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Al Shabaab in Somalia: Between Clan and Faith
Abstract
The dominant narrative regarding the emergence of Islamist militants in the form of Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujahideen2 (Movement of the Striving Youth),3 commonly referred to as Al Shabaab (The Youth) in Somalia, is beautiful in its simplicity. In the absence of central government authority, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) took control over much of south and central Somalia. Fears of the growing radical Islamist agenda of the UIC prompted the Ethiopian armed forces to invade the country in December 2006 with 14,000 troops.4 The rule of the UIC abruptly ended and much of its older leadership fled Somalia.5
تتناول هذه الورقةُ نشأةَ حركةِ “الشباب” الصوماليَّة، وتطورَ نشاطها، والتحولات التي طَرَأَتْ عليها، بالإضافة إلى إستراتيجية الدولة الصومالية في مكافحة الحركة. ثم تناقش الورقة السياق المحلي والإقليمي الحالي المرتبط بنشاط الحركة. كما تركز الورقة على تحليل تأثيرات الحركة المحتملة في أمن البحر الأحمر والتهديدات المرتبطة بها، مثل: تهديد الملاحة البحرية، وتوسيع نشاط القرصنة، فضلًا عن احتمالية استهداف الكابلات البحرية، وكذلك الإضرار بالنظام الإيكولوجي. وأخيرًا، تُقدم الورقةُ بعضَ التوصياتِ بشأن ضرورةِ تَبَنِّي عددٍ من السياسات لتقويض نفوذ الحركة، مثل: دعم قدرات الجيش الوطني الصومالي بالتوازي مع تحسين معدلات التنمية. كما تُوصِي الورقةُ أيضًا بالعمل على تعزيز استقرار منطقة البحر الأحمر، من خلال العمل على إعادة صياغة المعادلات الأمنية بما يتوافق مع التهديدات التقليدية وغير التقليدية، بجانب التوسع في الاستفادة من التطور التكنولوجي في المجال البحري.
This chapter delves into the complexities of terrorism, focusing on the recruitment strategies and power projection of Al-Shabaab. It explores the multifaceted dynamics behind Al-Shabaab’s recruitment, examining how the group exploits socio-economic grievances, religious beliefs, and clan dynamics to attract recruits. The implications of recruitment for Al-Shabaab’s power projection are analyzed, highlighting its territorial control and ability to impose extremist ideologies. Additionally, the effectiveness of the Somali government’s counterterrorism efforts is considered in light of the difficulties presented by scarce resources, unstable political conditions, and the influence of clan dynamics. The chapter underscores the need for comprehensive approaches encompassing military interventions, socio-economic development, good governance, and community resilience to counter Al-Shabaab’s influence effectively. By providing nuanced insights, this chapter contributes to understanding the intricate dynamics of Al-Shabaab’s recruitment strategies. It informs policymakers and researchers in their efforts to combat terrorism and foster stability in the Horn of Africa.
Staying Somalia in a state of instability is a serious threat for the security of the international community, including countries and institutions of the West. At the modern period, its key element is the activity of the international terrorist structure Al Shabab. Germany and its EU partners face with the problem of the revitalization of Al Shabab terrorists. The methodological basis of the paper is the theories of armed conflicts resolution and the con-struction of armed forces (at the example of the Somalian national army). The key research methods are the event-analyses and the comparative analyses. The aim of the article is the research of the German approach to resolving the “Somali problem”. In this regard, the first task is to study the previous experience of Germany in counteracting with in-stability in Somalia in the 1990-s and since the late 2000-s. (in the framework of counteracting piracy). The second task, on the solution of which is paid the main attention in the article, is the research of complex usage by Germany of its political, military and economic tools for the weakening of Al Shabab. The article studies German participation in the EU mission for the reform of the security sector of Somali. At this base, the article concludes about the military participation of Germany in the struggle with the international terrorism. The article covers the course, problems and prospects of using the national army of Somalia for fighting against Al-Shabab in the south, as well as separatist currents in the northern part of the country. The paper researches German promotion in restoring the structures of power in the country and the process of federalization as the key direction of the stabilization in Somalia. The article covers the features of German economic participation in the decision of deep internal Somali problems, which mainly led to the appearance and strengthening of the Al Shabab positions. The research paper concludes about the measures, which are needed from Germany for the full de-feat of Al Shabab and future minimization of the terrorist threat from the Horn of Africa states for Ger-many and the EU.
'Imagined Communities' examines the creation & function of the 'imagined communities' of nationality & the way these communities were in part created by the growth of the nation-state, the interaction between capitalism & printing & the birth of vernacular languages in early modern Europe.
The clash of inter- and sub-clans over natural resources in the region is a major challenge for the government of Somalia, Africa, headed by president Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. The clan structure in Somalia was deconstructed Britain and Italy during colonization and was decentralized to form a centralized government. An attempt at the unification of the two European-controlled territories within Somalia following its independence has been a major reason for the clash between the largest clans. Tribal clans and warlords have aspired to gain power in the region but have failed because of a disregard for centralized governments and an artificial subdivision of power within the governments. The agreement for the establishment of a national government has been brokered by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and, in particular, Kenya. The peace talks, which began in 2002, have failed as no reconciliation has been achieved between warring factions in Somalia. A big mistake made by the government was omitting a provision to disarm warlords. The people of Somalia now need to integrate members of civil society and communicate on basic humanitarian issues through clan conferences, in order to put an end to the ravaging violence and poverty.
