its slave, then the situation is full of promise and men enjoy all the blessings that the gods
shower on a state.” PLATO, THE LAWS 715d (Trevor J. Saunders trans., Penguin 1970) (360 BC).
11 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Benjamin Jowett trans., Nuvision (2004) (350 BC), III.16.
12 John Adams, Novanglus No. 7 (Jan. 1775), available at http://douglassarchives.org/adam_a50.htm.
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doctrinal assertions to the contrary, the development of norms and institutions that
might actually bind the sovereign took some centuries.
A. The Anglo-American Tradition
The rule of law took root in England in theory before it did in practice. Though
the 1215 Magna Carta established some limits on the exercise of power by the king with
respect to the liberties of freemen,13 it was not until the seventeenth century that the
notion of the king himself being subject to law began to be taken seriously. In an
extraordinary exchange with James I in 1607, Sir Edward Coke, Lord Chief Justice of
the Common Pleas, rebuffed the King’s argument that he could withdraw cases from the
judiciary and decide them himself: the King ought not to be subject to man, Coke
argued, quoting Bracton, but subject to God and the law.14 Due in large part to such
impertinence Coke was later dismissed from the bench, but returned to the legislature
where he played a role in drafting the 1628 Petition of Right, also seeking to limit the
prerogatives of the Crown.15
In the 1644 publication Lex, Rex, Scottish theologian Samuel Rutherford
outlined a more general theory of limited government, including concepts such as the
separation of powers—his book was burned and he was cited for treason, dying before
13 Article 29 of the Magna Carta (1215) provided that “No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled or any otherwise
destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the
Law of the Land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.”
Available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/magframe.htm.
14 Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co Rep 63, 64-65; 77 ER 1342, 1343, quoting HENRY DE BRACTON, DE
LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE f. 5 b (c1250) (“Ipse autem rex, non debet esse sub homine sed
sub Deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem.”).
15 See generally LAW, LIBERTY, AND PARLIAMENT: SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD
COKE (Allen D. Boyer ed., 2004); JOHN PHILLIP REID, RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN
THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES (2004).
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he could be tried.16 A more acceptable position was that of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan
(1651), who argued that the rule of law, even in the limited sense of government being
founded on a rule or set of precepts, was logically impossible. To be subject to the law,
Hobbes argued, a sovereign must subject himself to a greater power. This implies some
other sovereign who is free of the law unless subject to another sovereign and so on.17
It took a civil war, the beheading of one monarch, and the overthrow and exile
of a second before the Bill of Rights Act was adopted in 1689.18 This provided, among
other things, that it was “illegal” for the sovereign to suspend or dispense with laws, to
establish his own courts, or to impose taxes without parliamentary approval. It also
provided that election of members of parliament should be free, and that parliamentary
proceedings should be subject only to parliamentary scrutiny.19 The monarchy remained
powerful and institutions supporting the rule of law weak, however—judges were given
security of tenure only in 1701;20 deprivation of trial by jury was one of the abuses cited
in the American Declaration of Independence in 1776;21 Bills of Attainder were
16 SAMUEL RUTHERFORD, LEX, REX, OR THE LAW AND THE PRINCE: A DISPUTE FOR THE JUST
PREROGATIVE OF KING AND PEOPLE (Hess 1998) (1644).
17 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Dent 1914) (1651), ch 29, para. 9. Hobbes does, however, note in the
same passage that “sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature, because such laws be divine and
cannot by any man or Commonwealth be abrogated.” For an argument that Hobbes has been
misinterpreted with respect to the rule of law, see David Dyzenhaus, Hobbes and the Legitimacy of Law,
20 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 461 (2001).
18 An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown
1689 (Engl.) (“Bill of Rights 1689”). Charles I was executed in 1649 during the English Civil War (1642-
51). Charles II eventually regained the throne and died in 1685. James II succeeded him but was driven
into exile during the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Before William and Mary were affirmed as rulers in
1689, they affirmed a Declaration of Right that was subsequently embodied in the Bill of Rights Act.
19 Id.
20 The 1701 Act of Settlement provided, among other things, that judges enjoyed tenure during good
behavior rather than at the pleasure of the Crown. For a modern discussion, see THE RULE OF LAW
(Cheryl Saunders & Katherine Le Roy eds., 2003) (discussing responses to a 1992 decision by the
Victorian Parliament in Australia to abolish the Accident Compensation Tribunal and revoke the
appointments and commissions of its members).
21 Declaration of Independence 1776.
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abolished only in 1870.22 Political participation in Britain remained deeply flawed
through the nineteenth century: the Reform Act of 1832 abolished infamous rotten
boroughs such as Old Sarum, which elected two members to the House of Commons
despite having only eleven voters (none of whom was a resident), but the franchise
became universal only in 1928.23
In the face of this inconstant practice, the modern conception of the rule of law
in the Anglo-American tradition is frequently tied to the British constitutional scholar
A.V. Dicey, writing in 1885, who referred to it also as the “supremacy of law.”24 His
three-point definition is frequently quoted:
We mean, in the first place, that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer
in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal
manner before the ordinary Courts of the land . . . .
We mean in the second place . . . not only that with us no man is above the law, but
(what is a different thing) that here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is
subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary
tribunals . . . .
[Thirdly,] the constitution is pervaded by the rule of law on the ground that the general
principles of the constitution (as for example the right to personal liberty, or the right of
public meeting) are with us the result of judicial decisions determining the rights of
private persons in particular cases brought before the Courts.25
Dicey’s three aspects of the rule of law—regulating government power, implying
equality before the law, and privileging judicial process—are commonly regarded as
basic requirements of a formal understanding of the rule of law.
22 Forfeiture Act of 1870 (U.K.). The procedure does not appear to have been used in the nineteenth
century, however, with the last such bill passed in 1798 against the Irish rebel Lord Fitzgerald. Cf. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment
2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1996).
23 Equal Franchise Act 1928.
24 A.V. DICEY, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 171
(Macmillan 1st ed. 1885).
25 Id., 172, 177-78, 208.
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B. Continental Europe
Continental European jurists developed a slightly different understanding of the
role law plays in ordering society, placing less emphasis on judicial process than on the
nature of the State.26 This is reflected in the terms commonly used for “rule of law”—
Rechtsstaat, État de droit, stato di diritto, estado de derecho, and so on.27 An important
substantive distinction was the role of constitutionalism: whereas Britain never
developed a written constitution, in Europe the establishment of a basic law that
constrained government came to be seen as axiomatic.28 This distinction lives on in the
different approaches to legal interpretation epitomized by common law precedent-based
argument, and civil law doctrinal analysis. It also survives in the relative weight
accorded to fundamental rights in civil law as opposed to common law countries, with
the United States being a prominent exception.29
German scholars typically trace the origins of the Rechtsstaat (the law-based
State, or constitutional State) to Kant.30 Robert von Mohl developed the idea in the
1820s, contrasting it with the aristocratic police State.31 For Hans Kelsen, one of the
most influential scholars of twentieth century legal positivism, the rule of law and the
26 Dicey himself noted that his third aspect of the rule of law was somewhat specific to England. Id. 208.
27 There are occasional exceptions to such translations. See, e.g., the translation of “rule of law” as “le
rétablissement de l’ordre” in S.C. Res. 1040 (Jan. 29, 1996), infra note 91. In Canada, the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms translates “rule of law” as “la primauté du droit.” Constitution Act 1982 (Can.),
Part I, preamble. I am grateful to Gary F. Bell for bringing the latter to my attention.
28 Dicey wrote that “whereas under many foreign constitutions the rights of individuals flow, or appear to
flow, from the articles of the constitution, in England the law of the constitution is the result not the
source of the rights of individuals.” DICEY, supra note 24, at 294.
29 The United States, however, retains the prominent role of the judiciary, epitomized in the landmark
decision of Marbury v. Madison, in which Chief Justice Marshall insisted that “it is, emphatically, the
province of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 6 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
30 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1965) (1797).
31 ROBERT VON MOHL, DAS STAATSRECHT DES KÖNIGREICHS WÜRTTEMBERG (Tubingen, Laupp. 1829).
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State were essentially synonymous.32 The extent to which the concept of Rechtsstaat
embodies both substantive aspects, such as the requirement that the State be based on
reason, as well as formal requirements of legality, is a recurrent debate in the literature
with the slide towards National Socialism providing a troubling political backdrop.33
(Nazi Germany is the most prominent example of a State in which the rule of law was
used for pernicious ends, but far from the only one. Apartheid South Africa was another
such “wicked” legal system34—a list to which some might add certain aspects of the
U.S. legal response to the global war on terror.35)
Though the French concept of État de droit was originally derived from the
German Rechtsstaat,36 ideas now centrally connected to the rule of law predate this
nineteenth century translation. Montesquieu’s L’esprit des lois, anonymously published
in 1748, advocated constitutionalism, the separation of powers,37 and basic civil
liberties.38 Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762) also affirmed the supremacy of law, but
in the form of legislation as the expression of the popular will and therefore not subject
32 HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 318-19 (Max Knight trans., University of California Press 2d ed.
1967) (1960).
33 See generally Otto Kirchheimer, The Rechtsstaat as Magic Wall, in POLITICS, LAW, AND SOCIAL
CHANGE: SELECTED ESSAYS OF OTTO KIRCHHEIMER 429 (Frederic S. Burin & Kurt L. Shell eds., 1969);
Jacques-Yvan Morin, The Rule of Law and the Rechtsstaat Concept: A Comparison, in FEDERALISM-IN-
THE-MAKING: CONTEMPORARY CANADIAN AND GERMAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, NATIONAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL 60 (Edward Mcwhinney et al. eds., 1992); Rainer Grote, Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat, and
‘Etat de droit’, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, UNIVERSALISM AND DEMOCRACY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
269 (Christian Starck ed., 1999); N.W. Barber, The Rechtsstaat and the Rule of Law, 53 U. TORONTO L.J.
443 (2003) (reviewing WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS (Arthur Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds.,
2000) and focusing on translation of Rechtsstaat as “rule of law”).
34 DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW IN THE
PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1991).
35 See Simon Chesterman, Secrets and Lies: Intelligence Activities and the Rule of Law in Times of Crisis,
28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 553 (2007).
36 JACQUES CHEVALLIER, L’ÉTAT DE DROIT 11 (3rd ed. 1999).
37 CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn
Miller, & Harold Samuel Stone trans., Cambridge University Press 1989) (1748), bk. XI, ch, 6 (drawing
lessons from the English experience).
38 Id., bk. XIX, ch. 27.
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to any form of limitation.39 Thus the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man laid crucial
foundations for the emergence of human rights more generally, but it was only in 1971
that the Conseil Constitutionnel for the first time invalidated a French law for infringing
one of those rights.40
C. Other Approaches
Though colonialism served to export European law across the various empires to
varying degrees, the emergence of laws regulating governmental powers was not, of
course, confined to Europe. This was not always well understood. Montesquieu, for
example, wrote at length about China as a despotic regime under an emperor with
absolute power, regulated not by law but rites that shaped the relationship between
emperor and subject, father and son.41 This overlooked the presence of legal codes
dating at least as far back as the sixth century BC,42 but is suggestive of the traditional
tension between Confucianism and Legalism that emerged between the eighth and the
third centuries BC. Confucians held that society should be organized around li (rites, or
rules of propriety) and that to rely on law was to admit to a failure of virtue. Legalists
sought to use fa (norms, or law) to regulate society through the possibility of
punishment. These debates resonate with the discussion of early Greek approaches
described above43 and may be roughly compared to “rule of man” and “rule by law.”44
39 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (G.D.H. Cole trans., Dent 1990) (1762).
40 Conseil Constitutionnel Decision of July 16, 1971 (1972) D.S.Jur. 685, (1971) J.C.P. III No. 16832
(parliamentary law held unconstitutional as violation of fundamental right to freedom of association). The
French constitutional scholar Jean Rivero refers to this case as the French Marbury v. Madison, though
this perhaps understates the significance of the Conseil d’État in checking the power of the executive. See
Richard J. Cummins, Constitutional Protection of Civil Liberties in France, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 721, 724-
26 (1985).
41 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 37, bk. VIII, ch. 21.
42 YONGPING LIU, ORIGINS OF CHINESE LAW: PENAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN ITS EARLY
DEVELOPMENT 128 (1998).
43 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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As to the possibility of holding the governing authority itself to account, the
legitimacy of imperial rule in China was defended, from the eleventh century BC Zhou
Dynasty onwards, by reference to the Mandate of Heaven (tianming). This held that a
just emperor’s rule would be blessed, but that an unwise ruler would lose Heaven’s
favor so that the mandate will pass to someone else. Interesting echoes can be found in
the Second Treatise of John Locke, written before but updated and published after the
Glorious Revolution and the Bill of Rights Act 1689, where he held that the prerogative
powers of a sovereign were not subject to review by earthly powers but only by an
“appeal to Heaven.”45 As in the case of the Mandate of Heaven, this ultimate sanction
embodies a somewhat circular logic: the illegitimacy of a ruler is proved by the fact of
his or her being deposed.46
In the Arab world, the Code of Hammurabi preceded a rich tradition of Islamic
law. Though founded on revelation and scripture rather than secular authority, this
tradition embraced a notion of supremacy of law—application of the law to the ruler as
well as the ruled, and the independent interpretation of law by scholars—far earlier than
44 Albert H.Y. Chen, Toward a Legal Enlightenment: Discussion in Contemporary China on the Rule of
Law, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 125, 129 (2000); cf. LIANG CHI-CHAO [LIANG QICHAO], HISTORY OF
CHINESE POLITICAL THOUGHT DURING THE EARLY TSIN PERIOD (Harcourt Brace 1930) (1922)
(comparing them to “rule of man” and “rule of law”). See generally RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S
LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 27-54 (2002) (discussing evolution of the rule of law in China). Cf.
Li-Ann Thio, Lex Rex or Rex Lex? Competing Conceptions of the Rule of Law in Singapore, 20 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing the rule of law in Singapore).
45 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Cambridge University Press 1988) (1690), vol. 2, §
168.
46 Id., vol. 2, § 168 (“And therefore, tho’ the People cannot be Judge, so as to have, by the Constitution of
that Society, any Superiour power, to determine and give effective Sentence in the case; yet they have, by
a Law antecedent and paramount to all positive Laws of men, reserv’d that ultimate Determination to
themselves, which belongs to all Mankind, where there lies no Appeal on Earth, viz. to judge, whether
they have just Cause to make their Appeal to Heaven. And this Judgment they cannot part with, it being
out of a Man’s power so to submit himself to another, as to give him a liberty to destroy him; God and
Nature never allowing a Man so to abandon himself, as to neglect his own preservation: And since he
cannot take away his own Life, neither can he give another power to take it. Nor let any one think, this
lays a perpetual foundation for Disorder; for this operates not, till the Inconvenience is so great, that the
majority feel it, and are weary of it, and find a necessity to have it amended. But this the Executive
Power, or wise Princes, never need come in the danger of: And ‘tis the thing, of all others, they have most
need to avoid, as of all others the most perilous.”).
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its European counterparts. As with the early moves towards the rule of law in Europe,
however, theory was not always matched by practice.47 The term “rule of law” itself
does not translate directly into modern Arabic. A common approximation is siyadat al-
qanun. Literally translated this means “sovereignty of law,” a concept more akin to the
notion of rule by law.48 Many developing and post-colonial States have also embraced
law as a means to augment centralized authority rather than to restrain it. Promotion of
the rule of law in such States by Western officials has thus sometimes been seen by
those officials as a means of advancing human rights and liberal democracy, while their
counterparts have seen it as a means of making government more efficient and therefore
supporting the legitimacy of the State.49
D. A Core Definition
The content of the term “rule of law,” then, remains contested across both time
and geography. Analysis of its content often begins by parsing out formal and
substantive understandings.50 Those theories that emphasize the formal aspects describe
instrumental limitations on the exercise of State authority; they tend to be minimalist,
positivist, and are often referred to as “thin” theories—distinguishing them from the
47 See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari’ah: Sources, Interpretation, and Rule-
Making, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 137 (2002) (describing supremacy of the law in Islamic
tradition); Susanna Dokupil, The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modern
Turkey, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 53 (2002); Muhamad Mugraby, Some Impediments to the Rule of Law 26
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 771, 777-78 (2003) (arguing that Islamic law is incompatible with equality before
the law); MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE (3rd ed. 2003); Chibli
Mallat, From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law: A Restatement of the Field (Part II), 52 AM. J. COMP. L.