Strategically located in the horn of Africa, for the past few decades Somalia's place in the international spotlight has been secured by its complete political and economic failure as a state. The colonisation of this East African mono-ethnic nation by various European nations, and its subsequent devolution into a multitude of mini-fiefdoms, led to attempts to reunite the greater Somali nation after independence was granted. However, although Somalia had one ethnic group and religion, its internal politics was complicated by clan factions. Understanding the clan dynamics is central to understanding the difficulty of ruling Somalia. Siad Barre's 21-year dictatorship culminated in civil war; the various clans could not achieve consensus on a post-Barre political order. During its 20 years as a leading example of state failure, the international response to Somalia varied from direct military intervention and humanitarian assistance to simply no acknowledgement of the plight of the Somalis. In many cases, the international response addressed the symptoms of failure – treating famine, piracy or the terrorist threat – rather than the root causes of failure.
The scope of this study is to demonstrate that the failed state scheme of Somalia has not been and is not a safe haven for the al-Qaeda, an issue that has been already displayed in Ken Menkhaus's excellent study (2004). Within this context, the article will consider the Somali Islamist political landscape in contrast and in relation to the current situation in Yemen, and thus, it aims to support the premise that weak states, such as Yemen, rather than “collapsed” states, can be incubators of international terrorism. In addition, while studying the interactions between Somalia and Yemen, we will attempt to answer some other important questions arising from this relationship: (1) does the emergence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Shabaab have potential convergence; and (2) why is piracy a cross-border phenomenon and how is it connected to radical Islamism?
Somalia and Somaliland are both inhabited basically by Somaliswith small Oromo minorities in both, and a large Swahili minority in the latter. Both have multiple clans, sub-clans, lineage and blood groups and in both Islam is central to social values. Somalia had no history of a stable state before Italian rule but Somaliland did (Haud-Hargeisa-Berbera-Arabia trade axis centred). The United Republic of Somalia (rejected in the referendum by Somaliland) passed from political instability to two decades of Said Barre's increasingly centralised and repressive dictatorship which waged war against the North-west (Somaliland) and North-east (Bosaso) as well as against Ethiopia. The dictatorship collapsed in 1991 basically because of the 1987-91 Somaliland Liberation war. The economies of Somalia/Somaliland turn on pastoral production, commerce and remittances. These have recovered in part in Somalia and fully in Somaliland. However, only a fraction of the Barre regimes dissolution of service delivery and user friendly law and order capicity has been made good in Somaliland and virtually more in Somalia. USA/UN intervention did limit starvation and-for a time-open violence. That was at a high cost in finances, in the reputation of peacekeeping and to Somalis. UNOSOM answered political and civil questions before having any real grasp of civil, political and economic realities. The price was to entrench warlords and militias and to marginalise 'peacelords' (elders and merchants). Somaliland, never occupied by UNOSOM, has engaged in a series of large, long peace conferences of elders from all parts of its territory leading to a real if fragile national/territorial identity with personal security in most areas, an elected president and two house parliament, a user friendly police force and court system and the beginnings of a restored professional civil service.
Somali piracy has been poorly understood and consequently the international strategy designed to curtail it has not worked. Because of this mismatch some of the pirates have extended their exploits deep into the Indian Ocean. This article provides an analysis which shows that several pirate types driven by different logics have operated along the Somali coast and all but one of these pirates emerged as a result of the Somali state's disintegration. In contrast, pirates in other Third World regions operate under established states. Therefore, we argue that piracy is not only a matter of robbery on the high seas, but that political economy and conflict over resources have been fundamental to the rise of piracy in the region. The article offers a more refined assessment of the piracy in the region, as well as a critical appraisal of the moral economy of Somali pirates which yields an alternative method of understanding and curbing the problem.
This paper interprets the regional (geo-cultural/geo-Islamic) pressures interacting with localized Somaliland expressions of pastoral Sufi Islam and Wahhabi “Gulf Islam”, and the rise of political Islam in North-East Africa. It also examines the geo-politics of the “war on terror” and the global Islamic civil war. Somaliland's culture of Islamic education, and the prognosis on Islam and stability in Somaliland, and how an Islamist ascendancy might affect Somaliland are reviewed to support this analysis. The Somaliland politics of religion dovetail into what has become the ultimate “bottom-line” of Somaliland: the achievement of international diplomatic recognition—or, at the very least, a workable contingent status that will facilitate the normalization of Somaliland's international relations.