209 (2004).
48 See generally NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE
GULF (1997).
49 John Stuart Blackton, Democracy Lite: Arab Judicial Reform, 1(4) ARAB REFORM BULLETIN (Oct.
2003), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ArabReform. See also Yash Ghai, The Rule of
Law, Legitimacy, and Governance, 14 INT’L J. SOC. L. 179 (1986) (discussing the rule of law in East
Africa).
50 See Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework,
PUBLIC LAW 467 (Autumn 1997).
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“thick” theories that incorporate substantive notions of justice.51 The latter conceive the
rule of law more broadly as a set of ideals, whether understood in terms of protection of
human rights, specific forms of organized government, or particular economic
arrangements such as free market capitalism.52 Ronald Dworkin has referred to the two
conceptions as the “rule-book” model and a “rights” model, respectively;53 Judith
Shklar as models of institutional restraint and the “rule of reason.”54 David Dyzenhaus
casts theorists of the first school, including Shklar, as democratic positivists and those
of the second, including Dworkin, as liberal anti-positivists.55
Such categories are far from stable. Substantive theories are typically built on
the back of formal ones, and any “thin” theory must necessarily exist within a political
context.56 Indeed, a common critique of those who claim to articulate “thin” theories is
that substantive elements have been included by stealth.57 The problem with articulating
51 See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW:
THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE US 1
(Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004). Cf. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72-87 (1944); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-43 (1972).
52 See, e.g., W. IVOR JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 47 (University of London Press 4th ed.
1952) (1933) (“The doctrine involves some considerable limitation on the powers of every political
authority, except possibly (for this is open to dispute) those of a representative legislature. Indeed it
contains . . . something more, though it is not capable of precise definition. It is an attitude, an expression
of liberal and democratic principles, in themselves vague when it is sought to analyse them, but clear
enough in their results.”); HAYEK, supra note 51, at 72 (the rule of law “means that a government in all its
actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with
fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge”); Hans Corell, A Challenge to the United Nations and
the World: Developing the Rule of Law, 18 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 391 (2004) (speech by the former
U.N. Legal Counsel stating that the rule of law requires both democracy and compliance with human
rights).
53 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 11-13 (1985).
54 Shklar, supra note 2, at 1-2.
55 David Dyzenhaus, Recrafting the Rule of Law, in RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF
LEGAL ORDER 1, 2 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999).
56 Peerenboom, supra note 51, at 6.
57 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 54, n.260 (1997).
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a “thick” or substantive theory, by contrast, is that it may imply defense of a complete
social philosophy and render the rule of law no longer meaningful in its own right.58
A third way of considering the rule of law, suggested by the approach here of
examining its international context, is to look at the function that the rule of law is
intended to serve in a society. Rule of law promotion, discussed in the next section,
tends to be presented as a form of technical assistance. On its face, this resembles a
formal theory looking to the architecture of a legal system rather than the content of its
laws. Yet closer examination reveals that rule of law assistance is supported because of
perceived outcomes it may achieve in the recipient community: in addition to promoting
human rights and providing a stable foundation for economic development, it has also
been used to establish non-violent mechanisms for resolving political disputes.59 This is
incompatible with most substantive theories of the rule of law, however, as those most
actively involved in promotion of the rule of law—U.N. officials, donor governments,
non-governmental organizations, external advisers, and so on—are outside the legal
system in question and, almost literally, above the law. As we shall see, this has
troubling implications for the idea of an “international rule of law.”
58 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210-11 (1979) (criticizing,
among others, the International Commission on Jurists’ 1959 Delhi Declaration, in which the rule of law
was said to require “not only the recognition of . . . civil and political rights but also the establishment of
the social, economic, educational and cultural conditions which are essential to the full development of
[one’s] personality”). Cf. Arthur L. Goodhart, The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty, 106 U. PA. L.
REV. 943, 943-44 (1958) (warning against confusion of concepts of democracy, fundamental rights, and
the rule of law).
59 As Jeremy Waldron has argued, even within a given community the rule of law acknowledges a
plurality of views: JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 37 (1999) (“the Rule of Law is not
simply the principle that officials and citizens should apply and obey the law even when it disserves their
own interests. It is the principle that an official or citizen should do this even when the law is—in their
confident opinion—unjust, morally wrong, or misguided as a matter of policy. For the enactment of the
measure in question is evidence of the existence of a view concerning its justice, morality, or desirability
which is different from their own; someone must have been in favor of the law or thought it is a good
idea. In other words, the law’s existence, together with the individual’s own opinion, is evidence of moral
disagreement in the community on the underlying issue.”).
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For present purposes, a definition that is applicable and acceptable across
cultures and political systems will necessarily be a formal one. This is consistent with
how the rule of law is articulated in international forums, but not necessarily why. The
latter question may incorporate aspects of the substantive and functional understandings
of the rule of law, but these may be distinguished from the basic norms, institutions, and
procedures implied by the term itself.
That being said, what we might term a core definition of the rule of law as it has
evolved over time appears to have three elements:
– First, the power of the State may not be exercised arbitrarily. This incorporates
the rejection of “rule of man,” but does not require that State power be exercised
for any particular purpose. It does, however, require that laws be prospective,
accessible, and clear.
– Secondly, the law must apply also to the sovereign and instruments of the State,
with an independent institution such as a judiciary to apply the law to specific
cases. This implies a distinction from “rule by law.”
– Thirdly, the law must apply to all persons equally, offering equal protection
without prejudicial discrimination. The law should be of general application and
consistent implementation; it should be capable of being obeyed. This presumes
that the rule of law is more than simply “law in the books” and that these
principles also apply to “law in action.”60
These elements of the core definition may be summarized as a government of laws, the
supremacy of the law, and equality before the law.61
60 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
61 Cf. A. W. BRADLEY & K. D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 105 (12th ed. 1997)
(“First, the rule of law expresses a preference for law and order within a community rather than anarchy,
warfare and strife. In this sense, the rule of law is a philosophical view of the society which is linked with
basic democratic notions. Secondly, the rule of law expresses a legal doctrine of fundamental importance,
namely that government must be conducted according to law, and that in disputed cases what the law
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II. PROMOTION OF THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL FORUMS
Having adopted a core definition of the rule of law, reflecting what one hopes is
a broad understanding of its content, it is possible now to explore the ways in which the
domestic rule of law has been used in international forums. This examination of the
manner in which the rule of law is deployed will help elaborate how and why the
concept may apply to the international level itself.
Through treaties and international organizations, the rule of law has been
promoted at the international level for all the functional reasons described earlier:
human rights treaties have advocated the rule of law as the foundation of a rights-
respecting State; development actors, including donor States, have promoted the rule of
law as essential for economic growth; and more recently security actors, notably the
U.N. Security Council, have promoted the rule of law as a form of conflict resolution.
It is important to distinguish promotion of the rule of law in the sense used here
from specific action to deal with past incidents. “Transitional justice,” for example, is
frequently used to refer to both prosecution of war criminals and the establishment of a
legal system, but it is typically the former that receives the most attention and resources.
Demonstrating that leaders who violate the law may themselves be prosecuted is an
requires is declared by judicial decision. Thirdly, the rule of law should provide in matters both of
substance (for example, whether the government should have power to detain citizens without trial) and
of procedure (for example, the presumption of innocence in criminal trials, and the independence of the
judiciary).”); Peerenboom, supra note 51, at 2. See also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-95
(1964) (citing generality, publicity, prospectivity, intelligibility, consistency, practicability, constancy,
and congruence as the “internal morality of law”); RAZ, supra note 58, at 212-14; Fallon, supra note 57,
at 8-9; The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies (Report of the
Secretary-General), U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 3, 2004), available at http://documents.un.org, para. 6
(defining the rule of law as “a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s mission. It refers to a
principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the
State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as
well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law,
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.”).
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important part of the core definition outlined earlier, but if accountability depends on
the massive international presence that may follow a crisis then it may be seen as the
exception rather than the norm. Episodic prosecutions when outside political will and
resources are available may do little to establish sustainable institutions.62
Similarly, terms such as “human rights” are used in multiple senses in this
context. Certain human rights concerning the right to life and freedom of the person, for
example, might be seen as essential aspects of a government of laws; non-
discrimination may similarly be seen as an essential aspect of equality before the law.
Inclusion of such specific rights, however, is distinct from the manner in which the rule
of law is argued to be a tool for promoting human rights more generally. It is the latter
sense that is intended here.63
To be clear, the fact that the rule of law is used to promote what some include
within a substantive conception of the rule of law should not be confused with a
reversion here to such a substantive understanding. Rather, the rule of law is best
understood in the core sense outlined earlier and then examined with reference to the
various purposes (including the achievement of specific political ends) to which it is
put.
A. Human Rights
The preamble to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “it
is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion
against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of
law.”64 The Declaration goes on to enumerate specific rights such as prohibiting
62 See Simon Chesterman, Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN State-
Building Operations, 1(1) J. INTERVENTION & STATE-BUILDING 3 (2007).
63 One might also argue that the rule of law is only possible with a certain level of economic
development, or basic peace and security within a territory.
64 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A(III) (1948), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), preamble.
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arbitrary deprivation of liberty,65 requiring fair trials by independent and impartial
tribunals,66 and protecting equality before the law.67 These protections broadly
correspond to the three aspects of the core definition adopted here, with the
qualification that independence of the judiciary is only part of what is implied by
supremacy of the law. The rule of law as protected under the Universal Declaration is
thus open to an interpretation that is more consonant with what has been described
earlier as rule by law.68
With varying degrees of specificity—in particular concerning the requirements
of a fair trial and prohibited forms of discrimination—the Universal Declaration is
consistent with most subsequent general human rights treaties.69 Other documents
provide guidelines on compliance, including codes of conduct for law enforcement
officials,70 principles on the independence of the judiciary,71 as well as more elaborate
regimes on specific types of discrimination.72
65 Id., arts. 3, 8, 9, 12, 29(2).
66 Id., arts. 10, 11.
67 Id., arts. 6, 7.
68 Supra note 9 and accompanying text. On the relationship between human rights and the rule of law, see
generally Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the Relationship?, 36
GEORGETOWN INT’L L. REV. 809 (2005).
69 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966 (in force Mar. 23, 1976),
999 UNTS 171; [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
done at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950 (in force Sept. 3, 1953), 213 UNTS 222; American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969 (in force July 18, 1978), 1144 UNTS 123, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas3con.htm; African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, June 27, 1981 (in force Oct. 21, 1986), 21 ILM 58.
70 Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, GA Res 34/169, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, Annex (1979).
71 Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1 (1985).
72 See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21,
1965 (in force Jan. 4, 1969), 660 UNTS 195, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/d1cerd.htm; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979 (in force Sept. 3, 1981), U.N. Doc A/34/46, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/e1cedaw.htm.
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The 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights recommended that the
United Nations should offer technical and financial assistance upon request to “national
projects in reforming penal and correctional establishments, education and training of
lawyers, judges and security forces in human rights, and any other sphere of activity
relevant to the good functioning of the rule of law.”73 This was endorsed in a series of
General Assembly resolutions, each citing the rule of law as “an essential factor in the
protection of human rights.”74
Again, this might be seen as consistent with rule by law, though some advances
have been made through human rights jurisprudence concerning the right to an effective
remedy,75 which has recently been the subject of a new set of basic principles.76 In
addition, at least since the 1999 Pinochet case,77 the extent of head of State immunity
has been substantially reduced. This has been complemented by the rise of international
criminal law.
B. Development
As indicated earlier, the rule of law has long been seen as a vehicle for
promoting economic development.78 In the 1960s, the U.S. Agency for International
73 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc A/CONF.157/24 (1993), Part I, ch. III, sect.
II, para. 69.
74 G.A. Res. 48/132 (1993), preamble. See also G.A. Res. 48/132 (1993); G.A. Res. 49/194 (1994); G.A.
Res. 50/179 (1995); G.A. Res. 51/96 (1996); G.A. Res. 52/125 (1997); G.A. Res. 53/142 (1998); G.A.
Res. 55/99 (2000); G.A. Res. 55/99 (2000); G.A. Res. 57/221 (2002). Cf G.A. Res. 61/39 (2006) (on “the
rule of law at the national and international levels”).
75 See, e.g., Castillo Páez v. Peru (1997), 34 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) (1997), paras. 82, 83.
76 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law, GA Res 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/res60-147.html.
77 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (H.L., 1999), 2 W.L.R.
827 (1999).
78 For an early link between the rule of law, the free market, and economic prosperity, see ADAM SMITH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 15 (University of Chicago
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Development, the Ford Foundation, and other private American donors began an
ambitious program to reform the laws and judicial institutions of countries in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America. The “law and development” movement, steeped in
dependency theory, generated hundred of reports and articles—yet a decade later
leading academic participants and a former official at the Ford Foundation declared it a
failure.79 Criticisms included the program’s over-reliance on exporting certain aspects
of the U.S. legal system, notably strategic litigation and activist judges, that were
incompatible with the target countries.80 Later assessments have been less negative,
however, noting that law reform projects take many years to bear fruit and that the rise
and fall of the movement may have been more connected to U.S. domestic political
issues in the period 1965-1975 than with programs on the ground in developing
countries.81
Subsequent efforts have focused less on exporting a specific national model, but
continue to assume a close relationship between the rule of law and economic
development.82 One of the difficulties has been in coming up with objective criteria to
Press 1976) (1776). See also Kristen E. Boon, “Open for Business”: International Financial Institutions,
Post-Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 513 (2007).
79 David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in
Law and Development, 4 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974); John. H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social
Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J.
COMP. L. 457 (1977); JAMES GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN
LATIN AMERICA (1980).
80 See, e.g., JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE
AND LATIN AMERICA: A HANDBOOK OF LEGAL INDICATORS FOR COMPARATIVE STUDY 18 (1979)
(describing it as “ineffectual, if not harmful, as technical assistance and peripheral as scholarship”). For
an early warning of this, see Thomas M. Franck, The New Development: Can American Law and Legal
Institutions Help Developing Countries?, 3 WIS. L. REV. 767 (1972).
81 Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 470, 472-73
(1995); MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW-RELATED WORK OF FORD FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND
THE WORLD (Mary McClymont & Stephen Golub eds., 2000).
82 Critics argue that this approach focuses exclusively on using the rule of law to limit interference with
the market, rather than providing public goods. See, e.g., Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law
Orthodoxy (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, Rule of Law Series, Working
Paper No. 30, 2002), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp30.pdf; Kevin E. Davis,
What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule of Law Reforms?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 141
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measure the rule of law. The 1992 Human Development Report, issued by the U.N.
Development Program, suggested five possible indicators: fair and public hearings in
criminal cases; a competent, independent, and impartial judiciary; the availability of
legal counsel; provision for review of convictions in criminal cases; and whether
government officials or pro-government forces are prosecuted when they violate the
rights and freedoms of other persons.83 The World Bank has defined rule of law for
these purposes as “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” and uses aggregate indicators
from a basket of other sources to measure the rule of law in more than 200 countries and
territories.84
From around 1997, the development community began using the more general
term “good governance” to refer to a set of activities that embraced participation,
transparency, and accountability in government—specifically including the rule of
law.85 The term “governance” itself had emerged within the development discourse in
the 1990s as a means of expanding the prescriptions of donors to embrace not merely
projects and structural adjustment but government policies. Though intergovernmental
organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are technically
constrained from referring to political processes as such, “governance” provides a
convenient euphemism for precisely that.86
(2004); Joel M. Ngugi, Policing Neo-Liberal Reforms: The Rule of Law as an Enabling and Restrictive
Discourse, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 513 (2005).
83 U.N. Development Programme, Human Development Report 1992: Global Dimensions of Human
Development (UNDP, New York, 1992), available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports, 31.