Somalia has been without a government for the past thirteen years. After the ousting of Siyaad Barre in 1991 observers were left with the question why a promising, even democratic, society sharing the same ethnicity, one religion, a common language and a predominantly pastoral culture was overtaken by a devastating civil war. Analysts stressed the significance of kinship and clan politics in the maintenance of sustained conflict. They argued that Somalia's state collapse must be placed in a historical context taking into consideration the cultural heritage of Somali society and the legacy of the colonial past. The purpose of the article is twofold: first, it seeks to explore an alternative explanation for the breakdown of Barre's dictatorial regime; and second, to analyse the social consequences of political and economic exclusion that followed the state collapse. The paper argues that Somalia's state failure can be explained by the unjust distribution of new sources of wealth in postcolonial Somalia. This modernisation process was accompanied by violent clashes and continued insecurity. The breakdown of the former regime did not create a representative government. Instead, faction leaders fought for political supremacy at the cost of the lives of thousands of civilians. In the absence of a functioning government that could guarantee security and protection, clan loyalties gained importance. Clan affiliation became a condition of being spared from violence. Unjust distribution of pockets of wealth, such as the high‐potential agricultural land in the riverine areas in southern Somalia, led to localised clashes. It will be argued that horizontal inequalities, or inequalities between groups, are based on both material and imagined differences. Somali faction leaders use these differences instrumentally, to maintain and to exercise power. Irrespective of the existence of invisible and physical markers, it is important to understand what existing social boundaries mean to their participants. A localised clan conflict in Lower Shabelle between the Jido and the Jareer clan families illustrates the consequences of social and economic exclusion. Groups who felt excluded from economic and political life, such as the Jareer, took up arms. Violence became a means of being heard and taken seriously in the current Somali peace talks in Kenya.
The article discusses the use of private security contractors to support coastguard forces in the Somali substate entities of Puntland and Somaliland. Neither of these entities is sufficiently robust to raise and maintain an effective maritime security force without external assistance, hence they have had recourse to the private sector for training, logistical and operational support and high-level consultancy with respect to their coastguards. The article makes some general observations about the international private security industry and Somali politics in order to provide a context for the three case studies. The case studies, each of which covers the engagement of one security contractor in support of a coastguard, assess the roles played by the contractors, making particular reference to sustainability and influence on governance networks. The analysis establishes a matrix of security company typologies and potential roles and then uses this matrix to suggest which types of company might be best employed for which functions. The article has current pertinence, as two of the three case studies concern efforts by substate entities to hire private security to enhance anti-piracy capability.
Piracy and rising Islamist militancy have intensified US and European diplomatic interest in Somalia, while . African perceptions of the establishment of US AFRICOM and the growing likelihood that the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa in Djibouti would become a long-term American base, have posed a strategic communications challenge for the United States. A deteriorating humanitarian situation in drought-plagued Somalia, precipitated by the October 2009 US suspension of food aid over fears that aid workers were diverting it to terrorists, and the prospect of unmanageable numbers of Somali refugees fleeing over comparatively stable Kenya's border, have increased pressure on Washington to revise US policy. These factors could lead to a new approach, consonant with the evolving emphasis on nuanced counter-insurgency, involving the application of soft power, such as development aid, with less scrutiny on governance. Robust, high-profile international diplomatic or military initiatives in Somalia, however, are unlikely. Near-term developments in Somalia will probably follow the depressingly familiar pattern whereby the Transitional Federal Government and Islamist militias maintain an uneasy military stalemate, with neither building the political infrastructure and good will required to tip the balance decisively.
‘Somalia’ is often portrayed as the quintessential ungovernable, failed state – with pirates, terrorists and humanitarian crises as a consequence. This article tells how Somalis in Somaliland and Puntland today have realised a degree of successful governance in the Horn of Africa.
The lack of internal order in Somalia has left the country vulnerable to the rise of hard-line Islamist groups, most notably al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab purports to be committed to global jihadism, has self-professed connections to al-Qaeda, and of late, has proved able to capture and control territory. Consequently, al-Shabaab and other like-minded Somali radicals are viewed as a threat to the Somali Transitional Federal Government, to Somalia's neighbours, and to the broader international community, particularly the United States and other Western countries. However, it is argued here that al-Shabaab's particular rise to prominence is partly a factor of the policy follies of regional and international players in Somalia. Morever, despite the threat the organisation poses, al-Shabaab quite likely faces implosion.
The al-Qaeda-linked Somali insurgent group al-Shabaab has raised alarm in the United States. The proliferation of Somali piracy, too, has US foreign policymakers concerned. This open letter to ‘Uncle Sam’ makes a straightforward case: with the pirates, America should mete out collective punishment; with the terrorists, it should do nothing.
The consequences of insecurity in Somalia to the government of Kenya and its citizens is well documented: massive flows of refugees since the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991; cross-border violence including poaching, cattle-rustling, kidnappings, and trafficking of illegal goods; and, lately, threats of attacks and jihad from al-Shabaab, the terrorist group which is aligned with Osama bin Laden and, therefore, al-Qaeda. The lack of security and a viable government in Somalia continue to threaten the sovereignty and security of Kenya. As policymakers, military officials, and academics attempt to find solutions to the failed state of Somalia, another dimension of the problem (but also a potential avenue for useful exploration) warrants academic attention and insight – namely, examination of the ethnic Somali populations outside of Somalia and their influence on the politics (and lack thereof) within Somalia itself. This article offers an initial analysis of one subset of the Somali people outside Somalia, Kenyan Somalis.
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