84 World Bank, A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance: Governance Matters 2006 (World
Bank, Washington, DC, 2006), available at http://www.worldbank.org, 3. On a scale from -2.5 to +2.5,
the 2005 statistics range from Somalia (-2.36) to Iceland (+2.10). See statistics available at
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/indicator_report.asp?indicatorid=5.
85 U.N. Development Programme, Governance for Sustainable Human Development (UNDP, New York,
Jan. 1997), available at http://magnet.undp.org/policy.
86 Goran Hyden, Governance and the Reconstitution of Political Order, in STATE, CONFLICT AND
DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 179 (Richard Joseph ed., 1999). For a discussion of various efforts to measure
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Developing States themselves have embraced the rule of law, acknowledging in
the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document that “good governance and the rule of law
at the national and international levels are essential for sustained economic growth,
sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and hunger.”87
C. Peace and Security
The U.N. Charter refers to domestic law only in the context of trust territories,
the last of which became independent in 1994.88 Article 2(7) of the Charter specifically
excludes matters “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” from U.N. interference,
except when the Security Council exercises its coercive powers to maintain
international peace and security under Chapter VII. Since the mid-1990s, these powers
have increasingly been used to support, supplant, or replace domestic legal systems.
Apart from a preambular reference in relation to the deterioration of law and
order in the Congo in 1961,89 the Council first used the words “rule of law” in the
operative paragraph of resolution 1040 (1996), where it expressed its support for the
Secretary-General’s efforts to promote “national reconciliation, democracy, security and
the rule of law in Burundi.”90 (It is noteworthy that the French text rendered rule of law
as “le rétablissement de l’ordre.”91) Many peace operations have subsequently had
the rule of law, see Gerardo L. Munck, Measures of Democracy, Governance and Rule of Law: An
Overview of Cross-National Data Sets (World Bank, Washington, DC, Understanding Growth and
Freedom from the Bottom Up Workshop, July 15-17, 2003), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMOVOUTPOV/Resources/2104215-
1148063363276/071503_Munck.pdf.
87 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 3, para. 11. See also para. 21, 24(b).
88 U.N. Charter, art. 84.
89 S.C. Res. 161B (Feb. 21, 1961), preamble (“Noting with deep regret and concern the systematic
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the general absence of the rule of law in the
Congo”; the relevant French text was “l’absence générale de légalité au Congo”).
90 S.C. Res. 1040 (Jan. 29, 1996), para. 2.
91 “The reestablishment of order.” S.C. Res. 1040 (Jan. 29, 1996), para. 2 (French text available at
documents.un.org).
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important rule of law components, such as those in Guatemala (1997),92 Liberia
(2003—),93 Côte d’Ivoire (2004—),94 Haiti (2004—),95 and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (2007—).96 The mandates for such missions tend to be broad, calling for the
“re-establishment” or “restoration and maintenance” of the rule of law, without formally
articulating what this might entail. In practice, the dominant activities have tended to be
training of personnel, assisting institution-building, advising on law reform issues, and
monitoring, with the emphasis on criminal law processes.97 Less attention has been
paid, for example, to land law.98
92 U.N. Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA).
93 U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).
94 S.C. Res. 1528 (Feb. 27, 2004), para. 6(q) (authorizing the U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to
“assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international
organizations in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout Côte
d’Ivoire”).
95 S.C. Res. 1542 (Apr. 30, 2004), para. 7(I)(d) (authorizing the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH) “to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public
order in Haiti through the provision inter alia of operational support to the Haitian National Police and the
Haitian Coast Guard, as well as with their institutional strengthening, including the re-establishment of
the corrections system”). The U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL, 1991-1995) had a rule of
law component within its human rights division.
96 S.C. Res. 1756 (May 15, 2007), para. 3 (“decid[ing] that the U.N. Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) “will also have the mandate, in close cooperation with the
Congolese authorities, the United Nations country team and donors, to support the strengthening of
democratic institutions and the rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, to that end, to: .
. . (c) Assist in the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children
and vulnerable persons, investigate human rights violations with a view to putting an end to impunity,
assist in the development and implementation of a transitional justice strategy, and cooperate in national
and international efforts to bring to justice perpetrators of grave violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law; . . . (e) Assist in the establishment of a secure and peaceful environment
for the holding of free and transparent elections; (f) Contribute to the promotion of good governance and
respect for the principle of accountability”).
97 Vivienne O’Connor, Rule of Law and Human Rights Protections Through Criminal Law Reform:
Model Codes for Post-conflict Criminal Justice, 13(4) INT’L PEACEKEEPING 517 (2006).
98 Daniel Fitzpatrick, Land Policy in Post-Conflict Circumstances: Some Lessons from East Timor
(Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva,
Working Paper No. 58, Feb. 2002), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/research/opendoc.pdf?tbl=RESEARCH&id=3c8399e14.
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In two situations, Kosovo (1999—)99 and East Timor/Timor-Leste (1999-
2002),100 the United Nations has had direct responsibility for the administration of
justice, including control of police and prison services. Similar powers were exercised
in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the Office of the High Representative from 1996.101
Though created as temporary operations, each was challenged on the extent to which
the rule of law applied to international officials who enjoyed personal or functional
immunity from legal process, were unaccountable to the local population through any
kind of political process, and who exercised “all legislative and executive authority . . .
including the administration of the judiciary.”102 Such powers, recalling the provisions
of military occupation, became harder to justify as months became years and the
disjunction between what international officials said and what they did continued.103
In addition to supporting or supplanting domestic rule of law institutions, the
Security Council has created international criminal tribunals to replace domestic
processes for trials arising from the former Yugoslavia (1991—)104 and Rwanda
(1994).105 These tribunals were explicitly created as part of an effort to bring peace to
99 U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
100 U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).
101 See generally SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL
ADMINISTRATION, AND STATE-BUILDING 154-82 (2004).
102 UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 (July 25, 1999), On the Authority of the Interim Administration in
Kosovo, § 1.
103 See, e.g., Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Second Annual Report 2001-2002 (July 10, 2002),
available at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org (noting that “UNMIK is not structured according to
democratic principles, does not function in accordance with the rule of law, and does not respect
important international human rights norms. The people of Kosovo are therefore deprived of protection of
their basic rights and freedoms three years after the end of the conflict by the very entity set up to
guarantee them.”).
104 S.C. Res. 827 (1993). Unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which has jurisdiction
over incidents within the period Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia has jurisdiction to prosecute persons responsible for crimes committed “since 1991.” Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827 (1993), Annex, art. 1.
Though no formal end to this temporal jurisdiction has been defined, in practice it is likely to be 1999,
given the decision to cease new prosecutions.
105 S.C. Res. 955 (1994).
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war-torn territories, though they have been criticized for spending significant resources
in order to prosecute few individuals with little lasting impact on the judicial institutions
of the territory concerned. Hybrid tribunals, such as the Special Court for Sierra
Leone106 and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,107 were intended
to blend international supervision with development of national capacity but have had
limited success.
The International Criminal Court (I.C.C.) exercises complementary rather than
primary jurisdiction:108 this may encourage national prosecution where possible,
suggesting a desire to bolster national courts as well as protect State sovereignty.
Nevertheless, the Security Council retains the power to defer prosecutions for a
renewable period of one year.109 This reflects ongoing tension between the international
interest in promoting justice or securing peace.110
III. THE RULE OF LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Though the rule of law has been promoted strongly through international
forums, it has been less clear what relevance it has to the conduct of international affairs
106 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of
a Special Court for Sierra Leone, completed at Freetown, Jan. 16, 2002.
107 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the
Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea,
completed at Phnom Penh, June 6, 2003, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh.
108 Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (July 17, 1998),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf, art. 1.
109 Id., art. 16. See generally Morten Bergsmo & Jelena Pejic, Article 16: Deferral of Investigation or
Prosecution, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 373
(Otto Triffterer ed., 1999); Luigi Condorelli & Santiago Villalpando, Referral and Deferral by the
Security Council, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT : A COMMENTARY
627 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002); Carsten Stahn, The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution
1422 (2002), 4 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 1 (2002).
110 Simon Chesterman, No Justice Without Peace? International Criminal Law and the Decision to
Prosecute, in CIVILIANS IN WAR 145 (Simon Chesterman ed., 2001).
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itself. This is in part because, as we have seen, the historic challenge for the rule of law
has been its relationship to the sovereign. In a domestic legal order, the sovereign exists
in a vertical hierarchy with other subjects of law; at the international level, sovereignty
tends to be conceived of as remaining with States, at least nominally existing in a
horizontal plane of sovereign equality. This section considers how the rule of law might
apply to the internal operations of organizations constituted by those States, before
turning in the following section to the rule of law as it would apply to States and other
actors on the international plane more generally.
A. The United Nations
The United Nations is a creature of treaty. Its legal personality was recognized
in the 1949 Reparations advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) as
implicit in the decision of fifty States to create the organization;111 today that intention
to create legal personality is often included explicitly in the text of a treaty.112
Referring back to the core definition of the rule of law,113 the United Nations
operates through legal mechanisms, though these are not always free from arbitrariness.
Here a distinction must be made between the exercise of discretion formally provided
for in the constituent document of the organization and the arbitrary exercise of the
powers that it grants. Both may be illustrated by actions of the Security Council.
Originally designed as an archetypically political body, it is entirely proper that
members of the Council should determine whether, for example, to send peacekeepers
to a specific crisis. The moves from 1999 to use targeted sanctions to limit financing of
terrorist operations, by contrast, have been criticized for the manner in which
individuals may be listed and have their assets frozen without either transparency or the
111 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion, 1949) I.C.J.
Rep. 174 (1949).
112 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 108, art. 4(1) (“The Court shall have international legal
personality.”).
113 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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possibility of formal review.114 In 2005, Member States called upon the Security
Council to adopt “fair and clear procedures” for listing and delisting;115 this led to the
creation of a focal point within the U.N. Secretariat to receive requests for delisting, but
left the decision to unfreeze assets at the absolute discretion of the members of the
Council.116 Such concerns may be contrasted with the elaborate protections established
when the Council created the International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.117
On the question of applying the law to the United Nations itself,118 there is a
surprising degree of uncertainty as to whether the organization is bound by, for
example, the human rights treaties for which it has been the primary vehicle. The
United Nations is not a party to the human rights treaties negotiated under its auspices
or monitored through its agencies. In part this reflects the traditional view that only
States properly enter into such treaties, a view based on the understanding that it is
primarily States that violate or protect human rights. As the United Nations has assumed
State-like functions, however—including administrations that ran entire territories—the
question of whether the United Nations is required to abide by basic human rights
standards has become more pressing. In a series of cases arising from the use of targeted
114 See Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came In from the Cold War: Intelligence and International
Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1109-20 (2006) and sources there cited.
115 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 3, para. 109.
116 S.C. Res. 1730 (Dec. 19, 2006), Annex. Decisions by the committee administering the sanctions are by
consensus; in the absence of consensus a matter may be referred to the Council proper, where the veto
power of the permanent five members would apply. See Security Council Committee Established
Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and
Entities, Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of Its Work (as amended) (New York, Nov. 7,
2002), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdf.
117 Chesterman, supra note 114, at 1113.
118 For disputes within the organization, the U.N. Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) was established by the
General Assembly through resolution 351A(IV) (1949). It is an independent organ competent to hear and
pass judgment upon applications alleging non-observance of contracts or terms of employment by staff
members of the U.N. Secretariat. See, e.g., Qiu, Zhou, and Yao v. Secretary-General of the United
Nations (United Nations Administrative Tribunal Judgement No. 482, May 25, 1990), U.N. Doc.
AT/DEC/482 (1990) (The Chinese Translators Case).
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financial sanctions, the European Court of First Instance has held that Security Council
decisions, by virtue of the U.N. Charter’s primacy clause in Article 103, are constrained
only by norms of jus cogens.119 This is one of only a few cases in which a tribunal has
reviewed, even indirectly, the validity of Council action.120
Similarly, in 1952 a committee of the American Society of International Law
expressed doubts that international humanitarian law was fully applicable to U.N.
forces, concluding that the United Nations should “select such of the laws of war as
may seem to fit its purposes.”121 It has been assumed by most writers that States
involved in U.N.-authorized enforcement actions nevertheless remain bound by their
individual obligations under the jus in bello.122 This would be true for actions
authorized by the U.N. Security Council, but it would be less clear if the Council
deployed forces made available to it under Article 43 agreements—a hypothetical
119 Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and
Commission of the European Communities (Court of First Instance of the European Communities, Case
T-306/01, Sept. 21, 2005) (2005), available at http://curia.eu.int, para. 277 (“the Court is empowered to
check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security Council in question with regard to jus
cogens, understood as a body of higher rules of public international law binding on all subjects of
international law, including the bodies of the United Nations, and from which no derogation is possible”).
See also Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European
Communities (Court of First Instance of the European Communities, Case T-315/01, Sept. 21, 2005)
(2005), available at http://curia.eu.int; Faraj Hassan v. Council of the European Union and Commission
of the European Communities (Court of First Instance of the European Communities, Case T 49/04, July
12, 2006) (2006), available at http://curia.eu.int; Chafiq Ayadi v. Council of the European Union (Court
of First Instance of the European Communities, Case T-253/02, July 12, 2006) (2006), available at
http://curia.eu.int.
120 See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion, 1971) I.C.J.
Rep. 16, 54 (1971), para. 118 (referring to “a situation which the Court has found to have been validly
declared illegal” by the Security Council (emphasis added)); Prosecutor v. Tadic (ICTY Appeals
Chamber, Appeal on Jurisdiction, Oct. 2, 1995) Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (1995), available at
http://www.un.org/icty, paras. 28-30 (“neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the
Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law)”).
121 William J. Bivens et al., Report of Committee on the Study of the Legal Problems of the United
Nations, Should the Laws of War Apply to United Nations Enforcement Action?, 46 AMERICAN SOCIETY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 216, 220 (1952).
122 DEREK W. BOWETT, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE 503-
06 (1964).
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proposition since no such agreements have been concluded.123 Remaining doubts about
the applicability of international humanitarian law to the United Nations have been
removed by the issuance of an administrative order by the Secretary-General.124
The United Nations lacks a formal process to establish the vires of its organs as
the question of interpreting the Charter powers of each was quite consciously left to the
organs themselves.125 The I.C.J. does not exercise the functions of a constitutional
court, though an organ may choose to submit a relevant question to it for an advisory
opinion.126 In the Lockerbie case, a direct clash loomed between the Security Council
and the Court when both were seized of issues arising from the bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103 on December 21, 1988 over Lockerbie, in Scotland. The Court declined to
rule on the merits in provisional measures and preliminary objections proceedings in
1992 and 1998, but even as it affirmed the discretion of the Security Council the Court
implicitly asserted its own power to determine the limits of that discretion.127 The case
123 See Julianne Peck, The U.N. and the Laws of War: How Can the World’s Peacekeepers Be Held
Accountable?, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 283 (1995); Christopher Greenwood, Protection of
Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 185 (1996); Brian D. Tittemore,
Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace
Operations, 33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 61 (1997).
124 Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian
Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=ST/SGB/1999/13. See also Conditions of Application of
Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in Which United Nations Forces May Be Engaged
(1971 Zagreb Resolution) (Institut de Droit international, Zagreb, First Commission, Rapporteur: Mr.
Paul de Visscher, Sept. 3, 1971), available at http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1971_zag_03_en.pdf.
125 Statement of Committee IV/2 of the San Francisco Conference, Report of Committee IV/2 of the
United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, June 12, 1945, UNCIO Doc.
933, IV/2/42(2), p.7; 13 UNCIO Documents, 703, at 709-10.
126 U.N. Charter, art. 96.
127 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.) (International Court of Justice, Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures, Apr. 14, 1992) (1992), available at http://www.icj-cij.org; Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.) (International Court of Justice, Preliminary Objections, Feb. 27, 1998) (1998),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
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has been likened to Marbury v. Madison128 in which the U.S. Supreme Court asserted
the ultimate power to determine whether the political branch had acted
constitutionally—though this is premised on a reading that focuses more on what the
Court did not say rather than what it did.129
Turning to the notion of equality before the law, the United Nations is based
upon the principle of the sovereign equality of its members,130 though the structure of
the Security Council establishes that some—with permanent positions on the Council
and a veto over its decisions—are more equal than others. This has been an issue in the
context of quasi-legislative resolutions adopted by the Council on matters such as
counter-terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.131 Criticisms that
such resolutions inappropriately use what may be understood as the Council’s
“emergency” powers under Chapter VII132 to establish abstract rules of general
application stress either the limits on the Council’s powers under the Charter or its
relative legitimacy as opposed to, say, the General Assembly. The former argument
draws upon rule-of-law-type arguments to constrain the powers of the Council; the
latter appears to assume that the General Assembly is more “democratic” than the
Council and therefore more legitimate, both dubious assumptions.133
128 Marbury v. Madison (1803), 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
129 Thomas M. Franck, The “Powers of Application”: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86
AM. J. INT’L L. 83 (1992).
130 U.N. Charter, art. 2(1).
131 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1368 (2001); S.C. Res. 1373 (2001); S.C. Res. 1540 (2004); S.C. Res. 1566 (2004).
For commentary and critique, see José Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L
L. 873 (2003); Stefan A. Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 175
(2005).
132 See generally Jared Schott, Chapter VII as Exception: Security Council Action and the Regulative
Ideal of Emergency, NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. (forthcoming).
133 Talmon, supra note 131, at 179.
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B. Other International Organizations
It is questionable whether the United Nations may properly be said to embody
the rule of law in a meaningful way, in large part due to the peace and security powers
given to or asserted by its Security Council and the unusual relationship to other
international legal regimes due to Article 103 of the U.N. Charter. Other institutions
created to foster economic development or protect human rights tend to be more
constrained by rules in the exercise of their delegated authority.
The World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, was established by treaty
in 1995 with rules, institutions, and procedures for the liberalization of trade.134 In the
human rights sphere the various treaty bodies have jurisdiction limited by the consent of
States but generally operate in accordance with a clear normative regime, with
independent institutions to determine compliance with the law and process guarantees.
The I.C.C., to pick a prominent recent creation, is established as a legal person
constrained by its statute. It has an elaborate, independent procedure for the
determination of compliance with that statute and protections of the procedural rights of
persons brought before it.135 Both organizations operate through laws and are bound by
them.
The limits of such analysis, however, are that the WTO, the I.C.C., and indeed
the United Nations, do not exist as autonomous and complete jurisdictions in a manner
comparable to the national legal systems that gave rise to the concept of rule of law.
Though analogies may be made, examination of such institutions in isolation begs the
larger question of whether the rule of law is a coherent concept at the international or,
perhaps, global level.
134 See Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal
and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35(2) J. WORLD TRADE 191 (2001).
135 Rome Statute, supra note 108.
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IV. AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW?
What, then, might the rule of law mean at the international level?136 It is helpful
here to distinguish between three possible meanings. First, the “international rule of
law” may be understood as the application of rule of law principles to relations between
States and other subjects of international law. Secondly, the “rule of international law”
could privilege international law over national law, establishing, for example, the
primacy of human rights covenants over domestic legal arrangements. Thirdly, a
“global rule of law” might denote the emergence of a normative regime that touches
individuals directly without formal mediation through existing national institutions.
The first sense is how the rule of law is typically understood in this context and
as it will be applied here.137 The second may be relevant to certain regional
organizations, notably the European Union, but such regimes are exceptional and, with
the aggregation of power, resemble State-like institutions rather than international
136 Iraq provides an interesting example of both hope and despair for the idea as a rhetorical device. In
1990, during the lead up to the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, U.S. President George H.W. Bush asserted
that the end of the Cold War had made possible a world in which “the rule of law would supplant the rule
of the jungle.” George H.W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf
Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit (Washington, DC, Sept. 11, 1990),
http://millercenter.virginia.edu/scripps/diglibrary/prezspeeches/ghbush/ghb_1990_0911.html. Following
the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which took place without a Security Council authorization, U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan observed that the Organization had reached a “fork in the road,” when the rules
drawn up in 1945 to govern international behavior might have to be rethought: “And we must not shy
away from questions about the adequacy, and effectiveness, of the rules and instruments at our disposal.”
Kofi A. Annan, Address to the General Assembly (United Nations, New York, Sept. 23, 2003),
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.htm.
137 For an early discussion along these lines, see William W. Bishop, The International Rule of Law, 59
MICH. L. REV. 553 (1961) (stating that the concept “includes reliance on law as opposed to arbitrary
power in international relations; the substitution of settlement by law for settlement by force; and the
realization that law can and should be used as an instrumentality for the cooperative international
furtherance of social aims, in such fashion as to preserve and promote the values of freedom and human
dignity for individuals”). See also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS,
THEORY 127-36 (2004).
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organizations in the strict sense of the word.138 The third approach accurately reflects
the rise of quasi-administrative regimes that fall outside traditional domestic and
international legal categories, but remains at an early stage of development.139 It is
possible that justice will one day be sought through global law, but at the present time it
is most likely to be pursued through the global organization of well-ordered States.
Though the U.N. Charter has been compared to a kind of constitution for the
modern international order,140 its language concerning international law is hortatory
rather than declaratory. The preamble expresses determination “to establish conditions
under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained”;141 its principles include peaceful
resolution of disputes that may threaten the peace “in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law”—though the latter phrase does not qualify the related goal
of suppressing breaches and preventing or removing threats.142 An important role of the
General Assembly is “encouraging the progressive development of international law
and its codification.”143
138 Cf. Mattias Kumm, International Law Before National Courts: The International Rule of Law and the
Limits of the Internationalist Model, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 19 (2003) (describing and critiquing the
“internationalist” position on direct application of international law). One might argue that such a
conception also embraces certain aspects of international economic law, though the dominance of
regional or international rules tends to be through domestic incorporation rather than wholesale
abdication of the privileges of sovereignty.
139 See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 15 (2005); Simon Chesterman, Globalization Rules: Accountability, Power, and the Prospects for
Global Administrative Law, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (forthcoming, 2008).
140 Thomas M. Franck, Is the UN Charter a Constitution?, in VERHANDELN FÜR DEN FRIEDEN—
NEGOTIATING FOR PEACE: LIBER AMICORUM TONO EITEL 95 (Jochen Abr Frowein et al. eds., 2003). Cf.
Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15
EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 907, 930 (2004) (developing a constitutionalist model for international law but
contrasting this with specific claims that the U.N. Charter, for example, serves as that constitution).
141 U.N. Charter, preamble (emphasis added). See TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS
OF STATES 106 (1983) (arguing that reference to both law and justice is either redundant if the terms are
synonymous, or revolutionary if they are in tension).
142 U.N. Charter, art. 1(1).
143 U.N. Charter, art. 13(1)(a).
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Similarly, documents such as the Declaration on Friendly Relations refer to the
“promotion of the rule of law among nations.”144 Thirty years later, in the Millennium
Declaration, Member States resolved to “strengthen respect for the rule of law in
international as in national affairs and, in particular, to ensure compliance by Member
States with the decisions of the International Court of Justice, in compliance with the
Charter of the United Nations, in cases to which they are parties.”145
These cautious endorsements of the rule of law reflect the primitive nature of
international law as a legal system. If the rule of law is understood in the core, formal
sense used here, it might be questioned whether the process of international rule-making
can itself be said to be governed by laws.146 Those judicial institutions that exist are
limited to essentially voluntary jurisdiction,147 and sovereign equality may be the
founding myth of the international legal order but remains a myth nonetheless.148 Such
144 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Declaration on Friendly Relations),
25 GAOR, Supp (No 28), U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1970), preamble.
145 Millennium Declaration, GA Res 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (2000), available at
http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm, para. 9.
146 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213-37 (2d ed. 1994) (concluding that international law
constitutes a set of rules but not a system of law, as it lacks a basic norm providing general criteria of
validity for other norms within that system).
147 See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36.
148 Sovereign equality in its traditional conception made sense when most laws were derived from natural
law; as the consent-based notion of international law evolved and positivism took hold, it came to be
understood literally as the consent of each and every State to general norms rather than the presumed
universal applicability of certain rules to all. (There are rare examples of norms being imposed against the
will of persistent objector States, such as the prohibition of apartheid over the objections of South Africa
and the U.N. Charter provisions on the applicability of its peace and security provisions to non-members:
U.N. Charter, art 2(6).) This was only possible because for centuries international law tended to avoid the
hardest questions that might undermine the principle: on the one hand, by not attempting to regulate such
areas of activity as recourse to war; on the other, by excluding from consideration relations with those
deemed outside the law, such as those subject to colonialism. Assumptions today that international law
meaningfully constrains States even in the use of force and sets the smallest and poorest States on an
equal footing with the largest and richest has led some—typically the larger and richer—to question
whether freedom from jurisdiction and consent in law-making processes should continue to apply equally
to all. See Michel Cosnard, Sovereign Equality: “The Wimbledon Sails On,” in UNITED STATES
HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds.,
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an account might conclude that there is presently no such thing as the international rule
of law, or at least that international law has yet to achieve a certain normative or
institutional threshold to justify use of the term.149 This may in turn be understood as a
subset of the larger ongoing debates over whether international law is “law” in any strict
sense of the word, a largely sterile inquiry due to the dearth of strong theories of
international law and the abundance of practice accepting its legality nonetheless.150
The problem is the uncritical assumption that domestic legal principles can be
translated directly to the international sphere. As Martti Koskenniemi has shown, since
at least the middle of the eighteenth century, jurists have included the rule of law among
these principles.151 This fails to take account of structural differences between
2003); Nico Krisch, More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in
International Law, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135
(Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003).
149 Indeed, the president of the I.C.J. herself concluded as much: Rosalyn Higgins, The I.C.J. and the Rule
of Law (speech at the United Nations University, Apr. 11, 2007),
http://www.unu.edu/events/files/2007/20070411_Higgins_speech.pdf. Judge Higgins cited Dicey’s
definition of the rule of law and then considered its application to the international level:
How then, in this national model, should an “international rule of law” look? First, there should
be an executive reflecting popular choice, taking non-arbitrary decisions applicable to all, for the
most part judicially-reviewable for constitutionality, laws known to all, applied equally to all,
and independent courts to resolve legal disputes and to hold accountable violations of criminal
law, itself applying the governing legal rules in a consistent manner.
One has only to state this set of propositions to see the problems.
150 Dicey, for example, suggested that international law consisted of “rules of public ethics, which are
miscalled international law.” DICEY, supra note 24, at 23. International law has long endured a tension
between the realist understanding of law as an instrument of policy and the legalist view of law as a
constraint on policy. It is possible to distinguish further between the political realist critique that the rule
of law cannot be achieved internationally because the institutions necessary to make and enforce law do
not exist at that level, and the legal realist critique that the rule of law is conceptually impossible because
law is always an instrument of policy at any level. See Terry Nardin, Theorizing the International Rule of
Law, 12-14 (forthcoming). See also Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of
Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 345 (1998) (exploring the relationship
between analyses of compliance with international law and theories of law).
151 Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 4 (1990). See, e.g.,
ROUSSEAU, surpa note 39, bk. I, ch. 7 (discussing sovereigns entering into compacts with one another);
LOCKE, supra note 45, vol. 2, § 183 (comparing commonwealths in a state of nature to individuals);
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international law and domestic law—the horizontal organization of sovereign and quasi-
sovereign entities as opposed to the vertical hierarchy of subjects under a sovereign—
but also of the historical and political context within which the rule of law was
developed.
That history of the rule of law is a tale of kings and judges, of revolutions and
bills of rights. One might conceive the creation of the League of Nations and the United
Nations in such a context, but a more persuasive account can be made of the modern
political context within which the rule of law is promoted: as a tool with which to
protect human rights, promote development, and sustain peace. This functionalist
understanding of how and why the rule of law is used—as distinct from the formal
understanding of what it means—matches more closely the manner in which the rule of
law is articulated at the international level; it also offers some suggestions as to how the
core definition used here may apply to the international legal system.
The first aspect, government of laws, requires non-arbitrariness in the exercise
of power.152 This is embodied in the foundational concept of pacta sunt servanda,153
but is also evident in efforts to establish international protections for human rights,
formal regimes to govern international trade, and international security institutions such
as the Security Council. Moves towards the rule of law in this area include the further
codification of the content of international law as well as the manner in which it is
created; rule of law concepts such as clarity are undermined by fragmentation of the
legal order154 and assertions that legally indeterminate categories of “legitimacy” exist
alongside determinations of legality.155
EDWIN DEWITT DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-31 (1920) (discussing
analogy between States and natural persons).
152 See Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law in Contemporary Liberal Theory, 2 RATIO JURIS 79, 82-84
(1989) (discussing the relationship between the rule of law and arbitrariness).
153 Agreements are to be kept.
154 See Symposium: The Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piecing together the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 679 (1999); Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law.
Postmodern Anxieties?, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553 (2002); ANDREAS ZIMMERMANN & REINER
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The second aspect, supremacy of the law, distinguishes the rule of law from rule
by law. This distinction is less applicable to the international legal system, however,
where the primary question is not the relationship between subject and sovereign but
between subject and subject. In such a regime the relevance of concepts such as
separation of powers is less important than the possibility of determinative answers to
legal questions. Rule of law advances would include greater acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. and other independent tribunals, and confirmation
that international law applies to international organizations in general and to the U.N.
Security Council in particular.
The third aspect of the core definition, equality before the law, raises the
question of who the true subject of law is. Equality of individual human beings before
the law is a formal constraint on the exercise of public power by State institutions; it has
a very different meaning in the context of sovereign equality of States.156 The
individual’s relationship to the State is defined by its coerciveness: one does not
normally choose the State to the laws of which one is subject. Legal systems frequently
treat juridical persons, such as corporations, differently from natural persons; it
therefore seems unnecessary to overemphasize the formal equality of States as such.
Steps towards an international rule of law in this area would include more general and
consistent application of international law to States and other entities; it might also
entail amelioration of structural irregularities such as the veto power over Security
Council decisions presently enjoyed by the victors of the Second World War.
HOFFMANN, UNITY AND DIVERSITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (Report of the Study
Group of the International Law Commission), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006), available at
http://documents.un.org.
155 See, e.g., INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 4 (2000)
(finding the 1999 Kosovo intervention “illegal but legitimate”). For a more considered view of the role
legitimacy plays in international affairs, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG
NATIONS (1990). See also Simon Chesterman, Legality Versus Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention,
the Security Council, and the Rule of Law, 33 SECURITY DIALOGUE 293 (2002).
156 Supra note 148.
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These are all, in essence, political challenges. Recognizing the rule of law as a
political ideal at the international level, rather than asserting it as a normative reality,
properly locates the conduct of most of international affairs in the political rather than
the strictly legal sphere. Over time this may change, but in the efforts to achieve human
rights, development, and peace, the international rule of law presently offers a means
rather than an end.157
V. CONCLUSION
The rule of law, as Judith Shklar ultimately acknowledged in her provocative
chapter on the topic, is more than mere ruling class chatter.158 But assertions that the
rule of law is a meaningful concept at the international level depend on a coherent
meaning at the national level, and the applicability of the term to power relations
between States as well as within them. Neither should be taken for granted.
Through examining the evolution of the term, this article has sought to establish
a core definition of “rule of law” that properly reflects what is distinctive about the term
and is applicable across cultures. The price of clarity is abandoning the additional role
that the rule of law sometimes plays as a Trojan horse to import other political goals
such as democracy, human rights, and specific economic policies. It is a price worth
paying, however, as these substantive goals may properly be seen as distinct from the
rule of law—folding them into its robes reduces it to a rhetorical device at best, a
disingenuous ideological tool at worst. In this core sense the rule of law reflects the
history of efforts to restrain sovereign power that continue in many States today,
157 Cf. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGIA TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT (1989); Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33(2) PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC
AFFAIRS 113 (2005).
158 See supra note 2.
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including some established liberal democracies confronting what the modern sovereign
claims are emergencies requiring ever-greater claims to executive authority.159
At the international level anything resembling even this limited idea of the rule
of law remains an aspiration. Yet seeing the rule of law as a means rather than an end,
as serving a function rather than defining a status, more accurately reflects how the rule
of law developed and has been imported or imposed around the world. And for
international law, this understanding appropriately highlights the political work that
must be done if power is to be channeled through law.
159 See, e.g., DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW (2006); OREN GROSS, LAW IN TIMES OF
CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2006).
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